POLICE RESPONSE TO ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
For the degree of Doctor of Education
Department of Theory and Policies Studies
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the
University of Toronto

Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-22052-8
Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-22052-8

ABSTRACT

Following 9/11, Canadian and American governments took steps to protect themselves from future acts of terrorism. The introduction of anti-terrorism legislation in the form of the Patriot Act in the US and the Anti-Terrorism Act in Canada strengthens connections among federal, state and municipal police enforcement. The new legislation increases police powers, whereby police departments are now subject to implementing terrorism strategies in addition to their regular duties.

This study questions how Canadian and American police departments employ new terrorism laws and policies. Utilizing a qualitative approach, twelve departments located in states in the mid west, west and southwest and the province of Ontario took part in interviews for this study. Eight American and 4 Canadian police chiefs and managers provide insight into police response to new anti-terrorism laws and policy. The study is framed around a conceptual analysis examining policy instruments employed by government in the form of mandates and inducements. Capacity building includes the actions of government investing in the implementation of policy.

Implementation of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism policy by both Canadian and American federal governments promotes interagency connectedness in the promotion of proactive and reactive response measures. Intelligence gathering and preparation for disaster response is influenced by availability of personnel, funding and education.

The importance placed on counter- and anti-terrorism policy by police is influenced by the size of the department, national differences, geographical position and

funding. How police interact with their communities influences government laws and policies for implementation of counter- and anti-terrorism responses at the department level. Relationships between police and community shape how laws and policy are put into practice at the street level.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number of individuals who contributed to the successful completion of this dissertation. It is of primary importance to acknowledge my advisor, Dr. Nina Bascia, for her intellectual leadership and contributions throughout this journey. In recognition of the members of my committee, Doctors, Jim Ryan and Malcolm Richmon, of OISE/University of Toronto and Dr. Robert Macmillan, of the University of Western Ontario for their valuable assessment and recommendations.

I am very grateful to the police chiefs and managers in Canada and the US who agreed to participate in this study considering the sensitive nature of the topic. In addition I would like to thank Dr. Alice Greer for her support, guidance and friendship. Interim-Dean, Dr. Bill Wagner, of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, chair, Doran Hunter, of the Law Enforcement/Political Science Department, and colleagues at the University of Minnesota, Mankato for their support and tolerance. Lastly, an acknowledgement for my family, my husband Frank and children Ben, Shea, Keely and Roarke for the sacrifices required to fulfill this dream.

DEDICATION

Dedicated with love to my husband Frank Ronald Jowitt.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Problem Statement

With the growth in global terrorism, and in particular with the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York and the damage to the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001, the United States (US) government initiated prompt and forceful steps ostensibly as a means of defending their country (United States Department of State, 2001). Canada, as a member of the United Nations, understood its responsibility to take action against terrorism as well (Government of Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001). With increased demands for systemic security to combat terrorism, both governments expanded their mandate to employ protection strategies at the federal, state/provincial and municipal levels of policing (Ashcroft, 2002; FBI, 2001; Public Service, and Emergency Preparedness Canada 2004). The US implemented the Homeland Security Act (Whitehouse, 2002) to connect the federal government to state and municipal police forces. At the same time, the Canadian Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, formerly the office of the Solicitor General of Canada, was restructured to regulate an intelligence system linking provincial and municipal police agencies. Each Canadian province has an intelligence service sharing information of national concern with this federal body[1].

[1] The intelligence branch in Ontario is known as the Criminal Investigation Service of Ontario (CISO).

Ratification of anti-terrorism legislation occurred with haste and the enactment of these changes transpired with little benefit of past policy or research to guide the decision making (Macnamara, 2002; Thomas, 2002). The connection of police agencies across three levels of Canadian government runs counter to the initial allocation of power distribution defined in the Canadian Constitution Act (1867-1982) in Canada and the division of Federal and state law enforcement authority under the United States Constitution.

Because of the additional responsibility of responding to anti-terrorism activities at municipal and state/provincial levels, current governmental and police administration demands differ from past policy. The sharing of federal policing responsibilities blurs the once distinct lines between external federal governance and internal police administration. Canadian police departments are expected to establish procedures consistent with federal and/or provincial counter- and anti-terrorism plans,[2] in the Ontario Police Services Act. In the US, the main role of police departments is the enforcement of the states' criminal codes. Police managers [3] have had to adopt policies based on public demand, accountability and efficiency (Oettmeier, 1992). The threat of terrorist activities puts additional pressure on police to respond to public concerns by acting in accordance with attitudes and beliefs consistent with federal and state expectations for what constitutes the role of a police officer.

As a former police officer, I was skeptical of the expected involvement of police to combat terrorism. A police officer is presently expected to perform multiple duties,

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[2] Anti-terrorism includes proactive measures to interrupt or halt terrorism such as partnerships and information sharing. Counter-terrorism is a reactive approach to prepare for terrorism threats and attacks.
[3] Police managers refer to upper ranking officers interviewed for this study in lieu of the police chief of the department.

often in complex situations, using knowledge of law, strategies for situational intervention, and training for physical encounters, while subject to organizational and public scrutiny. Before undertaking this study, I had conversations with patrol officers in both countries about the anti-terrorism training within their police agencies. It became clear that these officers did not know what was expected of them since they described counter-terrorism as viewing suspicious activity in the vicinity of nuclear, electric or water facilities. Their understanding of the importance of both anti- and counter-terrorism duties appeared negligible. As a patrol officer, when I was faced with policy or rules that did not seem appropriate, I felt it was apparent that those who had responsibility for policy development had never worked in a cruiser. As a result, I saw officers ignore policies or follow them minimally. Policies deemed important to departments were adhered to with pressure from management.

How police departments implement anti-terrorism policy and laws and whether the specific requirements correspond with policing goals and objectives is evident in the literature on police culture. Researchers and academics have recognized the existence of multiple cultures and varied beliefs within departments (Chan, 1996; Goldsmith, 1990; Scripture, 1996). Particularly noteworthy is the significance of informal rules within police culture (Goldsmith, 1990). If anti-terrorism policy does not fit with the values and beliefs of a police department, it may not be reflected in the implementation process.

Through this research study, I sought to determine the importance placed on anti- and counter-terrorism measures by police departments. The significance of fighting terrorism to American and Canadian police administrators in daily management decisions is uncertain. As well, since the effect of proactive or anti-terrorist measures on

relationships between police and citizens has not been fully explored, this connection is of interest. I wanted to delve into this topic to ascertain whether proactive community policing or reactive crime control methods of policing are practiced.

Police managers are confronted by the magnitude of anti-terrorism legislation. Canadian law, specifically Bill C36, the Anti-terrorism Act, assented December 18, 2001and the Public Safety Act, 2002, Department of Justice Canada, assented to May 6, 2004, authorize increased police powers at the risk of diminishing Charter rights[4]of individual Canadians under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). The American Patriot Act, enacted on October 26, 2001, broadens the powers of law enforcement officers through the expansion of intelligence and surveillance powers, and a requirement to share with government and other police agencies, information on potential anti-terrorism activities. With such untested legislation offering sweeping powers to subordinate level beneficiaries, the implementation of these new laws deserves closer scrutiny. The implications of police policy and the extent to which anti-terrorism plays a part in routine police duties and investigations based on the new legislation has largely been unexplored.

As an educator of future police officers, attention to training needs based on police policy is important to me. Studies specific to the field of police policy, and more specifically, focusing on anti-terrorism policy as it relates to patrol officers are lacking. This deficiency impedes clarity of expectations specific to the daily routine of police officers (White, 2002). There is no research examining whether specific expectations by federal, state and provincial governments conflict with police goals and objectives.

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[4] Fundamental Freedoms, Legal Rights, Equality Rights, Enforcement.

An important area of police education includes the study of proactive community-oriented policing. Policy regulating terrorism may conflict with policies that value community oriented goals, particularly when that community represents new immigrants and citizens from a variety of cultures. It is unclear whether police departments see a distinction between terrorists and minority groups. This dichotomy represents a potential for profiling and other civil rights abuses. To have a broader understanding of these issues, this study includes questions on departmental policies on racial profiling and community relations.

Front line police officers are expected to perform a variety of duties requiring knowledge, physical capability and common sense. Police educators must continually acquire new information to assist students with job preparedness. When I began this study, I believed that anti-terrorist responsibilities for front line officers were non-existent or limited to intelligence and covert operations sections of departments. If there are increased expectations of police officers, more information is needed to educate police recruits to fulfill these tasks.

I was also concerned about the possibility of police officers abusing their positions because of the extensive authority these new laws have afforded them. I believed that the proper implementation of anti-terrorism policy demanded simultaneous control from an upper ranking body of command and flexibility for lower ranking officers to provide input and work with citizens. This combination is consistent with the philosophy of community oriented policing but one that often runs counter to police culture (Lurigio & Rosenbaum, 1994; Rosenbaum, 1994; Seagrave, 1996; Sherman, 1991).

Because police serve as first responders, it makes sense that police training will involve emergency response techniques, though other factors require consideration. Local community contexts, decision making practices and the philosophical approaches adhered to by a particular police agency are also important. Taking this combination into consideration led to the development of the following research questions.

Research Questions

This study examines specific police departments' approaches to these new government directives. The initial research question is: How do Canadian and American police departments respond to new anti-terrorism laws and policies? This study focuses on the relationship between expectations and experiences based on the perceptions of those who must implement policy. Specific sub-questions attempt to distinguish the following:

- How are policy instruments employed by governments to ensure responses to anti-terrorism policy at the local level?
- How do a police department's normative standards and political agendas influence the implementation of government anti-terrorism policy?
- How are decisions made that translate anti-terrorism policies into practice?
- How do anti-terrorism policies influence relationships between local communities and police departments?

Significance of the Study

An examination of the responses of police departments to federal policy from two countries crossing multiple state and jurisdictional lines is unique. There are few studies comparing policing between Canada and the US and none specific to this study. The study explores the attitudes and values of police managers toward threats of terrorism and the implications of these values in relations between police and local citizens. Further, the study examines where governments commit funding and in turn, how government offices prioritize their directives to police agencies.

As a former Canadian police officer and an educator of students entering law enforcement in the United States, I am interested in how police officers take on new roles. The logistics of incorporating additional anti-terrorism duties into an already large and complex range of public expectations and mandated duties is fraught with unknown difficulties that I want to explore. Examining police management of anti-terrorism policy may offer an indication of the future direction of police organizations in North America. Research (Government of Canada, 2001; FBI, 2001; FBI, 2006) suggests a call for a proactive relationship between community policing and anti-terrorism, yet there is little evidence of such a connection. My research study aims to contribute to the larger body of knowledge on policy development and management practices that respond to terrorism and the resulting impact on community based policing.

Limitations of the Study

The reliability and validity of the study is controlled by the qualitative methods utilized. Qualitative research concentrates on open and rich conversation between interviewer and interviewee acquired during interpersonal dialogue (Merriam, 1998). Time and funding restraints limit the number of participants in this study. Travel to interview the respondents by land and air took a number of months to complete and the expense was restrictive. Further there is an overall reluctance, especially among Canadian police agencies, to participate in an anti-terrorism study that questions the policies, duties and preparedness of their officers.

This study is grounded in and shaped by policy implementation research and organizational theory. In qualitative research, there is a recognition that the findings are strongly shaped by the beliefs and perceptions of both researcher and participants (Merriam, 1998). This study analyzes information offered by 12 participants in Ontario, Canada and west, mid-west and south-west states in the US. The 12 departments are responsible for populations that range from less than 50,000 to over 500,000. A study using a qualitative methodology is beneficial to research inquiry since: "research focused on discovery, insight, and understanding from the perspectives of those being studied offers the greatest promise of making significant contributions to the knowledge base and practice of education" (Merriam, 1998, p. 1).

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter Two, Literature Review, provides an overview of the existing research on anti-terrorism and related public policy, policing duties and management, community policing and police culture. This combination of categories builds an understanding of the police environment in a time of broad terrorist threats. The review and assessment of the literature builds the foundation for the study and the introduction of the conceptual framework.

Chapter Three, Conceptual Framework, presents a conceptual framework that considers the significance of the new concerns about terrorism at all levels of policing and the ambiguous nature of related government policy, focusing on policy mandates, inducements and capacity building. Important variations between police departments in geographic location, size and internal and external dynamics are identified in terms of the potential impact on policy implementation. Literature referencing this conceptual framework is located in this chapter.

Chapter Four, Methodology, outlines the methodology used, including participant selection, data collection and analysis. The characteristics of the sample departments are described in terms of size, location and social and economic profile

Chapter Five, Presentation of Data, outlines American and Canadian responses to anti-terrorism policies as described by police chiefs and managers during interviews. The ambiguity of police anti-terrorism policies and the implications of the translation of policy into practice by police agencies are discussed. National characteristics are described in ways that emphasize differences in approach to anti-terrorism policy. The

resources police managers said they received and their organizational capacities are examined, highlighting the relative priority of anti-terrorism policy in terms of daily police work. Relative community relations are also reviewed.

Chapter Six, Analysis, analyzes various government policies in terms of the range of policy instruments employed and the consequences of their implementation. The final section of the chapter describes the divergence between governmental policy expectations and the reality of police departments' relations with communities. Variations across settings are explored, revealing the differences in relationships and dynamics associated with interdepartmental connectedness and linking the findings of this study with previous research.

Chapter Seven, Conclusions and Implications, examines the similarities and differences between government anti-terrorism policy expectations. Findings are presented and recommendations are offered for future research and practice in this area of police anti-terrorism action.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

This chapter discusses five areas of relevant literature. The first area is an overview of research on terrorism, from both the before and after 9/11 perspective followed by a chronological overview of terrorism laws and policies of Canada and the US. The historical and political viewpoints that influence both countries' perceptions of terrorism and the effect on terrorism policies are examined.

The second area provides a synopsis of Canadian and American anti-terrorism legislation since 9/11. The literature focuses on terrorism and policing and provides a background for understanding terrorism and its relationship to policing and public policy. The literature questions legislation provisions for law enforcement and the relevance of this legislation to street officers. Noted is the limited knowledge of education and training developments focused on anti-terrorism at the street level. The last portion of this section presents literature on military-based and democratic policing, and draws attention to the potential for civil rights' abuses with military based policing and expanded state control.

The third area concentrates on research that looks at police responsibilities and culture. Daily policing tasks and administrative developments serve as a basis for understanding where anti-terrorism policy fits with regular police work.

The fourth area includes literature on community policing. Community policing is important because fighting terrorism potentially reinforces profiling which conflicts with the trend toward improving police-community relations.

The final section focuses on police culture. The processes used to implement policies depend on the degree of congruity between the policy and the implementer which is revealed in the unique culture of law enforcement.

Terrorism

Published information on terrorism historically included journal articles, textbooks, periodicals and media coverage. The two prevalent themes from this material were terrorism on foreign soil and concerns about the imminent threat of terrorism in North America, specifically the US (Emerson, 1998; Kushner, 1998). Both types of materials vary in their definitions of terrorism[5] (Carlson, 1995; Coombs, 2000; Cutterbuck, 1992; Harmon, 2000; Kushner, 1998). Prior to 911 the FBI only classified acts claimed by a terrorist group as terrorism otherwise they were classified as criminal acts (Carlson, 1995). Following 9/11, the American Patriot Act (2001) and the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act (2001) included legislation connecting other criminal acts such as money laundering and drug trafficking to terrorism. After 911 the literature expanded to include reasons for the attacks, the characteristics of Al Qaeda, numerous partisan and bipartisan media reports on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and harsh critiques of newly enacted terrorism laws (Glynn, 2005; McCulloch, 2002; Raul, & Tyler, 2001; Scraton, 2002; Schneiderman, & Cossman, 2001; Thomas, 2002; Turk, 2002).

[5] Terrorism was divided between groups outside the US and threats within the US.

The literature (Alexander & Hoenig, 2001; Carlson, 1995; Cilluffo, 2001; Falkenrath & Newman & Thayer, 1998 identifies both actual and potential threats to North America. Academic literature and Canadian and American security information portray both the seriousness of terrorism and the intelligence available to North American governments (Backgrounder, 1999, July; Cutterbuck, 1992; Emerson, 1998; Kushner, 1998; United States Department of State, 2000). This body of literature contends that governmental protective bodies, for instance the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Canadian Security Intelligence service (CSIS), have not always accepted the reality of threats and have failed to act upon their sources. For instance, Osama Bin Laden is listed as a threat against Canada and the United States in reports from CSIS and the Department of State's report to Congress.

The Department of State's report to Congress (2000) cited Asia and the Middle East as particular areas of concern. 'Usama [sic] Bin Ladin' is named as a major financial sponsor, since he was known to have actively sought weapons of mass destruction and called on Muslims to wage war against Americans anywhere in the world (US Department of State, 2000, p. 31).

Similar information submitted to the Canadian Parliament by CSIS was gathered prior to 9/11 and passed on to the Canadian federal government. The report (Backgrounder Series, 1999) offers a view of intelligence information on Bin Laden and other terrorist threats and potential targets: transportation, oil and gas; water; emergency services; continuity of government services; banking and finance; electrical power; and telecommunications. The report claims terrorists have an easier time hacking into computers of these potential targets due to increasingly sophisticated tools. The threat to

security is described in terms of lacking protection with a simple fire wall. Recommendations to the Canadian government included more vigilant screening of persons entering Canada, assistance to enforcement agencies and cooperation between agencies and countries. The information was not acted upon. This may be evidence that people were lulled into complacency or prioritized political correctness ahead of reporting potential danger. Some examples of complacency and political correctness include portraying Islamic extremists as moderates or as human rights activists (Emerson, 1998).

Descriptions of previous disasters such as the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on Feb. 26, 1993 and potential for future catastrophic events of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks depicted an overwhelming concern for the reality of terrorism. This type of terrorism literature directed readers to the inevitability of future anti-terrorism strikes.

There is a great deal of literature on terrorism pre 911, highlighting the possibility of future attacks. Illegal activity to fund terrorism both within and outside of Canada and the US is mentioned by both Carlson (1995) and in the Backgrounder Series report by CSIS (1999). Knowledge of the threats was not enough to change the outcome of September 11, 2001, however.

Canada

Canada has less experience with terrorism than the US. Canada's recent experiences with terrorism and counter-terrorism included threats from the Front de

liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in the 1960s resulting in the enforcement of the War Measures Act (Joseph, 2001). As well, in 1982, an attempt was made in Ottawa to kill a Turkish diplomat and, later that year, his military attaché was assassinated. In 1985, the Armenian Liberation Army seized the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa (Smith, 1993). In the same year, the Air India disaster occurred when a jet originating in Canada blew up over Ireland. The bombing was the largest terrorist attack, at that time, and the investigation took over twenty years and was one of the most costly in Canadian history (Wikipedia, 1985).

Canada knew of potentially serious anti-terrorism threats to the Canadian infrastructure with roots in information warfare such as banking, finance, oil, gas and water. Prior to the assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Backgrounder, 1999), Canada's counter terrorism policies were not capable of responding to a threat of violence on Canadian soil. The CSIS order, at that time, was outdated and did not include authority over hackers or internet criminals (Backgrounder, 1999). In addition, Canada's defenses were inadequate (Haynal, p. 21). Canadian experts commented on Canada's political and economic situation in a document titled, September 11: One Year Later/*Le 11 Septembre: Un An Plus Tard*. Macnamara (2002) and Haynal (2002) recommended Canada increase the ability to defend itself following 9/11 to maintain sovereignty from the greater political and economic power of the United States. Haynal reviewed the outcome of the US closing its northern border on September 11, 2001, especially the economic constraints and subsequent slow-down of cross border trading. American literature represented the Canadian border as an issue of national security discussing the most cost effective ways to secure the American borders (O'Hanlon, Osszag, et al, 2002).

Haynal suggests improvements are mutual "since our national interests in security are very similar" (Haynal, 2002, p. 24). Gagnon (2002) believes federal policies set in concert with other governments such as the US, promotes centralization of federal decision making while diminishing provincial policies. For instance, immigration is a shared jurisdiction between the provinces and federal governments. Policies set at the federal level with other national governments limits Quebec's choice to set immigration and spending policies (Gagnon, 2002).

Four concerns appear to have influenced Canadian policy on terrorism and in particular its relationship to policing, leading up to and following the events of September 11, 2001. The first is a political stance. Canada's political position as a member of the United Nations and North American Treaty Organization (NATO) demanded action on the part of the government. More specifically, Macnamara (2002) found that Canada's geographical and economic ties to its southern neighbour demanded a rapid political and legal response. Immediate action by the federal government would quell the fears of its citizens by demonstrating it was in command. However, it could be argued this political and legal action is simply a symbolic response to placate the US. The second concern is that Canadian culture influenced and continues to influence anti-terrorism policy. Canadian consciousness, how Canadians view themselves as a nation and a democracy, and believe the terrorism war is over (Macnamara, 2002), has shaped terrorism policy.

Stairs (2002) offered insights on Canadian observations and the reality of smaller world powers. Canadian perceptions of terrorist dangers, whether based on facts or not, is filtered through our image of ourselves as peacekeepers and our belief that Canada is immune to danger. The third concern is Canada's financial obligations and position in the

world. A government whose fiscal policy allocates funds toward security and anti-terrorism during difficult economic times runs the risk of alienating its citizens. In such times, the allocation of funds for police and security are in direct competition with health care and other highly valued social services. The final concern points to implications of terrorism threatening the legal boundaries imposed by the Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Barkun, 2002). The Constitution Act clearly divides policing and military powers between the federal and provincial governments while counter anti-terrorism measures require a new order of police command. Following 9/11 with the presence of American armed guards at airport check points, Barkun (2002) said there is an enticement to follow American adaptations. This change would "threaten to radically destabilize the federal system by shifting law enforcement responsibilities, traditionally state functions, toward the national government...this may not only jeopardize constitutional arrangements but may also be bad counter-terrorism policy"(Barkun, 2002, p. 31). The Charter demands the balancing of laws, citizen protection, civil rights and sovereignty. The balance between national security and civil rights will shape policy implementation. Development and growth of policy requires the constitutional arrangement be adhered and closely monitored.

Canada was the only NATO country that did not have a specially trained anti-terrorism force until 1986 (Smith, 1993). A Senate Special Committee report on Terrorism and the Public Safety published in June, 1987 asserted that Canada would not be directly affected by international terrorism but that domestic terrorism could not be ignored. Even though the fear of terrorism was not great, the committee recommended preparation for action in harmony with due process and Charter rights. Part III of this

Senate Special Committee report raised concerns about lax immigration procedures that could allow for terrorists to enter Canada (Smith, 1993). Americans have criticized Canada's open immigration policies, using Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian arrested at the border in 1999 who planned an attack in Los Angeles, as a specific example (Waller, 2002).

Criticism of Canada's immigration policy continue, James Bissett, a former Canadian Ambassador and Executive Director of the Canadian Immigration Service, criticized the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for letting refugees into the country without documentation while thousands sat in refugee camps (Bissett, 2002). As well Bissett (2002) complains of passing softer immigration policy after 9/11 and the senate refusing to return it to Parliament for adjustment. Canadian Auditor-General General Sheila Fraser reprimanded the federal government for its inability to keep Canadians safe from terrorist attacks. In March 2004, Ms. Fraser addressed the breaches of security at airports and border crossings. CSIS provided Parliament with written documentation of this same concern in 1999 (Backgrounder, 1999), yet Canadians were still not protected in 2004. Included in Fraser's evaluation was evidence of lost immigration records, and how $7.7 billion allocated for terrorism had been spent since 2001 (Backgrounder, 2004). Ms Fraser told a news conference "They should have been functioning more effectively at the time of our audit" (CTV, 2004)

These accusations are supported by information made available to government bodies highlighting threats to the country's infrastructure. Criticism included the outdated goals of CSIS and its lack of sophisticated technological tools, which created an unfair disadvantage (Backgrounder, 1999). CSIS for example, did not have the sophisticated

technology or the ruling from government to handle information operations (Backgrounder, 1999). The Canadian government responded to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 with a hastily produced piece of legislation (Macnamara, 2002). Bill C-36, passed in December 2001, followed by the Public Safety Act, Bill C-42 in November of the same year and later withdrawn for amendment (Macnamara, 2002).

Smith (1993) examined Canada's counter-terrorism policy over four decades. He noted that the Organization Act (1966) placed counter-terrorism measures under the Solicitor General of Canada and this made terrorism a Canadian Criminal Code offence, putting police at the forefront of the defence against terrorism. In 1972, Canada's security merged with the recognition of the connection of international terrorism to domestic security. Separating enforcement and security intelligence was accomplished through the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Act (1984) by establishing a civilian security service, without policing powers and separate from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In the same year the Security Offences Act passed, assigning the RCMP primary responsibility for peace-officer duties involving threats to Canada. The initial threat would be assumed by the local police and passed along to the RCMP.

In 1986, following the Air India crash and the Turkish Embassy strike, the Solicitor General of Canada created a new policy that included a lead-ministry for crisis management. The Solicitor General was to be responsible for internal management and the Department of External Affairs was to be responsible for international incidents, and continued work with the United Nations and NATO. This created some recognition of the importance of intelligence and sharing with other nations and reaffirmed the roles of CSIS and the RCMP to work with the federal and provincial authorities. As a result, the

RCMP had more strength and greater responsibility for foreign missions, airport security and consultation with media about access to information.

Canadian perceptions have influenced the development of anti-terrorism policy (Smith, 1993). During the 1970s and early 1980s, Canadians viewed themselves as peacekeepers, the danger of terrorism such as the FLQ incident fading with time from the Canadian psyche (Smith, 1993). The seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa and Air India disaster heightened government anxiety, and although Canadians were more concerned with domestic issues at this time such as education, labour, health and culture (Dixon, 2003), the government was compelled to act. The Senate Special Committee Report on Terrorism and the Public Safety (1987) outlined significant weaknesses with Canada's counter-terrorism program, and pointed to deficiencies in the organization of departments and levels of cooperation between police agencies. Based on the recommendations of the report, the Canadian government initiated a National Counter-Terrorism Plan in January 1989 (Smith, 1993). However, Canadians did not consider this a top priority issue (Smith, 1993). The plan was not sufficient to defend against attacks similar to the ones of September 11, 2001, but neither Canada nor the US was prepared for an attack of this proportion as reflected in both countries' lack of ability to respond to forewarnings of terrorism. The failure to foresee the possibility of this catastrophic event left many feeling defenseless.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, polls taken in Canada showed support for increased spending for the military and for backing Canadian military support in Afghanistan due to feelings of vulnerability (Macnamara, 2002). Approximately 80% of the Canadian public was willing to accept fingerprinting and

identity cards, wire taping, screening of mail and close scrutiny of new immigrants (McNamara, 2002). With time, Canadians' fear of terrorists decreased. Perceptions of our vulnerability dissipated and attitudes changed, including how government funding should be dispersed.

It has been maintained by Barkun that in a democracy the desire of the people should be represented, even when this choice is associated with fear. Barkun, wonders whether: "Dangers that evoke disproportionate fears receive disproportionate resources... And what 'disproportionate' means in a political system that is to be responsive...of the electorate..."(Barkun, 2000, p. 28). This is applicable to both counter- and anti-terrorism policy with government having to balance public safety with monetary constraints.

In the space of one year, Canadian opinions shifted (Macnamara, 2002); 77% of the respondents did not believe a terrorist attack would occur in Canada. Canadian priorities focused again on the economy, health care and high taxes. John Thompson of the MacKenzie Institute, a Canadian independent, non-profit organization, commented on how Canadians think the war is over because they want to believe Canada is a peaceful kingdom (Macnamara, 2002, p. 15).

A similar warning was expressed almost a decade earlier by Smith (1993) who claimed: "Certain major issues have yet to be completely resolved, notably police command arrangements at all levels, if the Canadian counter-terrorism programme is to achieve the full measure of success" (Smith, 1993, p. 104). The counter-terrorism programme was not finalized due to disagreement over police control in terrorist management. Smith (1993) warns Canadians not to lapse into the trend of the 1970s of being comfortable, smug and peaceful. Canadians' relaxed attitudes toward national

security may be because they assume we can rely on the US, whose military might is much greater than our own (Macnamara, 2002).

In 2001 former Prime Minister Chretien, allocated $7.7 billion for all aspects of counter-terrorism in Canada which is an indication of where the government places value for resources. The portion allotted to police services should, therefore, reflect the significance of government expectations for police in their strategies to combat terrorism. Since 2001 the federal government's allocation of $7.7 billion to fight terrorism and reinforce public safety has been distributed to 6 areas. Intelligence and policing at the federal level received $1.6 billion for hiring personnel, upgrading equipment, intelligence sharing, operational technology and protective operations as well as security at major ports, airports and border crossings (Backgrounder, 2004). Fiscal resources from provincial governments to police departments may indicate government policy expectations of police at the street level. A lack of new funding may signify routine police duties at the street level.

New anti-terrorism initiatives took place within the RCMP (RCMP, 2004). A re-organization created Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams to increase collection, sharing and analysis of intelligence. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams were developed to enhance existing security along the Canadian and US border. Additional money was allocated for the improvement of automated fingerprint, forensic, and other forms of investigative technology, like the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Response Team which prepares for and gathers intelligence pertaining to such attacks. There is a new air carrier protection plan for flights to Reagan Washington National Airport and selected international and domestic flights, and aircraft protective

officers to respond to security threats aboard aircraft. There are additional expectations of the RCMP including the federal intelligence and financial intelligence branches and protection of designated persons and sites in Canada (Backgrounder, 2004).

The accountability for the substantial funding allocated to anti-terrorism measures is unclear. Numerous questions surround responsibility for added duties and expectations of provincial and municipal police officers by government and administrating officers. Without the funding there is concern that police will not be capable of meeting the new demands related to terrorism while fulfilling their more routine reactive obligations toward criminal activity.

Canadian terrorism policy is influenced politically by its world position and geographical and economic ties to the United States (Macnamara, 2002). Canadian culture influences terrorism policy through perceptions of Canadians viewing themselves as peacekeepers (Macnamara, 2002). Defining terrorism police policy in Canada is a sensitive task where citizens' rights outlined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) must be balanced with the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) and the Public Safety Act, (2002) while maintaining national security.

United States

Canada experienced fewer terrorist incidents than did the US. The literature that follows outlines numerous attacks against the US, the policies and the direction the US government followed when confronted with terrorism. The attacks against Americans took many forms (Coombs, 2000; Sloan, 1993): the death of Lieutenant Colonel Charles

Robert Ray by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction in January, 1982; the bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut on April, 1983; the hijacking and killing of passengers on Trans World Airlines Flight 840 in April, 1986 by a radical Palestinian organization; and a car bomb outside a United Service Organization club in Naples, Italy on April, 1988 by the Japanese Red Army. Random terrorist actions directed against America in the 1980s have been described as: "contemporary terrorism from ideologies of the extreme left toward fundamentalism from the extreme right" (Coombs, 2000, p. 2).

Former President Nixon outlined a hard line US terrorism policy in 1972, specifying no concessions to terrorists. During the Carter Administration, this policy was compromised by the hostage taking at the American Embassy in Iran in 1979 since the hostages were released after the release of $8 billion of frozen Iranian funds. After a failed rescue mission, questions surfaced regarding the vigilance of American intelligence and military capabilities (Sloan, 1993). A US State Department commission in 1985 made numerous recommendations and questioned the function of the Marine Corps guards (Sloan, 1993).

During the Reagan administration, the FBI had an increased role in overseas anti-terrorism. The consequence of this was a department whose normal duties of information gathering faced a new set of concerns. The FBI, whose mandate is to gather information for prosecutions in American courts under the State Department, faced new problems as the lead agency in international incidents. Intelligence gathering is different from information gathering for America courts (Sloan, 1993). An example is a known anti-terrorist, Fawaz Younis, who was apprehended at sea by the FBI, was not afforded his full constitutional rights and had his confession thrown out when brought before a US

court (Sloan, 1993). There was a need for long term anti-terrorism policies to foster "agreement on the nature of terrorism and ... [overcome] potential bureaucratic competition and contradictory approaches in meeting the anti-terrorism threat" (Sloan, 1993, p. 12).

The American response to 9/11 suffered from this lack of policy and from infighting between agencies because "Faced with the changing nature of conflict, of which terrorism is only a part, where the line between warfare and criminality, state and non-state actors will often be blurred" (Sloan, 1993, p. 118). The distinction of responsibilities between federal, state and street level policing was not clearly determined. Further, the historical record of anti-terrorism conflicts determined the role President Bush would pursue following the attacks of September 11, 2001. In the past, attempts to negotiate with terrorists compromised American terrorism policy. President George W. Bush revisited his father's policies as outlined in the Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on combating Terrorism in February 1986 (Sloan, 1993). This report advocates "acting in a strong manner against terrorists" and offers no concessions to terrorist (Sloan, 1993, p. 111).

For decades, the US experienced terrorism within its borders from domestic terrorists such as the Ku Klux Klan, Weatherman and Black Panthers. The people and groups identified by government agency documents as terrorists range from white supremacists, anti-abortionists, nationalists, anti-government groups and militia members to eco-terrorists and people who abhorred large corporations and acted independently of direction from foreign governments (Carlson, 1995). According to James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, in recent years the

right-wing extremism of the 1990s overtook left-wing terrorists as the country's most dangerous threat (Jarboe, 2002). More recently, leftist special interest groups such as the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front have also emerged as potentially serious risks. "Such extremists conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of society, including the general public, to change attitudes about issues considered important to the extremists' causes" (Jarobe, 2002, p. 1).

Domestic terrorism was acknowledged as more widespread than anti-US action abroad. However, it was noted that international terrorism has: "a direct impact on US interests" (United States Department of State, 2000, p. ix). This factor may offer a partial explanation for the emphasis on global rather than domestic terrorism. Before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the American government looked to other parts of the globe when addressing foreign anti-terrorism concerns. The literature demonstrates a disparity in international anti-terrorism attacks and casualties between North America and other regions of the world (Combs, 2000; United States Department of State, 2000; Turk, 2002; White, 2002). There were far more injuries and deaths attributed to terrorism on foreign soil because domestic terrorism was often classified under criminal acts in the Uniform Crime Report. A true picture of deaths attributed to terrorism in America was not available because terrorism incidents often counted as regular crimes (White, 2002). Arising from this stance is the assumption that terrorism occurs in foreign countries (Turk, 2002) and that many Americans view terrorism as "perpetrated only by radical Muslims or crazed anarchists in lands far removed from the comfort of North America" (Eagan, 1996, p. 1). Questioning police chiefs and upper-level police managers' terrorism

education practices and stands on profiling may reveal if this belief exists in some police departments.

US Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan noted that regions of Southeast Asia and the Middle East were primary areas of terrorist concern to the US in a State Department's 1999 report on global terrorism. Afghanistan was noted as the major terrorist threat since it "continues to harbor Usama [sic] Bin Ladin and a host of other terrorists loosely linked to Bin Ladin, who directly threaten the United States and others in the international community" (United States Department of State, 2000, p. v). At that time, American foreign policy was based on four factors:

> First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. Fourth, bolster the counter terrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance. (United States Department of State, 2000, p. iii)

The relevance of this policy is important when it is compared to the actions of President George W. Bush following 9/11. The president followed the policy, making decisions without concessions to terrorists as the original US policy intended.

Diplomatic efforts by the United States in 1999-2000 included continued cooperation with the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel and Japan and work with India to increase counterterrorism efforts (United States Department of State, 2000). The US also began to work with the G 8 nations of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the Russian Federation accepting a United Nations convention to collaborate and support investigations, prosecution and extradition of persons financing terrorism. The government also continued the sanctions against the Taliban initiated by President Clinton's administration (US Department of State, 2000).

With the terrorist attacks of 2001, President Bush swiftly enacted the Patriot Act (2001) that included provisions that heightened federal agencies' security powers. This increased authority threatened to contradict the First and Fourth Amendments of freedom of speech and the right against unreasonable search and seizure when incidents are terrorism-related. For example, heightened intelligence-gathering authority included access to medical and financial business transactions. Other provisions substantially reduced certain civil liberties, including the right to detain non-citizens indefinitely (Raul & Tyler, 2001; Thomas, 2002).

Critics of the Bush government's actions noted that the hyperbole of 9/11 rapidly altered perceptions from a terrorist attack to a war on terrorism. Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were described as evil, as were Muslims living throughout the West, fuelling racism already endured by black and Asian communities (Scraton, 2002). Threats or perceived threats cause anxiety and psychological effects that have a direct impact on politics (Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav, 2005). The perceived threats served to increase fear of citizens in the United States. "Terrorism has moved from the periphery to the center of public awareness and fear" (Turk, 2002). Turk claims the American government utilized this fear to move terrorist acts out of criminal courts and into military tribunals away from civilian law.

The US attacked Afghanistan in response to 9/11 in October 2001 with the support of the UK, Canada, Australia, France, New Zealand, Italy and Germany (Wikipedia, 2001). When the US decided to attack Iraq, relations with European allies were strained with many nations recommended greater prudence (Worldpress.org, 2002). The Bush Administration responded with the basic message to the rest of the world that:

"either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (McCulloch, 2002). Continuing this aggressive tactic, the American military moved into Iraq on the belief that there were links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda and Bin Laden. The Bush Administration cited the existence of weapons of mass destruction as further justification for this invasion. Reports have since proven each of these allegations to be false (Glynn, 2005). Consequently, these revelations, the ongoing deaths of American soldiers, and fears that this war may be another drawn out losing battle similar to Viet Nam, is making the war in Iraq increasingly unpopular in the US (Page, 2005).

Very soon after 9/11, the US Congress and Administration allocated $6.3 billion for emergency personnel, known as first responders,[6] across America. The funding was meant to improve communications, training for terrorist events and the purchase of protective gear and equipment for biological and radiological attacks. While the appropriation of funding was generous, the lack of standards and goals hampered distribution and assessment of need (Cox, 2004): "roughly $5.2 billion in Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant money remains in the administrative pipeline, waiting to be used by our first responders" (Cox, 2004, p. 1). The distribution of funding to police departments and the expectations attached to the funds offer insight into police terrorism policy.

In addition to funding, there was a reorganization of federal agencies under the new Homeland Security Department. These agencies are a complex group of interrelated departments, most often referred to by police by the use of acronyms. There were over seventy federal law enforcement agencies in all three branches of government before 9/11

[6] First responders such as the police, fire and medical personnel are the first to respond to emergency situations.

(Bumgarner, 2004). The numbers remained the same and only the affiliation has changed. Many protective and police-type agencies also were organized under the Department of Homeland Security umbrella but remained independent agencies. The Homeland Security Act also expanded law enforcement authority for the Offices of the Inspector General throughout the federal government. According to Bumgarner (2004), the nature of American federal law enforcement is such that agencies possess narrow authority with divided responsibilities. Further, the agencies are known to be internally competitive.

The United States terrorism policy initially focused on terrorist activity around the world. Criminal incidents linking terrorist activity in America were not counted as such in the Uniform Crime Reporting system (UCR). This oversight led to the representation of domestic terrorism as less serious than foreign terrorism. Federal, state and local police departments continued to work separately from one another, only calling upon the FBI for crimes within federal jurisdiction. This oversight, failing to link criminal activities with terrorism, left American police disconnected and working independently from one another.

Intelligence collected from international and nationwide sources remains a federal responsibility; however, because new developments regarding terrorism now cause nations to look within their own borders for possible threats, federal agency responsibility is no longer perceived as sufficient. Distinctions between federal and state/provincial policing agencies, once clearly partitioned, are less obvious now because governments have turned to police for increased intelligence from the street level. As an experienced police officer, I know police agencies continuously gather criminal intelligence as a regular part of their duties; however, since 9/11 governments have conveyed a need for

police intelligence from the street level (Cox, 2004; FBI National Press, 2005). Prior to 9/11, the FBI and RCMP operated under mandated authority in specific areas. Some of these areas, to name a few, are customs, postal, internal revenue, treasury department, coast guard, national defense and criminal investigations under the auspices of the federal government. Following 9/11, Americans and Canadians enacted various pieces of legislation which lead to an increase in the number of intelligence officers at all levels (Canadian Security and military Preparedness, 2002; United States Department of Justice, 2006).

> The Patriot Act and a federal court decision in November 2002 have broken down what has been known as "the Wall" that legally separated law enforcement and intelligence functions. As a result, coordination and information sharing between the law enforcement community and intelligence agencies have been greatly improved. Since the attacks of September 11, the cultural and operational wall between the FBI and CIA has also been broken down, with the two agencies becoming integrated at virtually every level of operation, (Baginski, 2006)

Criminal activities previously handled by municipal and state/provincial departments such as fraud through fund raising, organized crime and investigations of activities that could lead to a catastrophic event are now being more closely scrutinized by federal agencies (RCMP, 2004). This resulted in closer working and shared relationships among federal, provincial/state and municipal agencies.

Anti-Terrorism Legislation

Anti-terrorism legislation relaxed laws that previously protected citizens' rights against government intrusion. With less stringent protocols and criteria for terrorism investigations, police could intercept communications and search, seize and arrest

without first obtaining a warrant. The legislation and literature does not specifically address how the federal governments will determine how police respond to terrorism legislation at the local level. There are unanswered questions regarding the criteria used to define terrorism investigations. Is terrorism policy set as guiding principles or specific outlines to determine uniformity? For instance, when does a police department decide when a criminal investigation becomes a terrorism investigation?

The Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act amended numerous prior Acts including the Evidence Act, Official Secrets Act, and the Registration of Charities and Income Tax Act. The latter addresses terrorism within and outside Canada, citing activities associated with financing or participating in anti-terrorism actions (Department of Justice, 2002).

Section 83.3 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code of Canada required consent of the Attorney General of Canada before a peace officer may lay a charge, pertinent to terrorist activity. Sections (5) and (6) apply to arresting for terrorist activity without a warrant. Section 83.05 (6.1) allows Canadian judges to accept evidence as admissible even if it would not be acceptable under Canadian law. Section 83.28 (2) allows for a police officer, when gathering evidence for the purpose of a terrorism offence, to apply ex parte to a judge for an order for the gathering of information. In this way, obtaining prior consent from the Attorney General allows police to collect evidence, such as private communication or information, preceding a warrant. Section 83.3 of the same act requires the Solicitor General of Canada to prepare an annual report to bring before Parliament outlining anti-terrorism activity undertaken by police unless the information would jeopardize an ongoing investigation or endanger life (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, 2004).

Police in Ontario are bound by the Police Services Act that specifically outlines requirements of police chiefs for Adequacy and Effectiveness of Police Services for a number of areas including crime prevention [O. Reg. 3/99, s.1 (1)] and law enforcement [O. Reg. 3/99, s.3] to the establishment of procedures and processes for internal management [O. Reg. 3/99, s.13 (1)]. The Act purposely demands every police chief prepare for specific emergencies [O. Reg. 3/99, s.21 (1)]. More specifically, every chief must have procedures developed and a manual available to all members to refer to for emergency services and perimeter control and containment [O. Reg. 3/99, s.25 (3)]. The Police Services Act further provides for chiefs of police to establish procedures in keeping with any federal or provincial counter-anti-terrorism plan issued from the Solicitor General [O. Reg. 3/99, s.28].

The US government described the Patriot Act as a means of punishing terrorist acts in the US and around the world and to improve law enforcement investigatory tools to assist in this function (US Department of Justice, 2006). Some of the more contentious tools enabled government intrusiveness in private citizens' affairs. Section 215, for example, that allows third-party holders of financial, medical, phone and similar information to be searched without the parties' knowledge, govern the government's assertion that it is required to protect against terrorism. Section 213 also extends authority for criminal searches where one's home and property may be secretly searched without prior notice. Sections 214 and 216 permit the government access without warrant to devices that monitor telephone calls and internet surveillance providing it is relevant to ongoing investigations against international terrorism. Section 206 authorizes roving wiretaps on phones and computers of a target without specifying what phone or computer

will be monitored. Section 505 allows for subpoena of personal records without probable cause or judicial oversight (United States Department of Justice, 2001).

The hastily drafted and enacted Anti-Terrorism Act in Canada and Patriot Act in the US caused apprehension in many citizens (Macnamara, 2002; Sadler, Lineberber, et al, 2005; Thomas, 2002). Terrorism legislation in both countries raises concerns over government rules to deal with security at the expense of democracy (Dostal, 2002; Gagnon, 2002). It has been suggested that peoples' heightened fear of terrorists led to the acceptance of anti-terrorism legislation. The fear and "perceived threat and anxiety have distinct psychological and political effects" (Huddy, Feldman et. al, p. 595). Further, there is unease that acts by government will lead to violence against their own citizens. "States, through the military and the police, have enormous capacity to coerce citizens and inflict violence on individuals" (McCulloch, 2002). How these laws are employed by government and interpreted at the local level is of interest to this study. The questions asked of participants in this study attempt to reveal how these laws are interpreted at the department level.

Terrorism and Policing in Canada and US

The literature related to policing and terrorism prior to 9/11 is limited. Authors assumed that police handled criminal investigations and terrorism investigations in the same way, often identifying them as routine (Carlson, 1995; White, 2002). There is no acknowledgement of the necessary education and training specific to terrorism for police to be able to conduct investigations. Academic literature on terrorism relevant to police at

the street level outlined legal and illegal activities connecting police on the streets to terrorist groups on a global scale (Cutterbuck, 1992; Emerson, 1998; Harmon, 2000).

In Canada, the Constitution Act (1982) established the boundaries for policing power and authority between federal and provincial governments. Police in Canada had additional powers of arrest and detainment under the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001) and the Public Safety Act (2002). The Anti-Terrorism Act provides police the authority to arrest a terrorist suspect without a warrant. Pursuant to subsection 83.3(4) of the Criminal Code, a peace officer who suspects on reasonable grounds that the detention of a person is necessary to prevent a terrorist activity, may arrest the person without a warrant (Government of Canada, 2002, p. 1).

Even as many news reports and government officials referred to Canadian and American police as essential in protecting against terrorism (Alberto, 2001; Ashcroft, 2002), little is known about the specifics of training and education of police needed to deal with this newly obtained authority (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2002; Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, October, 2002). The Canadian Security and Military Preparedness report suggested policing as a means of exchanging intelligence nationally and internationally through a variety of approaches. The National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP) alleges an interest in maintaining an appropriate balance between state and individual rights. It is unknown whether organizational policy at the federal level is set for police departments to specifically address the NCTP's concern for individual rights and employment of these rights. Further, it is yet to be determined whether the organizational strategy at either

federal provincial or municipal levels supports reactive, proactive or any other position of policing.

There was some belief (Hancock, 2004) that police departments operate under high-risk, low-frequency tasks, such as the use of force, and high-risk, high frequency activity, such as pursuit driving. Alpert and Smith (1991) believed these high-risk, low-frequency and high-risk, high frequency activities: "require the most extensive policies, training, and overall guidance" (as cited in Hancock, 2004, p. 180). This model states that duties that may cause serious injury or death require clear policies and training guidelines. Regardless of whether the duty occurs frequently, such as varying degrees of force or less frequently such as incidents of pursuit driving, a review is required to determine the extent of policy, training and supervision evident at the department level. Similarly, terrorism policy should clearly outline training and overall guidance in gathering intelligence. Terrorism policy may not fit the high-risk, low frequency tasks or the high-risk frequency activity, but it appears to include job responsibilities that may challenge democratic freedoms as well as those that respond to citizens in the event of a terrorist attack. The importance of these concerns warrants clear policies and guidelines.

There is little research on the application of international anti-terrorism activities to police at the street level (Cutterbuck, 1992; McVey, 1997). Local police response to terrorism may be an expectation built into Canadian and American government procedures. The answer to this question will depend upon a department's normative standards and political agendas. Police departments are accountable and therefore politically influenced by their local city council or other civil service system (Roberg, Kuykendll & Novak, 2002), and therefore, policies may vary. Meanwhile public and

police perception may classify the FBI, Homeland Security, the RCMP, CSIS and the military as the primary agents protecting citizens from terrorism. If this is the case, the question of who is responsible for counter and anti-terrorism at the local level is an issue.

Academics Jackson and Lyon (2002) express apprehension over the implications of the politicization of law enforcement, defined as moving to military-style policing and away from democratic agency. Repressive police actions may reinforce social discrimination; evidence suggests this occurred in the past. History reminds us of numerous incidents dealt with swiftly and deliberately in a preemptive fashion. Examples include anti-Semitism in the 1920s and 1930s (Nelson, Fleras, 1995), the internment of Japanese Canadians during WWII, and the aforementioned implementation of the War Measures Act during the FLQ crisis in the 1960s (Joseph, 2001).

CSIS is Canada's national police service and has responsibility to gather intelligence, investigate, and report threats against Canada's security to the federal government, a task once managed by the RCMP. CSIS does not have law enforcement powers; law enforcement functions are expected to be undertaken by police (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2005). This means that any anti-terrorism activity encountered by a provincial or municipal police agency will be transferred to the RCMP.

Police and other government bodies have traditionally withheld information from one another and other police departments. Sharing information is done only on a need to know basis because of privacy rights and ownership in the final outcome of an investigation. This convention resulted in Canadian federal government agencies failing to share information required for national security (Office of the Auditor General, 2004). Transferring investigations from one police authority to another, particularly in light of

the centralization of authority within police hierarchy, has historically run counter to a prevailing police culture of territorialism (Ortiz, 1994). The reluctance to share information between agencies will compromise anti-terrorism initiatives of passing intelligence information from one agency to another.

In 1987, The Senate Special Committee Report on Terrorism and the Public Safety recognized this dilemma, raising concerns over the training and cooperation among police forces (Smith, 1993). One of the major problems is that municipal and provincial police experience with terrorism focuses on criminal cases that fall within their mandate, while acts committed by groups known as or claiming to be anti-terrorists are deal with by federal agencies (Carlson, 1995; Smith, 1994).

Anti-terrorism connects to policing in two ways: first, through criminal activities such as drug trafficking and money laundering; and second, through intelligence gathered linking the criminal activity to terrorism. Prior to September 11th, 2001, the Canadian government did not require increased awareness or assistance from police agencies on an international scope. The duty was a federal responsibility and therefore, designated to the FBI and RCMP. This is no longer the case, in that there is a recognized connection between criminal activity and terrorist. The increase in the range of policing, the consequence of expanding international policing connections, was emphasized by Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Commissioner Gwen Boniface. At a Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement Conference, she stated "The OPP mandate is unique in this province. We fulfill municipal, First Nations, provincial and international policing responsibilities on behalf of the Province of Ontario"(June 2004, p. 3-4). Improved communications resulted from terrorist-related criminal activity and new

authority emerged which permitted the connecting and sharing of intelligence across state/provincial, federal and international boundaries. In addition, the OPP are regularly deployed to international civilian police missions related to peacekeeping at the request of the RCMP (Ontario Provincial Police, 2005). A provincial police agency assisting in an international setting is a new facet to policing in Canada.

This change in police experiences at the provincial level blurs past government and police responses to terrorism. Expanded responsibilities may mean a change in the present definition given to terrorism that will create competition for increased funding. This phenomenon is noted as a concern prior to 9/11.

> The lack of agreement on the nature of the threat has continued to act as a barrier to the development of a unity of effort among the military, the law enforcement establishment and the intelligence community in addressing a multidimensional threat, as each defines the act in such a way as to justify more funding for their organizations in the ongoing 'war' at a time of declining national funding. (Sloan, 1993, p. 118)

Revealing where government directs funding for police terrorism policy may establish who is responsible or where policy is set. Financial apportion in general terms equates to political determination.

Changing policies and increased expectations of police have some academics suggesting changes in the policing model to better reflect our communities. For example, some scholars foresee differing policing standards between rich and poor, private and public, military and democratic, as well as along race and class lines (Bayley & Shearing, 1998; 2001). Changing terrorism policies that reflect a different policing model could marginalize groups of people in society.

> Threat has had remarkably consistent effects in past social science research. One of the most pervasive and powerful effects of threat is to increase intolerance,

> prejudice, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia, regardless of whether threat is defined as a widely acknowledged external force or a subjective, perceived state. Groups that are disliked, violent, or disruptive elicit intolerance and face heightened restrictions on their civil rights and liberties. (Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav, 2005)

A police officer from California (McVey, 1997) discussed the impact of splintering ethnic groups based on political and religious ideology with respect to terrorist activity. He developed a concept of dealing with terrorism utilizing various countries around the world dealing with anti-terrorism groups. His approach to terrorism is a response that leans away from democratic policing toward military-style policing. Democratic policing may be defined as subject to the rule of law, publicly accountable and offering limited interference in citizens' lives under controlled circumstances (Marx, 2001). Military-style policing is defined as a government department controlling the affairs and maintaining law in the community (American Heritage Dictionary, 2006) Military policing is also viewed in the context of safety and the possibility of civil abuse (Bayley & Shearing, 1998; 2001). Some suggest that there are consequences for private freedoms when government allows sanctioned surveillance in the name of terrorism:

> While the economically "undisciplined," criminalized terrorist may be guilty of throwing bombs – literally – for political purposes, his brother, the surveillance expert, may also represent a threat to life of property by his ability to manipulate and distort personal information. The former receives a prison sentence. The latter because he works in furtherance of some system of superior power, receives police protection, or just a lack of legislative control. (Chadwick, 1997, p. 344)

Acceptance of surveillance and other forms of intrusive investigations as a means of security against terrorism may erode democratic rights afforded individuals.

Bayley & Shearing (1998; 2001) raise concerns about military-style policing in comparison to democratic policing. An article related to the establishment of democratic

policing following a war indicates that repressive police actions run contrary to democratic policing resulting in a slower, more gradual, move toward a democratic state (Jackson, & Lyon, 2002). Some researchers emphasize the importance of the community in maintaining democratic police departments appropriate to the war on terrorism that police must wage in North America. The idea is for the community to maintain control of the police as opposed to the government (Bayley & Shearing, 1998; Jackson, & Lyon, 2002). The implications of politicizing law enforcement rather than operating police as a democratic agency might mean the establishment of a special, distinct, military police force controlled by the government.

An article with a differing perspective highlights the relevance of increased internal military security within police departments in the United States. Kraska (1999) voices concern over the implications of state control, noting that the reference to America's rhetoric on war, drugs and crime draws the two closer together. With a war on drugs, crime and terrorism, a military style police, coordinated and controlled by government would be an effective, dominant force. Questions of civil liberties arise: will individuals on the street lose their rights, be held without bail, and suffer the loss of their attorney-client privilege? The new laws provide Canadian and American police with powers similar to military law, providing police easy opportunities to restrict civil rights to persons they consider a threat to security.

There is limited research documenting terrorism and policing at the street level in Canada and the United States. Legislative jurisdictions dividing police among federal, state and local levels are obscured with recent collaborative efforts between departments. There is speculation on the direction policing will take with warnings of lax security and

threats to civil rights. A closer look at the connections between community and their police departments provides a more comprehensive understanding of police in their response to terrorism at the street level.

Policing Duties and Management

Textbooks provide information on basic policing duties (McKenna, 1998), and journal articles (Bryett, 1999) offer an indication of contemporary activities in police management. At the community level, the most common police duties occur through operational assignments of general patrol and traffic functions. These services provide the most direct contact with the public and require the most personnel. Traffic responsibilities cover a wide range of tasks from responding to traffic accidents and fatalities, reconstruction of traffic accidents, follow-up investigations, impaired driving investigations utilizing breathalyzer technicians, and radar programs. General patrol officers are usually the first officers to arrive at the scene of an incident. Policing covers a wide range of knowledge, skills and the development of physical endurance to prepare for street patrol. Patrolling has evolved over the years from walking the beat to a professional model where officers use cruisers to patrol areas 24 hours a day. There are three different kinds of patrol: reactive, where officers respond to calls; proactive, where increased patrol vehicles are assigned to an area; and control, where one vehicle is assigned to provide normal service (McKenna, 1998).

The detective branch (McKenna, 1998) of policing generally deals with the more complex activities carried out under the auspices of investigations including crime scene

analysis, interviewing witnesses and victims and suspect interrogation. Intelligence work, (McKenna, 1998) on the other hand, encompasses the collection and dissemination of information to assist criminal investigations covering areas of organized crime, including outlaw biker gangs, ethnic and youth criminal gangs, illegal immigration, gambling, prostitution, pornography, white collar crime and smuggling. Due to the nature of the crimes listed, effective intelligence requires the sharing of information between agencies and across borders. Examining criminal information collected on any of these illegal groups is examined for potential developments, shared with other police agencies, and used in the departments' future planning objectives.

Administratively, police organizations are required to manage personnel and departmental needs much the same way as a business organization (Bryett, 1999; Clarke, 2002). Some police agencies attempt to project a more corporate image by publishing their business plans and using publicity to relate a positive connection to the community. Like business employers, police administrators value more mature adults with life experiences, placing less emphasis on the physical requirement in their recruitment processes. As well, there are expectations from the general public that police agencies reflect the percentage of citizens in the communities they serve in terms of ethnic, religious and gender composition. Education and training is an ongoing process addressing the continuous changes in legislation and technology in this field.

Policing duties as outlined above describe democratic as opposed to military policing in Canada and the US. Police in both counties are expected to follow the rule of law while respecting human dignity (Marx, 1999). Police officers are taught, when intervening with citizens, to offer individuals their rights as afforded by the Charter of

Rights and Freedoms and the American Bill of Rights. Officers are expected to enforce laws and rights of people, while at the same time they are subject to public accountability.

The Canadian federal government adopted the business model of Total Quality Management (TQM) as the next approach to participatory management, where each employee is responsible for quality control of their work. This approach altered the prior military model in managing police officers (Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999). Efforts toward this endeavour focus on labour saving forms of technology. There are modifications based on the size of the agencies with the goal of improved management through increased centralization of power. The expertise required to achieve corporate-style efficiency is not usually found in policing (Bryett, 1999). Many administrators control officer performance through policy changes in response to an officer's inappropriate behaviour. The result "...creates a situation that may be too limiting and challenges officers to circumvent the language of the policy" (Hancock & Sharp, 2004, p. 184). Adaptation of TQM to policing is difficult, making it easier for some managers to return to the less challenging form of military management of evaluating officer behaviour. The extent of resistance or acceptance to modern management practices is unknown although there is some discussion over the lack of knowledge required to make changes.

According to White (2002), police management appears to lack the expertise required to adapt to changes facing law enforcement:

> American law enforcement is focused on local issues, and is dominated by anti-intellectual feelings. Most police managers do not think abstractly, and they pride themselves on pragmatism. When critical thought is applied in law enforcement, it is inevitably focused on local issues. (White, 2002, p. 207)

Police administrators have responded to increasing costs associated with growing numbers of police personnel as well as to new issues facing policing, such as computer crime, by hiring civilian staff. Numerous secondary functions within a police agency are now handled by civilians (Bryett, 1999). Forensic identification, recording and storing of files, transportation of prisoners, communications and dispatch and collection and maintenance of evidence and property, are no longer duties where a police officer must be assigned (McKenna, 1998).

Democratic policing is the focus of police text books (Arcaro, 2003; Bryett, 1999; Hancock &Sharp, 2004; McKenna, 1998; Walker & Katz, 2002), but police managers may be lacking intellectual ability or critical thought (White, 2002). Questioning chiefs of police regarding implementation of terrorism policy within their departments illustrate practices unique to their departments.

Community Policing

Community policing is conceptually ambiguous (Ponsaers, 2001), an abstract notion, and an instrument for police accountability to the citizens police serve. There are a number of definitions of community policing. A straightforward description is proactive policing with respect to security and crime prevention and entails close community involvement. Despite the move to more sophisticated management practices and the public demand for more community-centered policing, more policing resources go toward weapons, technology and large-scale investigations (Carlson, 2005). There are many diverse descriptions and practices in community policing across Canada and the

United States, with much debate over the best approach (Carlson, 2005; Goldstein, 1993; McKenna, 1998).

Proactive community commitment requires officers to approach community concerns in a manner that is inconsistent with traditional police work. Forming close social bonds to problem solve is equated by many police officers as social work not in keeping with the confrontational, exciting employment they expected (Lurigo & Rosenbaum, 1994; Meese, 1993; Skogan, & Hartnett, 1997). Stojkovic, Kalinich & Klofas (2003) raised concern about the reluctance of public administrators to be responsive to the needs of the public.

The literature suggests that closer community-based policing includes sensitivity to cultural and ethnic groups (Flores, 1992; Jackson, & Lyon, 2002; Riley, & Hoffman, 1995). Canada's pledge to cultural diversity and dedication to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms may be challenged if Canadian police officers are adverse to the community policing concept and to associating with minority and ethnic groups in the communities they serve. With the increased legal authority afforded to police officers in Canada in the fight against terrorism: "the danger is reinforced in policing ethnic minority groups where the police officer is not as attuned to the signals of respectability" (Reiner, 2000, p. 93). A police agency's stance toward community policing should reflect the positive standards and relationships with the range of population groups in their area. It is not enough for police departments to have written mission statements or to articulate the goals of their agencies. Without education and emphasis for proactive policing undertaken by a department: "A culture may create a *de facto* mission that may differ substantially from

the *de jure*, or official, mission of the organization" (Stojkovic & Kalinich & Klofas, 2003, p. 28).

The literature views police accountability and community in a variety of ways. Reiner (2000) believes community policing serves to legitimize police, fostering accountability to the people they serve. Ponsaer (2001), however, sees the prevention model as a means of repression and control with a top-down approach, leaving final decisions open to review by superiors. Sherman (1991) criticizes the lack of evaluation of programs responding to community dilemmas, particularly the more serious and costly apparent solutions.

The US Department of Justice published a Community Oriented Policing Services document promoting data analysis, threat assessment and communication between agencies. The material is presented as a means of preventing and responding to terrorism with a focus on community policing as well as responding to the Patriot Act (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2002). The implications of utilizing community policing as a way to respond to terrorism are gauged in the responses to questions on the use of community policing within departments later in this study.

In recent years the RCMP has been criticized for downsizing and restructuring by using community policing as a means of delegating work to provinces and communities. The practice of delegating (also known as downloading) as a cost-saving measure is often thought to be the cause of failure of community policing by the RCMP (Clarke, 2002).

Community policing has been labeled as costly with no proven success rates (Sherman, 1991). However, various studies are now analyzing its benefits. Sherman

outlines a method scrutinizing community programs in terms of cost and success. Others offer more self interested comparisons when faced with the possibility of losing their community police officers (Sack, 2001) or weighing the cost of crime per household in terms of taxes based on police, private security, Medicare, or surveys on the quality of life (Waller, 1997). While some researchers have attempted to calculate service and productivity (Sherman, 1991; Van Dijik, 1997), others predict inequitable community policing across racial and class lines. Criminal justice researchers have suggested police might adopt a future policing model for the wealthy that differs from those in poor, high crime areas. Policing efforts gauge taxes paid for policing (Bayley, & Shearing, 1998).

Research suggests that the success of community policing on cultural and linguistic issues provides a strong link to incidences of success. Latinos in Chicago who preferred speaking Spanish viewed police with the same level of distrust as they did the police in their home country; English speaking Latinos, however, reported improved relationships (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Some academics suggest police officers who get to know their citizens build trust and a close working relationship. Community policing, therefore, lessens the alienation felt by minorities when they are involved with police. Critics of this philosophy suggest relaxed controls over police will increase prejudiced decisions by police officers. The belief is that increased discretionary powers will negatively increase extralegal influences of race, gender and wealth (Mastrofski, Worden, Snipes, 1995).

Police education regarding the social conditions of a community appears relevant to the community policing program's success. The educational requirements of Canadian and American police officers varies from a Grade 12 diploma to a minimum of two years

of post secondary education. Standards set by the chiefs of police of Ontario for the two year college Police Foundations diploma program demand knowledge of culturally diverse groups within Canada. The interaction of anti-terrorism policy, cultural diversity and community policing are as yet undetermined. It is important to note the inadequate research about the connection of community policing to terrorism.

Community Oriented Policing Services does offer a symposium for American chiefs and sheriffs to address criminal intelligence policy and safeguards to discuss criminal intelligence and homeland security to develop new methods of implementing intelligence operations while maintaining ethical and constitutional principles (United States Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2002). Close connections between police and their communities yield more trusting relationships (United States Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2002). By building on these relationships at the street level, it is possible to obtain information on criminal activity that may be pertinent to terrorism. Further, connections between police and their communities lessen the possibility of abuses of civil rights. Educating police officers on the importance of familiarizing themselves with their community members enables them to build trust and respect for one another.

Conclusion

The literature reviewed in this chapter offers an overview of terrorism and public policy that highlights events affecting terrorism policy and implementation in both Canada and the US. History and political stances on terrorism affected both countries,

with the potential for political, psychological, and social conditions to impact terrorism and policing.

The developments of terrorism in other parts of the world overshadowed the connection of criminal occurrences in US and Canada to foreign terrorism (Sloan, 1993; United States Department of State, 2002, White, 2002). Investigations into foreign and domestic terrorism were a federal domain, with state and local police agencies investigating criminal investigations (White, 2002). The result of this separation was a lack of communication, sharing of information and cooperation needed to respond to these incidents (Cox, 2004).

Canada suffered from fewer terrorist attacks than those experienced by the US. Both countries received intelligence, forewarning of a possible strike by Osama bin Laden (Backgrounder, 1999; United States Department of State, 2000), but neither government reacted proactively. It was evident there were serious problems in sharing and acting on intelligence between federal and state agencies (Sloan, 1993).

The reaction following 9/11 was disbelief and anxiety (Sadler, Lineberber, et al, 2005) that terrorists could attack America with such destructive consequences. The political effects included the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act and the American Patriot Act, and Homeland Security Act. The 9/11 disaster also revived previous efforts by police to collect and share criminal intelligence between federal and state/provincial police agencies. Involvement of local police efforts at intelligence gathering to prevent and counter terrorist attacks has yet to be determined. As well, reactions to terrorism and the new legislation increasing police authority at federal, state and municipal levels raise concern over the threat to civil liberties (Scraton, 2002).

The Canadian literature emphasizes the division of responsibilities between federal, provincial and municipal agencies and the American literature emphasizes agencies' relationships to Homeland Security. Terrorism legislation and literature highlights the potential for abuse at the street level.

Police departments in Canada and the US investigate criminal investigations while federal agencies have authority over terrorism and foreign intelligence gathering (Sloan, 1993; White, 2002). Without knowing, police investigated criminal activities at the local levels with ties to terrorism prior to 9/11 (Sloan, 1993). The question remains whether terrorism will be fought militarily, as a federal investigation, a criminal investigation controlled at the local level or a combination of the three. At present the literature on police and terrorism at the street level is minimal.

An overview of police management at the departmental level provides possible implications toward terrorism policy. Police are known to follow business management practices (Bryett, 1999; Clarke, 2002; Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999), yet there are criticisms of the lack of expertise in police organizations (Bryett, 1999). A lack of expertise and inability to conceptualize the larger picture (White, 2000) may influence the implementation of policy at the department level. The values and goals of a department is another influence on management that may be reflected in a departments' relation to their community.

The last section addresses proactive efforts by police departments toward their communities, raising questions about the impact of anti-terrorism policies on these relationships. There are numerous definitions of community policing and even more methods practiced (Carlson, 2005; Goldstein, 1993; McKenna, 1998; United States

Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2002). The cost of community policing is prohibitive (Sherman, 1991) and it is difficult to prove success of programs (Sack, 2001; Waller, 1997). Some proponents of community policing say police build trust when they work closely with citizens (Goldstein, 1993; Skogan & Shearing, 1998).

Building trusting relationships with communities and the proactive goals of community policing may be important outcomes for terrorism policy. How chiefs of police utilize terrorism policy in their community policing programs will reflect their relationship with their communities.

CHAPTER THREE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter provides the focus for the analysis by introducing the conceptual framework. In the development of the conceptual framework, my emphasis is on the perceived dissonance between duties routinely performed by police officers and the possibility of additional tasks associated with anti-terrorism policy. Research on policy emphasizes linking the expectations of the federal government for police officers in relation to police departments' goals and objectives. The conceptual framework draws on literature based in education that fits well with this topic due to the public policy arena common to both sectors. Literature identifying numerous complications with educational policy implementation is useful in understanding police policy on terrorism.

The conceptual framework I am using consists of categories of three analytic strategies useful in understanding the implementation of anti-terrorism policy by police departments (Table A). The first strategy assesses the policy instruments employed by governments with respect to police involvement in fighting terrorism. The second strategy considers the variance between the expectations of governments and the reality at the local level and the consequences for implementation. The third strategy looks at variations across settings based on local departmental priorities and their influences on the translation and implementation of policy (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987). McDonnell and Elmore (1987) categorize another consideration in this grouping termed system changing, that calls for shifts in authority to provide a service, but this last strategy is not applicable to this study. Before exploring these analytic strategies in depth, it is necessary

to map out the broad outlines of policy analysis from which the particular strategies are drawn.

Traditional to Contemporary Aspects of Policy

Perceptions of policy in the 1960s and 1970s took for granted that policy outcomes could be directed from the top down (Melnicoe & Mennig, 1978). It was generally assumed by political and civil groups that policy was controlled by the policy maker in its design in what Elmore labels forward mapping (1977) and Werner refers to as linear sequence of events (1991). As implementation research revealed the many discrepancies between policy intents and actual outcomes, this traditional logical step-by-step model of policy processes was challenged for its over-simplicity. Both Werner and Elmore questioned the assumption that policy intent and design are clearly understood and adhered to by those responsible for implementation. Elmore, for instance, presents the idea of backward mapping (1977) whereby the policy maker is seen as influencing policy implementation, but considers the lowest level of desired performance as the starting point for design.

Researchers have identified a range of extenuating circumstances that may affect policy implementation (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000; Clune, 1990; Hargreaves, 1994; McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991). McLaughlin (1987) describes a growing awareness of the discrepancies between policy intent and policy implementation in the 1960s and 1970s and what may have attributed to these inconsistencies. One idea was that implementation was shaped by capacity and will. Capacity referred to the implementers'

resources and knowledge base, and commitment to policy goals, as dependent on beliefs and attitudes. A more recent concept is the notion that although policy is shaped by policy makers, it is difficult, if not impossible, to control the implementation process due to numerous factors. Despite these more nuanced understandings, prevailing assumptions about policy continue to follow a top-down, linear-predictable model (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000).

Government anti-terrorism policy with respect to police agencies assumes a straightforward traditional chain of command from the federal to municipal levels. However, it is much more complicated. A complex hierarchy, continual assertiveness among agencies and other factors are all in play. Policy cannot mandate what is important to all police forces because police agencies and individual officers all have convictions and priorities on terrorism as it relates to policing duties. For example, police are generally noted for their conservatism and belief that traditional policing is the most effective way to fight crime (Ortiz & Peterson, 1994). As with the teaching profession, policing is an activity that may be classified as requiring emotional labour (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000). Policing is a career men and women enter to catch criminals and help others (Martin, 1997). Such a diversion away from policing the community and directed toward terrorism may be viewed as redirecting valuable time and resources away from the important tasks of policing, adding stress to the work of officers and the organizational goals of agencies. Faced with challenges, individuals will implement change or innovate as they see necessary from professional or personal motivations (Mclaughlin, 1987).

The implementation of anti-terrorism policy that affects police agencies may be studied in terms of the influence by organizational structures. Hierarchies, such as those in police departments, increase the likelihood of failure, particularly if the implementation process involves strict guidelines with no allowance or expectation for innovation or problem-solving (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000; Elmore, 1977). Elmore believes the closer policy is to the source of the problem, the more influence there is on the solution. This notion places emphasis on the human factor of improvement at the hands of members within organizations. Police departments faced with terrorism concerns may ultimately discover unique ways to approach these problems from the street level. Input during implementation may influence the level of importance placed on terrorism. Response through informal authority and decisions of what is important to an organization are believed, by some, as the factor that will ultimately dominate the outcome (Clune, 1990; McLaughlin, 1987).

The more complex the policy process is, the more difficult it is to control, and the more steps there are in policy implementation, the less likely it is to succeed (Elmore, 1977). The number of steps involved in the process increases the likelihood of departure from the original policy design. Policy makers, pressure groups or those citizens who believe they ought to have a role in influencing policy, the values or beliefs of an organization and those meant to put the policy into practice (Clune, 1990; Werner, 1991) all influence policy outcomes. While this may cause some concern, both Clune (1990) and McLaughlin (1987) argue that local variation often leads to problem solving and innovation and thus better and more appropriate outcomes (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000; Clune, 1990; Elmore, 1977).

In the field of policy research, increased awareness of the complexity of the process extended to the understanding that those meant to implement policy have their own set of goals. Clune (1990) questions the assumption that those expected to implement policy are aligned with policy makers. Each organization is faced with its own set of complex issues, normative standards and political environments (Clune, 1990; Fink, 2000). There is a growing conviction in the literature that policy is affected by issues beyond the control of policy makers (Elmore, 1977; McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991). Researchers conclude that while the process is complicated and it is impossible to realize all conditions, it is beneficial to attempt to develop policy that takes some of these circumstances into consideration.

The conceptual framework of police departments' implementation of terrorism policy considers three strategies. The first is policy instruments engaged by government for police to fight terrorism. The second strategy reflects on government expectations and realities pertinent to implementation at the local level. The third strategy contemplates differences between police departments and how this affects translating policy at the local level.

Policy Instruments

McDonnell and Elmore (1987) identify a range of instruments policy makers may utilize to ensure that implementation follows the designers' original intentions. The four categories of instruments they describe are: mandates or government rules; inducements or transfer of finances for compliance; capacity-building, usually financial transfer for

long term intellectual or human resource enhancement; and system-changing-transfers or the relocation or redistribution of authority within a system or organization. They describe how a more informed choice of policy instrument, including consideration of both policy goals and the realities of the implementation context, is likely to result in more successful policy outcomes.

Mandates

McDonnell and Elmore (1987) assert that problems are defined and solutions become apparent when policy makers review the resources available and the constraints blocking change. Mandates require skill (Fullan,1993) and demand exact compliance as an outcome, regardless of differences in capacity since they attempt to control behaviour to create uniformity: "Mandates assume an essentially coercive and adversarial relationship between enforcers and the objects of enforcement; they place the major responsibility for assuring compliance on the initiating government" (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p.141). Each branch of government put in a policy making role will tend to select a different range of possible policy instruments. For instance, the federal government holds the major responsibility for ensuring compliance of terrorism laws, yet each subsequent level of government will attempt to comply with implementation based on the resources available. The resources available at each level of policing will determine the extent of performance provided for the terrorism policy.

The choice of mandates is also related to cost (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). The instrument, in its purest form, requires no transfer of money. This may be why the mandate in the form of government legislation may be viewed by police departments as simply another law on the books because it created little in the way of capacity for

change. Not only do mandates bring new money; but McDonnell and Elmore also refer to compliance costs which are the additional expenditures brought on by mandates that must be borne by the agency.

Inducements

The prime inducements of anti-terrorism policy to police agencies are the availability of funding and the ease of implementing the proposed provisions (Cox, 2004). Inducements and mandates may be used as instruments of measurement in defining the value of anti-terrorism policy to police. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) describe inducements as things of value that may not be expected to continue without the input of funding. If anti-terrorism policy is a priority for the federal government, directives will be outlined and funding will be allocated. Police agencies will acquire funding or other forms of support by responding to government conditions.

In the discussion of inducements, an important question relevant to this study is raised: how much variation will policymakers will tolerate and how strict will they be in their control of funding? According to McDonnell and Elmore (1987), inducements are associated with the things policy makers' value. If this is the case, the presence of inducements will act as a means of determining the value of the policy by the policy makers. The presence of inducement vs. mandates will reveal the policymakers' seriousness to long term commitment to initiatives. Mandates might include a new law passed by government with no further incentives. Mandates followed by funding or equipment as inducements indicate greater significance policy makers place on a policy. Policymakers who want to change behaviours beyond a basic response will probably choose inducements. In addition, the inducements will be chosen from the policymaker's

own value base and how they define a problem (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). The literature (Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999; Stojkovic, Kalinich & Klofas, 2003) suggests the values policymakers hold are based on their beliefs about how societal systems work and how they ought to work.

One of the problems with inducements, as with mandates, is the assumption that local agencies possess the ability to implement policy. The literature tells us inducements are more effective when there is the ability to implement the policy, particularly when local priorities are consistent with values embedded in policy (McDonnell & Elmore (1987). An influx of funding must be for something of value to the recipients. Police are receptive to material contributions, particularly when supplementary funds are available. Because policing is a publicly funded service, money for "toys",[7] is infrequent so there would be demand and competition from departments to receive their share.

Capacity-building

Capacity building requires the transfer of funds or other resources from one government group to another. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) describe capacity building as an investment in material, intellectual or human resources. They view capacity building as requiring distinctive actions around the treatment of implementation. There are expectations that problems resulting in deviation from the original policy will arise through implementation, and follow through by policymakers and ongoing intervention in implementation is needed for success (McLaughlin, 1987).

Capacity-building is applicable when there is a desire for long term gain. If this is the case, both the government and the police organization will employ expertise owing to their belief in the seriousness of the policy. Capacity-building would include measuring

[7] Toys is a term used by police for equipment in addition to standard issue.

the demands for future plans, management, education, training, etc. used as an indicator of short term control vs. long term democratic policing initiatives. Determining the presence or extent of either inducements or mandates could establish if the policy is meant to meet minimum standards or linked to capacity building in conjunction with long term investment of intellectual and human resources, and material. Because McDonnell and Elmore (1987) theorize that capacity-building is rarely successful as an inducement, the government must recognize the benefit of long term goals for local agency success.

Capacity building is sometimes difficult to justify because the results are often intangible. Change that takes time to produce results is very challenging for people (McLaughlin, 1987). Obtaining equipment is concrete and measurable, but only valuable in the short term. For example, once equipment is received policy implementers may return to normal routines neglecting training necessary to use the equipment. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) explain that capacity building and long term benefits and value received by future recipients is a concept difficult to guarantee in the present.

The enforcement of federal mandates to improve capacity building is complicated because of the organizational structure and frequent lack of appropriate personnel (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987). Unless federal personnel have the will and understanding to employ capacity in police departments, implementation is unlikely to succeed. To ensure capacity building, government personnel must be in accord with police managers' main concerns. As Werner (1991) notes, priorities must be clear and consistent, and allow police managers to decide what aspects of the current practices must be maintained.

The degree of change required by anti-terrorism policy will involve modifications to basic police techniques and necessitate increased pressure, assessment and tangible contributions by government. With the addition of anti-terrorism policy demands to existing police activities, the choices will be daunting. Police are presently required on deal with the public through a variety of general patrol functions and traffic supervision as well as more proactive community policing duties. In addition, police agencies must manage human resources and the general tasks of an organization. Anti-terrorism policy originating at the federal level will be implemented in conjunction with these other organizational priorities.

Bascia and Hargreaves (2000) refer to the dumbing down of teachers through policies that emphasize technical management rather than intellectual input. Police are faced with similar conditions when government policy expectations do not take local police departments' considerations into perspective. The intensification and complexity of responsibilities presently required of police necessitates ongoing training and education. Attention must be given to the classification of intellectual progress required for police to fulfill anti-terrorism policy obligations. Is a forum available for ongoing planning, resourcefulness and ingenuity on the part of police managers or is policy limited to the provision of technical training (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000)? Police may be provided with emergency response training to deal with anti-terrorism incidents, but intellectual input, as well as personal beliefs about the seriousness of a threat of an anti-terrorism attack, may vary. Governments requesting input from the department level on police terrorism policy may accumulate novel approaches to fighting terrorism or determine when policy is altered.

Disconnectedness Between Expectations and Reality

Regardless of policy makers' goals and understandings, organizations determine policy importance in relation to their ideals and expectations (Mclaughlin, 1987). Mandated changes "require skills, capacity, commitment, motivation beliefs and insights, and discretionary judgment on the spot" (Fullan, 1993, p. 23). Police managers must make choices while their departments conclude whether the policy fits with their goals and norms. The police agency must work with numerous guidelines and may have to find various ways of meeting policy expectations (Clune, 1990). How a department interprets laws and policies regarding anti-terrorism is a reflection on the agency's values and beliefs. Mclaughlin (1987) Werner (1991) and Clune (1990) suggest the shaping and reshaping of policy is an ongoing process in the implementation stages. Sometimes policy fails to achieve intended goals because of overly strict guidelines. An organization plays the role of policy mediator when given the opportunity to make decisions beneficial to policy goals. A policy confined by strict adherence to rules and guidelines void of opportunity for creativity and problem solving is at a distinct disadvantage.

McLaughlin (1987) views both pressure and support as necessary because most institutions are not eager to accept change. Because policy outcomes are strongly influenced by individual and institutional values, this provides impetus to an organization reluctant to institute change and authority to a policy whose merit may be in question. Support without pressure affords the prospect of other institutional concerns shaping programs. Bascia and Hargreaves (2000) attribute reasons for policy outcomes to the particular complex relationships occurring at the level of implementation. Multifaceted

combinations of intellectual, socio-emotional, sociopolitical and technical experience defy exacting predictions of policy outcomes.

Organizations interpret and reshape policy during the implementation process. Pressure and support is necessary for implementation of policy because organizations are reluctant to change. Disconnectedness between the expectations of government and the realities at the street level are due to a number of complex factors affecting implementation.

Variations Across Settings

Another aspect to policy implementation in the literature is the influence of local community context. Differences in culture, conditions, standards and practices of the neighbourhood and civic groups with whom police interact vary and ultimately, affect implementation (Fullan, 1993; McLaughlin & Talbert, 2001). Police agencies' ties to cultural groups in their communities and their ways of doing business are shaped by local contexts. While financial resources corresponding to policy demands strengthen the likelihood of implementation, culture and community influence on police departments also affect policy outcomes (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Maintaining the principles of this theory, police departments working closely with their communities will approach anti-terrorism policy differently than departments whose interaction with community is not as inclusive. Conditions at the local level influencing police delivery expose the possibility for variation of anti-terrorism policy across local settings. These variations may not reflect government intended purpose for police terrorism policy.

Conclusion

The conceptual framework used in this study emerges from the literature on policy implementation in order to create analytic strategies to understand how implementation strategies and contextual features shape how police departments implement anti-terrorism laws and policy. The literature review documented wide-ranging international anti-terrorism policies prior to and following 9/11, but none were specific to police departments.

The conceptual framework developed with the understanding that traditional beliefs in top down policy implementation are no longer valid (Elmore, 1977; Werner, 1987). There are a number of steps involved that influence the process of implementation (Clune, 1990; Werner, 1991; McLaughlin, 1987). The more steps involved in the process the less control over the outcome (Elmore, 1997). There is recognition that there are a number of influences on policy implementers as it is implemented (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000; Clune, 1990; McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991).

There are three analytic strategies within the conceptual framework. The first is policy instruments employed by government. The second regards the variance between the expectations of government and the reality at the department level. The third considers the variations across settings of different police departments. The three strategies build upon McDonnell and Elmore's (1987) classes of instruments.

Policy makers are affected by issues beyond their control due to a number of complications they cannot foresee (Elmore, McLaughlin, Werner, 1991). Implementing

the strategies requires inducements and capacity building to determine short or long term outcomes. Inducements provided are those things valued by policy makers (McLaughlin and Elmore 1987).

While the literature maintains that pressure and support is needed in implementation (McLaughlin, 1987), there are so many complexities involved that it is impossible to predict policy outcomes (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000). Strict policy guidelines, however, are unworkable because there is a need for choice (Clune, 1990; McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991). The differences between those developing policy and those implementing policy are vast because policy implementers have their own set of goals (Clune, 1990). The result is disconnectedness between what the government expects and the reality at the department level. It is surmised that organizations play the determining role in implementation where policies must fit with the values and beliefs of an organization (Clune, 1990; McLaughlin, 1987). Pressure and support at the lowest end of policy implementation is, therefore, based on attitudes, motivations and beliefs (McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991).

There are numerous variations in police departments across local settings where policy implementation has different meanings to different organizations (McLaughlin, 1987). Martin (1997) Oritz and Peterson (1994), and McLaughlin (1987) argue that you cannot mandate what matters. This being the case, traditional police beliefs on how to fight crime may conflict with requirements for implementing terrorism policy.

The literature proposes that those closest to the problem are likely to be innovative at problem solving (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000; Clune, 1990; Elmore, 1977). Bascia and Hargreaves (2000) propose that those implementing policy leave room for

ingenuity. Police departments should have opportunity to manipulate policy at the department level allowing for innovative or suitable match that corresponds to the police department.

TABLE A

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF POLICE ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY



Different shapes represent variance among police departments

The conceptual framework of police department policy implementation first considers the policy instruments employed by governments for police involvement in fighting terrorism. Variance is regarded as expectations of government and the realities and consequences experienced at the local levels. Another consideration is the variations across settings based on local department priorities when translating and implementing policy.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodology used in this study. I outline challenges I faced, the access opportunities and decisions for selection of participants for this study, ethical issues, data collection strategies, and the process of data analysis.

This study is based upon opportunistic selection of police organizations followed by comparisons between agencies in two countries. Although the small number of the participating members is not representative of both countries, the person-to person interviews offer insight that would otherwise be unavailable.

Challenges

Initially this study was intended to focus on police departments in Ontario. As a former Canadian police officer, such a choice seemed straightforward. I began calling police services in Ontario in August, 2003, and then sending follow-up letters. Friends and acquaintances I contacted for assistance returned calls expressing regret at their inability to persuade their departments to allow interviews. The topic of terrorism and policing is sensitive for police agencies not only in Ontario, but across Canada due to concerns over increased police powers and the possibility of abuses of civil rights. By October, 2003, I sent letters to 15 police agencies across Canada and followed them up with a phone call. I received refusals for access to these departments for various reasons.

Assurances that the questions were not sensitive to national security and my offer to send the questions to be previewed were not persuasive. Police are generally known for their reserved culture and this may have contributed to the refusal to participate in this study. Also, police have no obligation to participate in studies when academics request their assistance.

In March, 2004, one police agency in Ontario agreed to participate in the study, but limited access to the chief and three upper managers selected by the chief. Contact with other police officers in the police hierarchy was denied. This particular chief was willing to discuss management's procedures, but did not want questions asked of street officers regarding terrorism.

Without a Canadian police agency willing to allow a broad range of officers to participate in the study, a decision was made by my thesis committee to involve police agencies and services of different sizes in Canada and the US. This new arrangement opened the way for greater access to a large number of police departments and afforded a data collection of broad scope and depth. Comparisons within and between Canada and the US became possible. There are similarities between the two countries: they are in close proximity, maintain a long friendship, share a border, economic and trading ties and political interconnectedness, including a closer reliance on a shared working relationship against terrorism (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, 2004). At the same time, this new approach allowed me to explore variations in implementation suggested by the literature.

Fifteen letters were sent to police agencies across Canada. Fourteen of the police agencies refused and one agreed to participate. The department chief agreed to participate in the interview, but refused access to street level officers.

Seeking Access

The selection of police departments for the study was based on the willingness of police chiefs and upper level managers to participate. For this study, when a police chief was unable to be interviewed, an upper level manager was designated to participate. Police chiefs frequently deny academics access to their departments because of the frequency of requests for involvement in research studies; further, police culture is steeped in suspicion. Gaining access to police agencies is less complicated when the chief knows the researcher or an individual who will vouch for the researcher. Both instances applied in my case. A few former and present colleagues assisted me in gaining admission to the chiefs of police or managers in charge of anti-terrorism measures. In the US, colleagues volunteered names or suggested departments they believed played an important role in police involvement in anti-terrorism in different parts of the country. As well, a few chiefs I interviewed offered names of other persons they thought would be valuable to the study. Reaching an agreement with American police chiefs was less problematic than my Canadian experience. Initially there was concern that the chiefs referred by participants may be like-minded and, therefore, influence the results of the study. This was not an issue because the referred participants varied in their approaches to terrorism policy.

After making telephone contact with the individuals and departments identified by my colleagues, I sent a follow-up e-mail message explaining the study and provided a copy of the interview questions. Once a department contact was established or an individual agreed to participate, I sent a copy of the letter of informed consent and a list of the questions, and established a date for an interview.

Through this type of opportunistic selection, I received agreement from 12 police agencies and departments of varying sizes to participate (Table 4.1). There were 4 Canadian police departments and 8 American police agencies participating in the study. The sample included police agencies varying from small municipal departments with limited capacity to those serviced by the most modern infrastructures with the latest technology; others fell somewhere in between. It was not the intention to limit my participants to males. However, all the interviewees were male. This is not surprising, because the majority of chiefs and upper level managers on both sides of the border are male, as are the majority of police officers. Age, ethnic background, education and other characteristics may have identified some of the participants in the study. For this reason, to protect anonymity, background information on the participants is not included in the study.

In other ways, the sample of departments and/or participants is unusual. Colleagues assisting me in locating candidates for this study may not be considered typical to policing or the educational field of law enforcement. My Canadian police contacts hold upper level management positions in their organizations, were highly educated, displayed abstract thinking and were outspoken in their desire for creative improvement in an occupation known for its conservatism. These individuals promote

continuing education and the specialization of officers under their command, and they strive to enhance policing through operationalized community involvement.

Recommendations from this group for study participants led to individuals similar to themselves. As a result of information offered on their backgrounds during the interviews, it was evident the Canadian managers' approaches exemplified risk taking and candor. Another interviewee held a high ranking position in a large agency and conducted himself in a more formal manner. His responses did not stray outside those pronouncements set by the Canadian Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (C, Table 4.1). This respondent holds the most powerful position of all the Canadians interviewed and presented himself and his agency in a paramilitary fashion. The final Canadian participant answered the questions with ease, but the information offered was informal because of the size of the department and the geographical location.

The American chiefs and managers, although comparable in their desire for improved approaches to policing, differed in their reasons for agreeing to participate. Access to the largest police departments would probably not have been available to me had it not been for the assistance of one particular colleague. Three of the largest departments agreed to be interviewed at the request of this individual. Other colleagues offered names for potential candidates. From these first interviews, I acquired other names and the 12 departments to be studied collected in this fashion.

Because of the small size of the group participating in this study, it may not be representative of departments in both countries. What is notable of nine departments is an assertive approach toward cutting-edge technology and current police research. Nine participants may be described as forward thinkers and risk takers, unafraid of pursuing

avenues of change they believe applicable to their departments. These individuals are completing undergraduate and graduate degrees or their equivalent, and were well read and informed about the policing profession. While respondents from larger agencies appeared more politically astute, speaking confidently and with self assuredness on government directives, managers of middle sized agencies tended to be more critical of government policy, particularly where it conflicted with local perspectives. The smaller departments' range of responsibilities limited their responses to those concerning their immediate department. They seemed less concerned about terrorism and other policing agencies.

Working with the small and mid sized departments was informative; they offered a different outlook than those respondents from larger agencies. The respondents from mid to small sized agencies appeared more relaxed and willing to discuss the questions at length in the comfort and quiet of their offices. Interviews with upper level managers (E, H, Table 4.1) of two of the larger US departments participating in this study were intriguing. These respondents may be described as two of the most powerful Americans interviewed for this study. One (E, Table 4.1) was a high ranking officer with substantial authority in his organization. The meeting was controlled, limited in time due to both his regular duties and unexpected commitments. The respondent's office administrator frequently interrupted the interview. With the door open, the background noise added another distraction. This respondent was straightforward with his answers and openly said when he would not answer one of the questions for security reasons. This individual's responses were similar to information already available from the US government. The second powerful participant (H, Table 4.1) from a large agency had

fewer interruptions, and although busy, spoke in a more informal manner. This individual's relaxed nature and charm may be attributed to the fact his position was political in that he had to be elected to his position.

Two respondents (G, F, Table 4.1), active in the gathering of intelligence data, proved to be the most discrete of the 12. One of these respondents was very guarded during the interview and follow-up. This behavior is typical of officers working in the intelligence field.

Ethical Issues

The ethical review procedures were followed as demanded by the Office of Research Services at the University of Toronto. The questions asked of the recipients posed minimal risk. The interview questions were similar to what might be asked by the media or by a community for information on a department's stance toward terrorism policy. Privacy and confidentially of the interviewees and police departments was employed. Participation was voluntary and participants had the right to withdraw from the study at any time. Information that may have connected a participant or a department was removed from the thesis.

Research Methods

Participants were sent two letters. The first was a letter of introduction (Appendix A) and the second a letter of consent (Appendix B). Included, at the request of the

respondents, was a list of questions to be asked during the interview (Appendix C). The second letter explained that the study would be audio taped during face-to-face interviews. The interviews took place between July and October, 2004. The interviews lasted from 40 minutes to just under four hours. One person (C, Table 4.1) planned to spend as much time as needed, but had to shorten the interview to just under an hour to respond to an unforeseen task.

Participants were asked to share policy from the federal or state/provincial level, written internal policy related to anti-terrorism, and other relevant materials (Appendix D). This request was refused by all but a small number of departments. One agency (F, Table 4.1) sent a copy of their internal policy on intelligence gathering, and another (L, Table 4.1) allowed me to view mock training scenarios sent from Homeland Security for weapons of mass destruction and biological warfare, but would not sign a release authorizing the use of this material for this study.

I recorded the 12 interviewees' responses to the interview questions. I reviewed typed interview transcripts and returned to audio voice recordings for clarification. The printed material available from one agency provided a glimpse of a small portion of its internal organization. Access to a copy of federal training scenarios provided a more comprehensive view of American federal anti-terrorism policy than would otherwise have been available. A few departments that used procedural manuals for emergency services showed me or offered to show me the binders outlining the courses of action to be taken for emergencies. Overall, I was able to collect a considerable amount of rich information.

Transcribed interviews capture actual patterns of speech in conversation. Unlike most printed material, casual speech often includes short or incomplete sentences, poor grammar and colloquialisms. The transcripts of the interviews for this study were no exception. The most consistent request from all interviewees was that changes be made to their transcripts for grammar, spelling and sentence structure. A few of the participants requested the changes and corrected the syntax of the copy themselves before returning the edited version. Two participants returned an e-mail message without an attached edited transcript, but gave permission to use the material from the interview. One perused the work, but did not have time to edit, specifically asking that is done by me. The second had an assistant pass a message along that the document was reviewed and approved. Overall, the requested changes were minor, focusing on spelling of terms, acronyms and the participants' full designation. These changes did not alter the substance or meaning of the interview material. One respondent clarified questions I had asked, made changes to sentence structure and questioned the manner in which the material presented his speech. That individual asked that sentences be removed that would identify the location as well as a few sentences that did not make sense to the interviewee. These sentences were removed from the working copy of my transcript. One participant corrected spelling and grammar, clarifying terms used in the interview and rephrasing sentences. This individual made changes on every page, initialed each change and initialed the bottom of each page. Changes made by this person increased the clarity of his points with the addition of hand written notations in sentence form expanding on comments.

Data Analysis

The category construction method was used to analyse the data. The data were further divided into subcategories. This method involves capturing themes or patterns in the data by "continuous comparisons of incidents, respondents' remarks, and so on, with each group...*A unit of data* is any meaningful (or potentially meaningful) segment of data (Merriam, 1998, p. 179). This method was a good match, comparing the responses of each participant to each question asked and then breaking it down into smaller units.

While transcribing the interviews, I listened carefully for similarities and differences in responses. All of the transcribed interviews were then read carefully to build upon the themes identified through the category and subcategory construction method during the transcribing. Different coloured tabs were used to identify parallel opinions in each question. This procedure greatly assisted quick retrieval of material and the organization of topics across interviews.

The transcripts were reviewed a second time to record the number of times each topic appeared in the 12 interviews. Many respondents voiced similar answers to questions and these formed the basis of some emerging themes. To aid in the development of themes and to show uniformity, responses to each of the fourteen questions were abbreviated and listed on paper in chart form. On each of these charts beside the letter representing the police department were the responses to one question; second question, another chart; and so on. This provided a succinct summary of all responses for every question and for each department.

Similar responses for all questions were then numbered to identify consistencies. Therefore, every similar response to a question was numbered according to the frequency it appeared. The responses were further condensed by listing in order of importance those duties participants credited to policing their community. This method facilitated the analysis that is expanded upon in the next chapter.

The first question asked in each interview was what specific federal and state/provincial policy guidelines were given to police departments for management and implementation of anti-terrorism legislation. I used the definition of policy as attributed to Thomas R. Dye: "Policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do" (cited in Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999, pp.126-7). Also included is Peter Aucoin's definition: "Public policy must be considered to encompass the actual activities undertaken by a government, whether or not a government's objectives and strategies are explicit, or are congruent with its activities" (cited in Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999, pp.126-7).

In the interviews, however, policy was left to the interviewee to define. A number of respondents denied knowledge of any policy set forth by their government. In particular, respondents defined policy more narrowly than I do, claiming there was no policy because for them, policy is a single, concrete authorization. Yet, counter- and anti-terrorism measures in police departments are either in place or in the process of initiation. Further questioning revealed that departments in the United States and Canada took fairly consistent steps to counter terrorism, regardless of their conception of anti-terrorism policy.

The terms "department" and "agency" are used throughout this work to refer to both Canadian and American police departments. As expressed by a Canadian police

chief, there is a preference for terms "agency" or "service" because "force" or "department" is perceived to have a negative military or aggressive connotation. There is a belief that the use of these more benign terms builds a closer connection with the communities police serve. In the US, when referring to police and sheriff departments, agency, force or office, are all used. To protect anonymity on both sides of the border, each of these four terms are utilized interchangeably for both American and Canadian police.

It is important to note that data presented in the following chapter does not include the alphabetized code assigned each police department as shown in Table 4-1 for two reasons. Originally, this method was used, but it appeared too cumbersome and distracted from the content. The second reason for not identifying by a code is that the anonymity of two participants may be revealed if a location is given in relation to the comments. It is for that reason that I removed the codes.

Once the examination of the questions was completed, further analysis was needed to compare the conceptual framework to the data that developed from the questions. Adjustments were needed to build upon the connection between the conceptual framework and the data. Through modifications, the conceptual framework paralleled the data collected. Following this procedure, the data were again organized by conceptual themes: American and Canadian anti-terrorism policy, counter- and anti-terrorism practices, and terrorism policies as they relate to departmental priorities. This process led to the development of the findings described in the presentation of data in Chapter Five.

Conclusion

Chapter Four describes the choice of agencies and participants in the study. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 describe distinctions between the country, geographical area, size and brief description of the 12 police departments. Data collection methods included interviews and document analysis. The collected material was transcribed, organized and analyzed. The literature and themes produced by the interviews provided the basis for a modified conceptual framework. The strategies used in the data collection and analysis worked well and I would follow a similar format in a comparable study.

Table 4-1

Characteristics of Participating Police Departments

Code	Country	Geographic area	Department Size
A	Canada	Northern Ontario	Small
B	Canada	Northern Ontario	Mid-sized
C	Canada	Southern Ontario	Large
D	Canada	Southern Ontario	Mid-sized
E	USA	West	Large
F	USA	West	Large
G	USA	South-west	Mid-Sized
H	USA	Mid-west	Large
I	USA	Mid-west	Small
J	USA	Mid-west	Small
K	USA	Mid-west	Small
L	USA	Mid-west	Mid-Sized

Note. Small Departments are responsible for populations from 50,000 – 100,000.

Mid-sized Departments are responsible for populations from 100,000 – 500,000

Large Departments are responsible for populations over 500,000

Table 4-2

Brief description and code of police departments participating in the study

Code	Description
A	This department serves a small community in Northern Ontario with a population under 50,000 with little cultural diversity. This area enjoys the benefits of business and industry, with a modern infrastructure. The town has a low crime rate. This service relies on the OPP for equipment and expertise when it is required.
B	This department serves a northern Ontario community with a population of 100,000 with some cultural diversity, but the total range of cultures and size of population of each group is small. There is a large Aboriginal population. The community is losing young people who move to larger cities in search of employment. This results in an aging population and a narrowing tax base to draw upon for emergency and social services. The police agency is well trained and equipped and will call upon the OPP for additional equipment or services when necessary.
C	This department serves a Ontario police community with a large number of officers responsible for diverse populations and cultures. This agency regularly communicates with several other agencies in the greater Toronto area regarding counter- and anti-terrorism measures. Personnel is not an issue to this department that is well equipped drawing from a strong tax base. This agency is confident of its ability to respond and work preventively with other agencies expressing pride in their abilities and relationships with others.
D	This department serves a Canadian city situated on the border with the US. This city has a population over 200,000 with large and diverse groups of ethnic populations. The community does not have the fiscal prosperity of some of the larger centres in Ontario. The police agency employees are well educated and trained. The agency boasts close community relationships.
E	This US county agency is located in the west. The largest ethnic group in this region is Latino. This agency is responsible for a very large population. Police departments in this western region focus considerable time and energy training for response situations.

F This western city department is responsible for a large population of Latino ethnic groups. This department is in a highly populated area and focuses considerable time and energy on training for response situations.

G This south-western county is home to a large population of Latino groups. The department believes there is a competent instructional program for its members. The police departments in this western region focus considerable time and energy training for response situations.

H This Midwestern county police agency is responsible for over one million predominately Caucasian people. This upper level manager considers intelligence a top priority in anti-terrorism. The manager puts this agency as one of the better prepared prior to 9/11. The responsibility of this agency expands over a significant region.

I This Midwestern community oversees a population under 100,000. The department polices a diverse demographic population and is located in a suburb of a large city. This suburb is home to various racial and ethnic groups including a large number of recent immigrants. The economic status of its citizens ranges between the two extremes of very affluent to that of underprivileged.

J This department is located in a wealthy Midwestern suburban community with a population over 100,000 persons. This small city is located near a large metropolitan centre. The department owns or has access to the latest technology, training and educational services. The agency expresses pride in the preparedness of its officers for counter and anti-terrorism and interacts with the large and varied racial and ethnic groups in their community. The police voice pride in the low crime rate and continually search for ways to improve and grow as a department.

K Another Midwestern town participating has a population of less than 50,000. The area is an agriculturally based and working class, close to institutions of higher education and a large metropolitan center. The diversity of the community is minimal, and the majority of the population is Caucasian.

L This Midwestern community with a population of around 200,000 people is diverse with large Hispanic and Hmong populations. The city promotes close ties with cultural groups and the community in general.

Note:
* Training and educational requirements for police hired, vary between countries and states. High school is the minimal hiring requirement for most police departments but a college diploma or baccalaureate degree is preferred. Forty hours per year of continuing education and training for every officer is considered as average by most respondents.

** Chiefs and mangers' education differed between participating members. While a few participants obtained a high school or college diploma other participants completed two or more baccalaureate degrees and/or master level accreditation.

CHAPTER FIVE

PRESENTATION OF DATA

This chapter reports on the results of data analyses organized to address the four research sub-questions. The overarching research question is: how do Canadian and US police departments implement strategies to respond to new anti-terrorism laws and policy? Overall there appears to be no explicit police anti-terrorism policy in either country. What I found were varying courses of action built on previously existing practices. Anti-terrorism policy implementation by police varies according to the relationships between agencies and governments, other departments and their communities as further discussed in the presentation of data below. Both financial and human resources also determine the extent of involvement police have with counter- and anti-terrorism activities. The philosophy of the department determines the priorities police place on anti-terrorism duties. While there was great similarity across sites, this chapter identifies differences attributable to the country and the size of the force and belief systems. The four sub-questions are:

1. How are policy instruments employed by Federal governments in their attempts to ensure responses to anti-terrorism policy at the local level.
2. How does a department's normative standards and political agendas influence implementation of government anti-terrorism policy?
3. How do anti-terrorism policies become practice?
4. How do anti-terrorism policies influence relationships between local communities and police departments?

The data in response to the central question of the study of how Canadian and American police departments implement anti-terrorism policy varied across respondents. The data presented in response to the four sub-questions sre grouped under each of the four topics and further sub-divided into sub-categories for clarification.

Canadian and US Implementation Strategies in Response to Anti-Terrorism Policy

The respondents said there were no policies from the federal level, though they identified laws and government guidelines related to terrorism. All US participants claimed federal and state criminal laws guided their own written and unwritten internal policy. The US police departments referred to the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights as well as state criminal codes and department guidelines to direct them. One police chief said:

> I don't think there were any...we've heard of policy guidelines that were given to us: obviously we use as a policy guideline, or what I use as a policy guideline, is federal law, state statues that guide our behavior and guide what we can do and what we can't do, so policy first off, before you can establish any sort of a policy, that has to fall within allowable actions, either under the constitution of the US, federal law or the laws of the state.

The Ontario respondents were unanimous in stating that anti-terrorism is the responsibility of the duty of the federal government, which assigns primary authority to the RCMP and CSIS. One manager said: "Our direction to our folk is that we do not engage in that area so we don't get into this. Investigations for terrorism are not the responsibility of provincial and municipal police, under the federal/provincial framework." A chief from another locale said: "If there was an incident in (a city) that was anti-terrorism related, the RCMP would then take over the lead role of investigating

that incident, we would be the supporting agency." Respondents reported that each province has a counter-terrorism plan, for instance, Criminal Intelligence Service of Ontario (CISO). Municipalities follow their own policies and internal procedures for their emergency response plans. Such plans included existing practices and training in the event of a natural disaster or in response to violations of the Canadian Criminal Code. Municipalities expected they will gather intelligence and pass the information on to CISO or CSIS, a practice that was in place long before 9/11.

Ontario municipalities met the guidelines the province set forth in the Police Services Act, but claimed they do not have anything in writing from the federal government with respect to anti-terrorism policy. One Canadian chief said: "There is nothing really written and the government has never really come out and said they are totally responsible for crimes related to terrorism." Whether an incident is a bombing of a building, fraud, organized crime, or other criminal activity, police will respond to criminal episodes. For instance, one police manager described police functions in the following manner:

> There is terrorism, there is criminal extremism, there is crime, there is organized crime, there are all these levels and everyone has a different interpretation of it, but a police officer faced with a crime or needing to address a crime that has occurred will deal with that under the criminal code and all the existing policies and practices and training guidelines that exist. So, regardless of whether or not someone might be characterized as a terrorist, if they commit a criminal act, our officers will engage in that but engaging in investigating and laying charges and using whatever the law applies to it in terms of criminal training within the law. But, if there was some recognition that the individual we were dealing with was anti-terrorism, then under the counter provincial anti-terrorism plan that we have in our agreement, the RCMP would take it away in terms of taking on the investigation.

The language of the Police Services Act permits variation between police departments to meet the needs of their community. Each department will establish their own emergency response plans in ways congruent with their understanding of their local communities. The response plans are usually kept in binder format for outlining their own policies or procedures.

Half of the departments across national borders said they had an emergency response plan prior to 9/11 consisting of their own policies and procedures. Four respondents claimed they do not have specific anti-terrorism measures in their departments. The police in this category spoke of the lack of policy from the federal and state/provincial levels. Two referred to their departments' internal policies outlining procedures for incidents, but one of the two refused to share those steps, while the second said he sees no reason why they would not give them to me, other than the time and paper it would take to photocopy all of the documents. The binders put forward were not anti-terrorism specific, but outlined steps for emergency and natural disasters. The emergency measures described by respondents were either written or unwritten policy designed by their own departments to meet the needs of their communities.

The two remaining agencies in this group did not follow specific formalized procedures that could be located in binders. In the past, both of the departments had specific instructions for officers to follow in the event of atypical incidents, but this process had been discarded for a more fundamental approach to emergencies. When there were no itemized procedures directing what to do under every type of emergency, respondents might follow the necessary steps in whatever order they deem practical under the circumstances. The reasoning that respondents shared with the interviewer was the

reluctance to formalize each and every procedure when a primary standard of response was more efficient. Binders containing formal procedures, they insisted, hamper police when they have to return for a list of instructions on a course of action. These departments believed it was a waste of time and left less discretion for the commanding officer.

Policy and practice of daily police routines was, in most cases, unchanged since 9/11; the procedure police followed was basic police practices common in the policing field. In spite of government legislation and ensuing laws connecting police to terrorism, working within the existing laws and investigating and laying criminal charges were still seen as the most important responsibility for police.

Respondents claim there is no policy, yet reference was given to guidelines from the federal level and reliance on legislation enacted through Anti-Terrorism legislation in Canada and the Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act in US. The responses suggest there are attempts to remove communication barriers between agencies. Another consistent view from police chiefs and managers is that terrorist acts are regarded as criminal acts and therefore fall under police jurisdiction. When a criminal act is determined to be terrorism related, it is passed on to the federal level. Half of the respondents claimed their departments have emergency procedures specific to their geographical areas for emergencies procedures, but not specific to terrorism. Both Canada and the US were consistent in stating that terrorism within their own borders is a federal responsibility.

Policy Instruments Employed by Federal Governments

Policy instruments employed by federal governments expose two prominent themes that further influence police duties. The first is how departments interact with one another and the second is the importance of collecting intelligence information. National differences between the two countries were noted.

Two prominent themes emerge with respect to the police roles in both countries related to policy instruments. The first theme is reactive or counter-terrorism responsibilities and the second theme is proactive or anti-terrorism functions. Reactive measures are those most commonly utilized within police agencies due to funding, (Clarke, 2002; Rosenbaum, 1994) socialization (Chan, 1996; Lundman, R., 1984) and values and culture (Wasserman, R., & Moore, M., 1988; Scripture, A., 1997). They are essentially responding to emergency situations. New York City, for instance, was regarded by one interviewee as: "the largest homicide investigation in the United States." Police saw themselves as responding to an emergency as they would to any other, viewing the situation not only as an anti-terrorism episode, but as a crime scene. In terms of counter-terrorism, the police were one entity within a larger group of first responders present at any emergency they were called upon to attend.

The reactive response procedures by police were generally those policing duties that are a normal part of the job of responding to emergencies. Each of the departments made reference to the similarities between responding to anti-terrorism events and responding to natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes and power outages or criminal actions involving bombs, riots and murders. What altered emergency plans

was the potential for biological and chemical attacks and weapons of mass destruction. Since 9/11 there was increased training for potential anti-terrorism responses, particularly for specialized and elite groups such as bomb squads or those affiliated with Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT). Financial support for equipment, training and education is necessary to enhance performance of police reacting to such a crisis. Funding to buy equipment and advanced education to put these measures into practice varies between departments and countries.

Respondents from each department spoke of taking action for terrorism and natural disasters as a duty expected of police officers. Reacting responsively is a common outcome to emergency situations and fits with the values and culture of police (Goldstein; 1990; Meese, 1993; Reussi-Ianni, 1993).

Interagency Connectedness

Three quarters of the participating agencies listed first responder preparedness as essential to working with agencies other than police departments. Interacting and training with other emergency personnel (first responders) was identified as important because preparing for catastrophic responses would require the coordination of not only the police agencies but also fire departments, bomb squads and public health agencies (Jackson, Peterson, Bartis, LaTourette, Brahmakulam, Houser, & Sollinger, 2005). Close alliances were important in anti and counter anti-terrorism measures. This lesson was learned from first responder groups reacting to the 9/11 catastrophe in New York City, where there was little or no communication between first responders; emergency equipment and

clothing was inadequate, and no previous preparations had been made for an emergency of that magnitude (Backgrounder Series, 2004; Jackson, et al.).

The 12 police departments agreed that they would either rely upon another force for assistance or offer assistance to anyone needing help. All respondents said they could pick up the phone, speak to neighbouring departments or agencies and elicit their aid. The majority spoke of a willingness to share equipment and human resources in any dire emergency. Seven of the 12 said sharing was a common occurrence regardless of whether there was a written contract in place. "For the most part we go even if we are not a signatory to the document just because that is the way things are done here...the whole feeling is that we are a community." Helping other police departments or areas when there was a need appeared to be commonplace with police respondents in this study. It would appear that police assist one another when department resources are not sufficient to fulfill their duties to their communities. It may be expected that police will operate in the same manner for terrorism policy implementation.

Interagency connectedness was common among police departments prior to 9/11. The importance of working together in response to emergency situations was clear to the participants in the study following the tragedy of 9/11 (Bartis, Brannan, Byman, et al., 2001). The participants were willing to share resources with other police departments and expected better equipped and trained police departments or agencies to assist when necessary.

Intelligence

When participants were asked about what terrorism related duties they performed, the majority mentioned intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing with other agencies. All respondents identified standard policing duties as their priority. However, looking across departments, it was apparent that as the size of the department and geographical proximity to major centres increased, so did the level of importance placed on counter and anti-anti-terrorism duties. The smallest of the departments interviewed saw no connection between officer duties and terrorism. Seven of the 12 associated the standard intelligence model of information gathering and sharing as the principal connection for terrorism between officers on the street and the federal level. These duties included reporting suspicious vehicles or persons and passing this information on to their intelligence division.

Other proactive measures mentioned by the participants included investigating criminal acts such as fraud, fund-raising, and money laundering as well as protecting infrastructure. The objective behind infrastructure protection was to perform a risk analysis, identifying buildings and businesses as well as communication and transportation routes most at potential risk. As a group, possible targets were identified by managers of police, emergency responders, elected government officials, and city planners. Determining the order of importance of highest to lowest threat level was undertaken within each community by this group. Once possible threats were identified, police worked within these groups to set plans in place for prevention and protection, or as repeated by more than one manager, "identifying the threat and hardening the target", in other words evaluating their communities for the most likely targets and securing these

vulnerable areas to prevent criminal or terrorist action. This had already taken place at airports, nuclear facilities, many large businesses, schools and other public facilities.

The police interviewed understood that intelligence gathering was an extension of regular duties. For instance, police already expected to respond to emergency situations, and gathering criminal intelligence is one of the duties of police agencies. In some cases respondents noted it was not easy to gather information because they were impeded by factors that hampered intelligence gathering. One respondent pointed to the Freedom of Information Act, stating it made it difficult for police to access vital information quickly due to the official procedure for access. Another believed the expectations of street level officers were unclear; therefore, not all observations at the street level were reported. One respondent in a mid-western region believed more data would be conveyed up the intelligence chain if there was a clearer understanding of expectations. Improperly trained officers lacking knowledge of what to look for at the street level may overlook potential terrorist threats.

While federal governments may stipulate the need for a relationship between anti and counter terrorism and local police activity, some departments did not clearly understand these expectations. Under this new arrangement, with patrol officers expected to gather intelligence while on general patrol, chiefs of police recognized that their patrol officers required education as a means of helping to alert them to various indicators of anti-terrorism development. As well, some police managers were concerned that they did not receive enough criminal intelligence information back from federal sources. Lack of intelligence feedback was seen by a few chiefs as detrimental to ongoing investigations and withholding information that might educate patrol officers to potential terrorist

threats. These chiefs conveyed the need for education for their officers in terms of intelligence feedback to make them more aware of specific information linking individuals to terrorism.

If intelligence is not analyzed and communicated between agencies, information gathered from the street level is limited in its use. Although the majority of police departments listed intelligence sharing with other policing agencies in their own countries as a very important activity, half voiced apprehension over how the intelligence was used. Concern was raised by departments regarding the collection and use of intelligence. One of the eight claimed intelligence sharing was the most important issue between police agencies. A respondent from another department maintained confidential information was shared in a limited capacity, depriving other ranking police officers and other first responders the benefit of education or training based on additional intelligence. This manager said more police-gathered intelligence, shared with ambulance, fire and other first responders, would assist them in recognizing conditions or circumstances connected to criminal activities and intelligence gathering. A third chief viewed police agencies as having greater sharing of information since 9/11; however, the respondent did not believe all departments shared their intelligence information.

The practice of withholding facts was perceived by this chief as an empire building strategy; departments that withheld information when making arrests might receive considerable media attention. Three of these four departments who believed they were not given enough intelligence information criticized the system of releasing information to police agencies. Information was released to chiefs and managers who were cleared through Homeland Security. Three respondents questioned the rationale of

withholding data, arguing that "each is wearing the same badge." Other respondents, spoke of the need to collect and disseminate information on a need-to-know basis. One such respondent said that where others consider withholding information as empire building, he thought:

> that's never going to change over time and you overcome that by building relationships. But there are certain things that people do not need to know; if it is not particular to a specific criminal investigation they don't need to know. There may be a little piece of that, that may be of interest or importance to the general area as far as security or awareness and that little piece should be shared, but it doesn't mean that everything should be.

One manager from a large agency pointed out that some things needed to be shared while others did not: "You can compromise an investigation by sharing information that could get out that is irrelevant." In other words, something may have seemed immaterial to an investigation, but as time went on, it might have proved to be critical. A few managers encouraged chiefs to commit at least one officer strictly to intelligence duty. This would ensure that intelligence flowed from the local to federal departmental levels. It was also strongly recommended, by the same chiefs, that more chiefs and managers submit to Homeland Security for security clearance, thus enabling intelligence officers to share restricted information with their own departments.

The chiefs who did not have security clearance said they did not receive feedback from Homeland Security that would let them know whether the intelligence they sent had been of value. As stated by a manager of one of the larger departments who had security clearance, "We can't tell them, thanks for the information. It just has to be that way." This sentiment was voiced by large and mid-sized agencies who expected chiefs to make the connection with Homeland Security. The chiefs and managers with security clearance

and working closely with Homeland Security were more accepting of the intelligence gathering process and the need for secrecy.

One chief believed all police departments must build upon their present structure by making intelligence units the central focus of their department. This department had hired an analyst to gather information locally, nationally and globally. Information was collected, analyzed, interpreted and then disseminated to the state and federal level as well as regionally, and then back to the patrol officers. This chief saw this approach as being of primary importance for intelligence-led policing. This police department draws funding from a wealthy community and may have more resources available due to the wealth of its citizens.

In both Canada and the US, where two chiefs perceived police agencies as sharing more information since 9/11, not all computer data banks were linked to one another, making access to criminal information difficult. In this same vein, one respondent also related a lack of intelligence sharing and did not consider the police agencies in their region to be particularly close. The respondent said informal discussions were not a huge priority in the region, though he nevertheless believed they were important. One manager stated "You don't build relationships in crisis situations." A few departments also passed on local intelligence via computerized messages or telephone calls as well as the national intelligence connection available; in other words, information transference from one department to another occurred through previously acquired friendships and working relationships.

Intelligence was linked to anti-terrorism, with the most frequent description of this task as street officers reporting suspicious persons or activities. A department's

geographical location as well as the size of the agency determined the relevance placed on intelligence gathering and the connection made to terrorism. Some departments viewed intelligence as an extension of regular duties while others did not make the connection. Over half of the respondents voiced apprehension over how intelligence is employed and a few of the chiefs did not believe intelligence is shared as it should be.

National Differences

National differences were evident in the data, with Canadians believing their organization of intelligence information surpassed that of the Americans because of the intelligence sharing procedure linking Canadian police across the country that had been in place for the past forty years. Canadian respondents also pointed to that country's federal division of police linked to all provincial departments as compared to Americans who had a more complex federal system as well as separate state and municipal agencies. The American system had more levels and agencies such as the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency and Homeland Security and this was seen by Canadian respondents as detrimental to information sharing.

As stated by one Canadian respondent:

> The RCMP is the only federal service that we have, unlike the United States where you have the DEA and all the different federal groups, we only have one. And the second one under that is CSIS which is the Criminal Intelligence Service. These are the only two federal services that we have other than Customs and Immigration which is federal too. But these two work very closely so when you have CISO and all of the municipal services. Each province has their own criminal intelligence services and they all feed their information to a national group and they all work very closely.

There were also standards set out in the Ontario Police Services Act linking local intelligence crime units to anti-terrorism squads. Because terrorism was linked to various criminal activities, it was important to work collaboratively so that departments received the benefit of each other's information. With all the agencies connected, essentially the principle was an integrated approach to policing and sharing. One Canadian respondent said:

> You know there is always room for exchange of information and improvement and how you do. We didn't have the problems that the Americans had in terms of lack of information going between the FBI and municipal and state and other federal agencies. We already had this set up set in Ontario and have had for forty years.

In another comment by the same Canadian manager, the point was made that all information is relevant and may pertain to a larger criminal picture. This respondent criticized the American intelligence procedures prior to 9/11.

> I think a lot of people learned a lot about information sharing both on the Canadian side and on the American side. There is no such thing as minute information; there is such thing as bad information, but many small pieces can be pieced together. You know, the Americans would probably love to be able to rethink how they analyzed their intelligence information when you think about it.

Canadian intelligence was shared between federal, provincial and local agencies prior to 9/11. Canadian police departments indicated that for the past thirty years, an established criminal intelligence sharing network was in place across the country.

Normative Standards and Political Agendas of Departments' and Their Influence on Anti-Terrorism Policy

Participants in this study identified three issues related to the implementation of anti-terrorism policy. The first issue included both proactive and reactive education of

street officers. This included identifying suspicious activities linked to terrorist activity and responding to various disasters. The second issue of personnel was seen as an important factor in dealing with terrorism. The third issue was funding and who was responsible for paying for anti-terrorism implementation and follow-through.

Education

Regardless of the differences in counter- and anti-terrorism implementation, each respondent asserted that his agency educated officers for some form of anti-terrorism response. Half of the respondents said officers were taught to be vigilant of suspicious persons or vehicles. Four participants made reference to seminars on terrorism, criminal profiling, suicide bombing and other education related to terrorism they attended taught by either Israeli military or police. Three of the 12 participants said they decided on the education and training requirements for their agencies. One of the three referred to the federal government as the guide, and directing where training will extend. The second said he, alone, decided on education and training, while the third reported delegating education and training to division commanders, but also stated that some training needs came from the bottom up from specialized teams. Training is detached from education in this context, defined as physical, hands-on strategic preparation specific to first responder encounters. One manager identified training as "conditioning...what you do in training is what you do in an actual situation and that has been proven over many years of training." Again, managers of the same six agencies who claimed their officers are trained to look for suspicious persons or vehicles, said there is little difference in training officers for the job of responding to emergencies, crowd control, rescue assistance and other first responding duties.

Departments in both countries were mandated to fulfill training and educational requirements. The average training and educational requirement was 40 hours each year per officer, but the requirements varied among agencies.[1] Each of the 12 departments had training officers who coordinated the educational delivery, while eight agencies spoke of either individual middle managers or a team of the chief and upper managers as those who decided on training applicable for their departments. Five of these eight respondents identified their state/province or police academy as principal to decisions regarding what education would be given to their officers. Two of the five departments sent one officer to the academy to "train-the-trainer sessions" so that the officer would tutor others over a period of time. But nearly half of the agencies perceived the minimal yearly training requirement per officer by their department as difficult to actualize. Managers and chiefs contended that beyond the large number of calls their officers responded to, vacation and sick time left minimal time for training.

The procedure of training within departments is a long-held practice that is thought to be economical and practical. Education and training are continuous, responding to ongoing societal changes and subsequent amendments to laws and procedures. Two of the agencies identified specialized divisions, such as the intelligence branch, as having in-house training separate from other divisions. Nine of the 12 departments said their intelligence officers taught other police colleagues when they had information specific to terrorism. Two of the 9 connected intelligence gathering with information brought into the academies to teach police officers.

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[1] Forty hours of training per police officer per year is an average. Some department standards exceed this level of training while other departments struggle to maintain the average. There is also variance among departments with officers in specialized training such as tactical units.

All department participants in the study provide education and training for their officers. Training specific to anti or counter-terrorism ranged from requesting increased officer vigilance of persons and vehicles as well as education conducted within their own agencies, to officers attending seminars outside their departments. The length and type of training differed between departments. Each department had a training officer but the type of training or education was decided upon from recommendations from the federal government, by the chief alone, chosen from middle management recommendations or at the police academies affiliated with those police departments. Funding and personnel issues influenced education and training decisions

Personnel

All 12 respondents contended that the ability to deal with terrorism was significantly linked to the availability of resources. Following 9/11, funding for equipment and first responder training was the primary resource available for many departments, but hiring more police personnel was not an option for most. As well, there were differences between the funding practices of Canada and the United States.

Police departments in Ontario and in regions of the US carried out their approaches to anti- and counter terrorism activities in various ways. All claimed these additional duties required the expense of one or more officers to work in the intelligence branch. If a department did not have an intelligence officer prior to 9/11, they would have the additional expense of a new officer or the loss of an officer from general patrol to be placed in the intelligence section. Only one department hired additional officers to specifically work in their intelligence unit. In one municipal police force, officers left their positions to move to the federal level, making it necessary to hire new employees.

This loss of human resources left this department with one officer working half time in the intelligence division.

One of the 12 departments did not have the personnel to incorporate any type of proactive or reactive anti-terrorism measures, relying instead on a larger agency for all practical intervention. This department was the smallest department in the study.

It was noted by all but one participant that additional resources for both personnel and equipment are required to respond to anti- and counter-terrorism demands. Departments that did not have intelligence officers prior to 9/11 moved officers from other areas to fulfill the requirement.

Funding

The Ontario respondents complained that the lack of new funding for either reactive or proactive measures put the onus on the local departments to shoulder the economic burden. The departments claimed to have received some money, but said it did not cover all expenses. The Ontario government authorized funds for the OPP to put toward a Provincial Emergency Response Team for equipment and emergency preparedness as well as for the creation of an Ontario anti-terrorism section in the OPP intelligence bureau. Municipalities were expected to request services from the OPP when such a need arose (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2005). One Ontario respondent said:

> When 9/11 happened the Ontario Chiefs of Police held meetings and the ministers came and gave X number of dollars to handle terrorism activities to the OPP and we're saying well that is not good enough. That is fine for the OPP, congratulations, but where is the money for the municipalities, because it is the major municipalities especially the big 12 (Toronto area police agencies) who would be the front line people answering most of these types of calls.

For example, when the power grid shutdown in August, 2003, leaving Eastern Canada and the US in blackout conditions, one of the respondents claimed the OPP faced excessive demands with limited capacity, leaving the municipalities without assistance. The respondent said his own municipality was forced to provide additional emergency services, thus incurring additional expenses. This respondent believed the OPP should have provided this service and the province should have paid for the additional policing and emergency expenses for the blackout rather than the local municipality.

US counterparts did not have the same concern with funding, as their federal government distributed money to states, which in turn allocated funds to regions and municipalities. Federal funding carried stipulations requiring the purchase of specified equipment and the appropriate training of personnel to utilize the new items. These stipulations were redundant for those large cities and municipal departments who previously prepared for such emergencies. The larger agencies already met the needs assessments required by the federal government and were not subject to the new funding format; therefore, they were not entitled to any funds. On the other hand, for small departments, the result was an ability to partner with other departments and receive funding and education to bring them up to the standards set in federal funding specifications. A few respondents said they surpassed the rules set in the federal government's standards by increasing intelligence, education, equipment and partnering with other agencies and departments.

The OPP received funds from the provincial government to pay for personnel and equipment. Ontario municipal police agencies received some funding, but claimed it was not enough to cover additional expenses. American police departments received funds for

equipment and training to raise them up to a national standard. Larger departments that already met the standards were not eligible for grants.

Prioritizing and Practice of Anti-Terrorism Policies

Police Departments were at varied levels of terrorism preparedness. While some departments had previously experienced some form of terrorist activity, other departments were preparing themselves because of their size and geographical location. Other participants relied on larger departments for assistance.

Existing Capacity

The process to put anti-terrorism measures into practice varied across agencies. Police responsible for, or situated in close proximity to, sizeable populations had already employed intelligence units within their departments which had dealt with terrorism prior to 9/11. Five of these agencies were prepared for some form of potential anti-terrorism event. After 9/11 these procedures were intensified, as was the expectation for enhanced sharing of information among all levels of government and police.

In the US, there are incentives for police departments to join forces through intelligence networks. In some states, municipal police departments that grouped regionally benefited from federal funding provisions. By working with other departments, they stood to reap greater benefits. A number of states allocated federal funding by modifying national standards and distributing money according to their own state guidelines, which respondents claimed exceed those set federally. One department set internal criteria surpassing federal and state requirements through additional education

and linking between agencies. The respondent reported: "We have accompanying standards but we don't have a standard that says basic awareness, we are going to try and ensure that every officer is trained to [raising his hand over his head] this level." In his agency, prior to 9/11, administrators took it upon themselves to implement terrorism measures. It was his belief that the officers in his agency were trained to a higher degree than most police officers, but there is no evidence to support this view.

One of the 12 department chiefs said his anti-terrorism measures were enacted within 15 minutes of the first plane hitting the twin towers in New York City. The city police in that jurisdiction acted simultaneously with emergency responders and city personnel by first meeting to formulate a plan. Their next response was to initiate immediate protection of the city's infrastructure most in jeopardy, including mosques and synagogues. The other action required all officers to come into work as a means of showing police presence on the streets to reassure the public.

What made this department unique in its preparedness may be attributed to several factors. The community it serviced was a wealthy suburb of a large metropolitan city and had the latest in equipment and technology. The crime rate was very low and the community did not experience serious crime with the same intensity as neighbouring districts. A high crime rate that would normally consume funding money was not a concern. In addition, the department was mid-sized and easier to manage than a very large department. The police chief, who was well educated and forward thinking, put a great deal of effort into crime prevention and working closely with the community long before 9/11. This suburb was geographically situated near a potential terrorist target, and

this fact continued to play a role in the department's continued preventative and community efforts.

The capacity of police to respond to terrorism threats differed between departments. Five agencies said they were prepared for some form of terrorism threat prior to 9/11. A few departments stated their state standards surpassed the federal standards of preparedness. One department described its pro-active stance within 15 minutes of the 9/11 attacks. The variation in the level of preparedness depended on the size and geographical position of the police department. The American departments were encouraged to work collectively in preparing for disasters. Forming alliances made departments eligible for federal grants for equipment and training.

Anti-Terrorism Policies and Police Community Relations

Most respondents acknowledged the importance of community relations to anti-terrorism measures. The differences arose in the type of community policing followed by different departments. The most prevalent link between anti-terrorism and police-community relations was intelligence gathering.

Community Policing

The majority of Canadian and American police in this study acknowledged the importance of community policing and its role in the collection of data. It was viewed as significant to intelligence gathering as a proactive response to terrorism, possibly because they understood the connection of access to criminal intelligence at the community level. One important distinction among the police agencies in this study was that some did

community or community-oriented policing and some operated at a distance from their communities. Those who operated separate from their community presented themselves as in control by stressing their power as law enforcers. Rather than working with the community, they seemed to value opportunities to demonstrate their authority. Frequent responses to the question about the fit between community policing and anti-terrorism policy was a query of how the interviewer defined community policing. Such responses suggest discrepancies in beliefs and functioning of community oriented policing, as mirrored in the literature on this subject. Seagrave (1996) claims community policing differs between agencies and cannot be compared, and Goldstein (1990) evaluates the piecemeal design of community oriented programs. In other words, there is ambiguity about what community policing really is. Williams (1996) includes examples of police prevention through building design, for example, security features, lighting and landscaping design.

Descriptions of community policing varied, covering a range from full community policing to a community policing structure dividing the city into quadrants. One department assigned officers to areas in the city even though the process was costly, because that is "what the community wants." Two did not like the term community policing, claiming the term is passé because all departments have had some form of community policing or community-oriented policing. A second department had satellite stations for community police officers at one time, but decided it was too expensive and there were further issues around span of control.

Discussion with respondents regarding their department's philosophy on community policing offered insight into community relations. There were disagreements

on whether community policing should even be a priority. The inference was that all police are involved in community-oriented policing and are doing it well. Others preferred the term community-oriented policing, to community policing.

Where some departments viewed community policing as the practice of public relations, other agencies described community interaction with police in a more profound way. Descriptions ranged from commonplace statements such as "you strengthen your relationship with your citizens" to explanations recommending officers get out of their cars to speak with citizens, constant contact with businesses and participating in sporting events, to cultural awareness training and neighbourhood coordinated groups such as Block Watch. Four of the 12 agencies described community policing in very inclusive terms. Descriptions from these four departments included welcoming invitations and describing many cultural and ethnic groups' interactions with the organization through open communication and regular, active involvement in the development of internal police policy. While most departments articulated an interest in community, only a few produced documents that listed actual input and described changes they had made based on recommendations from various ethnic groups.

The majority of respondents described community policing as important to intelligence gathering. There were differences in the way community policing was practiced between departments. Some of the departments worked very closely with their communities while others interpreted community policing in a more authoritative way. The working models described by the participants offered some insight into the relationships the police have with their communities.

Connection to Community and Intelligence Gathering

One chief described community policing as "a fundamental role of policing." Community Oriented Policing Services recognized the importance of local law enforcement and terrorism issues shortly after 9/11 (Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2002). The FBI hosted a conference in Washington, DC in June, 2004 and emphasized the importance of community oriented policing and how it relates to anti-terrorism, communication and intelligence gathering.

Although all 12 of the respondents understood a relationship between community policing and terrorism in gathering intelligence, their styles differed. Three of the 12 respondents viewed community outreach by police on the street as paramount to positive community relations. They believed community members would share information with their police departments when there was mutual trust and respect. One respondent said: "What the chief of police does in the community is important, but more importantly, what the officers do on the street defines the temperament of the citizens." One chief believed we all have personal bias that we learned in our homes and with this thought, he turned this opinion back to the community.

> Our position has been with some of our partners that if you constantly hear in your home that cops are bad that you don't like them what do you think they are going to learn when they get older? So if we have a black family that does nothing but criticize police and call them bigots and the kids hear that from their formative years then what chance have we got when they go out on the street and deal with the police?

Two of the four Canadians as well as two of the eight Americans interviewed said they requested input from community members from different ethnic groups. These four agencies actively involved ethnic groups in the consultation and managing of their

departments and designing yearly business plans. Other managers spoke of inviting different ethnic and physically disabled groups into the department to familiarize officers with their issues and perspectives. Another respondent spoke of community policing as going beyond educating officers to educating citizens, managers and residents.

The chief of the smallest department said terrorism was a non-issue in the community. He spoke of responding to social concerns, not just those of a criminal nature, by developing entertainment events for teenagers, for example, as a crime prevention practice. Respondents in the largest three departments described officers regularly stopping and talking to people as community policing. One of the three chiefs recommended their officers get out of their cars and go back to the basics of serving people. This particular agency also believed that officers on the street were the best strategy for gathering criminal intelligence. Yet another variation was the strategy of community oriented policing within high crime areas or where there were specific problems. Intervention in troubled areas rather than the entire community, it may be argued, is more closely related to reactive policing.

Community oriented/community policing was also described as outreach, with police acting as a reassurance and reinforcement to community members. One respondent could see how some of the relationships in the world of terrorism might be connected with local mosques and different Islamic groups. Others believed police have personal relationships with many facets of the community and that maintaining relationships with groups in society was critical.

Education was a key component of community policing in five agencies. There are practices of educating both the public and officers on information flow. Cultural

awareness and education regarding persons with disabilities was seen as vital to community oriented policing by three respondents.

While interviewed, managers frequently spoke of making friends with other department managers before an emergency, yet when it came to their communities, it appears that interaction with ethnic, cultural and religious groups was only superficial at best. This may be because, although police were encouraged to group to obtain funding, in terms of cooperating with community, there are few incentives. One American chief said the funding normally provided through Community Oriented Policing Grants had gone by the wayside where funding for terrorism response will continue for several years.

Some respondents said community policing fit with counter and anti-terrorism policy because having a close connection helps with "information flow both ways from the local to the national region" One chief said:

> We've done very well with community oriented policing. We've created community partnerships, we've developed trust and respect in the communities we serve and overall we've reaped tremendous benefits...we have to continue to have community policing and have that trust and respect because that will help us in our new level and I don't know what the term is going to be. I don't know if it is going to be called enterprise policing or web-based policing intelligence. I haven't heard a term attached to it.

The American COPS, under the mandate of the US Department of Justice, noted the importance of community and terrorism in 2002. The FBI spoke to community oriented practitioners about terrorism and community at a community policing conference in June, 2004. The FBI identified community policing as a means of gathering information at the community level. Canadian and American police respondents both requested input from ethnic groups in their communities. While some of the departments

considered their relationship with the community as important to prevent criminal activity others considered community policing an outreach to their communities.

Racial Profiling vs. Incident Profiling

Police have been accused of racial profiling in many communities in the US and Canada. After 9/11, due to these accusations of racial profiling, concern was raised over further targeting of minorities (Her, 2002; Vanderpool, 2002). When asked if profiling was employed in their police departments, all 12 respondents denied this practice. Racial profiling is antithetical to community-oriented policing, hindering connections between police and their divergent neighbourhoods and thwarting efforts to build upon the sharing of information.

One chief said his department did not use racial profiling nor a system of identifying terrorists. This chief said if they developed a profiling method, it would focus on criminal activity. This was a typical response. One third said the practice of racial profiling was either illegal or the departments referred to their written or unwritten policy on the matter. One of the departments kept statistics on traffic stops to discourage such actions. Two of the 12 said they believe racial profiling occurred at the street level because "everyone has their own bias and that is human nature." These two participants believed the larger the agency, the more likely this practice would occur.

Although the managers did not condone profiling and said they believed such practices were dissipating over the years, one said, "I would think that if there is a chief of police in this country that says racial profiling doesn't exist in their department, they

should do a reality check." A third manager from one of the larger agencies, said he believed officers on the street followed the anti-racist profiling policy. In reality, this agency was in conflict with ethnic communities throughout the region. The manager of this department said:

> If you are working an area that is made up of a particular group and everybody you stop is of that particular group, they can claim profiling anytime they want. If there is a crime that's been committed then you're reinforcing the law equitably and fairly then you're enforcing the law. So, there will always be claims of that occurring.

If each of the different ethnic groups claim profiling exists, then this particular individual considered this a sign that police are doing their jobs. The geographical area managed by this individual was comprised predominately of minorities. The inference was that there are always complaints against police, if there were not then police were not exercising their authority and people would not be protesting. Another chief had a different perspective: if you knew members of a particular ethnic group were involved in criminal activity and the police watched people within these groups, then that was good racial profiling. The individual put it this way:

> You know racial profiling has to apply; it is just the nature of the beast. How do you have an open society and have law enforcement...if I know a certain ethnic group are doing these types of crimes and I start watching persons of these ethnic groups then I'm racial profiling but is that a good way of racial profiling as opposed to I start stopping persons of a certain ethnic group because I don't like them and giving them tickets. There are good racial profiling and bad racial profiling.

Another chief of police on the Canadian border said that following 9/11, there had been a number of complaints from Middle Eastern people having problems at the border. This chief said "They were being targeted, we had to be honest with them. They were being asked more questions than a white Anglo Saxon, because of their

background." Half of the respondents reported that criminal, behavioural or incident profiling was practiced by their police departments. The difference between this and racial profiling was described by one as "identifying on the basis of behavior and the context of behavior rather than basing investigations on race, cultural heritage, sexual orientation or gender." A second claimed "The information obtained must not rely on the race of an individual but what that person is doing and whether it is consistent with past surveillance." In other words, past surveillance may offer information from another investigation, linking a new subject to criminal behaviour. Regardless of the race of the individuals, the criminal act is what is to take precedence in criminal profiling.

One respondent said that prior to 9/11, it appeared to him that society was more accepting of ethnic groups, but following 9/11, society had little patience for minority races. He said because personal safety was an issue, there were few complaints about standing in long lines at airports and having baggage thoroughly checked, but as time passed, patience also dissipated. The officer described society moving from acceptance to intolerance with the following story. There had been numerous drive-by shootings in the centre of his city "and for the most part, well, it was, those folks (African Americans)". The police department was not accepting of the behaviour, but public opinion was against police exercising excessive authority to handle the situation. It was not until a downtown businesswoman drove through that area, got caught up in the gun fire and was killed that public opinion changed. At that point white society was no longer tolerant, demanding the police stop every suspect vehicle and get them out of their cars with guns drawn.

> You know, at one point it was ok to felony stop those people and what I mean by felony stop is you pull up behind them order them out of a car on a PA, you get them face down on the cement, you walk up with a shot gun pointed to their head, you hand cuff them and then you find out there is no gun, oh well, un-cuff them

> and send them on their way. That was ok then, it was not ok now... as time passes the community becomes less tolerant of that and we as a police department, we respond to those ups and downs in society's opinion. The community, in my mind looks at who we should be targeting. If it is this person, that skin colour, that religion, driving these cars or what-ever the background may be that they have formed this biased opinion; that is the target population. We can't do that, it is not the right thing to do.

From a police perspective, society will not support aggressive actions by police that threaten basic freedoms. Society is willing, however, to make concessions where race is concerned. Drawing an analogy to terrorism and profiling, this police manager was aware that not all terrorists are Middle Eastern Muslim males; however, that is what he believes many in society believe. He believes people expect police to use racial profiling or whatever means necessary when their safety is the issue.

Some departments built better relationships than others with their communities, but even these departments might have difficulty with race related issues. There were still complaints of prejudice, bias, and lack of sensitivity to cultural customs. One respondent said "(the police) know that the Somalia community has strong financial ties to Al Qaeda...there is no doubt there is a terrorist threat here."

The more common comments regarding race focused on the difficulty of gaining access to some ethnic groups within their communities because these people have come from countries with police states. Police managers spoke of the struggles of trying to talk with citizens who viewed police as a threat because in their own countries police were corrupt, oppressive and abusive. A similar difficulty was found with recruiting minorities for police work because of the negative view of police. One manager said,

> I've been involved in recruiting for more than a decade and our problem is reaching many of the different cultures. Policing is not seen as a profession that they choose to go to especially many of the African nations, Rwanda, Ghana, Somalia and Nigeria. We have a hard time breaking into that group. They are very

> responsive to their parents and their parents want them to do other professional work. So, from that point of view we are having a hard time.

When there is no dialogue between minority groups and police, there appears to be a lack of understanding of between views and values.

All respondents accepted racial profiling as illegal and unacceptable in their departments, but there were a couple of chiefs who acknowledged that it may exist at the street level. It was believed by these individuals that the practice has lessened over time. The practice was not condoned and polices are in place in departments regarding racial profiling. The majority of chiefs were in favour of criminal profiling regardless of the race of the criminal. Overall it appeared that some departments have better relationships with their communities than others, but there is still difficulty recruiting minorities into the police profession.

Effort to Connect With Communities

Of the 12 agencies participating in this study, four practiced extensive two way communication and involvement with their communities. Three of the four respondents described clear strategies to connect with different ethnic groups in their communities. There are a number of reasons why departments do not expand their interaction with ethnic groups in their communities; one of the reasons was the time, energy and resolve required. Building these relationships with community expended considerable emotional energy. As one manager said:

> Whey you go out and speak with the sixteen, seventeen and eighteen year olds on the street that we're having problems with and you say, well we're meeting with so and so and the youths say "That has nothing to do with me. I don't recognize

> him as my leader; you should be talking to so and so." So you have to develop new relationships and the other person at the opposite end of the spectrum is put off. We've got this outstanding relationship and have to continually work at it. It is a work in progress where you are constantly working through those kinds of things. Some of them are struggles and some... a lot of trust goes into those relationships.

It takes time to build relationships. Bascia and Hargreaves (2000) write that socio-emotional effort usually develops voluntarily. What follows are innovative approaches in the change and development process: "emotional understanding is threatened when policies, structures and change practices create excessive distance between [implementers] and those around them" (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000, p. 11). This occurs when anti-terrorism policies do not exhibit values of police and their communities. What is important to police at the street level differs from one department to another. For this reason, "You can't mandate what matters" (Fullan, 1993, p. 22). Changes cannot be forced on people because change requires skills, beliefs, motivation and discretion (Fullan, 1993). Hargreaves recommends offering a: "range of ...models to create menus of choice" (Hargreaves, 1994, p. 261). This enables departments at the street level to work with policy, finding a fit for their agency and community.

One manager described the development of his department's policy of a threat protocol for anthrax. The first step was to go to the FBI for critical threat criteria, but the FBI would not share with the department. Finally the policy document was sent to the department, but it did not identify a plan this department could utilize. The document explained what had happened internationally and nationally, offered protective measures for police themselves, described what was expected from police if they responded to an anthrax call, and finally, identified the point at which the FBI expected to be called. Then the manager said his state tried to set rules for police departments regarding unsolicited

mail. The plan was to simply tell callers to throw the mail away and not respond to the police call. Believing this was inappropriate, the department developed its own protocol with the assistance of its public health department, and picked up and kept unsolicited mail for ninety days before it was destroyed. The manager said: "we needed to provide some response to the community. You can't just say I'm not coming; what a horrible way to do business." The manager said the media stepped in, asking questions about the differences between departments where one department is following state guidelines and the other their own procedures.

It is easier for agencies to be consistent and difficult for the agency that does things differently and possibly faces a reprisal from government. The department shared their policy with other agencies as a guideline to work with and modify to meet others' local needs. Deviating from governmental policy still remained a problem for some departments. The same manager said: "Will these other agencies tweak [this departments' protocol]? Probably, but most of them will probably not want to deviate too much from what has been established as the norm because they see themselves as opening themselves for some vulnerability."

A few police agencies had clear strategies linking police to their communities. The difficulties associated with the connections were the time and energy it takes to build and maintain these continuously evolving relationships. The policies set at government levels did not always match the priorities set by police and their communities at the street level. Deviating from government guidelines was challenging because departments that changed or resisted policy or guidelines risked reprisals. For this reason police departments said they do not deviate too much.

Groups Known for Violence

When asked how their department addresses concerns about specific groups with a potential for violence within their communities, the most common answer was that they balanced civil rights with criminal acts. In other words, citizens have the right to demonstrate publicly providing they do so in a legal manner. One agency manager had had a few concerns with anti-abortion activists 10 to 12 years ago, but nothing from anti-abortionists, white supremacists, middle-east terrorists, environmentalists or animal rights groups. Another said they never interacted with any of these groups. The final department did not respond to the question "for security reasons."

Some departments responded to the above named groups in a reactive manner while other police agencies dealt with such groups in a preventative way. Reactive responses dealt with criminal acts occurring as a result of actions by any of the groups listed. Ten managers distinguished the rights of groups that are respected by law from crossing the line and breaking the law. When groups wish to lawfully demonstrate, police will stand by and keep the peace without interfering in their protest. However, if the individuals break any laws, the police will intervene.

Half of the agencies used intelligence sources to track some groups. Proactive measures included building on relationships with communities for information and intelligence gathering. For some, open intelligence on the internet, for instance, offered information on many of the groups. Others made contact with departments in different communities to ask for advice on how to handle a particular group. The groups specifically mentioned as having had interactions with police are People for the Ethical

Treatment of Animals or Animal Liberation Front, Ontario Coalition Against Poverty, white supremacists and pro life groups. The remaining respondents either spoke vaguely of groups, not referring specifically to any in particular, or refused to respond to the questions.

The final question of the interview explicitly asked respondents to prioritize the role of the police in their community, in particular, how they would list their duties from most to least important as noted in Table 5-1. The majority of respondents identified reactive responses to calls as very important. Eight said public safety and maintaining public order was of primary importance. The four largest departments' respondents identified preventing criminal activities while keeping abreast of terrorism activities as their primary concern. Two interviewees identified responding to calls and providing basic services. One person from a mid-sized department listed meeting the needs of the community by finding out what the community wants. This sentiment was echoed in three other responses as the second and third places in the order of importance among police activities. Although reactive style policing was still a primary concern for police departments, over half identified preventing criminal activity among one of their primary concerns.

Prevention of crime and prevention as a means of effectively solving crime was ranked by four departments in varying degrees of importance. Crime prevention, like community policing, is an ambiguous term.

Including protecting life and property first, two departments ranked patrol response in a timely manner as their second priority. Another department referred to treating people appropriately, mirroring their community in an ethical, moral and legal

manner. A second response by another agency listed quality of life as important after protection in terms of what is happening on the streets including gang and drug activity. Finally, anything that could be done to protect the environment of the community was a second priority of one department.

As a priority, terrorism fluctuated from number one to not being mentioned, but is noticeably not highly salient to the majority of police departments. The majority of police departments participating in this study still considered common police practices as their most important task. One of the largest agencies listed terrorism in the primary category; a second listed it third. A third ranked terrorism behind all other things. Terrorism is a "player issue", important but not something police concerned themselves with on a daily basis. For the sample as a whole, it ranked in the bottom half of the list of top ten concerns.

Groups known for their violence by the law enforcement field are dealt with both proactively and reactively by police in this study. The respondents repeatedly said groups have a right to demonstrate as long as they follow the laws. Half of the agencies use intelligence sources such as the World Wide Web or passing information from one police department to another to track these groups. Others contacted police departments for advice on dealing with a particular group. The final question of the study asked respondents to prioritize the duties of police to the community. The majority claimed that reacting to calls from the public was their primary concern. Over half identified preventative criminal activity as one of the primary concerns. Interestingly terrorism fluctuated between the most important to not being listed as a concern. The participants in this study consider common police practices as most important.

Conclusion

This chapter presents data from the interviews and document analysis. The pervasive response to the overarching research question of how Canadian and American police departments influence anti-terrorism policy is the assertion that formal policy does not exist. The participants did however identify policy instruments when referring to laws and guidelines from the federal governments. Policy instruments are the first theme of the chapter.

These laws and guidelines utilized by governments as policy instruments consisted of counter- and anti-terrorism practices. Formal authority for counter and anti-terrorism aimed at police departments remained at the federal level. There was no specific anti-terrorism policy directed toward police departments other than local interpretation of federal legislation and state/provincial directives. There is ambiguity in the expectations of police agencies; anti-terrorism functions were built upon existing police duties. These duties included reactive preparations, such as responding to emergencies, and proactive measures which include intelligence collection and dissemination of information.

Interagency connectedness was central to working toward both anti- and counter-terrorism tasks. Gathering and sharing intelligence from the street level is important to the federal government's anti-terrorism effort. Police departments participating in the study varied in their ability and desire to fulfill federal expectations. Those police agencies without closely integrated intelligence connections were not as aware as other departments who had made the commitment to connect to intelligence sharing. There

was, however, a contention by many departments that intelligence was not decoded and/or returned to local police agencies as many believed it should. It was suggested that as well as a reluctance to share, there was too much data to be deciphered. Although these same issues appear in both countries, Canadians believed their intelligence sharing capacity was superior to the Americans.

Normative standards and political agendas of departments influenced anti-terrorism policy through three avenues: education, personnel and funding. The education of officers is an ongoing issue that requires funding and access to current information. The level of education and training increased with the importance placed by the department on terrorism as a priority. All officers received training but the type of education and training was not consistent.

Prioritizing and Practice of Anti-Terrorism Policies varied from those who had been prepared before 9/11 to others who recently integrated their own anti- and counter-terrorism policies of their own volition. Smaller departments in the US were encouraged through incentives to come together and work collectively on regional anti-terrorism efforts. Reactive training, must be coordinated with other first responders in the same community and surrounding areas. Respondents report the difficulty in meeting this challenge because of a lack of personnel to cover regular duties. Some agencies are better prepared because they have greater capacity in terms of past preparedness for interactions with anti-terrorism activity, their geographic locations, and departmental size. Many either followed the lead of their state/province or did nothing, expecting to rely on larger agencies.

Anti-terrorism policies and police community relations were relevant to the connections police had with their communities. The importance of community policing to anti-terrorism policy varied between departments, depending upon the philosophy and previous involvement with the communities. Beliefs in the importance of this orientation corresponded to funding allotted to community policing; departments that placed a high value on community put the funding into place in those areas. Where some departments placed effort into building relationships with their community, others operated in a hierarchical way, with the community at the bottom. The practice of racial profiling was denied by all participants. A few chiefs said that while it was not condoned, they know it existed. Civilians who fit racial profiles might face racial abuse. Departments who had contact with groups known for their violence used intelligence sharing or ask for advice from other departments experienced with similar groups.

Departments varied in how they ranked the importance of anti-terrorism policy and preparedness, from those who believed it was an important concern to most respondents who saw it as just another policing task. The importance of the issue ranked low compared with other day to day policing duties.

Table 5-1

Listing Prioritized Duties by Departments

A	1. Protection of people 2. Protection of property 3. Keeping the peace 4. Prevention as a kind of umbrella; even though we are small prevention is one of our biggest roles. We have a number of active community programs and are working on a new one with our youth.
B	1. Community safety and maintaining order 2. The most important thing that we do is reflect what people want & that is a public police service. People are assigned a beat, and they know their businesses and their people. They are doing great things.
C	1. Public safety
D	1. Keeping the peace, "we want community to feel safe-that is the #1 priority that our community wants-health and safety, wellness in our community" 2. All the other things; terrorism become a player, but it is not an average thing for us.
E	Meet the needs of the community, find out what the community wants and desires. Problems are then addressed locally because we have very diverse communities
F	1. Public safety 2. Quality of life includes what is happening on the streets in terms of gang and drug activity 3. Our city has one of the highest risks of anti-terrorism attack so terrorism is one of our top priorities but not more than reducing the murder rate, narcotics & the general crime rate
G	1. Providing basic services to the community. When the public calls for an officer, they arrive quickly and when crime occurs appropriate attention is provided. Offering the basics of policing. 2. To be as effective as possible in solving crimes. Part of that top priority is being effective in preventing crime, everything else is secondary
H	1. Public safety 2. Prevention 3. Aggressive patrol 4. Criminal investigation and investigative techniques 5. Communication skills for our officers. You have to be sensitive to the experience.

I
1. Service in responding to calls
2. Patrol response and investigative response.
3. Prevention; our community is very urban with a broad economic range. Poverty is also an indicator in our area. It is no secret crime and poverty have a relationship, if we don't address that issue we are not going to deal with crime effectively.

J
1. Prevent criminal activities by keeping abreast of anti-terrorism activities
2. Respond to emergencies rapidly and protect life first, property second
3. Maintain efficient traffic flow, investigate traffic accidents
4. investigate criminal activities

K
1. Serve the people, get back to basics, enforce the laws and ordinances.
2. Keep the community safe
3. Enforce traffic laws.
4. Treat people with respect
5. Respond in a timely manner and at the core, treat people appropriately then you become a mirror of your community as long as it is ethical, moral and legal.

L
1) Safety as the most important priority
2) Anything we can do to protect the environment and those things; looting business or extreme damage
3) Maintain the normal realm of what the community expectations are.

CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSIS

Chapter Six is organized around the three strategies emerging from the conceptual framework. The first strategy assesses the policy instruments employed by government with respect to police involvement in fighting terrorism. The second considers the variance between the expectations of government and the reality at the local level and the consequences for implementation. The third looks at variations across settings based on local departmental priorities and their influences on the translation and implementation of policy. Practices differ between police agencies and countries with respect to community demographics, size and geographic location, personality of chiefs and manager, and departmental goals.

Despite the gravity of the situation and attention in the media, the evidence suggests policy makers did not devote much attention or high-quality deliberation towards anti-terrorism policy. This became apparent to me when I first discovered that, apart from minimal funding for equipment and related training, there was no significant coherent new policy. In a range of different ways, a lack of attention by federal law makers has resulted in uneven outcomes across police jurisdictions.

Policy Instruments

The findings from this study indicate the complexity and ambiguity around the existence, magnitude, nature and context of police anti-terrorism policy. One way to understand this situation is to examine implementation in relation to McDonnell and

Elmore's (1987) work on policy instruments, emphasizing the importance of the relationship between choice of policy type and local conditions for policy implementation.

McDonnell and Elmore (1987) identify four categories of policy, of which three are applicable to police terrorism policy: mandates or rules; inducements or rewards for compliance; and capacity building for future benefit. The choice of mandates, inducements or capacity as instruments by policy makers sheds light on why some departments in this study fared better than others with respect to fighting terrorism. The choice of instruments determines "which key constituents would lose or gain with different alternatives" (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p.135). For instance, where some instruments benefit larger agencies, smaller departments may not manage as effectively.

Mandates

McDonnell and Elmore (1987) assert that problems are defined and solutions become apparent when policy makers review the resources available and constraints facing change. Mandates demand exact compliance of outcomes, regardless of differences in capacity and are attempts to control behaviour to create uniformity. "Mandates assume an essentially coercive and adversarial relationship between enforcers and the objects of enforcement; they place the major responsibility for assuring compliance on the initiating government" (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p.141). Further, each branch of government put in a policy-making role will tend to select a different range of possible policy instruments.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon initiated immediate and forceful retaliation by President Bush as the executive branch of the American government whose responsibility is the protection of citizens. Mandates in the form of laws and regulations may be a response considered beneficial by government to the broader community (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Sadler, Lineberger, Correll, & Park, 2005). Anti-terrorism laws mandating police response would be accepted by police as arising from the legitimacy of government and therefore necessitating compliance. The shock and fear resulting from the assault legitimized the strong governmental role that McDonnell and Elmore (1987) claim is necessary for the acceptance of mandates. Specifically, the Patriot Act, while it was disputed as invasive to privacy and allotting excessive control over citizens by government, was nonetheless passed into law (Thomas, 2002).

Canadians, reeling from the shock of the attack on their neighbours, accepted similar legislation (Macnamara, 2002; Schneiderman & Crossman, 2001). Both the Canadian and American legislation consists of a broad definition of anti-terrorism activity allowing enforcement agencies expanded authority over its citizens (Dostal, 2002; Raul, & Tyler, 2001).

The choice of mandates is also related to cost, in the sense that, as McDonnell and Elmore (1987) claim, the instrument in its purest form requires no transfer of money. This may be why the mandate may be viewed by police departments as simply another law on the books because it created little in the way of capacity for change.

Not only do mandates bring no new money. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) also refer to compliance costs which are additional expenditures brought on by mandates that

must be borne by the agency. Anti-terrorism legislation authorizes increased police powers in Canada and in the US. In both countries there was an expansion of intelligence and surveillance powers, with the expectation that there will be compliance in sharing information on prospective anti-terrorism activities. However, not all departments had the human resources to commit an additional officer to the intelligence branch to work with Homeland Security. Canadians complained that funding for emergency and anti-terrorism activities was given to the provincial police rather than the municipal agencies, even though, as one respondent said, "90% of the people in this province are policed by municipal police services." Additional costs must therefore be incorporated into local departments' working budgets.

Mandates are attempts to control behaviour, and create uniformity, but compliance is infrequently realized (Elmore, 1977; McLaughlin, 1987). The Canadian chiefs interviewed said they already had a portion of their counter-terrorism measures in place through the mandated emergency contingency plan every department must have. One chief claimed it is constantly being updated, saying

> I have my provincial guidelines relative to emergency readiness and under the Police Act I have to be ready and held accountable for those things which is why we have our emergency plans and our emergency contacts and our emergency network.

Commonality and agreement of mandated policy varied between departments. Interpretations of expectations varied across departments. Uniformity of compliance is infrequently realized. As noted by a Canadian chief:

> You have to write policy based on the needs and how you're to react and that is what we did here. I think the problem is they come out and say this is the blanket policy on how you do this across the country because it is different, it has to be, and that is the nature of people.

With mandates, such as the American Patriot Act and the Canadian Terrorism Act, compliance is expected by policy makers; however, with inducements, incentives such as money are used to encourage a particular response. The mandated laws were passed by the American and Canadian governments with the expectation that compliance or changed behaviour would occur without the transfer of money.

In the simplest of forms, mandates require no additional funds transferred to police departments. Mandates that require additional expenses must be borne by the agency (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). The mandated laws for police in both countries expected compliance devoid of funds for that purpose.

Inducements

Policymakers who want to change behaviour beyond a basic response usually choose inducements. The specific inducements will be chosen from the policymaker's own value base and how they define a problem (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). The literature suggests the values policymakers hold are based on their beliefs about how societal systems work and how they ought to work (Clune, 1990; McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Policy makers for police involvement in counter- and anti-terrorism practices selected funding as the instrument to effect change in both the US and Canada. The US Congress appropriated $6.3 billion in 2001 specifically for first responders, with an increase in 2002 of more than 2000% (Cox, 2004). Canada allocated a total of $7.7 billion to be spent over a five year period on public security and anti-terrorism initiatives (Office of Auditor General, 2004).

In the US, few federal standards or goals accompanied the expenditure of the funds either at the state or local levels. Policy makers hurriedly awarded money to states with few standards and "without regard to need or risk (other than population)" (Cox, 2004, p. 5). Because of these measures:

> The system has provided small counties across the country with relatively large awards of terrorism preparedness money, while major cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Washington, and Chicago struggle to address their needs in a near-constant heightened alert environment. (Cox, 2004, p.4)

The American Office of Domestic Preparedness set conditions for the expenditure of grants, including the approval of state or local spending plans. Federal policy makers choosing money as an inducement is consistent as a generic tool (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). The federal government may not have taken the time to study guidelines previously prepared by those states who had formerly dealt with anti-government terrorist groups. When policy makers do not have information or knowledge available, they are not aware of "the full range of instruments available to them" (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 135).

A second alternative may be the policy makers' inability to recognize what standards or goals were required. One Canadian chief said, "Where is the money for the municipalities? The government didn't even come and talk to us." An American manager said, "It is a Homeland Security idea and there is grant money attached...the desire is huge, the funding is minimal and I think it brings us to a very weak response of what the goal is." Government response to terrorism was rapid, and inducements such as grants and other forms of funding are used when the policy must pass quickly through government (Cox, 2004).

The appropriation of funds in both countries was done quickly, based on policymakers' values rather than assessment of need, risk or the wants and needs of police departments. In the US a review prepared by the staff of the House Select committee on Homeland Security found "no Federal terrorism preparedness standards or goals to guide expenditure of funds at the state and local levels, leading to numerous examples of questionable spending" (Cox, 2004, p. 2).

The Canadian government defined responsibility, directing both spending and reporting on spending activities. Even so, Auditor General Sheila Fraser commented on the lack of centralized supervision in a report on National Security: "We found that the government did not have a management framework that would guide investment, management, and development decisions and allow it to direct complementary actions in separate agencies or to make choices between conflicting priorities" (Office of Auditor General, March, 2004).

One of the key problems with inducements, as with mandates, is the assumption that local agencies possess the capacity to implement policy. The literature tells us inducements are more effective when capacities exist to implement the policy, particularly when local priorities are consistent with values embedded in policy (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). This transfer of funding must be for something of value. Police are receptive to material contributions, particularly when supplementary funds are available.

How policymakers defined the problem and solutions differed between countries based on assumptions about capacities and funding available. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) describe inducements as things of value that may not be expected to continue

without the input of funding. Canada's anti-terrorism measures, for instance, already included a communication network linking federal, provincial and municipal police. Intelligence gathering by police was already a valued commodity prior to 9/11, requiring minimal policy changes. One Canadian chief stated:

> It boils down to money. It costs a lot of money to run an intelligence system. I know in Ontario the Criminal Intelligence Services do collect information and do disseminate it. There is nothing really written and the government has never really come out and said they are responsible for this on terrorism. I think the fact that the organization existed, well before September 11, just facilitated that process of focusing on terrorism.

Some funding was invested in provincial anti-terrorism intelligence areas to add more officers to work in the CISO. Here, duties of officers are described by one manager as "proactive intelligence gathering on terrorism or extremism and ordinary occurrences." The additional officers placed in the intelligence division process and investigate information provided by intelligence officers in departments across the province as well as intelligence they gather themselves. The information investigated may appear to be an ordinary occurrence except when brought together with other occurrences that could indicate terrorism or extremism.

In America, federal funding was transferred to the states through the Office of Domestic Preparedness, which then passed the money on to municipal departments. Some states, therefore, perceived the purchasing guidelines as a wish list, confessing that some of the equipment listed was not recognized by state officials who later realized they were receiving things they would never use (Cox, 2004). One American manager voiced his dismay at receiving equipment that was of little use when the equipment the department really needed was not on the list provided. Another chief complained that he received chem-bio suits and some training and that was all. Another American chief said

the funding normally provided for Community Oriented Policing Grants had gone by the wayside and believed this sort of funding for terrorism would continue for several years.

The most common criticism about the funding was the inability of police to use it to hire personnel for anti-terrorism related tasks. In the US the value of the funding to police departments varied from those pleased to receive an abundance of equipment to others disturbed at the lack of choice in purchasing what the department itself believed it required, and a few who could not think of anything else to ask for. Finally, large agencies received less funding because they already met the federal guidelines and therefore did not qualify for additional funds. Such variance in the value of inducements corresponds with McDonnell and Elmore's view that: "large variations in capacity or preferences and priorities will produce similar variations in the results produced by inducements"(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, pp.142-3).

Inducements are expected to elicit an outcome of value. However, there is variance between agencies in their ability to produce things of value (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). In Canada, funding for counter and anti-terrorism functions was given to provincial departments, such as the OPP, rather than to municipal agencies. A few municipal chiefs complained that they received some equipment and a couple of training sessions, but no budget money for anti-terrorism. The policymakers may have believed there was variance between agencies accepting the OPP as the lead agency, perhaps because the OPP was the provincial service. This standpoint was not accepted by all municipal agencies with one chief commenting

> I think there was a lack of understanding...the bottom line is the municipalities I don't think got what was deserving of them. (city) spent tons of money dealing with these issues of anthrax and hate propaganda calls and all this stuff as did other municipalities.

In the US, policy makers understood variance to mean a discrepancy in preparedness between large and small police departments, causing them to pay less attention to the needs of previously prepared and experienced departments. Policymakers bypassed those agencies to bring smaller departments up to standard (Cox, 2004). The assumption on the part of policy makers was that standards would be met bringing police departments up to anti and counter terrorism standards merely through inducements.

Policymakers chose inducements to change behaviours beyond a basic response. The inducements tend to be based on policy makers' belief of how societal systems work (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987).

In the US, money accompanied standards and goals in a general fashion, suggesting the federal government did not take time to study alternatives. Governments' rapid response, according to McDonnell and Elmore, suggests policy moved quickly through government. The Canadian government received criticism from the Auditor General for lacking a management framework to guide investment and management of federal funding.

Problems associated with inducements are assuming agencies implementing policy possess the capacity and hold values consistent with the policy. In Canada a communication network already in place was consistent with the values of the policy. Funding increased for provincial intelligence to assist at the provincial and federal levels.

Funding in the US for specified equipment and limited training did not always mesh with the values of the department. Another respondent criticized the transfer of funding from Community Oriented Policing to anti-terrorism initiatives. Failing to permit hiring new personnel was the most common criticism of funding.

Capacity Building

Capacity building requires the transfer of funds or other resources from one government group to another. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) describe capacity building as an investment in material, intellectual or human resources. They view capacity building as requiring distinctive actions around the treatment of implementation. There are expectations that problems will arise through implementation, and follow through by policymakers and ongoing intervention in implementation is needed for success (McLaughlin, 1987). For example, the transfer of funds to the states and then to the municipal police departments allowed police to obtain equipment and training to use the equipment. Some states required small municipalities to group regionally, submitting a bid to the state as a single entity, to utilize all emergency response personnel in a mutual partnership.

Group training with the new equipment was meant to foster relationships toward a collective effort that could be called upon in the event of a catastrophe. In theory this should work to build long term capacity; however, in practice departments soon returned to their previous independence. One respondent said:

> The feds always told the state "we encourage you to disperse your money in those areas where there is regional cooperation." We said "well if we are going to get a piece of this pie, a bigger piece of this pie than another agency over here, then we need to work together." Interestingly enough, now that these agencies have the equipment, the tangible things, they are not as willing to work together as they were when the planning was going on.

Capacity building is difficult because the results are intangible. Change that takes time to produce results is very challenging for people (McLaughlin, 1987). Obtaining equipment is concrete and measurable, but only valuable in the short term. McDonnell

and Elmore (1987) explain that capacity building and long term benefits and value received by future recipients is a concept difficult to guarantee in the present.

The enforcement of federal program mandates to employ capacity building is complicated because of their organizational structure and there is often a lack of appropriate personnel. Investing in knowledge or education may be challenging because terrorism is a demand on police with a set of problems with a few solutions. Spending large amounts of money on equipment to demonstrate action by government in the aftermath of the 9/11 crisis worked as an inducement but could not build capacity. One manager stated:

> This state is trying to do things on a grand scale which I think will fail. Many things in the state of [identifying reference] have failed, more from the perspective of trying to do this huge thing clear across the entire state rather than building on little things that they want to do.

Research has noted that mandates and inducements fail because of a lack of knowledge, skill and competence not from a lack of willingness to comply (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). There may be little or no ongoing management to enhance future capacity.

Policy makers often fail to differentiate between immediate results with long term capacity. "The only way to assure a short-term response, in other words, is to call upon existing capacity... yet the choice of agency is often not treated by policymakers as a distinguishable problem" (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987 p. 138). Different police agencies hold various levels of variability in both nations. In other words, there is inconsistency and unevenness affecting their ability to build capacity in this regard. Agencies who actively participated in joint intelligence sharing or had experience with other forms of terrorism prior to 9/11 tend to appreciate long term gain over immediate value; they have a history of capacity building, in other words, departments that believed their

jurisdictions may be potential targets illustrate their belief in capacity building. One respondent said:

> I think that September 11, 2001 created a fundamental change in American law enforcement. It added to our responsibilities, we were responsible for investigating and prevention...now we also recognize that we have a role in homeland defense issues. It is inconceivable that 19 people could organize the biggest attack ever in the history of the world and no one knows about it. There had to be talk about it, the information had to be out there, it was not properly disseminated and therefore the prevention measures weren't in place to prevent it.

Departments lacking experience in previous anti-terrorism investigations and whose geographical location led them to believe they were not a target, did not accept the need for capacity building. All chiefs and managers said their primary concern was protecting their community, dealing with regular police issues. Many did not believe Al Qaeda terrorism was a threat or that it would take place in their communities. One chief from a mid sized department said:

> The bigger cities have obviously bigger issues, there were certain cells in Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto, you would probably have a little different interview with people from those major cities relative to terrorism than you would from smaller communities like this.

As McDonnell and Elmore (1987) note, capacity-building instruments are valued only by those participants directly involved. The ability to recognize and discern the long term value by so few obstructs strong political alliance of an entire nation of police departments.

Capacity building, according to McDonnell and Elmore (1987), is an investment in material, intellectual or human resources. It is expected that problems will arise and that implementation requires ongoing intervention (McLaughlin, 1987). McDonnell and Elmore (1987) recognize that change is difficult, takes time and its long term value is difficult to assure. This is particularly true for police faced with terrorism problems that

offer few solutions. The police wish to comply but there is a lack of management to develop ongoing capacity.

Policy makers' call upon existing capacity when implementing policy. There is often a failure to recognize long term results by treating agencies as discernible problems. As well, capacity building instruments are valued by those directly involved (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). This is the case with the respondents in the study who had experience with terrorism prior to 9/11. Those who did not encounter terrorism lacked capacity and could not see the long term value. Departments believing they were not a target for terrorism did not accept the need for capacity building.

Disconnectedness Between Expectations and Reality

Bureaucratic response is typical of large systems. School reform has traditionally come from the top down and of bureaucratic control where decision making has been characterized through the "inertia of historical tradition and ingrained interest rather than the virtue of collective moral choice" (Hargreaves, 1994, p. 260). When policy decisions are made at a great distance from implementation, the results are unavoidably skewed (Darling-Hammond, 1997; McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991).

Anti-terrorism policy designed by federal and provincial/state decision makers for local police is based on the belief that the realities of large agencies are the norm, because larger agencies yield more influence on government planning than smaller departments (Kernaghan & Siegel, 1999). One large American agency explained that the federal government was interested in their expertise, activities and preparations based on their

previous involvement with terrorist groups. A second large agency said they were preparing a police anti-terrorism educational/training package for examination and possible use by the federal government. Further, the managers of larger agencies spoke of making friends with federal agencies and other departments. Such input supports the larger departments' goals and values, affecting the final course of action chosen by governments.

In Canada, the provincial police departments were awarded the majority of funding for terrorism duties. The American government distributed funding to states, but because policy was unclear and the education/training and equipment was not clearly identified, the result was problematic.

The influence on policy shaping by government, motivated by large departments and other interest groups may not reflect what is important or authentic to smaller agencies. To understand the reality for police managers operating at the street level, one must acknowledge the coercion placed on them from a collection of involved parties. Government influenced by large departments and other public and private agencies pressure smaller departments into implementing policy valuable to those groups applying the pressure. The smaller agency, therefore, is expected to mould itself to criteria relevant to a series of inappropriate standards.

This flow of events, described by Nespor as: "focusing on networks and the layered connections that knot them together rather than on simpler linear histories of circumscribed events or settings" (cited in Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000, p. 16) proposes a more succinct view. Scrutiny of this flow offers a disjointed picture of expectations that are not suited to the context of smaller departments. These discrepancies are not

exclusive as variation between countries prompts similar re-assessment. More important differences between large and smaller departments are discussed later in this chapter.

There are too many factors influencing policy to expect conformity across all departments (Bascia & Hargraves, 2000). For example, one respondent said he was speaking to the community addressing Homeland Security procedures when he realized the government had completely missed the boat. The police were talking about policing, protection and terrorism and one women got up, deathly afraid and wanted to know how she would get her kids from school to reunite the family. This respondent thought that police have to change their thought process and go back to what is important to their community: "the basic building blocks of life". In this case, he said his chief and the other managers felt obligated to address local community needs as well as complying with federal mandates.

A difference exists between governmental criterion and what a department chief at the street level might consider standard. "...context involves not simply a different factual foundation but often a difference of normative perspective as well. Part of the challenge and subtlety of policy analysis is the often implicit choice of normative perspectives" (Clune, 1990, p. 260). Situations at governmental levels affect design of policy that may differ between what is reality and normal at the departmental level and, therefore, realities may not coincide. There is obviously missing communication in the relationship between government and departments at the street level. Clune (1990) points to the instability of policy and the need for continuous modifications as a view that "policy is an endless, recursive dialogue, rather than a series of self-sealing implemented commands" (pp. 258-9).

Policy making decisions are made at a distance from implementation, resulting in skewed outcomes (Darling-Hammond, 1997; McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991). Federal, state and provincial decisions are based on the beliefs and norms of large agencies and other pressure groups (Kernaghan & Siegel; 1999) and this does not reflect what is valid to smaller departments. Governments pressure smaller agencies to accept inappropriate standards that are relevant to larger agencies. There are too many differences between agencies to expect conformity (Bascia & Hargraves, 2000). Policy development at the government level does not reflect the reality experienced at the departmental level. (Clune, 1990).

Variations Across Settings

As policy is developed and implemented, a wide range of possible outcomes occur. Various stimuli motivate departments in different ways that may affect alterations to the initial policy. These numerous influences vary between departments and countries, ultimately making it impossible to predict the outcome and uniformity of policy (Bascia & Hargraves, 2000).

Although similar mandates and incentives originated from the American and Canadian federal governments, the realization of policy outcomes varied. The capacity-building of anti-terrorism policy in police agencies differed across and even within countries, depending upon the local department's size, geographic location, economic circumstances and relationships with other police agencies. Policy implementation by

police was shaped by managers who have influenced by their department's goals, beliefs and values.

Policy theory says that decisions by policy makers shape policies according to their own goals and values (McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991). What may be important at the design level may not be important at the department level. Werner argues that there are discrepancies because those making policy do not always share the same values as those expected to implement the policy. Every one is different and where departments are located affects their viewpoint. When values and policy goals conflict, the possibility arises that policy goals may not be achieved. This is not always a bad thing: "What appears as sabotage from a policy perspective may look quite constructive and adaptive at the ground level" (Clune, 1990, p. 258). The department responds according to: "their own complex, shifting and contradictory agendas" (Clune, 1990, p. 258). When putting policy into practice, police managers at the state/provincial and departmental levels exercise discretion by responding to the priorities at their level that change policy during implementation.

Influences across police departments and between countries result in varied outcomes to the original policy (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000). Size, geographical location, economic circumstances and relationships with other departments result in differences in capacity that influence the implementation of policy. Policy is influenced by managers' and departments' goals, beliefs and values. Those making the policy may not have the same values as those expected to implement policy at the street level. Deviation of policy at the street level may appear as sabotage but in reality may represent novel revisions to the original policy (Clune, 1990; McLaughlin, 1987).

Past Experience

American police departments realized the importance of, and increased their involvement in, anti and counter-anti-terrorism initiatives based on 9/11. Awareness developed in relation to the realization of American vulnerability to attacks on US soil. Although there had been violent assaults in America from a range of anti-terrorism groups preceding 9/11, the attack was the first of this magnitude and changed the national perception by Americans of beliefs about personal safety. Canadians also acknowledged the increased threat of terrorism, recognizing their own vulnerability. Police in both countries intensified their stance on counter- and anti-terrorism measures. However, not all outcomes were the same for Canadian and American police departments. Also, for some police agencies, with the passing of time, the resolve to remain attentive to anti-terrorism concerns lessened.

The 9/11 attack shook American perceptions of personal safety and security. The police responded, strengthening their position on counter- and anti-terrorism. Police stance differed from one department to another and the sense of the magnitude of the threat subsided to varying degrees between departments.

Size and Geographic Location

Departments who remained vigilant to the possibility of terrorism attacks shared similar characteristics. The primary incentive to remain focused developed through experiences with previous anti-terrorism activity. Departments that had earlier dealings

with anti-abortionists, white supremacists, middle-east terrorists, environmentalists and/or animal rights groups were inclined to view terrorism more seriously.

The large agencies responsible for significant populations and smaller departments within close proximity to these same large agencies were more conscientious. One chief said:

> Now, we have been constantly at an elevated level of action ever since September 11th and some of the things we took upon ourselves to do. We created a list of what we think are potential targets in [city]. We don't consider ourselves a primary target, not like, say [city] would be, but none-the-less, we have areas that are densely populated, we have a very popular downtown, our schools, hospitals, government structures, and things like that in our community.

Another aspect affecting American attentiveness to the possibility of terrorism was expressed by the departments situated in close proximity to a national border. On the other hand, other large agencies who did not view their geographic position as a prime target were cognizant of the fact that terrorists piloting the jets on 9/11 traveled from other areas of the country to execute their strikes. In other words, terrorist cells may exist anywhere in America, not just targeted centres. One manager said:

> But I think what we always have to recognize...even though we may not be a target for terrorists; they want to go to places where they are going to be safe and blend in and hide. I would just use 9/11 as an example. New York City was attacked, Washington DC was attacked, and I don't think any of those terrorists lived in either of those cities. They flew planes into those areas and lived in different locations.

Similarities in beliefs and values existed across the two countries in terms of the size of the agency and geographic location. The physical structures housing the largest agencies were different than mid and small sized departments. Security of the buildings where the managers' offices were located was more substantial. For instance in two

different departments there was a series of locked doors to access the interior of the building where the offices were situated.

Respect and authority given to these upper level managers by subordinates set the tone for the most formal of interviews conducted in this study. The offices of these individuals were larger and contained impressive accolades and personal memorabilia with pictures and signatures of high ranking political, sports and entertainment figures. These interviews were the most controlled in terms of time allotted, interruptions during the interview, and restrained responses. The managers of these large agencies commented that they expected smaller and mid-sized departments to work with them and follow their lead.

The larger police departments in both countries were already better prepared for terrorism than smaller ones because they had dealt with various forms of terrorism in the past. Because of these past experiences, they expected to be targeted again. There are certain expectations of larger agencies of mid and smaller departments that smaller agencies would merely act as resources. The larger agencies expect the smaller agencies to be prepared when they are needed. Bascia and Hargreaves (2000) describe this approach as a technical approach, where mandated details and procedures assume those implementing are technicians who will clearly understand and follow expectations. For example, one manager said:

> You see if they are in a small city or they are even in an area that is even more remote in the county and they may not be in a higher threat area. The way we look at it is, if there is a (disaster) centered in the east end of the county and our station up in [identifying reference] say hey, it doesn't bother us, it hasn't happened up here then we say, hang on, you may not be a problem but you are a resource. So, you need to be able to respond when we need you to and to have what ever equipment we need you to have so any police department, if they are not a problem, they can still be a resource.

There was no consideration given to the prospect of a break down in counter terrorism preparations in the follow through of smaller agencies:

> If something happens in one of our communities in terms of terrorism we know that for the first 48 to 72 hours it is going to be the local responders that are going to deal with that. Nobody else is going to be able to come in other than probably people within our own state for that first 24 to 72 hours or 48 to 72 hours. We are going to deal with it locally.

All departments expressed a willingness to assist other departments or communities as required and some specifically mentioned the importance of having contacts and friends that may be relied upon when needed. Some chiefs spoke of sharing equipment and sending officers across jurisdictions to assist departments who required their help. Managers from the larger agencies expressed the importance of linking between agencies. One manager referring to intelligence gathering said:

> I think a lot of that stuff has to go to relationships and you don't build relationships in the middle of a crisis situation and I'm a firm believer at least in my agency, personal relationships build professional relationships. I work very hard at establishing personal relationships with the heads' of all federal agencies here because number one you have a personal relationship and you look at them as more than just a colleague, you are much more tolerant of each other, of the mistakes that each of you may make. You're much more willing to maybe go that extra step to find that compromise that works for both of you to assist to do what ever it may be. I just think a crisis situation is not the time to build a relationship so I try to build them ahead of time and I have always found the stronger the personal relationship, the more cooperative and professional relationship that you have.

The linking and friendships between agencies and across states/provinces and countries are at different levels of significance. Large agencies influencing more control are more likely to link with similar agencies whereas smaller departments and those in secluded locations connect according to their importance and/or convenience. In terms of sharing resources, the idea of grouping departments is valid. Discrepancies arise,

however, when the goals of larger agencies are conveyed to smaller departments who do not share the same realities, beliefs or values (McLaughlin, 1987; Werner, 1991). For example, one respondent said:

> For me to go to senior management and say 'we want you to come in but take a secondary role to us' and that is not going to happen, they would view that as an insult. Whereas if (town) police called me and said would you come and help us with this and oh, by the way you are taking a secondary role I would say, 'Ok, that's fine, tell me what I need to do to help you.' You know, people are trying to make a name for themselves or they have so engrained into them that their institution is the best that they should be the leader in law enforcement, they can't get outside of the box. It does not matter what patch you are wearing on your shoulder, we are all doing the same job here.

Mid and smaller sized departments appear to operate under some of the same pressures as larger agencies, but their size changes the perspective of these difficulties. Some departments may not overcome these challenges, resulting in a lack of capacity. Human resources, for example, are a concern for many agencies of all sizes; however, the lack of qualified personnel has more of an impact on smaller departments' beliefs. A chief of a mid-sized department said:

> Once we identify we have somebody who is specially trained, I mean a PAPR suit is not necessarily going to protect you. Take away if you are not experienced in using the equipment, if you haven't trained a lot on the equipment and so forth, it seems foolish to me to take an untrained, non-specialist and send her/him into a hazardous environment, it makes no sense.

The smaller agencies receive equipment and train in its use but not always to the degree where they feel their officers are confident. When a chief responds to mandates, he alters the results to meet his and/or the department's own contradictory agenda (Clune, 1990). The likelihood of this chief sending his people into a situation where they require the use of the PAPR suits[1] is negligible. Technically, the equipment has been delivered and

[1] Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) protective chemical and biological suits.

training provided so from a distance, from the perspective of the government or nearby large agency, the department is prepared.

Another manager of a mid-sized agency spoke of the need for police, fire and other first responders to participate in exercises to see how those relationships worked face to face, experiencing both the strengths and weaknesses. The problem encountered by this manager is the inability to participate due to the funding cuts experienced in his state:

> The whole problem is that it is a funding issue because if you have the staff you pull people off of patrol and send those people to classes or to those experiences. The problem is when you start trying to put 8 or 10 people out; start taking 40 percent of a commander's capabilities to attend an event and he/she has to work with vacations and everything else trying to staff an operation with 15 per cent of her/his resources. You can't do it, so again; cities or government agencies have continued to cut positions to the point where you are really only able to do your day to day response stuff.

Some of the mid and small sized American agencies complained about the lack of intelligence information sharing. Some participants stated that it is possible to hear the same information on CNN as was offered as classified by Homeland Security. One chief of a mid sized agency complained that information was vague, saying he could understand the need for secrecy but feels there is still information that could be provided on how to prepare themselves on what they should be looking at rather than just teletypes. He said:

> It is interesting you hear whenever the threat level was being adjusted; they would say we are raising the alert because of increased chatter in terrorist circles. Well, I could say the same thing we are getting teletypes two or three times a day so we know something's going to go up when I might go two or three days without one otherwise. They give me a three page teletype on how to identify suicide bombers and tell me we don't have any specific threat information. How useful is that?

Countering opinions were offered from large departments and those geographically disposed to possible terrorism attacks. Agencies of this type questioned the effort expended by this mid sized department to stay in the loop. One manager said: "Do they have an intelligence officer? Is that intelligence officer truly dedicated to intelligence or is that just a collateral duty they are picking up when they can?" The problem, as it was explained by the respondent, is that it is necessary for the intelligence officer to receive clearance as well as a few select supervisors, otherwise the information cannot be transferred from the intelligence officer to administration.

The problem, another manager explained, is that everyone has rules to follow and gaining clearance is one of the rules. This manager said "I've listened to police chiefs say, 'well why do I have to fill out paperwork in order to get that top secret clearance, I'm the police chief here. Don't they trust me?" These examples of how some departments' responses to terrorism suggest a real hierarchy.

Departments who are not in the intelligence loop may not see the benefit of making the effort because they do not believe the intelligence is handled properly. One chief explained how one of his supervisors took information from someone who overheard a Middle Eastern man inferring that he was a terrorist. The supervisor called the FBI and they took the message. Apparently, a week and a half later, the chief followed up on the incident and nothing had been done with the information. The chief's response was "It doesn't give you a lot of confidence in the ability of our government to respond to these things. They tell us to call and when we do you blow us off, so what is the big deal?"

The representative of the largest of the American agencies assured me there is sharing of information across departments and the rest of the country. As well, one large agency boasted it was one of the few chosen for an award and was waiting to see who will be given the top award. This agency's intelligence sharing model is highly regarded.

Regardless of what country claims to have the best intelligence sharing model, it is irrelevant when departments claim they do not receive intelligence they consider valid and useful. The concern is also related to friendships between administrators and not just access to information.

The most vigilant police departments were ones familiar with terrorist activity. Those departments in close proximity to a national border were also vigilant. Large agencies in areas not considered a major target mentioned terrorist cells and referred to jets piloted on 9/11 as a means of striking any area in the country.

Beliefs and values are similar for large agencies and those geographical positions on both sides of the border. The managers of the largest departments displayed signs of importance, power and respect within their agencies. These departments were better prepared than smaller departments. The largest departments held expectations that mid and smaller sized agencies would act as resources. Assuming those implementing policy will clearly understand and follow through as expected is described by Bascia and Hargreaves (2000) as the technical approach. With this approach there is no consideration for a breakdown in assigned expectations.

All departments expressed a willingness to help one another with equipment, resources and expertise. There was an emphasis placed on friendships between agencies. These alliances tend to develop with agencies of similar size, importance and

convenience. Smaller departments did not all express the same level of confidence in training and preparedness. The smaller departments also criticized the lack of information sharing and did not feel part of the loop. These same agencies did not see the benefit of intelligence in the same way as the managers who experienced terrorism. Those agencies in the loop insist intelligence sharing requires security clearance and agreement that information is on a need to know basis.

National Identity

There were some differences between Canadian and American participants' attitudes toward terrorism. The most prominent difference was nationalistic statements made by three of the four Canadian respondents. For instance, when I commented to one participant that getting Canadian police agencies to participate was difficult because of the subject matter and that everything was such a secret in the province, a chief chided me by saying: "We will tell you but we will have to put you in isolation for a number of years. Guantanamo Bay, maybe!"

The Canadian police viewed themselves as further ahead of Americans in their ability to share information due to their technological connectedness. The American system was considered lacking when it came to sharing between agencies:

> I think we've done an awful lot of work...there is room for improvement in how we exchange information but we didn't have the problems that the Americans had in terms of a lack of information going between the FBI and municipal and state and other federal agencies. We already had this set up for 40 years.

Canadian police chiefs and managers perceived their department's ability to share information was more participatory than the Americans. Further, they frequently noted

the peaceful nature of Canada and their belief that Canada is an unlikely target compared to the US. Canadians have not been attacked by Al Qaeda anti-terrorisms and their sense of security reflects this fact:

> We have been very blessed in fact compared to any other country in the world; but it [terrorist act] could very well occur...I don't think the Canadian public is not being informed. Living next to our American cousins who are putting out alerts in every state and on a national level in a variety of ways they feel much more threatened and they may very well be mobilized in a more complex world more than we are. But, at the same time here in Canada, that is not the same kind of reality. We see bad things in the media, we see the odd things coming out from statements from federal politicians but level heights haven't changed in Canada and it is considered lower.

Canadian respondents defined their country's essence as more peaceful and better prepared in terms of intelligence sharing capabilities than the US. The comments by Canadian managers made an attempt at distancing themselves from Americans and in doing so expressed a belief that their safety from Al Qaeda terrorism was at a different intensity than that of the Americans. Although they believed terrorism is important, they did not believe they are at the same threat level as in the US.

Media reports on terrorist attacks in Great Britain and the subsequent dialogue that ensues changes perceptions. Following the shock and fear that such an attack initiates, it is not surprising to read the findings of a poll "Most (63%) Canadians Agree It's Only A Matter Of Time Before Canada Is Attacked By Terrorists' (Ipsos-Reid, 2005). Sandra Cordone (2005) reported Public Safety Minister, Anne McLellan, as saying Canadians must be prepared psychologically for an attack since there could be an attack in Canada.

A more ominous opinion has been voiced by Senator Colin Kenny, the chairperson of the Canadian Senate committee on national security and defense:

"Canadians are so ill-prepared to deal with home-grown terrorism that they risk becoming the next victims" (Kenny, 2003). Kenny also said government funding and public support to pursue domestic extremists is lacking in Canada because of little information given by the intelligence communities warning of anti-terrorism threats. A Canadian senator's job is to examine, in depth and report on, issues to Parliament. The dire warning by Senator Kenny strengthens the assertion that there is no police anti-terrorism policy from the federal level.

Although the interviews indicate that both reactive and proactive measures have been taken by Canadian police, less emphasis was placed on the risk of a anti-terrorism attack. Anti-terrorism preparations are viewed with less urgency by Canadians than Americans:

> They're not thinking about terrorism here. You know the borders are a whole different structure; they're looking for people moving across the country or borders and of a suspicious nature. They have a whole different mindset in what they're doing but I think our officers maybe have it in the back of their heads that there is always something there but I don't have those kinds of threat assessment issues in this community.

Canadians near the border consider the periodic raising of the anti-terrorism alert level by Americans as more of an annoyance to commerce and the general flow of traffic than a forewarning. One police chief said "Every time the United States moves to a higher alert I get backlogs, so when it comes to terrorism, the biggest impact is on our quality of life in terms of moving vehicles."

One Canadian border chief expressed frustration over responsibility issues with an international waterway. There was not a clear distinction of responsibility between Canada and the US as well as between federal/provincial and municipal police. He said "I think we need to have a full understanding of who is responsible for what and for

terrorism especially on international borders. Hopefully that is something they will work on in the next little while." The St. Lawrence Seaway, which runs on the border between the US states and Canadian provinces, is a federal responsibility, but the chief was concerned over the lack of visible federal watercraft patrolling the waterway. The chief was specifically concerned with the waterway system and who would respond and take action or accountability for inaction, should the need arise.

Canadian police see themselves as quite different from the Americans who they believe live within a more violent culture. They noted, for example, that Canadian media have less violence and deliver news with more of a critical political slant than American news. Laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons in Canada are beneficial in the eyes of many police in Canada. I have discussed officer safety in Canada compared to the US with many officers over the years. Canadian police believe that Canada is a safer place to work as one manager said:

> Our Canadian news is a whole lot different than American news. We talk about our government a lot. I think it is a different mindset...it is different for most Canadians around terrorism and weapons. We don't walk down the street and think, for the most part, that all the people we are going to walk into are going to have weapons. Generally here there are a few bad people and police but over there, there are a lot of good people who carry weapons and concealed weapons and it is just a whole different mindset on how people live; it is different.

National identity influences Canadian and American participants' attitudes toward terrorism. Canadian participants believe their technological connectedness is superior to the Americans. Canadians also define themselves as more peaceful and believe terrorism is less of a threat in Canada than in the US. In contrast to this opinion, a Canadian senator, whose job is to examine and report on issues to Parliament, describes Canadians

as ill prepared to deal with terrorism (Kenny, 2003). Terrorism preparations are in place, but the participants view them with less urgency.

Canadians on the border regard the Americans' use of terrorist alert levels as bothersome to traffic flow and harmful to the economy. Questions of responsibility on the waterways between the countries are an issue one respondent deemed lacking in clarity. He was concerned over the lack of visible patrolling of the waterways.

Canadian police see themselves as different from the Americans who they perceive as living in a more violent culture. Canadian police believe the weapon laws make Canada a safer place to work as officers.

Conclusion

The absence of specific policy left many police departments with unequal or inadequate guidance. The analysis of the data provides an interpretation of police terrorism policy by showing how departments understood the policy and guidelines. The analysis examined policy instruments employed by government for implementation of terrorism policy at the departmental level. The second analysis looked at the difference between the expectations from government and the reality at the street level. The third analysis considered variations across setting based on departments' priorities and influences. This theme expands to the inconsistencies between police departments based on demographics, size and geographical location. The values and beliefs of chiefs and managers including departmental goals were integrated in the interpretation of terrorism policy.

The first strategy of the conceptual framework refers to the policy instruments given to police to respond to anti-terrorism legislation. Policy instruments presented by governments offered differential benefits to departments. The authority of mandates was accepted by police departments. Mandates do not require the transfer of funds (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Mandates attempt to control behaviour and create uniformity but this seldom occurs (Elmore, 1977; McLaughlin, 1987).

Inducements offered by policymakers are chosen to change behaviours (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). The inducements offered by policy makers were put into place rather quickly with limited knowledge of the needs of departments. While equipment was offered, in some instances, it was either unnecessary or of little use. Compliance was disproportionate due to the inconsistency of inducements. While some agencies enjoyed varied benefits, others received few or none at all.

Capacity building described by McDonnell and Elmore (1987) as an intellectual or material investment requires transfer of resources from governments to agencies. Capacity was usually initiated by regionally grouping police departments as a means of obtaining equipment and training. After the equipment was issued, police departments returned to their previous practices, undermining the intent of continued collaboration. Evaluating the results of capacity building is difficult because benefits and value of future recipients is difficult to measure (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Expectations by government did not consider the variance at the local level where each department has its own sets of problems. Departments not included in intelligence gathering and sharing did not feel threatened or see the benefit of committing funds to such a policy.

Police forces were influenced by community demographics, size, and geographical location, personalities of their chiefs and departmental goals. For some departments, terrorism was not a serious concern. Responding to counter- and anti-terrorism did not fit with their primary values and beliefs for their department or their community. There are few solutions to terrorism and police at the local level were not considered as a viable source for input and innovation.

Government failed to distinguish between police departments, instead viewing them as a whole, rather than as separate units dealing with their own concerns. The findings that emerge from this study describe unpredictable or inadequate outcomes based on government policy interpreted and implemented differently across departments.

CHAPTER SEVEN

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Following the terrorist attack at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the governments of the US and Canada quickly responded with legislation to improve national security. The Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act in the US and the Anti-terrorism Act and Public Safety Act in Canada strengthened controls. This hastily prepared legislation, based on little research, left many unanswered questions regarding the expectations for police administrators and the obligations of police officers. For Canadian and American police to respond to this new legislation, clear policies supported by well thought out implementation strategies are essential. This study, a response to concerns about this legislation, considered how Canadian and US police departments implement anti and counter-terrorism strategies to respond to new anti-terrorism laws and policy.

As an educator, my interest focuses on how to better understand my students' educational and training needs. I felt the connection between terrorism and policy, and counter- and anti-terrorism response was unclear. While it appears reasonable that police will be expected to respond to emergencies as one of their primary duties, the training required for additional duties is unknown. Clarifying governmental expectations will assist in building upon the educational requirements of police officers.

To respond to the research question, how Canadian and US police departments implement strategies to respond to new anti-terrorism laws and policies, a search of the relevant literature was conducted. The topics reviewed were terrorism, public policy and

police studies, including community policing and police culture. Two major themes emerged in the literature on terrorism; one was a lack of preparedness and the other was concern about consequences for civil liberties.

The first theme documents terrorism prior to 9/11, emphasizing the threats of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons by terrorists (Carlson, 1995; Coombs, 2000; Cutterbuck, 1992; Emerson, 1998; Harmon, 2000; Kushner, 1998). The literature refers to terrorism abroad and North America and the lack of attentiveness to terrorists' threats (Alexander & Hoenig, 2001; Backgrounder Series,1999; Carlson, 1995; Cilluffo, 2001; Falkenrath & Newman & Thayer; 1998).

The second theme of the literature scrutinizes the Anti-Terrorism Act in Canada and Patriot Act in the US. The legislation attracted considerable criticism as a threat to democracy (Dostal, 2002, Gagnon, 2002; Thomas, 2002). Others claim the legislation was accepted because of citizens' heightened fears of terrorism (Huddy, Feldman et. al 2005).

The literature outlines management practices, personnel, technology, community policing and the costs associated with this proactive model. What was noteworthy was the absence of attention from one field to the other. The literature does not link foreign and domestic terrorism to legislation, nor does it define terrorism policing duties, community policing and terrorism or management for policing terrorism. The literature review identifies an absence of documented attention to the combination of concerns. The legislation and literature do not identify how the federal governments will determine how police will respond to terrorism at the local level. There are no studies of terrorism and terrorism policy in police departments in the literature.

My conceptual framework focused on four analytic strategies relevant to anti-terrorism policy for police departments. The initial research question asks how Canadian and American police departments implement strategies to respond to anti-terrorism legislation. The first strategy refers to policy instruments used by government to guide police at the local level. The major issue arising from this strategy is the presence, or absence, of relevant written policy to guide or shape implementation. The second strategy considers new relationships among police forces across three levels of government. The third strategy regards the possibility of divergence and conflict between policy intentions and local police implementers. The fourth strategy concerns variation among individual police departments and how local influences affect policy implementation.

Through the use of opportunistic selection, police chiefs and managers of departments in Canada and the US were invited to participate in this study. Guidelines followed the University of Toronto ethical review process, as specified by the Office of Research Services. Following a telephone conversation, the participants were sent e-mails with a list of interview questions and a copy of the letter of informed consent. Participants then received a copy on paper of the letter of introduction and a letter of informed consent.

Interviews took place in both countries at the convenience of the participants and interviewer. The interviews were transcribed, returned to the participants for review and returned. The category construction method was used to divide data and further subdivide into categories of themes or patterns arising from the questions asked in the interviews. Further analysis compared the conceptual framework to the data. Adjusting the conceptual framework to correspond to data led to the findings in the fifth chapter.

A combination of American and Canadian departments was used as cases for this study. Four agencies agreed to participate in Canada and eight in the US. Access was gained to departments through mutual friends who vouched for me as a researcher and through present and former colleagues who assisted me in gaining admission through their contacts. Chiefs participating in the study also recommended others they thought would be willing to participate. This opportunistic sampling strategy presented me with a wide selection of agencies, ranging from very small municipal departments to very large organizations. All of the respondents were male, a circumstance that is not unusual considering the majority of males in upper level positions in the profession. At the same time, due to the method of selection, participants may not be said to be broadly representative of departments across both countries. Agencies differed in population and geographical positions across Ontario, Canada and a number of states.

Some interviews with police chiefs and/or upper level managers were more in-depth than others based on the time availability of the participants. They were asked to share policy related to anti-terrorism from the federal or state/provincial level as well as relevant internal policy. All but one agency refused this request; one sent a copy of the internal policy on intelligence gathering, while a second allowed me to view mock scenarios from the Homeland Security Office, but did not sign a release form for use in this study. Some departments allowed me access to their standard procedures for emergency situations but nothing specific to terrorism. Government publications and websites contributed further documentation referenced throughout the study.

The research reveals similarities and differences between the police agencies participating in this study. The study detected differences related to the country they were

located in and to the size of the municipalities. I found no specific detailed anti-terrorism policy for police in either country. Each department functions without clearly detailed guidelines on anti-terrorism. What emerged was the existence of different courses of action, based to a large extent on the practices of individual departments. The extent of counter- and anti-terrorism activity within agencies is influenced by departmental capacity, specifically, human resources and financial circumstances. The values and beliefs of departments also played a role on the priority placed on anti-terrorism duties in conjunction with their resources.

Four issues emerged from the analysis of the data, based on the conceptual framework. The first issue speaks to the lack of policy and subsequent ambiguity police encounter with the direction they have received to address terrorism. The second issue assesses the policy instruments-mandates and inducements used by government, and the lack of attention to long term capacity building. The third considers the variance that occurs between the expectations of government and the reality at the local level. A mismatch of expectations by government with the reality of local conditions hampers implementation and capacity at the departmental level. The fourth issue concerns variations in the priorities of individual police departments and their influences on the translation and implementation of policy. Variations of implementation of anti-terrorism policy occur between police agencies and countries based on community, size and geographic locations, personalities of chiefs and managers and finally departmental goals.

The research reveals a lack of appropriate, specified policy by both the Canadian and American governments, resulting in unclear and substantially varying outcomes. While there is a lack of explicit policy in either country, there is an expectation that

police will participate in anti- and counter-anti-terrorism management. At the same time the majority of respondents prioritized regular police concerns public safety, keeping the peace and providing basic services to the community as primary. In almost all cases, counter- and anti-terrorism responsibilities were seen as of secondary importance. Criminal intelligence and subsequent investigations rather than terrorism are expected to be encountered by police.

Managers on both sides of the border said they referred to a broad range of laws for direction in anti-terrorism management, but the laws were interpreted differently across agencies because of the absence of documented expectations from government. The result was inconsistency across police departments, with some departments ill-equipped or under trained and thus unprepared to respond to a catastrophic event. Some agencies planned to follow their own policies and internal emergency response plans for terrorist incidents.

Mandating specific actions through a law is the most inexpensive policy instrument for government. McDonnell and Elmore (1987) observe that mandates transfer costs to the implementing body. Agencies with limited resources must prioritize their regular duties in relation to those assigned to terrorism. Enacting laws requires money for equipment, human resources, education and training. Without capacity, pressure and support of policy guidelines, local department factors determine implementation outcomes. This study reveals both pressure and support for these requirements tends to be lacking, resulting in chiefs and managers basing their decisions on local demands. Police regarded reactive terrorism measures as standard policing duties. Nevertheless, human resources and funding determined the concentration and

effort expended on terrorism specific concerns. Compliance with these laws was not always realized because police agencies must shoulder all additional costs to improve capacity.

Funding issues for police departments in the US differed from those in Canada. More capital was available in the US for equipment and training than their counterparts in Canada. Some American police chiefs did not have enough officers to sustain intelligence connections with Homeland Security, while others made the connections but needed more human resources to maintain those relationships.

While some departments in the US required additional human resources, Canadian departments were already linked for intelligence gathering, but there was concern over the distribution of funding for equipment, training and ongoing expenses related to counter- and anti-terrorism practices. Canadian police claimed criminal intelligence gathering was in place prior to 9/11 and, therefore, the inclusion of investigations linked to suspected terrorist criminal activities was put into practice with relative ease. In both countries it appears police departments were expected to maintain capacity through ongoing education, training and maintaining collaborative links between departments.

In the US and Canada, the expectations by large agencies of smaller departments was that they respond to all emergencies until the larger state or provincial agencies arrive. In the US, federal and state expectations were that smaller agencies link with one another to access the funding for terrorism equipment and expertise. Connecting departments was also meant to foster relationships that would enhance information

sharing. Once the departments received equipment and training, they returned to their previous policing duties neglecting ongoing collaborative efforts.

Departments choosing to minimize the importance of intelligence gathering and sharing of information, are either out of the loop in terms of accessing sensitive information or challenged by funding and human resource issues. Managers with access to sensitive information say those without access to information are responsible due to their reluctance, or misunderstanding, of the process or refusal to fund an officer to work with joint forces. The leaders of agencies with previous terrorist episodes, or departments closely connected to intelligence gathering and sharing, place more emphasis on anti-terrorism policy implementation and capacity. Most of the agencies familiar with terrorist incidents are large and receive less government funding than smaller agencies because they are, overall, better equipped and prepared for terrorism. This study shows that governments and those agencies experienced with terrorism expect all police departments to channel intelligence upward. This may not be the case because departments who are not as experienced with terrorism or intelligence gathering do not see their input as crucial.

Gaps between government expectations and outcomes at the local level appear to result from policy makers' lack of consideration of the situation from the local perspective. Governments did not comprehend the range of circumstances facing local police departments, including the values, belief and concerns of large and smaller police departments. Consideration was not given to the possibility of solutions developing at the community level.

Scrutinizing police departments' unique characteristics reveals a range of ideologies, some value reactive policing and military style preparedness training while other departments value close community ties. There were consistent differences between large agencies and mid to smaller departments in terms of dynamics between police and their communities. How leaders of police agencies interacted with the community they served reflected their beliefs, ideals, and motivation.

Implementation decisions are influenced at the local level by the methods departments use to interact with their communities. Pressures surfaced in the study in terms of how police practiced community policing and the ways different ethnic groups interacted with their police departments. Although all police agencies responded that they practiced community policing, some were more clearly proactive by including input from all ethnic groups in police management and community relations than others. How police perceived the nature and extent of interaction with their communities defined the context of their professional role. Police professionalism is viewed differently across departments. Some departments maintain a traditional role with their communities with emphasis on responding to calls while others work toward close community involvement. Police face complex challenges of changing populations and altered social norms in the communities they serve. Some of the agencies interacted with their community through open communication and exchange of ideas and some approached their diverse communities in an attempt to bridge these notions.

Understanding police work is to acknowledge there are no applications that fit every city and input at the local level is much more effective. As Clune (1990) suggests,

upon closer examination at the implementation level, the question is not how police should change, but rather how policy should change.

Implications for Practice

This study reveals a troubling situation that is consistent with previous academic research; policy makers do not usually take into sufficient account the factors that influence implementation, in this case of anti-terrorism policy affecting police departments at the local level. A lack of clear policy and reliance on mandates and inducements without building upon capacity diminishes the likelihood of successful policy implementation. While there is a connectedness between large agencies and the federal level, relying on only one type of implementer for information and feedback overlooks the values, beliefs, goals and concerns of others. As a consequence, it is probable the expectations of policy makers will not be met at the street level. As well, policy makers overlook a vast array of knowledge and potential solutions to problems when police are overlooked. Input may act as a resource in understanding the larger picture.

This view is addressed in the literature; although policy is shaped by policy makers, implementation is marred by extenuating issues, making it difficult if not impossible to control. The recommendation by scholars is for policy strategists to recognize extenuating circumstances that may affect implementation by taking them into account when policy is created.

Additional considerations center on the lack of ongoing co-operation between police agencies to ensure counter-terrorism preparedness. Police agencies continue to

struggle with issues of interconnectedness. Working toward an ongoing cooperative approach of sharing communications is an issue for many departments. The flow of intelligence information is viewed as inequitable by some agencies.

Intelligence, Education and Training

Police at the street level must be better informed by their managers to recognize terrorism activities. This will occur only when more chiefs and upper level managers realize the importance of intelligence gathering and sharing between agencies and officers. Officers collecting information need to follow guidelines consistent with our civil rights. To obtain this balance it is necessary to amend both the Patriot Act and the Anti-terrorist Act to establish precise guidelines for police intelligence gathering.

The importance of intelligence information for education of police is that it is sent upward to a centralized location as well as returning information of value to the street level. Current knowledge of terrorism practices is useless unless utilized by those in contact with suspects. Departments that do not utilize intelligence officers to gather and distribute intelligence run the risk of overlooking criminal or anti-terrorism behaviour that could otherwise be averted. Inadequate information and input from the local levels hampers analysis at a higher level. In the same way intelligence information not returned to the street level produces police officers with a lack of knowledge necessary to deal acceptably with potential risks. Officers who are not afforded continual education may rely on the media or word-of-mouth information with the potential outcome of ill-informed police officers.

As noted by respondents, receiving and disseminating information requires the use of intelligence analysts as well as intelligence officers. In small organizations it may

be necessary to coordinate the needs of a number of departments in order to share personnel. Collecting and disseminating information is recognized by government and police as important. However, the extent of information retrieval and distribution at the department level does not appear to be fully understood by all police departments. Gathering, processing and transferring information at the street level is one aspect of anti-terrorism preparation. The transfer of information and expectations to police officers as a realistic expectation depends upon the expertise of communication specialists and the value placed on this information by management and street officers.

There appears to be a discrepancy between agencies' practices in both reactive counter- and anti-terrorism training and anti-terrorism education through proactive intelligence gathering. Because terrorism prevention is emphasized more in some locales than in others, sharing of these practices and information is essential for police to gain knowledge. Education for department managers and officers may also be obtained from outside sources. Effective procedures and information from countries with anti-terrorism experience with various anti-terrorism groups, such as the US, Israel, Germany and Britain must be accessed, summarized and made available to police managers on a continual basis. Information and education shared between North America and Europe will prove beneficial to street officers. This could be accomplished with information transferal from one department analyst to another. Local input could be shared regionally at annual or semi annual meetings. Regional meetings could connect larger agencies to smaller agencies. In this regard, all departments must be encouraged and offered support by government through capacity building, to maintain connectedness.

The need to clarify expectations between departments requires increased communication and forthrightness. If the requirement is for a smaller department to act as a resource or to bide time until a larger agency arrives, then this must be made clear. When a department knows what is expected, training can be planned. Increased communication and interaction on an annual basis would provide opportunities for dialogue among departments.

Some respondents believe larger agencies are territorial and/or take steps for political and media advantage. This is deeply rooted in police culture and eliminating it will be difficult. Communication does not guarantee understanding of another's stance. Recognition of the needs of police managers, pressure and inducements for capacity building to maintain internal structure of police agencies and police work culture must be reanalyzed.

Respondents described a range of approaches to community policing. One approach is to invite ethnic groups to discuss police management and relations. This is a difficult endeavour but the time, effort and cost extended will reap many benefits through open, genuine communication, advancing a further understanding of one another.

The federal government must tackle policy concerns. This includes consulting those implementing policy for suggestions and feedback, more research by government with agencies participating in implementation and follow up rather than funding solutions that do not work. As well as funding, pressure and support by government is required for enhanced dialogue between agencies through the promotion of regular meetings between departments. Clarifying positions of power and chains of command regionally and at the federal level for counter and anti-terrorism practices will make expectations clear for

smaller departments. Connecting departments is in response to the comments of chiefs in the study who spoke of the importance of connecting before an emergency and the value of friendships. Changing the bureaucratic process may ensure more consistent policy implementation.

Feedback from police departments to governments should increase capacity building at the street level. When governments pay attention to police departments, they will have access to different views that may lead to atypical responses and innovation. Police departments may then work with government policy while supporting and maintaining their own values and ideals.

Implications for Research

Although it offers insight into police anti-terrorism policy, this study is limited due to the small group of participants. Because this is study was centered in Western and Midwestern US and one province in Canada, it cannot give a complete picture of police agencies. This group of police departments may not be representative of those across North America. What is offered in this study is a snapshot of a few select agencies in the two countries. It would be beneficial, for future study in this area, to include more departments from different regions in both countries. Surveying additional police departments will provide a more reliable assessment of the themes emerging from this study.

The passing of time and specific events will also add variation that would yield varying results; perceptions change over time. Immediately following 9/11, the populace in both countries expressed shock, fear and outrage. These emotions led the way for more political acceptance of infringing on civil liberties and allowing government intervention

into our private lives. Retaliation by the US against Afghanistan was acknowledged by many as justified, with international sympathy siding with the Americans for a period of time. The funding was abundant for an array of anti-terrorism measures by federal governments following 9/11. With the passing of time the US lost global sympathy because of the invasion of Iraq. Spending on war and terrorism is facing growing criticism domestically as well as from abroad.

The Canadian political point of view shifted from support for the US to open criticism. The budget in Canada for terrorism did not compare to the US following 9/11, and soon became secondary to health and education spending. Overall, the Canadian attitude (Macnamara, 2002) was that of a nation free from the terrorism faced by the US. Canadians consider themselves peace keepers and an unlikely target for a terrorist strike. In the US, those police departments seriously concerned with terrorism are either in a location that is vulnerable or have had past experiences with terrorism. Over time the urgency in both countries has lessened.

Policy development and implementation in law enforcement typically comes from the top down. Policy may be severely hampered when consideration is not given to those putting policy into action. Without further study of street officers' work, it is unknown whether chiefs' and managers' goals are those achieved by police officers. A study of policy implementation by officers on the street should yield significant information useful to policy makers.

This study explores police policy utilizing policy research in education and building upon current theoretical concepts of the study points to similarities in findings between education and police policy. This dissertation is unique and important to the

study of criminal justice because academic research of police departments and policy is limited. There is very little literature on policy and policing particularly in the area of anti-terrorism policy. There is still much we do not know. However, this study does provide policy makers a view of how some police chiefs and mangers perceive anti-terrorism policy. Policy makers may use this information on management perspective when creating new policy.

The study indicates there is no clear government policy set for police departments to follow. Government mandates in the form of laws and guidelines offer limited direction. However, each chief and manager makes his own interpretation of these mandates, resulting in substantial differences between agencies in terms of reactive and proactive intervention. Police in both countries view reactive anti-terrorism measures as handled through standard police duties. The most common policy is funding for equipment and training; with little to no follow-through in terms of longer term capacity building. Some mid to small departments are excluded from anti-terrorism preparation due to lack of funding for human resources and the implication this has for training. While large agencies criticized the government for not funding personnel, they continue to function by training officers and participating in intelligence operations. Those small and mid sized departments that did not participate in intelligence joint forces cited the reason for this as a lack of money to move an officer off the street. Agencies without intelligence officers participating in joint forces are uninformed regarding terrorist concerns in their areas. A few agencies complained intelligence sharing is limited to sending information upward with very little returned for use at the street level.

Recent literature directs our attention to the difficult task of controlling implementation. Academics suggest that policy strategists should recognize extenuating circumstances that may affect policy prior to and for the duration of implementation. Solutions may be found by those implementers closest to the problem. It is apparent the some policy makers overlook potential input from those at the street level. While there appears to be some contact by government with very large agencies, there is no systematic input from the majority of small to mid-sized agencies.

This study emphasizes the lack of government anti-terrorism policy and the restrictions on implementation by failing to take each contributor of the process into consideration. Mandates and limited inducements that do not build capacity or accommodate the goals, values and beliefs of each participant in the implementation process obstruct success.

Communication is lacking between the government and police agencies of all sizes and anti-terrorism response seems too critically important to leave in this situation. Governments ignore implementation realities at their peril.

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APPENDIX A

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION TO THE CHIEF OF POLICE AND/OR UPPER LEVEL OFFICER IN CHARGE OF ANTI-TERRORISM AFFAIRS.

OISE|UT
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STUDIES IN EDUCATION
OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF TORONTO
252 Bloor Street West
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5S 1V6
Telephone: (416) 923-6641

Date

Dear Chief &/or officer in charge of anti-anti-terrorism affairs

Thank you for indicating an interest in participating in a research project that will examine a police agency's response to anti-terrorism policy. Colleen Clarke, will carry out all research as part of the requirements for completing the Doctor of Education Administration degree at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto. The following outlines the study itself and information about your participation. If you require any further information or explanation, please contact me at 952-457-2593. My thesis advisor is Dr. Nina Bascia who may be contacted at the OISE/UT at 416-923-6641.

The project is entitled: Police Response To Anti-terrorism Policy

The objective of the research proposed is to query Canadian and American police departments for responses and implementation strategies to new anti-terrorism laws and policy.

Rationale for the Study: This study will examine responses by senior levels of government in the development of policy that moves across three levels of government and jurisdictional lines. The study will explore the attitudes and values of Canadian and American police managers toward the global threat of terrorism and the implications of this perception toward its citizens. Further, the study will scrutinize where government commits funding and in turn, how the office of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada and The Homeland Security Department, prioritizes their directives to police agencies. Examining police management of anti-terrorism policy will offer an indication of the future direction of police organization in Canada. Research suggests a call for a proactive stance between community policing and terrorism however, there are few documented responses to this request. This research will contribute to the body of knowledge on policy development and management practices in response to terrorism and the impact on Community based policing.

A Brief Overview: Volunteers who commit to this process will spend about one to two hours to carry out, the interview process.

Your involvement in the process will require you to do the following: Participate in an audio taped, face to face interview process by responding to the questions attached and identified as Appendix B. If acceptable, the sharing of policy from the federal or state/provincial level, written internal policy related to anti-terrorism or other materials the interviewee deems appropriate. (See Appendix H)

What are the benefits for you?

This study may be used for evaluative purposes demonstrating the level of preparedness or readiness of the goals set by the XXXX police agency toward anti-terrorism measures. The results may confirm or suggest realignment of implementation strategies by means of drawing comparisons to officer's responses.

- Insight into police chiefs and managing officer's beliefs and/or attitudes regarding terrorism, not readily available through normal working assessments, may be measured.

- The final document will be returned to your agency for scrutiny. As a result of interviews with your personnel, recommendations or solutions for the betterment of anti-anti-terrorism policy implementation could be exposed.

- The study may contribute to dialogue between police agencies and government regarding anti-anti-terrorism policy and funding.

- This study is strictly guided by a University of Toronto Ethical Review Committee and promises complete anonymity to protect XXXXX police Service from outside scrutiny.

- Contributing to the growing body of knowledge in police studies, particularly to the foundation of Canadian and American policing studies

What risks are there for you in participating in this study?

There are no external risks to participating in the study. Only the researcher, and the thesis supervisor will be privy to the data that is collected. All the raw data collected during the study will be secured in a locked file and after two years will be incinerated. You will not be identified by name in the study, nor will your police agency be identified. The data will not be available to any person or government administration and will not be used to evaluate your performance as part of any police evaluation. You will have access to all raw data collected about you. There will be approximately 12 participants in the study. This small number creates the possibility that participants might be identified in published material due to the small sample size however; they are less likely to be identified because the geographical specificity will be removed via the editorial process

Your participation in this research study requires a commitment of about two to three hours but you may, at any time, withdraw from the study by simply indicating to the researcher your intention to withdraw. No evaluative judgment will be made about you if you choose to withdraw from the study and at no time will there be risk of harm. All raw data connected to your participation will be immediately destroyed

When will your participation begin?
The early stages of the research will begin July, 2004. The goal would be begin scheduling interviews by the Middle to end of July, 2004. The collection of raw data will conclude by the end of September. I will attend at your police department at a mutually convenient date and time to conduct the interview.

Should you be interested in participating in this study please email me at _____. Once a copy of this letter is signed, dated and returned to me we will determine a convenient time and place for an interview.

APPENDIX B

LETTER OF INFORMED CONSENT FOR INTERVIEWEE

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OF THE UNIVERSITY
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Project: Police Response To Anti-terrorism Policy

Principal Investigator: Colleen Clarke, Ed. D. Candidate Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto (OISE/UT)

The study will be conducted under the supervision of:

Thesis Supervisor: Doctor Nina Bascia, Department of Theory and Policy Studies in Education, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto (OISE/UT).

Date: _____

Dear: _____

You have been selected to be one of 12 interviewees in this research study. Therefore, this is the consent for interviewees in accordance with your consent to be part of this research.

Enclosed is another copy of the Letter of Introduction related to this research.

Please review all this information. Should you be in agreement with the statements and consent to continue with a personal interview, please sign/date in the spaces provided. Please return it to the Principal Investigator, Colleen Clarke within one week of its reception.

I have read the Letter of Introduction for the proposed research study and agree to participate.

I understand the sample size for this section of the research is 12 interviewees and the criteria for inclusion are: Chief of Police or upper level managers responsible for anti-anti-terrorism measures.

I understand that the interview will take approximately 1 to 2 hours to complete and that the interview will take place at a date and time that is convenient to both parties.

I understand the interviewer will attend at my police agency, at a mutually agreed upon date and time, to conduct a face to face audio taped interview.

I understand that I may decline to be audio taped or request the taping cease at any time during the interview. This request will at no time be judged or evaluated or pose a risk of harm.

I understand that all data is to be treated as confidential. All collected data is to be used for research and analytical purposes and that the only individuals who will have access to this data are Colleen Clarke, the principal investigator and Dr. Nina Bascia, her thesis supervisor.

I understand that the interview will be audio taped with my permission and later transcribed. A transcript of the interview will be mailed or e-mail to me six to eight weeks following the interview. I will be requested to review the transcript to verify the information and return it to the Principal Investigator, by mail or e-mail, within ten days of its reception.

I understand that all data will be destroyed when it is no longer required (two years maximum).

I understand that my name will not be released or mentioned in any reports or publications without my written consent and that it will be protected with a pseudonym in the final dissertation.

I understand that the name of the XXXXXX Police Department with which the research is connected will be protected with a pseudonym in the final dissertation document.

I understand that there is the risk of responding to questions I believe are too sensitive in nature. If I feel that I am unable to respond to a particular question, I understand that I have the right to "pass" if there are questions that I am unable or unwilling to answer. I understand that my responses will not be personally evaluated.

I understand that I am free to withdraw from this research study at any time without penalty or negative consequence. I understand that all data connected to me will be immediately destroyed if I choose to withdraw.

I understand that my involvement in this research study is voluntary and will not benefit me directly, but could potentially contribute to the knowledge base and understanding of Police education, anti-anti-terrorism policy implementation in police agencies.

INTERVIEW CONSENT

Name: (please print)

_____

Signature:

_____Date Signed _____

Phone Number: _____

For further information please contact:

Colleen Clarke – Principal Investigator, at 952-448-9934 or _____

_____

Dr. Nina Bascia – Thesis Supervisor, at 416-923-6641 Ext. 2511 or e-mail nbascia@oise.utoronto.ca

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHIEF OF POLICE AND/OR UPPER LEVEL OFFICER(S) IN CHARGE OF ANTI-TERRORISM AFFAIRS

OISE|UT
ONTARIO INSTITUTE FOR STUDIES IN EDUCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
252 Bloor Street West
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5S 1V6
Telephone: (416) 923-6641

Background Information:
a) Name
b) Years as a police chief or at your present rank
c) Years as a police officer
d) Academic and police Education (degrees, diplomas)

1. What specific federal and (state/provincial) policy guidelines were given to police (agencies/departments) for management and implementation of anti-anti-terrorism legislation?

Prompt: Did this involve specific tasks?
Time frames?

2. What initiatives or activities are connected with policing and terrorism?

Prompt: How will police be utilized in the (defence of Canada against anti-terrorism?) (defense of American counter-terrorism?)

3. How was funding connected to anti-anti-terrorism policy implementation?

Prompt: is the funding connected to a time frame?

4. What do you believe are your police (agencies/departments) primary concerns related to (anti/counter)-anti-terrorism activities?

- Prompt: What are the connections between terrorism and police officers' regular duties?
- What specific tasks associated with terrorism are assigned to officers?
- Do anti-terrorism duties infringe on regular police functions?
- If yes, how? What police functions were eliminated or downsized to compensate for terrorism procedures?
- How would you prioritize anti-terrorism duties with regular policing duties?

5. How was it decided anti-terrorism measures would be put into practice in this police agency?

- Is there an internal policy for your department/agency?
- Can you share this policy with me? A general overview?

6. Who decides on the education and training to be given to police to deal with anti-terrorism?

- Prompt: Who, in the department is responsible?
  Who is assigned to receive education/training?
  Who/How is the education/training offered?

7. What interaction between police agencies exists that involves (counter/anti)-anti-terrorism policy? What agencies does this involve?
How is this accomplished?

8. What recommendations would you make to police chiefs faced with implementing (counter/anti)-anti-terrorism policy in their departments?
Prompt. Are recommendations shared with other agencies, (state wide/provincially), nationally, internationally?

9. What are the connections between terrorism and police officers regular duties in your area of responsibility?
Prompt: What specific tasks associated with (counter/anti)-terrorism are assigned to officers?

10. Does community policing fit with (counter/anti) anti-terrorism policy? If so How?
Prompt: How are relationships with minority groups in the community initiated and/or maintained?

11. Is profiling a method used in this department?
Prompt: Racial Profiling?
Criminal Profiling?

12. How are concerns addressed in your community regarding anti-terrorism groups anti abortionist, white supremacist, middle-east anti-terrorism and environmentalists or animal rights groups?

13. In your agency, what involvement and interaction do your police officers have with the communities of anti abortionist, white supremacist, middle-east anti-terrorism and environmentalists or animal rights groups?
Prompt: How are officers taught to respond to community input or concerns?

14. Describe in priority, the role of this police agency to your community.
Prompt: How does your agency view its duties to the community from the most to lest important?

APPENDIX D

CONSENT TO RELEASE DOCUMENTS

OISE UT
ONTARIO INSTITUTE FOR
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252 Bloor Street West
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5S 1V6
Telephone: (416) 923-6641

I _____, responsible for anti-anti-terrorism affairs with the

_____ Police Department voluntarily and with the authority of my rank, release the following document(s)

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

to Colleen Margaret Clarke to be used for research purposes only.

I understand that the name of the _____ with which the document is connected will be protected with a pseudonym in the final dissertation document.

I understand the documents released from _____ will not be directly quoted at length to further ensure the department's anonymity.

Name: (please Print)

_____

Signature:

_____ Date Signed _____

For further information please contact:

Colleen Clarke – Principal Investigator, at 952-448-9934

Dr. Nina Bascia – Thesis Supervisor, at 416-923-6641 Ext. 2511 or e-mail nbascia@oise.utoronto.ca