THE 'RADICAL TRIP' OF THE CANADIAN UNION OF STUDENTS, 1963-69

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Introduction

Students have played a critical, if minor, role in significant political and social upheavals since at least the mid-19the century. In the revolutions which swept Europe in 1848, students flocked to the barricades in an attempt to overturn the last vestiges of feudalism. Several decades later, the students of Tsarist Russia were, until the emergence of a militant and revolutionary working-class, active subjects in a dramatic campaign of assassinations and bombings against the despotic government.[1] Between the two world wars, with the rise of fascism, the prevalence of socialist ideas, and titanic working-class mobilizations, students re-emerged as an active political force within broader social struggles.[2] However, the 1960s remain embedded in popular consciousness as the era of student radicalism and revolt.[3] Since then, students and their organizations have retained

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[1] The best short introduction to the history of student activism in the 19th century can be found in Mark Edelman Boren, *Student Resistance: a history of the unruly subject* (New York 2001), 27-56. On the role of students in the 1848 European revolutions, see John G. Gallagher, *The students of Paris and the Revolution of 1848* (London 1980); Priscilla Roberston, "Students on the Barricades: Germany and Austria, 1848" in Alexander DeConde, ed., *Student Activism: Town and Gown in Historical Perspective* (New York 1971), 59-71. On the Russian student radicals of the late 19th century, including those who turned to terrorism against the Tsarist state, see Daniel Brower, *Training the Nihilists: Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca, NY 1975); James C. McClelland, *Autocrats and academics, education and culture, and society in Tsarist Russia* (Chicago 1979); Samuel D. Kassow, *Students, professors, and the state in Tsarist Russia* (Berkeley 1989). For the first coordinated student political movement in North America during this century, see Steven J. Novak, *The rights of youth: American colleges and student revolt, 1798-1815* (Cambridge, MA 1977).

[2] In the United States during the 1930s, student activism was dominated by anti-fascist, pacifist and socialist ideas. The most detailed account can be found in Robert Cohen, *When the old left was young: student radicals and America's first mass student movement, 1929-1941* (New York 1993). Other useful but less rigorously researched accounts of the 1930s American student movement can be found in Ralph Brax, *The first student movement: student activism in the United States during the 1930s* (Port Washington, NY 1981) and Eileen Eagan, *Class, culture, and the classroom: the student peace movement of the 1930s* (Philadelphia 1981). Not all student movements were left-wing. For studies of European student fascism see Geoffrey, J. Giles, *Students and national socialism in Germany* (Princeton, NJ 1985); Michael Stephen Steinberg, *Sabers and Brown Shirts: The German Students' Path to National Socialism, 1918-1935* (Chicago 1977) and Tracy H. Koon, *Believe, Obey, Fight: Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922-1943* (Chapel Hill, NC 1985).

[3] For the international character of the 1960s student revolt, see Boren, *Student Resistance*, 122-183; Chris Harman, *The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After* (London 1988). For a survey of the 1968 events, see Mark Kurlansky, *1968: The Year That Rocked the World* (New York 2004). With significant reference to

a role in numerous countries as a force for social change. Although paling in comparison to the upheavals of the 1960s, or the recent student movements in France and Greece, Canadian students and their organizations have been at the forefront of campaigns for social change and social justice, particularly in an era of general working-class defeat.[4]

The Early Years of the Canadian Student Movement

Although Canadian students had always engaged in varying forms of political activity, [5] it was during the inter-war period that significant numbers of students were politicized and radicalized. In 1926, a handful of Canadian students launched the National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS), which linked students together through their student councils. This provided space for other student groups, such as the Student Christian Movement, Canadian Youth Congress and Canadian Student Assembly, to organize and coordinate the political activity of students in the 1930s. A significant

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international events, but with a focus on the United States, see Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York 1987).

[4] While there are no major accounts of the recent student mobilizations in France and Greece which do not emerge from a partisan socialist perspective, the following provide a sufficient introduction to the movements. See Nikos Loudos, "Greece: waves from the student struggle," *International Socialism* 115 (Summer 2007) <http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=331issue=115> (July 27 2009); Annick Coupé and Marie Perrin, "France's extraordinary movement," *International Socialism* 111 (Summer 2006) < http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=213&issue=111> (July 27 2009). Quebec's student movement remains the most active in Canada, and arguably all of North America. The 2005 Quebec student strike was the largest in its history, involving over 200,000 students, and successfully overturned Premier Charest's attempt to replace $103 million in grants with the equivalent in loans. In contrast, the Quebec labour movement balked at striking against Charest's labour reforms. Again, accounts are limited to left-wing publications. See Jose Bazin, "A battle won, a struggle that must continue," *International Viewpoint* IV/367 (May 2005) < http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article780> (July 27 2009).

[5] Scattered accounts of political activity on Ontario university campuses prior to 1951 can be found in A.B. McKillop, *Matters of mind: the university in Ontario, 1791-1951* (Toronto 1994). For a more focused look by McKillop at undergraduate student life in Ontario in the decades prior to the First World War, see "Marching as to war: Elements of Ontario Undergraduate Culture 1880-1914" in Paul Axelrod and John G. Reid, eds., *Youth, University, and Canadian Society: Essays in the Social History of Higher Education* (Montreal 1989), 75-93. In the same collection, Diana Pedersen provides an important starting point for the much-neglected history of female students and their role in campus politics. See Diana Pedersen ""The Call to Service": The YWCA and the Canadian College Woman, 1886-1920" in Axelrod and Reid, eds., *Youth, University, and Canadian Society* (Montreal 1989), 187-215.

minority of students were drawn to these groups because of their expressed opposition to fascism and militarism and their pioneering efforts to secure financial assistance for university students.[6] During this decade, however, the university student population in Canada was quite small, never more than 40,000.

Following the war, Canadian student leaders, through NFCUS, were engaged with efforts to foster international student cooperation. These efforts failed as NFCUS sided with the non-Communist student organizations following the International Union of Students' takeover by Communists students between 1947 and 1948.[7] Beyond this, there was little engagement with political issues by English Canadian students. However, in Quebec, a handful of students began looking to France and its student union which had developed the idea of "student syndicalism."

Canada's student unions in the 1960s

Though never capturing the imagination of the international student movement like the Berkeley Free Speech Movement of 1964, the 1965 civil rights march in Selma, or "May '68" in France, Quebec's student movement would nevertheless have an important effect on the direction of English Canadian student politics in the 1960s. Through the 1950s, in the "prelude" to the Quiet Revolution, Quebec's student leaders, mainly at the Université

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[6] The most important contribution to the understanding of Canadian university student life in the 1930s, including student politics, is Paul Axelrod's *Making a Middle Class: Student Life in English Canada during the Thirties* (Montreal 1990). For a survey on the 1930s student movement, with a focus on the Canadian Student Assembly, see Paul Axelrod, "The Student Movement of the 1930s," in Paul Axelrod and John G. Reid, eds., *Youth, University, and Canadian Society* (Montreal 1989), 216-246. On the Student Christian Movement, see Ernest A. Dale *Twenty-one years a-building: a short account of the Student Christian Movement of Canada, 1920-1941* (Toronto 1941) and Margaret Eileen Beattie, *A brief history of the Student Christian Movement, 1921-1974* (Toronto 1975). The Communist-led Canadian Youth Congress, which helped the Student Christian Movement form the Canadian Student Assembly, is subject to a new study. See Ruth Latta, *They Tried: the story of the Canadian Youth Congress* (Ottawa 2006).

[7] Nigel Roy Moses, "Canadian Student Movements on the Cold War Battlefield 1944-1954," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 39/78 (November 2006), 363-403.

de Montréal, were gravitating towards the emerging opposition to the conservative Catholic regime of Maurice Duplessis and l'Union Nationale. Between the first Quebec student strike of 1958 and the early years of the Lesage Liberals, "student syndicalism" became the hegemonic idea among Quebec's francophone student activists. Drawing upon the philosophy of France's "syndicalist" student union, l'Union Nationale des Étudiants de France, Quebec's student movement adapted the philosophy to inform, justify and define their role as students within the increasingly loud Quiet Revolution.[8]

The English Canadian students who dominated the leadership of NFCUS were often unwilling and at times incapable of satisfying the needs of their francophone membership in Quebec. Throughout the 1950s NFCUS remained rigidly focused on seeking education reforms, notably bursaries, from the federal government as opposed to pressuring provincial governments which had constitutional jurisdiction over education. In addition, NFCUS avoided any serious involvement in domestic or international political issues. The English Canadian students within NFCUS continued to clash with their politicized and provincially-oriented francophone counterparts until 1964, when Quebec's francophone student councils left to form their own student union. The crisis, which paralyzed NFCUS through the decade's early years, did foster a critical, reform-minded consciousness among a number of English Canadian student leaders. It also led NFCUS to change its name to the Canadian Union of Students.[9]

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[8] A detailed study of l'Université de Montréal's student leaders and their gravitation to syndicalist ideas and anti-Duplessis politics can be found in Nicole Neatby, *Carabins ou activistes; l'idealisme et la radicalisation de la pensée étudiante a l'Université de Montréal au temps du duplessisme* (Montreal 1999). Though neglecting the role of student councils altogether, a survey of the debates about educational reform in Quebec during the 1950s can be found in Michael Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberals vs. Neo-Nationalists, 1945-1960* (Montreal 1985), 150-182.

[9] While CUS is touched upon in broader studies of the 1960s student revolt, Robert Clift's thesis on CUS education policies is the only substantial history of the organization. Robert Fredrick Clift, "The Fullest

Shortly after the split in September 1964, a new crop of English Canadian student leaders was radicalized by the student revolt at Berkeley, the repression of civil rights marchers in Selma, and the escalation of the Vietnam War. In the wake of these events, a new CUS leadership was forged, a leadership which identified with the ideas of the New Left and sought to build an active student movement in English Canada. In the years that followed, CUS continued on its leftward trajectory, adopting a syndicalist manifesto, the *Declaration of the Canadian Student*, calling for the abolition of tuition fees, the democratization of post-secondary education, and creating educational programs on South Africa and Vietnam.

As CUS moved to the left, shedding its reputation as an inactive, service-oriented student union, English Canada's main New Left organization, the Student Union for Peace Action, entered into terminal decline.[10] Through 1966 and 1967, a number of

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Development of Human Potential: The Canadian Union of Students, 1963-1969," MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 2002.

[10] On the Student Union for Peace Action, and its predecessor, the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, see Myrna Kostash, *Long Way From Home: The story of the Sixties generation in Canada* (Toronto 1980), 3-30; Doug Owram, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation* (Toronto 1996), 218-226; Bryan Palmer, *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto 2009), 256-278. Each study situates the CUCND/SUPA in a broader context of the student revolt and the interrelated rise of the New Left. However, there exist important differences relevant to this study, notably the political evolution of SUPA. Palmer and Kostash interpret SUPA's turn to Marxism as part of an attempt to grapple with SUPA's failures, the intervention of the Company of Young Canadians in community projects, and SUPA's flirtations with the apolitical counterculture. Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 21-28; Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 274-284. Owram sees the countercultural component of SUPA as one of its strengths, placing SUPA and the New Left within a broader youth movement, which he describes as the "real force of the decade." SUPA was certainly part of a broader youth movement and linked to the counterculture, but in confronting new political problems in new contexts, SUPA and the New Left evolved beyond its eclectic non-Marxist origins which Owram statically defines as the New Left. See Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, 226-232. The Canadian New Left is also discussed in Cyril Levitt, *Children of Privilege: Student Revolt in the Sixties: A Study of Student Movements in Canada, the United States, and West Germany* (Toronto 1984). Levitt's analysis seeks to define the Canadian student revolt, along with the American and West German, as one of a privileged, middle-class student population rebelling against a system which has dashed its hopes of social mobility in the context of the expansion of the university system. In doing so, Levitt rejects the authenticity of student radicalism, describing its anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism as a form of political appropriation, adopting the struggles of others as their own. In contrast, this study operates on the understanding that major international political events were central to the emergence of the New Left in the early 1960s and its continued radicalization in the years following.

SUPA activists returned to campus politics, abandoning their earlier efforts on organizing poor and marginalized communities as the state-funded Company of Young Canadians moved in.[11] In doing so, CUS experienced an influx of ex-SUPA activists through 1966 and 1967. Bringing with them a heterogeneous but increasingly sophisticated set of Marxist-influenced ideas, and their oratorical and organizing skills, the ex-SUPA activists entered the CUS leadership just as the events of 1968 were unfolding. The Tet Offensive, the French general strike of May-June 1968, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the repression of protesters at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, compelled CUS' radical leadership to adopt a series of radical resolutions informed by the politics of anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, and women's liberation. The backlash was immediate, with a number of student councils withdrawing. Through the years 1968-69, CUS dwindled from its 1968 peak of 150,000 students and 40 student councils to 90,000 members at 17 student councils. Although the CUS leadership was not responsible for the series of sit-ins, protests and occupations that took place on Canadian campuses in late 1968 and early 1969, CUS was a convenient and easy target for a galvanized student right. Despite efforts in the summer of 1969 to rebuild CUS along politically moderate lines, referendum defeats in late 1969 forced the leadership to dissolve the union.

Student Syndicalism

The political direction of the Canadian Union of Students was influenced by both the American and Quebec student movements. Crucially, the latter student movement introduced English Canadian students to the concept of "student syndicalism," itself a

[11] On the Company of Young Canadians, see Margaret Daly, *The Revolution Game: The Short, Unhappy Life of the Company of Young Canadians* (Toronto 1970); Ian Hamilton, *The Children's Crusade: the story of the Company of Young Canadians* (Toronto 1970).

conscious adaptation of the *Charte de Grenoble*, the post-war manifesto drawn up by French students immediately following the Second World War.[12] In France and English Canada, the adoption of syndicalism came to define the rejection of apolitical student unions, whether UNEF in France or NFCUS in Canada. Once it became apparent to English Canadian student leaders in 1964 and 1965 that students were indeed capable of exercising an influential role in political events, the student syndicalism of Quebec's students became much more appealing. However, English Canadian student syndicalism remained muted in comparison. Quebec's student syndicalism was intimately tied up in the Quiet Revolution and the politically diverse nationalist sentiment affiliated to the equally diverse anti-Duplessis movement. It also had a strong international orientation, and drew inspiration from the liberation struggle in Algeria during which UNEF was one of the few French organizations supporting the Algerians.[13] The student syndicalism informing the foundation of l'Union Générale des Étudiants de Québec in late 1964, was bound up in the project of modernizing and secularizing Quebec. Students were understood as "young intellectual workers" occupying, at least in early conceptions, a contradictory role of both an ally to the Quebecois working-class but also an ally to the Quebecois elite which sought to shed the social, economic and political fetters of Duplessism.

No such national project informed the English Canadian conception of student syndicalism, although a growing awareness by CUS leaders of the influence of American economic and political power in Canada would develop. English Canadian student

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[12] On the origins of student syndicalism in France and UNEF, see A. Belden Fields, *Student Politics in France: A Study of the Union Nationale des Étudiants de France* (New York 1970).

[13] On the internationalism of UGEQ, see Jean Lamarre, ""Au service des étudiants et de la nation" L'internationalisation de l'Union générale des étudiants du Québec (1964-1969)" *Bulletin d'Histoire Politique* 16/2 (hiver 2008), 53-73.

syndicalism was oriented primarily to educational reform and international political affairs. It posed no relationship with organized labour, nor did it presume that students would occupy an important technocratic role in society. It thus served as a conscious rejection of the union's history of political disengagement, and a justification for the policies of universal accessibility and democratized education. It also justified CUS' efforts at educating the membership on important international political issues, mainly the war in Vietnam.

English Canadian student syndicalism had important differences with the student syndicalism adopted by the Students for a Democratic Society. In 1966, Carl Davidson initiated a "return to the campus" within SDS by writing an influential document calling for SDS to practice "student syndicalism." This entailed the creation of "Free Student Unions" to build up effective opposition on the campuses capable of displacing ineffective student governments, and exposing the complicity of the "knowledge factory" in reproducing a social system responsible for "Watts, Mississippi, and Vietnam."[14]

What Davidson proposed was more of a program, defined as student syndicalism, than a philosophy as expressed in the *Declaration of the Canadian Student*. Davidson's student syndicalism did have an impact on CUS mainly through the arrival of former SUPA activists in 1967, many of whom would have read Davidson's document through New Left publications, such as the SUPA-affiliated journal, *Our Generation*. While CUS did not adopt Davidson's idea of forming "Free Student Unions," a transition in 1967 was made by CUS leaders from "student syndicalism" to "student power," a term popularized

[14] Carl Davidson, "Toward a Student Syndicalist Movement, or University Reform Revisited," *Our Generation* 5/1 (May 1967), 103-112. For the impact of Davidson's arguments within SDS, see Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York 1973), 290-297.

from a slogan during the December 1966 Berkeley student strike.[15] Student syndicalism in English Canada, therefore, did evolve from its original and politically timid conception, but did so with a new name. Student power expanded upon the earlier idea of student syndicalism, but posed students as radical agents of social change with definite political interests and, in the Canadian context, opposing American imperialism, whether economic or military. The CUS leadership thus saw "student power", like Davidson's syndicalism, as seeking to dismantle the "knowledge factory" and, in the Canadian context, to change a social system responsible for American ownership of Canadian industry, national and class inequalities, and Canadian complicity in the war in Vietnam.

Structure

The two major political transitions in CUS' history – the 1964-65 turn to student syndicalism, and the 1967-68 transition to a new leadership with the broader idea of student power – provide for the periodized structure of this study.

The first chapter provides a survey of NFCUS history up to and including the 1964 split. The emphasis of this research is focused on the mounting tensions and open conflict between English Canadian and Quebec's French Canadian members. The second chapter explores the impact of Berkeley, Selma and the anti-war movement on CUS and the growth of student syndicalism and the influence of the New Left upon CUS. The final chapter begins with exploring the effect of the influx of SUPA and other New Left activists into CUS in 1967, and the extent to which their ideas found continuity with CUS' political leftward trajectory. The remainder of the chapter explores how, during

[15] See Carl Davidson, "Campaigning on the Campus," in Robin Blackburn and Alexander Cockburn, eds., *Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action* (London 1969), 327.

1968, the new leadership facilitated CUS' open turn to anti-imperialism, inadvertently precipitating the decline and dissolution of Canada's largest student organization of dozens of student councils representing a substantial majority of English Canadian university students.

The focus of this study is on the leadership of CUS. This includes the elected secretariat and staff based primarily but not solely out of the union's Ottawa office. It draws upon the organization's archival material at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa and the William Ready Division of Research and Archives at McMaster University in Hamilton. There are important limitations to an approach which focuses upon the leadership of such a large organization. There are inherent difficulties in assessing the relationship with local student council leaderships and the political dynamics within them. However, a focus on the CUS leadership is a necessary starting point for an organization of this sort, with a full-time secretariat working out of Ottawa, and the general membership convening at the union's annual congress. With such an approach, it becomes possible to gauge the degree of political continuity and relative organizational stability among those making the day-to-day decisions for the organization as a whole, and exercise their influence at the annual congress. It allows for studying the individual CUS leaders radicalized and informed by the ferment and flux of oppositional political thought and practice during the decade. The focus on the leadership of CUS in fact reveals the general argument made through out this study: that the left-wing leadership of CUS was ultimately unsuccessful in reconciling their New Left politics with their roles as leaders in a representative organization which did not have a large enough base of support.

Chapter One: The Origins of the Canadian Union of Students

The Canadian Union of Students had its start in 1926 as the National Federation of Canadian University Students. With a few exceptions before the late 1950s, the federation deviated little from its apolitical roots, focusing most of its efforts on organizing debates, providing discounted travel to students and managing student exchanges.[1] The only political sentiment expressed at its founding conference in Montreal was the desire to "promote national unity" and, in the decade following the devastating war in Europe, to develop international cooperation and harmony.[2] In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, NFCUS was pulled into the emerging Cold War in the battle for control of the International Union of Students and the establishment of the rival and far less political International Student Conference, an organization covertly funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.[3] This debate, however, did not stir the passions of most English Canadian students, although it did have an

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[1] See Paul Axelrod, "The Student Movement of the 1930s." in Paul Axelrod and John G. Reid, eds., *Youth, University and Canadian Society: Essays in the Social History of Higher Education* (Montreal 1989), 216-217.

[2] Quoted in Axelrod, "The Student Movement of the 1930s," 217.

[3] On NFCUS' navigation of the IUS and ISC debates, see Nigel Roy Moses, "Canadian Student Movements on the Cold War Battlefield 1944-1954," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 39/78 (November 2006), 363-403. Work on the Soviet takeover of the IUS and the American-led formation of the rival ISC includes Gert van Maanen, *The international student movement. History and background* (The Hague 1967). Philip Altbach's *The student internationals* (Metuchen, NY 1973) provides more reflection on the collapse of the International Student Conference following public revelations of its CIA funding in early 1967. For a more contemporary and exhaustively researched account, upon which Moses relies heavily, see Joël Kotek, *Students and the cold war*, Tr. Ralph Blumenau (New York 1996). Unlike Altbach, Kotek's account suffers from a simplistic set of anti-Communist politics. See vii-viii. Among the many problematic statements and conclusions relevant to this study, Kotek (89-91) dismisses the new syndicalist leadership of the French student union, l'Union Nationale des Étudiants de France, as political "neophytes" despite acknowledging their direct role in the French Resistance. Most importantly, he downplays the significance of the CIA's financial backing, however hands-off, of the ISC, and the significance of this revelation in 1967 amidst the escalation of the Vietnam War. See 207-209, 220.

impact on a number of Quebec's student activists.[4] As a result, NFCUS was neither a hub of political activism nor an intellectual milieu fostering research and analysis of a political nature. In the early 1950s, the federation did make its first, cautious forays into domestic politics, beginning with a brief pertaining to post-secondary education financial aid for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences.[5] Later in the decade, the French suppression of the Front de Libération National in Algeria and the Soviet invasion of Hungary motivated sufficient concern among the NFCUS leadership for international political matters to find their way into the federation's annual congress resolutions.[6] It was only in the early 1960s, when NFCUS became politicized by international political events, and with the post-war social transformation of Quebec, that questions of French-English relations within the federation became highly contentious.

1926-1960: The two nations in NFCUS

Canadian students radicalized by economic stagnation, political polarization and the rise of fascism in Italy, Germany and Spain during the 1930s simply bypassed NFCUS altogether. In the latter years of the decade, NFCUS found itself in competition with the newly formed Canadian Student Assembly. Developing out of the efforts of the Student Christian Movement, the CSA differed from NFCUS in its focus on individual student

[4] For the impact of the Soviet-led IUS on Quebec's student leaders see Nicole Neatby, *Carabins ou activistes; l'idealisme et la radicalisation de la pensée étudiante a l'Université de Montréal au temps du duplessisme* (Montreal 1999), 65-80.
[5] William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections, McMaster University (hereafter WRA) Archives of the National Federation of Canadian University Students/Canadian Union of Students (hereafter ACUS), Box 88, Canadian Union of Students "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism" (September 14 1965), 12-13.
[6] WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "1958 Congress," 15.

membership as opposed to student association membership.[7] It was explicitly political, supporting French-English unity, opposing militarism and agitating for increased accessibility to higher education.

During its brief existence, the CSA challenged NFCUS as the representative organization of Canadian student interests. While NFCUS focused its efforts on arranging discounts for student travel, international student exchanges and a large number of debating competitions, the CSA carried out a well-orchestrated campaign which succeeded in securing $225,000 in bursaries from the federal government under the guise of the Dominion-Provincial Youth Training Plan.[8] Part of this effort included the first attempts to publicize the financial limitations imposed upon young people seeking a university education.

Having only formed in January 1938, the CSA held its last congress in Ste. Anne de Bellevue in Quebec in December 1939. At the congress, a number of English Canadian students came to the support of French Canadian students who voted overwhelmingly to help pass a motion opposing conscription. The dissenting minority, almost entirely English Canadian, walked out in protest. A follow-up questionnaire on conscription organized by the remnants of the CSA found little support in English Canada with many student associations refusing to even distribute it. The jingoistic political climate, whether a majority sentiment or not, effectively silenced the anti-conscription opposition on the English Canadian campuses. This included a "riot" at McGill where five hundred students dispersed a CSA rally. Within a month of the

[7] Axelrod, "The Student Movement of the 1930s," 229-231.
[8] Paul Axelrod, *Making a Middle Class: Student Life in English Canada during the Thirties* (Montreal 1990), 130-1.

December 1939 congress, the CSA was crippled, collapsing shortly thereafter.[9] One of its goals, fostering French-English cooperation, foundered on the question of war.

Following the failed conscription questionnaire of the CSA, the NFCUS secretariat organized its own survey on conscription. It did so without the consent or consultation of its member student councils, including, most critically, the student councils at l'Université Laval and l'Université de Montréal. The secretariat had earlier proven itself unable to effectively handle French-English relations within the organization. AGEUM, the student council at Université de Montréal, had already resigned once from NFCUS in 1937 when a monthly NFCUS news bulletin described the university as the "French section of McGill."[10]

The survey was perceived by the Laval and Montréal student councils as an attempt to gain a mandate to support conscription through the majority Anglophone membership. As a result, they rescinded their membership in protest. To add insult to injury, NFCUS carried out all official correspondence in English, forcing the two notices of withdrawal to be written in English. Rather than experience the dramatic collapse of the CSA, NFCUS wisely suspended operations for the duration of the war. [11]

After partially successful attempts in 1944 and 1945, NFCUS formally re-emerged in December 1946 in part due to the momentum behind the creation of the International Union of Students.[12] Maurice Sauvé, the NFCUS president in 1947, attended the 1947 IUS conference in Prague as well as the founding conference of the

[9] Axelrod, "The Student Movement of the 1930s," 229-231.
[10] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 4.
[11] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 5-6.
[12] Moses, "Canadian Student Movements on the Cold War Battlefield 1944-1954," 379-381.

American National Student Association.[13] Through his individual efforts, Sauvé also helped establish NFCUS committees on numerous campuses by touring the country, quickly bringing NFCUS membership to 65,000.[14]

Having secured the attendance of delegates from twenty-one universities for the September 1947 congress in Winnipeg, Sauvé won over the delegates to joining the IUS. However, Sauvé failed to win over the largely English Canadian congress delegates to a new philosophy of "student syndicalism." In his speech to the congress, Sauvé insisted that student unity could be constructed through active and energetic political engagement. He believed "the most pressing task" for NFCUS was to secure the rights of students in order to "create an atmosphere of confidence and friendship in stimulating efforts of intelligence and understanding."[15]

Sauvé's vision for NFCUS was inspired by the *Charte to Grenoble*, a political manifesto adopted by the Union Nationale des Étudiants Francaise (UNEF) in April 1946.[16] The charter codified a new philosophy and praxis of student politics, a politics resting upon the collectivist *mentalité* of French youth and younger adults born in the cauldron of the armed and left-leaning anti-Nazi resistance.[17] Students were, according to the charter, integral members of society, "young intellectual workers" not merely capable of, but in fact carrying the responsibility for participating in and leading social change. The *Charte de Grenoble* was no doubt infused with the near-hegemonic status of radical

[13] Moses, "Canadian Student Movements on the Cold War Battlefield 1944-1954," 384.
[14] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 6. Maurice Sauvé would become a member of the Liberal cabinet under Pearson.
[15] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 7.
[16] Republished in A. Belden Fields, *Student Politics in France: A Study of the Union Nationale des Étudiants de France* (New York 1970), 26-27.
[17] Fields, *Student Politics in France*, 24-25.

socialist and communist ideas among core working-class sectors and youth, whether expressed through the French Communist Party (PCF), the largest such party in Western Europe, or the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO), the more moderate socialist party. The general idea embodied in the charter became more popularly known as "student syndicalism."

If this new conception of the student in society gained no traction amongst English Canadian students, it soon took hold in Quebec as UNEF organized two successive student strikes in 1947 and 1948, securing a reduction in tuition fees, an increase in grants, and free and accessible healthcare for all students.[18] Sauvé and other French Canadian students had been in France during this period on exchange. They returned to Quebec recognizing that student syndicalism was more than relevant to a nation beginning to enter a sustained series of social, political and economic transformations.[19] In less than a decade, student syndicalism became the ideological motor driving increasing numbers of French Canadian students towards a powerful oppositional movement within Duplessis' Quebec.

For students in English Canada, the transformations in Quebec during the 1940s and 1950s were generally conceived as isolated events if they were acknowledged at all. In the post-war period, English Canadian students, particularly those versed in the details and history of the broader student body and history, perceived French Canadian students as influenced heavily by the Duplessis regime with its amalgam of rigid Catholicism, anti-communism and conservative nationalism. Such perceptions were not simply a

[18] Fields, *Student Politics in France*, 28; Jean-Pierre Worms, "The French Student Movement," in Alexander DeConde, ed., *Student Activism: Town and Gown in Historical Perspective* (New York 1971), 77-80.
[19] Neatby, *Carabins ou activists?* 160-162.

reading of the Union Nationale's policies misapplied to the French Canadian student body. Experiences from the 1930s had confirmed such ideas. The incident which cemented this view took place in 1936 at McGill. When Montreal's City Hall refused to host three Spanish Republicans, they were invited by a campus group to the McGill Students' Society. An estimated 250 Université de Montréal students, chanting anti-communist and anti-Jewish slogans, threw rocks at the building and later attacked a McGill professor who was unassociated with the lecture. Capitalizing on the event, Quebec's Duplessis regime, in conjunction with the Catholic Church, organized a pro-Catholic, anti-communist demonstration of a hundred thousand in Montréal.[20]

It was this earlier political tradition that may have inculcated a degree of skepticism or even hostility towards French Canadian students in the 1940s within the affairs of NFCUS. Nevertheless, until the very early 1960s, English Canadian students engaged in NFCUS remained aloof from the developments in Quebec in spite of the interactions with the French Canadian membership at congresses and in international student affairs. Other problems also quickly resurfaced following the war. External and internal NFCUS correspondence, for example, was still conducted in English, a practice that persisted into the 1950s.[21].

In January 1950, NFCUS made its first significant foray into domestic political matters. The convening of the Massey Commission motivated the NFCUS secretariat to draft its first brief relating to federal education policy, calling upon the federal government to increase need-based grants. As with its conscription questionnaire in 1940, the federation's leadership avoided consulting member student councils. This aggravated

[20] Axelrod, "The Student Movement of the 1930s," 228;
[21] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 6.

students at l'Université de Montréal who believed that any federal aid would entail a secular Anglophone federal government trampling on Quebec's distinct culture. Students at Montréal and Laval criticized the NFCUS brief at the September 1950 congress but for the sake of organizational unity did not withdraw.[22] The episode, however, was the catalyst for Quebec's francophone student leaders committing themselves to defending the interests of all francophone students and developing a set of strategies and proposed reforms independent from that of NFCUS. Their reform efforts would, critically, bring them into conflict not only with the NFCUS leadership, but Quebec's Union Nationale government of Maurice Duplessis.[23]

By 1952, NFCUS had finally established a permanent national secretariat, a demand made by Quebec's francophone student councils several years earlier. That same year, syndicalism became firmly established at Université de Montréal with the influential *Quartier Latin,* AGEUM's official publication, endorsing the philosophy as a necessary strategic orientation for not only Quebec's students but for all Canadian students, including NFCUS.[24] Another demand from AGEUM, to raise NFCUS fees from fifty cents to a dollar per student, was rejected, prompting another cancellation of membership in protest. The following year, Laval and Sherbrooke, accompanied for the first time by McGill and Bishop's, boycotted the annual congress, confirming the opinion

[22] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 12-13.
[23] Nicole Neatby, "Student Leaders at the University of Montreal from 1950 to 1958: Beyond the "Carabin Persona," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 29/3 (Fall 1994), 26.
[24]WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 10.

of Quebec's student leaders, French and English, that education was, as stated in the British North America Act, strictly a provincial matter.[25]

Dissent within NFCUS eventually manifested itself in independent action. Led once more by AGEUM, Quebec's students presented a brief, backed by a mountain of data, to Quebec's politically conservative Tremblay Commission exploring constitutional problems.[26] Acknowledging student concerns, the commission recommended increasing provincial funding, only to be ignored by Duplessis. Rather than return to the NFCUS strategy of lobbying for federal funding, AGEUM student leaders came into increasing contact with organized labour and the liberal intelligentsia which supported educational reforms as part of a broader political project opposing Duplessis.[27] Resolving to press ahead with their demands, and following Duplessis' refusal to accept increased federal funding for education, the Presidents des Universités de Québec (PUQ), an ad hoc body of student council presidents resenting 21,000 students, organized a one-day student strike in 1958. PUQ's efforts won the support of the Canadian Labour Congress and the Confederation des travailleurs catholiques du Canada (CTCC).[28] The new alliances served to deepen the syndicalist convictions among a layer of Quebec student leaders and activists. The 1958 student strike marked, according to Nicole Neatby and Lysiane

[25] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 13-14.
[26] Neatby, *Carabins ou activistes?* 172-181. A detailed discussion of how the anti-Duplessis intellectuals around the influential journal *Cité Libre* approached the Tremblay Commission can be found in Michael Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberals vs. Neo-Nationalists, 1945-1960* (Montreal 1985), 150-182. Unfortunately, there is no discussion of the student response to the commission and the 1958 student strike.
[27] Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution*, 148.
[28] The CTCC would become secularized, renaming itself the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux in 1960. See Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution*, 132.

Gagnon, the emergence of Quebec's modern student movement and the entrenchment of student syndicalism as its political philosophy.[29]

As the Quebec student movement began to build momentum during the last years of the Duplessis era, NFCUS stubbornly and somewhat unwittingly resisted the first sustained overtures for structural reform emerging from Quebec's student leaders. However, the extent to which the latter formed a "united front" *within* NFCUS was never a *fait accompli* until the early 1960s. While AGEUM focused on student advocacy within Quebec, effectively operating independently of NFCUS, Laval's student leaders worked to reform NFCUS, proposing a new organizational structure to facilitate provincial campaigns based on constitutional responsibilities. Laval's proposal was rejected by the 1956 congress and the accompanying calls for Quebec's classical colleges to be allowed membership were ignored.[30]

AGEUM eventually rejoined NFCUS through negotiations with Laval's student council. When AGEUM attempted to launch a potential rival to NFCUS in 1957, the Association canadienne des universitaires de langue française (ACULF), Laval joined on the condition that Montréal return to NFCUS. ACULF collapsed shortly thereafter, but served as the precursor to the ad hoc body which organized the 1958 student strike. All the while, English Canadian students demanded the loyalty of Quebec students to the

[29] Lysiane Gagnon, "Bref historique due movement étudiant au Québec (1958-1971)," *Bulletin d'Histoire Politique* 16/2 (hiver 2008), 14-15; Neatby, *Carabins ou activistes?* 230-1. By the late 1960s, CSN, unlike the CLC, would endorse increasingly radical politics, developing into full-blown revolutionary syndicalism. See Black Rose Editorial Collective, *Quebec Labour: The Confederation of National Trade Unions Yesterday and Today* (Montreal 1972).

[30] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 16-17.

federation but did nothing in exchange to resolve the grievances of the Montréal, Laval and Sherbrooke student councils.[31]

Following the student strike and AGEUM's return to NFCUS in 1958, French-English tensions within NFCUS appeared to evaporate as student-government relations in Quebec improved, particularly after Duplessis' death in 1959, which more than symbolized the crumbling hegemony of the Catholic conservative ideology he embodied. As a result of the lessening of French-English tensions, the largely Anglophone NFCUS secretariat continued submitting briefs to the federal government between 1958 and 1960 with no opposition from the student councils in Quebec. Quebec students ignored the NFCUS secretariat, lobbying their own government as the "Quebec region of NFCUS."[32]

The interregnum merely postponed the resolution of the federation's internal conflicts over the focus of lobbying efforts, the related question of provincial-federal jurisdiction over education matters, and the differences between those advocating a service-oriented NFCUS and those seeking something more akin to UNEF.[33] The two years of peace ensured that once the dispute resumed, it would take on new, more, calamitous dimensions. Student syndicalism in Quebec and increasing French Canadian dissatisfaction with NFCUS did not subside. The syndicalist philosophy was deepened and propagated among wider numbers of students as English Canadian students remained relatively stagnant in their approach to student politics. Nevertheless, the agitation of

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[31] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 21.

[32] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 22.

[33] It is worth noting that UNEF did not maintain a consistently syndicalist set of politics. In the early 1950s, conservative-minded students regained control of UNEF. This changed with the French student left recapturing the leadership amidst growing opposition to the war in Algeria at the same time as Quebec's students were becoming part of the anti-Duplessis opposition. See Fields, *Student Politics in France*, 30-40; Worms, "The French Student Movement," 83-84.

French Canadian students during the previous decade as well as events in Algeria, Hungary and the American South, was slowly changing NFCUS into an advocacy organization. To the chagrin of Quebec's new syndicalists, this new form of advocacy was, in the realm of international affairs, limited to passing resolutions, and in terms of education questions, focused on the federal government and undertaken with minimal consultation of member councils.

Having abstained from the enormous political questions posed in the 1930s and refusing to entertain any of the ideas that animated Maurice Sauvé and subsequent Quebec student leaders, the English Canadian majority in NFCUS had come to see itself as something different, something new. NFCUS literature had become emphatic in stating that it was "not a service organization" but "the voice of Canadian university students on student matters of national significance."[34] This slow transformation led to the first substantial foray into the arena of international political affairs. Although contested by a number of delegations, the 1958 NFCUS congress passed a motion "recognizing that students are involved in the struggle for national independence" and calling for assistance "to student unions in colonial and dependent areas to move as rapidly as possible towards a goal of national independence, where it is the pre-requisite of full educational opportunity."[35] Events in Algeria informed the resolution, as well as subsequent statements that became less vague and more interventionist, taking sides in the post-war wave of decolonization by aligning with national student unions who found themselves at the forefront of liberation movements and imperialist repression. As mentioned, these tentative forays into international affairs remained strictly resolution-

[34] WRA, ACUS, Box 99, "The NFCUS – What it was, is and will be," (1958). Emphasis included in original.
[35] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "1958 Congress," 15.

based. The federation absented itself from any concrete expression of solidarity such as fundraising, speaking tours, seminars, and literature.[36]

Not coincidentally, the English Canadian leadership of NFCUS saw the question of colonialism as one existing beyond the borders of Canada. Conspicuous silence regarding the new developments in Quebec reigned, thus preventing any coherent understanding of the forces politicizing Quebec's student population and feeding the new syndicalist philosophy. The dismissive ambivalence towards Quebec was shattered in 1961, sending NFCUS into a prolonged, multi-year crisis culminating in the exodus of Quebec's francophone student unions, the reformation of NFCUS as the Canadian Union of Students and the formation of an independent Quebec student union, l'Union Générale des Étudiants du Québec.

1960-1962: Reform without reforms

As the 1960 NFCUS congress in Halifax came to an end, the delegations from Quebec returned home satisfied with their accomplishments. The classical colleges were finally allowed NFCUS membership and English Canadian efforts to introduce a new policy to lobby for federal aid were successfully amended by the Quebec contingent to require provincial approval and cooperation.[37] However, in early 1961, the NFCUS leadership announced a proposal for a National Bursary Plan again with no consultation of member student councils. The amendment requiring provincial consultation and approval was ignored as NFCUS president Bruce Rawson asserted that the federal government could

[36] The organization's first resolution calling for concrete political action came in 1964 over apartheid in South Africa. This was the same congress where Quebec's French Canadian student associations withdrew to form their own national union of students.
[37] WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "Resolutions 1960" (1960), 8, 12-13. WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 22.

provide aid to students "within the framework of the constitution."[38] Student leaders at l'Université de Montréal, Laval, Sherbrooke and Moncton spoke out against the plan, arguing, like they had in the early 1950s regarding the NFCUS brief to the Massey Commission, that education was a strictly provincial matter.[39] With that, the interregnum came to an abrupt end.

Quebec's student leaders responded to the new federal lobbying efforts with demands for reforms to NFCUS even greater than those presented in previous years. This included a complete overhaul of the NFCUS structure to guarantee a French Canadian presence on the secretariat and executive. As Quebec's francophone student leaders had done so before, reform efforts appealed to the British North America Act. A Sherbrooke resolution called for NFCUS to "observe the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial governments" in the field of education with presentations to the federal government requiring a two-thirds majority of each NFCUS region.[40] But Quebec's francophone students also began asserting, for the first time, recognition of their unique national position within Canada as a justification for the reforms. AGEUM, with the support of the McGill delegation, introduced a motion at the 1961 congress to strike a committee to "study the possibility of a modification of its [NFCUS] structures with relation to the bi-cultural character of Canada."[41] The resolution reflected how student syndicalism in Quebec was becoming increasingly intertwined with the new national consciousness, now unleashed by the election of the Lesage Liberals in 1960. The interventions at the congress did not yield immediate reforms but succeeded in

[38] Canadian University Press, "NFCUS asks for 10,000 Bursaries," *The Carleton*, February 17 1961, 6.
[39] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 23.
[40] NFCUS, *Resolutions 1961*, 20.
[41] National Federation of Canadian University Students, *Resolutions 1961* (Kingston 1961), 18.

establishing a commission on structures, chaired by Robert Carswell of McGill, to develop a proposal for overhauling the organization.

The Quebec Region of NFCUS, a section of the secretariat concerned with the implementation of NFCUS policy and programs in Quebec, could not ignore the new political situation in Quebec. However, Quebec's 1962 regional NFCUS seminar, "The Canadian Identity – A Positive Force," revealed the extent to which even the leadership of NFCUS in Quebec, which was by no means synonymous with those leading AGEUM, placed NFCUS in opposition to the emerging nationalist sentiment among Quebec's francophones. The seminar's guest of honour was former Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent. Another prominent guest was Walter Gordon. These choices were telling of the seminar's political angle. Gordon had already been the keynote speaker at NFCUS' national seminar hosted at UBC two years earlier, telling the audience of local and national NFCUS student leaders that "Canada must assert herself at once, politically and economically if she is to survive as an independent nation."[42] Quebec's regional president, Jean Marier, described the 1962 regional seminar as a success, allowing "an excellent opportunity" for participants to "express freely our opinions on separatism, the negative aspect of the theme, and on the Canadian identity, the positive aspect."[43] Gordon's ideas, representing the embryonic form of the new nationalism later in the decade, still held firmly to the centralism of the earlier nationalism.[44] In Quebec's new political landscape, NFCUS' leadership in Quebec was becoming decidedly federalist in contrast to the francophone student council leaders.

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[42] Fran Drury, "UBC hosts NFCUS," *The Carleton*, September 19 1960, 2.
[43] WRA, ACUS, Box 95, "NFCUS Executive Report, 1961-62," (1962), 5.
[44] For Gordon's views on Quebec nationalism and separatism, see Stephen Azzi, *Walter Gordon and the rise of Canadian nationalism* (Montreal 1999), 169-170.

The English Canadian majority of the NFCUS leadership did not engage Quebec's emerging nationalism and nascent separatist currents in any uniform or coordinated manner, though the pattern of neglect towards the concerns of Quebec students and their social environment revealed an unwillingness to consider a bi-national or "asymmetrical" student union. This was only reinforced further at the September 1962 NFCUS congress at Sherbrooke.

Returning a year later, the Commission on Structures, chaired by Carswell, presented its proposals to the congress. The "Carswell Commission" criticized the "attempts to impose an artificial and one-sided concept of 'unity' upon the minority group" while arguing that a united organization should not be scuttled because of "racial or national divisions."[45] The commission's findings were, according to a later interpretation of Anglophone student leaders, "almost completely ignored" at the 1962 congress.[46] Concessions were piecemeal with a new French Canadian position in the secretariat created to oversee French Canadian education matters, a concession which seemed to satisfy only the English Canadian delegations. Likewise, bilingualism became one of the "duties" of future NFCUS presidents, though one Université de Montréal delegate observed that bilingualism was only "a moral obligation" not an actual requirement.[47]

Having failed to implement significant structural reforms, an attempt was made to resolve differences through an ideological rapprochement. Intended to unite students in English and French Canada around a common perspective and common goals, a draft

[45] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 25.
[46] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 26.
[47] Fran Drury, "Bilingual Prexy for NFCUS," *The Carleton*, September 28 1962, 1.

charter, not unlike the *Charte de Grenoble*, was introduced. The effort was inspired in part by AGEUM adopting its own version of the *Charte de Grenoble*, the "Charte de l'étudiant universitaire" in 1961.[48] Like the Carswell Commission, the draft charter was to be voted on at the following 1963 congress for ratification after each NFCUS region had the opportunity to study and discuss it.[49] With the predictable exception of the Quebec region, the charter was rejected, thus preventing any resolution and debate on the charter from even reaching the 1963 Edmonton congress. An incidental and not immediately apparent outcome of the charter debate was the facilitation and growth of syndicalist ideas amongst Anglophone students at McGill, Sir George Williams and Loyola College. A number of Anglophone students in Quebec were already beginning to look to their francophone counterparts as more interesting, engaging and effective than the leaders of NFCUS. Daniel Coates, president of the Students' Undergraduate Society at Sir George Williams had already pulled his student council out of NFCUS in September 1961 over its "weak stands" on domestic and international political issues, a complaint usually made by AGEUM.[50] English Canadian students in Quebec were increasingly finding themselves with one foot in each of the diverging camps of the pan-Canadian student movement, a matter that would be resolved, at least temporarily, in the mid-1960s.[51]

The failure of the ideological rapprochement confirmed Coates' criticisms. It also highlighted the conservative approach to political advocacy amongst the English

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[48] Robert Fredrick Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential: The Canadian Union of Students, 1963-1969" MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 2002, 15; Pierre Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Québécois: son passé, ses revendications et ses luttes (1960-1983)* (St-Jean, QC 1984), 7.
[49] The four NFCUS regions were Ontario, Quebec, the Maritimes and Western Canada.
[50] "Sir George Quits NFCUS", *The Carleton*, September 18 1961, 1; Bill Neddow, "Local Body for SGW," *The Carleton*, September 26 1961, 1.
[51] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 27.

Canadian NFCUS leadership, which was still unwilling to stray from a rigid focus on federal lobbying. Whereas francophone students in Quebec were motivated to take on local and national matters within the confines of the provincial, an approach that was reinforced by its codified syndicalist ethic, and a variety of tactics ranging from respectable lobbying (submissions to the Tremblay Commission) to student strikes (the 1958 walkout), the NFCUS leadership would not go beyond producing lengthy if well-argued briefs on questions of financial aid. The English Canadian leadership of NFCUS may have briefly entertained the idea of student syndicalism, but it could not bring itself to embrace it. Through observing international student politics and adopting and adapting the ideas of UNEF and, to a lesser extent, the IUS, Quebec's student leaders had bridged the gap between theory and practice when they became proponents of student syndicalism.[52] As English Canadian students outside Quebec were becoming more aware of international political matters, they were still unwilling to draw lessons from the struggles of students in South Africa, Hungary and the American South, and adapt them to NFCUS' domestic political practice and relationship with its francophone membership. It was precisely this contradiction that would lay the basis for the first serious criticisms of NFCUS from within the secretariat, establishing the origins of student syndicalism among the English Canadian leadership.

The contradictions became most apparent in 1962. That year, the NFCUS congress passed an extensive and detailed resolution supporting student rights, universal

[52] For a much broader and deeper discussion of the connections between the international politics (primarily decolonization movements) the radicalization of Quebecois society through the 1960s, see Sean William Mills, "The Empire Within: Montreal, the Sixties, and the Forging of a Radical Imagination," PhD thesis, Queen's University, 2007. On the centrality of international student politics to the formation of l'Union Générale des Étudiants du Québec, see Jean Lamarre, ""Au service des étudiants et de la nation": L'internationalisation de l'Union générale des étudiants du Québec (1964-1969)," *Bulletin d'Histoire Politique* 16/2 (hiver 2008), 53-73.

access to education, academic freedom, and, perhaps most remarkably, to "guarantee to all students the right to an education developed in harmony with their own traditions, language and culture." It also called for Canadian students to support other students "in the struggle against all forms oppression" specifically colonialism, neo-colonialism (defined as "the survival, within the framework of formal political independence, of economic and cultural and military domination"), imperialism, totalitarianism, dictatorship, racism and social injustice. Students, it claimed, had the "right and responsibility to seek every means to ensure a just peace in the world" which included "the full achievement of national independence of oppressed peoples."[53] In passing this resolution, NFCUS' English Canadian majority could, for a few years at least, make little effort to simultaneously understand syndicalism in Quebec and reform the NFCUS structures, while espousing essentially syndicalist support for students in the Third World.

That this positioning did not translate into active support for the proposed syndicalist charter can be attributed to the over-riding concern of the perceived threat to NFCUS' structural integrity from the Quebec student councils, a perception that required at least an implicit rejection of syndicalism, a rejection couched in the centralist tenets of English Canadian nationalism and a lingering Cold War skepticism of "radicalism."[54]

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[53] WRA, ACUS, Box 83, "Resolutions 1962," (1962), 44-45.

[54] As late as 1964, Quebec's syndicalist students were being described as "extremists" by the Canadian Union of Students president. See Canadian University Press, "Three French U.'s leave CUS," *The Carleton*, September 18 1964, 1. Although NFCUS aligned itself with the CIA-funded International Student Conference and regularly rejected IUS membership at its congresses, it did participate regularly in the Soviet-led IUS congresses through the 1950s as an observer. See Moses, "Canadian Student Movements on the Cold War Battlefield 1944-1954," 397-398. Moses argues, with plenty of supporting evidence from the NFCUS archives at McMaster University, that NFCUS was never an overtly anti-Communist organization, even at the height of the post-war IUS-ISC battles from 1948-1952. Although some student council presidents did monitor campus activism for the RCMP in these years, Moses suggests

Such sentiments were likely reinforced by a bureaucratic inertia. The conflicting and diverging directions and agendas within NFCUS were driving a wedge between English Canadian and French Canadian students. They were also sparking dissent within the predominantly English Canadian secretariat. As post-war decolonization gained momentum in the late 1950s, with high profile engagements by students in large scale social upheavals, some violent, a number of NFCUS Vice-Presidents of International Affairs became increasingly irritated by the rhetorical nature of the resolutions.[55] Paul Becker, VP-International Affairs in 1961-2, was the first to be openly critical, describing NFCUS as having "failed to a great degree to engage the hearts and minds of its members in a confrontation of the major issues of our times." He added, with the substance and style foreshadowing the politicized urgency and internationalism yet to develop among English Canadian students,

> The students of the world, who stand in so many countries in the vanguard of their countries' social and political changes and transformations, deserve our honest support and commitment in the work they undertake in the pursuit of dignity and liberty for their peoples. If Canadian students continue to stay as aloof on the campus level as they have until the present, then the human progress and prosperity they risk is their own as well as that of others.[56]

Becker regarded the 1962 resolutions as not going far enough. His successor, Michael A. Meighen, reiterated this sentiment, but linked his concern for the inactivity on

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that student collaboration in such efforts was on behalf of university administrations seeking to identify potential opponents. See 375-376.

[55] The 1960-1 report from the NFCUS VP of International Affairs reveals the extent to which the position could transform the political consciousness of the individual in question. For a six month period from March to August 1961, three requests for financial support and twenty-five requests for "solidarity and moral support" were made via the International Student Conference from the affiliated student organizations of sixteen different countries. Support was requested for issues ranging from civil war, dictatorship and foreign invasion to persecution of student activists and solidarity with student protests and congresses. See WRA, ACUS, Box 95, "Report of the Vice President for International Affairs," (1961), 5-7.

[56] WRA, ACUS, Box 95, "Executive Report, 1961-62," (1962), 3.

international matters with the organizational crisis of NFCUS. In a document prepared for the 1963 congress, Meighen warned that unless NFCUS' "traditional concepts" and "sacred cows" were modified, the organization could "at best look forward to a period of inconclusive drifting, bringing with it the inherent risk of an eventual break-up."[57] Meighen best expressed what was starting to be seriously acknowledged among English Canadian student leaders. It was no coincidence that those constantly engaging and observing the international student movement were the members of the secretariat most open and vocal about internal reform. They saw it as absurd that Canadian students were faced with the fragmentation of their national student union when their organizational counterparts in Algeria and South Africa remained intact under violent repression. Stewart Goodings, the newly elected 1962 president, came to this conclusion as well and soon began to publicly state that NFCUS could only remain relevant to Canadian students if it focused more effort on human and student rights.[58] International political events, in Algeria, South Africa and Cuba, were politicizing English Canadian students just as the Quiet Revolution burst forth.[59] Amidst the NFCUS crisis, this politicization began to change the attitudes of a minority of English Canadian student leaders towards their Quebec counterparts.

1963-1964: The CUS compromise

The failures of structural reform and ideological rapprochement at the 1961 and 1962 congresses, and a delay in hiring the francophone member of the secretariat until the

[57] WRA, ACUS, Box 95, "Report of the Vice President for International Affairs, 1962-63," (1963), 1.
[58] "NFCUS Not Campus Clique," *The Carleton*, December 4 1962, 1.
[59] On the Algerian student movement during the war of independence, see David B. Ottaway, "Algeria," in Donald K. Emmerson, ed., *Students and Politics in Developing Nations* (New York 1967), 3-36.

summer of 1963, further served to alienate the Quebec student councils. In March of 1963, a provisional committee was struck by student representatives from Quebec's three francophone universities, Laval, Sherbrooke and Montréal, to organize the Union Générale des Étudiants de Québec (UGEQ).[60] According to Robert Clift, this decision emerged out of a successful organizing drive among the classical colleges to join NFCUS.[61] More importantly to UGEQ's provisional founding was the influence of *Quartier Latin*, AGEUM's newspaper, which had left the Canadian University Press and merged with the secularized remnants of the Jeunesse étudiante catholique, a diverse youth group, and other youth and student organizations, to form Presse étudiant nationale (PEN). PEN quickly adopted a nationalist position, having developed ties with Rassemblement pour l'Independence Nationale (RIN), the new leftist and sovereigntist party formed in 1960, and the closely related publication *Parti Pris*. Crucially, PEN was by no means hermetically sealed from the student councils, with many student leaders and activists finding themselves in both or relating to both formations.[62] However, the representative nature of student councils, as opposed to student newspapers and other youth groups, ensured that the new national consciousness of Quebec's students would manifest itself at a slower pace within the student councils, hence the provisional nature of UGEQ's formation. For NFCUS student leaders, the split within the Canadian University Press as well as the quick disintegration of the Québec New Democratic Party, was a cause of concern.[63] Still, UGEQ remained a tentative project. Although appearing

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[60] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 27.
[61] Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 16.
[62] Gagnon, "Bref historique du movement étudiant au Québec (1958-1971)," 14-18; Lamarre, ""Au service des étudiants et de la nation"," 54.
[63] WRA, ACUS, Box 99, "untitled NFCUS bulletin from September 1963," (September 1963). On the NDP's fortunes in Quebec during the 1960s, see Desmond Morton, *The New Democrats, 1961-1986: the*

to be independent of NFCUS, there was no explicit statement at its founding meeting as to whether or not it would compete with NFCUS in Quebec or co-exist with NFCUS as a provincial organization.[64]

UGEQ's founding provided a greater opening for NFCUS leaders to follow the lead of Becker, Meighen and Goodings. Unlike his predecessor, Ronald Sabourin, president of the Quebec region of NFCUS, attempted to ward off a split by advocating dramatic reforms, including the decentralization of NFCUS through the strengthening of the regional bodies. Regional presidents, he argued, should be supported by a full executive, ending their reliance on the direction and efforts of the national president who allowed "national problems" to over-ride regional and provincial concerns. Sabourin further echoed Meighen with regard to the organization's lack of direction and "common rally point." Belying a lack of faith in NFCUS to reform itself, Sabourin added that perhaps "Confederation or biculturalism will find a solution to this."[65] In the wake of UGEQ's provisional founding, the pan-Canadian debate about Quebec's role in Canada, as well as in NFCUS, took on new dimensions with the first wave of FLQ bombings over the summer of 1963.[66]

Despite the efforts of some NFCUS leaders to address the deepening divisions, the crisis worsened in the days before the October 1963 congress in Edmonton. Pierre Marois, AGEUM president and one of the six students at UGEQ's founding meeting, declared in mid-September that NFCUS had to become a genuine bi-national

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politics of change (Toronto 1986), 45-46; Norman Penner, *From Protest to Power: Social Democracy in Canada 1900-present* (Toronto 1992), 104-106;

[64] It was not until UGEQ's founding congress in November that the union's internal structure was decided.

[65] WRA, ACUS, Box 95, "Report from the Quebec Regional President," (1963), 1.

[66] Louis Fournier, *F.L.Q. The Anatomy of an Underground Movement* (Toronto 1984), 30-40.

organization with a joint leadership superstructure.[67] "If NFCUS refuses to comply with this ultimatum," he added, "it will sign its own death warrant." NFCUS President David Jenkins replied that such matters should be dealt with at the congress, adding that French Canadian rights were "always respected and defended in NFCUS."[68] The editorial in *The Carleton*, the student newspaper at Carleton University, typified the English Canadian response. Although English Canadian students were partly at fault for vacillating on "justified and long overdue" demands of French Canadian students, the newspaper stated the problem lay with "the political aspirations of a few extremist leaders" seeking "to gain favour with the Quebec government hierarchy."[69] An atypical response came from the University of British Columbia where the student council passed a number of resolutions which recognized Quebec as a distinct and separate nation within Canada.[70] As Marois' comments sent shockwaves through the politicized sections of the English Canadian and Quebec student population, the NFCUS secretariat made an attempt to rebuild a sense of solidarity, issuing an uncharacteristically militant statement in defense of student rights at l'Université de Montréal. An increase in cafeteria food prices had led AGEUM to organize a boycott which was countered by the administration with a threat of expulsion for the entire AGEUM executive. A mere five days after the Marois ultimatum, the NFCUS secretariat called upon the presidents of member associations to send telegrams of support directly to Marois.[71]

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[67] *Le Devoir*, September 19 1963, 5.
[68] Canadian University Press, "NFCUS Jeopardized," *The Carleton*, September 27 1963, 1.
[69] "Phynque," *The Carleton*, September 27 1963, 4.
[70] Canadian University Press, "U.B.C. Recognizes a Separate Quebec," *The Carleton*, September 27 1963, 9.
[71] WRA, ACUS, Box 99, "untitled CUS bulletin," (September 24 1963).

The debate and discussion about Quebec's Quiet Revolution, the FLQ, the troubles at l'Université de Montréal, and the prolonged crisis in NFCUS ensured that English Canadian delegates arrived at the 1963 congress with a far greater respect for the gravity of the task at hand. It was a significant change of attitude compared to previous national gatherings. The Quebec delegation, reinforced by new members from the classical colleges and an invigorated sense of syndicalist and nationalist unity, as well as apparent support from some NFCUS leaders, arrived with resolutions to completely overhaul the organization.

Like the previous congress, the first efforts were focused on structural reform. Marois' proposal for two independent organizations – one for English Canada, one for French Canada, with a united "superstructure" – was introduced. The original formulation was opposed by the English Canadian students, forcing a lengthy debate which was unable to arrive at a solution. Backed by the McGill delegation, AGEUM was eventually able to get "Resolution 25" passed, affirming the "cultural and ethnic duality of Canada" and equal rights for French Canadian students in NFCUS. Despite the failure of the Carswell Commission, the resolution called for a new commission on structures, this time comprising seven members, including the president as a non-voting chairman, and three members from each "cultural group."[72] The commission would solicit the opinions of member student councils and propose a new structure respecting "sovereign dualism" at the 1964 congress.[73] Six members were elected to the commission, including francophone representatives from Laval and Montréal as well as Jean Gobeil from the

[72] At this point, NFCUS was defining this strictly by one's first language, not geography. This would not be fully clarified until late 1966. See next chapter for this discussion.
[73] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 29-30. WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "Resolutions 1963," (1963).

University of Ottawa, NFCUS president, Stewart Goodings, and future CUS president Patrick Kenniff.[74]

With structural reform committed to through a resolution and the formation of a commission, an overture on the ideological and political front was also made. NFCUS was renamed the Canadian Union of Students, a resolution advanced by the UBC delegation and seconded by their counterparts at l'Université de Montréal.[75] Downplaying the name change as a concession to Quebec's syndicalists, Jenkins would also explain to the student press that the name change reflected the inclusion of Ryerson Polytechnic in the membership of the organization, rendering the term "University" inaccurate.[76] As Jenkins' non-political explanation of the name change demonstrated, some English Canadian student leaders were still opposed to substantial reforms, or pandering to a conservative Anglophone student population, or both.

Having postponed structural reform for another year, conflict at the congress resumed with the new presidential elections. NFCUS had recently reorganized presidential elections whereby the annual congress elected a president for the following year, in this case the 1964-65 term. In either a cynical or misguided attempt to appease Quebec's student syndicalists, English Canadian delegations voted overwhelmingly for Jean Bazin, a Laval student leader who was, according to a later account, "vehemently opposed" by the delegations from Quebec because of his firm opposition to UGEQ. In contrast, Doug Ward, president of the Student Administrative Council at the University of Toronto, was nominated by the AGEUM delegation and garnered the syndicalist and

[74] WRA, ACUS, Box 99, "Press Release," (January 27 1964).
[75] WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "Resolutions 1963," 33.
[76] Canadian University Press, "NFCUS Name Change Explained to NCCUC," *The Carleton*, October 25 1963, 3.

reform-oriented vote.[77] Bazin, the anti-UGEQ francophone soundly defeated Ward, the reform-minded Anglophone. As a consolation of sorts, Ward was elected as the 1964-65 Associate Secretary of International Affairs, the renamed post previously held by Becker and Meighen.

Despite the obvious tensions, the "unity" congress in Edmonton appeared to be a success. Even Pierre Marois threw his support behind the changes, including the six-person Structures Commission.[78] English Canadian students returned to their campuses fully aware of, and engaged with the "Quebec question" which had become even more relevant to students with the arrest of Francois Giroux, a Laval student implicated in the FLQ's activities.[79] The "confederation crisis" was declared the central theme of the CUS educational program through the 1963-4 year.[80] Various activities initiated by CUS-affiliated student councils emerged over the school year on numerous campuses, marking the first widespread and sustained educational program organized by NFCUS/CUS. The national seminar was entitled "A New Concept of Confederation?" and was held in Quebec City in August 1964. The CUS Western Region seminar examined "Western Canada and Confederation", and the attending delegates from seven universities passed a resolution supporting the "retention of the Canadian Federal Union, included therein a unique position for the province of Quebec."[81] In February of 1964, the Carleton CUS

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[77] National Archives of Canada (hereafter NAC), Canadian Union of Students collection (hereafter CUSC), MG 28-I61, vol.12, April 1969, Lib Spry and Peter Allnut, "The Canadian Union of Students – Its Growth & Development," 2.
[78] WRA, ACUS, Box 99, "untitled CUS bulletin," (November 4 1963).
[79] "Quebec Student Charged As Terrorist Member of FLQ," *The Carleton*, October 4 1963. For an overview of the first wave of FLQ actions, see Bryan D. Palmer, *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto 2009), 326-329.
[80] Referring in particular to "Resolution 25", the cover of the 1963 congress resolutions booklet reads "These resolutions are indicative of the decision taken at the Congress to make our "Confederation crisis" the central issue in the CUS program for 1963-64." WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "Resolutions 1963."
[81] WRA, ACUS, Box 99, "untitled press release," (November 5 1963).

committee organized Confederation Week, and, among other invited guests, hosted a speech by Pierre Maheu of *Parti Pris*.[82] The CUS committee at the University of Western Ontario conducted a three month survey on "Quebec and the new spirit", soliciting the opinions of an overwhelmingly Anglophone student population of 5,600. Demonstrating a tentative but generally accurate understanding of basic demographic characteristics of Quebec and basic political questions, UWO students revealed a paternalistic view of Quebec: dismissive of separatism, supportive of bilingualism, but believing that French Canadians ought to make more of an effort to be "Canadian" with Quebec being treated like any other province.[83] Nevertheless, a large minority of respondents, varying in size, thought along the same lines of the UBC students who had recognized Quebec as a distinct nation.

Despite these overtures, the majority genuine in their intent if still largely academic in nature, the efforts of the "unity" congress at Edmonton slowly unraveled through the 1963-64 academic year. Dissatisfaction among French Canadian students resumed as the CUS secretariat continued to focus its lobbying efforts on the federal government. The CUS Board of Directors, now comprised of an equal number of French Canadian and English Canadian students, witnessed French Canadian members increasingly absent as the secretariat continued to exercise its power as if the Edmonton congress had ushered in no new changes.[84]

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[82] "Confederation Week," *The Carleton*, February 21 1964, 9. On the importance of *Parti Pris* to the revolutionary left of the nationalist movement in the 1960s, see Fournier, *F.L.Q. The Anatomy of an Underground Movement*, 48-49; Mills, "The Empire Within" 70-77; Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 331-332.
[83] WRA, ACUS, Box 85, "Quebec and the new spirit: Questionnaire," (1964).
[84] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 30-32.

Similarly, the Structures Commission also had little impact in resolving the crisis. In mid-February 1964, after four formal meetings and having received verbal and written submissions from eight student councils (including Laval and FAGECCQ, the body representing classical college students), the Structures Commission presented its preliminary conclusions to the CUS Board of Directors, who approved them and forwarded them to student councils on March 1.[85] The commission recommended equal representation on the international affairs bureau, to be elected by the respective language constituencies. In addition to the president and vice-president having to win a majority in both constituencies to be elected, if the president spoke English as a first language, the vice-president had to speak French as a first language, and vice versa. Two-thirds majorities by both constituencies were recommended for "fundamental issues" as well as for all constitutional amendments. What constituted a "fundamental issue" would relate to issues of "language, education, federal-provincial relations" and be ruled upon by the meeting chair, a ruling that could be overturned by two-thirds majorities from both language constituencies. If disagreements continued, "supreme authority" would reside with congress. Implicitly acknowledging the existence of UGEQ, a concession was made allowing "regional units" to develop unhindered by CUS, but with the proviso that such units could not conflict with the CUS constitution.[86]

Following the preliminary report, the commission held one more meeting and sent representatives to the Ontario and Maritime regional conferences of CUS. After receiving the Université de Montréal submission in late July, the final report was published. It explicitly distanced itself from the question of political goals, asserting that the new

[85] WRA, ACUS, Box 85, "Report of the Commission on Structures," (1964), 2-3.
[86] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Preliminary Report of the Committee on Structures," (March 1 1964), 1-2.

structure was to accommodate the "tremendous spirit of urgency" amongst Quebec students. With reference to Resolution 25, it reaffirmed the "cultural and ethnic duality" of the organization.[87] The findings did not deviate from the preliminary report, but the conclusion, most likely to the dissatisfaction of the francophone students in Quebec, urged that "patriots in this country must be concerned with the protection and encouragement of regional and cultural interests, while maintaining at the same time an active federal unit which alone can erect the overall foundation stones for the peace, progress and prosperity of the Canadian state."[88] Ongoing unwillingness to even acknowledge UGEQ or the reforms advocated by Sabourin prevailed: an elaboration of the preliminary report's position on provincial organizations was conspicuously absent. It did provide an opening for "regional associations" to exercise their jurisdictional power, though it was unclear whether or not these regional associations were appendages of CUS like the old NFCUS regions, or independent provincial student unions.[89] For the last time, NFCUS tested its francophone members in Quebec with yet another set of proposed piecemeal reforms interspersed with veiled and not-so-veiled criticisms of Quebec nationalism and student syndicalism.

In line with the constitution which required student councils to announce their withdrawal at the annual congress, AGEUM announced its intention to withdraw from CUS in August. Sherbrooke's announcement followed in early September only days before the congress at York University. Jenkins responded publicly, accusing Montréal and Sherbrooke student leaders of having closed minds. "We feel there are many French students," claimed the NFCUS president, "who are not separatists and do not wish to

[87] WRA, ACUS, Box 85, "Report of the Commission on Structures," 2-3.
[88] WRA, ACUS, Box 85, "Report of the Commission on Structures," 11-12.
[89] WRA, ACUS, Box 85, "Report of the Commission on Structures," 9-10.

burn their bridges."[90] These two withdrawals were formally announced at the congress. Laval's student council delayed exiting, introducing a resolution at the congress calling for the dissolution of CUS and the construction of new provincially-based student unions like UGEQ. When the resolution was quickly defeated, Laval ended its membership in NFCUS. Bazin, the incoming president, found himself heading up a student union that his own council no longer belonged to. However, without Quebec's three francophone universities, Bazin secured a unanimous vote of confidence for his presidency.[91]

Responding to the charges from Jenkins and other delegates, AGEUM's Robert Panet-Raymond, supported by Sherbrooke's Pierre Hogue, insisted the split had nothing to do with separatism. The problem was constitutional. "If we remain in CUS," explained Panet-Raymond, "our position will be that of either a suppressed minority or a minority that defeats the majority wishes."[92] Indeed, this was the interpretation of some English Canadian student leaders who now saw new potential for a strengthened CUS. Stewart Goodings, who had served as NFCUS president in 1962 and on the failed Structures Commission, predicted that CUS could now focus more on federal lobbying efforts than internal matters relating to French-English relations.[93]

"Another nail in Canada's coffin"

Later CUS interpretations of the split were more sympathetic to Quebec's student councils but tended to offer no consistent explanation, collapsing mainly into vague and ultimately misleading formulations about cultural miscommunication. Such a perspective

[90] "Union of Students in Danger of Splintering," *The Carleton*, September 14 1964, 1.
[91] Canadian University Press, "Three French U.'s leave CUS," *The Carleton*, September 18 1964, 1.
[92] Canadian University Press, "Three French U.'s leave CUS," *The Carleton*, September 18 1964, 1.
[93] Canadian University Press, "CUS strengthened by break," *The Carleton*, September 18 1964, 1.

was first put forth by Patrick Kenniff who was elected as the 1965-66 CUS president at the 1964 York congress. Less than a year after the split, Kenniff explained that English Canadian students had perceived the new CUS of 1963-64 as a united organization with two caucuses each holding equal representation. In contrast, Quebec's student leaders saw two independent organizations with a united superstructure operating only on the basis of consensus between both groups. Concessions were, acknowledged Kenniff, "made simply to "satisfy the French"," and not necessarily offered "in a genuine attempt to find the common basis for mutual respect and understanding."[94] He added that it was the English Canadian students who "could not fathom the superstructure notion," and this rigid approach which prevented a more fruitful cooperation with French Canadian students through respecting their right to free association.[95] Kenniff's frank assessment would be the basis for CUS' only official interpretation of the split, an analysis which was presented in September 1965 as the CUS submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Despite the apparent clarity of the argument discussed above, both Kenniff's interpretation and the submission to the Royal Commission which he helped draft glossed over the straightforward ultimatum from Marois preceding the 1963 congress. Marois had called for two autonomous national student unions with an undefined superstructure operating only on the basis of mutually agreed upon issues. This was widely reported in campus newspapers via the Canadian University Press. However, the CUS submission to the Royal Commission suggested that "the demise of French-English student cooperation within one structural unity" was not due to political events, but "a long evolution of lack

[94] WRA, ACUS, Box 5, "CUS Brief to the Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism," (1965), 2. This document is an internal CUS memo from Kenniff directing the content of the brief itself.
[95] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "CUS Brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,"2-3.

of communication leading to misunderstanding."[96] The same document also provided other explanations, placing blame on various other tendencies among English Canadian students, including "the gradual disillusionment of French Canadian students" with NFCUS, the "desire on the part of English Canadian students to preserve one structure" and, most bizarrely, the "Anglo-Saxon tradition of pragmatic common law."[97]

Kenniff's confused take on the 1964 split was not an attempt to rewrite history or malign the Quebec students, but rather an expression of the brewing identity crisis among English Canadian student leaders who were confronting a rapidly changing political situation in Canada, Quebec and the United States as well as the international impact of events in Hungary, Algeria, South Africa and, following the split, Vietnam. The early 1960s was, as Bryan Palmer has recently argued, a period in which Canadian national identity was entering a deep crisis.[98] Walter Gordon's economic nationalism and Diefenbaker's populist anti-Americanism were highly visible manifestations of this process, an unfolding dynamic that accelerated with the transformations in Quebec. This identity crisis manifested itself within NFCUS not as an abstract debate, but concretely in the repeated internal rows over structural reforms and adoption of syndicalist operating principles. The evolving and deepening syndicalism and nationalism of Quebec's students, itself an integral if underappreciated component of the Quiet Revolution, clashed with the staid goals and stifling structures of NFCUS. The organization itself was structured around and rooted in the old Canadian national identity, premised on a unitary and majority-rule conception of Canada. Although NFCUS began to move beyond its

[96] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 35.
[97] WRA, ACUS, Box 88, "Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 27-28, 31.
[98] See Palmer, *Canada's 1960s,* 16-21, 415-430.

narrow service-oriented focus through parliamentary lobbying and passing resolutions in support of persecuted Algerian and Hungarian students, its political practice remained decisively conservative and its collective political pronouncements cautious and restrained.

When the crisis reached its climax in 1963 and 1964, most English Canadian students responded not from a position of respect and genuine concern, but one of paternalism – a paternalism rooted in the imperial-colonial relationship between the Canadian state and Anglo economic power, and the French-speaking population of Quebec. Thus, Jenkins could simultaneously insist upon NFCUS/CUS' good treatment of the French Canadian students in Quebec, while decrying their moves towards autonomy as separatist, malicious and, of course, "unrepresentative" of the subordinated population in general. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the formal split between CUS and the members of the provisional UGEQ, nationalist prejudices and hostile bewilderment plagued sections of the English Canadian student movement, with one student newspaper declaring UGEQ's founding congress in November 1964 as "Another Nail in Canada's Coffin."[99]

Even apparently genuine attempts to solve the crisis failed, hampered by the conservatism of the English Canadian student leaders and the union's bureaucratic operating methods. The 1963-64 Commission on Structures was such an attempt. It was a politically neutral intervention intended to resolve a question upon which the viability of a bi-national union of students rested. Paradoxically, its neutrality allowed it to merely replicate the business-like approach that characterized the organization's mishandling of previous internal political matters. Although recognizing the urgency and energy of the

[99] WRA, ACUS, Box 67, *The Gateway* "Another Nail in Canada's Coffin," (December 4 1964).

Quebec student movement, the report embodied none of these same sentiments. In acknowledging the emerging syndicalist philosophy in that province, the report treated structural reform as a bureaucratic matter devoid of political content. In attempting to appease the dissenting Québécois with a neutral language, it inspired no confidence in the prospect of a mutually reinforcing overhaul of the union where structures would cultivate a new syndicalism in English Canada. And in the final report, a Canadian nationalist argument was thrown in, an argument which was completely uncharacteristic and out of place with the rest of the report. The old nationalist ideology was acting as a barrier to reforming NFCUS.

Not all reactions to the crisis within NFCUS were as caustic or bureaucratic. Political events south of the border increasingly weighed upon the minds of English Canadian students. The split in CUS prompted a serious reinvestigation of Canada itself among some student leaders and activists at the same time as such questions about sovereignty, identity and "national purpose" would lay the basis for the later radicalism of CUS. But such developments were several years off. In a sense, Goodings' claim that CUS was stronger because of the split was in fact true. English Canadian students were "freed" from the Quebec problem, providing a certain degree of distance to contemplate the debacle, as Kenniff's interpretation clearly demonstrates, while beginning to appreciate syndicalism as a positive philosophy as opposed to a constant threat to the union's structural integrity.

What Goodings did not count on was the crisis forging a new layer of English Canadian student leaders willing to steer CUS in a new direction, a syndicalist direction. The first signs of this process came from those who found themselves in leadership

positions where the crisis intersected with international political issues. Becker and Meighen, both NFCUS Vice Presidents of International Affairs, were the first English Canadians to openly criticize the organization's structures and lack of political purpose. Sabourin and Goodings followed, with criticisms not dissimilar from those of Quebec's syndicalists. Doug Ward, who had won the support of the Quebec syndicalists and reformers at the 1963 Edmonton congress in his failed presidential bid, took up the role previously held by Becker and Meighen at the 1964 congress. While the 1964 congress would be known for its dramatic split, submerged beneath the CUS-UGEQ controversy was a motion calling for active opposition to Apartheid South Africa, including a boycott of South African goods in cooperation with the Canadian Labour Congress, and a 24-hour picket of the South African Embassy in Ottawa.[100] Keenly aware of international political issues and sympathetic to the syndicalism of Quebec's students, an emerging crop of English Canadian student leaders were on the cusp of displacing the old leadership, setting the Canadian Union of Students on a path towards the New Left.

[100] Canadian University Press, "CUS votes action against South Africa," *The Carleton*, September 25 1964, 8.

Chapter Two: Towards Student Syndicalism

As CUS was coming to grips with the departure of the francophone student unions in Quebec, events at the University of California Berkeley were unfolding on the public stage. The student protests at Berkeley signaled the arrival of the "New Left" on the American political landscape, capturing the imagination of thousands of young people around the world, including Canada. Like the formation of UGEQ, the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley represented a culmination and convergence of political trends and tendencies that had been fermenting outside mass consciousness for at least several years. The most notable influence was that of the civil rights movement, notably the non-violent direct action and community organizing of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality.[1] The "old left" also asserted a degree of influence through Trotskyist, Communist and social democratic grouplets which had survived the 1950s.[2] One such organization was the anti-communist League for Industrial Democracy, whose student organization had renamed itself Students for a Democratic Society in 1960 before setting off on a new path that diverged from the staid socialism of its parent organization.[3] The American New Left would come to play a critical role in the ideas and actions that came to define the New Left in Canada.

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[1] Mark Edelman Boren, *Student Resistance: A History of the Unruly Subject*, (New York 2001), 141-144; Jack Newfield, *A Prophetic Minority* (New York 1967), 101-106; Hal Draper, *Berkeley: The New Student Revolt* (New York 1965); Max Heirich, *The Beginning: Berkeley, 1964* (New York 1970); W.J. Rorabaugh, *Berkeley at War, the 1960s* (New York 1989), 18-47.

[2] For an early snapshot of the "hereditary left" in 1964-65 see Newfield, *A Prophetic Minority*, 109-130. A more thorough account of the American New Left's origins in the American Old Left is Maurice Isserman, *If I Had a Hammer...The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left* (New York 1987).

[3] The most detailed account of the Students for a Democratic Society remains Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York 1974). On the origins of the LID in the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, the first socialist student organization in the United States, see Ralph Brax, *The first student movement : student activism in the United States during the 1930s* (Port Washington, NY 1981).

English Canada's New Left

Overshadowed by the events south of the border, notably the Freedom Summer registration drives in the American Deep South, was the development of English Canada's own student-based New Left. Inspired by student syndicalism in Quebec as well as the threat of nuclear war, the single-issue Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament also gravitated towards a deeper and more radical critique of society.

Formed in late 1959, the CUCND drew its name directly from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great Britain. Dimitri Roussopoulos, a Canadian student attending the London School of Economics at the time of the British CND's Aldermaston march, was the driving force behind the formation of the CUCND.[4] The organization quickly linked up with the awkwardly-named National Committee Control of Radiation Hazards which eventually changed its name to the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.[5]

While remaining a small group on several campuses, and often derided by other students as well as faculty and administrators as Communists and subversives, the CUCND was nevertheless able to construct a functioning pan-Canadian organization.[6] The organization and its "adult" counterpart was able to firmly establish itself on the

[4] Maurice Dufresne, ""Let's Not Be Cremated Equal," The Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1959-1967," MA thesis, Carleton University, 1996, 22-23.
[5] Patricia I. McMahon, "The Politics of Canada's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963," MA thesis, University of Toronto, 1999, 265.
[6] See, for example, Frank Marzar, "CUCND Ousted at St. Mike's," *The Carleton*, February 2, 1962, 3; "CUCND Ousted at University of Manitoba," *The Carleton*, February 2, 1962, 3; "McMaster CUCND," *The Carleton*, October 30, 1962, 1. Communists such as Danny Goldstick did play a role within the Toronto CUCND though he was expelled in 1961 due to a combination of red-baiting and his refusal to condemn Soviet nuclear tests. On the red-baiting of and within the CUCND and CCND, see McMahon, "The Politics of Canada's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963," 250-252, 267-268.

political scene through a successful petition drive of 142,000 signatures delivered to Prime Minister Diefenbaker in October 1961.[7]

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and Diefenbaker's vacillating position on nuclear weapons propelled the CUCND to adopt increasingly hard positions on nuclear weapons, including what was described as "positive unilateralism" which entailed complete renunciation of nuclear weapons as well as any cooperation with any aspect of manufacturing, testing or storing nuclear weapons.[8] CUCND also began exploring the necessity of opposing "national elites," and in doing so began to address the implications of developing an internationalist opposition to the arms race while also supporting social transformation in Quebec.[9]

Propelled by the dialectic of debate and discussion, and a desire to understand the drive towards nuclear competition between nation-states, Roussopoulos and others in the CUCND took the single-issue campaign into new territory to address the root causes of the arms race. Already Editor-in-Chief of *Sanity*, the CCND bulletin, Roussoupoulous spearheaded the formation of the theoretical journal, *Our Generation Against Nuclear War* in 1962 to provide an open forum for such discussions.[10]

As the National Federation of Canadian University Students grappled with its own internal divisions during 1963, the ranks of the anti-nuclear movement also witnessed a sharp polarization along mainly generational lines. The "nuclear election" of early 1963 was the catalyst. Despite the construction of missile bases for the nuclear-

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[7] Doug Owram, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby-Boom Generation* (Toronto 1997), 165.
[8] James Harding, "An ethical movement in search of an analysis," *Our Generation*, 3/4-4/1 (May 1966), 21.
[9] Dimitri Roussopoulos, "Internationalizing the Nuclear Disarmament Movement," *Our Generation Against Nuclear War*, ½ (Winter 1962), 20-21; "My Country, Right or Wrong – a Dangerous Lunacy," *Our Generation Against Nuclear War*, 2/1 (Fall 1962), 18-19.
[10] Dufresne, ""Let's Not Be Cremated Equal"," 29-30.

tipped Bomarc missile, the Diefenbaker government appeared noncommittal regarding their acquisition. The Defence Minister resigned as a result of the opposition to topple the government in a confidence vote. During the election, the Liberal leader, Lester B. Pearson, reversed his party's position on opposing nuclear weapons on Canadian soil forcing the anti-nuclear movement into action.[11] Pearson's victory, although not sufficient to secure a majority of seats, was a crushing defeat for the CUCND and CCND. Whereas CCND, made up of older activists, continued publishing press releases and working to shape public opinion through petitions and information leaflets, the students, in contrast, were motivated to examine their failure, an examination that reached beyond considering the efficacy of particular tactics into a rethinking of the campaign's conception of peace activism.[12]

In September 1963, shortly after the Canadian Union of Students was formed, a national CUCND meeting was held in Regina. A new direction was struck, with a number of activists looking to the American civil rights movement as their model for a new type of activism. James Harding, an NDP activist in Saskatchewan, having returned from the March on Washington only weeks earlier, called for links to be made between questions of economic exploitation and war. Others called for the adoption of non-violent civil disobedience to oppose the installation of the Bomarc missiles. Arthur Pape, an activist from Toronto and an editor for *Sanity*, proposed a policy of withdrawing from the

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[11] On Pearson's decision to accept nuclear arms in Canada, see Patricia I. McMahon, "The Politics of Canada's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963," 307-317. For more on Pearson's decision in the context of policy and party debates, see J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: the years of uncertainty and innovation* (Toronto 1986), 116-138.

[12] Arthur Pape, a leading member of CUCND, expressed this most clearly in a post-election working paper distributed to the organization. See William Ready Division of Archives & Research Collections, McMaster University (hereafter WRA), Archives of the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (hereafter CUCND), Box 10, Arthur Pape, "A working paper for the CUCND conference," (February 1963). See the comments by Roussopoulos in Dmitri Roussopoulos and Brewster Kneen, "Dialogue," *Our Generation Against Nuclear War*, 2/4 (December 1963), 90-2.

Cold War and adopting a position of non-alignment, or as it was referred to in anti-nuclear literature, "neutralism." The various ideas underlying the different suggestions included an understanding of the failure of liberal democracy to offer any real democracy.[13]

Shortly afterwards, at the October 1963 CCND national meeting in Montreal, the rift between the students and the CCND membership became apparent as the CUCND called for withdrawal from NATO and NORAD as a means to reduce Cold War tensions. The CCND leader, as well as outsiders, considered that such a position would discredit the campaign, isolating it from the broader population. A compromise brokered by political theorist C.B. Macpherson, to adopt a policy of opposing nuclear-armed alliances but not to advocate this policy publicly, seemed to prevent a split.[14]

More confident of their position, the students held another CUCND meeting in early December in Montreal. At the meeting, they formally adopted neutralism. Arthur Pape, then chairman of the organization, also delivered a speech describing the university as a site capable of facilitating peace research and launching new, more dynamic campaigns for peace.[15] In combination with a new focus on the university, the question of Quebec was widely discussed with guest speakers such as the president of the Montreal Rassemblement pour l'Indépendence Nationale and the editor of AGEUM's *Quartier Latin*.[16] Listening intently to their guests, the predominantly English Canadian students learned that constructing a new nation, not the peace movement, was the priority of

[13] A detailed overview of this pivotal meeting is found in Dufresne, ""Let's Not Be Cremated Equal","43-46.
[14] Dufresne, ""Let's Not Be Cremated Equal"," 47-48.
[15] WRA, CUCND, Box 11, "Federal Conference Report," (November 1963), 6.
[16] On the role of RIN in the Quebec left of the early and mid-1960s, see Sean William Mills, "The Empire Within: Montreal, the Sixties, and the Forging of a Radical Imagination," PhD thesis, Queen's University, 2007, 61-65. Sections of the FLQ also found their origins within RIN. See Bryan Palmer, *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto 2009), 324-327.

young people in Quebec with events in Algeria and Cuba providing inspiration for this task. The students were willing to listen because of earlier discussions with young Quebec radicals that had taken place a few years before. In these prior discussions, the Quebec students had suggested that the CUCND should cooperate with an independent anti-nuclear campaign in Quebec as opposed to constructing a Quebec wing under an Anglo-dominated federal organization.

The questions of Canadian foreign policy and Quebec's new nationalism dominated the December conference.[17] A new name for the organization, the "Radical Student Movement for Peace," was also proposed to reflect the new approach of the group but the proposal was shelved.[18] This suggestion was in line with American New Left notions of "participatory democracy" outlined most famously and influentially in "The Port Huron Statement" of the Students for a Democratic Society.[19] Drafted primarily by Tom Hayden of SDS, the document had gained widespread circulation among students in North America and would become one of the most widely published and read New Left documents of the decade.[20] Daniel Drache, chair of the February 1964 CUCND seminar at Queen's University, expressed the new philosophy quite succinctly. "Peace, rooted in man's dignity," he explained, "respects the individual and the need for him to be involved in the determination of his own life and future..."[21]

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[17] WRA, CUCND, Box 11, "Federal Conference Report," 4-5.
[18] WRA, CUCND, Box 11, "Federal Conference Report". See also "CUCND and French Canada," *Sanity*, December 1963, 1/9, 6.
[19] For a recent republication of the Port Huron Statement with new commentary from its principle author, see Tom Hayden, *The Port Huron Statement: the visionary call of the 1960s revolution.* (New York 2005). On SDS's anti-poverty organizing as seen in the mid-1960s, see Richard Rothstein, "A Short History of ERAP," *Our Generation*, 3/4-4/1 (May 1966), 40-45. See also Jennifer Frost, *"An Interracial Movement of the Poor": Community organizing and the New Left in the 1960s* (New York 2001).
[20] An estimated 20,000 copies of the The Port Huron Statement were distributed from the New York office of SDS between its publication in the summer of 1962 and late 1964. See Sale, *SDS*, 69.
[21] *Sanity*, March 1964, 1/11.

Guided by this new philosophy and inspired by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and SDS's anti-poverty organizing in the ghettos of northern industrial cities, CUCND developed a new approach to opposing the Bomarc missile.[22] In the summer of 1964, a handful of CUCND activists moved to North Bay and La Macaza, Quebec where the Bomarc missile sites were being installed. The new radicals prepared to organize the two communities in opposition to the missiles by developing a proposal for an alternative local economy not associated with the military-industrial complex identified so eloquently by President Eisenhower's speech a little over three years earlier. A dozen students, including Arthur Pape and a staff member of the Students for a Democratic Society, moved in to a house on the outskirts of North Bay. Conducting interviews with residents in order to gather information and identify possible avenues of action, the students uncovered a class-divided city with a substantial number of poor, whose lives were disrupted by a housing shortage caused by the arrival of military personnel associated with the new missile site. Although efforts to produce a study on possible economic alternatives in cooperation with the residents of North Bay ultimately failed, the project hardened the determination and commitment of the students who would start to explore the possibilities of greatly expanding their community organizing projects.[23]

A similar but different campaign took place in La Macaza, Quebec, some 250 kilometres northeast of Montreal. More so than North Bay, the residents of La Macaza welcomed the students.[24] After setting up a 24-hour vigil outside the missile base entrance on June 13, the students sought to escalate their tactics. Trained in civil

[22] Harding, "An ethical movement in search of an analysis," 23.
[23] Dufresne, ""Let's Not Be Cremated Equal"," 57-61.
[24] David Lewis Stein, "The Peaceniks go to La Macaza," *Maclean's*, August 8, 1964, 36.

disobedience by a black activist from the Congress of Racial Equality, seventeen of the one hundred students in attendance sat down to block the base entrance on June 21. The following day they were repeatedly dragged from the entrance by air force police.[25] A return on Labour Day with 58 students resulted in a more violent removal.[26] As had been the case in North Bay, the students were not deterred by the project's failures.

As the new school year rolled around in the fall of 1964, CUCND had found the new style of political protest it had been seeking in the wake of Pearson's election in early 1963. As the parent organization fell apart, its last action being a protest on Parliament Hill, Christmas Day, 1963, Canada's New Left was quickly moving towards an engagement with the new student union in Quebec, l'Union Générale des Étudiants de Québec, and towards its own transformation into the Student Union for Peace Action, the quintessential New Left organization in English Canada during the decade. CUCND broadened its scope of activity, which included activism on issues not simply of nuclear arms and foreign policy, but also "participatory democracy", civil rights, anti-poverty, social justice for Canada's native population, and solidarity with the emerging nationalist movement in Quebec. Thus, CUCND's last conference, at which it transformed into SUPA, was aptly titled "the student and social issues in the nuclear age," expressing the definite end of the formally single-issue CUCND.[27] In attendance at this meeting in December 1964 was Doug Ward, the Canadian Union of Students' first Associate Secretary for International Affairs.

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[25] Stein, "The Peaceniks go to La Macaza," 11, 36.
[26] *Sanity*, October 1964, 2/6.
[27] WRA, CUCND, Box 11, "CUCND National Membership Conference: The student and social issues in the nuclear age," (1964).

A Stumbling Start

In the weeks following the 1964 congress, little activity emanated from the CUS secretariat. Nevertheless, CUS was inching towards its own political transformation. The new Associate Secretary for International Affairs, Doug Ward, set about translating the union's resolution opposing South African apartheid into a functioning, multi-campus program of action. The resolution called upon the union, for the first time, to organize a visible political campaign involving educational activities as well as demonstrations. Prior resolutions on international political affairs entailed no education campaigns or attempts to organize protests of any sort, beyond letters of solidarity. Identifying Canadian complicity in the apartheid economy of South Africa, CUS now called upon affiliates "to initiate and coordinate a program of information, study and non-violent direct action aimed at confronting the peoples, governments and commercial interests of Canada with the implication of assistance to the economy of the Republic of South Africa."[28]

Ward drafted a detailed manual on the new South Africa program which was distributed to member unions in late October of 1964. Plans were also made to produce an information pamphlet later in the term.[29] A background paper on South African apartheid, first distributed to attendees of the congress, was sent out again. The document pulled no punches, singling out the Canadian government for opposing the apartheid policies of the Voerword government while avoiding economic sanctions, thus maintaining material ties.[30] The paper also noted that Western states, unlike the

[28] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, September 1964, "Resolution on South Africa."
[29] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, October 1964, "Executive Memo."
[30] A brief overview of Canadian political and economic relations with Apartheid South Africa from the Second World War to the mid-60s can be found in Linda Freeman, *The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and*

Communist states, had a "particularly bleak" record, with the exception of Denmark which provided a model for Canada.[31] Ward's efforts were rewarded by the formation of committees on nearly a dozen campuses to help enact the program.[32]

The union president, Jean Bazin, voiced his support for the South Africa program in late October in a speech to the national conference of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada at the Chateau Laurier in Ottawa. Students had a responsibility, asserted Bazin, to educate other students and support the National Union of South African Students in actively opposing apartheid.[33] However, events in Quebec would sour Bazin's attitude towards international solidarity work, eventually undermining the South Africa program.

Shortly before UGEQ's founding conference from November 13-16, the CUS executive received notice from the McGill student council of its dissatisfaction with CUS and interest in cooperating with and possibly joining UGEQ. No relations with UGEQ had been established following the split and no new policies relating to UGEQ had been developed. Few expected the split to encompass McGill, a bastion of Anglophone privilege in Quebec, but it was also acknowledged that McGill students were not immune from the debates and discussions taking place among francophone students. They had, after all, participated in these debates in early 1963 when the Quebec Region of NFCUS had discussed the attempted ideological rapprochement that made overtures to the syndicalist politics of Quebec's new student movement. The experiences of the

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South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney years (Toronto 1997), 13-30. For a Marxist critique of Canadian complicity in South Africa, see Dick Fidler, *Canada: Accomplice in Apartheid* (New York 1977).

[31] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, October 1964, "Re: South Africa Programme."

[32] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, October 1964, "Re: South Africa Programme."

[33] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin, "Adresse Prononcée par Jean Bazin, President, Union Canadienne des Étudiants," (October 27 1964), 3.

radicalizing CUCND had also shown that Anglophone students could be won over to supporting the self-determination of Quebec even if it meant radically altering the Canadian status quo, a view toward which newly radicalized students were already gravitating.

McGill's student council was motivated to court UGEQ due to CUS' apparent lack of political activity, particularly in regards to educational policy. The council saw UGEQ as more in line with the "principles" of McGill students but refrained from joining because UGEQ had yet to hold its founding congress. McGill, therefore, gave CUS one more chance, indicating the new direction they wanted to see by applauding CUS' "vastly expanded program of international action" and attempts to improve regional representation.[34]

A few days after receiving McGill's complaints, Bazin attended UGEQ's founding conference. Observing the familiar and often endless debates between student councils over organizational structures, Bazin's contempt for the syndicalists, notably the leaders of AGEUM, shone through his detailed, confidential account of the congress, which was distributed within the leadership ranks of CUS.[35] In his report, Bazin attributed UGEQ's unwillingness to consider dual membership in both CUS and UGEQ to the influence of Serge Joyal,[36] a radical nationalist at l'Université de Montréal who carried, according to Bazin, a "psychotic attitude towards CUS."[37] Predictably, Bazin was delighted when AGEUM and their allies at Sherbrooke relented under pressure from his

[34] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Students' Society of McGill University External Affairs Committee, "CUS-UGEQ Questions," (November 1964).
[35] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964).
[36] Serge Joyal drafted an influential document on student syndicalism for the founding UGEQ congress. It was reprinted in *Canadian Dimension*. See Serge Joyal, "Student Syndicalism in Quebec," *Canadian Dimension*, 2/3 (March/April 1965), 20-21.
[37] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 4.

colleagues at Laval to allow the new union to be controlled by a general assembly of delegates as opposed to a strictly centralized leadership.[38] Despite this, the CUS president lamented the congress being "controlled by a small group of individuals" centred around AGEUM where the syndicalist idea had its deepest roots and widest support.[39]

While remaining relatively neutral on UGEQ's favourable attitude towards student strikes as a means to achieve social change, and the new union's related decision to adopt a "quite radical" syndicalist charter defining the student "as a young intellectual worker", Bazin attacked the international affairs resolutions as "an absolute snow-job."[40] He suspected that the union's resolution in support of "world peace and general disarmament" was the work of Dimitri Roussopoulos, not the resolution's mover, Richard Guay, a CUCND activist, member of AGEUM, and an ally of Serge Joyal.[41] Bazin was blunt in his views:

> Needless to say that I am quite disturbed by the orientation that UGEQ took on international affairs. The people responsible for this type of attitude should be publicly exposed and I think CUS has a responsibility to try and inform the students as much as possible in order to avoid the consequence of irresponsible, unrealistic attitude towards which they are leaning now. Everyone is for peace, and everyone is against hunger, but to conclude to [sic] general disarmament, non-alignment, creation of a third world student movement, without any more studies is quite upsetting.[42]

Bazin claimed that UGEQ's radicalism was the result of Serge Joyal, AGEUM, "outside influences" such as Roussopoulos and "the ignorance by most of the members at the

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[38] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 2.
[39] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 4.
[40] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 6. Emphasis in original.
[41] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 6-7.
[42] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 7.

congress." [43] In reality, Bazin had grossly mischaracterized the centrality of the internationalist sentiment motivating those at the founding UGEQ congress, and downplayed the importance of such questions. Seven of the nineteen resolutions at the founding congress addressed international questions, and the desire to create a "Third World student movement" was driven simultaneously by the anti-colonialism of the new national consciousness and opposition to the International Union of Students and International Student Conference, which were seen as mere expressions of the two Cold War superpowers.[44] As for Bazin's claim that there would be no further study of international affairs, this was simply untrue. Daniel Latouche, who was elected to head up UGEQ's international affairs bureau, set about drafting an extensive document, *le Livre blanc*, which, according to Jean Lamarre, rooted UGEQ "au coeur due movement étudiant international."[45] Likewise, international politics was at the heart of UGEQ.

In the wake of the rumblings from McGill, Bazin wrote in his report, "Because of the nationalist, left-leaning, syndicalist principles accepted, I don't see how any representative student council of the English-speaking schools could recommend joining UGEQ."[46] Whether this was merely an observation, or one masking a personal opposition to such politics, Bazin suggested to the CUS leadership reading the confidential document that CUS should not act as a negotiator between English-speaking student unions in Quebec and UGEQ.[47]

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[43] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 8.
[44] Jean Lamarre, ""Au service des étudiants et de la nation": L'internationalisation de l'Union générale des étudiants du Québec (1964-1969)," *Bulletin d'Histoire Politique* 16/2 (hiver 2008), 55.
[45] Lamarre, ""Au service des étudiants et de la nation"," 56.
[46] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 8.
[47] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964), 9.

Most English Canadian students were indifferent to UGEQ's founding congress, just as they were indifferent to the Canadian Union of Students. However, opposition was expressed in some quarters. At Bishop's University, one student leader claimed that French Canadians did not want to engage in a dialogue with English Canada.[48] In the west, the editors of the University of Alberta's student newspaper chose to reprint the *McGill Daily*'s report of the UGEQ congress under the headline "Another nail in Canada's coffin."[49] Among English Canadian students, only a few saw anything positive emerging from UGEQ's founding. Most were either indifferent or opposed.

At the CUS Board of Directors meeting that followed from November 27 to 29, Bazin's interpretation and proposals regarding UGEQ's founding meeting were not openly challenged. Whether Ward would have spoken against Bazin is unknown, since he was absent from the meeting. No changes in policy were undertaken to improve relations with UGEQ and francophone students. The result would be a prolonged lack of communication between the CUS leadership and their new counterparts in Quebec. In addition, Ward's absence meant that Bazin led the discussion on the international affairs program which McGill had cited as one of the few redeeming qualities of CUS. Whether influenced or not by the events at the UGEQ conference, Bazin effectively shut down the South Africa program as having "received enough publicity" only a month after Ward's efforts were starting to come to fruition. [50] In the eyes of the president, the program's conclusion, a speaking tour by a past president of the National Union of South African Students, was satisfactory.

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[48] "UGEQ – radical, nationalist" *The Varsity*, November 16 1964, 2.
[49] WRA, ACUS, Box 67, *The Gateway* "Another Nail in Canada's Coffin," (December 4 1964).
[50] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, December 1964, "Executive Memo," (November 1964), 3.

If the short-lived South Africa program was an indication that Bazin and others intended to resist the drift of CUS towards active engagement in international affairs, this effort was equally short-lived. In the final months of 1964 and through much of 1965, there was a qualitative political transformation among students in North America. CUS would be part of this transformation, providing the opportunity for Doug Ward and other like-minded student leaders to exercise greater influence within the union.

Berkeley, Selma, and Vietnam

Between the fall of 1964 and spring 1965, a series of electrifying political events helped break down the lingering conservative mindset that characterized the early Bazin leadership. While UGEQ's founding congress was an early and significant step in the birth of the political mass student movement of the later 1960s, its temporal and political proximity meant that it had far less of an impact on students in English Canada than events south of the border. Returning to university after a summer of civil rights campaigning, Berkeley's student activists found their rights to staff political tables on campus removed by the university administration. From September onward, students began to organize in opposition to the new policy forming the Free Speech Movement. The campaign culminated with a December 2 rally of some 6,000 students where Mario Savio delivered his seminal speech calling upon students "to put your bodies upon the gears" of the machine and "indicate to the people who run the machine that unless you're free, the machine will be preventing from working at all."[51] A thousand students proceeded to occupy the administration building only to be removed through a violent police operation involving 814 arrests. Into January, the Berkeley Board of Regents, the

[51] Quoted in Draper, *Berkeley: The New Student Revolt*, 98.

faculty and the Free Speech Movement engaged in a series of disputes eventually resulting in a new Chancellor conceding an uneasy and unstable truce.[52] The revolt at Berkeley captured the imagination and the anger of thousands of students around the world, including, of course, in Canada.[53] Berkeley had an immediate impact on CUS. Bazin himself was swept along by the new mood, approving the union's uncharacteristically bold intervention in the AUCC's Commission on Financing of Higher Education. Delivered in January, 1965, the brief they prepared demanded, for the first time in NFCUS/CUS history, the elimination of tuition fees.[54] The New Left in English Canada was also changing.

Events at Berkeley, the experience at La Macaza and North Bay, and the founding of UGEQ amidst Quebec's rising political ferment, provided a new sense of purpose to the activists of the CUCND who gathered in Regina over the 1964-65 holidays for their national conference. At the conference, the CUCND was reformed as the Student Union for Peace Action in order to reflect the desire of activists to expand their activities and begin to seek out new ways of achieving radical social change.[55] South of the border, SUPA's counterparts in SDS were also profoundly influenced by Berkeley, even if its chapter on the Berkeley campus played a relatively insignificant role.[56] The SDS National Secretary, Clark Kissinger, spearheaded efforts to generalize the possibilities of

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[52] Heirich, *The Beginning: Berkeley, 1964*, 200-204, 252.
[53] Tellingly, Myrna Kostash, in *Long Way From Home: The story of the Sixties generation in Canada* (Toronto 1980), begins her chapter on the student revolt by recounting the growth of the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley. Levitt also sees the Free Speech Movement as the birth of the modern student movement. See Cyril Levitt, *Children of Privilege: Student Revolt in the Sixties: A Study of Student Movements in Canada, the United States, and West Germany* (Toronto 1984), 45.
[54] See Robert Fredrick Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential: The Canadian Union of Students, 1963-1969" MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 2002, 27-30. This commission will be hereafter referred as the "Bladen Commission" after its chair, Vincent Bladen.
[55] See WRA, CUCND, Box 12, "Report on SUPA National Conference," (no date).
[56] Sale, *SDS*, 168.

radicalization in the wake of Berkeley, and in doing so, SDS became the main beneficiary in terms of recruitment, national profile and influence within the blossoming if inchoate American student movement. As Kirkpatrick Sale put it, "Berkeley spurred the consciousness of the American student, so it spurred the growth of SDS."[57] As the new SUPA was being formed in Regina, an SDS national meeting in New York also adopted a plan to organize a march in opposition to the Vietnam War in Washington, DC during the spring break of April, 1965.[58]

In early 1965, CUS was focusing its efforts on drafting its brief to the Bladen Commission and the Duff-Berdahl Commission on University Government, the latter being jointly sponsored by the Canadian Association of University Teachers and the AUCC. As mentioned, the union's brief to the Duff-Berdahl Commission was uncharacteristically radical. Only a few months earlier it might have been confused with the sort of analysis emerging from the Free Speech Movement, UGEQ or SDS. Citing the events at Berkeley as well as the threats of expulsion against AGEUM student leaders in September 1963, the brief argued for a greater role for students and faculty in minimizing the influence of administrators:

> In view of the ever-increasing complexity of the administration of universities in the type of society which is ours, special bodies have been created whose task it is to see that universities are provided with the bureaucratic system necessitated by their operations and with the financial means required for their expansion. These bodies (Senates, Boards of Governors, Boards of Trustees) have, by their very nature, assumed a function of continuity within our universities, and have increasingly tended to view professors and students as concerned solely with the academic activities of teaching and learning. By thus holding the professors and the students away from the day-to-day management of the universities, these administrative bodies have gained a great amount of power, often extending beyond their normal duties. They have come to be known as "monsters", in the

[57] Sale, *SDS*, 169.
[58] Sale, *SDS*, 171.

> original sense of the word, their actual responsibilities being out of proportion with what should be their fields of action.[59]

The brief concluded by demanding mandatory consultation of students and faculty and administrators, the freedom of faculty and students to form their own representative organizations and the presence of students and faculty on all governing bodies.[60] On educational questions, CUS was rapidly embracing the same syndicalist positions as UGEQ.

That spring, once again, events south of the border accelerated the political transformation of CUS, which was already flirting with new forms of political activism in its international solidarity work and asserting the need for democratizing university structures. Following on the Freedom Summer of 1964, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and their prominent leader, Martin Luther King Jr., set up their next campaign in Selma, Alabama, where the black population was nearly completely disenfranchised. Demonstrations in January were followed by a march in February in which one protester was fatally shot by police. To bring further awareness to the situation, a march from Selma to Montgomery was organized on March 7 in which Alabama Governor George Wallace unleashed the police upon the protesters using clubs, tear gas and dogs. Television coverage galvanized public opinion in support of the civil rights campaigners. King's efforts to march again resulted in another death of a protester

[59] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 2, February 1965, "CUS Brief to the Duff Commission," (February 17 1965), 2.
[60] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 2, February 1965, "CUS Brief to the Duff Commission," (February 17 1965), 4-5.

prompting President Johnson to escort the 25,000-strong march to Montgomery with the state's National Guard.[61]

The events in Selma led to large solidarity actions in Canada. Toronto's SUPA members, led by Arthur Pape, organized a sit-in at the US consulate on University Avenue.[62] When the protest received press coverage, several hundred people, most of them young, converged on the consulate. [63] Another solidarity rally at Parliament drew approximately 2,000.[64] UGEQ staged its first major demonstration at the US consulate, combining demands for racial integration in the American South and an end to American military escalation in Vietnam. Somewhere between 3,000-6,000 students participated in a peaceful sit-in, and listened to speakers, including James Forman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.[65] At the time, this was, according to Bryan Palmer, "perhaps the single most important action that both galvanized SUPA and brought fresh forces of radicalizing youth into its midst."[66]

Obscured by the events in Selma and the coverage of solidarity actions in Toronto and other Canadian cities was a protest against tuition fee increases at McGill University. It had been announced by the McGill administration that fees would be increasing by $100 in September 1965. A day before the sit-in at the US consulate in Montreal, a demonstration of 3,000 was organized on March 22, drawing in students from a number

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[61] See David J. Garrow, *Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965* (New Haven, CT 1978).
[62] Kenneth Drushka, "U of T Protesters Bed Down for Night," *The Globe and Mail*, March 11 1965, 1-2.
[63] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 9-10
[64] Bernard Dufresne, "2,000 join in protest at Ottawa," *The Globe and Mail*, March 15 1965, 1.
[65] Pierre Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Québécois: son passé, ses revendications et ses luttes (1960-1983)* (St-Jean, QC 1984), 15-16; Lamarre, ""Au service des étudiants et de la nation"," 57-58.
[66] Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 269. Kostash situates the US consulate sit-in in much the same way as Palmer, as a transformative moment for SUPA. See Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 9-12. While referencing the influence of the civil rights movement in general, Selma is not mentioned by either Owram or Levitt in their accounts and understandings of the catapulting of SUPA into the political limelight in 1965, and the effect it would have on the New Left.

of universities and attracting speakers such as René Levesque. A petition of 5,300 signatures opposing the fee increase was also delivered to the Board of Governors. The efforts failed but, as the left-wing McGill professor Charles Taylor consciously pointed out in a speech to the rally, the event marked a dramatic example of cooperation between French Canadian and English Canadian students.[67] Even thought CUS was moving in a syndicalist direction, many McGill students saw UGEQ as far more effective and inspiring in organizing students.

Late 1964 and early 1965 – with the foundation of UGEQ, the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, the increased student role in the civil rights movement and the solidarity actions in Selma, as well as the protest at McGill – was widely recognized as a watershed moment for what was now being termed the "New Left." This consolidation was evident even before SDS's April 17 demonstration in Washington DC, which amazed supporters and detractors alike when 10,000 to 25,000 turned up in front of the White House to denounce the war in Vietnam.[68]

Former CUS president Stewart Goodings was quick to respond to the transformation of the student body into an active political force, publishing two articles in April 1965 in *The Canadian Forum* and *University Affairs* on the "new spirit," the articles being distributed internally among CUS' active core. Goodings' article in *Canadian Forum* focused on the CUS-UGEQ split. He was far too kind in describing the English Canadian response to the demands of Quebec's francophone student unions and, perhaps drawing on Bazin's interpretation, described UGEQ's formation as "a

[67] CUS, NAC, MG28-I61, Box 3, March 1965, "Extrait du journal, "Le Devoir", Montréal, Mardi, 23 Mars, 1965," 3.
[68] Sale, *SDS*, 186-7; Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left* (Los Angeles 1980), 46-47.

tremendous victory for a small group of politicians," an obvious jab at AGEUM's leaders. To his credit, Goodings attempted to diffuse the persistent worries of English Canadian students, suggesting that the existence of "two student majorities" was "not necessarily bad." And while calling for "frank and free discussions" between the two unions, he suggested it was the responsibility of CUS to make the first steps. Goodings concluded with an unanswered series of questions about the nature of Canada, pondering whether or not the split was "a symbol of failure for the Canadian experiment" while observing that if diverging regional interests were to be overcome, the "elusive goal" of defining Canadian identity "would help." "If we must have a nationalism in Canada," added Goodings, "we must realize that it will have to be a rather peculiar variety" based on "pride in our differences and respect for our individual and collective freedom."[69]

Goodings' piece in *University Affairs* provided a more contextual overview of student politics in Canada as a whole, drawing out the common themes between the formation of UGEQ, CUS' monstrous effort to produce the Student Means Survey, and the new Student Union for Peace Action. Goodings assured the older *University Affairs* readership that the "new spirit" did not mean "revolution on the campuses." Rather, the student body was seeking "a more sophisticated student government philosophy" that rejected traditional political parties and old campaign strategies due to widespread disillusionment with the current political system.[70] Given the events in Berkeley, it is questionable whether or not this description of Canadian students assured the older readers.

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[69] Stewart Goodings, "Two Student Majorities," *The Canadian Forum*, April 1965, 6-8.
[70] CUS, NAC, MG28-I61, Box 3, May 1965, Stewart Goodings, "A New Spirit On The Campuses," *University Affairs*, April 1965.

Goodings' intervention marked a turning point in the internal culture of the CUS leadership. With a new momentum and enthusiasm energizing a large number of students, it became increasingly important for CUS leaders to analyze the political terrain to successfully navigate it and benefit from it. The abundance of "New Left" and student movement coverage in the mainstream and student press was a prod to action. CUS' national office began to circulate numerous articles both internally and externally. This practice was particularly common through late 1965 and early 1966 due to the efforts of Paul Ladouceur who succeeded Doug Ward as Associate Secretary of International Affairs. While the circulation of articles in this manner would subside after Ladouceur's term, it did serve to normalize political discussion and debate within the union. This led to larger numbers of increasingly sophisticated working papers being submitted for congress each summer. The CUS leadership was becoming increasingly political in its approach to union matters, analyzing society and expressing that analysis through documents written to raise the political consciousness of students and to encourage political action. Like Goodings, Kenniff's article in the Montreal Catholic monthly, *Challenge*, was distributed to the entire CUS mailing list. This made student council leaders aware of the incoming president's embrace of the political nature of the tasks for the union, including the goal of eliminating financial barriers to education and the necessity of students being agents of social change.[71] The union's syndicalist turn in the political environment of late 1964 and early 1965 was developing the CUS leadership as a minor intellectual milieu, which in turn would accelerate the politicization and radicalization of CUS.

[71] CUS, NAC, MG28-I61, Box 3, June 1965, "To All Presidents/To All CUS Chairmen," (June 22 1965).

Congress '65

Student council leaders across English Canada converged on CUS' 29th congress in Lennoxville, Quebec with a newfound sense of purpose and possibility. In the wake of the spring events, student unions, and not only the New Left activists of SUPA, began an exploration of syndicalism and the implications for the Canadian Union of Students. Following a CUS-sponsored seminar in Regina on student syndicalism, one student identified both UGEQ and SDS as expressions of this new syndicalism while observing that the "seeds of syndicalism" could also be found in the University of Manitoba's Students' Union's resolutions on South Africa and Selma, a suggestion that could easily be attributed to CUS and its South Africa program and calls for university reform.[72] The influence of SUPA and SDS's Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) was also evident as the prospectus on the Kingston Community Project (KCP) was among the documents distributed to the delegates at Lennoxville.[73] This led directly to the passing of a motion on "Student Community Action Projects" which proposed the establishment of local committees to study the prospects of such projects and mandating the Queen's University delegation to study and distribute the lessons of the KCP to the rest of the union.[74]

Building upon the year's previous efforts to "freeze the fees" and the brief to the Bladen Commission calling for an elimination of tuition fees, a resolution calling for "universal accessibility" to post-secondary education was passed with the abolition of

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[72] CUS, NAC, MG28-I61, Box 3, June 1965, *The Manitoban* "Syndicalism in Quebec's "Quiet Revolution" sparks Western Canadian student seminar," (May 27 1965).
[73] CUS, NAC, MG28-I61, Box 4, August 1965, "To all congress delegates," (August 14 1965). On the Kingston Community Project, see Richard Harris, *Democracy in Kingston: A Social Movement in Urban Politics 1965-1970* (Montreal 1988).
[74] WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "Resolutions 1965," (1965), 7.

tuition fees seen as a "first step" towards an end to all financial and social barriers to education and the "democratization" of the university.[75] With only one dissenting vote, the union decided to organize an education campaign as well as a round of demonstrations on a "National Student Day" which the secretariat would later declare to be October 27, 1965.[76]

Conceived as an "integral part of our commitment to education and human rights," the international program was restored through a series of new resolutions, two of which related directly to the war in Vietnam and another to South Africa.[77] The Vietnam resolutions, both advanced by the University of Toronto student council, avoided any sweeping condemnations of American imperialism or Canadian complicity. Instead, the first resolution called upon the union to send a bilingual representative to Southeast Asia on a fact-finding mission, and construct an educational program and speaking tour around its results. The motion also called for CUS to endorse and promote the upcoming International Teach-In being organized with the support of University of Toronto President Claude Bissell.[78] The second Vietnam motion called upon the Canadian government, which had been part of the Geneva Accords' International Control Commission, to set about resolving the conflict in a peaceful manner through an "independent position."[79] This cautious approach may not have reflected the actual sentiments of the student leaders regarding the war. In fact, the very willingness of CUS students to develop an education program suggests that its advocates believed that

[75] WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "Resolutions 1965," (1965), 4-5.
[76] "CUS Dislikes Barriers to Post-Secondary Students," *The Carleton*, September 17 1965, 4.
[77] WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "Resolutions 1965," (1965), 36.
[78] Claude Bissell, *Halfway up the Parnassus: A Personal Account of the University of Toronto 1932-1971* (Toronto 1974), 124-125.
[79] WRA, ACUS, Box 96, "Resolutions 1965," 33-35.

students in general were uninformed on the war, and any further education would lead one to oppose it. The program, therefore, was most likely a conscious attempt to politicize the student body without alienating the students and galvanizing a political opposition. If the representative nature of CUS was acknowledged, based as it was on student council membership and not individual student members, it had a conservatizing effect on the student council leadership.

Associated with the South Africa program and engaged with SUPA at its founding, Doug Ward won the CUS presidential election for the 1966-67 academic year. If some delegates were wary of electing a leftist president, their fears may have been allayed by the reports of the two past presidents, David Jenkins and Jean Bazin. Bazin praised Ward's efforts without mentioning him by name, observing that "our attempt to develop an international outlook among our students" was the union's "most considerable undertaking" of the year.[80] Jenkins' report adopted a more freewheeling approach consistent with the new mood of students, self-consciously adding that "Student leaders realize that all their predecessors were stodgy, old-fashioned and probably quite stupid." With that, he argued strongly for "more of our time, energy and money" to be devoted to international affairs with a focus on developing countries, observing that "Canada, until recently a colony itself (some may argue we haven't escaped this status), is not distasteful to the majority of the world's students."[81] In making such statements, Jenkins may have in fact been promoting further involvement in the realm of international student politics, namely the Cold War battlefield of the IUS and ISC. This understanding of "international affairs" had always been an elitist one, limited to a handful of Canadian student leaders

[80] WRA, ACUS, Box 95, Jean Bazin, "President's Report: 1964-65," (1965), 6.
[81] WRA, ACUS, Box 95, David Jenkins, "Report of the 1963-64 President," (1965), 1.

sent to the international congresses which were largely unknown and practically irrelevant to the vast majority of university students. The syndicalist idea infusing much of the 1965 congress was linked with a more relevant approach to international politics, as shaped by the Selma solidarity demonstrations. Part of the idea of syndicalism was actual engagement with students, hence the Vietnam education program and National Student Day.

Questions surrounding UGEQ were also discussed. Paul Ladouceur, outgoing Quebec region president of CUS and incoming Associate Secretary of International Affairs, lamented the initial polarizing affect the CUS-UGEQ split had had on French-English relations. As a result, he welcomed the failure of efforts by some English students to form an "Association of Quebec Students" which he argued would have reinforced French-English divisions in the province. Ultimately, the excitement and vibrancy surrounding the "Quebec Revolution" and broader political transformations had created a basis on which relations could improve.[82] Even Bazin's report chose to reinterpret the split as an opportunity to develop new policies and new understandings between "the two nations of our country."[83] There was a better appreciation of CUS' past mistakes, as demonstrated in the drafting of the CUS submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, but the congress made no substantial efforts to rectify the ongoing lack of cooperation between the two national unions, with the exception of a resolution recognizing UGEQ as the legitimate Quebec student union.

Although CUS made no concrete effort to begin cooperating with UGEQ, especially in Quebec itself, the union did codify its new found syndicalism. Drafted and

[82] WRA, ACUS, Box 95, Paul Ladouceur, "Quebec Regional President 1964-65," (1965), 1-3.
[83] WRA, ACUS, Box 95, Jean Bazin, "President's Report 1964-65," (1965), 1.

introduced by syndicalist University of Ottawa student leaders, and seconded by a New Leftist University of Alberta contingent, resolution UA-42 read,

> The Canadian Union of Students declares that:
>
> 1. The Canadian student is a member of society who is intensively engaged in the pursuit of knowledge and truth and who has both the capability as a student and the responsibility as a citizen to contribute to his society's well-being;
> 2. The Canadian student has the right to establish a democratic representative student association governed by its student constituents;
> 3. The Canadian student has a vital interest in the administrative and academic affairs of the institution, and as the right to have his views represented;
> 4. The Canadian student has a vital interest in the future of his country, and has the right and responsibility to exert pressure in favour of his goals;
> 5. The Canadian student is a member of a global society, with the duty to be concerned about his fellow citizen, and the responsibility to promote human rights and mutual understanding.[84]

On educational policy, CUS was now advocating the abolition of tuition fees as a first step towards broader reductions in barriers to education as well as the democratization of the university. With National Student Day, it had committed these ideas to action. The union's internationalism was also developing at a rapid pace; its positions on South Africa entailed concrete action, though the position on Vietnam only implicitly took sides, simply stating that the union wanted "peace in Vietnam."[85] The motion on "Student Community Action Projects" also laid the groundwork for firm links to be cemented between CUS and SUPA, as well as the yet-to-be-formed Company of Young Canadians, which had pulled Stewart Goodings and SUPA's Arthur Pape into its leadership ranks.

[84] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 4, September 1965, "UA-42."
[85] "CUS rep for Vietnam?" *The Carleton*, September 17, 1965, 4.

Pape in turn successfully recruited Ward for CYC membership.[86] As Robert Clift has argued in his detailed survey of CUS' education policies, the 1965 congress "was the crossroads between the remnants of the NFCUS' conservative, low-key lobbying embodied by outgoing president Jean Bazin's work, a dynamic-but-centrist orientation under president Patrick Kenniff, and the activist leftist tendency of president-elect Doug Ward."[87] Rhetorically and intellectually, the transition to syndicalism was being made. Practically, the transition would prove much more difficult.

The Vietnam Program

The energy of the previous spring may have oriented CUS in a new direction, but it was no substitute for the successful implementation of the new international affairs resolutions at each member campus. Within weeks of the congress, Ladouceur began this process, first by encouraging member unions and their respective CUS committees to appoint an "International Affairs Coordinator", preferably a student with previous organizing skills, and familiar with CUS, who could carry out the "general terms" of the relevant resolutions.[88] This was followed up two months later with a more detailed explanation of what the program could entail. A wide variety of suggestions were made, including the sponsorship of debates, lectures, seminars, teach-ins or even a discussion of Canadian policy on Vietnam in model parliaments.[89] It was even proposed to seek out help from the Student Christian Movement, SUPA and anyone who helped organize for

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[86] Margaret Daly, *The Revolution Game: The Short, Unhappy Life of the Company of Young Canadians* (Toronto 1970), 28-30.
[87] Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 38.
[88] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 4, September 1965, Paul Ladouceur, "Re: International Affairs Program, 1965-66," (September 29 1965), 1-2.
[89] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, Paul Ladouceur, "Viet Nam, 1956-66," (November 23 1965), 3.

the October International Teach-In in Toronto.[90] This was a strong indication of how the CUS leadership felt about the war in Vietnam.

Delayed at first by the union's focus on National Student Day, an ambitious itinerary and call-out for a student representative to Southeast Asia were only drafted in late November.[91] The call-out proposed a three week visit in South Vietnam, a ten day journey via Cambodia, Thailand and Laos to North Vietnam, and following three weeks there, a two week visit to Peking and Hong Kong before returning to Canada.[92] The trip would be followed up by a two week tour in Canada in early April and a presentation to the newly constituted Seminar on Student International Affairs, a body that had been set up the previous year to discuss issues relating to the International Student Conference and International Union of Students.[93]

Applications from interested students were due by December 24 and selection of the representative was to be completed by December 31. However, as of the first week of January, only four students had applied and no member unions had contributed any funds. To compound the problems, the Canadian Press picked up and distributed an erroneous *Toronto Star* story claiming the union was "offering college students and recent graduates a free, three-month trip to Southeast Asia – including North Vietnam and Communist China" and that up to 25 students would be going.[94] The trip was far from free for CUS. From discussions with Dimitri Roussopoulos and a member of the

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[90] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, Paul Ladouceur, "Viet Nam, 1956-66," (November 23 1965), 4.
[91] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, December 1965, *CUS Newsletter*, 2/1, (December 1965), 2.
[92] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, "Canadian Union of Students Representative to South-East Asia, January-May 1966."
[93] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, "Canadian Union of Students Representative to South-East Asia, January-May 1966."
[94] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, January 1966, Paul Ladouceur, "Memorandum: CUS Representative to South-East Asia," (January 5 1966), 2.

Canadian Friends Service Committee, it appeared that the trip was estimated to cost a total of $4,000.[95] In response, Ladouceur sent a memo around to the secretariat on January 5. It was peppered with pessimism. "Everyone seems to think that the money can be found without any trouble," he complained, "but no one quite knows where." The Communist Party and their front organization, the Canadian Peace Congress, were discussed as possible funders but were rejected since Ladouceur believed this would ultimately discredit the veracity of the fact-finding tour.[96] UGEQ, when approached to help support the tour, also rebuffed the project as not having "sufficient merit." Ladouceur's memo was in fact a long-winded post-mortem. "The risk is that the immediate impact will be zero," concluded Ladouceur, "while the long range benefits may fall flat or be of dubious value." He added, "a search for the causes and factors of the present conflict is better carried out in a university library."[97]

The ambitious tour was finally cancelled when Rae Murphy, editor of *SCAN Magazine*, contacted CUS to let them know that he had just completed a two-week Communist Party-funded tour of North Vietnam which included a meeting with Ho Chi Minh. Ladouceur forwarded Murphy's offer to speak to students if any CUS member unions were interested in hosting.[98]

Although the speaking tour never materialized, a steady stream of documents and reading lists on Vietnam were distributed from the national office. The critical nature of many of the documents was apparent from the 1965 congress onwards. Cy Gonick's

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[95] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, January 1966, Paul Ladouceur, "Memorandum: CUS Representative to South-East Asia," (January 5 1966), 3.
[96] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, January 1966, Paul Ladouceur, "Memorandum: CUS Representative to South-East Asia," (January 5 1966), 4.
[97] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, January 1966, Paul Ladouceur, "Memorandum: CUS Representative to South-East Asia," (January 5 1966), 6.
[98] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, January 1966, Paul Ladouceur, "Bulletin: Viet Nam," (January 18 1966).

"What every Canadian can learn from Vietnam," first published in *Canadian Dimension*, was one of the more popular pamphlets.[99] Critical essays and books by SDS president Carl Oglesby, Jean-Paul Sartre, Seymour Hersh and others were also promoted alongside official American and Canadian government documents.[100] In mid-January, another series of essays on Vietnam was distributed specifically to support the claim that Canada's role in the International Control Commission was facilitating and justifying South Vietnamese and American military efforts.[101] Two weeks later, six documents from the North Vietnamese, Chinese and Soviet governments were also distributed, including the political program of the National Liberation Front.[102] As CUS gravitated towards a more critical approach to the American and Canadian roles in Vietnam and continued to cooperate with SUPA in various limited and usually unpublicized capacities, it was accused of helping American draft dodgers, a claim it promptly denied.[103]

The education campaign was given a boost by Canada-Vietnam Week, a series of events in various cities organized and supported by SUPA between March 1-8, 1966. Despite the emergence of a Canadian anti-war movement, the majority of Canadian students in early 1966 were not anti-war. A poll conducted by the McGill student council in early February found that half of students surveyed strongly or moderately supported the American position while only 38 percent were strongly or moderately opposed. Even 57 percent of those who opposed the war felt that American peace overtures were

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[99] C.W. Gonick, "What Every Canadian Should Know About Vietnam," *Canadian Dimension*, 2/1, (May-June 1965), 3-7; 2/2 (July-August 1965), 3-5; 2/3, (September-October 1965), 7-9.
[100] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, December 1965, "Documents on Viet Nam," (December 30 1965).
[101] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, January 1966, "Bulletin: Documents on Viet Nam," (January 14 1966).
[102] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, February 1966, "Documents on Viet Nam," (January 31 1966).
[103] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, May 1966, "Press Release," (May 16 1966). On two separate occasions, the 1968-69 CUS leadership did entertain the idea of providing services for American war resisters. See Jessica Squires, "A Refuge from Militarism? The Canadian Movement to Support Vietnam Era War Resisters, and Government Responses, 1965-1973," PhD Carleton University, 2009, 53-54.

sincere.[104] A second poll, using the McGill survey questions, was taken at York University after Canada-Vietnam Week, finding 63 percent strongly or moderately in favour while only 35 strong or moderately opposed. Like McGill, a small majority – 51 percent – of anti-war students found the American peace efforts sincere.[105]

The polls merely confirmed what the CUS leadership knew at the 1965 congress. It had already considered it "unrealistic" for the union to take a particular stance on the war in Vietnam. This meant that the justifications for the program remained vague and abstract, appealing to elitist conceptions of the university student and a dose of nationalism. As Ladouceur explained, students ought to engage in the CUS Vietnam program "by reason of their greater knowledge and special training to become the leaders of tomorrow's world." He added that Canada's "prestige" was at stake, and except for "a few platitudes," there was no serious public debate on the matter; students had the opportunity to advance such a debate. It was also argued that the union's commitment should be "world peace through a policy of education and information on international affairs."[106] The union's syndicalist turn in 1965 had yet to fully displace the notion of students as privileged elite, replacing it with an understanding of the "young intellectual worker" as described in the *Charte de Grenoble* that animated UGEQ.

Despite these findings, the education program, the emerging anti-war movement and the escalation of the war in Vietnam all helped lead CUS to taking a firm position on the war at the 1966 congress in Halifax. Through the leadership of the University of

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[104] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, February 1966, Paul Ladouceur, "Viet Nam Opinion Poll," (February 8 1966), 5.
[105] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, April 1966, "For Information: Viet Nam Opinion Poll," (April 4 1966), 1-2.
[106] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, Paul Ladouceur, "Viet Nam, 1956-66," (November 23 1965), 1, 4.

Waterloo contingent, a lengthy International Student Conference resolution condemning American imperialism in Vietnam and supporting the "heroic struggles of the Vietnamese people for social justice and national independence" was passed as the general policy of the union.[107] A related motion, also advanced by the Waterloo students, urged the creation of Vietnam committees on each campus to organize students, raise awareness about Canada's pro-American role in the ICC and to investigate Canada's economic interests in Vietnam.[108] Even before the union had adopted this clear anti-war stance, it had already found an opposition developing both internally and externally. However, discontent over the union's leftward direction was overshadowed by developments in Quebec.

"Do you wish McGill to remain in UGEQ?"

In mid-1965, the debate among McGill students over UGEQ membership escalated dramatically. The joint McGill-AGEUM tuition fees demonstration on March 22, 1965, and the UGEQ-led sit-in at the US consulate in Montreal the day after had led a large number of McGill students, including student council leaders, to support the new student union. The student council responded by forming a committee to meet over the summer

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[107] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 7, September 1966, "Resolutions 1966," 19-24. This is perhaps the most significant resolution ever taken by the ISC. At this point, observes Kotek, the ISC and American National Student Association, both came into conflict with its CIA backers which had nevertheless tolerated the ISC adopting mildly leftist and anti-colonialist resolutions since the mid-1950s. See Joël Kotek, *Students and the cold war*, Tr. Ralph Blumenau (New York 1996), 220. If the CIA was ever intending to counteract the ISC's policy on Vietnam, it was pre-empted by a small number of National Student Association leaders who blew the whistle on the CIA's involvement in the ISC, NSA and other national student unions including CUS. They were motivated in large part by their opposition to the war in Vietnam. For the article which exposed the CIA's covert funding, see Sol Stern, "A Short Account of International Student Politics & the Cold War with Particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, Etc.," *Ramparts*, 5/9 (March 1967), 29-37. According to Hugh Armstrong, the 1967-68 CUS president, Doug Ward was also involved in helping with the *Ramparts* article. NAC, Hugh Armstrong fonds (hereafter HAF), MG31-D66, Volume 1, File 3, Hugh Armstrong "untitled," 10.

[108] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 7, September 1966, "Resolutions 1966," 25.

of 1965 and study UGEQ's politics and history in order to determine whether McGill students should seek out membership in UGEQ. Completed shortly after the 1965 CUS congress, the study expressed a sympathetic and at times enthusiastic account of UGEQ's syndicalist philosophy and its potential role in the Quiet Revolution.[109] It conceded that nationalism was a force within UGEQ, but argued that syndicalism, not "ethno-centrism," was the underlying basis of unity. McGill's students would, the study concluded, become isolated from Quebec's broader student movement if they did not join UGEQ and actively engage in Quebec's social and political transformation.[110]

The report spurred the student council leadership into action. On October 13, a large council majority voted to join the new national student union in Quebec. The motion, promoted by McGill's first female student union president, Sharon Sholzberg, sought to secure dual membership despite UGEQ's policy against it.[111] Unexpectedly, McGill's lead was followed by Marianopolis six days later. The day after that, Sir George Williams, which had been out of CUS for several years, struck a committee to explore UGEQ membership. Only Loyola and Bishop's expressed no interest in joining UGEQ prior to the October 28-30 UGEQ congress in Quebec City.[112]

The decision by McGill unleashed a storm of controversy, particularly in Montreal, where McGill's students found themselves torn between two student unions and engaged in a larger battle between English Canadian and Québécois nationalists. A *Montreal Star* editorial argued that the English Canadian students in Quebec would

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[109] WRA, ACUS, Box 17, McGill University Students' Society, "Report of the commission on UGEQ," (November 15 1965), 3-5.
[110] WRA, ACUS, Box 17, McGill University Students' Society, "Report of the commission on UGEQ," (November 15 1965), 23-4.
[111] "McGill Council Votes to Join UGEQ," *McGill Daily*, October 14, 1965.
[112] Canadian University Press, "CUS could lose two," *The Carleton*, October 22, 1965, 1.

eventually find themselves without an effective voice, marginalized within UGEQ, a union that was supporting, to the *Star*'s dislike, Vietnam draft dodgers from the United States.[113] AGEUM's newspaper, *Quartier Latin*, warned readers that McGill students were being misled by their student leaders who were interested more in "ideological muscle-flexing" than taking a stand on which union's philosophy was more effective.[114] All sides could at least agree that CUS was the more conservative student union.

On behalf of CUS, Kenniff waded into the debate diplomatically, acknowledging the logic of considering membership in a strong union like UGEQ, but remaining openly concerned about the possible weakening of the "student voice" on the national level. "I don't feel that McGill or Marianopolis or the other English-speaking universities in Quebec would want to sever their ties with the rest of Canada by withdrawing from CUS."[115] Kenniff was rebuffed by Sholzberg and the McGill student council which demonstrated their intentions by absenting themselves from organizing any actions for CUS' National Student Day on October 27.

Three Anglophone councils – McGill, Marianopolis and Sir George Williams – formally joined UGEQ on October 28 at the congress. McGill was provided membership on the condition it withdrew from CUS at the September 1966 CUS congress.[116] This condition, mandated by the UGEQ constitution, was rejected by a general assembly of McGill students on November 16. To resolve the deadlock, a referendum was called on December 1 to resolve whether or not McGill would remain in UGEQ.[117]

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[113] WRA, ACUS, Box 17, *The Montreal Star*, "Regrettable Move," (November 5 1965).
[114] WRA, ACUS, Box 17, Roch Denis, "McGill at l'UGEQ," *Quartier Latin*, October 28, 1965.
[115] "Kennif [sic] won't object," *The Carleton*, October 22, 1965, 1.
[116] Canadian University Press, "CUS Loses Three," *The Carleton*, November 5, 1965, 1.
[117] Canadian University Press, "CUS Loses Three," The Carleton, November 5, 1965, 1.

Meeting in Ottawa from November 19-21, the CUS Board of Directors unanimously reaffirmed its position that student unions in Quebec be allowed membership in both CUS and UGEQ. The resolution was introduced by CUS' Quebec region president, Peter Maloney.[118] Following the advice of the CUS advisory committee, a body consisting of former CUS leaders and a handful of faculty and politicians,[119] the Board of Directors recommended supporting UGEQ's admission into both the International Student Conference and the International Union of Students.[120] This move was a sign, in strained circumstances, of Kenniff's willingness to at least maintain good relations with UGEQ.

The battle at McGill entered a new phase when Kenniff's request to speak at McGill was turned down by Sholzberg on the grounds that no UGEQ speaker would participate and that "McGill students and McGill students alone will decide what external affiliation or non-affiliation with outside associations there will be."[121] CUS responded with a sternly worded press release arguing that both Kenniff and Robert Nelson, the UGEQ president, ought to be able to address McGill students to inform them about the issues at hand. Sholzberg's actions, CUS argued, were tantamount to a "negation of the right to free speech" and "an attempt to confine the range of opinions expressed to those advocated by the McGill Executive."[122] The referendum question itself – "Do you wish McGill to remain in UGEQ?" – was also declared unclear and confusing. It avoided the two main issues: whether McGill students wished to participate in the unilingual UGEQ,

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[118] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 4, November 1965, "Board of Directors Meeting, November 19-21, 1965," 8.
[119] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 4, July 1965, Mildred Morton, "Summary of proceedings of the Canadian Union of Students Advisory Committee," (July 13 1965), 5.
[120] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 4, November 1965, "Board of Directors Meeting, November 19-21, 1965," 8.
[121] Canadian University Press, "CUS President Silenced at McGill," *The Carleton*, November 26, 1965, 1.
[122] CUS, NAC, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, "Press Release," (November 25 1965), 1-2.

and do so only on the condition of being prevented from maintaining CUS membership. The press release ended with an olive branch, an olive branch stemming from the union's policy of dual membership: McGill was recognized as "a leading force in advocating progressive student policy" at the 1965 congress and CUS welcomed McGill's efforts to participate in "the development of a dynamic and progressive Quebec."[123]

A large turnout at the first referendum resulted in a slim majority defeating UGEQ membership.[124] However, the result was thrown out due to a technicality forcing a new referendum to be held January 26, 1966. CUS efforts to keep its foothold in Quebec were dealt a serious blow when, on December 10, the *McGill Daily* published "The Bazin Papers," which consisted of Bazin's secret report on the founding UGEQ congress in November 1964. The *McGill Daily*, which leaned further left than the McGill student council, described Bazin's report as "a malange [sic] of fear, bewilderment, neo-colonialism and irration [sic]." It concluded that "CUS's reaction to the Quiet Revolution has been to hire a spy. He has now come in from the cold. And his report is an icicle...pointing directly at the heart of Confederation."[125] Despite this, the second referendum was defeated.[126] However, Bazin's report and the pro-UGEQ editorial line of the *Daily* reinforced the convictions of a determined pro-UGEQ minority on the McGill campus to engage the Quebec student movement and reject Anglophone nationalism. Sholzberg submitted her resignation to the student council after the defeat, only to have it

[123] CUS, NAC, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, "Press Release," (November 25 1965), 3.
[124] Jim Hoffman, "Will McGill Join the Trek to UGEQ," *The Martlet*, January 6, 1966, 1.
[125] Jim Hoffman, "Will McGill Join the Trek to UGEQ," *The Martlet*, January 6, 1966, 6.
[126] WRA, ACUS, Box 11, Patrick Kenniff, "President's Report – 1965-66," 15.

rejected by the council. As she explained, to the average person in Quebec, "once again McGill has proven to be the bastion of the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy."[127]

New Ideas and New Opponents

The 1966 CUS congress was not radically different from the 1965 congress. Each trend established in 1965 was merely extended and deepened, though this did open up new avenues of analysis. The Vietnam program, as discussed, matured between the 1965 and 1966 congresses from an educational program on the conflict to adopting the International Student Conference resolution opposing American imperialism and supporting the right of Vietnamese to self-determination. CUS was also active in registering its support for students facing repression in South Africa, Greece, Portugal and Rhodesia.[128] Generally, students were becoming increasingly aware and engaged with international political issues, especially the war in Vietnam. The war was starting to provide a steady stream of recruits for the New Left. The convictions of CUS' increasingly syndicalist leadership were also hardened, maintaining sufficient momentum for the union to continue its journey leftward.

Developing from the policy of universal accessibility, the 1966 congress marked the union's earliest foray into questions of class. Universal accessibility had been vindicated and become more relevant with the results of CUS' extensive Student Means Survey published in February 1966. Described as "the most sophisticated analysis of the

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[127] Quoted in George Z.F. Bereday, "Student Unrest on Four Continents: Montreal, Ibadan, Warsaw, and Rangoon," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Student Politics* (New York 1967), 102.
[128] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, December 1966, "Students call for UN Rhodesian Force," (November 13 1965). NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, February 1966, "Letter of support to the National Union of Greek Students," (February 22 1966). NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, May 1966, "Solidarity with Portuguese Students," (March 24 1966). NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, May 1966, "President of NUSA Banned," (May 12 1966).

socio-economic conditions of Canadian undergraduates ever done,"[129] the survey brought class divisions into stark relief, revealing a significant over-representation of middle- and upper-class students at universities.[130] The findings meshed well with the monumental work by John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, published only the previous year.[131] Porter's work caused a stir in the academy, a stir which quickly and inevitably found its way to students. CUS had facilitated this process through the circulation of an important review of *The Vertical Mosaic*. The review, first published in *Canadian Dimension*, was authored by Gad Horowitz, a leftist professor at McGill.[132] At first, universal accessibility emerged out of liberal conceptions of and values towards education. Yet, the very idea of universal accessibility and its promise of social mobility opened up a new dialogue about class within the union, a dialogue that would prove to have radical implications in the political context of the 1960s. It also added a new dimension to the question of democracy.

The union's position on the necessity of university reform, first articulated in early 1965, was legitimized by the findings of the Duff-Berdahl Commission published in March 1966. The commission suggested that without student and faculty representation on administrative bodies "disturbances" and even "student rebellions" would be likely.[133] The English Canadian campuses were not immune. At the University of Victoria, a "fees strike" was organized by the student council to withhold tuition fees in January 1966. In

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[129] Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 43.
[130] Robert Rabinovitch, *An Analysis of the Canadian Post Secondary Student Population* (Ottawa 1966), 37-40.
[131] John A. Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: an analysis of social class and power in Canada* (Toronto 1965). Porter would continue to serve as a reference point for the development of Marxism amongst English Canadian New Leftists. A good example of this can be found in Philip Resnick, "The Dynamics of Power in Canada (Vertical Mosaic Revisited)," *Our Generation* 6/1-2 (May-June-July 1968), 134-154.
[132] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, March 1966, Gad Horowitz, "Creative Politics."
[133] Warren Gerard, "Report advocates shakeup in Canada's universities," *The Globe and Mail*, March 14 1966, 1, 13.

an attempt to create a form of collective bargaining, the goal of the strike was to force the administration to consult the student council each year about the fee structure. Although a referendum garnered 85.2 percent student support for the strike, and half of the three thousand students pledged to withhold fees, the university's threat of expulsion for those who did not pay led to a capitulation by students.[134] After the 1966 congress, the reform of university structures would become a central issue for student activists on the campus through 1966 and 1967.[135]

CUS' New Left credentials and external perceptions of its radicalism continued to grow as its relationship with SUPA and the government-funded Company of Young Canadians deepened. Stewart Goodings and Doug Ward became important leaders of the CYC following its formation in late 1965. Their involvement led to CYC anti-poverty documents being circulated to the CUS congress in relation to Windsor's "Student Community Action Project" resolution. CYC also issued calls to CUS member student councils to facilitate CYC recruitment where possible.[136] Another example of this overlap in leadership was SUPA staff member, Kenneth Drushka, who doubled as a CUS staff member. Drushka, who had been a journalist with the *Globe & Mail*, wrote a number of articles on the student movement and educational reform that were circulated by CUS.[137]

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[134] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, March 1966, Mike Horn, "The Victoria Fees Strike," (March 7 1966), 2-3.
[135] Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 51.
[136] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, Rolli Cacchioni, "CYC Documents," (November 18 1965). NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, February 1966, Rolli Cacchioni, "Student Community Action Projects," (February 1 1966). NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, February 1967, Doug Ward, "Recruiting Program of the Company of Young Canadians."
[137] See NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 5, November 1965, Kenneth Drushka, "Real Questions Not Raised in Education Debate," (November 18 1965); Kenneth Drushka, "The CYC," *The Canadian Forum*, February 1966, 242-244. Reprinted in NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 6, March 1966, Kenneth Drushka, "The CYC."

The only radically new idea at the 1966 congress was introduced in an article distributed to the congress, co-authored by James Laxer and Arthur Pape.[138] Laxer and Pape came out openly against American influence and power in Canada and blamed the Liberals of King and Pearson as "colonial caretaker regimes."[139] They lamented the inadequacy of "traditional Canadian nationalism" as a tool for social change, and wrote off the NDP as subservient to "powerful US-dominated trade unions," suggesting instead that the radical democracy sought by the New Left contained the potential to free Canada of the "US branch-plant system."[140]

The document was peppered with explicit and implicit references to George Grant who had published the unexpected and highly influential bestseller, *Lament for a Nation*, in 1965.[141] Grant's influence on the emerging New Left was visible in the pages of *Canadian Dimension* where Cy Gonick, the Winnipeg-based editor who had graduated from Berkeley, provided a forum for Grant to engage the New Left. In the same magazine, Gad Horowitz also engaged Grant, most notably in his review essay of *Lament for a Nation.*[142] Beyond Gonick and Horowitz, who heaped praise on Grant's book, the first issue of *Our Generation*, the New Left reincarnation of the CUCND's *Our Generation Against Nuclear War*, carried a quote on the back from *Lament for a Nation* beginning with the declaration, "Canada has ceased to be a nation..."[143] Grant returned the favour by writing "A Critique of a New Left" which was republished in *Our Generation* and by SUPA as a pamphlet.[144]

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[138] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 7, August 1966, James Laxer and Arthur Pape, "The Young View."
[139] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 7, August 1966, James Laxer and Arthur Pape, "The Young View," 1.
[140] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 7, August 1966, James Laxer and Arthur Pape, "The Young View," 2-4.
[141] George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto 1965).
[142] Gad Horowitz, "Tories, Socialists and the Demise of Canada" *Canadian Dimension*, (May-June 1965).
[143] *Our Generation*, 4/2 (September 1966).
[144] George Grant, "A Critique of the New Left," *Our Generation*, 3/4-4/1 (May 1966), 46-51.

It was Grant's argument in the first half of *Lament for a Nation* which struck a chord with readers, especially those attuned to *Canadian Dimension*, the leading publication on the English Canadian left and a lively forum for debates on the "national question" in Quebec and Canada's economic and political relationship to the United States.[145] Grant's argument was strong as well as easily discernable. He expressed his view that Diefenbaker's reign was a flawed and failed attempt to resuscitate Canadian nationalism as a means to reassert an independent Canada which had virtually disappeared under the premierships of Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent.[146] Where the left quibbled with Grant was on his belief that socialism could not overcome American liberal imperialism. Grant believed that American liberalism, as opposed to socialism, allowed technological progress to subordinate human need and suppress human desires, allowing it to "dissolve opposition."[147] Horowitz disputed this in his review essay, dismissing Grant's "overpowering" determinism and "uncompromising" pessimism.[148] In taking this tone, Grant certainly did not reflect the optimism of the emerging New Left.

Laxer, a history student at Queen's University and early SUPA member, began organizing seminars on Canadian history and Canadian nationalism and by 1966 was producing a series of widely read articles, including the aforementioned piece circulated

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[145] Early examples of such articles include, Scott Gordon, "Foreign Investment in Canada," *Canadian* Dimension, 1/1-2 (October/November 1963), 18-20; H.C. Pentland, "A Plan for a Canadian Owned Economy," *Canadian* Dimension, 1/8 (September/October 1964), 5-8; C.W. Gonick, "A Political Program for Canada in 1965," *Canadian Dimension,* 2/2 (January/February 1965), 3-4; Gad Horowitz, "The Future of English Canada," *Canadian Dimension,* 2/5 (July/August 1965), 12, 25.
[146] Grant, *Lament for a Nation*, 9-10.
[147] Grant, *Lament for a Nation*, 56-7, 63-4.
[148] Horowitz, "Tories, Socialists and the Demise of Canada," 14.

by CUS.[149] Laxer's partner in these efforts was Arthur Pape who had stirred up controversy in SUPA when he joined the government-backed CYC.[150] Both Laxer and Pape, but Laxer in particular, represented an early dissenting "school" of the English Canadian New Left. Prior to the 1966 congress, Laxer had already written a lament for the Canadian student movement. In the fall of 1965, he observed CUS boldly embracing a policy of abolishing tuition fees, and preparing to send a representative on a tour of Southeast Asia. SUPA "was about to engage in dozens of Berkeley-style actions," McGill was joining UGEQ, UGEQ was "building student syndicalism" and the yet-to-formed CYC was being discussed by "everyone in the country."[151] But the movement went off track, argued Laxer, as SUPA's national office in Toronto "became too important to talk to local SUPA members," and CUS' National Student Day and Vietnam tour flopped. "[I]t has become apparent," lamented Laxer, "that student action takes more than feckless dream to make itself felt."[152]

When writing with Pape, Laxer's pessimism was submerged below a more positive interpretation of the New Left. In these collaborations, Laxer's arguments about American imperialism in Canada came to the fore, and began to play a role in a growing perception among English Canadian New Leftists of the high degree of American economic and political power in Canada. The ideas were greatly influenced by anti-colonial struggles abroad and by the Quiet Revolution in Quebec. Laxer was not alone in bringing activists around to seeing English Canada itself in a colonial context. A former

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[149] Laxer and Pape's article, "The Young View," was reprinted in *Canadian Dimension* as "The New Left...as it Sees Itself," *Canadian Dimension*, 4/2 (September/October 1966), 14-15. See also James Laxer and Arthur Pape, "Youth and Canadian Politics," *Our Generation*, 4/3 (November 1966), 15-21.
[150] Daly, *The Revolution Game*, 28-30. For a critical discussion of the Company of Young Canadians and its firm ties to the Canadian state, see Martin Loney, "A Political Economy of Citizen Participation," in Leo Panitch, ed., *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power* (Toronto 1977), 464-466.
[151] Jim Laxer, "Movement Weary," *The Carleton*, January 21, 1966, 10.
[152] Laxer, "Movement Weary," 10.

NDP Youth activist and SUPA leader James Harding, who had become well-known in CUS through his controversial firing from the University of Saskatchewan, helped generalize these ideas within the ranks of the New Left.[153] In the pages of *Our Generation*, Dimitri Roussopoulos asserted the need of a "bi-national voluntary union" between Canada and Quebec in order to stop American imperialism.[154] From its founding, SUPA embraced such ideas and sought to make available a wide array of pamphlets and articles dealing with questions of Canadian subordination to American foreign policy, economic power and political influence.[155]

Those influenced by both Laxer and the general gravitation of the New Left towards an anti-imperialist brand of Canadian nationalism included Doug Ward. In the latter half of 1966, Ward began to speak openly about the need to stop American imperialism in Canada particularly in the context of CUS relations with UGEQ.

Laxer's anti-imperialist conception of Canadian nationalism did not gain traction beyond the realm of ideas at the 1966 congress. It was not codified in any resolutions; nor did it play any significant role in influencing new resolutions and programs. However, Laxer's view served to clarify and sharpen the ideas of the CUS leadership. As this happened, a new problem arose. A small number of conservative student leaders had gained power of their local student councils in a minor backlash against the political turn of CUS and a number of local student councils.[156]

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[153] For a detailed background of the University of Saskatchewan's decision not to rehire Jim Harding for the 1965-66 academic year, see NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 7, August 1966, "Submission on Academic Freedom (Re James Harding)."
[154] "Editorial Statement on Quebec," *Our Generation*, 4/2 (September 1966), 1-12. See pages 5-12 in particular.
[155] WRA, CUCND, Box 15a, "SUPA Literature List."
[156] See discussion below of the 1966-67 University of Alberta and McGill student councils.

As the new executive began to prepare for the 1966 congress, the first open signs of conservative rebellion against CUS' New Left politics came out of Edmonton. Although the University of Alberta Students' Union had been one of the key forces behind the leftward trajectory of CUS, seconding, for example, the syndicalist UA-42 resolution at the 1965 congress, its incoming 1966 leadership chose to initiate a process of slow disaffiliation in response to the "mild New Left" regime of the previous student council president, Richard Price.[157] The two University of Alberta Students' Union leaders, President Branny Schepanovich and Vice-President Marilyn Pilkington, spearheaded the attack, arguing that CUS policy was not democratic, "beyond the comprehension of students," and, in reference to the Vietnam program, not within the union's mandate.[158] When the 1966 congress began in the first week of September, it became clear to most CUS delegates that the dissenting opinions emanating from Edmonton were not genuine, driven by stated concerns about internal democracy or the union's potential overextension. Rather, the dissidents were motivated by their own political ideology. According to a 1968 article in *Issue*, a short-lived CUS publication, Schepanovich's intervention at the congress in Halifax did not go over well. Comments from other delegates on Schepanovich's performance were too rude to print in *The Gateway*, the University of Alberta student newspaper.[159] Schepanovich was also quoted in the *Edmonton Journal* and *The Gateway* accusing CUS of being under Communist

[157] Doug Owram, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation* (Toronto 1996), 235.
[158] See Robert Clift's detailed discussion of these developments in Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 52-3. See also WRA, ACUS, Box 10, Letter from Marilyn Pilkington to Douglas Ward, July 18, 1966.
[159] Brian Campbell, "The Weird and Wacky West Has Given Birth to a New Movement: "The Deadest Campus,"" *Issue*, March 8 1968, 2. Cited in Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 53.

influence.[160] Schepanovich's accusations tended to detract from the very real political divisions emerging in CUS and the student population as a whole.

In a lengthy article in *The Gateway*, which was also issued by CUS as a press release, Doug Ward addressed Schepanovich's concerns point by point, but opened with a blunt statement:

> Actually it is not that Alberta has announced its intention to withdraw from the Union that is so disturbing. Rather, the reasons which they have put forward to justify this withdrawal indicate acceptance of the view that a student and his colleagues are passive consumers of facts with no capacity to act upon their academic community, the wider society of Canada, or the world.

Ward continued,

> Alberta's president, Branny Schepanovich, argues that he would like to see students involved with economic and social questions as individuals, but that as students they should concentrate solely on their studies and other immediate and particular concerns. This is an attractive argument until one realizes that its effect is to emasculate the student community, which, in an age which has opted out of direct social responsibility, is an immediate form of community which can be instrumental in reinvigorating a national involvement.[161]

In spite of the polemics, Ward was aware of the distance between the CUS leadership, local student union leadership and the "average" student. However, he was insistent that the withdrawal had nothing to do with these concerns but was driven by Alberta's reactionary opposition to CUS' "deepening concern for educational and social issues."[162]

Following Alberta's withdrawal after the 1966 congress, Richard Price and the remnants of the CUS committee attempted to overturn the council's decision at a general meeting. Despite the attendance of 664 students, the meeting failed to achieve quorum –

[160] Campbell, "The Weird and Wacky West Has Given Birth to a New Movement."
[161] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 7, October 1966, Doug Ward, "CUS and Alberta," 1.
[162] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 7, October 1966, Doug Ward, "CUS and Alberta," 5.

set at one thousand. With that, about four hundred students left the meeting, leaving Pilkington and Price to spar over the decision to pull-out of CUS. Price attacked the council for withdrawing without consulting the student body and doing so before the majority of students had returned to campus. "It was impossible for them to consult students in most faculties and gain an accurate sampling of campus opinion, so we find our council has been "unrepresentative" on a basic issue" explained Price. "Ironically, this is what they accused CUS of."[163]

If the arguments of Price and Ward had merit, they did not stop the withdrawal of Acadia and the small Prince Edward Island college of St. Dunstan's. The backlash was even felt at generally pro-CUS campuses such as Waterloo and Carleton where anti-activist student leaders undertook unsuccessful efforts to pull their councils out of CUS. Meanwhile, at a "stormy" student council meeting at Bishop's, students apparently voted to withdraw, although the vote went scandalously unrecorded.[164]

CUS had never before experienced a backlash from the right. Nearly all previous withdrawals had revolved around the question of Quebec and could be, given the syndicalist direction of Quebec student politics, interpreted as leftist withdrawals, though admittedly tied up with the national question. However, this right-wing backlash was still by no means as fundamental as the events that led to the formation of UGEQ. The withdrawals at Bishop's and the University of Alberta were carried out quite undemocratically. The subsequent failure of both student unions to rejoin CUS indicated that there was overwhelming support for neither the New Left incarnation of CUS nor the student right. Even so, it was clear that the emergence of the New Left was galvanizing

[163] "Revolt Within U of A Fails For Support," *The Martlet*, October 20, 1966, 8.
[164] "Now Bishop's-CUS fading fast," *The Carleton*, October 21, 1966, 1. Peter Johansen, "Carleton may leave CUS soon," *The Carleton*, November 11, 1966, 1.

the student right and beginning to polarize the campuses. As the right began to organize opposition, membership in UGEQ was the other major source of CUS' new wave of defections. It was also becoming apparent that the representative nature of CUS and its structures were bound to cause problems for a left-wing leadership in a period of political radicalization and polarization.

"I would have voted the same way"

The debate over UGEQ in Quebec's Anglophone universities and colleges did not subside as students returned to classes in the fall of 1966. The first-past-the-post electoral system led to the defeat of the reformist and modernizing Lesage Liberals in June 1966. Despite lagging nearly seven percent behind the Liberal popular vote, Union Nationale won six more seats due to its dominance in less populated rural ridings. Despite the fears of students, organized labour and the liberal intelligentsia, there was no return to "la grande noirceur" of the Duplessis-era.[165] Nevertheless, there were a number of actions taken by the government that angered its opposition. Students were immediately dismayed by the new premier, Daniel Johnson, who spoke of "placing the crucifix back in the schools."[166] It was fairly obvious that within Quebec, only UGEQ could effectively channel the power of the student movement, a student movement which drew its strength from the francophone majority. This situated the Anglophone New Left, especially at McGill, in an opportune position to spearhead the campaign for membership in UGEQ. It was just a matter of the McGill left uniting around a common cause.

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[165] Herbert Furlon Quinn, *The Union Nationale: Quebec nationalism from Duplessis to Levesque* (Toronto 1979), 222-230.
[166] Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Quebecois*, 17.

As CUS was becoming increasingly marginalized in Quebec, its Anglophone foothold becoming smaller and more tenuous, the CUS leadership set about forming friendly and constructive relations with UGEQ. After the leak of Bazin's account of the founding UGEQ congress, Kenniff, Ward and Ladouceur began talking with UGEQ leaders, in particular Robert Nelson, UGEQ's 1966 president. The two national unions cooperated with regards to the student pavilion at EXPO in Montreal and also began joint discussions on educational matters and student exchanges in the spring of 1966.[167] CUS had also publicly lobbied on Nelson's behalf when he was forced to resign from UGEQ to fulfill his commitments in the Regular Officer Training Plan, asserting that Nelson was of "immense value" to "an organization upholding the principle of equality of educational opportunity and encouraging the social and political involvement of students as responsible citizens."[168]

Having built-up this degree of trust, aided by his reputation as a New Left leader, Ward sat down with Nelson in late 1966 to resolve the CUS-UGEQ debate at the bilingual University of Ottawa. In late 1964, the University of Ottawa applied for membership in UGEQ. The effort was made by the University of Ottawa's syndicalist student council president, Jock Turcot. Over the 1965 Christmas break, Turcot was tragically killed in a car accident, but his legacy to CUS was the drafting of the original *Declaration of the Canadian Student*. Turcot was among the many francophone students in Ottawa who identified with UGEQ's syndicalism. While they had been been largely

[167] WRA, ACUS, Box 11, Patrick Kenniff, "President's Report – 1965-66," 16; WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Martha Tracey, "Memorandum on ISEP," (June 20 1967).
[168] WRA, ACUS, Box 17, "Telegram to the Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence," (May 18 1966).

welcomed at the UGEQ congress and later meetings, no formal membership had been acquired.[169]

Ward and Nelson quickly agreed that the University of Ottawa should not be in UGEQ. Although the union had no formal policy on the geographical nature of its membership, Nelson limited it to "students who are under the jurisdiction of Quebec education policy."[170] The discussion, however, was not a simple bureaucratic, territorial carve-up. The strength of the student council at the University of Ottawa remained paramount to both union presidents. It was suggested that Nelson visit the Quebec students in Ottawa to address their inevitable unhappiness with the decision and to argue that if the University of Ottawa student body was split, the student body "would be very easy to control by the administration of the University."[171]

Despite the agreement, Ward did not drop concerns about dual membership in both CUS and UGEQ within Quebec itself. Ward framed his argument around the question of American imperialism in Canada and Quebec. Until UGEQ came out in favour of political independence for Quebec, argued Ward, "then many of the unions from within UGEQ might feel that there is a great responsibility to participate in a Canada-wide student movement, especially since it is becoming more and more clear that the future of the top half of the North American continent seems to be bound up in the continuing existence of a Canada which includes Quebec."[172] This suggestion would foreshadow the future direction of the union's ideas about anti-imperialism, Canadian nationalism and Quebec and already beginning to shape Ward's politics through 1966.

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[169] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 1, November 1964, Jean Bazin "UGEQ – 1964," (November 24 1964). 7.
[170] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Doug Ward, "Memorandum: UGEQ File," (November 18 1966), 1.
[171] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Doug Ward, "Memorandum: UGEQ File," (November 18 1966).
[172] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Doug Ward, "Memorandum: UGEQ File," (November 18 1966), 1-2.

The argument did not resolve the issue at the meeting with Nelson. As relations warmed between the two national unions, Ward's ideas about Canadian anti-imperialism and Quebec self-determination would be put to the test at Loyola and McGill.

As Sir George Williams and Marianopolis joined UGEQ in late 1965, with McGill's students narrowly defeating UGEQ membership, Loyola College was still believed to be uninterested in UGEQ membership. However, the Loyola student council notified the 1966 CUS congress in Halifax of its desire to withdraw and its intention to hold a referendum on membership in the two national unions.[173] The referendum process, organized by André Guay, Loyola's student council External Vice-President, was conducted in a much more collegial and friendly manner than the campaign organized by Sholzberg at McGill the previous year. Guay invited both Ward and Hugh Armstrong, president-elect of CUS, to "push strongly for Loyola's participation in CUS, so as to insure that Loyola students are given a fair presentation of the CUS option in the referendum."[174] Robert Nelson and another UGEQ leader were also invited to speak. Delivered in late November, Ward's speech at Loyola struck the new theme – American imperialism in Canada. According to Ward, in the early 1960s there had been a need for English Canada to recognize Quebec as a distinct nation. In 1966, however, there was a new need to recognize the importance of a nation separate from that of the "American empire."[175]

The Loyola referendum was held on December 1, a full year after the first referendum at McGill. Of the 1243 votes cast, 528 voted to join only one union while the remainder of the votes were split between joining both unions or belonging to neither.

[173] WRA, ACUS, Box 13, Richard Aitken, "Loyola – Withdrawal From CUS," (September 1966).
[174] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Letter from André Guay to Doug Ward, November 11, 1966.
[175] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Dave Young, "Memorandum: Loyola Referendum," (December 1, 1966).

The second question, asking students which union to join, resulted in 651 votes for UGEQ and only 262 for CUS.[176] In a letter to Guay, Ward expressed his happiness with Loyola's decision as well as the 367 votes in favour of dual membership despite its admitted impossibility. Ward raised the new argument about American imperialism again. "I remain concerned that in the long-run the future of Quebec – and of Quebec students – must be bound up with that of the rest of us, if we are all to evade the American empire."[177] Loyola was a testing ground, and so far, Ward's appeals were not leading to support for CUS, though the ideas themselves may have influenced some. A greater challenge was about to come.

At McGill, varying political tendencies were entering into sharp conflict over a number of questions, including the political role, if any, of student councils, and McGill's relationship to UGEQ. The battle expressed itself most sharply in the student council. As had been the case with the election of Schepanovich and Pilkington to the executive of the University of Alberta Students' Union, two of the McGill student council executives, President Jim McCoubrey and Vice-President (external affairs) Arnie Aberman, were elected on a platform of avoiding all involvement in political issues not directly concerning "students as such."[178] These two found common cause with the University of Alberta student council's fight for a "non-political" CUS at the 1966 congress.[179] Regarding the CUS policy of universal accessibility as impractical, and its recent

[176] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Dave Young, "Memorandum: Loyola Referendum," (December 1, 1966).
[177] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Letter from Doug Ward to André Guay, December 8, 1966.
[178] The phrase "students as such" was first widely used in the debates over whether or not the early International Union of Students would be an explicitly political organization or only address matters relating directly to student affairs. This is brought up regularly in Kotek's *Students and the Cold War.* By at least the early 1960s, the term had trickled down to the local student council level and came to be regarded with contempt by the emerging New Left. See NAC, HAF, MG31-D66, Volume 1, File 3, Hugh Armstrong, "The Rise and Fall of a Student Empire," 1.
[179] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Students' Council of McGill University, "Minutes of Meeting of Students' Council," (October 13 1966), 1957-58.

decision to seek associate membership with the "communist run and controlled" IUS questionable, Aberman proposed to withhold fees from CUS and hold a membership referendum in January.[180] McCoubrey, Aberman and their supporters were hoping to pull McGill out of CUS like the University of Alberta, although they differed from the latter student council in actually seeking a democratic mandate. After much debate in the student council, Aberman was only able to get his referendum if membership in UGEQ was included as a question.[181]

The CUS leadership, now acquainted with politicized referenda, moved swiftly into action. Martha Tracey, the CUS Associate Secretary of Services, visited McGill in October, speaking to a number of its student leaders in order to assess the political terrain. To her disappointment, she reluctantly concluded that CUS' most reliable ally would be Robert De Jean, chair of McGill's National Affairs Committee which operated under Aberman's eye.[182] De Jean, she noted with condescension, had opposed UGEQ and supported CUS because he was a self-described "Canadian Nationalist." But De Jean was also a conservative and was not happy with CUS becoming a politically engaged union, a union which he saw as taking over the role of SUPA.[183] Nevertheless, he remained useful in providing accurate information about the obstacles facing CUS at McGill. The campus left, explained De Jean, had been won decisively to UGEQ's syndicalism, especially following UGEQ's support for the striking workers at the Lagrenade shoe factory, a

[180] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Students' Council of McGill University, "Minutes of Meeting of Students' Council," (October 13 1966), 1958-60.
[181] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Students' Council of McGill University, "Minutes of Meeting of Students' Council," (October 13 1966), 1960-61.
[182] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Martha Tracey, "Memorandum: Discussions with McGill Students, October 21 and 22," (October 24 1966), 2.
[183] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Martha Tracey, "Memorandum: Discussions with McGill Students, October 21 and 22," (October 24 1966), 2-3.

strike which also involved a deadly bombing by the FLQ.[184] The student right, or "fascists" as Tracey described them, opposed CUS because they did not want an activist student organization.[185] CUS, it seemed, could satisfy neither right nor left.

Despite the precarious position of CUS, it appeared that most McGill students were uninterested in their council's call for a new referendum.[186] However, this changed when the council, in a move spearheaded by Aberman, fired Sandy Gage, editor of the *McGill Daily*, who refused to resign over publishing a November 11 article accusing a McGill professor, Raymond Yong, of aiding the American war effort in Vietnam through his research.[187] McCoubrey yielded to the widespread outrage at the decision, striking a commission which, two weeks later, found that Gage did not breach Canadian University Press's charter and code of ethics.[188] The editor was reinstated.

From this controversy emerged the Students for a Democratic University, which united much of the McGill left, recruiting over a hundred members by late November. The new group began distributing a series of one-page pamphlets attacking the student council for "muzzling" the *McGill Daily*, which it argued was "the only Organized Opposition to the Council."[189] As the debate over the *Daily* died down, SDU continued to organize, doubling its membership to two hundred members by December under the

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[184] It is worth remembering that UGEQ was organizing picket support while CUS was only beginning to address the question of class. On UGEQ's intervention in the Lagrenade and Dominion-Ayers strikes through 1965 and 1966, see Robert Favreau, "The Quandary of l'Union Générale des Étudiants de Québec," *Our Generation*, 5/1 (May 1967), 97; Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Quebecois*, 24-25. On the FLQ's bombing of the Legrenade shoe factory, see Louis Fournier, *F.L.Q. The Anatomy of an Underground Movement* (Toronto 1984), 96-98. The participation of students on the picket lines at Legrenade was also an example of the emerging class politics among Quebec's student syndicalists.

[185] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Martha Tracey, "Memorandum: Discussions with McGill Students, October 21 and 22," (October 24 1966), 2-3.

[186] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Martha Tracey, "Memorandum: Discussions with McGill Students, October 21 and 22," (October 24 1966), 1.

[187] "McGill editor fired, CUP investigates," *The Carleton*, November 25, 1966, 1.

[188] "McGill Council accepts report; Daily Editor Gage reinstated," *The Carleton*, January 13, 1967, 1.

[189] WRA, ACUS, Box 38, Students for a Democratic University, "Constitution Needs Reform," (November 1966).

chairmanship of Stanley Gray, a SUPA activist and McGill lecturer. SDU unleashed a barrage of attacks on the council for a number of other controversial decisions, including withholding its fees from CUS. As the CUS-UGEQ referendum approached, the group voted unanimously to campaign in support of UGEQ membership.[190]

In both correspondence with McGill student activists and in his speech to McGill students on January 25, Ward argued that although he still supported the principle of dual membership, McGill students would be best served in UGEQ.[191] SDU's literature on the referendum, written by former CUS staff member, Victor Rabinovitch, made light of Ward's position as well as his recent recommendation for Loyola students to join UGEQ.[192] In making an argument about the "practical necessity" of joining UGEQ, SDU also argued that in rejecting UGEQ, McGill would be opposing the efforts of Quebec's francophone population from defending their "national homeland" and "preserve their identity in the context of 200 million English North Americans."[193]

In a two-question referendum similar to the one held at Loyola, 3,168 of 4,092 voters supported joining a national union, with 2,063 backing membership with UGEQ and 1,489 supporting CUS. The previous year, CUS had won 2,893 to 2,254. "If I had been a student on the McGill campus," commented Ward on the results, "I would have voted the same way." McCoubrey expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with the result, publicly demanding that English minority rights and bilingualism be introduced to UGEQ, and adding that "I have strong reservations about almost all of UGEQ's

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[190] WRA, ACUS, Box 38, Students for a Democratic University, "Democracy on the Rocks." WRA, ACUS, Box 38, Students for a Democratic University, "The SDU Rag," 1/2 (January 31 1967), 1-2.
[191] WRA, ACUS, Box 20, Letter from Doug Ward to Taro Alepian, January 19 1967, 1-2.
[192] WRA, ACUS, Box 38, Victor Rabinovitch, "CUS, UGEQ, and McGill," (January 1967), 2; WRA, ACUS, Box 38, Students for a Democratic University, "A pracitical necessity," (January 1967).
[193] WRA, ACUS, Box 38, Students for a Democratic University, "English Students and UGEQ," (January 1967).

policies."[194] Led by the SDU, the McGill left was able to overcome their political opponents, leading McGill into UGEQ and spearheading a successful election campaign which brought the student council under left-wing control.[195] With the left's victory at McGill, CUS was now completely cut out of Quebec.

Relations with UGEQ did not sour with the McGill result. In fact, they improved. Having invited UGEQ's Daniel Latouche to speak at the Halifax congress, UGEQ formally returned the favour by asking Ward to send a delegation to their congress in February, 1967. [196] Ward happily accepted. Having anticipated an invitation to speak at the congress, Ward sought out Laxer to develop a speech for the Quebec student movement, addressing rebuilding UGEQ and CUS relations through a common anti-imperialist perspective in order to halt American domination of "the top half of this continent."[197] "A lot of thought would have to go into this speech," explained Ward. "I think we should do some pretty hard talking about the American empire" through "a strong historical framework and interpretation for the kinds of deals and decisions that will have to be made in the next few years."[198]

Ward went to work drafting the speech, observing with envious admiration how Quebec's francophone students "leapt over the soft pragmatic activities of NFCUS to a program where educational requirements were firmly integrated within a broad view of a new Quebec."[199] It was, admitted Ward, a "bitter pill for many English Canadians to swallow" when UGEQ was formed, but added that English Canadian students had failed

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[194] "McGill trades campus – over to UGEQ," *The Carleton*, February 10, 1967, 1.
[195] Stanley Gray, "The Troubles at McGill," in Tim Reid and Julyan Reid, eds., *Student Power and the Canadian Campus* (Toronto 1969), 49-50.
[196] WRA, ACUS, Box 87, Letter from Doug Ward to Paul Bourbeau, February 2, 1967.
[197] WRA, ACUS, Box 87, Letter from Doug Ward to Jim Laxer, December 20 1966, 1.
[198] WRA, ACUS, Box 87, Letter from Doug Ward to Jim Laxer, December 20 1966, 1.
[199] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Doug Ward, "Speech to the UGEQ Congress," n.d., 2.

to develop a similar "burgeoning student movement."[200] Ward also acknowledged Quebec's colonial position within Canada but argued that the most pressing issue of the time was American (and Soviet) imperialism which required a "union of necessity" between English Canada and Quebec. Ward assured his audience that "this is no trick to call upon anti-Americanism to draw Quebec back into an unreformed and unreforming Canadian body politic," but rather based on the premise of "participatory democracy" and opposition to "nation-statism."[201]

The ideas of anti-imperialism and nationalism continued to grow in English Canada's New Left even if they remained a minority sentiment within CUS. The extent to which a small number of individuals, such as Ward, could influence the political direction of the approximately 150,000-member organization was indicative of the structural problems inherent CUS.

The Crisis of Radicalization

Between September 1964 and early 1967, the Canadian Union of Students transformed from a service-oriented student union with a cautious educational policy to a clear an defined syndicalist platform, urging the democratization of the university, the abolition of tuition fees, and taking increasingly partisan stances on international conflicts, first on South Africa, then Vietnam. This process mirrored in many respects the radicalization of Quebec's students, the growing militancy of American students, particularly those in SDS, and the trajectory of SUPA.

[200] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Doug Ward, "Speech to the UGEQ Congress," n.d., 6.
[201] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Doug Ward, "Speech to the UGEQ Congress," n.d., 7-8.

However, in comparison with the experience of Quebec's students and UGEQ, English Canadian students did not experience a multi-decade social transformation that the term "Quiet Revolution" attempts to denote. While sufficient to ensure that a large majority of English Canadian student union leaders were able to endorse resolutions calling for the abolition of tuition fees and support for Vietnamese self-determination, the New Left leadership of CUS was not able to successfully marginalize conservative student leaders or satisfy the radicalism of Quebec's Anglophone students. Thus, by mid-1966, these tensions were already manifesting themselves, mainly over the membership of English student unions in Quebec, but increasingly in English Canada where conservative-minded students were organizing against CUS.

These tensions were unlike those that developed in SDS and SUPA after the major political events of late 1964 and early 1965. The organizational structures of SUPA and SDS ensured that this radicalization, in a collective sense, was quicker and deeper than what was experienced by CUS, but was generally less pressing on these organizations. This was possible because New Left groups eschewed organization to the point of lacking clear structures, a coherent program of any sort, or an effective central leadership, democratic or not. Where such structures did exist, they were regarded with suspicion, even contempt as Laxer and others stated openly.[202]

CUS, in contrast, was highly centralized and was elected by the votes of member councils, which were traditionally regarded by the New Left as bureaucratic and conservative. These member councils were themselves elected by the student body of their campus, usually a minority of students who were never as radical as organizations such as SDS and SUPA, although the experience of SDU at McGill demonstrated that the

[202] See, for example, Harding, "An Ethical Movement," 21-22.

New Left, at a particular political conjuncture, could intervene and mobilize a significant minority of students. What was rarely understood by either local or national student leaderships was the extent to which being elected to the CUS executive and secretariat itself was a radicalizing experience, even if such leaders were already leaning to the left. As discussed, the internal crisis of 1962-64 saw a number of NFCUS/CUS leaders dealing with international political matters or Quebec's Quiet Revolution, and begin to advocate structural and political reforms to the organization. Likewise, Doug Ward and Paul Ladouceur in their capacities as Associate Secretary for International Affairs, both accelerated the development of CUS' internationalist approach to politics, a component part of the union's turn to syndicalism, and its courtship with SUPA and the CYC. This catapulted Ward to the presidency. In his dealings with CUS-UGEQ relations and the referendums at McGill and Loyola, Ward laid the foundations for CUS' turn towards an anti-imperialist nationalism. The New Left never consciously "took over" the CUS leadership between the 1964 and 1965 congresses, as some right-wing students were starting to claim. Rather, they stumbled upon it, just as the UGEQ split freed CUS from the paralyzing internal debate only months before the emergence of a New Left at Berkeley, Selma, the US consulates in Toronto and Montreal, and in opposition to the Vietnam war.

However, as the right-wing backlash of 1966 demonstrated, the CUS leadership was moving further to the left than the student body as a whole, resulting in a situation where local member unions were unwilling to carry out the increasingly controversial and radical resolutions and programs passed at congress. The CUS leadership was also becoming increasingly frustrated, with Ward publicly chastising local union leadership

for their conservatism. "If I were the student press or a candidate in the upcoming council elections," complained Ward in a Canadian University Press interview, "I wouldn't tolerate the neanderthal priorities of the average student council." He also added these councilors were willing to discuss and vote for resolutions on the "contemporary problems of society" but when they returned to their campuses they were more interested in "yearbooks, dances, model parliaments and the budget of the outing club."[203]

Despite the centralized structure of the union, there was little guarantee that anything emanating from the congress or secretariat was carried out at the local level. The lack of an informed and politically engaged local CUS leadership at most campuses left the national leadership with few actual allies. The potential to create such a local leadership was given a real chance to develop during the first wave of student politicization in late 1964 and through 1965. Bazin prematurely halted the 1964 South Africa program, and the Vietnam program of 1965-66 amounted to little more than a publication service, however useful. Not surprisingly, National Student Day in October 1965 was also a general disappointment. And unlike SDS's *New Left Notes* or *Le Traite d'Union* in Quebec, there was no regular CUS publication that could foster an ongoing discussion between the national and local student leaderships in English Canada.[204] Still, there was only so much the small secretariat of a dozen or so students in Ottawa could do. Understandably, frustrations mounted. Having singled out the local CUS committee chairmen on each campus for failing to distribute CUS materials coming from the secretariat, Ward and others in the CUS leadership began investigating the possibility of

[203] "Ward – Fed up with Student Councils," *The Carleton*, January 27, 1967, 3.
[204] Short-lived and infrequent publications included *CUS Across Canada*, the *CUS-UCE Bulletin,* and later in 1968-69, *Issue*.

"field workers," CUS activists who would visit the campuses to raise awareness of CUS policy, help implement programs and shore up support for the union.[205]

The political gap between the CUS leadership and its base was the main problem facing the union as the 1967 congress approached. CUS was also becoming a focus for a growing number of New Left radicals, many of whom were leaving the failing Student Union for Peace Action. The long-term ramifications would not be immediately apparent, but CUS was about to make another important step to the left.

[205] WRA, ACUS, Box 13, "Are We Ready For Field Workers?"

Chapter Three: The Rise of Student Power

As syndicalism entrenched itself in CUS during Doug Ward's 1966-67 leadership, the Student Union for Peace Action was experiencing increasingly acrimonious internal crisis, a crisis which would ultimately lead to the organization's dissolution in September 1967. Given its role and reputation as the leading New Left group in English Canada, SUPA's demise, and the political debates preceding its fall, had an important and lasting impact on the broader English Canadian student movement. CUS, perhaps more so than any other existing student organization at the time, would feel it.

Syndicalism, Marxism and the Demise of SUPA

As Myrna Kostash put it, the Student Union for Peace Action began to experience the "undercurrents of its collapse" at its September 1965 national meeting in Ste. Calixte, Quebec, less than a year after its formation in the final days of 1964.[1] While political differences and tensions had always existed within SUPA, particularly between the Toronto and Montreal chapters, it was the federal government's formation of the Company of Young Canadians which exacerbated these tensions, influencing the fatal crisis within SUPA.[2] Although formally created by an Act of Parliament in July 1966, the

[1] Myrna Kostash, *Long Way From Home: The story of the Sixties generation in Canada* (Toronto 1980), 20.

[2] There are differing interpretations as to whether or not the CYC's formation was critical in SUPA's demise. Margaret Daly, for example, acknowledges that the formation of the CYC led to a "split down the middle of SUPA" but also believes, without giving the other reasons she alludes to, that "SUPA's collapse was no doubt inevitable." Interestingly, she also argues that without Pape and Ward, the CYC would have been a "safe, service-oriented youth group" and "the history of the New Left in Canada would be entirely different." See Margaret Daly, *The Revolution Game: the Short, Unhappy Life of the Company of Young Canadians* (Toronto 1970), 28-29. In contrast, Myrna Kostash argues that when SUPA began accepting CYC money in late 1965, "it was the beginning of the end." Having situated the CYC at the centre of the first major debates within SUPA, she describes the CYC's intervention in general as the "*coup de grace*"

CYC was already recruiting during the summer and fall of 1965 through a broad umbrella group, the Canadian Committee for the Assembly of Youth Organization (CCAYO), led by former CUS president, Stewart Goodings.[3] An early coup for the CYC was Arthur Pape, who had served as a national chairman for the CUCND and was a high profile Toronto SUPA activist. This was followed up when Pape then recruited Ward to the CYC in late 1965, Ward being a SUPA member but known for his work in CUS.[4] A large number of SUPA members followed Pape and Ward into the CYC, though many of them maintained allegiances to both organizations, at least initially. The CYC had, after all, helped fund the St.Calixte conference and paid for the summer project reports. However, a significant section of SUPA, including Dmitri Rousopoulous, rejected the CYC outright, arguing that cooperation with the state, led by the same government which had accepted nuclear weapons and was complicit in supporting the American war in Vietnam, was a betrayal of SUPA's principles.[5] As this debate erupted, the CYC, with its lavish levels of funding, which at times spilled over into corruption,[6] displaced SUPA from its pedestal as Canada's leading community organizing group. This led to SUPA's funding

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for SUPA See Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 20-21-28-29. Developing upon the criticisms of the CYC made by SUPA activists such as Dmitri Rousopoulos, Martin Loney frames the creation of the CYC as a clear example of state cooptation of "citizen participation," in this case, the New Left. See Martin Loney, "The Political Economy of Citizen Participation," in Leo Panitch, ed. *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power* (Toronto 1977), 464-466. Palmer's recent re-examination of the New Left is sympathetic to both Kostash and Loney, writing "There is no denying the role of the CYC, as a state agency, in not only co-opting SUPA's leaders and ranks but, more importantly, in culturally disrupting the solidarity and collective experience of the nascent New Left formation." He adds a critical observation: "This happened, in part, because SUPA lacked a clarity of perspective and anything approximating a programmatic orientation to the illusive revolutionary change it embraced with such fervour." See Bryan Palmer, *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto 2009), 276.

[3] Daly, *The Revolution Game*, 7-9; Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 20.

[4] Daly, *The Revolution Game*, 28-30.

[5] For a later New Left critique of CYC see "The CYC: The Bird That Cannot Even Fly," *Our Generation*, 6/1-2 (May-June-July 1968), 13-14.

[6] On the corruption and lavishness within the CYC that contrasted so greatly with the nearly resource-less SUPA community projects, see Daly, *The Revolution Game*, 105-109.

drying up which in turn led to more SUPA members joining the CYC.[7] With little money, fewer members, and its summer projects under effective CYC control, the debates within SUPA intensified. If the crisis was proving destructive, the discussions it fuelled were creative. Ideas, new and old, were entertained, debated and discussed in an attempt to reorient and transform SUPA.

Two developing political trends within SUPA would prove most significant to the future of the Canadian Union of Students. First, through 1966, there was a growing call within SUPA for a "return" to the campuses. Practically, this made sense since the campus was a common terrain for most SUPA members, particularly those who had repudiated the community projects following the CYC takeover. Politically, the New Left, both Canadian and American, was also beginning to re-envision the campus as a strategic site of radical social change. A short paper entitled *Towards a Student Syndicalism, or University Reform Revisited* had an enormous impact on the New Left, with Kirkpatrick Sale describing it as the *Port Huron Statement* for a new generation of post-Berkeley student radicals.[8] Written by Carl Davidson, a leading member of the Students for a Democratic Society, for the August 1966 SDS convention, the document was a blistering assault on the "knowledge factory" of post-secondary education, contextualizing the university within the social system which had produced the war in Vietnam, segregation in the American south and riots in Watts. [9] Rejecting single-issue campaigns and non-radical tactics, Davidson also argued that the only reason to be in student government was to abolish it. The context, of course, was different. The US

[7] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 21.
[8] Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York 1973), 290.
[9] Carl Davidson, "Toward a Student Syndicalist Movement, or University Reform Revisited," *Our Generation* 5/1 (May 1967), 103-104.

National Student Association was not as politically engaged as CUS, let alone UGEQ, and it was dealt a fatal blow when revelations about its CIA sponsorship were published in early 1967. Davidson called for the creation of "free student unions" in order to gain majority student support and accomplish the abolition of student government. To the same ends, he also proposed the formation of a "Campus Freedom Democratic Party," a name no doubt drawn from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, to run in student government elections. Last but not least, Davidson placed "the abolition of the grade system" at the centre of his demands for university reform and saw it as the "umbrella" issue for a student syndicalist movement, much in the same manner as the abolition of the wage system serves the syndicalist trade union movement."[10] The ideas were attractive, and it was the success of the Students for a Democratic University at McGill, under the chairmanship of SUPA activist Stanley Gray, which provided the concrete example of what the "return to the campus" could mean.

The second and equally important political trend within SUPA was the gravitation towards variants of Marxism and, to a lesser extent, anarchism. This was driven in part by a rebellion against the "anti-intellectualism" of SUPA's earlier years, an anti-intellectualism which had allowed members to be co-opted by the state-sponsored CYC.[11] As Jim Harding put it, SUPA was "an ethical movement in search of analysis."[12] While not all SUPA activists turned to Marxism, Roussoupoulous, for example, gravitating more towards anarchism, the turn was not merely a case of thoughtless ideological appropriation. The crisis within SUPA was real, and rooted in its collective experience.

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[10] Carl Davidson, "Toward a Student Syndicalist Movement," 107-111.
[11] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 21; Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 273-274, 280-283.
[12] James Harding, "An ethical movement in search of an analysis," *Our Generation*, 3/4-4/1 (May 1966), 20-29.

The difficulties and general lack of clear success in community projects had already contributed to SUPA members losing some of their faith in the revolutionary capacities of the poorest and most marginalized sections of Canadian society. A number of activists began looking for alternatives. Having already carved out a position of influence and credibility within SUPA, Stanley Gray was among those arguing within SUPA promoting Marxist ideas with its emphasis on the potential power of the working-class.[13] Jon Bordo also argued for the New Left to adopt and adapt Marxism, rejecting the community projects as an expression of American liberalism.[14] A timely critique of the New Left by *Canadian Dimension*'s Cy Gonick argued, like Bordo, that SUPA was replicating the community projects of SDS and SNCC, absenting itself from a larger audience in the NDP, organized labour, the churches and other community groups.[15] Gray, Harding, Roussopoulous and others would push back against Gonick's promotion of the NDP as an arena of meaningful political activity, but Gonick's criticisms hit a nerve.[16] By late 1966, Marxist ideas and analysis had become prevalent within SUPA, prompting one American attendee of the December 1966 SUPA conference to state that there was "an awful lot of "Marxism" among the Canadians."[17]

The English Canadian New Left was not alone in its turn towards Marxism. Through 1967 and especially 1968, Marxism became the new ideology of the Western

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[13] On Gray's turn to Marxism see Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 279-284; Stan Gray, "The Greatest Canadian...Shit-Disturber," *Canadian Dimension* 38/6 (November/December 2004), 13-14.
[14] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, Jon Bordo and Harry Edel, "Situation of the New Left," 1.
[15] Cy Gonick, "Strategies for Social Change," *Canadian Dimension* 4/1 (November-December 1966), 39.
[16] Two substantial New Left critiques of the NDP and parliamentary politics include Dimitri Roussopoulos, "Towards a Revolutionary Youth Movement and an Extra-parliamentary Opposition in Canada." in Dimitri Roussopoulos, ed., *The New Left in Canada* (Montreal 1970), 131-152; and Stanley Gray, "New Left Old Left," *Canadian Dimension*, 3/1 (November 1965), 11-13.
[17] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 22.

student movements, especially in North America.[18] South of the border, the Students for a Democratic Society gravitated towards Marxism through 1967 partly as a result of the recent turn to the campuses, a turn which prompted Davidson and others to begin looking at the role of student syndicalism within a broader societal context.[19] This led a handful of SDS theoreticians to develop and popularize the concept of the "New Working Class," defined as a highly-educated white collar working force operating within a technologically advanced industrial capitalism.[20] The theory justified Davidson's call for student syndicalism while shifting SDS into the realm of class analysis. Coupled with its growing anti-imperialist politics, SDS was a step short of embracing Marxism. As one SDS leader explained about the turn to Marxism, "there was – and is – no other coherent, integrative, and explicit philosophy of revolution."[21]

Through late 1966 and early 1967, SUPA activists brought their nascent Marxism onto the campuses and into student politics, including CUS.[22] The intervention of SUPA members into CUS did not go unnoticed but it did not stir any controversy, at least not before the 1967 congress. The CUS leadership, many of whom identified as part of the

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[18] See Palmer, *Canada's 1960s,* 281-284. For an informative and sympathetic discussion of why the American New Left turned to Marxism, especially Maoism, see Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che* (New York 2002), 41-90. The New Left's transition to Marxism, at various national levels and at the international level, remains a central theme in political and historiographical debates over the 1960s. A number of studies differentiate between the early New Left of the 1960s from the later Marxist-influenced student movements of 1968 and after, heaping condemnation on the latter. This is what Max Elbaum has criticized as the "good sixties/bad sixties" thesis. See Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air*, 8-9. Elbaum singles out one of SDS's early leaders for promoting this thesis, Todd Gitlin, and his work *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York 1987).

[19] Progressive Labor (PL), a Maoist organization, had been promoting its brand of Marxism within SDS since late 1964. Other Marxist groups, whether Maoist, Stalinist or Trotskyist, also populated the world of American student politics so Marxism was never an entirely exotic or unknown to SDS or the rest of the international New Left. As for PL, it was generally regarded as an irritant by the SDS leadership, but as Sale suggests, the leadership's attempt to sideline PL forced them to enter into a dialectic of debate which opened them up to Marxist ideas. See Sale, *SDS*, 390-391.

[20] Sale, *SDS*, 336-338.

[21] Carl Oglesby, SDS' 1965-66 president, quoted in Sale, *SDS,* 391.

[22] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 28; Doug Owram, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation* (Toronto 1996), 235.

New Left, had already begun a process of class analysis as a consequence of the Student Means Survey findings and the implications of the universal accessibility policy.[23] Waterloo proved to the be site where most early SUPA-CUS interactions took place. The 1966 CUS seminar, held at the University of Waterloo in September, proved to be a major turning point for CUS. The seminar took on a completely new style, dispensing with the usual structured series of lectures. With alcohol flowing freely, the 150 delegates engaged in a freewheeling, open-ended discussion which was considered a political and ideological "breakthrough" for many of those involved.[24] Several months later, Ward was able to report that a "significant number of students have commented that it was one of the most important and significant experiences of their lives."[25] The seminar served to pull in a layer of SUPA activists towards CUS and student union politics. This included SUPA member Peter Warrian, who was also a member of the Waterloo student council. The energy from the CUS seminar translated into action in late November 1966 when over two hundred Waterloo students, led by Warrian, carried out a sit-in at the university president's office to protest bookstore prices.[26] Following the sit-in, SUPA held its last relatively successful meeting at Waterloo in December. It was an "ideological conference" which brought class questions to the fore and set about forging a new, Marxist-influenced ideology for the New Left.[27] With SUPA on its last legs, CUS would become new terrain for these debates to play out.

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[23] See previous chapter for a lengthier discussion of this process.
[24] "The Structure of Unstructured Discussion," *CUS Across Canada*, 2 (November 22 1966), 4-7.
[25] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, April 1967, Doug Ward, "Seminar Working Group," (April 24 1967), 1.
[26] "Presidential sit-in," *CUS Across Canada*, 2 (November 22 1966), 1-2.
[27] On SUPA's "ideological conference" at Waterloo, see Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 22.

Preparing for Congress

As SUPA activists made their presence felt on the campuses, revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency's funding of at least twenty-five different student organization, shook CUS and numerous other national student unions.[28] One of the CIA's major fronts was the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs which had provided $3,000 to help sponsor CUS's Seminar on International Student Affairs, a project dealing with ISC-IUS matters between 1964 to 1966.[29] Although it had been rumoured for several years that the CIA was funding student organizations, notably the American National Student Association and the British National Union of Students, Ward clarified the matter in Canadian University Press reports, stating that the allegations had never been more than rumours, as nobody had had proof at the time.[30] When proof was provided, the statement on NFCUS/CUS relations with the RCMP explained that NFCUS leaders had been first contacted by the RCMP in the 1950s to provide information about international student meetings. According to the CUS statement, NFCUS leaders had told the RCMP that they would only provide them the same material accessible to CUS members and the student press. This was not in fact true. It is quite unlikely that the 1966-67 CUS leadership knew, but as Steve Hewitt reveals in his study of RCMP intelligence operations in Canadian universities, there was at least one RCMP source

[28] For the first article to expose the CIA, see Sol Stern, "A Short Account of International Student Politics & the Cold War with Particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, Etc.," *Ramparts*, 5/9 (March 1967), 29-37.
[29] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, February 1967, "CUS Asks Government to Protest CIA Involvement," (February 20 1967), 1-2.
[30] "Canadian Union of Students may have taken CIA money in past two years," *The Carleton*, 1, February 24, 1967.

within the NFCUS leadership in the early 1960s.[31] Ward did, after all, publicize the fact that the RCMP had approached his five presidential predecessors, in a direct attempt to solicit information.[32] For CUS, SUPA and the international New Left, the CIA's involvement in student organization only served to reinforce concerns about American imperialism and subversion of democracy.

Such concerns would find expression in a vehicle all too familiar for CUS: a commission on structures. Intended to examine the feasibility of a voluntary student union, the new commission, mandated by the 1966 congress, provided the CUS leadership an opportunity to voice their concerns about American imperialism, their new understandings of UGEQ and Quebec, and the problem of inactive student councils. Drafted by the CUS Board of Directors, the commission's report was prepared for the 1967 congress in August. It would prove to be a catalyst for a new level of political discussion and debate within CUS.

In the report, Ward's brand of New Left Canadian nationalism was visible in a discussion of why a national union was necessary. "Canadian students," the report stated, "are becoming increasingly aware of, and disenchanted with, our tendency to accept the cultural patterns, political necessities and social timetable of the United States." CUS could help reverse this tendency of existing intellectual elites by creating an "indigenous intellectual leadership" that could focus on "Canadian priorities" to avoid becoming "complacent adherents" to the American agenda, while also countering "sterile purveyors

[31] Steve Hewitt, *Spying 101: The RCMP's Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997* (Toronto 2002), 95.
[32] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, February 1967, Doug Ward, "Students Reject RCMP Approaches," (February 21 1967), 2.

of anti-Americanism."[33] The argument was not new. It echoed an essay written in early 1967 by American academic, Noam Chomsky, as well as the arguments being made by some intellectuals in the Students for a Democratic Society.[34]

The report's sympathy towards UGEQ was palpable, mirroring the efforts of the Kenniff and Ward presidencies to patch up the NFCUS legacy of indifferent, centralist and apolitical leadership. The CUS name-change and related structural reforms were critically described as "a problem of politics...handled as a problem of administration."[35] The UGEQ split was therefore understandable as NFCUS was unwilling to address "French Canadian nationalism, and a theory of practice of student involvement in society known as student syndicalism, or student unionism."[36] The report also dismissed those who thought UGEQ could be reincorporated through rebuilding CUS as a federation of regional student unions. UGEQ could not be considered a grouping *comme les autres* because it would "destroy the confidence which has recently built up between CUS and UGEQ," a confidence developed out of "the former's recognition of the latter as a national union according to her own definition."[37] With this report, the CUS leadership was effectively recognizing Quebec as a distinct society within Canada, requiring English Canadian students to recognize UGEQ as a national union.

Beyond reaffirming the *Declaration of the Canadian Student* as the guiding principle of the union and the campus as central to its work, the report also made the first major policy statement on the growing trend of provincial and regional student

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[33] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 3.
[34] Noam Chomsky, "The Responsibility of Intellectuals." *The New York Review of Books,* 8, 3 (February 23 1967), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/12172> (July 16 2009); Sale, *SDS*, 337-340.
[35] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 1.
[36] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 5.
[37] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 5.

organizations.[38] Although CUS was clear that UGEQ's formation carried with it unique characteristics, it did mark the beginning of what some worryingly perceived as the fragmentation of the Canadian student movement. Formed in early November 1966, the British Columbia Assembly of Students was among the first provincial student organizations. It brought together student councils at various colleges, several dozen high schools and two major universities, the University of British Columbia and the University of Victoria.[39] Hugh Armstrong, the first full-time president of the Ontario Region of the Canadian Union of Students, and CUS' president-elect, oversaw the provincial body reformed as the Ontario Union of Students near the end of his term in March, 1967. This was in part an attempt to become more flexible towards recruitment, notably among the the province's new community colleges.[40] Through the following academic year, this trend would continue in the prairies as well as in the Atlantic. The report on structures welcomed the formation of the provincial unions, observing that the NFCUS/CUS "regions" had achieved few real accomplishments. The provincial unions responded to the urgent need "to confront provincial governments" in line with the provincial jurisdiction over education. The report noted that the "prime movers of provincial unions" were those recently trained in CUS seminars, congresses and other programs, indicating that syndicalist ideas and the recent politicization of the student body was part of the trend to provincialism.[41]

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[38]NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 4, 6-7.
[39] Ron Simmer, "Mass march plans pushed by BCAS," *The Ubyssey*, November 15, 1966, 1.
[40] Ian Kimmerly, "New Ontario student union formed as province leaves Canadian union," *The Carleton*, March 10, 1967, 1. Special thanks to Hugh Armstrong for clarifying this transition from ORCUS to OUS.
[41] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 4.

Prompted by the student council defections of late 1966, and the general laggard performance of member councils in carrying out the programs and policies passed at CUS congresses, the possibility of a voluntary student union, based on individual student membership, was openly and formally discussed for the first time in the union's history, though the debate had been brewing informally for a number of years. The attraction of a voluntary union was that "CUS could speak honestly as the representative of a particular number of students, and would not infringe upon the rights of students not seeking inclusion in such representation."[42] However, the idea was deemed financially impractical. If students had to sign union cards and send a cheque into the head office, "individual membership would drop ninety or ninety-five percent."[43] The report concluded that the union should be based on local student council membership but where councils were not CUS members, individual students could take out individual membership. These individual members could work on promoting CUS policies, but, in contrast to Davidson's proposals for a "Campus Freedom Democratic Party, CUS would not recognize individual members as the "student government" on that particular campus.[44] The report translated ideas, but few solutions, to the problems facing CUS.

Congress '67

The political trends and tendencies developing over the 1966-67 academic year were expressed at the CUS congress at the University of Western Ontario, this time with the presence of an important but well-organized, well-spoken and politically astute SUPA contingent. It would be wrong to characterize the SUPA intervention as imposing issues

[42] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 8.
[43] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 8.
[44] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 8, June 1967, CUS Board of Directors, "A Shape for Things to Come," 9.

upon CUS. Rather, the SUPA activists made their impact felt through the debates framed by the existing CUS leadership in the report on structures. These debates included the problems of structure, whether the formation of provincial unions or the political gap between the national leadership and the student council base. The escalating war in Vietnam and the revelations about the CIA sponsorship of student organizations also kept international politics at the forefront of the union agenda. As for the philosophy of student syndicalism, the SUPA activists had much to discuss, and would play a key role in bringing about a reconceptualization of student syndicalism.

"Hi, I'm a union organizer," was the opening line of Hugh Armstrong's speech to the congress.[45] If there had been any doubt before, CUS' syndicalism was firmly entrenched. At the meeting, Jock Turcot's *Declaration of the Canadian Student* underwent modification to include a section explaining that "educational reform will not come in a vacuum or without a continuous examination and possible transformation of societal values and institution arrangements," and that student unions "must be free to ally themselves with other groups in society which have similar aims."[46] Inspired by the UGEQ interventions in the Lagrenade and Dominion-Ayers strikes of the previous year, New Left delegates attempted to include a clause on eventual affiliation of CUS to the trade union movement after forming "inter-union councils" at both the local and national level.[47] This suggestion proved too radical and had to be moderated after threats of withdrawal from the UBC and Calgary delegations.[48] Nevertheless, a resolution promoted by SUPA members and other New Leftists supporting the right to strike and opposing

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[45] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, Hugh Armstrong, "Opening remarks by Hugh Armstrong," (September 2 1967).
[46] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, "Congress 1967," 4.
[47] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, John Cleveland, "Social Unionism and Unions," 1-2.
[48] Jim Russell, "CUS Congress '67: A Carleton student interprets events," *The Carleton*, September 15, 1967, 4.

scab labour, was passed but not without a major debate and plenty of opposition. Ten student councils voted against it, making it the most contested resolution of the congress.[49] Still, the radicals were unsatisfied with its concrete accomplishments. One delegate summed up this feeling, describing the *Declaration of the Canadian Student* as "overly flexible [and] meaningless," and "a bunch of mush."[50] However, the SUPA-led radicals would contribute in raising new ideas.

Syndicalism was not disconnected from perspectives on international politics. Former CUS associate secretary, John Cleveland, was the lynchpin for providing the basis of a new conception of student union organizing. He had visited England in the spring of 1967 as the CUS observer to the National Union of Students annual conference. Intent on learning about the CIA's involvement in NUS and the International Student Conference, Cleveland quickly discovered the Radical Student Alliance. He described the group as "an uneasy loose federation of diverse left groupings united on limited objectives" and operating within NUS to change its political orientation.[51] In a critique of the report on structures, which he claimed was devoid of substantial political content, Cleveland attacked the resigned attitude of the report's authors towards student councils unwilling to carry out the educational work mandated by CUS congresses.[52] To resolve the dilemma of maintaining politicized local student councils alongside centralized, national-level policy-making, Cleveland floated the idea of forming "parapolitical

[49] Canadian Union of Students, *Resolutions 1967* (Ottawa 1967), 34.
[50] Canadian University Press, "CUS demand more 'conscious students'," *The Carleton*, September 15, 1967, 5.
[51] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, John Cleveland, Introduction to CUS reprint of the Radical Student Alliance pamphlet, "ISC, CIA & NUS," 1.
[52] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, John Cleveland, "The Thirty-Six Articles: Wards from a Protestant," in John Cleveland and Barry McPeake, "Social Unionism and Structures," 5.

parties" on the campus that could run for student council, like the SDU at McGill or the Radical Student Alliance in Britain.[53]

The idea found an echo. Dan Laprès, an activist at the Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan, believed CUS had failed as a "pressure group" because it had no real local base due to the bureaucratic nature of local councils. CUS could only become effective if pressure originated locally and extended upwards through provincial/regional unions and then to CUS.[54] The critique was common among many congress delegates, particularly those in SUPA who had been exposed to similar critiques in the long debates about the New Left's structures and ideology and the relationship between the two.[55]

The idea of "parapolitical parties" had been planted in the minds of many CUS activists, but the general consensus was to initiate the field work program proposed by Ward the previous year. In a sense, the "community project" orientation of the 1964 CUCND and 1965 SUPA was translated to CUS and appeared to offer a solution to the political problems facing the union. Field workers could visit campuses not to make formal speeches in the tradition of Maurice Sauvé, but to work and talk with local student councils and activists about campus matters, using the opportunity to generalize the priorities of *Declaration of the Canadian Student*, which included the democratization of university structures, universal accessibility, awareness of CUS services and an engagement with human rights issues via the international affairs program. Field workers

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[53] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, John Cleveland, "The Thirty-Six Articles: Wards from a Protestant," in John Cleveland and Barry McPeake, "Social Unionism and Structures," 6.
[54] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, Dan Laprès, "The Canadian Union of Students: A Pressure Group," 1-3.
[55] On the debates raging within SUPA, see Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, 231-2; Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 20-7; Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 274-278.

could also help "combat student council lethargy," and address the most "vital needs" of students and their unions.[56]

The decision to go with fieldworkers over parapolitical parties reflected the dilemma of the CUS leadership. They remained the political minority within the union but dominated its leadership, and in doing so remained unable to directly relate to local campus politics by virtue of working out of the national office in Ottawa. In contrast, the New Left minority in Britain had to construct parapolitical parties, usually "socialist societies" and an umbrella group like the Radical Student Alliance. This was because they did not have control of the National Union of Students.[57] CUS field work was an attempt to foster grassroots support from above, building bridges with local council leaderships as opposed to developing local oppositional movements. The latter, which would entail the formation of pro-CUS parapolitical parties, would likely evoke a bitter reaction from the student councils who would rightly see it as a threat. When the field work program was initiated through 1967-68, this is in fact what the CUS leadership would uncover: local CUS committees acting as an opposition to student councils which in turn bred student council opposition to CUS itself.

Student Power and Ideology

The other major problem facing CUS was the international program. Not surprisingly, it was subjected to a rigorous critique from various quarters. Throughout the entire 1966-67 academic year, not a single document on Vietnam was automatically forwarded from the

[56] Canadian University Press, "CUS to visit all campuses," *The Carleton*, November 10 1966, 8.
[57] On the Radical Student Alliance and its opposition role within the National Union of Students, see David Treisman, "The Impermanent Stronghold," *New Left Review* 53 (January-February 1969), 33.

national office to any member unions.[58] Only once did the *CUS Across Canada* bulletin carry anything about Vietnam: a small note to readers that the national office had copies of an *Ottawa Citizen* supplement on the war.[59] There was also no visible CUS engagement with the anti-war movement despite overtures and invitations from student anti-war activists.[60] Prior to the 1967 congress, the secretariat could only muster up a mildly worded letter to the Prime Minister, expressing regrets that the Canadian government had not exercised an independent role in the International Control Commission.[61] Through the discussions of international affairs, differences between the SUPA-led New Left and the older CUS leadership became apparent, though not acrimonious.

Paul Ladouceur, together with Tim LeGoff, CUS's Overseas Commissioner in London, produced the most scathing critique of this failure to act, attacking the previous year's international program as "confused, ineffectively [sic], and inadequate."[62] Citing syndicalist principles, he argued that international affairs were part and parcel of what students and their organizations should engage in.[63] Revealing that they were somewhat out of step with the style of politics developed after the Waterloo CUS seminar, Ladouceur and LeGoff proposed that exchanges, seminars, educational events and visits to international student meetings would lead to students having an "intensive international experience" that could lead to CUS gaining a group of students committed

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[58] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Letter from Rolli Cacchioni to Stephen Becker, June 15, 1967.
[59] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Letter from Rolli Cacchioni to the editors of the Ottawa Citizen, November 28, 1966.
[60] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Letter from Brenda Dineen, Chairman of the Carleton Committee to End the War in Vietnam to Douglas Ward, September 29, 1966.
[61] WRA, ACUS, Box 30, Letter to Lester B. Pearson from Rolli Cacchioni, June 15, 1967.
[62] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, September 1967, Paul Ladouceur and Tim LeGoff, "Report on the International Commitment of the Canadian Union of Students," 1.
[63] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, September 1967, Paul Ladouceur and Tim LeGoff, "Report on the International Commitment of the Canadian Union of Students," 1-2.

to the union's international program. This would enable CUS to begin a campaign to change Canadian foreign policy.[64]

CUS recommitted itself to educating students about the Vietnam War and passed a resolution to invite a delegation of the National Liberation Front to speak to Canadian students.[65] As for the union's participation in the International Student Conference and the International Union of Students, the debate raged through the entire congress. At the last plenary sessions, the UBC delegation moved for withdrawal from both organizations. It was soundly defeated, 74-37.[66] Ladouceur and LeGoff provided concrete proposals for rebuilding the international program. The decision to invite the NLF no doubt reflected the influence of the New Left but was no more radical than the union's failed attempt to tour a student through Southeast Asia in early 1966. Instead, the SUPA intervention on international affairs helped CUS overhaul and radicalize its conception of student syndicalism.

The war in Vietnam was the subject of an important contribution by Dimitri Roussopoulos. He connected several issues and strands of thought in the New Left around the idea of "student power." Emphasizing the need for "honesty, patience, and a sense of humour," Roussopoulos called for activists to approach engineering and technical students who would be hired in the industries complicit in the war effort while also confronting corporate and government recruiters on campus.[67] Though critical of faculty for being unreliable at best, Roussopoulos cited Noam Chomsky's essay, "The

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[64] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, September 1967, Paul Ladouceur and Tim LeGoff, "Report on the International Commitment of the Canadian Union of Students," 3-4.
[65] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, "Resolutions 1967," 36-7.
[66] Canadian University Press, "UBC's proposal is squashed, congress says CUS worldly," *The Ubyssey*, September 19, 1967, 8.
[67] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, Dimitrios Roussopoulos, "The War in Vietnam and the Development of the Student Power Movement," 3.

Responsibility of Intellectuals," in asserting the need for students to develop a "revolt of the trainees" while not collapsing into "an elitist corporate monster, mainly concerned with developing better techniques of 'co-managing' the bureaucratic apparatus of advanced industrial society."[68] The ideas were not dissimilar from those of the "New Working Class" advocated in SDS.[69]

Roussopoulos' intervention usefully introduced a variety of concepts introduced in a radical manner for the first time at a CUS congress, most notably the term "student power." Student power was ambiguously related to the more theorized program of student syndicalism which had been outlined by the *Charte de Grenoble* and the *Declaration of the Canadian Student.* The term, however, implied a more radical approach to student activism. For lack of a clear definition, "student power" as understood by CUS represented the marriage of both the syndicalist *Declaration* with a broadening conception of imperialism and colonialism, ideas that were becoming increasingly common to describe US-Canadian economic, political and cultural relations. However ill-defined, student power represented something more than the *Declaration*'s relatively cautious brand of student syndicalism. Students were not merely integrally related to society and central to its development, but agents of radical or even revolutionary social change.[70] Through the intervention of the SUPA activists and

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[68] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, Dimitrios Roussopoulos, "The War in Vietnam and the Development of the Student Power Movement," 2, 4.

[69] *Our Generation* would also publish a thesis by John and Margaret Rowntree which, like theories of the "New Working Class", fused class analysis with the impulses and insights of student syndicalism. See John and Margaret Rowntree, "The Political Economy of Youth," *Our Generation* 6/1-2 (May-July 1968), 155-190.

[70] The origins of the term "Student Power" clearly stem from "black power" used among radicalizing SNCC activists. The term seems to have been popularized during the December 1966 Berkeley student strike as part of the widely-used slogan "Happiness is Student Power." See Carl Davidson, "Campaigning on the Campus," in Robin Blackburn and Alexander Cockburn, eds., *Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action* (London 1969), 327.

supporters, the term "student power" was generalized among CUS activists. As Hugh Armstrong explained in an October 1967 interview, the *Declaration of the Canadian Student* expressed his views on education, but was still politically narrow. "[I]t should also talk about Canada; our binational culture, and other domestic issues, American economic domination, this sort of thing."[71] Armstrong may have opened the congress with his syndicalist statement, "I'm a union organizer," but after the congress he was an advocate of "student power."[72]

The introduction of the idea of "student power" radicalized CUS but did not introduce anything new in terms of policy or concrete avenues for action. This was characteristic of the SUPA-led interventions at the congress. Thus, the debates within SUPA for ideological clarity spilled over into CUS, raising the theoretical level of discussion within CUS to new heights. In an essay originally drafted for internal SUPA debates, Jon Bordo and Harry Edel contributed to the CUS congress by arguing that the American New Left was rooted in "Christian humanism and Jeffersonian Democracy," not socialist or Marxist politics.[73] One passage was particularly sharp, echoing the concerns of others in SUPA who had tried to develop and generalize a coherent ideology within SUPA and the New Left generally:

> The New Left (and in the U.S. the New Right) is essentially regressive. It is not dialectical. Rather than attempt to situate cultural values, ideology and theory, historically, it presupposes teleological à prioris. It wants to fit ahistorical values into historical structures. Its game appears always on the verge of "political mysticism", and its organization with its charismatic priests and its psychoanalytic ideologues seeks to "convert", "to turn on"... That the categorical imperative, "participatory democracy", rather than becoming the chrysalis for the direct transformation of society into an industrial democracy, ends up in Haight-

[71] Rod Manchee, "Hugh Armstrong: a new advocate of 'student power'," *The Carleton*, October 6, 1967, 8.
[72] Rod Manchee, "Hugh Armstrong: a new advocate of 'student power'," *The Carleton*, October 6, 1967, 8.
[73] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, John Bordo and Harry Edel, "Situation of the New Left," 1.

> Ashbury, "the blown mind", the turn on, tune in, drop out community and its conjuncto mystico cry to the barricades "flower power", indicates more the perversity of the society, its irrationality, brutalization and reification of men, then [sic] it does the specific transhistorical project of the flower children.[74]

The argument against the New Left's counter-cultural tendencies was part of SUPA's turn to the "ideological" at the December 1966 SUPA conference in Waterloo.[75] A turn to Marxism, and its variants, notably the thought of André Gunder Frank who was teaching at Sir George Williams University, could be accomplished with a turn to "concrete analysis" of Canada and the affect of American imperialism in Canada. Canada's colonial relationship with the United States, explained Bordo, required a "colonial analysis with organizational tools to mediate the effects of such domination upon the socio-political structures [of Canada]."[76] In doing so, Canada's New Left had to reject the American New Left's ostensibly liberal politics and organizing strategies. In the section written by Harry Edel, a "prominent member of the SDU at McGill University," an explicitly Hartzian argument was laid out to make the case:

> Unlike the situation the European liberals faced, American liberals never had to confront a feudal cultural, political tradition like toryism. That is, the liberal mind in America, characterized by individualism and mechanism, was never forced to confront the reality of a tory mentality which has running through it the themes of community and community which is organic.
>
> It is essential to grasp that in order to think in socialist terms, a mixture of both toryism and liberalism is essential to the culture. The reason for this is that socialist thought borrows the organic community element from the former and adds to it the 'democratic' and egalitarian aspect of liberalism.
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> The tragedy of the left in the U.S. is that because it has no tory tradition it, concomitantly, has been unable to develop an indigenous socialist tradition. The

[74] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, John Bordo and Harry Edel, "Situation of the New Left," 1.
[75] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 22.
[76] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, John Bordo and Harry Edel, "Situation of the New Left," 7.

> result of this has been the reactions against American lbieral [sic] society have always been in American liberal terms.
>
> The American left, because it is liberal and because it is not socialist, always challenges America to live up to the Utopian past rather than a Utopian future. The American radical is, to all intents and purposes, a Christian Fundamentalist and Jeffersonian rather than a socialist or, even less, a marxist.[77]

The argument was transposed almost directly from Gad Horowitz, the leftist McGill professor who had engaged George Grant in the pages of *Canadian Dimension*. Horowitz had also just published the influential book *Canadian Labour in Politics* which attempted to apply Hartz's theory of societal fragments to explain the origins of the CCF/NDP and the labour movement in Canada, as well as the lack of a social democratic party in the United States.[78]

The argument presented by Bordo and Edel was only one of many "ideological" critiques emanating from SUPA's many debates, though their contribution was the most forceful within CUS in extolling the virtues of an anti-colonial, Canadian-specific ideology. Grant Amyot, an overseas commissioner, called for CUS to be part of the "Canadian radical movement", to adopt a comprehensive political philosophy, and to avoid becoming "a pressure group fighting for student interests" that operated within "the framework of the corporate liberal ideology."[79] The SUPA-turned-CUS activist Jim Russell, who had made a name for himself by burning a Canadian flag on Parliament Hill,[80] also criticized the lack of ideology on the New Left, describing it as "a psychological revolt turned political" which failed "to contribute to a framework for

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[77] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, John Bordo and Harry Edel, "Situation of the New Left," 10.
[78] Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto 1968); Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia* (New York 1964).
[79] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, Grant Amyot, "Strategies for Academic Reform," 3, 5.
[80] "Flag Burned on Hill," *The Carleton*, November 11, 1966, 1.

understanding this society."[81] Russell's role in the congress was to push CUS towards a more radical set of politics. He argued, in a jab perhaps directed at Ward, that if CUS was not to become like the CYC, it could no longer be a "stepping-stone into the liberal-left establishment."[82] This "ideological" critique was also present in Cleveland's attack on the report on structures which he argued was too concerned with structures and not enough with politics.[83]

The union's new direction was perhaps best expressed on the last day of the conference in a speech by M. Pierre Le François, president of UGEQ.[84] He greeted the political transformation of CUS with excitement, noting that it was the lack of politics in the earlier years of the decade which had led Quebec's students to leave. The president also praised the "gradual acceptance" of syndicalism among English Canadian students and proceeded to explain how Quebec's student syndicalism was tied up in the project of protecting and preserving Quebec's culture in North America and playing "an active and militant role in the struggle for a Quebec which is Master in its own house."[85] After making this clear statement, LeFrançois turned the tables on his English Canadian audience,

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[81] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, Jim Russell, "Socialization and the Development of Alternatives in the North American Society," 2.
[82] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, Jim Russell, "Socialization and the Development of Alternatives in the North American Society," 4.
[83] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, August 1967, John Cleveland, "The Thirty-Six Articles: Wards from a Protestant," in John Cleveland and Barry McPeake, "Social Unionism and Structures," 5-6.
[84] LeFrançois succeeded Robert Nelson as president of UGEQ at its second congress in February 1967. LeFrançois and his slate won the executive elections uncontested on a secular, socialist and independitist platform. He would lead UGEQ in organizing important demonstrations against the war in Vietnam and begin calls for a second Montreal-based francophone university. See Pierre Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Quebecois: son passé, ses revendications et ses luttes (1960-1983)* (St-Jean, QC 1984), 23, 27-29.
[85] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, September 1967, M. Pierre LeFrançois, "Text of speech," (September 6 1967), 1.

> This, to answer that perpetual question, is what Quebec wants. Or, at least, what UGEQ wants. But now we must ask the embarrassing question – "What does Canada want?" Surely, the economic and cultural independence of you Anglo-Saxons is threatened to an even greater extent than that of Quebec. Look at your television; look [at] the ownership of your industries; what does one see but almost total hegemony by the Americans.[86]

The new ideas and new challenges posed by LeFrançois' and the SUPA contingent did not necessarily represent a majority at the 1967 congress. However, it was sufficient for Peter Warrian to win the 1968-69 presidency as an open socialist. Supported by outgoing president Doug Ward, Warrian defeated University of Victoria student council president, Steven Bigsby in a vote of 67-37 after John Cleveland withdrew from the race.[87] Despite the intervention of the New Left, the new ideas about student power, American imperialism in Canada and Vietnam, and the question of Quebec, CUS associate secretary Brian Hutchison concluded that "there can be little doubt that the educational function predominated at the XXXI Congress."[88] The concrete achievements of the congress were expansion of the *Declaration of the Canadian Student* and a new resolution on universal accessibility, both of which were component parts of "academocracy."[89] The latter resolution called for the *immediate* abolition of tuition fees, as opposed to the "progressive abolition" of fees which was in the 1966 universal accessibility resolution, prompting a delegate from Waterloo to claim that its "[s]uccessful implementation would lead to social revolution."[90] However, the major change was, as Robert Clift has argued, "the expansion of universal accessibility" to

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[86] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, September 1967, M. Pierre LeFrançois, "Text of speech," (September 6 1967), 2.
[87] Kim Cameron, "CUS congress confusion reveals opposing views," *The Ubyssey*, October 19 1967, 10.
[88] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, Brian Hutchison, "XXXI Congress: An Assessment," 1. This assessment is accurate. The subsequent approach to fieldwork during the fall of 1967 and early 1968 was focused almost entirely on questions of educational policy.
[89] On the origins of this term, see Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 46-47.
[90] Canadian University Press, "CUS Congress defines goals," *The Ubyssey*, September 19 1967, 8.

"include as a barrier the failure of the education system to relate learning to life experience, to stimulate the natural desire to learn, and to encourage individual and creative expression."[91] This was, according to Clift, an attempt to counter the alienating nature of the university for under-represented groups as well as to increase the Canadian content of courses.[92] For similar reasons, policy was also revised to call for wider community participation in the functioning of the university with more transparent and openly democratic structures.[93]

Despite Warrian's election, the congress did not reflect or initiate a groundswell of New Left activists on the campuses. CUS was still top-heavy and its congresses could never spark anything resembling the radicalization caused by SUPA's sit-ins at the US consulate in Toronto. As one CUS associate secretary, Brian Hutchison, observed:

> Many delegates (perhaps a majority) came to the Congress with little or no understanding of the then current CUS policies or of the rationale underlying them. On the other hand, a significant minority arrived prepared to make major policy advances. This latter group was frustrated in their attempts to achieve a major leap forward by the need to educate the comparatively uninformed majority. The end result was minor advance which left the politically sophisticated dissatisfied and the basically uninformed somewhat mystified. Many, if not most, delegates returned to their campuses with an understanding of the newly adopted policies and programs which was (and is) superficial at best. In view of this situation, failure on the part of returned delegates to communicate and explain CUS policies to their students' councils (much less their student bodies) should come as a surprise to no one.[94]

This problem was, Hutchison believed, "less a right-left division than an informed-uninformed division" and could be resolved through education of student council

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[91] Robert Fredrick Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential: The Canadian Union of Students, 1963-1969," MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 2002, 60.
[92] Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 60.
[93] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, "Resolutions 1967," 18-20.
[94] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, Brian Hutchison, "XXXI Congress: An Assessment," 1.

members.[95] On the surface this interpretation might be plausible for the 1967 congress, but the "informed-uninformed" divide could not remain non-political amidst the immense social upheaval and political polarization taking place in Canada, the United States and around the world.

A Breeze Before the Storm

Following the congress, CUS's first notable problem was the failure of the NLF speaking tour. Preparations in conjunction with UGEQ had been going smoothly and CUS student councils were encouraged to host the NLF speakers who were to arrive in Montreal on September 26.[96] However, the project quickly fell apart when a single delegation, as opposed to two, arrived in Montreal. As it turned out, the NLF tour, which had been organized through the International Union of Students, had been perceived as a single tour as opposed to two. UGEQ, which had invited the NLF to speak three months before CUS, was given priority. Thus, the tour was limited to Quebec.[97] With the exception of Paul Ladouceur's efforts to circulate readings on Vietnam during the 1965-66 academic year, CUS's Vietnam education program failed to materialize for a third year in a row. Meanwhile, in the United States, the anti-war demonstrations of October 1967 proved to be a significant turning point for the American New Left.[98]

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[95] WRA, ACUS, Box 26, Brian Hutchison, "XXXI Congress: An Assessment," 1.
[96] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, September 1967, Daphne Kelgard, "Letter regarding NLF speaking tour," (September 25 1967).
[97] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 9, October 1967, Daphne Kelgard, "Letter regarding NLF speaking tour," (October 11 1967).
[98] Although many more students would participate in the peaceful mass marches, SDS and other sections of the New Left began promoting "resistance" to the war in Vietnam, sparking a series of high profile confrontations with the authorities such as the nationwide "Stop the Draft Week" and actions against Dow Chemical recruitment on campus. Sale proposes that the repression meted out against the fall 1967 protests was a major factor in facilitating SDS' transition from the ideas of a "New Working Class" entertained earlier in 1967, to embracing Marxism outright. See Sale, *SDS*, 369-391.

In English Canada, the defining issue in the fall of 1967 was the use of university disciplinary action against students. The most prominent example was at McGill where three *McGill Daily* staff, including the editor, were charged by the university administration with obscenity and libel and faced expulsion. Their crime was reprinting a satirical article describing President Lyndon Johnson sexually assaulting the corpse of John F. Kennedy. CUS vice-president Don Mitchell was dispatched to McGill where he spoke to the student council alongside UGEQ's M. Pierre LeFrançois. Both argued that the freedom of the student press, not the newspaper's content, was the issue. The council was unable to come to a clear consensus, merely requesting that the *Daily* editor, Peter Allnut, print a retraction, to which he agreed.[99]

The episode opened the door for the Students for a Democratic University to intervene. The group launched a campaign that mobilized a large number of students to oppose the administration's intervention in student affairs. They also reprinted the controversial article in a widely distributed leaflet. The SDU attempted to negotiate with the administration for the charges to be dropped. When this failed, they organized a 400-strong occupation of the administration's offices to delay the disciplinary hearings. Within a day, the administration conceded to reforming the disciplinary committee to include student representation and a reduction of administrative representation. Having won the concession, the SDU called off the occupation but several students remained. When police were called in to clear them out, the SDU organized once again to oppose the police actions and began to call for a student strike. At the protest, police attacked students and arrested Stanley Gray for assaulting an officer. [100] Photographs proved that

[99] "McGill Daily staffers face expulsion," *The Carleton*, November 10 1967, 9.
[100] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 84.

the administration's allegations against Gray were untrue, leading the student council to take a position of opposing the disciplinary actions against the *McGill Daily* staff. However, a plebiscite on November 24 proved that SDU's efforts had not entirely succeeded, with 2,964-2,243 voting against dropping the charges and 4,117-1,296 voting against a strike.[101]

In response to the actions taken against the *McGill Daily*, the Canadian University Press encouraged student newspapers to reprint the provocative article, "The Student As Nigger," penned by Jerry Farber, a lecturer at California State University in Los Angeles.[102] John Lalor, editor of the University of Windsor's student paper, *The Lance*, published the article on December 1, leading to the administration convening its disciplinary committee to investigate. It was clear that the university had already determined its verdict when Windsor university president J.F. Leddy, attacked *The Lance*'s "morbid obsession with squalid vulgarity." Lalor and his co-editor Marion Johnstone, chose to resign on January 9 instead of being expelled, Lalor explaining that he would not let the committee "roll up my future in a little ball and flush it down the toilet for the sake of expediency." [103] This prompted the Canadian University Press, led by its president Lib Spry, to convene the organization's first investigation commission since Sandy Gage's firing at the *McGill Daily* in late 1966.[104] Not surprisingly, CUP found the university "guilty of intervention"[105] but that did not stop an almost identical

[101] Canadian University Press, "McGill votes to retain charges," *The Ubyssey*, November 24, 1967, 3.
[102] "Obscenity: Can students be censored?" *The Carleton*, February 2, 1968, 4. For the full text of Farber's essay, see Jerry Farber, *The student as nigger: essays and stories* (New York 1970).
[103] Canadian University Press, "Free Press squashed," *The Ubyssey*, January 11, 1968, 5.
[104] Canadian University Press, "CUP to examine dispute," *The Ubyssey*, January 12, 1968, 13.
[105] Canadian University Press, "University of Windsor 'guilty of intervention," *The Ubyssey*, January 23 1968, 9.

case of disciplinary action at Mount Allison University in New Brunswick later in January 1968.[106]

Other incidents of student discipline at McMaster, Western and Toronto also stirred controversy. A McMaster graduate student David Guy faced disciplinary action for describing the Dean of Graduate Studies' unsolicited and meddlesome intervention in the graduate student union's internal affairs as "dishonest" and "reprehensible." Backed unanimously by his union, Guy's right to free speech was defended and a motion to "reaffirm the Dean's honesty and integrity" was firmly rejected.[107] At Western, a student was suspended by the university after receiving a two-year suspended sentence in the civil court system for possession of marijuana, an incident Armstrong described as "a clear case of double jeopardy."[108] The CUS leadership took note of what was happening and circulated a document drafted by Pat Hembruff, the CUS Associate Secretary, Student Government Research Service, to council presidents and local CUS committee chairs to provide background information and direction for how to respond to such issues.[109]

It appeared that students and their organizations, including CUS, could do little. The exception was McGill's SDU. Although it did not succeed in launching a student strike, it provided the most effective response to the generally questionable disciplinary actions taken by largely arbitrary and undemocratic administrative bodies. The CUS leadership, on the other hand, was unable to do much beyond writing letters of protest, sending messages of solidarity, and circulating documents such as Hembruff's. The

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[106] Canadian University Press, "Editor sacked over reprint," *The Ubyssey*, February 2, 1968, 2.
[107] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, January 1968, "Background Paper on the McMaster Controversy."
[108] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, January 1968, Hugh Armstrong, "Memorandum regarding Student Discipline," (January 12 1968).
[109] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, January 1968, Pat Hembruff, "Student Discipline."

leadership did send members of the secretariat to speak to students on affected campuses, but they did not have the capacity to do anything like the McGill SDU. As a result, the vacuum of an organized student left on most campuses quickly led to the establishment of SDUs on other campuses. CUS activists, New Democrats, members of the Student Christian Movement all played a role in building the SDUs, but the major impetus came from former SUPA activists.[110] Within a couple months of congress, SDUs were formed at Carleton and Waterloo.[111] A similar group, the Student Activist Movement was established at Guelph.[112] The politics of these groups ranged from syndicalism to Marxism, often combing the two.

The CUS leadership, however, did not change its mind about field workers in favour of establishing Cleveland's "parapolitical parties." Field work was a success and was instrumental in winning critical membership referendums at Windsor and UBC. Like the year before, students opposed to CUS's international affairs policies spearheaded campaigns to pull out of CUS. This was partially fuelled by an erroneous story circulated by the Canadian University Press claiming the congress had voted in favour of immediate withdrawal from Vietnam.[113]

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[110] Kostash, *Long Way From Home,* 82-83. One could argue that there were "two generations" of SDUs. When Kostash characterizes the SDUs as having an "emphasis on the politics of outrageous life-style and extravagant gesture," this does not describe the McGill SDU (formed November 1966) or the Carleton SDU (formed September 1967). These two groups preceded the "yippie!ism" of the later SDUs, and were originally created as an opposition to right-wing student councils and to further advance educational reforms such as student representation on senates and boards of governors. Most SDUs were formed in late 1968 in the context of the student revolt, and often through the efforts of CUS fieldworkers taking their inspiration from the Simon Fraser SDU. It should be noted that not all SDUs were in fact called SDU. The Queen's equivalent was the Students for a New University. The University of New Brunswick had the Students for a Democratic Society. The University of Toronto had the Toronto Student Movement. Further study is required on the SDUs of 1966-1970 since they arose largely independently of one another and came to represent, arguably, the most important organizational centre for campus radicals in 1968-69.
[111] "Group formed for academic reform," *The Carleton*, September 29, 1967, 3.
[112] WRA, ACUS, Box 38, Letter from Brian Hutchison to Dan Lapres, November 24, 1967.
[113] Canadian University Press, "False report injures CUS," *The Ubyssey,* October 19, 1967, 8.

The Windsor withdrawal attempt was led by a council member who saw CUS as dominated by leftists. Only after an intervention by Armstrong at a Windsor student council meeting was the plan for immediate withdrawal from CUS shelved in favour of a referendum.[114] Working closely with Windsor's student councilors and targeting mildly anti-CUS students, Armstrong's efforts were quickly reinforced by those of Pat Hembruff, Monique Ouelette, the president of OUS, and a pro-CUS activist from the UWO student council. [115] The intervention was able to secure a CUS victory by a margin of 24 votes at the October 13 referendum.[116] The campaign also politicized sufficient numbers of Windsor students to reorient the student council into focusing on the democratization of university structures. The student council became increasingly critical of the administration especially after the disciplinary actions taken against *The Lance's* staff. The CUS leadership was relieved by the victory and the direction taken by the Windsor student council afterwards. They feared a defeat would, in Armstrong's words, "spark a nation-wide trend, or indeed an avalanche."[117]

The same threat was posed at UBC in September and October 1967. Delegates at the congress had already observed the UBC delegation's unwillingness to go along with the general CUS approach on international affairs, a position that the University of Alberta had taken the year before. UBC's Alma Mater Society president, Shaun Sullivan, convened a meeting on September 24 to discuss withdrawal from CUS with council

[114] Canadian University Press, "CUS at stake under Windsor referendum," *The Ubyssey*, September 29, 1967, 5.
[115] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, Hugh Armstrong, "Campus by Campus Review" in "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 4.
[116] Canadian University Press, "Windsor union stays in CUS," *The Ubyssey*, October 17, 1967, 3.
[117] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, Hugh Armstrong, "Campus by Campus Review" in "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 4.

delegates from the University of Victoria and Simon Fraser.[118] Expecting the University of Victoria to follow UBC out of CUS, Armstrong and CUS secretariat member Bob Baldwin visited the UBC campus to intervene, finding *The Ubyssey*, the student newspaper, a strong ally in favour of CUS membership.[119] Even though the council voted 12-9 in favour of CUS membership on September 25, [120] a referendum was declared on October 2 to be held November 1.[121]

While the UBC campaign was underway, Windsor's students voted to stay in CUS but Acadia withdrew in a lopsided 618-286 vote which Warrian attributed to misinformation.[122] Armstrong expressed mystification at the Acadia vote, noting that the Acadia student council president, Bob Levy, was not at congress and had not contacted CUS for any information. The Canadian University Press reported that Levy "made it clear before the referendum that a vote for CUS was a vote against him."[123] The events at Acadia proved to be inconsequential as UBC students voted 3,811-1,743 in favour of the union.[124] With the feared tide of withdrawals over, Armstrong was able to go to Victoria the day after the referendum "somewhat in the manner of a Roman Emperor's triumph."[125]

As February 1968 approached, CUS had weathered two tense battles at Windsor and UBC and observed an increase in university repression, particularly in regards to

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[118] "Councils consider CUS," *The Ubyssey*, September 21, 1967, 8.
[119] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, Hugh Armstrong, "Campus by Campus Review" in "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 6. See also the editorials "CUS fuss," *The Ubyssey*, September 26, 1967, 4; "CUS and money," *The Ubyssey*, October 5, 1967, 4; "Why we need CUS," *The Ubyssey*, October 27, 1967, 4.
[120] "Separatists Fail – UBC keeps CUS," *The Ubyssey*, September 26, 1967, 1.
[121] "Referendum on CUS set for Nov.1," *The Ubyssey*, October 3, 1967, 1.
[122] Canadian University Press, "Acadia drops CUS; opinion is 3 to 1," *The Ubyssey*, October 20, 1967, 15.
[123] Canadian University Press, "Mixed reaction meets Acadia CUS pull out," *The Ubyssey*, October 24, 1967, 11.
[124] Charlotte Haire, "UBC Remains in CUS," *The Ubyssey*, November 2, 1967, 1.
[125] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, Hugh Armstrong, "Campus by Campus Review" in "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 6.

student newspapers. Lakehead University, Mount Allison and Ryerson had also voted to join CUS in referendums. The union was in fact growing. Field work, which concentrated mainly on educational policies and not questions of international politics, also provided the CUS leadership a far better understanding of the problems they faced at each local campus. They found a general lack of engagement by student councils with CUS educational policies. Like Ward before him, Baldwin complained that although student councils were encouraged by and engaged with CUS seminars and congresses, "when they come back to the campuses, all they do is talk about mickey mouse dances and games."[126] CUS field workers also had to confront red-baiting. In defending CUS against accusations that it was a "leftist elite," Armstrong argued that "[i]f CUS doesn't represent the Canadian student, then the problem is with representation on student councils, on a discrepancy between student councils and electorates, not between student councils and CUS."[127]

Opposition to CUS emanated from unexpected quarters, not simply the resolutions passed at congress. The student councils at Calgary, the University of New Brunswick, St. Francis Xavier and Brock had become irritated with CUS as a whole because of the tensions with their local CUS committees, committees which were perceived as bureaucratic appendages of the CUS national office in Ottawa.[128] CUS fieldworkers generally managed to allay concerns and resolve tensions through long discussions with student council members and by dissolving the CUS committees. Aside from Calgary, Alberta was generally seen as a write-off, victims of the University of

[126] Paul Knox, "'Councillors don't do job,' says CUS rep," *The Ubyssey*, October 26, 1967.
[127] Bob Schwarzmann, "Armstrong says CUS not a leftist elite," *The Carleton*, January 26, 1968, 7.
[128] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 5-6, 17, 57, 61.

Alberta right-wing now led by Al Anderson.[129] CUS leadership could at least take comfort in knowing that the efforts of Marilyn Pilkington and Branny Schepanovich to launch a conservative national student association had failed, even if they did manage to establish the Alberta Assembly of Students, a body funded by the ruling Social Credit party. [130] A similar body, though not nearly as conservative, was cobbled together in the Maritimes, continuing the trend towards provincial and regional unions.[131]

As for politically active campuses, CUS leaders learned that they did not automatically engage with the increasingly leftist CUS. Both Armstrong and Mitchell found their visits to Simon Fraser unrewarding. The campus, they explained, was in a constant state of political crisis which ensured that there was no focus on "what may be happening elsewhere."[132] A high level of political engagement with a much stronger awareness and favourable attitude towards CUS was witnessed at Moncton during the fall. Samuel Arsenault, the Moncton student council international affairs coordinator, managed to organize a 500-strong anti-war demonstration on the campus, a feat all the more impressive considering the student body was only 1,200.[133] The large number of Quebec students at Moncton played a key role in maintaining the high level of political engagement which was on full display when the university announced tuition fee increases. A 91.4 percent turnout voted 95 percent in favour of the strike, which commenced in early February, 1968.[134] CUS enthusiastically supported the strike, but could offer little concrete support. Armstrong flew to Fredericton where the strike fever

[129] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 26-27. On Social Credit's intervention in Alberta student politics, see
[130] Arthur Joevenazzo, "Alberta Association non-activist," *The Ubyssey*, January 5 1968, 9.
[131] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 20.
[132] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 14.
[133] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 18.
[134] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, February 1968, Don Mitchell, "Memorandum regarding Université de Moncton Strike," (February 12 1968).

was spreading to the University of New Brunswick.[135] After ten days, the strike at Moncton ended as 70 percent of students voted to return to classes after the university threatened that strikers could not write their exams.[136]

The fall of 1967 was a period of uneasy turbulence and political transition. The disciplinary actions against students had escalated dramatically, hardening the increasingly Marxist convictions of the New Left. The university was being understood as a component of a broader social system, one which Carl Davidson had already linked with the domestic suppression of democracy and imperialism abroad. CUS, however, steered clear of making the open political pronouncements that would have satisfied the New Leftists who saw the *Declaration of the Canadian Student* as a "piece of mush." It was around educational issues and CUS' related policies that the CUS leadership oriented its fieldwork and secured the victories at Windsor and UBC. Vietnam, Quebec, and the political debates on the New Left were not the issues in which student councils were being won over to CUS. On paper, the union was becoming quite radical, but practically, it was restrained. How long this could persist was soon to be tested by the growing confrontational style of student activism, much of it in response to how university administrators and the police dealt with student protest. Signaling the new mood to come, two students expressed their dissatisfaction with the defeat of the Moncton strike by leaving a pig's head at the doorstep of the city's mayor.[137] Coincidentally, in Vietnam, the Year of the Pig commenced.

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[135] Canadian University Press, "Strike brief prepared," *The Ubyssey*, February 20, 1968, 11.
[136] Canadian University Press, "Fee strike ends," *The Ubyssey*, February 27, 1968, 7.
[137] Canadian University Press, "Ham, frog at trial," *The Ubyssey*, March 15, 1968, 3.

The Storm Breaks

The National Liberation Front launched its Tet Offensive on January 31, 1968, an offensive that brought the war into South Vietnam's cities for the first time on a large scale. Militarily, the offensive was a massive defeat, with the NLF battered by the American counter-offensive. However, the grueling Battle of Hue, the dramatic seizure of the US embassy in Saigon and the infamous television broadcast of the Saigon police chief executing a suspected NLF member in the streets, resulted in a massive political defeat for the United States. Only a few weeks before, General Westmoreland, commander of the American forces in Vietnam, had said that he could see the "light at the end of the tunnel" and "the end coming into view." But American casualties rose dramatically, with an average of five hundred being killed each week in April, and 5,000 more through to May. Westmoreland's response was to request an additional 200,000 troops which would have brought the US military strength in Vietnam to over 700,000. After this request was revealed in the *New York Times* on March 10, incumbent Lyndon Johnson suffered a surprise defeat two days later in the New Hampshire primaries to the anti-war candidate, Senator Eugene McCarthy. Johnson's approval rating was in free fall and on March 31 he announced that he would not seek another term as president.[138]

Four days earlier, student protests against Columbia University's ties to the Pentagon had set events into motion that would soon culminate in a massive student

[138] On the Tet Offensive see James H. Willbanks, *The Tet Offensive: A Concise History* (New York 2007). On American public perceptions of the Tet Offensive, see Jake Blood, *The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War* (New York 2005) and for the impact on American politics see, Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, *America Divided: the Civil War of the 1960's* (New York 2008) 232-235.

strike and a series of occupations.[139] Four days after Johnson's announcement, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, sparking riots, demonstrations and street battles with police and the military in over a hundred American cities.[140]

As events south of the border intensified following the Tet Offensive, the CUS leadership came under pressure from various quarters to take an openly anti-imperialist stance. For example, in a March 8 edition of *Issue*,[141] the editor, Terry Campbell, called for students to "respond en masse" to the US-based Student Mobilization Committee's call for anti-war protests on April 26-27. He argued that the war was the most important issue of the day for Canadian students since many of Canada's universities were being run by unelected boards of governors who had direct and indirect ties to numerous arms producing corporations. Campbell also argued that the recent disciplinary actions against the *McGill Daily* were in fact a response to their exposé linking over two-thirds of the McGill Board of Governors to companies producing war materials.[142] Arguments such as these were hard to dismiss, especially since the CUS leadership was largely in agreement. The question of Canadian complicity in Vietnam had long been highlighted by Canadian anti-war activists and the New Left.[143] However, the Tet Offensive and the social turmoil it unleashed lent these concerns new legitimacy and propelled them to the forefront of the

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[139] On the Columbia occupation from the perspective of one of its leaders, see Mark Rudd, "Columbia – Notes on the Spring Rebellion," in Carl Oglesby, ed., *The New Left Reader* (New York 1969), 290-312. Eric Mann, an SDS activist, provides a similar but somewhat more critical view of the Columbia occupation in Eric Mann, "The Columbia University Insurrection," *Our Generation* 6/1-2 (May-June-July 1968), 101-120. For the details of the occupation situated in the broader context of 1968, see also Isserman and Kazin, *America Divided*, 234-241; Mark Kurlansky, *1968: The Year That Rocked the World* (New York 2004), 178-208.

[140] Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air*, 21.

[141] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, January 1968, "Press Release: National student newsmagazine."

[142] Terry Campbell, "Why Vietnam should concern you," *Issue*, 1/2 (March 8 1968), 6.

[143] For the most extensive study of Canada's political, military and economic involvement in the Vietnam War, see Victor Levant, *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War* (Toronto 1986).

CUS agenda. Questions of American economic and political power in Canada also became much more important.

The CUS leadership responded by planning a "Student in the World" statement for the 1968 congress. Whereas the *Declaration of the Canadian Student* had focused on the student role on campus, this statement would be designed to "develop policy and action concerning "off-campus" issues."[144] Hugh Armstrong suggested that the new statement required a position on "how we view Canada," including whether the union favoured "self-determination for Quebec," or would "take a stand on economic nationalism." Though he acknowledged such questions were bound to cause controversy, he pressed ahead, also raising the possibility of making statements "about neo-colonialism, cultural imperialism, wars of liberation, etc."[145] At the CUS Board of Officers meeting on March 22-24,[146] there was strong consensus around opposition to Vietnam. Vice-president Don Mitchell suggested that the board allow Armstrong to speak on behalf of CUS at one of the April anti-war rallies. Despite the consensus, the Board chose a cautious approach, mandating the executive to draft a statement on the union's position on Vietnam that would be discussed at the following Board of Officers meeting.[147] The cautious approach to the Vietnam anti-war demonstrations and the decision to press ahead with the "Student in the World" statement was an expression of the contradictory situation that the leadership found itself in. Restraint was becoming increasingly difficult as the spring of 1968 wore on. Eventually, even the approach to

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[144] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, March 1968, Hugh Armstrong, "Memorandum regarding the Student in the World Statement for the Congress," (March 22 1968).
[145] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, March 1968, Hugh Armstrong, "Memorandum regarding the Student in the World Statement for the Congress," (March 22 1968).
[146] Following the 1967 congress, the "Board of Directors" was referred to as the "Board of Officers."
[147] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, March 1968, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Officers," (March 22-24 1968), 9.

fieldwork began to change and it became increasingly common for the CUS leadership to suggest working with or encouraging the formation of groups like SDU to help pressure student councils to adopt CUS policies.[148]

At the Board of Officers meeting in mid-May, it was decided to draft a statement announcing CUS withdrawal from the International Student Conference due to its ties with the CIA. Armstrong also presented the draft statement on Vietnam, which caused a lengthy debate. Some argued that the statement had to be redrafted entirely, with more emphasis on the history of the conflict, while others suggested that it was appropriate, as Armstrong had done, to explore the relationship between American imperialism in Vietnam and American imperialism in Canada. A minority suggested that no statement on Vietnam should be made at all and CUS should stick to educational matters. Armstrong resolved the debate, stating that the union "should not wait for the lowest common denominator" and should "add its voice to the opposition to American imperialism." The anti-war statement was adopted as interim policy and would be redrafted in time for the Congress.[149] Following the Board meeting, a public statement was made on the federal election reflecting the new militancy. It described the electoral process as inadequately democratic and meaningless to the "many dispossessed." It also called for the voting age to be lowered to 18 from 21.[150] Unlike an earlier draft, it made no mention of American ownership of Canadian industry and Canada's complicity in Vietnam.[151]

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[148] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, "The Wonderful World of Fieldwork," 47; WRA, ACUS, Box 32, Letter from Bob Baldwin to Julie Wierzbicki, March 29 1968.
[149] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, May 1968, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Officers," (May 17-19 1968), 10.
[150] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, May 1968, "CUS Statement on the Federal Election," (May 23 1968).
[151] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 10, April 1968, "Federal election statement," (April 30 1968).

On the heels of Tet, King's assassination, Columbia and a federal election call, massive student protests in France sparked off an enormous general strike that appeared to be on the verge of toppling the De Gaulle government.[152] The revolt in France seemed to confirm the Marxist ideas that so many radical students had been engaging with. As this happened, dozens of CUS activists prepared for the annual CUS seminar in June. The documents flooding in to the national office reflected the enthusiastic radicalism. Alongside Farber's "The Student as Nigger," documents by Jim Harding, John Porter, Carl Davidson and Christian Bay, a New Left American professor from the University of Alberta, were submitted. The Communist Party's Stanley Ryerson was also invited to speak. Myrna Kostash's brief account of the Winnipeg-based seminar celebrates the radicalism of the event. In her words, the majority of delegates pressed

> for free-wheeling discussion about the role of a student movement in revolutionary change in Canada, about spontaneity versus discipline, grass-roots activity versus centralization, the relationship of theory to practice, the function of the multiversity in preparing the "new working class" and so on.[153]

The seminar also coincided with visits to Winnipeg by Trudeau and Conservative leader Robert Stanfield. Resisting the tide of Trudeaumania,[154] official CUS demonstrations

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[152] Among the many account of France's "May '68" are Daniel Singer, *Prelude to Revolution: France in May, 1968* (London 1970); Angelo Quattrocchi and Tom Nairn, *The Beginning of the End: France, May 1968* (New York 1998). There are a number of important accounts of May 1968 which highlight the role of the French Communist Party (PCF) in defusing the revolt. Such accounts are critical to understanding the intense and often divisive political debates that plagued the student movements of the late 1960s, a point which is often overlooked by those who portray such debates as entirely theoretical and not connected to actual political events. See Richard Johnson, *The French Communist Party versus the Students: Revolutionary Politics in May-June 1968* (New Haven 1972). An important product of the revolt was the rejection of both Stalinism and Trotskyism in Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, *Obsolete Communism:The Left-Wing Alternative* (London 1969). For the often over-looked role of UNEF in the events of May-June 1968, see A. Belden Fields, *Student Politics in France: A Study of the Union Nationale des Étudiants de France* (New York 1970), 170-175.

[153] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 87.

[154] In his highly readable and entertaining global survey of 1968, "the year that rocked the world," Mark Kurlansky describes Trudeaumania as setting Canada "out of step with the times." A far more nuanced

were held at both events, and each led to CUS activists storming the platforms and disrupting the political rallies. One CUS placard read "One, Two, Three more Sorbonnes!" capturing the insurrectionary mood with reference to the Parisian student revolt and Che Guevara. Absent in Kostash's account of the seminar are the deep divisions that emerged between the "moderates" and the "radicals." When the radical left, who comprised the majority of the seminar delegates, stormed the Stanfield and Trudeau rallies, the CUS "Liberals" and "reformists" were, in the words of CUS activist Andy Wernick, "horrified" and "outraged" even if some of the "Liberals" were radicalized by the experience.[155] Prior to the seminar, Alan Dudeck, the University of Winnipeg student council president, had already warned that "extreme tactics" could not be used by CUS unless absolutely necessary, otherwise "the establishment" would be provoked and cause divisions within the union.[156] Dudeck's concerns were largely ignored. The protests, according to Wernick, helped "sabotage" the efforts of the University of Manitoba Student Union to pass a new university reform bill through the province's legislature. In contrast, radicals from SFU, University of Toronto and UBC attacked this approach to student politics as "reformist" while delegations from the prairies and the Maritimes leapt to Manitoba's defence. The seminar fragmented into small discussion groups. One plenary session organized by the radicals, defiantly entitled the "Student Violence Coordinating Committee – Student Power and the Canadian Revolution" drew a large audience, leading to unfulfilled plans to draw up a "Red River Manifesto."[157] The split

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view is provided by Bryan Palmer who explores the phenomenon as well as the underlying tensions in Canadian society. "Trudeaumania," Palmer concludes, "foundered on the shoals of late 1960s conflicts." Kurlansky, *1968*, 351-352; Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 163-177.

[155] Andrew Wernick, "Blowin' in the wind – CUS in Winnipeg," *The Canadian Forum*, September 1968, 132-133.

[156] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, May 1968, Alan Dudeck, "A Sense of Direction," (May 17 1968), 2.

[157] Andrew Wernick, "Blowin' in the wind – CUS in Winnipeg," 133.

between the radicals and the "reformists" and "moderates" was not resolved. It was a foretaste of the congress to come and little was done over the summer to redress the divisions.

The outgoing and incoming CUS leaderships maintained their openly radical stance. Jerry Farber's "The Student as Nigger" was printed by the national office and member student councils were encouraged to order copies and include them in orientation programs, though only thirteen of over forty student councils responded positively to the suggestion.[158] In a memo to council members on CUS' withdrawal from the International Student Conference, Bob Baldwin explained the decision as part of "CUS's present battle...against U.S. interests."[159]

Over the summer, the previous year's disciplinary actions and strikes, including a successful strike at Sir George Williams for greater student representation in university government,[160] were increasingly seen by the CUS leadership as part of an agenda to clamp down on student demands and student activism. They had good reason. Earlier in January, the Committee of Presidents of the Universities of Ontario had released a report opposing the inclusion of students on university administrative and governmental structures.[161] CUS had rebuked the report, and Terry Campbell wrote a scathing critique in *Issue*, describing the arguments as "doublethink," "muddled thinking and rhetorical rationalization."[162] The question of discipline re-emerged in June and July following the victory of the SDU "student power" slate in the Simon Fraser student council elections.

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[158] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, June 1968, "Memorandum regarding Jerry Farber and your Orientation Week plans," (June 12 1968); NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, July 1968, Colin Leonard, "Memorandum regarding Jerry Farber – don't you want him?" (July 12 1968).
[159] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, June 1968, Bob Baldwin, "Regarding ISC Charter Commission," 4.
[160] Canadian University Press, "SGWU students out on strike," *The Carleton*, October 27, 1967, 1; Canadian University Press, "Student strike succeeds," *The Carleton*, November 3, 1967, 1.
[161] For a detailed discussion of this report, see Clift, "The Fullest Development of Human Potential," 63-64.
[162] Terry Campbell, "...and the Establishment's manifesto," *Issue*, 1/2, (March 8 1968), 7.

Shortly afterwards, a crisis which culminated in an occupation of the administration building on June 6 demanding the resignation of the Board of Governors, a call winning 80 percent support in a student plebiscite.[163] The crisis had erupted on the heels of the Canadian Association of University Teachers censuring the SFU administration for politically intimidating the Political Science and Anthropology department, a department populated by young, anti-war and New Left academics.[164] With the SFU administration's legitimacy in tatters amidst the global student revolt, upwards of fifty Canadian university presidents and high-level administrators gathered in Ottawa on July 11 to discuss "campus unrest." The meeting was held only a block away from the CUS national office.[165] Peter Warrian posed the question to the media, "If they really want to talk about student revolt, why aren't we there?" Don Mitchell issued a CUS memo to all council presidents, suggesting that if there were attempts by university administrators "to buy you off with token reforms," it would probably be the work of "liberal presidents" such as the University of Toronto's Claude Bissell, trying to prevent his "reactionary colleagues" playing "directly into the hands of student revolutionaries."[166] The events at SFU and the collective response by the university administrators fuelled CUS student revolutionaries in their preparations for the 1968 congress.

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[163] James Harding, "From the Midst of a Crisis: Student Power in English Canada," in Gerald F. McGuigan, ed., *Student Protest* (Toronto 1968), 90-91.
[164] Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, 244-246. For more context on the SFU protests of 1968, see Hugh J.M Johnston, *Radical Campus: Making Simon Fraser University* (Vancouver 2005), 282-292.
[165] Canadian Press, "University presidents discuss unrest on Canadian campuses," *The Globe and Mail*, July 12, 1968, 1.
[166] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, July 1968, Don Mitchell, "Memorandum," (July 16 1968), 2.

Congress '68

The invasion of Czechoslovakia, following the Dubcek reforms and mass agitation among students, was only days old when the CUS congress in Guelph started.[167] James Harding, who had been elected vice-president of the SFU student council on the SDU slate, had just returned from Europe after visiting the World Youth Festival, sponsored by the International Union of Students, in Sofia, Bulgaria, and had liaised with a number of Czechoslovak students who were involved in the "Prague Spring." Harding and other radicals brought a sense of righteousness and purpose to the congress, supplementing the literature prepared for the CUS delegations.

Like the seminar in June, radical analysis dominated the discussion papers submitted for the congress. A theoretical cohesiveness was also developed by the CUS leadership. Bob Baldwin produced a lengthy text on American imperialism that outlined Canada's place in the world as a "modern colony" in an adaptation of André Gunder Frank's dependency theory as espoused in his book, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America.*[168] Designed to supplement Baldwin's analysis was Warrian's "Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Canada," which wedded Gunder Frank with the "metropolitan thesis" of J.M.S. Careless and D.G. Creighton.[169] Barry McPeake also produced a lengthy and detailed analysis of the war in Vietnam, including Canada's

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[167] On events in Czechoslovakia, see Kieran Williams, *The Prague spring and its aftermath: Czechoslovak politics, 1968-1970* (New York 1997). For a Marxist interpretation supportive of the Czech social movements, see Chris Harman, *Class Struggles in Eastern Europe, 1945-1983* (London 1983), 187-211.
[168] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, July 1968, Bob Baldwin, "An Analysis of U.S. Imperialism," 4, 18-23; André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: historical studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York 1967).
[169] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, August 1968, Peter Warrian, "Capitalism and the Underdevelopment of Canada," 1-2..

role.[170] CUS had become an intellectual milieu for the English Canadian student movement.

Strategy and tactics for the student movement were addressed by Harding, Russell and Hutchison. Harding's approach provided little concrete analysis of the student movement or CUS and focused on broader strategic questions of a "national liberation" struggle he saw as necessarily growing out of the campaigns to democratize the universities.[171] Confronting the corporate-controlled Boards of Governors meant attacking the branch plant economy and its "colonial mentality" of "branch plant liberalism."[172] However, Harding also argued that students should not make the mistake of "seeing ourselves as a vanguard for the dispossessed" or use Third World forms of struggle such as "cultural revolution" and "guerilla war" in the Canadian context.[173]

Hutchison and Russell were not as theoretical and abstract as Harding in their analysis. Hutchison attempted to offer solutions to the problem of "fragmentation" in English Canada, by which he meant the trend towards provincial and regional student unions. In contrast to the commission on structures from 1967, Hutchison was critical of this trend, arguing that only in Quebec was there a substantially different education system and that was only so because Quebec was a nation in its own right, though still part of Canada.[174] While not dismissing the necessity of provincial and regional bodies in English Canada outright, Hutchison argued against those who saw their necessity as "a self-evident truth," claiming they were peddling "a dangerous oversimplification."[175] The

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[170] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, August 1968, Barry McPeake, "The Vietnam War."
[171] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, James Harding, "Students and Revolutionary Reformism in English Canada," 1.
[172] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, James Harding, "Students and Revolutionary Reformism in English Canada," 1.
[173] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, James Harding, "Students and Revolutionary Reformism in English Canada," 1-4.
[174] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, Brian Hutchison, "CUS and Student Unionism," 3, 16.
[175] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, Brian Hutchison, "CUS and Student Unionism," 18.

problem with basing arguments in support of provincial unions on UGEQ's success was, he argued, to see UGEQ as a provincial union "*comme les autres*", a mistake resting on the failure of CUS and English Canadian students in general to see Canada as a "bi-national" entity. Provincialism and regionalism in English Canada, he suggested, might in fact lead to a worsening of Canada's "economic, political and cultural subservience to the United States."[176]

For his part, Russell addressed the problem of local student council conservatism in what was for him typically aggressive New Left prose. He attacked student councils as being "Uncle Tom" organizations and compared them to "company union[s]."[177] Organizations such as SDU were, claimed Russell, necessary for radicals to pressure not only student councils but the student body as a whole. He also warned that student councils were a problem regardless of who controlled them.

> Although most S.G. [student government] people will be willing to cut alot [sic] of the bureaucratic shit that they now do, part of being in S.G. is a predilection for B.S. They will try to put the movement into committees. While in the short run this might bring more changes, it won't be significant change and the movement won't survive in committees.[178]

Like Davidson two years earlier, Russell called upon radicals to engage student councils but only towards radical ends, including fostering debate, questioning the role of the university in society, highlighting how education was tailored to the needs of "American imperialism and Canadian capitalism", and working to "build a movement committed to

[176] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, Brian Hutchison, "CUS and Student Unionism," 18.
[177] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, August 1968, Jim Russell, "Radicals on Campus: An Overview," 1.
[178] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, August 1968, Jim Russell, "Radicals on Campus: An Overview," 2.

structural change and anti-imperialist in direction."[179] Despite Russell's bombastic style, his suggestions were seen as reasonable enough, proposing a general principle of maintaining a distinct radical organization outside student council, while still working to push the student council when necessary. The argument, however, represented a shift in focus away from council and towards radical student groups, a shift made all the more significant as Russell was selected as the British Columbia fieldworker for the 1968-69 academic year.

The evening before the congress started, students gathered around television sets watching the police attack protesters at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.[180] The following day, on August 28, the congress started and the incoming president, Peter Warrian, delivered a speech to 300 delegates in which he stated that if students recognized that the university was "a social institution which is destructive of human potential then we may symbolically or physically burn it down or do what seems necessary" to democratize it and society as a whole. He added that it was "the year for socking it to the administrators," and "that democratization and liberation will not come through the manipulation of a few, but only through the struggle of all."[181] He also called for education to be freed from American imperialism and "neo-capitalism," and for Canada's colonial status to be challenged and ultimately overturned.[182]

The mainstream press quickly took notice of Warrian's statement, with the *Toronto Star* running a sensationalized version of events as a front page story the day

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[179] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, August 1968, Jim Russell, "Radicals on Campus: An Overview," 1-2.
[180] Robert Schwarzmann, "The CUS Congress: An Analysis," *The Carleton*, September 13, 1968, 7. On the Chicago protest, see Frank Kusch, *Battleground Chicago: the police and the 1968 Democratic National Convention* (Chicago 2008).
[181] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, Peter Warrian, "The State of the Union or Brothers and Sisters This is Our Thing, So Let it All Hang Out," (August 28 1968).
[182] Donna Mason, "Burn! Sock it to 'em! Canadian students told," *The Toronto Star*, August 29 1968, 1.

after.[183] *The Star* even went as far as getting comment from Toronto mayor William Dennison who described Warrian's speech as "most destructive, defeatist, almost reprehensible."[184] The following day, it ran an editorial dismissing Warrian's speech as "irresponsible" and merely an attempt to mimic Europe's two most prominent student leaders, Daniel Cohn-Bendit and "Red Rudi" Dutschke, the most prominent spokespersons for the French and West German student left, respectively.[185] The story was quickly picked up in the press across the country, including a front page story in the *Globe & Mail* on August 31.[186] The sustained attack in the press failed to deter the CUS radicals.

Reflecting the turn to Marxism by a number of student leaders, Martin Loney, a leader of the Simon Fraser University SDU, led a delegation into the congress on its second day, carrying red and black flags, chanting "Ho! Ho! Ho Chi Minh!" and placing the Vietnamese Communist leader's portrait over the Queen's at the head of the room. Loney addressed the crowd,

> We've come four thousand miles to this congress to discuss what is happening in the world. We want to discuss how this affects students. Just look at Czechoslovakia and Chicago and tell me you can't be concerned...CUS exists as a national voice, a place for discussion, a forum, a place to mobilize students.[187]

On August 30 delegations were asked to sign a declaration of commitment to the union. This sparked a revolt among the delegates, many of whom claimed they were upset with

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[183] Donna Mason, "Burn! Sock it to 'em! Canadian students told."
[184] Donna Mason, "Dennison: He's got his nerve," *The Toronto Star*, August 29, 1968, 1.
[185] "Sock it to 'em – why?" *The Toronto Star*, August 30, 1968, 6.
[186] John Kelsey, "Withdrawals threaten student movement," *The Globe & Mail*, August 31 1968, 1,2.
[187] Quoted in Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 90.

the increase of CUS fees from $0.75 to $1 per student.[188] Five unions immediately withdrew membership, including Ottawa, Bathurst College, the Southern Alberta Institute of Technology (SAIT), the University of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon), and, surprisingly, Moncton. The latter explained its withdrawal as resulting from CUS's failure to meet the needs of its French-speaking students and for only offering "a four-line telegram of support" during its February student strike.[189] Seven other unions, Mount Allison, UNB, Manitoba, Notre Dame in Nelson, B.C., Victoria, St. Patrick's College in Ottawa and UBC, threatened withdrawal. Ottawa and King's College in PEI would resign the following day. Warrian responded to the withdrawals by offering to resign, but the congress voted to maintain the incoming secretariat.[190]

Within a day, the union had gone from 40 student councils representing 150,000 students to 28 student councils representing 90,000. Only a few delegations, notably those from Saskatoon, SAIT and King's College, framed their withdrawals in terms of a left-right conflict. Eric Olson, president of the Saskatoon delegation, attacked the radicals as "reprehensible" and a "vocal minority committed to leftist dogma."[191] There were a series of grievances expressed by delegates who withdrew or threatened to do so. Concerns ranged from the aforementioned CUS fees, to accommodation of French-speaking students to, as the UBC delegation claimed, a failure to "decentralize" power to the local student councils.[192] Whether or not these grievances masked a reluctance to appear to support an overly political stance by CUS is difficult to determine. Perhaps the emergence of provincial and regional student unions across the country can help explain

[188] "St. Pat's, Ottawa U., out; Carleton to hold fall vote," *The Carleton*, September 13, 1968, 7.
[189] Kelsey, "Withdrawals threaten student movement," 1-2.
[190] Kelsey, "Withdrawals threaten student movement," 2.
[191] Kelsey, "Withdrawals threaten student movement," 2.
[192] Donna Mason, "6 more colleges quit union," *The Toronto Star*, August 31 1968, 15.

the willingness to withdraw from CUS over such non-political, technical matters. Nevertheless, no leftist delegations withdrew for such reasons and later withdrawals would be led by opponents of CUS's radical turn.

Eventually, a number of delegations dropped their threats of withdrawal as the congress wore on. By the end of the congress, 34 of the 40 original councils remained in the union.[193] The turmoil at the start of the congress served to reinforce the determination of the radicals. Delegates voted three to one in support of an SFU resolution explicitly backing the National Liberation Front, opposing the "imperialist and genocidal war currently being waged against Viet Nam by the United States and its allies," demanding the "immediate withdrawal of all U.S. and allied troops" and calling for an end to "the Canadian government's political and material support for U.S. aggression in Vietnam and elsewhere."[194] Motions were also passed opposing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, affirming "the right to self-determination of all peoples," and for women's liberation.[195] Resolutions entitled "The Student in Society" and "Canada and Quebec" defined Canada as dominated by "giant American corporations," supported the right to self-determination for Quebec and called for "a strong national government for English Canada" to oppose American imperialism.[196] The *Declaration of the Canadian Student* was reaffirmed and augmented by a resolution on "Student Power" which called for students to control "the learning process and the University decision-making process at all levels."[197] Reflecting the radical mood of the congress, Martin Loney was elected as the 1969-70 CUS

[193] Canadian University Press, "Dissidents out, CUS forges action," *The Ubyssey*, September 10, 1968.
[194] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, "Resolutions 1968," 5.
[195] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, "Resolutions 1968," 5-6.
[196] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, "Resolutions 1968," 3-4.
[197] WRA, ACUS, Box 35, "Resolutions 1968," 1.

president. But the radicalism of the CUS congress was not entirely unpredictable, even if it was a surprise to spectators and many students.

From the Vietnam resolution, to the Quebec resolution, to the open anti-imperialism and strong Marxist influence, the groundwork had been laid in the years between Berkeley and Paris. It was the fourth consecutive congress which passed a resolution dealing with Vietnam, and the second to oppose American imperialism outright. Beginning with the Kenniff presidency, but taking clear shape under Ward's, CUS had also come to develop a de facto recognition of Quebec's right to self-determination. CUS leaders continually argued that UGEQ could not be seen as a union *comme les autres*, because Quebec was a nation, not simply a province. As for the question of class, it did not assert itself as prominently as in 1967, but the anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism that infused the 1968 congress was certainly informed by Marxism. It was precisely the fusion of class analysis, which had been raised in the debates and discussions surrounding the policy of universal accessibility, with anti-imperialism which had made the turn to Marxism possible. Nevertheless, there was a significant transition. If the 1967 congress was defined by its focus on educational matters, the 1968 congress came across as militantly anti-imperialist.

The Backlash Gains Momentum

Following the congress, the CUS leadership responded to the press portrayal of Warrian and the union as "violent." A press release defended the tactics of sit-ins and strikes as pacifist and accused the universities of fomenting violence as part of a society replete

with racism, war and nuclear weapons.[198] As for Warrian's statement, the mainstream media was dismissed as "sensationalist" and "irrational."[199] When confronted with the content of his speech at a University of Toronto student council meeting, Warrian denied suggesting burning down university buildings, describing the quote as a result of "the incompetent bourgeois press."[200] The CUS response had little impact.

Yet, the intense public spotlight on the union and the withdrawals did not temper the radicalism that continued after the congress. A series of documents and radical reading lists, including Gunder Frank, Ernest Mandel, André Gorz and Frantz Fanon, were sent out to delegates in September and October.[201] The union also threw its support behind mid-October anti-war demonstrations, urging student councils to build local actions.[202] However, by late October, it was apparent that a backlash against the union's radicalism showed no sign of subsiding.

Once the congress was over, the backlash began immediately. At SFU's student council elections in September, the SDU slate was soundly defeated.[203] At Windsor, anti-CUS students delivered a petition to the pro-CUS student council forcing a membership referendum for late September.[204] In Ottawa, Carleton's student council president, Jerry Lampert, also called for a CUS referendum, explaining "I've finally realized I'm against

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[198] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, September 1968, Wynton Semple and David Black, "Students and Violence."
[199] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, October 1968, "CUS: On Representativity and Democracy."
[200] Canadian University Press, "'Bourgeois press' hacks CUS quote," *The Ubyssey*, September 17, 1968, 9.
[201] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, August 1968, Lib Spry, "List of books.". NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 11, September 1968, "A Selection of Readings on Vietnam."
[202] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, Judy Skinner, "Vietnam Resolution and Educational Programme" (October 2 1968).
[203] George Reamsbottom, "Radicals go down in SFU elections," *The Ubyssey*, September 24, 1968, 3.
[204] Canadian University Press, "Campus councils question CUS student radical role," *The Ubyssey*, September 24, 1968, 10.

the idea of student unionism."[205] As a member of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, Lampert's statement was disingenuous, but he was far from alone in opposing CUS.[206] On September 27, the anti-CUS campaign at Windsor succeeded with an overwhelming 1184-675 vote. Ted Richmond, the CUS fieldworker for Ontario who had previously worked with OUS, blamed the loss on "lies" being peddled about CUS supporting "Communism and Separatism."[207] In his field report, Richmond added that "after watching Detroit burn across the river they [Windsor students] have decided that "students shouldn't be involved in international affairs"." He also described the campus as "American and relatively conservative."[208] The previous year's referendum victory went unmentioned. Following a narrow victory at Laurentian and two defeats at non-member campuses, Lethbridge and Waterloo Lutheran, a sense of urgency set in among the CUS leaders. CUS fieldworkers also responded by moving away from working with increasingly hostile student councils towards working with campus radicals, encouraging them to form SDUs, of which there were at least nine in Ontario and many others across the prairies and Maritimes by October 1968.[209]

As Richmond lamented the "defeatist mentality" spreading on the campuses, Jim Russell assessed the situation in his typical style. He believed the problem was the unrealistic expectations of students who had had "their minds fucked" by the June seminar and August congress and were anticipating "a minor revolution by October." Russell remained confident that things would "change by post-Christmas" as long as field

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[205] "Lampert to call for CUS vote," *The Carleton*, September 13, 1968, 5.
[206] "Lampert attends PC conference," *The Carleton*, October 25, 1968, 1.
[207] Canadian University Press, "Windsor shafts CUS with two to one vote," *The Ubyssey*, Tuesday October 1, 1968, 2.
[208] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, October 1968, Ted Richmond, "Ontario Field Report, October 1968," 1.
[209] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, October 1968, Ted Richmond, "Ontario Field Report, October 1968," 2-3.

workers "talk quietly and tell people to calm down."[210] Russell's assessment was not shared by Richmond. By the end of October, Richmond was describing the congress's resolutions as "adventurous." He suggested the union become voluntary for individuals, councils, and non-council student groups and even proposed that the CUS leadership resign and call an emergency congress.[211] This sentiment permeated the October 25 National Council meeting in Ottawa, with the idea of a voluntary union being discussed, and a suggestion that CUS form alliances with SDUs on non-member campuses. Everyone also agreed that the backlash was a result of the mainstream press, but the council was unable to develop a coherent strategy to successfully fight the referendums.[212]

Nevertheless, the union pressed ahead with its support of the October anti-war demonstrations, marching alongside groups such as the Canadians for the National Liberation Front, the Anti-Imperialist Front and the Trotskyist-led mobilization committees present in many Canadian cities.[213] It also issued statements describing Canadian students as "no longer accepting the role of passive receptors in the educational system" and calling for "a redistribution of power so that the needs of the people are not subservient to the interest of the few who form the corporate elite."[214]

Through October, the international student revolt continued. Days before the beginning of the Mexico City summer olympics, police opened fire on a student protest

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[210] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, October 1968, Jim Russell, "Strategy," 1.
[211] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, October 1968, Ted Richmond, "State of the Union and All That – Some Questions," 1-2.
[212] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, October 1968, "National Council Meeting Minutes," (October 25 1968) 6-7, 10.
[213] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, October 1968, Judy Skinner, "Memorandum regarding International Days of Protest – Demonstrations, October 26, 1968," (October 18 1968).
[214] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, October 1968, "CUS and All That," 1-2.

killing dozens.[215] Starting with a single occupation on October 8, Quebec was gripped by a full-blown student strike a week later. Having formed the CEGEP system only a year before, the Quebec government had failed to provide sufficient space in the universities for the 35,000 CEGEP students, giving credence to UGEQ's demand for a new francophone university in Montreal.[216] This set the stage for the McGill SDU to initiate a large-scale campaign to make McGill a bilingual institution.[217] On October 17, a three-week sit-in at the University of New Brunswick to protest the firing of physicist Norman Strax was attacked by counter-demonstrators.[218] In November, the sit-in ended through the use of police.[219] Later in the month, a handful of Waterloo students occupied the university president's office demanding the student union building be handed over to the student council. The university president responded by calling the students Marxists-Leninists under orders from the Canadian Union of Students.[220] Other sit-ins at the University of Alberta and UBC also gained notoriety in the student press.[221]

In November, English Canada witnessed its most dramatic student protest of 1968. At SFU, revelations about unfair admission policies culminated in a short-lived mass occupation of the administration building on November 14.[222] After the protest, the

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[215] Kurlansky, *1968*, 326-344. For a collection of first-hand accounts of the Mexican student movement and the massacre, see Elena Poniatowska, *Massacre in Mexico* Tr. Helen R. Lane (Columbia, MO 1991).
[216] Pierre Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Quebecois*, 38-43; Lysiane Gagnon, "Bref historique due movement étudiant au Québec (1958-1971)" in *Bulletin d'Histoire Politique* 16/2 (hiver 2008), 36-42.
[217] Pierre Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Quebecois*, 49-50; Lysiane Gagnon, "Bref historique due movement étudiant au Québec (1958-1971)," 36-42; Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 90-91; Adèle Lauzon, "The CEGEP General Strike in Quebec," *Our Generation*, 6/4 (June 1969), 149-160.
[218] Canadian University Press, "Maritimers continue strike, protest enters third week," *The Ubyssey*, October 17, 1968, 9.
[219] For more on the Strax affair, see John Braddock, "Strife on Campus," in Tim Reid and Julyan Reid, eds., *Student Power and the Canadian Campus* (Toronto 1969), 115-124.
[220] Canadian University Press, "Campus commies cause creeping revolution," *The Ubyssey*, October 24, 1968, 8.
[221] Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 92; John Gibbs, "Raucous Ruckus Rouses Faculty Club," *The Ubyssey*, October 25, 1968, 3.
[222] Paul Knox, "Students at SFU stage accreditation demonstration," *The Ubyssey*, November 15, 1.

student demands were taken to a senate meeting on November 20. Despite support from CUS, the BC NDP, BC Federation of Labour, various local labour unions, Vancouver Teachers Association and the municipal Vancouver party, the Coalition of Progressive Electors, the senate rejected student demands.[223] The result was another mass occupation led by SFU's own SDU and the Vancouver City College's SDU. The occupation lasted four days before 150 RCMP officers arrested 114 students.[224]

While CUS' radicalism over the spring and summer of 1968 had earned a backlash from conservative and moderate student council leaders, the union found itself an easy and convenient target for those reacting in opposition to the crescendo of student revolt in the fall of 1968. CUS, of course, actually played no real role in initiating the actions at UNB, Waterloo or SFU. By mid-November, referendums were being organized at eight member campuses and five non-member campuses.[225] The avalanche of referendums crippled the union's ability to do anything but act defensively. Warrian complained that the referendums were "counter-productive, abstract, organizational debates" that did little to actually engage students,[226] but such complaints gained little traction as Guelph, Western and Carleton all voted to leave CUS in December.[227] The momentum was such that even though Carleton's anti-CUS student leaders boycotted three separate referendum debates with Loney, Warrian and University of Toronto

[223] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, November 1968, Lib Spry, "SFU Emergency Bulletin," 2-3.
[224] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, November 1968, Lib Spry, "SFU Emergency Bulletin," 3; George Reamsbottom, "The occupation," *The Ubyssey*, November 29, 1968, 2-3; Kostash, *Long Way From Home*, 93-4; Johnston, *Radical Campus*, 282-284.
[225] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, November 1968, "Referendums."
[226] Kevin Peterson, "CUS head Warrian 'not anarchistic'," *The Ubyssey*, November 5, 1968, 6.
[227] "Referendums," [November 1968]; Dave Studer, "Carleton votes CUS out," *The Carleton*, November 29, 1968, 3.

student president Stephen Langdon,[228] Carleton students still voted 1298-1043 against CUS.

"The radical trip...is over"

Following a relatively quiet December, the CUS leadership got back to work. At a National Council meeting in early January in Toronto, the "state of the union" was discussed. Several reasons were provided for the referendum defeats in Ontario, including the fall-out from the Guelph congress and the mainstream press coverage and the "corporate-liberal mentality" associated with "Ontario's relationship to the American metropolis."[229] Langdon's suggestion that the CUS leadership had failed to help councils after the congress was disputed, while David Black claimed the problem was a lack of a concrete political program, and proposed that Russell's idea of a "National Union Day" be carried out. This was dismissed by McPeake, Richmond and Wernick. Warrian and Martha Tracey, a former CUS associate secretary, avoided taking sides, explaining that they did not know how local student unions would respond. The question was referred to the secretariat to draw up a proposal and possibly approach the Canadian Labour Congress for support, an idea reflecting the working-class orientation of the Marxist-influenced leadership.[230] The referral was effectively the end of the proposal.

Reflecting the political priorities of a majority of the CUS leadership, the union's efforts in early January were focused on building support for the *Peterborough Examiner* strike which had become a focus for the newly-swelled ranks of Ontario's Marxist

[228] Bob Schwarzmann, "Nobody opposes Warrian's stand," *The Carleton*, November 15, 1968, 1; Sheila Herbert, "Lampert not issue in referendum: Langdon," *The Carleton*, November 15, 1968, 1.
[229] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, January 1969, "National Council Minutes," (January 5-7 1969), 3.
[230] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, January 1969, "National Council Minutes," (January 5-7 1969), 5-6.

student groups.[231] As Marxists looked to Peterborough, five more referendums on January 17 resulted in the loss of Victoria and St. Mary's, and Southern Alberta Institute of Technology.[232] Ted Richmond was again first to express his concerns, arguing that CUS was now operating in an "anti-intellectual framework." Richmond all but dispensed with any practical discussion of how to rebuild CUS in Ontario, instead indulging in long theoretical discussions of Marxism, student-labour alliances and how student radicals could become a "radical intelligentsia."[233] The turn to abstract theoretical discussion was one response to the series of seemingly inevitable defeats for CUS. The only "practical" response advanced by Richmond was to begin salvaging a core of radicals, based around the SDUs, and effectively set CUS adrift, allowing it to adopt a more moderate set of politics or become a voluntary union.[234] The blows continued when Calgary withdrew on January 27 followed shortly thereafter by extremely narrow votes at Waterloo and Winnipeg.[235] The union was now down to 24 student councils.

The CUS leaders still managed to issue militant statements regarding major crises on Canadian campuses. CUS attacked the administration's attempt at the University of Saskatchewan to cripple the Regina student union by not collecting student union fees,[236] and issued a defence of the students at Sir George Williams who had destroyed computer

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[231] For an overview of the New Left's intervention in the strike see Philip Resnick, "The New Left in Ontario," in Dimitri Roussopoulos, ed., *The New Left in Canada* (Montreal 1970), 98-99.
[232] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, January 1969, "Referendums – 1969."
[233] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, January 1969, Ted Richmond, "Notes on Ontario Strategy" (January 20 1969).
[234] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, January 1969, Ted Richmond, "Ontario Field Work and CUS Strategy," 4-6.
[235] Canadian University Press, "CUS loses 3 on the prairies and at Waterloo," *The Ubyssey*, February 7, 1969, 3.
[236] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, January 1969, "Press Release," (January 7 1969).

equipment in a frustrated demonstration against racism.[237] It also organized support for Stan Gray who was being "hauled over the coals" by the McGill administration for his activities in the SDU and Operation McGill.[238] As such statements were being drafted, the referendum defeats bred turmoil within the leadership. The secretariat working in the national office was embroiled in arguments over division of labour, leadership, elitism and bureaucracy.[239] The tensions continued to mount as the new wave of referendums continued, reducing CUS to 17 student councils representing 90,000 students by early March.

CUS had not yet collapsed, but the future seemed bleak given developments in Quebec. In the wake of the CEGEP student strike, AGEUM had dissolved itself. The reasons were numerous, but all were rooted in the crisis of radicalization. AGEUM was too bureaucratic, stifling grassroots militancy and increasingly dysfunctional amidst the numerous political tendencies vying for its control. With the loss of the AGEUM dues base, UGEQ entered into financial crisis. At its March 12-16 congress, UGEQ dissolved itself, with Laval's student council following in September.[240] As this happened, the CUS leadership issued a memorandum to all remaining councils on the future of the union. It proposed three options for CUS: a "social democratic union," a voluntary union or a service union. The social democratic union was described as basically the same union with the same structure but not taking "obviously radical stands, such as attempting to

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[237] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, February 1969, "Press Release," (February 14 1969).; NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, March 1969, CUS Secretariat, "Sir George Williams University: An Evaluation." For a detailed and sympatehic New Left account of the conflict, see Dennis Forsythe, ed., *Let the Niggers Burn! The Sir George Williams University Affairs and its Caribbean Aftermath* (Montreal 1971).
[238] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, February 1969, Lib Spry, "Memorandum regarding Stan Grey."
[239] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, February 1969, Judy Skinner, "Secretariat meeting on work in the Office," (February 24 1969); NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, March 1969, Peter Warrian, "Memorandum regarding Work and Work Styles," (March 13 1969).
[240] On the dissolution of AGEUM and UGEQ, see Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Quebecois*, 47-49; Gagnon, "Bref historique due movement étudiant au Québec (1958-1971)," 42-44.

allie [sic] itself with Third World liberation movement."[241] The document opened up the floodgates of internal criticism, setting CUS on a path towards either a complete overhaul or dissolution. As secretariat member Lib Spry observed, "The radical trip which began at Guelph last August is over, and now we have to start operating in the real world to build a non-elitist, disciplined movement."[242]

The National Council meeting in late March was a grim affair. Don Kossick, the prairies fieldworker, stated that CUS "had lost in the West" due to the union's "image in the press as violent and destructive."[243] Langdon, Wernick and Richmond sparred over interpretations of what had happened in Ontario – no consensus was reached – while McPeake explained that the Martimes simply lacked "political leadership on the campuses."[244] When it came to British Columbia, Loney criticized Russell's work as ineffective, and in a motion tabled by Armstrong, Russell was removed as field worker.[245] When it came to CUS's national strategy, discussions were largely abstract, revolving around questions of Canada's economic relationship to the United States and the possibilities of linking up students with organized labour.[246]

Following the generally inconclusive meeting, Martin Loney, the incoming president, set about organizing the remaining CUS forces to help rebuild the union while the outgoing secretariat focused on planning the upcoming national seminar at Laurentian, "Education and the Economy: Knowledge for Whom?" Loney's first rebuilding conference was set to be held at the end of the seminar on May 24.

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[241] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, March 1969, CUS Secretariat, "Memorandum regarding the Future of the Union," (March 7 1969).
[242] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, March 1969, Lib Spry, "On Communications or What is a Nice Girl Like Me Doing in a Place Like This?" 9.
[243] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, March 1969, "National Council Minutes," (March 21-23 1969), 1.
[244] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, March 1969, "National Council Minutes," (March 21-23 1969), 2.
[245] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, March 1969, "National Council Minutes," (March 21-23 1969), 2-3.
[246] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, March 1969, "National Council Minutes," (March 21-23 1969), 3-4.

The seminar was the last and most refined political analysis of the radical CUS leadership. Warrian provided a second, much more detailed analysis of the development of the Canadian economy up to World War Two.[247] Using Warrian's analysis as a basis, CUS fieldworker Ron Davis provided an overview of the Canadian labour movement up to 1959, focusing mainly on the growth of the international unions and the lack of autonomy for Canadian unions.[248] Completing the overall analysis, John Conway, an SDU member at SFU, examined American corporate interests in the Canadian educational system, concluding that Canada's universities were geared towards a US-led continentalist economy.[249]

Once the seminar was over, the rebuilding conference got underway. Having attracted delegates from 34 campuses, including notable CUS opponents at the University of Alberta, and a large number of councils that had withdrawn since the 1968 congress, there was a sense of possibility among the participants. Surprisingly, Alberta and Calgary were first to introduce a motion declaring the common priorities of the CUS rebuilding conference as "unemployment (both summer and full time), housing, universal accessibility, and course content."[250] The motion passed unanimously with only two abstentions. The *Declaration of the Canadian Student* was reaffirmed with two dissenting votes and universal accessibility supported unanimously. Motions pushing in the opposite direction were not nearly as successful. A Mount Allison motion to dissolve CUS was defeated 20-1, but a second Mount Allison motion that declared CUS "not a political

[247] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, April 1969, Peter Warrian, "Staples, Structures and the State: Notes on Canadian Economic History up to the Depression."
[248] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, April 1969, Ron Davis, "Canadian Trade Union Struggles to 1959."
[249] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, April 1969, John Conway, "American Imperialism in our Educational System," 3-5.
[250] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, May 1969, Canadian Union of Students, "Minutes of Rebuilding Conference," (May 23-25 1969), 2.

party" and not "the vanguard of the New Left Movement in this country" was passed 15-8.[251]

A small sense of hope returned in the early summer. Calls were sent out for the 1969 congress to be held at Lakehead from August 27 to September 3.[252] A new edition of *Issue* was printed and 100,000 circulated around the country, receiving a favourable response.[253] A second rebuilding conference was organized for July 12-13 at Carleton but only seventeen delegations were present. Despite that, Loney found that most delegates "left with a commitment to rebuild the union" after arriving with "severe reservations about CUS."[254] The meeting also came to the conclusion that the motion to support the NLF at the 1968 congress was, in combination with a "hostile press," the key contributing factors to the CUS crisis.

Despite these advances, the 1969 congress, attended by 33 councils, was not a happy affair. Attempts to overhaul the union structures and put limits on the union's ability to take political stands failed as "radicals" and "moderates" clashed over the future of the union. Barry McPeake, the 1968-69 Maritimes field worker, told the congress that "a lot of people here are going to return to the campus and not do very much. People have to make a choice. Either they fulfill the implications of the content of our motions in action and words, or they sustain the structures which have lead to failure in the past." John Gallagher, an incoming member of the secretariat and Martin Loney lined up against the remaining open radicals, arguing that students needed to focus on "issues such

[251] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 12, May 1969, Canadian Union of Students, "Minutes of Rebuilding Conference," (May 23-25 1969), 2-3.
[252] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 13, June 1969, Martin Loney, "Invitation to the XXXIII CUS Congress."
[253] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 13, June 1969, Canadian Union of Students, "Report on Secretariat Activities Since the Rebuilding Conference," 1.
[254] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 13, July 1969, Martin Loney, "An Introduction to the Minutes of the Second Rebuilding Conference."

as housing and unemployment rather than a radical analysis of society."[255] While delegates did pass a resolution opposing the "Americanization of Canadian universities,"[256] there was little evidence of the radical legacy of the previous year. Coming out of the congress, the primary concern of the secretariat and CUS supporters was winning referendums to increase the membership beyond 39,500 in order to prevent, as the CUS finance commission stated, the union from going "belly-up by Christmas."[257]

The future of the union hinged on three referendums in October, at Carleton, Dalhousie and the University of Toronto. On October 20, despite a pro-CUS council, Carleton students rejected the union 1656-881.[258] Three days later, Dalhousie did the same in a 633-411 vote as did the University of Toronto with a result of 5,434-2,222.[259] Unable to shake the image of a radical left-wing organization, the National Council decided to dissolve the organization. A letter, defiantly Maoist, was sent to national student unions around the world:

> Due to the withdrawal of a large number of unions from the Canadian Union of Students, the Union will cease to exist as of November 30, 1969.
>
> Secretariat
> Canadian Union of Students

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[255] Canadian University Press, "Money Problem Will Spell CUS Death," *The Ubyssey*, September 9, 1969, 8.
[256] This was drawing on the "Canadianization movement" spearheaded by Robin Mathews and James Steele, left-wing faculty at Carleton University, who sought to stem the tide of American faculty being hired by the universities amidst their rapid expansion. See Robin Mathews and James Steele, eds., *The Struggle for Canadian Universities* (Toronto 1969). A useful survey of the movement can also be found in Jeffrey Cormier, *The Canadianization Movement: Emergence, Survival, and Success* (Toronto 2004).
[257] Canadian University Press, "Budget reduction rests on Oct. CUS referendums," *The Ubyssey*, September 9, 1969, 9.
[258] Phil Kinsman, "Carleton students reject CUS," *The Carleton*, October 24, 1969, 1.
[259] Canadian University Press, "Toronto, Carleton, Dalhousie kill CUS," *The Ubyssey*, October 24, 1969, 1.

> "In times of difficulty we must not lose sight of our achievements. We must see the bright future, and we must pluck up our courage." -- Mao[260]

The spectacular events of 1968 had made the prospects of revolutionary change, for a moment, within the realm of possibility. The radicals who found themselves in the CUS leadership had made their move over the summer, seeking to participate in the international revolt, and help foster it at home. However, after the denouement of the May-June events in France, the revolts of 1968 faced increasing repression, from the protesters in Chicago, to the students in Mexico City, to the masses in Czechoslovakia. Canadian students, who carried out sit-ins, strikes, occupations, marches and numerous protests through late 1968 and early 1969, did face repression for their actions but nothing on the scale seen elsewhere. The repression was the sharpest expression of a global crackdown on social movements and social protest. On Canada's campuses, CUS, which had so clearly identified itself with the radicalism of 1968, became the most convenient and easy target for the students who aligned themselves with the existing order, the two major political parties, or simply opposed the national student union taking such positions. With that, the Canadian Union of Students was no more.

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[260] NAC, CUS, MG28-I61, Box 13, September-October 1969, Canadian Union of Students, "To all national student unions." At the oral defence of this thesis, Professor Hugh Armstrong suggested that the Mao quote was tongue-in-cheek, reflecting the extent to which the emerging revolutionary rhetoric of the period was treated as something of a joke by the CUS leadership in Ottawa. In the absence of other evidence I have decided to leave my interpretation intact. However, it may need to be corrected in future studies of CUS.

Conclusion

CUS was not alone in the world when it came to student organizations radicalized by the events of the mid-1960s, notably Berkeley, Selma and the war in Vietnam. Nor was CUS alone in taking a hard left turn in 1968. It ought not come as a surprise that CUS was accompanied to the grave by a number of other, more radical and more famous student organizations. A few months prior to the CUS dissolution in October 1969, the quintessential American New Left organization, the Students for a Democratic Society, exploded in an acrimonious battle between various radical Marxist factions.[1] In Quebec, AGEUM and UGEQ had already dissolved themselves, followed by AGEUM's counterpart at Laval in September 1969.[2] In West Germany, the New Left group led by Rudi Dutschke, Sozializtischer Deutscher Studentenbund, was on the path to collapse in early 1970.[3] In Britain, the successor of the Radical Student Alliance, the Revolutionary Socialist Student Federation, first formed in 1968, broke apart only a year later.[4] In France, the events of May-June 1968 "shattered" UNEF, though the organization never folded.[5]

Why these organizations collapsed at roughly the same time requires further study, but the radicalization of the student movement and New Left, the repression often meted out against the protest movements amidst a general societal polarization, were

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[1] On the SDS split, see Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York 1974), 557-574.
[2] Pierre Bélanger, *Le Mouvement Étudiant Québécois: son passé, ses revendications et ses lutes (1960-1983)* (St-Jean, QC 1984), 47.
[3] Cyril Levitt, *Children of Privilege: Student Revolt in the Sixties: a study of student movements in Canada, the United States, and West Germany* (Toronto 1984), 53.
[4] Alex Callinicos and Simon Turner, "The Student Movement Today," *International Socialism* 75 (February 1977), 9-15.
[5] A. Belden Fields, *Student Politics in France: A Study of the Union Nationale des Étudiants de France* (New York 1970), 170-175.

certainly central to their demise. Beginning with the Tet Offensive, the year was marked by extraordinary upheavals in Vietnam, American ghettos, Czechoslovakia, Mexico City, and in France, where students acted as a detonator for an explosion of working-class militancy. Campus strikes, sit-ins and occupations were numerous and widespread, even in Canada. However, the increase in student radicalism and the general political instability of that year also led to a rapid coalescing of opposing forces on the campus and in society at large. Although university administrations had clearly over-stepped their political legitimacy in the numerous cases of disciplinary action in late 1967, this was not actually accompanied or supported by a groundswell of "anti-radical" opposition among students. In fact, as the CUS referendum campaigns of late 1967 demonstrated, support for the union was fairly good with two withdrawals defeated and three new student councils joining. It is likely that the repression against students in late 1967 benefited CUS to a slight degree, as seen by the Windsor student council's pro-CUS turn after the referendum when the student newspaper editor was disciplined for printing Farber's "The Student as Nigger."

The critical turning point for CUS began with the seminar in June 1968 and culminated at the August/September congress. The seminar was wracked with divisions between the radicals, and the "moderates," even though many of the moderates were by no means opposed to educational reform as the University of Manitoba delegation's efforts in the Manitoba legislature shows. However, the enthusiastic sense of purpose among the radical student delegations, buoyed by their defiant disruptions of the Liberal and Tory rallies in Winnipeg, ensured that the real political differences that did exist at the seminar between delegations, councils and individual students, were not even

tactically maintained. As demonstrated by the arrival of Loney and the SFU contingent, the radicals at congress, backed by the incoming CUS leadership, were able to win a series of resolutions which pushed CUS beyond being merely a left-wing student union focused primarily on educational concerns. It had become a radical student organization focused, at last rhetorically, on anti-imperialism and radical social change. Even at the 1967 congress, when SUPA and other New Left activists brought with them a new level of political sophistication to CUS, the congress was still described as overwhelmingly focused on educational issues.

Although students on a number of campuses would face repression by police called in by the university authorities in late 1968, this was not what broke CUS. Rather, it was the rise of an organized opposition on most Canadian campuses and within many student councils that sought to reign in the political activities of representative student bodies and head off any real or perceived radicalism on their campuses. CUS had become the most obvious target, a problem compounded by the CUS fieldworkers who began to promote the formation of radical student groups, notably the Students for a Democratic University which sprang up on nearly every campus in the fall of 1968. Like Schepanovich and Pilkington in late 1966, the opposition was clearly spearheaded by anti-Communist, conservative politics. This force was no doubt a minority voice on campus, but as public opinion was shaped by the mainstream press' depictions of CUS, and CUS leaders' declarations in support of the National Liberation Front, Quebec self-determination, and so on, the anti-CUS forces were able to construct a sizeable opposition. When the editors of the *Toronto Star* accused Warrian of imitating Europe's student radicals, Cohn-Bendit and Dutschke, they were also playing the role of the

reactionary Springer press in Germany.[6] The events of 1968 galvanized the right-wing student opposition, and a significant minority of students, sufficient to win referendums for withdrawal, a process encouraged by the press, which publicized the most radical aspects of the CUS congress.

A Minority's Dilemma

In this context, it is understandable why the CUS fieldworkers of 1968-69 were unable to repeat the successes of the 1967-68 fieldwork. When Hugh Armstrong visited the Windsor and UBC campuses to fight the withdrawal referendums, he did not have to confront a barrage of questions and criticisms about the union's position on Vietnam, Quebec, and so on. Instead, the referendums were won based on arguments surrounding educational reform, the most controversial aspect of which was the mild syndicalism of the *Declaration of the Canadian Student*. The *Declaration*, however, was hardly controversial and was unanimously supported by student councils in the rebuilding conferences over the summer of 1969, which attempted to curtail the union's political scope. The problem for the dedicated fieldworkers in 1968-69 was their inability to defend the resolutions of the 1968 congress. This is not to say CUS activists were incapable of making a case for opposing the war in Vietnam, for example, but rather that the anti-CUS opposition was simply operating on slogans, reports from the press, and the momentum which this generated. What this revealed was that CUS had no coordinated base of radicals on the campuses to support the union, hence the role of CUS fieldworkers in facilitating the formation of SDUs across English Canada. The CUS radicals learned the hard way that they were the minority.

[6] Mark Kurlansky, *1968: The Year That Rocked the World* (New York 2004), 149-156.

The crisis of radicalization was already felt in late 1966 when the University of Alberta student council withdrew under the leadership of overtly right-wing students. However, the 1966-67 leadership expressed a general dissatisfaction with the lack of student council support for the CUS resolutions and programs passed at congress. The gulf between the leadership and the base was what led Ward to propose the creation of fieldworkers. A second strategy towards the same end was informed by Carl Davidson's vision of a student syndicalist movement and the success of the McGill SDU. This entailed the formation of "parapolitical parties" which could unite the student left, act as a student council opposition, and remain free to engage in other issues on the campus. Ward's proposal won out at the 1967 congress, though there was never a serious push behind the second option. The choice seemed a good one. As the fieldworkers quickly learned, local CUS committees were already acting as an SDU-like opposition on some campuses and were the source of distrust towards CUS from local student councils. The committees were dissolved in order to strengthen ties between the councils and the national leadership. In late 1967, parapolitical parties seemed unnecessary and would have likely been seen by student councils as an attempt by the national leadership to take over the councils. Fieldwork oriented around educational matters and focused on student councils appeared to work for 1967-68. It was a top-down approach to foster grassroots support, a semi-conscious, partially acknowledged recognition that the leadership was to the left of the base and that forming radical groups like the SDU at McGill would jeopardize the left's domination of the CUS leadership.

The outcome of 1967-68 fieldwork was its formalization. Whereas the fieldworkers of 1967-68 were a rotating cast of national, regional and even local CUS

activists, the fieldworker was dedicated to each region for 1968-69: BC, the prairies, Ontario and the Maritimes. As student council after student council began to withdraw from CUS, CUS fieldworkers had to organize the pro-CUS forces on the campuses, or at least the forces that would support CUS' educational as well as anti-imperialist policies. As a result, fieldwork shifted from educating students to bolster local-national relations in CUS, to forming local radical student groups, the SDUs, in order to mount an opposition to hostile student councils. This was not a winning formula but did serve to focus the efforts of those who took inspiration from the revolts of 1968.

Doug Ward's vision of fieldwork, which was successfully implemented in late 1967, was a recognition of the crisis of radicalization which had allowed a minority of New Leftists to sweep into the leadership of CUS through 1964 and 1965. However, as this moment subsided, and it became apparent that the leadership was in fact a minority, it was clear that if any of the union's policies and programs were to be carried out, an active, engaged and politicized local base was required. This, however, did not exist. Fieldwork, with its orientation on the local student councils, was an attempt to remedy the problem, a problem which could threaten the survival of the union through student council withdrawals. Whether this approach to fieldwork would have functioned in the long-term is not certain given the annual election of student councils and the high turnover of students at each campus year to year. When the union took an open turn to the left in 1968, the problem of the New Left's minority position became acute. Student councils became actively opposed to CUS, rendering any previous conceptions of education-oriented, patient fieldwork hopeless. The immediacy of the referendum crisis in late 1968 prompted fieldworkers to construct SDUs in a desperate attempt to harness

the radicalism of students and build a base for CUS on each campus. It was still, however, the strategy of a minority, and a strategy that ultimately failed in keeping CUS alive.

A related problem confronting the CUS leadership was the consistent inability to mobilize students, beginning with the failed National Student Day in October 1965 and the annual failures of the Vietnam education program. Without an active local base, the union was never able to pull off anything like coordinated, large-scale demonstrations on numerous campuses. In fact, after National Student Day, there were no major coordinated protest actions led by CUS. Even if the 1968-69 leadership and fieldworkers had not been consumed with battling referendum campaigns, they still had no concrete political program. This was summed up in a comment made by Chris Huxley, an SFU delegate to the 1968 congress. After the resolution committing CUS support to the National Liberation Front's victory in Vietnam, Huxley turned to Hugh Armstrong and asked, "What the hell do we do now?"[7]

Following the collapse of CUS, a Trotskyist student at Carleton University, Ian Angus, penned a critique based around this criticism. He argued that the radicals had simply "taken over" the union. In the process, they did not build sufficient support on the campuses and then "found themselves isolated – generals without an army."

> The Congress they won at produced many very positive resolutions, including, for the first time, a serious program for identifying with the struggles of students in other countries, and with the most significant struggle going in the world today – that of the Vietnamese against the U.S.
>
> But these were merely expressions of verbal radicalism. There was no understanding in CUS of the need to act on the decision taken.[8]

[7] NAC, HAF, MG31-D66, Volume 1, File 3, Hugh Armstrong "untitled," 6.
[8] Ian Angus, "CUS, UGEQ flopped for same reason," *The Carleton*, October 31, 1969, 5.

While other aspects of Angus' critique were certainly inaccurate – describing, for example, UGEQ's collapse as also stemming from a lack of activity – his point on the union's lack of "action" is accurate.

Why did the Canadian Union of Students collapse? In short, the New Left leadership was a minority within CUS that had not sufficient base to support its anti-imperialist turn in 1968. However, there was never a shortage of student activists in English Canada during the mid-to-late 1960s. The problem facing the union's New Left leadership was that it inherited an organization whose structure was never designed to foster an active student movement. The annual congress had always been a place where the existing leadership could easily win over the local delegations, but when those delegations returned home, they had neither the political experience nor the training to defend, implement and carry through the union's policies. In addition, the annual CUS congress, and the union's Ottawa-based leadership of about a dozen people seemed remote from the daily concerns of student council leaders and students in general.

It would be unfair, however, to portray the left-wing CUS leaders as being incompetent. CUS leaders did respond to the union's problems fairly quickly, implementing the fieldwork program only a year after the University of Alberta withdrawal. When the referendum crisis hit in late 1968, SDUs were constructed almost immediately.

Explaining 1968: Continuity and change

If CUS leaders were not incompetent, one still has to explain the motivations of the radicals at the 1968 congress whose resolutions were the critical ingredients in the backlash that led directly to CUS' dissolution. As previously discussed, the resolutions can only be understood in the context of the events of 1968. This occurred at the same time CUS was experiencing a transition in its leadership, from those trained in student council politics, to those accustomed to political activism within relatively narrow and radical political groups. The 1967-68 leadership had been politically trained in the former context. For example, the 1967-68 president, Hugh Armstrong, had been Carleton student council president in 1965-66 and Ontario Union of Students president in 1966-67. Peter Warrian, in contrast, had been a SUPA activist, and an anti-poverty organizer in the United States. Warrian did serve as a Waterloo student councilor from 1966 to 1968, but councilors could still be elected by a small minority unlike student council presidents who also assumed much greater responsibilities. This helps explain why the 1968-69 leadership was able to lurch leftwards without any apparent concern for what would happen to the union, or recognition of the 1966 withdrawals and 1967 withdrawal attempts. As a result, the 1968-69 CUS leadership spent most of the year directionless in terms of assessing and responding to the crisis. The political distance between the leadership and base was paralleled by the distance between the goals of the radical leadership and the organization they had inherited. This latter problem is most apparent with the fieldworkers, notably Jim Russell and Ted Richmond in BC and Ontario, respectively, who could not reconcile their desire for a revolutionary student movement and their roles in CUS. In such a context, tensions within the leadership became more

acute. Warrian was accused of failing to provide leadership, Russell forced to resign as BC fieldworker by Loney, and the national office descended into chaos. Activists were torn between focusing on the SDUs, building the annual seminar, and rebuilding the union.

One could draw the conclusion that SUPA activists captured the leadership of CUS and led it to destruction. This formulation is far too simplistic and ignores, as this study has tried to demonstrate, the extent to which CUS was set upon a leftward political trajectory by events in South Africa, Vietnam, Quebec, Berkeley, Selma, France and Czechoslovakia. Had the events of 1968 not happened, CUS's New Left leadership may not have taken the union on its "radical trip." Nor is it obvious that a different CUS leadership, one with a political background like Armstrong, would not have been swept along by the events of 1968. In fact, it was the pre-1968 leadership of CUS that had laid the groundwork for further radicalization.

The withdrawal of Quebec's student unions, beginning with the francophone councils in 1964 and the Anglophone councils in the following three years, had forced the CUS leadership to reconsider and redevelop its understanding of Canada's relationship to Quebec's in the context of the Quiet Revolution. Despite Jean Bazin's hostility to UGEQ's founding in late 1964, both Patrick Kenniff and Doug Ward would begin repairing relations with Quebec and embrace, however, mildly, the philosophy of student syndicalism. The 1965 CUS submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism demonstrated the extent to which the CUS leadership had come to recognize the mistakes of a previous predominantly English Canadian leadership in ignoring the concerns of Quebec students and recognizing their unique position within

Canada. Ward also came to support Loyola and McGill membership in UGEQ even though he knew it meant losing them as CUS members. The CUS leadership had developed, through their relationship with Quebec's students, a de facto recognition of Quebec's right to self-determination, a resolution that was passed in 1968.

With the exception of the short-lived South Africa program of late 1964, CUS international programs focused almost exclusively on Vietnam from 1965 through to its demise. Prior to the 1968 resolution calling for victory to the National Liberation Front and immediate withdrawal of all American forces, the 1966 congress affirmed a lengthy International Student Conference resolution which asserted the same demands. Through the educational component of the Vietnam program, as well as the Canadian anti-war movement's focus on Canadian complicity in the war, politicized students were becoming increasingly alarmed by the Canadian relationship with the United States.

The new understanding of events in Quebec, the war in Vietnam and Canada's complicity, and revelations about the CIA's involvement in numerous student organizations, made the CUS leadership, notably Ward and Armstrong become increasingly concerned with American and corporate power in Canada. This concern was popularized by George Grant's *Lament for a Nation* and in the pages of *Canadian Dimension*, the most important intellectual bridge between the New Democratic Party and the New Left. The relationship between the economic system and the education system became increasingly apparent as the intransigence of university officials came to confirm the non-democratic nature of the education system and its role in training the "new working class."

The politicization and radicalization of CUS prior to 1967 was precisely why SUPA activists saw the union as a potentially worthwhile organization to engage with. These students brought with them a more radical set of politics but one that was not at all alien to the CUS leadership which had been trained in student council politics. The general problem with the new leadership was its poor understanding of CUS structures which, through the history of NFCUS and CUS, had demonstrated that the national leadership could not ignore its student council base without serious implications.

Given that CUS was only in existence from 1963 to 1969, and that the left only gained power in 1965, it was not as though the CUS leadership had much collective experience or history to rely upon. In many respects, what they were doing was entirely new. Their efforts were the first since the Canadian Student Assembly to construct a progressive, left-wing student organization. And unlike the CSA, it had a mass membership representing the majority of English Canadian students.

Avenues for further research

This study of the Canadian Union of Students is limited primarily to how the leadership of CUS was shaped and influenced by the major political events of the 1960s, propelling the union in a leftward direction. It has been an attempt to situate the union's experience within the wider revolts of the 1960s, and contribute, in its small way, to reinserting CUS within a broader understanding of Canada's student revolt. However, there remains plenty of research to be done on the Canadian Union of Students. Analysis of the CUS relationship with Indigenous issues and struggles, including CUS' relationship with Harold Cardinal during the middle part of the decade, warrants further

study. Such a focus was left out of this study for thematic reasons, but also because CUS relations with such struggles was tangential at best and would be best addressed in a study of the New Left's community projects of the mid-1960s.

There is of course much more work required on the local campus politics during the decade. Most examinations of the 1960s Canadian student movement focus on dramatic events such as the occupations at Simon Fraser University in 1968 and Sir George Williams University in 1969. A more thorough look at local campus politics would likely provide a much richer understanding of the rise, the trial and the collapse of the New Left and student revolt. A detailed profile of Canada's student leaders, whether local, provincial or national, would also contribute to an understanding of how these student leaders were politicized and how the various student, youth and political organizations of the decade were interrelated. This study has only demonstrated some links of some of the major CUS leaders. Such a study should not limit itself to the political left. There is virtually no research on the relationship between the Liberal and Conservative parties and the student councils, such as Branny Schepanovich's, which were most vocal and active in opposing CUS's increasingly political and radical politics.

The story of the Canadian New Left after the collapse of SUPA also needs to be told. This study has provided an examination of how the New Left entered the leadership of CUS. However, the numerous Marxist, Maoist and Trotskyists groups have yet to be analyzed, as well as the history of the SDUs which were, in 1968-69, on nearly every Canadian campus. Such a study would also serve to complement any foray into understanding the history of the student movement between the collapse of CUS in 1969

and the organizational reunification of the student movement in the 1981 formation of the Canadian Federation of Students.

Implications for Today

The post-secondary education system in Canada has changed and grown since the dissolution of CUS in 1969. However, many of the same problems confronting today's students remain. Outside of Quebec, where a militant student movement has regularly re-emerged, accessibility to post-secondary education has been facilitated mainly through loans which in turn burden students with enormous debts. Questions of student rights have recurred regularly in recent years, whether related to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and academic freedom. While benefiting from the reforms won on Canadian campuses by the 1960s student movement, students remain marginalized within the structures of the university with only token representation on senates and boards of governors. Though rarely formulated with the same terms, students continue to grapple with the implications of the "knowledge factory" and the "new working class" on their lives and broader society. The rich lessons of CUS' short history remain extremely valuable to students today, whether those students are student union leaders seeking to politicize their union or "rank-and-file" students seeking the same, develop new strategies for campus-based political action, or come to a deeper understanding of how the post-secondary education system functions and the role of the student within it.

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