

Regional Realities: The India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry as an Obstacle to Success in  
Afghanistan

by

John Mitton

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University  
Halifax, Nova Scotia  
September 2010

© Copyright by John Mitton, 2010



Library and Archives  
Canada

Published Heritage  
Branch

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

Bibliothèque et  
Archives Canada

Direction du  
Patrimoine de l'édition

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

*Your file Votre référence*  
ISBN: 978-0-494-69788-7  
*Our file Notre référence*  
ISBN: 978-0-494-69788-7

#### NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

#### AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

---

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

  
**Canada**

DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

To comply with the Canadian Privacy Act the National Library of Canada has requested that the following pages be removed from this copy of the thesis:

Preliminary Pages

Examiners Signature Page (pii)

Dalhousie Library Copyright Agreement (piii)

Appendices

Copyright Releases (if applicable)

## **Table of Contents**

<b>Abstract</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Acknowledgments</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>Chapter 1:</b> <i>Introduction</i>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter 2:</b> <i>The Rivalry Approach To International Conflict</i>	<b>19</b>
<b>Chapter 3:</b> <i>The India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry</i>	<b>35</b>
<b>Chapter 4:</b> <i>Escalation In An Enduring Nuclear Rivalry: The Role Of Conflict Contagion</i>	<b>50</b>
<b>Chapter 5:</b> <i>Afghanistan As A Venue Of Competition</i>	<b>71</b>
<b>Chapter 6:</b> <i>Policy Implications</i>	<b>98</b>
<b>Chapter 7:</b> <i>Conclusion</i>	<b>135</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>147</b>

## Abstract

As international involvement in Afghanistan approaches its 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary, conventional interpretations of the conflict increasingly recognize the importance of regional dynamics for the success or failure of the campaign. The current strategy explicitly acknowledges that Pakistan represents perhaps *the* key challenge for defeating the Afghani insurgency, dismantling al-Qaeda, and establishing stability in central Asia. Without purposeful and genuine Pakistani support, current military efforts are likely to be inadequate. Yet the balance of analysis regarding this phenomenon has eschewed theoretical treatments and frameworks in favour of practical policy prescriptions regarding U.S. and NATO options for overcoming Pakistani duplicity. This thesis attempts to overcome this shortcoming by incorporating established theoretical models of international conflict into its analysis of Pakistani behaviour in Afghanistan. Specifically, the theory of “enduring international rivalry” helps to clarify Pakistan’s strategic priorities in the region, such that its overriding enmity with India trumps all other concerns – including cooperation with coalition forces. A discussion of the enduring rivalry model serves to highlight the salience of the Afghan theatre for both India and Pakistan. The presence of a viable nuclear deterrent makes sub-conventional, proxy conflict (such as that in Afghanistan) an attractive venue for balancing behaviour. This requires an adjustment of standard accounts of enduring rivalry, particular as regards escalation patterns. The theory of conflict contagion (and specifically its underlying components of “opportunity” and “willingness”) is used to explore the dynamics of escalation in this context. Finally, the establishment of competition in Afghanistan as a core component of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry allows for the coherent and theoretically informed assessment of current coalition strategies in the region. Unfortunately, an objective appraisal of current realities offers little optimism for convincing Pakistan to purposefully cooperate in Afghanistan. Instead, Islamabad is likely to continue its present tactics with the belief that the current conflict is temporary in comparison to the ongoing battle with India.

## **Acknowledgements**

Special thanks to my supervisor, Frank Harvey, for his support, patience, guidance, and general ability to inspire confidence. Thanks also to Dan Middlemiss and Ken Hansen for their insightful and helpful comments, and to the entire Department of Political Science at Dalhousie for a wonderful experience.

## Chapter 1

### *Introduction*

*Americans fighting the war in Afghanistan have long harbored strong suspicions that Pakistan's military spy service has guided the Afghan insurgency with a hidden hand, even as Pakistan receives more than \$1 billion a year from Washington for its help combating the militants, according to a trove of secret military field reports made public Sunday. The documents, made available by an organization called WikiLeaks, suggest that Pakistan, an ostensible ally of the United States, allows representatives of its spy service to meet directly with the Taliban in secret strategy sessions to organize networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan, and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.*

- New York Times, July 25<sup>th</sup> 2010

*In March, two Pakistani generals – Ashfaq Kayani, the Army chief, and Ahmed Pasha, the head of I.S.I. – met with [Afghan President] Karzai in Islamabad, and signalled that they could help cool down the Taliban insurgency. In exchange, Kayani said, the Karzai government must “end” India's presence in Afghanistan. According to a senior Afghan intelligence official, he said, “There cannot be any type of Indian presence in Afghanistan – any type.”*

- The New Yorker, May 24<sup>th</sup> 2010

*An enduring rivalry is a persistent, fundamental, and long-term incompatibility of goals between two states. This incompatibility of goals manifests itself in the basic attitudes of the parties toward each other, as well as in recurring violent or potentially violent clashes over a long period of time.*

- Maoz and Mor (2002: 4-5)

*...international conflicts may spread from one nation to another in patterns that are similar to those followed by contagious diseases. Participation in war at one point in time may affect the likelihood of subsequent war participations.*

-Most and Starr (1980: 932)

The above quotations have been offered as an attempt to situate what is, by necessity, a complex argument. The intent, ultimately, is to offer a theoretically informed interpretation of the current war in Afghanistan. In this endeavour my scope will be both limited and large; limited in the sense that one particular aspect of the conflict will be thoroughly examined (Indian and Pakistani competition in Afghanistan); and large in that the importance of this aspect is such that it could significantly affect not only the conflict in Afghanistan, but the geopolitical realities of the entire Central and South Asian region as well. Further, the juxtaposition of these quotations mirrors, to a large extent, the content and progression of the thesis as a whole. Conventional and factual accounts are examined through a theoretical lens in the hope that novel and dynamic explanations can be uncovered and provided. In this sense, it is my hope that the current project will perform the dual role of illuminating an important and topical case while simultaneously exploring the applicability and viability of – and relationship between – two extant theories of international conflict. In this introductory chapter I will briefly detail the key components of the argument, how they inform one another, and why the work proceeds as it does. As we shall see, each seemingly disparate element is in fact connected by a core logic in which the spatial and temporal components of the current conflict are emphasized. In other words, this thesis is primarily concerned with *context*; that is, the belief that the war in Afghanistan cannot be understood as an event which began in October of 2001 and will end with the withdrawal of coalition forces, nor that it is neatly encapsulated by the international borders that demarcate the territory in question. To fully understand it, and its potential consequences, requires an appreciation of the pushes and pulls of history and a broader understanding of regional geopolitical realities. The



theoretical discussions provided emphasize the importance of this context; many of the policies currently in place emphasize a misunderstanding of it; this, then, is my intended contribution.

With thousands of lives on the line, billions of dollars in play, and the future of global security potentially at stake, there is little difficulty in making the case that understanding the Afghan war is of vital importance. That Canada remains a significant and crucial contributor to the NATO effort reinforces this notion. It is not surprising, therefore, that a substantial and ever-growing volume of literature exists chronicling the current campaign; its inception, evolution, and possible future. From best-seller lists to academic journals to the pages of major magazines and newspapers, accounts of the Afghan war occupy a prominent position in the public discourse. For the most part, these accounts focus on general foreign policy philosophy, practical policy prescriptions or detailed dissections of on-the-ground events. Not surprisingly, journalism has tended to dominate impartial academic analysis, and information is generally more available than explanation. Nonetheless, a consistent theme in many accounts is the complexity of the region in question; a region in which ethnic divisions, religious rationales, historical enmities, and duplicitous allegiances obscure traditional tactical concerns and hinder humanitarian efforts. In the almost 9 years since the campaign began, the only thing that has become clear is that there are no clear answers. If the 91,000 recently leaked military documents offer any insight however, it is that a major component of the current coalition strategy is failed and failing. The inability to secure comprehensive cooperation from Pakistan despite significant diplomatic efforts and financial outlay represents *the* key challenge for U.S. and NATO policymakers. The role of Pakistan has become the central

theme in discussions regarding the Afghan war as academics, journalists, and pundits alike attempt to explicate and understand the motivations underlying Pakistani duplicity. Not in dispute, however, is the recognition that Pakistan's cooperation is vital.

When President Obama outlined his strategic priorities in late 2009, he emphasized the importance of regional dynamics for the success or failure of the campaign. Specifically, the current military strategy explicitly acknowledges that Pakistan's cooperation represents the most important variable for defeating the Afghani insurgency, dismantling al-Qaeda, and establishing stability in Central Asia (Hasnat 2009; Fair 2009; Weinbaum 2009). As Mohan (2009: 174) notes, "Obama [is] calling for an integrated approach toward the region as a whole, taking into account the complex intraregional dynamics in addressing the mounting security challenges to the United States from the faltering war in Afghanistan." This recognition and strategic shift is a welcome one. The border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is both a major venue of fighting and an important staging ground for insurgent groups. The inhospitable geographical realities of the region are well known (Qassem 2007; Johnson and Mason 2008); it is an area defined by high mountain ranges and steep, treacherous passes. Practically, such a border is nearly impossible to purposefully monitor and defend. Moreover, the so-called Durand Line (named for the British officer who established it in 1893) bifurcates the ethnic and tribal communities of the Pashtun people (Hasnat 2009; Ganguly and Howenstein 2009); it is, ultimately, an arbitrary demarcation that is both highly porous and routinely ignored by local inhabitants. Limiting military operations to Afghan territory allows Taliban fighters to slip across the Durand Line into relative safety, and subsequently recuperate, replenish, and strategize future attacks. That many

top-Taliban officials, such as Mohammed Mullah Omar, have utilized Pakistan as an operating base is well known and widely documented (Behuria 2007; Fair 2009). Clearly, effective counter-insurgent operations cannot be bound by the Durand Line. As such, the Obama administration has increased pressure on Pakistan to bolster counter-terrorist and counter-insurgent operations within Pakistani territory. Removing potential safe-havens for insurgent groups is considered crucial to establishing a modicum of stability in the troubled regions of South East Afghanistan (Mohan 2009).

Unfortunately, whole hearted Pakistani cooperation has not been forthcoming. Instead, Pakistan has been consistently hesitant in its efforts to crack down on insurgent groups operating along the Af-Pak border. As Weinbaum (2009: 76) summarizes, “[t]he absence of a sense of urgency and the frequently accommodating policies of the Pakistani government and military toward the militants [have] naturally brought into question the will and capacity of the Pakistani leadership regarding the insurgency.” More recently, leaked military documents highlight the extent to which Pakistan, primarily through its intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), continues to play a “double game” with coalition forces. There is evidence that ISI agents are actively involved in strategizing and facilitating attacks with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other insurgent groups against American and NATO targets. Referring to these newly leaked documents, the New York Times (July 15 2010) has reported:

Some of the reports describe Pakistani intelligence working alongside Al Qaeda to plan attacks...The records also contain firsthand accounts of American anger at Pakistan’s unwillingness to confront insurgents who launched attacks

near Pakistani border posts, moved openly by the truckload across the frontier, and retreated to Pakistani territory for safety.

Such revelations are troubling indeed. They do not come as a complete surprise, but nonetheless reinforce the more pessimistic appraisals of the current situation, particularly as regards such a major portion of coalition strategy. Moreover, they deal a damaging blow to the perception that U.S.-Pakistan relations may be on the mend, a view that was ostensibly tenable just a few weeks prior to the leaks (New York Times, July 18 2010). At the very least, the released documents show a consistent and persistent connection between the ISI and insurgent groups.

Though the extent of such duplicity is widely debated, its rationale is generally recognized: opposition to Indian influence in Afghanistan. The perception that India represents an existential threat is the underlying tenet for nearly all Pakistani foreign policy. The current strategy is pursued entirely with India in mind, and represents the continuation of a long-standing practice for Pakistan, its military, and the ISI. For decades, Pakistan has successfully cultivated relationships with militant organizations in the remote Pakistani regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) as part of an ongoing campaign against India, training and equipping such groups to carry out attacks in both Kashmir and Afghanistan (Fair 2009; Tellis 2008). Numerous terrorist attacks in Afghanistan have taken aim at Indian targets, leading many to implicate Pakistan and its proxy organizations. As Rubin and Rashid (2008: 30) explain, Pakistan's "intelligence agency stands accused of supporting terrorism in Afghanistan, which in many ways has replaced Kashmir as the

main arena of the still-unresolved struggle between Pakistan and India.” In other words, Pakistan may not only be an unreliable ally but also an active threat to success in Afghanistan. That subversive Pakistani behaviour in Afghanistan is influenced by its enmity with India is clear. Yet the balance of analysis regarding this phenomenon has eschewed theoretical treatments and frameworks in favour of practical policy prescriptions regarding coalition options for overcoming Pakistani duplicity. Such prescriptions range from adjusting financial aid towards more long-term development goals (Cohen and Chollet 2007), emphasizing the economic benefits of a stable Afghanistan (Starr 2005), attaching stricter requirements and conditional terms to military aid in an effort to bolster Pakistan’s counterinsurgent capabilities (Fair 2009), promoting Pakistan’s transition to diplomatic rule (Grare 2007), and even brokering rapprochement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir with the belief that appeasement over such a critical issue might cool general tensions between the two antagonists (Rubin and Rashid 2008; Sinno 2008). What these suggestions lack, however, is an adequate understanding of the India-Pakistan relationship itself; one in which long-standing hatred, mistrust, and paranoia obscure conventional rationality and “victory” – even in a limited sense – is privileged above absolute gain, and in which Afghanistan represents a central – not tangential – venue of competition. Absent such an understanding, useful interpretations of, and effective solutions to, the Afghanistan conflict will remain elusive. Indeed, the prominence of Pakistan’s role demands an answer as to how (and even more importantly) why it behaves as it does.

Fortunately, a burgeoning theoretical literature exists regarding the nature of the India-Pakistan rivalry, with important implications for the dynamics (and therefore

behaviour) of the two states. Specifically, the India-Pakistan relationship is considered to be a crucial case of “enduring rivalry” in international relations (Paul 2005: 3). As Goertz and Diehl (1993: 148) summarize, the concept of “enduring rivalry” places any particular crisis, conflict, or competition within a broader historical narrative: “...disputes or crises in an enduring rivalry may be influenced by the outcome or processes of previous disputes or by the prospect of future disputes between the same states.” In other words, the designation of “enduring rivalry” is not merely descriptive, but rather connotes a rigorous theoretical interpretation of how states act and what is likely to occur as they interact with one another. It therefore explicitly incorporates the historical *context* of the international relationship and accounts for the spatial and temporal constants of international events. By definition, any instance of conflict or venue of competition between India and Pakistan is subject to the dynamics of their enduring rivalry. As such, the application of the enduring rivalry framework to Indian and Pakistani behaviour in Afghanistan greatly augments conventional interpretations of the current conflict; it allows for a better appreciation of present realities, future possibilities, and ultimately relevant policy implications.

Chapter 2 will deal explicitly with the theory of enduring rivalry. It will summarize the key contributions to the literature and explain the relevance of this approach to the study of international conflict and competition. The two main models of enduring rivalry will be explored: the “punctuated equilibrium” model of Diehl and Goertz (2001), which is primarily quantitative and deals with the general structural trends of international rivalries over time; and the “evolutionary model” of Maoz and Mor (2002) which focuses primarily on the internal dynamics and psychological aspects of

state behaviour in recurring conflicts with the same opponent. Ultimately both approaches are found to be useful in the study of enduring rivalry, though the evolutionary model is found to offer insights particularly germane to interpretations of a specific relationship such as that between India and Pakistan. As such, I identify the theoretical components of Maoz and Mor (2002) as relevant for the present case. These components include:

1. *An outstanding set of unresolved issues.* There is a long-standing conflict of interest over a set of issues that typically remains unresolved over a long period of time, and over how specific militarized disputes or wars end at specific junctures of the states' common history.
2. *Strategic interdependence.* Each of the states views the other as a strategic rival. Each state pays a great deal of attention to what the other state does or to what its officials say. Each state spends a great deal of effort in gathering intelligence about the other state, and it bases its strategic planning on what it thinks the other is doing or planning.
3. *Psychological manifestations of enmity.* Considerable suspicion, mistrust, hatred, and demonization underlie the relationship between the two states, even when this relationship lacks overt features of internationalized conflict.
4. *Repeated militarized conflict.* The relationship is characterized by a repeated set of overt militarized conflicts that extend over a relatively long period of time, and that recur with a considerable degree of intensity and severity.

The strength of this framework is its ability to capture both the structural (outstanding set of unresolved issues; repeated militarized conflict) and actor-level (strategic interdependence; psychological manifestations of enmity) components of enduring rivalry, thereby capturing a complete picture of the phenomenon in question. Again, this framework mirrors my general emphasis on *context*; that is, it does not privilege either environmental or entity level factors but rather recognizes the mutual constitution of the two.<sup>1</sup>

In chapter 3, the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry is explicitly engaged. Existing interpretations of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry will be briefly discussed and evaluated. Both the punctuated equilibrium and evolutionary models will be shown to offer important insights into the India-Pakistan dyad. Nonetheless, neither model is able to adequately account for an important dynamic of current relations: increasing bilateral stability. Since the testing of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan in 1998, instances of direct military confrontation have declined. A limited “war”<sup>2</sup> was fought in 1999, troop mobilization occurred in 2002, but overt conflict has become less pronounced and many analysts point to an observable cooling of bilateral tensions between the two antagonists. Yet few would argue that the India-Pakistan rivalry has ended, and indeed there is ample indication that underlying hostilities remain strong as ever (see for example Wirsing 2007). What conventional enduring rivalry interpretations lack,

---

<sup>1</sup> This approach mirrors the ecological theory of “environmental possibilism” offered by Sprout and Sprout (1956, 1965, 1969) in which environment factors establish what is possible but do not ultimately determine what will occur within a given system. That is, both the environment itself and the entities within it are responsible for determining events in a system.

<sup>2</sup> There is no clear consensus as to whether the Kargil conflict constituted actual “war” between India and Pakistan. The Pakistani government never explicitly acknowledged its role in the fighting, blaming instead insurgent forces for the incursion across the Line of Control; on the other hand, the quantitative criteria for war as outlined by the COW project were satisfied. As a result different authors have different interpretations, with Diehl, Goertz and Saaedi (2005) coding the Kargil conflict as war, and Khan (2005) arguing that it was not.



therefore, is an understanding of enduring *nuclear* rivalry; that is, the fundamental changes that result from the presence of nuclear capabilities in the rivalrous dyad. In other words, the rivalry between India and Pakistan is in fact alive and well, but has necessarily taken on a different form as the prospect of conventional bilateral confrontation becomes largely untenable due to basic principles of nuclear deterrence. Instead, limited and non-conventional conflicts have increased, as both nations seek alternative methods for challenging one another. The India-Pakistan rivalry thus constitutes an example of the “stability-instability” paradox in which nuclear states avoid large scale war but engage in more limited confrontations (Krepon 2003). A significant literature deals with the concept of nuclear rivalry in the South Asian context (Hagerty 1998; Kapur 2003; Krepon 2003; Khan 2005; Mistry 2009). Most notably, Rajesh Basrur (2008) discusses the South Asian “cold war” and highlights the ways in which nuclear weapons have come to shape the behaviour of both India and Pakistan. As expected, he finds that the two antagonists have avoided major confrontation in several recent crises. In this context, the competition in Afghanistan becomes not only a *particular* component of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry, but in many ways the *crucial* one; it is primarily through such indirect, proxy conflicts that enduring nuclear rivals are able to engage each other (Basrur 2008). I contend that standard accounts of escalation in enduring rivalry must expand to include sub-conventional conflict in order to avoid jettisoning dyads that clearly continue to constitute ongoing hostile relations. Indeed, losing the India-Pakistan rivalry would be severely damaging to enduring rivalry theory.

Of course, this dynamic complicates the processes associated with escalation in enduring rivalry. No longer a strictly bilateral affair, the important consideration becomes

*how* and *why* particular proxy conflicts flare into violence. That is, what are the escalatory patterns associated with enduring *nuclear* rivalry? In chapter 4, I introduce the theory of conflict contagion in effort to establish an explanation of such patterns. A sizeable literature exists regarding the spread of war over time. Usually employing the metaphor of “infectious contagion”, this literature suggests that: “If fighting starts in a certain region, it becomes probable that... additional wars will break out in the vicinity of the battlefield” (Howeling and Siccama 1985: 646). In my discussion of conflict contagion I focus primarily on the concepts of “opportunity” and “willingness” as agents of diffusion. Siverson and Starr (1990; 1991) argue that conditions of opportunity and willingness are jointly necessary for the spread of war. Opportunity refers primarily to those structural, system-level characteristics that make war contagion more or less likely. For example, geographical proximity is found to offer significant levels of “opportunity” for infection. Conversely, willingness refers to actor-level considerations that determine whether a state will decide either to join an ongoing war, initiate a new one, or remain peaceful. The balance of literature on willingness focuses on alliance memberships and their impact on state decisions to go to war. I suggest, however, that the enmity generated in an enduring rivalry is sufficient to influence a nation’s “willingness” for conflict. The use of alliance partnerships is in fact just one of many potential “geopolitical factors in the environment” that can act as a measurement of willingness. Hence, with regards to the India-Pakistan dyad, I find that both opportunity and willingness are present. The geographical proximity of Afghanistan to the India-Pakistan dyad means “conditions” in Afghanistan will be afforded high strategic value in the calculus of both New Delhi and Islamabad. In addition, the enmity generated in the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry is a

powerful determinant of state preference, meaning neither nation is likely to hesitate when conflict becomes a possibility. Moreover, this preference (or “willingness”) is particularly acute in an enduring *nuclear* rivalry, as states must seek alternative (i.e. not bilateral conflict) avenues of confronting their rival. Afghanistan is hence a prime venue for escalation in the India-Pakistan enduring nuclear rivalry.

While my initial emphasis is certainly on examining the Afghan war and its related regional implications, the use of two existing theoretical models inevitably provides the opportunity to discuss the exploratory value of the case in question. That is, by taking generalizable theories and applying them to single case, I can offer some commentary on the processes by which the aggregate phenomena outlined by the two theories may occur. In this sense, the present thesis follows Zinnes’ (1976) concept of “additive cumulation” in which “one study adds some information to the existing literatures on the subject, through such activities as...the incorporation of new cases or new variables into the analysis, or expanding the application of models, indices or techniques to new cases or research questions” (Starr 2005: 388). Indeed, the enduring rivalry and contagion models share important theoretical aspects that make them particularly well suited for comparison and/or integration. Fundamentally, both are concerned with the processes by which states engage in conflict. Further, both eschew the traditional, cross-sectional nature of conflict studies, focusing instead on the dynamic connection of conflicts and disputes over time and space. Consider, for example, the following statement made by Diehl and Goertz (2001: 70) regarding the enduring rivalry model:

The second important way that the rivalry approach shifts the focus of international conflict research is in its emphasis on the longitudinal and dynamic aspects of the rivalry relationship. The literature on international conflict is primarily static and cross-sectional, as exemplified by the work of the Correlates of War Project [COW]...Such work analyzes conflicts as if they were independent of one another, and generally without regard to the history or future prospects of the rivalry.

Similarly, Most and Starr (1980: 932), working in the contagion/diffusion literature, suggest that: “Most of the analyses of the causes of war have ignored the theoretical and empirical evidence that at least some wars have significant consequences for subsequent conflicts.” Faber et al. (1984: 279) also lament the assumption, “invited” by COW research, that “observations over time and over space are independent from one another.” In terms of the present case, several underlying connections between the two theories may be tentatively proposed. For contagion theory, the presence of enduring rivalry likely constitutes a valuable measurement (to be added to existing treatments of alliance memberships) of willingness for conflict participation. In the case of enduring nuclear rivalry, the escalation of sub-conventional proxy conflicts is likely related to the concepts of opportunity and willingness as defined in conflict contagion literature.

This last observation emphasizes the importance of Afghanistan for the India-Pakistan enduring nuclear rivalry. In chapter 5, I build on this connection by offering specific evidence that Afghanistan represents a core component of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry, using the four characteristics outlined in the Maoz and Mor (2002)

model. Ultimately, political and strategic influence in Afghanistan will be presented as a fundamental issue of unresolved competition between the long-standing rivals. Drawing on various empirical sources I will offer evidence of this competitive behaviour, showing it to be both pervasive and well-entrenched. Further, the behaviour of the states will be shown to reflect both strategic interdependence and psychological manifestations of enmity, clearly indicating the extent to which psychological and actor-oriented explanations of rivalry dynamics are applicable. Importantly, the confluence of the first three criteria highlight the salience of competition in Afghanistan – a competition that in many ways has become a “core issue” in the India-Pakistan rivalry. The last criteria – that of repeated militarized conflict – is slightly more problematic, for reasons outlined above. The focus on bilateral conventional conflict that characterizes standard treatments of enduring rivalry is no longer germane for understanding the India-Pakistan rivalry due to stabilizing effects associated with nuclear deterrence. This should not, however, obscure the fact that the India-Pakistan relationship continues to exhibit all other characteristics of enduring rivalry. Indeed, the salience of the enduring rivalry model relies, as Thompson (1995) argues, not simply on the quantitative measurement of arbitrarily defined indicators, but rather on the underlying and persisting attitude of “rivalry” that defines the behaviour of the states in question. Over-reliance on the former risks losing sight of the latter. As he states:

If wars should not be plucked for analysis from their rivalry contexts, neither should one assume that all disputes are equivalent indicators that can be bundled into a rivalry threshold that holds equally well for all sorts of actors, arenas, and

eras....One may also miss some significant but more subtle rivalries that do not quite exceed some orthodox threshold for disputes (Thompson 1995: 197).

As such, I argue that the criteria of “repeated militarized conflict” should be expanded to include sub-conventional proxy conflicts. In this light, the competition in Afghanistan satisfies the spirit of Maoz and Mor’s fourth component.

Having established Indian-Pakistani competition in Afghanistan as a core component of their enduring nuclear rivalry, chapter 6 discusses potential consequences for coalition policies in the region. As we shall see, the dynamics of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry bear directly on key components of the current strategy in Afghanistan. By understanding Pakistan’s behaviour through the prism of enduring rivalry, I can reasonably assess current coalition policies vis-à-vis Islamabad. For example, if enhanced economic incentives (such as the recently signed and American-engineered Afghanistan-Pakistan trade accord [New York Times, July 18 2010]) and financial aid are thought to be sufficient to secure comprehensive Pakistani cooperation – they will not be. Similarly, if the transformation of the Pakistani military into an effective counterinsurgent force is the rationale behind significant military-directed aid such a transformation is exceedingly unlikely. Whatever the aspirations of the U.S. and its partners in the region, Pakistan will continue to hedge its activities vis-à-vis insurgent groups that may be useful in the ongoing campaign against its pre-eminent rival. Further, groups supported by the ISI with an eye on India not only increase general instability but inevitably become engaged in direct violence with coalition forces, with potentially disastrous implications for the

mission.; a prime example being the ISI-supported Haqqani network, an organization directly linked to attacks on coalition targets.

In short, the presence of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry largely precludes cooperative behaviour from Pakistan, at least insofar as U.S. demands jeopardize established strategic priorities. The central benefit of this analysis for policy makers is diagnostic; that is, it provides reasonable explanations for current policy failures thereby allowing for the re-evaluation of current practices and priorities. The capacity for prescriptive policy recommendations is slightly more limited, due primarily to the scope and complexity of the situation in question. Offering firm and resolute recommendations based on the findings in this thesis may be overly ambitious, although certainly general avenues of action can be gleaned from its conclusions. For instance, curbing current over reliance on Pakistan may at least prevent American funding from ultimately aiding and abetting their own enemies (see chapter 5). Further, strategies associated with rivalry termination should be pursued. Obviously, removing the impetus (enduring rivalry) for competitive behaviour between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan would go a long in securing more purposeful cooperation from Islamabad. In many ways, attempts to link the dispute over Kashmir to competition in Afghanistan is a tacit acknowledgement of this possibility. Yet such linkages will be inadequate in that a) agreement over Kashmir remains exceedingly unlikely and b) even if such an agreement could be reached it would not be sufficient to end the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry. Instead, Bennett's (1993) suggestion that a "common external threat" can help precipitate rivalry termination presents the most reasonable possibility for termination in the South Asian context. As the forces of Islamic extremism increasingly target the Pakistani state itself, a threshold

may be crossed in which Islamabad comes to view the forces of Islamism as more dangerous than the threat from India.

To summarize, the impetus for the present thesis was the general recognition, reinforced by the recently leaked military documents, that Pakistan has remained reluctant to meaningfully ally itself with coalition interests in Central and South Asia. This is a view that is consistently expressed by journalists and pundits alike; and, though many explanations are offered, few incorporate established theoretical models of international conflict. The result has been policy prescriptions that fail to adequately appreciate the complexity of the current situation, particularly as regards regional geopolitical realities that bear directly on the Afghan war. To be sure, many accounts recognize that Pakistan is wary of Indian influence in the region (see for example Joe Klein's article in the August 9, 2010 edition of TIME magazine), yet such accounts fall short of understanding the particular *dynamics* at work, specifically those relating to state behaviour. Pakistan's preoccupation with India is not tangential to the current conflict, it is central to it; absent this understanding, effective solutions will remain elusive.



## Chapter 2

### *The Rivalry Approach To International Conflict*

The “rivalry approach” to the study of international conflict improves upon traditional theories of war by theoretically incorporating what had long been intuitively presupposed. As Diehl and Goertz (2001: 1) explain:

Wars do not suddenly occur between two states, but rather almost always arise in situations in which the two countries have had serious conflicts and have been using the military instruments of foreign policy against one another.

Bennett (1996: 157), for his part, suggests that:

Scholars have begun to focus on [rivalries] in part to address criticism that international conflict studies often assume that conflicts between states are unconnected, and because certain dyads in the international system appear to be particularly conflict prone.

The central benefit of studying international rivalries is the notion that “conflicts and wars are related to each other” (Diehl 1998: 2). That is, particular events (wars, conflicts, disputes) are not ahistorical but rather part and parcel of a larger and ongoing temporal narrative. As such, the focus of inquiry shifts from a specific interstate dispute to the nature of the dyadic relationship – or context – in which it occurs. As Diehl (1998: 10) clarifies: “With the rivalry approach, instead of trying to explain the causes of war, one

tries to explain the causes of rivalry.” Making this conceptual shift does not dismiss the significance of war itself. Quite the opposite; an important component of the war process, hitherto ignored, is accounted for. Past conflicts (particularly wars) between two states bear significantly on subsequent confrontations. This is particularly true for those rivalries that persist over long periods of time.

Indeed, scholars have noted that some rivalries are more intense than others. Certain dyadic relationships display consistent and repeated hostility over an extended period, often lasting several decades. Specifically, the term “enduring rivalry” is meant to indicate “a context of ongoing and prolonged serious conflict between a set of states” (Diehl 1998: 12). For modelling purposes, Goertz and Diehl (1995: 33) stipulate that a rivalry must display a minimum of six military disputes over a minimum period of 20 years to qualify as enduring, though other slightly varied quantitative definitions exist<sup>3</sup> (see Diehl and Goertz 2001; also Moaz and Mor 2002). The identification of tangible and observable criteria allows scholars to develop rigorous and generalizable quantitative theories regarding enduring rivalries; examining trends related to their beginning, development, and ultimate termination.

It must be noted, however, that the development of an enduring rivalry is a relatively rare event, with the “overwhelming majority” of potential enduring rivalries dieing out quickly; that is, before they reach the level of repeated hostilities specified

---

<sup>3</sup> Thompson (1995) for his part, suggests that definitions based on the amount of disputes misses the key characteristic of enduring rivalries; namely the perceptions of decision makers. For instance, he says: “Instead of relying on criteria about the number of disputes, a preferable, albeit more labor-intensive, approach entails codifying decision maker perceptions, with some assistance from the analyses of historians about which states were regarded by decision makers as their state’s principal opponents” (Thompson 1995: 201). Arbitrary criteria about what constitutes “enduring” shifts the focus away from the more important consideration of what constitutes “rivalry”, leading to Thompson’s delineation of “principal” as opposed to “enduring” rivalries.

above (Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi 2005: 35). As Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi (2005: 36) specify:

Indeed, our research suggests that of states that have an initial dispute, approximately 76 percent end their 'rivalry' quickly, about 19 percent develop into proto-rivalries (something akin to adolescence in a lifecycle) and only 5.4 percent ever become enduring rivalries.

From an empirical perspective, the examination of enduring rivalries is nonetheless pertinent in that "of militarized disputes, 45% occur in enduring rivalries, and over half of the wars [in the international system] take place between enduring rivals" (Goertz and Diehl 1995: 32). Compared to states engaged in an isolated conflict or proto-rivalry, states in an enduring rivalry are "almost four times as likely to experience a war" (Diehl and Goertz 2001: 64). Ultimately, the quantitative research conducted by Diehl and Goertz (2001) on the war proneness of enduring rivalries offers powerful evidence that the study of enduring rivalries is relevant to the study of conflict more generally. As they conclude:

Our empirical analyses quite consistently showed that wars, disputes, and territorial changes occur disproportionately within medium to long-term rivalry contexts. This provides *prima facie* evidence that we need to consider conflicts, not atomistically, but as part of a wider rivalry relationship (ibid: 65).

These quantitative results largely confirm the notion that wars and disputes are related to each other over time (temporal diffusion), with conflict clustering among dyads that have experienced significant levels of prior confrontation. Scholars interested in understanding war, therefore, would be wise to embrace the significance of the rivalry concept.

Two main theoretical models of enduring rivalry have been developed: the “punctuated equilibrium” model (Diehl and Goertz 2001), and the “evolutionary model” (Moaz and Mor 2002). The former borrows its framework from evolutionary biology:

The biological theory stresses the very uneven rates of species evolution, arguing that it occurs in spurts followed by long periods of stasis and no change. Species evolve rapidly, change little, and then go extinct quickly. This, we will argue, is the dominant pattern in enduring rivalries. States rapidly lock-in to enduring rivalries, which then change little until their rapid decline (Diehl and Goertz 2001: 132).

Essentially, the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries takes a longitudinal view of international relations, conceptualizing each interaction as part of an ongoing sequence and tracking the development of the relationship (rivalry) in question. As alluded to above, it specifies three stages of enduring rivalry: onset, stasis, and termination. The onset stage occurs following a “political shock” – defined as a “dramatic change in the international system or its subsystems that fundamentally alters the processes, relationships, and expectations that drive nation-state interactions” (Goetz and Diehl 1995: 31) – which serves to “lock-in” the rivalry around a “basic rivalry level”

(BRL), around which relations remain relatively constant throughout the life of the rivalry. As mentioned, enduring rivalries are in fact relatively rare events, meaning why *specific* dyads result in enduring rivalry is an important consideration. The punctuated equilibrium model suggests that certain types of initial conflicts are more likely to trigger “lock-in” than others. Disputes over territory, conflicts that end in stalemate, and relative power parity are all considered factors that are likely to precipitate enduring rivalry (Diehl and Goertz 2001). Once established, an enduring rivalry becomes relatively stable, thus entering the “stasis” portion of its lifecycle. Hostilities are believed to generally follow the BRL: “The net effect of rivalry stability is that there should be consistent patterns of rivalry interaction over the course of the rivalry” (Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi 2005: 40). This is not to suggest that hostility does not fluctuate whatsoever, but rather that: “Periods of conflict and détente are seen as random variations around this basic level, with no secular trend toward more conflictual or more peaceful relations” (Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi 2005: 31). The final state, that of termination, requires the occurrence of another political shock (a necessary but not sufficient condition – rivalries may survive numerous political shocks but are unlikely to end without one). The punctuated equilibrium model, based as it is on the observation of trends using quantitative data on the relations of rivals over time, offers important insights into the structure and persistence of enduring rivalries. It highlights empirical patterns that are more or less generalizable across rivalries. It is less useful, however, in determining the specific processes that underlie state behaviour in recurring disputes, and thus cannot satisfactorily *explain* state behaviour in an enduring rivalry.

The evolutionary model, by contrast, focuses primarily on the outcomes of particular disputes and how they contribute to the continuation and maturation of rivalry. As Moaz and Mor (2002: 15) explain, the evolutionary approach focuses on “internal validity – uncovering evolutionary dynamics – rather than on external validity – generalizing these dynamics across rivalries.” Vasquez (1996: 532), for example, suggests that repeated confrontations can reinforce hostility and cause a negative spiral in which states become increasingly antagonistic vis-à-vis one another:

As conflict recurs, contenders become more concerned with hurting or denying their competitor than with their own immediate satisfaction, and with this, hostility deepens and goes beyond that associated with normal conflict.

This is an important contention. Essentially, Vasquez is highlighting the fact that prior hostility alters how states perceive each other; in situations where there has been significant levels of prior conflict “there is...a tendency for all issues (and the specific stakes that compose them) to become linked into one grand issue – us versus them” (ibid: 532). Once this “actor dimension” has become operative, states will abandon a strict cost-benefit analysis of conflict (a “stake dimension”) and engage in confrontation primarily out of hostility towards the other actor (rival): “Normal conflict is guided ultimately by a selfish concern, whereas rivalry...can get out of hand and make for disagreement and negative acts that from a strict cost-benefit analysis are not necessary” (ibid: 532). Similarly, Moaz and Mor (2002: 13) maintain that: “rivalries are different not because they are few, but because the same actors behave differently in rivalry and nonrivalry

periods, and in comparison to other actors in nonrivalrous dyads.” This may help to understand behaviour that seems, in isolation, to be counterproductive. It may also explain why seemingly limited disputes can result in significant military escalation. For instance, states in an enduring rivalry may allocate strategic value to a particular issue or stake to a degree far greater than would be the case in an isolated or nonrivalrous confrontation.

For Diehl (1998: 2-3), competitive behaviour is what ultimately drives the rivalrous relationship: “...when states are engaged in a rivalry, they have conflicting goals over the disposition of a scarce good.” The source of competition may vary from intangible goods (such as political influence or regional hegemony) to more tangible quantities (such as natural resources or territory) (Diehl 1998). It may also vary over time. As Goertz and Diehl (1993: 154) summarize: “In practice, it is likely that individual enduring rivalries reflect various mixes of...sources of competition.” Yet Bennett (1996: 160) points out that there exists “some connection or overlap between the issues at stake” insofar as each successive dispute inevitably informs subsequent interaction. In this sense, the hostility of any particular competition becomes firmly entrenched in the political psyche of each rival and influences state behaviour in other, ostensibly unrelated issue areas. Moaz and Mor (2002: 4-5) describe this dynamic well: “An enduring rivalry is a persistent, fundamental, and long-term incompatibility of goals between two states. This incompatibility manifests itself in the basic attitudes of the parties toward each other.” Issues of high salience (such as a disputed territory [Vasquez 1996; Diehl and Goertz 2001]) may be important for the genesis of a rivalry, but hostility from such confrontations is carried over and influences other conflicts within the dyad. McGinnis

and Williams (2001), for their part, argue that belief systems and domestic policies harden over time, meaning hostile behaviour becomes difficult to dislodge. Moreover, electoral success in domestic political campaigns may be contingent on maintaining such embedded policies.

Though not explicitly concerned with enduring rivalries per se, the work of Leng (1983) is extensively cited as an important contribution to understanding state behaviour in recurring crises. Using quantitative data on six international dyads, Leng investigates how each successive crisis influences subsequent interaction. His general proposition is that “the propensity to draw lessons from the outcome of one dispute to guide policymaking in the next is especially strong when statesmen find that they are engaged in a second or third crisis with the same adversary” (Leng 1983: 380). Leng calls this phenomenon “experiential learning”, though he is quick to point out that “learning” in this context actually remains relatively limited. Instead of drawing comprehensive lessons from each crisis, states are more likely to consider definitive successes or failures to be direct consequences of their own particular strategies. As such,

a diplomatic failure is likely to be followed by a more coercive bargaining strategy – a strategy demonstrating power and firmness through the use of threats, including the threat of war, in the next encounter (Leng 1983: 382).

The important conclusion, therefore, is that states engaged in recurrent crises are likely to see an increase in hostility over time, as failure entrenches resolve and states become eager to show “toughness” vis-à-vis their opponent.



Moaz and Mor (1996) attempt to explore this proposition by creating a “supergame” model of enduring rivalry that incorporates both game-theoretic predictions and learning-related preference changes over time (i.e. from game to game). They find that both learning and exogenous factors (war outcomes, power transitions, third party interventions) influence preference change and help shape the evolution of an enduring rivalry. For example, they state:

...game-theoretic frameworks and models...promote a decision-theoretic (rather than systemic) conception of recurring conflict, and suggest that the strategic behaviour of actions in any given interaction is shaped by the outcomes of previous encounters with the same opponent. Although the approach is strategic and dynamic, the notion of learning that underlies it is quite restricted, referring as it does only to changes in the perception of the opponent...What the approach does not take into account is that players may change their *preferences* in response to previous outcomes. By their nature, EIRs are long-term processes during which major events transpire: wars may be fought, territory may be lost, leaders and governments may be overthrown – even the structure of the international system itself may be transformed. It is implausible to assume that throughout such changes the preferences of national decision makers would remain invariant (Moaz and Mor 1996: 144).

Thus, both the perceptions actors have of each other (formed through experiential learning) *and* the preferences of those actors (formed by exogenous factors related to the

structure of the international system) determine how each iteration of the rivalry is likely to play out. Importantly, they conclude that “the peaceful resolution of enduring rivalries may require actors to modify their conflict-related preferences” over time. Moreover, this change is possible despite ingrained hostility, as systemic factors can and do change. In this sense, even the most entrenched enmities may be amenable to termination given changing structural conditions (more on rivalry termination below).

The processes highlighted by Vasquez (1993; 1996), Leng (1983) and Moaz and Mor (1996; 2002), indicate the extent to which hostility in an enduring rivalry becomes compounded over time. As Thompson (1995: 214) explains: “The outcomes of, and the lessons perceived from, earlier confrontations are likely to influence subsequent behaviour.” This has important implications for the behaviour of states embroiled in rivalry: “At the very least, one might expect rivals to behave differently with one another than with nonrivals. Confrontations between rivals may very well work differently than confrontations between nonrivals.” (ibid: 215). The concept of enduring rivalry therefore offers theoretical insight into the dynamics of a consistently hostile dyadic relationship. The focus on a broader temporal context (including both past and potential future) provides a more accurate understanding of particular disputes and interactions. Indeed, the pull of the future should not be ignored, as state behaviour is conditioned not only by past conflicts but also by “anticipation of future confrontations (the expectation of a continuing conflict relationship)” (Diehl 1998: 3).

Obviously, the high volume of international conflict that occurs within enduring rivalries makes the dynamics of rivalry termination an important focus of study. As mentioned, Goertz and Diehl (1995) examine the impact of political shocks on the

termination of enduring rivalries. Examples of political shocks include world wars, the independence of new states, and civil wars within the dyad. Absent a significant political shock they suggest that a rivalry is likely to persist; this contention is buttressed by an empirical analysis indicating that of the 26 enduring rivalries included in their quantitative study that were deemed to have ended, over 90% did so as a result of a political shock. The presence of a shock is hence considered a “virtual necessary” (but not sufficient) condition for rivalry termination (Goertz and Diehl 1995: 46). This finding offers little prospect for the purposeful termination of a rivalry through diplomacy; political shocks are exogenous to the relationship and do not result from the behaviour of the states engaged in rivalry. Even third-party mediation attempts to merely temper (and not resolve) enduring rivalries were found to be generally inadequate:

Overall, we found mediation attempts to have relatively little impact on the behaviour of states in rivalries... They did not apparently influence the likelihood of subsequent war between rivals. If anything, mediation attempts were associated with a greater likelihood of war between rivals (Diehl and Goertz 2001: 217).

In this sense enduring rivalries may end eventually (and quickly following a political shock), but there seems little that third-parties can do in the meantime to facilitate the process.

Similar to the approach of Moaz and Mor (1996; 2002), Bennett (1996) focuses on states as rational actors and examines their incentives for bargaining over particular

issues; incentives which can, under the proper circumstances, lead to rivalry termination.

As he explains:

A rivalry ends when both states in the rival dyad stop using and threatening to use force to attempt to change the status quo, and either agree to some compromise resolution of previously disputed issues or give up claims over those issues (Bennett 1996: 161).

His theoretical framework posits an enduring rivalry as “a bargaining game in which the two rivals bargain over the issues at stake in an attempt to obtain a settlement favourable to themselves” (ibid: 162). Thus, rivalry termination will involve each state determining that dispute settlement has become more desirable than continued conflict. In evaluating what conditions are likely to influence such a preference change, the author found that a “common external threat” had a major impact on rivalry termination: “Times at which both rivals’ security is affected by a single third party will offer an additional incentive to the rivals to settle their disagreements” (ibid: 163). As Diehl Goertz and Saeedi (2005: 50) summarize:

One might assume that common external enemies engender greater feelings of amity (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”). The rapprochement between the United States and China in the 1970s and 1980s was, in part, related to concerns with their common rival, the Soviet Union. Other rivalries also reduce the resources and attention that can be directed to extant rivalries; states must make a

choices on which enemies to focus on and this may mean ending one rivalry in order to pursue others.

Conversely, Bennett found that the importance of the issue at stake, or the “issue salience”, was strongly correlated with a continuation in hostility. Other factors, such as system polarity and relative military capabilities, were not found to bear significantly on rivalry termination. For international mediators, Bennett’s emphasis on rational actors and changing preferences allows for guarded optimism regarding the prospect of brokering the end of an enduring rivalry. As he concludes: “...peacemakers should be alert for situations where the participants in a rivalry can be convinced that they should end their rivalry in order to face external threats” (Bennett 1996: 180). Nonetheless, rivalries characterized by disputes over issues with high salience – such as territory – are more likely to persist. At the very least, the suggestion that rivalry termination is possible absent the political shocks identified by Goertz and Diehl (1995) is important, although Bennett (1996: 180) concedes that political shocks may be the most powerful catalysts for preference change.

The two extant models of enduring rivalry offer key, but contrasting, approaches to the study of recurring crises in international relations. Importantly, both emphasize the temporal connection between conflicts, thus ameliorating a major deficiency in the traditional approach to the study of war. The punctuated equilibrium model is useful in that it establishes observable criteria for the designation of enduring rivalry, and maps the progression of rivalrous relationships in a way that is generalizable across the international system. It also provides strong evidence as to the empirical importance of

enduring rivalry in the study of international conflict. Finally, it elucidates the structural forces that influence the generation, development, and termination of rivalry such that the external dynamics of enduring rivalry, in the aggregate, can be observed. The evolutionary model, by contrast, explores the specific psychological processes that operate in the context of recurring and repeated confrontations between two states. It helps to explain why and how hostilities between two states compound over time and how such hostility influences the perceptions of states' vis-à-vis both their rivals and the specific stakes under contention. It relies less on quantitative trends and instead focuses on the internal dynamics of state interaction, thereby offering insight into future state behaviour. Naturally, this approach lends itself more readily to qualitative treatments of particular cases. As such, my analysis of the India-Pakistan rivalry draws predominately on the evolutionary model.

Specifically, I employ four theoretical criteria (borrowed from the work of Moaz and Mor [2002]) which I believe offer the most compelling and useful set of characteristics regarding enduring rivalry. The four components are designed to capture the different dynamics of state interaction within an enduring international rivalry:

1. *An outstanding set of unresolved issues.* There is a long-standing conflict of interest over a set of issues that typically remains unresolved over a long period of time, and over how specific militarized disputes or wars end at specific junctures of the states' common history.
2. *Strategic interdependence.* Each of the states views the other as a strategic rival. Each state pays a great deal of attention to what the other state does or to

what its officials say. Each state spends a great deal of effort in gathering intelligence about the other state, and it bases its strategic planning on what it thinks the other is doing or planning.

3. *Psychological manifestations of enmity.* Considerable suspicion, mistrust, hatred, and demonization underlie the relationship between the two states, even when this relationship lacks overt features of internationalized conflict.
4. *Repeated militarized conflict.* The relationship is characterized by a repeated set of overt militarized conflicts that extend over a relatively long period of time, and that recur with a considerable degree of intensity and severity.

source: Moaz and Mor (2002: 5)

I find these criteria to be useful because they capture both the structural (outstanding set of unresolved issues; repeated militarized conflict) and actor-level (strategic interdependence; psychological enmity) components of the enduring rivalry concept. In assessing their own framework, Moaz and Mor (2002: 22) highlight this strength:

...our theoretical framework explicitly links two levels: (1) the objective level of interaction – the actual occurrence or nonoccurrence of such events as conflict, war, and peace agreements, and (2) the subjective level of national decision-making, where these events are perceived and evaluated. This framework also provides a conception of how the two levels relate *over time*, as the evolutionary perspective requires. Thus, we relate the objective-interstate level of analysis that

dominates extant work in the field to the perceptual-decisional level, which appears to inform the few studies that propose explanations.

As made clear in my discussion, both levels of analysis are necessary for understanding how enduring rivalries are created (given appropriate structural environment), how they evolve over time (due to compounding enmity in recurring crises), and what is likely to occur within them. In the next chapter I examine the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry more closely, examining key contributions to the literature and highlighting potential gaps in standard accounts.



### Chapter 3

#### *The India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry*

The nation of Pakistan was created in 1947 as an alternative to, and instantly became an antagonist of, India. This fact has come to colour nearly all of Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour. In his exploration of Pakistan's "India Syndrome", Racine (2002: 196) notes:

The essence of the paradox of Pakistan lies in this very basic fact: born out of a partition chose by itself, it appears to have found in independence neither the peace, nor the security, nor the freedom of spirit that would enable it either to live in harmony with India, or to ignore it. It seems impossible for Pakistan to forget India and to get along with it.

Similarly, Robert Wirsing (2007) offers an insightful anecdote as to Islamabad's long-standing strategic obsession. While chairing a public seminar at Islamabad's Institute of Strategic Studies in the early 1980s, Wirsing listened to a speech by the head of Pakistan's Air Force, Air Chief Marshall M. Anwar Shamim. The topic was the Reagan administration's sale of forty F-16 combat aircraft to Pakistan, a deal designed to augment Pakistan's capabilities with an eye to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Wirsing (2007: 152) describes a particularly revealing moment in the speech:

In the course of Shamim's remarks, he showed a slide of the F-16's combat range. The concentric circles depicting its range were drawn over India, to Pakistan's

east, not over Afghanistan, where the proxy war to free Pakistan's western neighbour of its Soviet invaders was then at its height. Shamim's tacit acknowledgement that the F-16 purchase was done with India fixed indelibly in Pakistani minds struck me at the time as curiously symptomatic of an infirmity in that era's U.S.-Pakistan strategic alliance.

This is an infirmity that has persisted to the present day. The U.S. requires Pakistan's pursuit of a strategic objective; further, it believes that Islamabad will acquiesce given proper incentives. All the while, however, Pakistan's foreign policy is concentrated on its enmity with India, at the expense of other tactical considerations.

Fortunately, there is an established theoretical model designed to account for state behaviour when engaged in a long-standing, hostile, and conflictual relationship with another state. As Moaz and Mor (1996: 141) explain: "An Enduring International Rivalry (EIR) is, by definition, a long-term hate-affair between nations." Our theoretical discussion of the enduring rivalry framework in the preceding chapter articulated the relevance of understanding rivalry for understanding conflict. Employing this theoretical lens to a particular case can help clarify the specific behaviour of states involved in ongoing and protracted competitions with another state. Specifically, conventional accounts of Pakistan's duplicitous behaviour vis-à-vis coalition efforts in Afghanistan can be afforded added depth and analytical value. Particularly because, as I have stated, Pakistan's strategic priorities are formed almost exclusively with India in mind and, as I will explain, India and Pakistan are engaged in one of the most severe and long-standing EIRs in the international system. In this chapter I briefly summarize the literature

regarding the Indo-Pak dyad as an enduring rivalry. These works concentrate on many different aspects of the relationship, and include applications of both the punctuated equilibrium and evolutionary models of enduring rivalry. What becomes clear, however, is that the conventional literature on enduring rivalry misses a key aspect of the India-Pakistan relationship – the presence of nuclear weapons. Building on the observations made by Khan (2005), Basrur (2008), and Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), I argue that the dynamics of enduring *nuclear* rivalry result in fundamentally different patterns of escalation. Specifically, one is likely to observe an *increase* in bilateral conventional stability while simultaneously witnessing the proliferation of limited, sub-conventional proxy conflicts and crises.

### **The India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry**

The India-Pakistan rivalry is included on virtually every comprehensive list of enduring international rivalries (Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi 2005; Geller 2005). It is, in other words, an exemplary case. Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 the region of South Asia has been defined by continued hostility, tension, and conflict between the nations of India and Pakistan. In the words of T.V. Paul (2005: 3): “[t]he India-Pakistan rivalry remains one of the most enduring and unresolved conflicts of our times.” Even when compared with other enduring, dyadic rivalries India and Pakistan display an atypical preponderance for war and conflict (Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi 2005). Since 1947, a total of three wars (1947-48, 1965, and 1971) have been fought, with an

additional 43 militarized interstate disputes<sup>4</sup> (MIDs) occurring (ibid). Most recently, the two countries narrowly avoided a major military exchange in 2002, as tensions mounted along the border but ultimately diffused without incident (Leng 2005). Indeed, rapprochement over Kashmir, the relatively limited scope of the Kargil conflict in 1999, and the peaceful resolution of the border crisis in 2002, have led some to question whether the rivalry is not entering a period of significant détente and even termination (Wirsing 2007; Mohan 2008). Such optimism has been offset, however, by repeated crises such as the prominent Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 (Mukherjee 2009). Stability at the conventional level has been offset by further crises at the sub-conventional level, with the result that the rivalry, and its attendant competitive behaviour, remains alive and well.

The most salient issue of dispute is clearly the territorial conflict over Jammu and Kashmir (Leng 2005; Mohan 2008; Mukherjee 2009; for a comprehensive treatment of this competition see Wirsing 2003; Saideman 2005). Generally, Pakistan is considered to be the revisionist state, as it seeks to incorporate the majority-Muslim populations living in the Indian controlled areas of Kashmir (roughly two-thirds of the territory). India, for its part, is labelled the status-quo state as it considers control over Kashmir to be crucial to its secular identity, and fears that an independent or Pakistani-controlled Kashmir could provide inspiration to similar secession movements elsewhere in the country. The result has been repeated, and as of yet unresolved, confrontation. As Saideman (2005: 203) summarizes:

---

<sup>4</sup> Defined as “a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force...these acts must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and government sanctioned” (Gochman and Moaz 1984: 587).

The tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir have been extraordinarily costly to both sides...While the two countries have many differences and there are many sources of conflict, unrealized irredentism is at the core of the rivalry.

Pakistan has, through a variety of methods, sought to “regain” the “lost” Muslim-majority of Kashmir. India has consistently resisted Pakistan, while inadvertently stoking the fires of irredentism through its policies in Kashmir.

Pakistan’s persistent challenges to the status quo have generally been successfully rebuked by a conventionally superior India. Yet because India’s goals have remained limited (merely maintaining the current distribution of territory), and its advantages in Kashmir have been mitigated by various factors (such as a concern with China to the East and qualitative inferiority in certain weapons systems [see Paul 2006]) the dyad has not experienced the sort of cathartic war that might resolve hostilities once and for all.

As such, the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry persists to this day, and represents a major threat to regional stability. Several authors have attempted to understand this dangerous dyad through an application of enduring rivalry theory. Khan (2005) addresses the role of nuclear weapons; Tremblay and Schofield (2005) examine the impact of domestic factors, such as regime type, on the intensity and persistence of the rivalry; and Paul (2006) analyzes relative power capabilities, designating the Indo-Pak dyad a case of “truncated asymmetry”. More general treatments are offered by Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi (2005) and Leng (2005). The former employs the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalry, and explores how the particulars of the India-Pakistan rivalry are accounted for by this framework. The latter offers an overview of state behaviour from

one crisis to the next, indicating the extent to which hostility has become compounded and entrenched over time, and is thus an example of the evolutionary model of enduring rivalry. I first examine the two general treatments before returning to the important and over-looked implications of Khan's (2005) emphasis on nuclear weapons.

Drawing on data of India-Pakistan confrontations between 1947-2001, Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi (2005) offer a comprehensive rendering of the Indo-Pak rivalry. Tracking the trend of conflicts over time, they find significant evidence to support the use of the punctuated equilibrium model. The political shock of partition is believed to have created an environment in which rivalry could take hold. As we know, a political shock is a "dramatic" change to the international system; the newfound independence of two contiguous states certainly constitutes such a change, particularly for the nations themselves. Such a drastic reorganization of the international system creates the opportunity for new conflicts to emerge:

The independence of India and Pakistan was a political shock to the region that set the stage for the rivalry, but it was the presence of unresolved territorial issues as a consequence of independence that encouraged its development" (Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi 2005: 33).

That is, once the environment was set there was no guarantee that rivalry would ensue (political shocks being necessary but not sufficient conditions for rivalry initiation). What was required was a conflict that could generate high levels of hostility in an initial encounter. The authors stress the general salience of territorial issues in disputes between

nations (see also Huth 2000; Vasquez 2001). In the India-Pakistan context, they further highlight the added symbolic and religious attachments that permeate the dispute over Kashmir. The salience of the Kashmir issue led to the first war between the nations in 1947, a war in which India was generally recognized to be the victor. Yet India's victory was not decisive enough to completely discourage Pakistan from initiating subsequent disputes.

Thus, another key component in ensuring rivalries progress beyond the proto-state and become enduring is satisfied:

The other dimension of rivalry maintenance is that disputed issues in the rivalry are not resolved, best indicated by repeated stalemate or indecisive outcomes to the militarized confrontations. Thus, the status quo, which is unacceptable to one or both of the participants, remains, and generates future attempts to change it. In the absence of changed preferences or the ability of one side to disable the challenger, the rivalry may persist for many years... (Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi 2005: 37).

While India did enjoy overall preponderance in conventional capabilities, this advantage was mitigated by Pakistan's relative strength in Kashmir and its superior technology in certain weapons systems, meaning India (the status quo state) was unable to achieve the level of victory required to discourage future attacks by Pakistan (the revisionist state) (see Paul 2006 for his discussion of India-Pakistan as a "truncated asymmetry"). As a result:

In the case of India-Pakistan, most of the disputes end in stalemate or indeterminate outcomes...As predicted by the punctuated equilibrium model, most of the military confrontations have ended in stalemates; 35 (or 81.4 percent) of the disputes ended with such indecisive results (Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi 2005: 39).

The punctuated equilibrium model therefore appears to correctly account for the onset and maturation of the India-Pakistan rivalry. It is less useful, however, for understanding the dynamics of hostility throughout the life of the rivalry. While the structure of the enduring rivalry may be correctly observed and predicted by the punctuated equilibrium model, little is understood about the internal *processes* of the rivalry that have caused India and Pakistan to be so violent and hostile over time. This highlights the general shortcoming of the punctuated equilibrium model: while useful for identifying and observing enduring rivalries, it fails to adequately engage the dynamics of state behaviour within them. In other words, it remains concerned with quantitative, aggregate, and structural considerations at the expense of a more actor-oriented perspective. Indeed, discussions regarding the “dynamics” of enduring rivalries entail the tracking of trends along a chart instead of analyzing the specific manner in which rivals interact with one another.

A quite different approach is offered by Leng (2005), who provides insight into the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry based on his concept of “experiential learning” outlined in chapter 2. Leng (2005: 103) contends that the learning patterns of the two



nations have been dysfunctional, such that the “experiential learning that has occurred during the course of the rivalry most often has reinforced behaviour that has encouraged the recurrence of crises and war.” While recognizing that other variables (such as changing capabilities, changes in government, changes to the international environment) are key to the India-Pakistan rivalry, Leng (2005: 105) nonetheless maintains that:

...no less important...are each party's perceptions of the other, particularly perception's of the other's intentions and capabilities, and of the most effective means of dealing with the other. Learning plays an important role in forming these perceptions.

The author then proceeds to evaluate the strategy of each state following successive crises. Repeatedly, India and Pakistan have displayed increased resolve vis-à-vis one another following conflict. India, for its part, has viewed the repeated war initiations of Pakistan as evidence of its inherent hostility:

The lessons that Indian leaders have drawn from the rivalry have reinforced their belief that India's interests are best served by responding in a resolute and uncompromising manner to what they view as an implacably hostile rival. India's decisive conventional military superiority, the coopting of the insurgency movement in Kashmir by Islamic militants from Pakistan, and an international environment conducive to proactive responses to terrorists and the states that

provide them with safe haven, add to the rationale for India's realpolitik approach (Leng 2005: 111).

That is, India's perception of Pakistan has compounded over time; with each confrontation it increasingly believes that a peaceful Pakistan is unlikely to emerge. Moreover, its superior capabilities have meant that forceful action has been considered an optimum strategy. For instance, a relatively cautious and ineffective response to the Pakistani incursion at the Rann of Kutch border crossing in 1965 led to a much more decisive and aggressive military response to a similar Pakistani incursion a few months later (precipitating, it should be mentioned, the border war of 1965) (Leng 2005). According to Leng's model of experiential learning, successful strategies are likely to be repeated while unsuccessful ones are adjusted. Hence, India's resolve to act forcefully was reinforced. Pakistan, for its part, has been continuously forced to reevaluate its strategy. Repeated military defeats have led Pakistan to pursue alternative methods of challenging the status quo, such as its infamous support of Islamic militant groups in their terror campaign against India. Moreover, the ability of these insurgents to successfully create instability in Indian Kashmir has led to a reinforcement of this strategy.

Ultimately, Leng (2005) concludes: "The realpolitik culture that pervades Indo-Pakistani relations constricts the range of actions available to their leaders, colors their historical memories, and narrows their collective identities." While the territorial dispute over Kashmir remains salient for both nations, the lessons learned by each party from an ongoing series of confrontations ratchets hostility to an artificially high level. In other words, Leng's appraisal of the India-Pakistan rivalry exhibits strong evidence of the

evolutionary model of enduring rivalries; each successive dispute is informed by prior crises, such that enmity is promoted essentially on a psychological level.

Yet the predictions of Leng's model fail to account for the aforementioned levels of relative stability in the recent bilateral relationship between the two rivals. The punctuated equilibrium model of Diehl, Goertz and Saaedi (2005) similarly offers little explanation for such recent patterns. Neither general model is adequate for understanding the specifics of a rivalry that defies one of the core requirements of the enduring rivalry model: repeated bilateral military conflict. The fundamental question, articulated eloquently by Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 2), is explaining why

...India and Pakistan have avoided major war over the past two decades, despite profound mistrust, chronic everyday tensions, an intractable political conflict over Kashmir, a prior history of three Indo-Pakistani wars, and the gradual but steady refinement of both sides nuclear weapons capabilities...

If the escalatory nature of Leng's model held true, we would expect full-blown war at relatively consistent intervals throughout the rivalry. Similarly, the punctuated equilibrium model predicts an even distribution of war through the life of the rivalry – yet the last major war between occurred in 1971.<sup>5</sup> What is lacking is an appreciation of the pacifying effects of nuclear capabilities.

As Wirsing (2003) maintains, the back-to-back testing of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan in 1998 added a significant new dimension to the dyad (Wirsing

---

<sup>5</sup> Though often referred to as the "Kargil War", the confrontation in 1999 remained limited – confined to India's side of the LoC and involving non-uniformed Pakistani soldiers.

2003). Considerable international relations scholarship has investigated the impact of nuclear weapons on conflict behaviour between rivals. Most prominent is the concept of “nuclear deterrence” (for an overview of the nuclear deterrence literature on the India-Pakistan relationship see Mistry 2009; also Kapur 2005). As Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 8) summarize:

The foundational insight of nuclear deterrence theory is that states possessing nuclear weapons avoid direct military conflict with one another for fear of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons – and of the mass death, suffering, and destruction nuclear use would cause.

Generally, the tenets of nuclear deterrence are considered operative in the India-Pakistan relationship. As Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 11) assert: “Our main overall conclusion is that the nuclear-deterrence proposition provides the strongest explanation for the absence of major war in the region over the last two decades...” Basrur (2008: 6), for his part, notes that the introduction of nuclear capabilities has “complex effects, intensifying rivalries and yet moderating the way they are played out.” Khan (2005) considers the acquisition of nuclear capabilities to be a significant contributor to the continuation of the India-Pakistan rivalry. He suggests that while nuclear weapons may decrease the likelihood of full-blown war, they may also increase the number of low-level crises. This is a clear articulation of the so-called “stability-instability paradox” first conceptualized by Glenn Snyder (1965). As Krepon (2003: 2) explains:

The stability-instability paradox was embedded in the enormity of the stakes involved in crossing the nuclear threshold. As posited by Western deterrence theorists, offsetting nuclear capabilities and secure, second-strike capabilities would induce special caution, providing the basis for war prevention and escalation control. Offsetting nuclear deterrents channelled the superpower competition into “safer” pursuits, the object of which would be to impose penalties on an adversary without inducing direct conflict.

The threat of nuclear retaliation in South Asia, therefore, “deters nuclear and conventional aggression, but not the unconventional military operations characteristic of guerrilla warfare” (Hagerty 1998: 184). An evaluation of conflict patterns in the India-Pakistan rivalry largely confirms this contention. For instance, Khan (2005: 162) differentiates between the nuclear (beginning in the mid 1980s) and pre-nuclear periods:

In the pre-nuclear age, wars occurred readily with little hesitation, leading to instability in the relationship... Contrary to that, the nuclear period had more stability due to absence of wars, but it also had more instability due to the frequent eruption of crises.

Important for studying the effects of enduring *nuclear* rivalry, therefore, is considering not only the *frequency* of conflicts but also the *form* such conflicts are likely to take. Even if India and Pakistan have not recently engaged in full-scale war (and are unlikely to in the future) it would be foolish to suggest that such patterns represent anything

approaching appeasement between the two antagonists. Instead, India and Pakistan have sought alternative avenues by which to engage one another. Khan (2005: 162), for example, finds that the nuclear era has “witnessed the usage of terrorism, proxy-wars, and low-to-medium-intensity violence by Pakistan. The Indians also changed their strategy from full-scale to limited war...” Writing as early as 1995, Ganguly noted that “...widespread evidence exists of Pakistan’s support for the insurgencies in Punjab and more recently in Kashmir. India, in turn, has been involved for some time in exploiting the Sindhi-*Mujahir* conflict in the Pakistani province of Sindh” (Ganguly 1995: 326). Rajagopalan (2006) highlights what he considers to be a shortcoming in the application of the stability-instability paradox to South Asia. Snyder’s original framework, he argues, was meant to indicate instances of limited *conventional* conflict that were ultimately prevented from escalating due to the nuclear deterrent. That is, the connection was between the conventional and nuclear level, not the sub-conventional and nuclear. Far from damaging the present argument this observation in fact strengthens it. That South Asia has come to be defined by sub-conventional conflict is a direct result of ambiguous nuclear doctrines on the part of both India and Pakistan (see Basrur 2008 for a detailed discussion). This makes even limited conventional conflict dangerous due to concerns over escalation. The result is, as has been observed, an increase in non-conventional confrontation as each side seeks a viable tactic through which to challenge its rival. In this context, the limited and proxy conflicts that punctuate the region of South Asia become not mere side effects of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry but rather central components of it – they replace conventional conflict as the outcome and perpetuator of

enduring rivalry. In the next chapter I explore this proposition by examining the underlying dynamics associated with escalation in an enduring nuclear rivalry.

## Chapter 4

### *Escalation In An Enduring Nuclear Rivalry: The Role Of Conflict Contagion*

As has been argued, conflict in an enduring nuclear rivalry is unlikely to occur at a bilateral conventional level. The risks associated with nuclear escalation rationally precludes major war between nuclear rivals. As relative stability comes to define the bilateral relationship, however, states engaged in enduring nuclear rivalry are likely to pursue alternative strategies for challenging their long-standing enemy. In the case of India and Pakistan, this has meant confrontation by proxy – conflict on a sub-conventional level. In chapter 5 I will discuss the implications of the India-Pakistan rivalry for events in Afghanistan – a task that will speak directly to coalition policies in the region. In this chapter, however, I find it worthwhile to examine the other direction of this conceptual causal arrow. That is, if the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry influences the conflict in Afghanistan, is it not possible that the war itself has important implications for the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry? This does not represent a deviation from the general focus on the war itself; rather, it constitutes a necessary component of a conceptual circle that helps establish a more thorough reading of Afghanistan and its surrounding region – a reading with insight not only into the roots of current instability but potentially the geopolitical future of South and Central Asia as well. If I am correct regarding the status of sub-conventional, proxy conflicts as venues of escalation in enduring nuclear rivalry, the important question becomes *how* and *why* such escalation occurs in a *particular* area. Specifically, why Afghanistan? The answer lies in the regional effects of the Afghan war itself. Following the topple of the Taliban, India began to move purposefully to establish itself in Afghanistan; Pakistan reacted, and began manipulating its ties with extremist



groups to attack Indian targets in the country (see chapter 5). Thus, the conflict in Afghanistan appears to have *spread* to the India-Pakistan dyad, initiating a proxy conflict between the enduring nuclear rivals.

The rivalry approach to international conflict highlights the extent to which particular international events (specifically, war and conflict) cannot be examined in isolation, but must instead be properly contextualized in time and space. Similarly, the theory of conflict “contagion” examines the possibility that war at time=1 has important causal implications for war and conflict at time=2. The similarities between enduring rivalry theory and contagion have been briefly mentioned elsewhere (see for example Diehl and Goertz 2001: chapter 12) but I believe a more purposeful *integration* may be possible in which the dynamics of war contagion have important implications for the underlying processes of enduring rivalry. Moreover, the current conflict in Afghanistan represents an ideal opportunity to pursue this potential; the presence of an ongoing war in the vicinity of an enduring nuclear rivalry suggests the simultaneous applicability of two extant theories of international conflict. Specifically, I argue that the onset of the Afghan war in 2001 had significant structural implications for the region of Central and South Asia – implications that directly affected the strategic calculus of India and Pakistan in the context of their enduring nuclear rivalry. Reacting to changes in the regional environment, India and Pakistan pursued strategies that have contributed to continued instability and escalation in Afghanistan (see chapter 5). Before fully discussing the implications of this argument, however, it will be useful to examine the theory of conflict contagion in more detail. I will then return to a specific discussion of contagion as it

relates to the Afghan war and the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry, and explore the extent to which future regional stability may be affected by its dynamics.

As Most and Starr (1980: 932) summarize, the concept of contagion/diffusion is based on the belief that “international conflicts may spread from one nation to another in patterns similar to those followed by infectious diseases. Participation in war at one point in time may affect the likelihood of subsequent war participations.” With its explicit emphasis on space and time, the contagion/diffusion approach shares important aspects with the theory of enduring rivalry. Specifically, both enduring rivalry theory and contagion theory emphasize the spatial and temporal components of conflict, eschewing the more traditional cross-sectional approach that long dominated conflict studies. For example, Faber et al. (1984: 279-280) note that the “orientation of COW [Correlates of War] research has invited the assumption that observations over time and over space are independent from one another” going on to suggest that such “studies, obviously, never can explain dynamic interaction.” Howelling and Siccama (1985) also take issue with the assumption of independence, which they believe ignores important and fundamental aspects of international interaction; namely, the spatial and temporal context that connects international events. In other words, both enduring rivalry and contagion/diffusion incorporate the idea that conflicts are related over time and that specific events may not be adequately understood when examined in isolation.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will briefly summarize the relevant literature on contagion/diffusion, highlighting the important contributions to the field and their application to the current case. Of particular importance will be the concepts of “opportunity” and “willingness”, most comprehensively outlined by Siverson and Starr

(1991), which attempt to integrate both structure and agency into an understanding of the war contagion/diffusion process. Kadera (1998: 372) summarizes the two concepts well: “Opportunity typically refers to systemic structures that produce alternatives from which nations choose, and willingness refers to factors influencing which alternative a nation will chose.” As will be demonstrated, the geographic proximity of the Afghan war to the Indo-Pak dyad means the structural components of opportunity are largely satisfied. In terms of willingness, a significant portion of the literature focuses on alliance behaviour as an indicator of what nations will choose to do. I submit, however, that the enmity generated in an enduring rival is sufficiently powerful to create willingness in terms of conflict initiation. This will lead into a more purposeful discussion of the connection between enduring rivalry and contagion, with the possibility that the two dynamics may influence and reinforce each other in a process that further enhances the possibility of instability in South Asia.

### **Opportunity and Willingness**

It is generally recognized that the study of conflict and war have dominated international relations scholarship, particularly in the formative years of the discipline. The focus of these studies, for the most part, has been the onset of war. Certainly, examining the circumstances that precipitate specific outbreaks of conflict is an important and valuable endeavour. Nonetheless, scholars have noted a fundamental problem with the treatment of wars as isolated, independent, and static events. Siverson and Starr (1990: 47) explain the dilemma:

The initially unrecognized problem [was] the conflation of the onset of war (a dichotomous variable) with the size of a war (a continuous variable). The problem, however, has consequences significantly beyond what type of measurement is appropriate, since by using the *size* of a war while the theory under investigation specifies that *onset* is being measured, the distinct possibility of diffusion is overlooked.

That is, the process by which a war is initiated may be markedly different than how that war expands and/or influences other international conflicts over time. As Most and Starr (1980: 932) observed elsewhere: “Most of the analyses of the causes of war have ignored the theoretical and empirical evidence that at least some wars have significant consequences for subsequent conflicts.” Building on this recognition, scholars began to investigate the dynamic effects of war, including the empirical observation that wars tended to expand with previously peaceful states joining ongoing conflicts.

The results were encouraging (or discouraging, considering the phenomenon in question). Several factors were identified that seemed to augment the possibility that the volume of conflict participation would increase from time 0 to time 1. Significant evidence was found to suggest that new war participations were influenced by such factors as geographical proximity and alliance memberships. That is, if a nation has a neighbour or alliance partner at war they are more likely to be drawn into the conflict; if both treatments are present, the chances are even greater (Most and Starr 1980; Siverson and Starr 1991). Beyond the expansion of existing wars, however, it was also found that outbreaks of *new* wars were clustered in time and space. As Howeling and Siccama

(1985: 646) conclude: “If fighting starts in a certain region, it becomes probably that within a short interval of time additional wars will break out in the vicinity of the battlefield.” In a quantitative analysis of three historical periods (1818-1853, 1854-1913, 1914-1980) the authors established that “one of the causes of war is war itself” (ibid: 661); that is, violence begets violence and the “contagion” metaphor is largely confirmed.

In their attempt to understand the contagion phenomenon, Siverson and Starr (1990; 1991) began by emphasizing the geopolitical *context* of international behaviour. They borrowed extensively from the work of Sprout and Sprout (1956, 1965, 1969) on the ecological relationship between environment and entity, in which environmental possibility helps to shape – but not determine – entity behaviour. In other words, all entities are bound by their environment, with the structure of that environment permitting or preventing certain actions and events. Nonetheless, merely understanding the structure of the environment (the international system) would be insufficient to determine the behaviour of a particular entity (a state); nothing is resolutely determined by structure – the rationale of particular entities must be accounted for. Ultimately, a combination of systemic and entity factors is required in order to explain events in the system.

The concept of opportunity relates to the environment; the structure of what is possible:

The central use of *opportunity* is as the degree of interaction....As in Sprout and Sprout’s environmentalism, this simply means that some activity must at base be physically, technologically or intellectually possible. Once the obstacle of possibility is crossed, however, opportunity is, in fact, a continuous phenomenon

in which some nations have more or less of it with respect to other nations  
(Siverson and Starr 1990: 48).

Conversely, willingness concerns the decision-making calculus of individual states or  
“entities”:

The dynamics of choice are embedded in a decision maker’s image of the world,  
or definition of the situation...It is through willingness that decision makers  
recognize opportunities and then translate those opportunities into alternatives  
that are weighed in some manner (Siverson and Starr 1990: 49).

Siverson and Starr (1991: 21-22) explain the importance of allowing for both levels of  
analysis:

While the micro- and macrolevel approaches to international conflict are  
generally posed as rival or competing explanations, the development of the  
opportunity and willingness concepts was specifically designed to indicate how  
the two levels could be integrated or synthesized...Neither micro- nor macrolevel  
approaches are individually sufficient for understanding international politics;  
instead they appear to be jointly necessary.

In other words, in order for wars to diffuse, conflict must allow the opportunity for, and  
influence the willingness of, nations to engage in conflict. The study of these two

concepts therefore centres around identifying reasonable measurements for them; that is, what factors contribute to both high levels of opportunity and high levels of willingness. As mentioned, Siverson and Starr (1991: 25) argue that opportunity and willingness cannot be separated: “They do not create mutually exclusive categories. Anything that affects the structural possibilities of the environment(s) within which decision makers must act also affects the incentive structures or those decision makers.” Nonetheless, it is possible to identify factors that are primarily structural or actor-level, while bearing in mind that the interplay between the two create and influence the environment as a whole. Indeed, this recognition maintains the emphasis on context that informs this thesis as a whole.

As noted in the definition of opportunity provided above, the key variable is the level of international *interaction* experienced by states. High levels of interaction lead to an increased opportunity for diffusion processes. In their study of international borders, Starr and Most (1976: 584) suggested that contiguous nations were likely to have high levels of interaction:

To the extent that nations are “close” to each other physically, they are likely to interact and perceive their mutual importance. If a nation is “close” to a large number of other nations, it is faced with a potentially high risk that it may be threatened or attacked by at least one of its neighbors, for example.

Boulding’s (1962) theory of “viability” argues that the strength of a nation diminishes over distance (through the “loss of strength gradient”). The ability of a nation to project

power is greater in its immediate vicinity, meaning proximate nations are more likely to affect one another's uncertainty than distant ones. A state may either be "unconditionally viable" (secure) or "conditionally viable" (insecure) based on its power relative to other states. In issues of power and preponderance therefore, it is likely that physical proximity creates higher levels of state interaction and a greater possibility that states will be made conditionally viable. As a result, the behaviour of proximate states is afforded high strategic value. As Most and Starr (1980: 934) explain:

...simple geographic proximity seems to constitute a very basic and at least initially useful basis for identifying those groups of interacting nations within which diffusion processes are most likely...Nations that are "close" to one another in terms of distance are likely to interact and perceive each other's conditions and behaviours as important.

This contention is supported by the findings of Faber et al. (1984) which found that wars do not tend to spread *between* regions but rather *within* them, suggesting that there is a distinctly regional component to diffusion processes. Howeling and Siccama (1984: 647-648) argue that the regional nature of war diffusion results from the uncertainty caused by proximate nations:

...we hypothesize that processes of war...infection will result in predominantly regional effects. This expectation is founded on the belief that an outbreak of war in some regional setting is likely to affect the local distribution of power more



dramatically than the power distribution in the rest of the world...Another way of expressing the expectation of regional infection is that additional nations, trying to maximize their share of the spoils or to minimize their part of the losses, will be situated predominately in the vicinity of hostilities that are already going on.

The focus here is on *context*. Given the presence of an ongoing conflict in the immediate vicinity, states are more likely to become involved as the consequences of that conflict bear directly on their own interests. International borders are helpful in measuring interaction because, as Boulding (1962) suggests, state power is greatest closest to home.

Quantitative analysis on the effect of contiguous international borders for war diffusion supports such a claim. Studying the period 1946-65, Starr and Most (1976) found that new war participation was between three to five times more likely (depending on the data sets used) if a nation had a least one warring border nation (WBN) in the previous five years. They concluded that “[t]he results of these simple analyses provide impressive evidence in support of the border/diffusion hypothesis” (Starr and Most 1976: 616). A subsequent study largely confirmed these results, with the suggestion that:

While having a warring border nation clearly did not mean that nation would necessarily have at least one new war participation in the subsequent five-year period, it certainly increased the probabilities that subsequent new war participations would occur (Most and Starr 1980: 944).

More recent overviews on the literature regarding diffusion (e.g. Kadera 1998; Starr 2005) again reinforce this proposition. From a structural perspective, therefore, the *opportunity* for geographically proximate states' to interact is related to the potential for war diffusion. Certainly, this observation does not explain *how* or *why* war may be contagious, but it does establish certain necessary conditions that facilitate the contagion process. It establishes different levels of possibilities with regards to the international system or "environment".

Given significant opportunity – that is, high levels of interaction such as that between contiguous or proximate states – what factors influence the decision of a particular state to enter or initiate conflict? As Siverson and Starr (1990: 49-50) explain, structural considerations are not sufficient to account for conflict diffusion:

It needs to be emphasized that within...a warring border nation framework it is not reasoned that borders *cause* wars but rather that they contribute to the potential outbreak of violence because the more borders a nation has, the greater (1) the number of risks and opportunities confronting the nation, (2) the likelihood that the nation or its territories will be "conditionally viable"...and (3) the level of that nation's uncertainty. Under these conditions, it is asserted, nations have a greater probability of going to war.

Translating this probability into action is contingent on entity level factors. Willingness, in this sense, refers to how states reach particular decisions: "It is through willingness that decision makers *recognize* opportunities and then translate those opportunities into

alternatives that, in some manner, are weighed” (Siverson and Starr 1991: 25; emphasis in original). Willingness is influenced, but not determined, by structural considerations. Factors related to uncertainty and balance of power are exogenous to the state itself; willingness refers to those endogenous factors that determine how a state will act *given* the possibilities it faces.

Siverson and Starr (1991) offer the most comprehensive treatment of willingness in the war diffusion literature. Specifically, they concentrate on the possibility that international alliances are a useful predictor of state preference with regards to ongoing conflicts: “Alliances as part of the international incentive structure, thus, may affect the willingness of decision makers in their foreign policy choices” (ibid: 26). This contention is based on the reasonable observation that alliances reflect conscious decisions by states to align their foreign policy interests with other nations. A more nuanced component of this argument however is the suggestion that alliances, similar to borders, represents a form of *interaction* between states. Just as is the case with international borders, it is as an agent of interaction that alliances may precipitate war diffusion. Particularly revealing is the following passage:

If alliances can be used to indicate the salience and importance of states to one another and delineate subgroups of highly interacting states, then they should have an impact on the diffusion of war similar to that found by Most and Starr using borders as agents of diffusion (ibid: 35).

In other words, it is not merely alliances qua alliances that qualify them as measurements of willingness. Instead, it is their ability to indicate state interaction based on preferences and perceptions that suggest a connection to war diffusion processes. They further explain:

...it is useful to remember that the importance we have attached to alliances is chiefly as a device for estimating an underlying variable, willingness...they were primarily used as a measure of willingness of one nation to join its foreign policy to that of some other nation or nations. *In a sense, they tell us about the proximity of one state's foreign policy to that of some other nation or nations* (ibid: 42; emphasis added).

Presumably, other factors could be introduced that are also capable of measuring such “proximity of foreign policy”. Further, the concept of willingness can be extended beyond the decision by states to join ongoing wars, as is expected when examining the influence of alliances on war diffusion. Fundamentally, the interaction that underlies willingness may extend to all aspects of interstate relationships, and may hence be influenced by the regional disturbances believed to cause the initiation of *new* wars in the vicinity of existing ones. For example, the following statement posits alliances as a way in which states deal with their environment:

...if the geopolitical environment, which consists of space, distance, topographical features, and the arrangement of political entities, takes on meaning

as a set of constraints on the possibilities and probabilities available to decision makers, alliances may be conceptualized as one mechanism such decision makers may use to cope with or adapt to that environment (Siverson and Starr 1991: 38).

It is therefore reasonable to suggest that other factors may similarly act as coping devices. For instance, if the foreign policy priorities of a state are dominated by an overriding concern (whether through strategic friendship as in an alliance or enmity as in an enduring rivalry), the structural opportunities presented to that state will be filtered through that concern; thus, if a strong alliance causes a state to join an ongoing war, enduring rivalry may generate willingness to initiate a new conflict based on enmity.

If we recall the prior discussion regarding enduring rivalry, we know that rivalry is a powerful determinant of foreign policy priorities vis-à-vis a states' rival. Moreover, it is clear that states engaged in enduring rivalry have high levels of interaction with each other. Similar to formal alliances, enduring rivalry is an excellent indicator of interaction as such relationships are in fact designated according to the number of identifiable disputes that occur between two states. For example, we know that the operational definition of an enduring rivalry requires a minimum of six military disputes over a minimum of 20 years (Goertz and Diehl 1995). In other words, enduring rivalry represents a tangible measurement of interaction, with the expectation that, at a minimum, states have engaged in recent and recurring conflict.

Similarly, because enduring rivalry is a reflection of what states actually *do* as opposed to what states *say* (as may be the case with alliances, which states may ultimately choose not to honour) it likely represents a better measurement of underlying

willingness than alliances. As Thompson (1995: 219) suggests in his evaluation of enduring rivalries: “Rivalry patterns should turn out to be much more useful than alliance patterns in predicting who ends up fighting whom and when.” I contend that enduring rivalry represents an extremely strong measurement of the salience of one state’s foreign policy for that of another. That is, states engaged in enduring rivalry are extremely sensitive to the foreign policy behaviour of their rivals. Further, this salience is necessarily conflictual, as the enduring rivalry framework deals exclusively with hostility. Of particular relevance is the “actor dimension” of enduring rivalry outlined by Vasquez (1993; 1996) and mentioned in chapter 2. Consider the following passage:

The actor dimension results from a persistent disagreement and the use of negative acts which build up negative affect (psychological hostility). Hostility reinforces the actor dimension which gradually reduces all issues to a single overarching issue...This makes for more disagreement, greater use of negative acts, and an intensification of hostility, which in turn reinforces the actor dimension. An escalating conflict spiral results, which creates an atmosphere in which crises are likely to be born (Vasquez 1993: 82).

The suggestion that “all issues” are reduced to “a single overarching issue” is a clear indication of the relative salience of one state in the rivalry to the other. Moreover, the emphasis on psychological hostility reinforces the notion that even at times in which relations are (ostensibly) peaceful, underlying enmity persists. In many ways, the emergence of the actor dimension suggests an ever-present willingness for war on the

part of the two states engaged in enduring rivalry, the actual outbreak of which is likely contingent on changing structural conditions.

Further, it has already been argued that war has the potential to upset the regional balance of interests. For instance, Siverson and Starr (1991: 100; emphasis added) note:

...if it is the case that borders and alliances create a structure of risks and opportunities, the fact that a bordering state or an alliance partner is at war redefines the situation and opens up new risks and opportunities. *It is this new structure that provides the setting for new war participation or infectious diffusion.*

In other words, a war which alters the established regional structure enhances the structural incentives for war contagion for proximate nations. Moreover, if that war directly affects the competing interests of enduring rivals, the instability it causes may exacerbate existing tensions, potentially leading to conflict initiation.

### **Opportunity and Willingness in Central and South Asia**

The preceding theoretical discussion distilled the two main elements of contagion: opportunity and willingness. This section will explore these concepts as they relate to the India-Pakistan dyad and, more specifically, the Afghan war. The relevance of this discussion to the current thesis involves the interplay between the conditions related to contagion and the dynamics of the enduring nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. While the analysis of enduring nuclear rivalry in chapter 3 suggested that sub-

conventional proxy conflicts are attractive strategies for states faced with a compelling nuclear deterrent, the injection of contagion theory offers a more complete picture of how and why *particular* conflicts may occur within that context. That is, the conditions associated with opportunity and willingness bear directly on how competitive behaviour in enduring nuclear rivalry is likely to play out. Further, the ability of the contagion model to account for conflict participation *over time* means it is particularly useful for projecting into the future; given the explicit emphasis on regional stability in U.S. foreign policy, outlining factors that may help shape the future of the Central and South Asian geopolitical landscape is an important endeavour and helps to complete the theoretical picture developed in the preceding chapters.

The Afghan war began in October of 2001. Coalition forces, led by the United States, conducted a swift campaign, quickly overthrowing the Taliban regime in Kabul. The implications of this event for the regional balance of power have been profound (see Tellis 2010 for a comprehensive overview of all regional actors and their respective interests in Afghanistan). Arguably, the states most directly impacted (other than U.S., its allies, and Afghanistan itself obviously) by the war in Afghanistan were and are India and Pakistan. The fall of the Taliban touched directly on Indian and Pakistani strategic interests. For Pakistan, a previously pliant regime was replaced with a government tacitly connected to New Delhi. India, conversely, saw a major opportunity to project its power capabilities into Central Asia and, as the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated, prevent the reemergence of inherently hostile Islamic extremism in the region. Further, Pakistani and Indian interests are inherently contradictory in Afghanistan – they are, ultimately, defined in opposition to one another (see chapter 5).



The war between coalition forces and the Taliban (and subsequently the insurgency directed at coalition forces by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremist elements) thus redefined regional realities in a manner that directly contributed to the “opportunity” for India and Pakistan to engage in sub-conventional conflict in Afghanistan. As the contagion literature predicts, the geographic proximity of Afghanistan to both India and Pakistan creates significant levels of “interaction” such that “awareness, risks and opportunities” (Most and Starr 1980) deriving from the conflict occurring there are acutely felt by both New Delhi and Islamabad. In other words, “conditions” in Afghanistan are perceived as highly salient for the foreign policy of both nations. Absent the U.S.’s decision to invade in 2001, the status quo would have continued – Pakistan would have been secure knowing an enemy to India remained in power in Kabul (despite its own minor grievances with the Afghan Taliban regarding the status of the Durand Line) and India would have been forced to continue its search for alternative avenues of access to Central Asia (Blank 2003). Obviously the long-standing differences between the two nations would have continued to shape their respective strategies vis-à-vis Afghanistan, but the *opportunity* for more purposeful competition, and ultimately violence, would not have been present. By overthrowing the Taliban in 2001, the U.S. and its allies rearranged the regional environment in such a fashion that such opportunities became available.

In regards to “willingness”, I noted above that the enmity associated with enduring rivalry is likely a reasonable measure of a state’s decision-making proclivities with regards to engaging in conflict. Clearly, the prospect of challenging one’s long-standing enemy and balancing one’s own interests against theirs – particular when, as is

the case in Afghanistan, these interests are fundamentally opposed – is attractive and likely to weigh heavy in the decision-making process. In the case of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry this attractiveness is likely even more pronounced. Given the dynamics associated with enduring *nuclear* rivalry as described in chapter 3, the prospect of challenging the enemy within the confines of a limited, sub-conventional proxy conflict served to further augment the willingness of both India and Pakistan to pursue confrontation in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, challenging Indian influence in Afghanistan is the primary avenue through which it can inhibit India's rise as a regional, and ultimately global, power. India, for its part, is supremely interested in preventing an Afghanistan beholden to Pakistani interests because, although superior in terms of conventional capabilities, New Delhi cannot punish Pakistan militarily for its continued support of Islamic extremism due to Islamabad's nuclear threat.

In assessing treatments of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry (see chapter 3) I noted that the evolutionary model offered by Leng (2005) failed to explain the growing stability in the bilateral relationship between the two nations. While correctly identifying the psychological processes that serve to entrench enmity and resolve, Leng's emphasis on bilateral escalatory patterns misses the powerful stabilizing factor associated with nuclear weapons. Instead, I argued, confrontations will proceed in accordance with the "stability-instability paradox", such that sub-conventional conflicts will be the preferred strategy of confrontation. Of course, this dynamic complicates the processes associated with escalation in enduring rivalry. No longer a strictly bilateral affair, the important consideration becomes *how* and *why* particular proxy conflicts flare into violence. That is, what are the escalatory patterns associated with enduring *nuclear* rivalry? The application

of contagion theory provides a satisfactory picture of this process. Specifically, the emergence of Afghanistan as a venue of conflict in the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry highlights the importance of opportunity and willingness for the escalation process. In this instance, the simultaneous presence of both factors was clearly linked to the decisions by New Delhi and Islamabad to engage in competitive behaviour in Afghanistan. Of course, the psychological motivations contained in Leng's model remain operative, albeit in a new context. This means that resolve and enmity continue to inform Indian and Pakistani behaviour in Afghanistan, with the implication that conflict is likely to get worse and not better in the short term.

As the war in Afghanistan continues, and as instability escalates due to the presence of the enduring nuclear rivalry in the region, the structural landscape of Central and South Asia will continue to shift. Indeed, this is a necessary observation given the emphasis of both enduring rivalry and contagion theory on the importance of time for international behaviour and crisis. In assessing the future of the region, therefore, one must be aware that the dynamics of both enduring rivalry and contagion will continue to be operative. Faced with an ongoing nuclear deterrent, India and Pakistan will constantly be subject to the forces of opportunity and willingness and the possibility of sub-conventional confrontation. One particularly ominous scenario is that instability and escalation in Afghanistan will influence conflict in other sensitive sub-regions, such as Kashmir. Indeed, the interplay between Afghanistan and Kashmir has been noted in the literature. Ganguly and Howenstein (2009: 132), for example, note that "[t]he rise of Islamist militancy on both sides of the Durand Line...correlates strongly with the rise in

militant capabilities in Kashmir and across the Line of Control.” Dossani and Rowen (2005: 19), for their part, observe:

...Pakistan has become the critical center in an arc of extremism that stretches from Central Asia to India, creating concatenations of extremist forces that envelop each other’s activities to provide an impetus for radicalism in the region. The conflicts that Pakistan has been engaged in – in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and also domestically – have been interrelated and have fed on one another. As such, these conflicts cannot be understood separate from one another.

Escalation in Afghanistan, caused primarily by Pakistan’s strategy of supporting extremist groups in the country, may therefore contribute to a rise in extremist activity in Kashmir, with the result that increased violence will occur. While this contention is highly speculative, it nonetheless remains clear that the compounded effects of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry and the contagion processes associated with ongoing and escalating conflict in Afghanistan will have important implications for the future of regional stability. In the immediate term, escalatory patterns associated with conflict contagion and enduring nuclear rivalry portend ominously for stability in Afghanistan, with obvious implications for the ongoing coalition campaign. In the next chapter, I offer specific evidence that links Afghanistan to the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry.

## Chapter 5

### *Afghanistan As A Venue Of Competition*

The main goal of this chapter is to offer an interpretation of Indian and Pakistani competition inside Afghanistan as a component of the broader enduring rivalry relationship between India and Pakistan. Using the framework offered by Maoz and Mor (2002), I establish the competition for influence in Afghanistan as a core issue in the rivalry, and provide evidence that rivalry dynamics are responsible for shaping state behaviour within that theatre. Further, I highlight the importance of Afghanistan as a venue of conflict in light of the presence of nuclear weapons and the attendant influence of nuclear deterrence on the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan. The stronger the connection between the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry and Indian-Pakistani competition in Afghanistan, the greater the implications for coalition efforts in the region. As such, this chapter represents the core component of my overall argument – it builds on the preceding theoretical discussions to offer an informed and dynamic interpretation of a (perhaps *the*) key variable in the Afghan war – Pakistan’s continued duplicitous behaviour.

#### *1. An Outstanding Set of Unresolved Issues*

As mentioned, the most prominent “unresolved issue” between India and Pakistan is the territorial dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. Further, recent years have witnessed significant progress in the ongoing peace process over this issue (Leng 2005; Mohan 2008; Mukherjee 2009). Mohan (2008: 181) notes that as recently as 2007 “negotiations

[over Kashmir] had made considerable progress.” Yet as tension in Kashmir has (mildly) dissipated, new theatres of competition have emerged, most notably Afghanistan (Wirsing 2007; Mukherjee 2009). In the words of Wirsing (2007: 153):

...the positive trend we are witnessing on Pakistan’s eastern border, though genuine enough, is narrowly focused on only one slice of India-Pakistan relations – a slice that has long since lost much of its centrality and currency. If it ever was the so-called core issue in India-Pakistan relations, it most certainly is not today. So while we can hail the passing of the Kashmir dispute, I am afraid we have also to hail the coming of equally troublesome successors to it.

The important recognition, Wirsing (2007: 153) believes, is “that the relationship between India and Pakistan [is] driven by far more than the Kashmir dispute.” That is, other areas of competition may be in the process of claiming “core issue” status. This possibility is consistent with our earlier discussion of competition in an enduring rivalry. Though the political shock of partition and the subsequent territorial dispute over Kashmir was likely important for generating and perpetuating the rivalry, we know that the “specific issues at stake...can change over the ‘life’ of the rivalry” (Bennett 1996: 160). Further, I believe that the pursuit of political and strategic influence in Afghanistan constitutes an important, ongoing, and unresolved issue of contention between India and Pakistan.

This competition is hardly new. In fact, the latest iteration of this struggle merely represents the continuation of an historical tug-of-war between the two regional rivals,

augmented in part by a current instability that offers the perceived potential for substantial gain; that is, both sides see a weak and fractious Afghan government and thus the opportunity to establish a sympathetic and compliant regime (Wirsing 2007; Ziring 2009). As power struggles in Afghanistan have developed over the years – from communist revolution to Soviet invasion to the Taliban’s rise and eventual fall – India and Pakistan have consistently supported contending internal forces. Grare (2006: 11) succinctly summarizes the situation:

The Indian factor focuses Pakistan’s perception of Afghanistan and its policies there. From independence until 1992, India supported whatever government was in power in Kabul...Things changed after 1992 when the Pakistan-backed mujahideen entered Kabul...India then supported whoever opposed Pakistan.

Though it is often suggested that Pakistan’s primary concern in Afghanistan is its fear of unrest among the Pashtun tribes along the Af-Pak border (see for example Johnson and Mason 2008), Grare (2006: 8) contends:

The motivations of Pakistan’s Afghan policy cannot be reduced to the Pashtun question alone; they should be sought within the structure of the South Asian security complex...The search for Pakistan’s motivations also must take into account the evolution of U.S. policy in South Asia, characterized by the ongoing rapprochement with India. Fear of being internationally marginalized is

undoubtedly an important component of Islamabad's foreign policy in Afghanistan.

Obviously, coalition military operations have significantly altered the dynamics of the Afghan theatre. Perhaps the most striking anomaly is that, for the first time, Pakistani and Indian interests have *ostensibly* converged within Afghanistan; both are (officially) supportive allies of the U.S. and NATO, both (officially) condemn the Taliban and do not wish to see it re-emerge, and both consider an ultimately stable Afghanistan to be in their long term interests (Fair 2008). Despite these shared interests, however, competitive behaviour pervades. Today, both India and Pakistan have considerable and contending strategic interests in Afghanistan.

Influence in Afghanistan is vital to both nations in the pursuit of their foreign policy priorities. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is considered a crucial venue through which to achieve "strategic depth" vis-à-vis its enemy to the East (Mukherjee 2009). Faced with a persistently uncertain Eastern border, Pakistan is loathe to allow inimical forces to also occupy the territory to its West. Though Pakistani officials now publicly dismiss the "strategic depth" doctrine, the pervasiveness of its logic is striking (Fair 2008). At the most extreme, Pakistan may fear the existence of a "U.S.-Indian-Afghan alliance...aimed at undermining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and even dismembering the Pakistani state" (Rubin and Rashid 2008 :36). In this scenario, an Indian-influenced Afghan regime "would allow an encircling India to create a backdoor military threat to Pakistan." Similarly, there is considerable concern (complete with accompanying accusations), that India might be stoking ethnic tensions along the Af-Pak border, particularly in the region



of Balochistan, as “just desserts” for historical Pakistani involvement in Kashmir (Fair 2008: 215). As Rais (2008: 24) asserts: “Pakistan suspects that India and Afghanistan have a hand in some of the troubles in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province.” Such admonitions are persistent despite the fact that “Pakistan has no strong proof of material assistance from India [to Balochi insurgents] passing through Afghanistan” (Weinbaum and Harder 2008: 30). Finally, there is a fear that preponderant Indian influence in Afghanistan would obstruct Pakistan’s access to the energy rich Central Asian Republics (CARs), severely curtailing Pakistan’s regional economic interests (Rais 2008). Perhaps the most succinct summation of Pakistan’s strategic interests comes from Grare (2010: 17):

Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan are primarily linked to the Indo– Pakistani conflict. Accordingly, Pakistan has managed to turn almost every other dimension of its regional policy—such as its dispute with Afghanistan regarding the border issue and Pashtunistan, and its dealings with Central Asia and the United States—into a zero-sum game with India.

Ultimately, Grare (2006: 8) contends that Pakistan will continue to hedge its activities in Afghanistan as a way of “keep[ing] its options open for the day that the United States and, subsequently its European and Australian allies, will leave.” That is, Islamabad considers the current conflict to be temporary phenomenon compared to its ongoing battle with India.

Concomitantly, the strategic value of Afghanistan is not lost on India; it has consistently pursued influence in the nation, largely to counteract Pakistani efforts but also in an attempt to establish itself as a regional hegemon and extend its reach into Central Asia. In the words of Ganguly and Howenstein (2009: 130): “since the end of 2001, India has developed an arsenal of economic, diplomatic and military tools in its pursuit of a more coordinated strategy in the region.” The authors contend that India’s goals in Afghanistan are two-fold: first, it “seeks to limit Pakistan’s influence over any emergent regime in Afghanistan and to ensure that no regime emerges in Afghanistan that is fundamentally hostile toward India” (ibid: 132); second, India considers a stable, pro-Indian regime as an opportunity to “leapfrog Pakistan and build robust strategic and economic ties with the energy rich states of Central Asia” (ibid: 133). Pant (2010: 151) highlights the structural considerations that help shape India’s interests towards Afghanistan:

As India’s economic and military prowess have increased in recent years, it has tried to use them to gain greater control over its strategic environment. It has become more ambitious in defining the scale and scope of its foreign policy with an increase in its relative material power capabilities. As India has risen in the global inter-state hierarchy, it has tried to expand its economic, political and territorial control and has made an attempt to reshape the regional strategic environment in accordance with its own interests. India’s Afghanistan policy is a function of India’s regional and global rise and is therefore seen as a test case for Indian ambitions.

Mukhopadhaya (2010: 27), for his part, considers India's security concerns in Afghanistan to be "concrete and tangible." Specifically, he argues that they include:

(1) the prospect of the return of the Taliban and its likely impact on militant Islamic fundamentalism in the region in general and Pakistan in particular; and (2) what it perceives to be the Taliban's symbiotic relationship with a revanchist military-jihadi nexus in Pakistan that India holds responsible for a series of security challenges, political reversals, and terrorist incidents that (involving Afghanistan alone) include the use of jihadi forces nurtured in the region by Pakistan against India in Jammu and Kashmir since the 1990s, the unceremonious exit of India from Afghanistan with the arrival of the Taliban in Kabul in 1996, the Kandahar Indian airlines hijacking and terrorist-hostage exchange in December 2000, and the two bomb attacks against the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008 and October 2009. India sees the visible hand of the Pakistani military in these incidents as the closest examples of state-sponsored terrorism today (Mukhopadhaya 2010: 28).

In an bid to solidify its position in the country, India has provided a substantial volume of aid and support to development and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. As of 2009, India had spent \$750 million in development funds, with a promise to spend just under an additional \$1 billion in the years to come (Ganguly and Howenstein 2009). This makes it the fifth largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, and far exceeds the outlay offered by

Pakistan (Feigenbaum 2010). Numerous infrastructure projects – from roads to schools to the Afghan parliament itself – have been funded and constructed by India. Though no official military involvement has occurred, part of India’s aid package included the delivery of three hundred military transport vehicles as well as the use of Indian army officers for the field training of the Afghan national army (Wirsing 2007: 161). In assessing Indian involvement, therefore, it is important to recognize that its aid and activity in Afghanistan are not pursued merely out of a desire to stabilize the country nor to simply fulfil the role of a good international citizen. Rather, Afghanistan represents a fundamental component of a broader Indian strategy aimed at promoting its status as a regional, and ultimately global, power. As such, “it is highly unlikely that India will curb its activities [in Afghanistan], humanitarian or otherwise, anytime soon” (Ganguly and Howenstein 2009: 133).

Wirsing (2007: 154), for his part, believes the main struggle between the two nations to be over energy resources, with such concerns “...gaining steadily in importance as a driver of security strategy in the calculations of both New Delhi and Islamabad. Iran, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have developed into major sites of energy resource-led rivalry.” Moreover, cooperation on the construction of gas pipelines in the region has been limited, stagnant, and disjointed (Mukherjee 2009). Talks on the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline have stalled and India has opted not take part as a result of American pressure against cooperating with Tehran (Reuters UK Edition, March 17 2010). Similarly, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline has yet to materialize despite financial backing by the Asian Development Bank, leading analysts to declare the future of the project

“unpredictable” (“TAPI members intensify joint efforts.” *Trend News Agency*, August 5 2010). Problems associated with securing the 1,200 kilometres of pipe travelling through Afghanistan is a likely cause of concern, particularly for India (Wirsing 2007). As such, the suggestion that Afghanistan might prove a source of economic *cooperation* for India and Pakistan is not borne out by the evidence; instead, economics and energy appear to be additional components of the competition that is being played out there.

At its most basic, competition in Afghanistan constitutes a positional struggle between India and Pakistan. Geographically, Afghanistan represents a “gateway” to Central Asia, in both literal and strategic terms. For example, in their examination of the South Asian “regional security complex”<sup>6</sup> (RSC) Buzan and Waver (2003: 111) note: “Afghanistan remains the key boundary between the South Asian and Middle Eastern RSCs.” Further, Buzan and Waver (2003: 111) suggest that internal conflicts within Afghanistan have tended to reflect competing external interests:

The civil war [in Afghanistan] that followed the ending of the Soviet intervention created a mini-complex, reflecting political fragmentation at the substate level, but nonetheless generating a conflict formation that possesses most of the qualities of a state level complex. In particular, the conflict formation serves to channel external interventions along the lines of the internal rivalries.

Though Buzan does outline that several nations were involved in this proxy struggle (Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) in addition to India and Pakistan, the salient

---

<sup>6</sup> A regional security complex (RSC) is defined as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Waver 2003: 44).

point is that the location of Afghanistan has allowed it to serve as a battle ground for numerous outside interests over the years. A fractured national identity, influenced by myriad tribal and ethnic loyalties, means Afghanistan is particularly susceptible to outside interference.

Clearly, the theatre of Afghanistan represents an ongoing and unresolved venue of competition between India and Pakistan. Perhaps even more importantly, this is a competition that seems to be intensifying while the traditional conflict over Kashmir may be cooling off. It is difficult to determine whether Afghanistan now constitutes the “core issue” in the rivalry, but several factors can be highlighted to support the possibility that it is at least *approaching* Kashmir in salience. Afghanistan constitutes an indispensable component of broader regional strategies for both India and Pakistan. New Delhi, for its part, wishes to consolidate its status as a regional hegemon and extend its reach into Central Asia in its quest to become a global power. India may be facing an impending energy crisis, with projected demand far outstripping current supply and China consistently outbidding Indian firms for lucrative oil contracts (“Is India too late for the Asian oil-guzzling party?” Foreign Policy Online, July 12 2010). The opening of energy corridors through Afghanistan would offer improved access to much needed oil and gas. Of course, Pakistan has energy concerns of its own, yet Islamabad is likely more driven by security concerns – namely the notion of “strategic depth” vis-à-vis India – which explains why economic cooperation (though ostensibly desirable for Pakistan) is unlikely to materialize. Interestingly, this adds a security component to India’s energy interests in the region as New Delhi, reasonably certain that Pakistan will work to discourage Indian activity in Afghanistan (as evidenced by ISI-coordinated attacks against Indian workers

in the nation), moves to protect its interests. As Blank (2003: 142) explains, security concerns:

...inevitably oblige India to play a major role in Afghanistan and beyond, lest Indian influence be marginalized while everyone else tries to create its own sphere of influence there. Since instability in one area feeds it in the other, not to mention Kashmir, India seeks to stabilize the new Afghan state, establish ties to the Pashtun majority so it will not relapse into an anti-Indian stance, and help it find a *modus vivendi* with the new Karzai government.

Also important is the recognition that instability in Afghanistan is inevitably linked to instability in Kashmir. In the words of Ganguly and Howenstein (2009: 132): “The rise of Islamist militancy on both sides of the Durand Line also correlates strongly with the rise in militant capabilities in Kashmir and across the Line of Control.” Similarly, several recent accounts of terrorist activity in Afghanistan have suggested that groups who traditionally operated as part of the Kashmiri insurgency may be migrating West (Ziring 2009). The two insurgencies perpetuate and encourage each other; the forces of extremism are fuelled on a broad regional level. Moreover, the intensity of Pakistan’s concerns should not be underestimated. As Ganguly and Howenstein (2009: 133-134) assert: “In many ways, Pakistan appears to be applying the same gravity – as well as the same concerns for its historically nebulous national identity issues – to India’s involvement in Afghanistan as it does to the Kashmir issue.” This is an important point. Ultimately, *perceptions* about the competition in Afghanistan are just as, if not more,

important than the legitimate strategic concerns mentioned above. Indeed, the enduring rivalry framework explicitly predicts that states' will inflate the value of particular stakes above and beyond the calculus of a strict cost-benefit analysis. The "actor-dimension" outlined by Vasquez (1996) suggests that the historical hostility of the Kashmir dispute bears directly on the competition in Afghanistan which, in conjunction with the actual presence of legitimate competing interests, equates to a very real and potentially volatile impasse.

## *2. Strategic Interdependence*

The presence of unresolved issues inevitably leads states to become preoccupied with one another. As Maoz and Mor (2002: 7) state:

The persistence of a conflict of interests due to unresolved issues leads each state to consider the other as an actual or potential opponent in a militarized conflict. This is what creates *strategic interdependence*. Specifically, each state bases its security-related calculations on plans or actions it attributes to its rival. For that reason, states in rivalries tend to be engaged in such processes as arms races, over and covert intelligence gathering, deterrence, and alliance- and counter-alliance-making...

There is no doubt that Indian and Pakistani strategic priorities are, at a general level, aimed at one another (Mukherjee 2009). As has been discussed, the partition of the Indian



subcontinent that created the two nations immediately placed them in a direct confrontation which has not abated in the decades since. Further, it is also evident that the two main intelligence organizations of India and Pakistan – the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) respectively – focus the bulk of their activities, both overtly and covertly, on their counterpart (Rubin and Ahmed 2008). More interesting, for our purposes, is the extent to which such activities are being played out within Afghanistan. In a surprisingly naïve suggestion regarding potential rapprochement between the two states, Rubin and Ahmed (2008: 42) hypothesize that “[p]erhaps that ISI and the RAW could be persuaded to enter a dialogue to explore whether the covert war they have waged against each other for the past 60 years could spare the territory of Afghanistan”; though they offer no reason as to why the two organizations might agree to such a proposition. The evidence suggests not only that they are unlikely to do so, but that extensive covert operations have already permeated the Afghan theatre. Further, to the extent that significant time and effort is put into such operations we confirm not only the importance of the struggle for the nations involved, but also the size of the obstacle that must be overcome.

The ISI’s activities in Afghanistan began well before 2001. The organization was crucial in recruiting, training, and supplying (often at the direction of, and in conjunction with, the CIA) mujahideen fighters battling the Soviet Union during the 1980s (Ziring 2009). Moreover, the roots of its contemporary strategy were likely formed at this time:

It was during this phase that the ISI...saw the opportunity to expand its interests in Afghanistan, not simply as a way to ward off the Soviet threat...but also as a

way to develop the strategy that provided the Pakistani army with greater leverage in its contest with India (Ziring 2009: 70).

Support for the Islamic “student movement” (i.e. the Taliban) through the 1990s was seen as a way to block Indian access to Afghanistan; a strategy that was largely successful (despite occasional tensions between Taliban leadership and Islamabad) until the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. Forced to publicly abandon its sponsorship of Kabul’s oppressive regime, there is nonetheless ample evidence to suggest that Pakistan, through the ISI, continues to aid Islamic militants inside Afghanistan.

For instance, New Delhi has blamed the killing of an Indian engineer in 2006 by Taliban forces on Islamabad, citing it as proof that Pakistan is seeking to discourage India’s presence in Afghanistan (Grare 2006). Further, the 2008 attack on the Indian consulate in Kabul has been linked back to the ISI (Mohan 2008; Ganguly and Howenstein 2009; Mukherjee 2009). Similarly, Afghan officials have accused the ISI of helping to plot an assassination attempt on Afghan President Hamid Karsai (Bajoria and Kaplan 2010). More recently, several terrorist attacks targeting Indians (such as the February 26<sup>th</sup> 2010 attacks in Kabul that killed seven Indian workers) led Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna to declare that Indians have become “soft targets” in Afghanistan for terrorist organizations keen on derailing India-Afghan relations (“Indians in Afghanistan are soft targets: Krishna.” *Times of India* March 21 2010). He went on to specifically implicate the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group in the attacks, a militant organization based out of Pakistan with historical connections to the ISI (Wirsing 2003).

Perhaps the most damning evidence of ISI's subversive operations in Afghanistan comes from military documents leaked on July 25<sup>th</sup> by the organization "Wikileaks", which detail an ongoing relationship between ISI agents and insurgent groups, including the Taliban. Granted, the documents are from the US military and not the ISI itself, which mean they necessarily fall short of "smoking gun" status; nonetheless, several reports allude to specific instances of ISI involvement in terrorist activity, often directly targeting Indian interests. For instance, an entry on December 18, 2007 describes attempts by an ISI agent (identified as "SARKATEEP") to establish relations with Afghans for the purpose of conducting attacks on Indian consulships in Jalalabad, Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Mezar-e Sharif ( "Afghanistan war logs: threat of attack against Indian consulate." *The Guardian*, July 25 2010). Similarly, a report dated March 22, 2008 details an ISI plot to offer between \$15,000 and 30,000 USD as reward for the killing of "Indian nationals working in Afghanistan" ("Afghanistan war logs: Pakistan allegedly offering money for money for assassination of Indian road workers." *The Guardian*, July 25 2010). Far from being limited to Indian targets, the reports show a Pakistani hand in many attacks on NATO troops as well. A document from December 2006 alleges that a series of suicide bombings in Kabul were coordinated by an ISI agent, while another report identifies several madrassas on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line as training facilities for suicide bombers ("The War Logs." *The New York Times*). Moreover, connections abound between Pakistan and the infamous "Haqqani network" – a particularly violent Islamic group – with a May 2007 report indicating that material support (motorbikes) for suicide bombings by the group may have come from Pakistani agents ("Afghanistan war logs: Pakistan's spies accused of arming Taliban ally with motorbikes for suicide attacks." *The*

*Guardian*, July 25 2010). All told, the UK newspaper *The Guardian* (one of three newspapers – along with *The New York Times* and *Der Spiegel* – that cooperated with Wikileaks in the publishing of the documents) counts 180 reports that implicate Pakistan (usually through the ISI) in cooperating and coordinating with insurgents to conduct subversive activities inside Afghanistan (“Afghanistan war logs: Clandestine aid for Taliban bears Pakistan’s fingerprints.” *The Guardian*, July 25 2010). As mentioned, many of these attacks specifically target Indian interests. A necessary corollary of this strategy is that Pakistan has also been involved in attacks on NATO troops. At the very least, material funding to the Taliban and other insurgent groups (even with India as the ostensible target) means Pakistan contributes to general instability in Afghanistan. Disturbingly, a commander of the Haqqani network is quoted as saying that their funding comes from the U.S. – “from them to the Pakistani military, and then to us” (*TIME*, August 9 2010: 19). The implications of this phenomenon will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6; presently, it is sufficient to conclude that Pakistan remains strategically focused on India in Afghanistan, and is overwhelmingly concerned with Indian involvement in the nation.

Though evidence is perhaps more limited, India also stands accused of conducting subversive operations against Pakistan from within Afghanistan. As mentioned, Pakistan has routinely accused Indian intelligence forces of conducting subversive operations along the Af-Pak border, usually implying at the very least tacit Afghan support (Grare 2006). The construction of an Indian embassy in Kabul (itself in close proximity to the Durand Line) was deemed the locus for such activity. Specifically, Pakistani complaints are focused on perceived Indian involvement “in supporting and training anti-Pakistan

elements in Afghanistan, like the Baluchistan Liberation Army” (Mukherjee 2009: 428). As Ganguly and Howenstein (2009: 136) note, these recriminations have entered mainstream Pakistani politics, as “Rehman Malik, the prime minister’s adviser on interior affairs, directly accused India...of supporting the Baluch National Army.” Pakistan continues to see an Indian hand in supporting nearly any potentially fractious ethnic activity along its North-Western border. Pakistan is extremely sensitive to what it considers a rising Indian presence in the region. India’s pre-2001 support of the Northern Alliance and rejection of the Taliban have inevitably garnered it a favourable position in the post-Taliban era relative to its Pakistani rival. As Ganguly and Howenstein (2009: 130) assert, “Kabul turns a suspicious eye toward aid from Islamabad due to its past support for the Taliban.” That many officials in the current Afghan government were drawn from the Northern Alliance (and further that Hamid Karzai obtained an undergraduate degree from an Indian University) exacerbates Pakistani suspicions that Kabul may be tilting toward New Delhi (Fair 2008).

Though undoubtedly stoked by embedded paranoia of Indian behaviour (more on that below), there is no doubt that India has moved to increase its strategic presence in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. By the end of 2002, India had reopened four consulates in the country (“The Great Game Revisited.” *The Economist*, March 24, 2007). Moreover, despite Indian insistence as to the benevolence of these outposts, New Delhi is undoubtedly leveraging its newfound position for strategic advantage. As part of a roundtable discussion published by the *Foreign Affairs* website in March of 2009, regional expert Christine Fair cautioned against dismissing Pakistani complaints entirely:

India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan.

To be certain, the RAW is guilty of such transgressions in the past (see for example Swami 2007) but there remains little by way of concrete evidence that it is continuing such policies or, for that matter, using its Afghan consulates to do so. More likely, RAW intelligence activity in Afghanistan is focused primarily on countering ISI behaviour – a situation which largely mirrors the historical relationship between the two organizations (Swami 2007).

In addition to its covert operations, India has been able to openly pursue its interests in Afghanistan as a result of a strong and amicable relationship with Kabul. Despite significant Pakistani opposition, for instance, New Delhi has built ties with the Afghan military. As Pant (2010: 140) summarizes:

The Afghan Air Force's fleet of MiG 21 fighters and other defence equipment, mostly of Russian and Soviet origin, has been serviced by Indian technicians.

India also played an important role in the reorganization of the Afghan National Army and hopes that it will help in the long-term evolution of Indo-Afghan military ties. India has now stationed the Indo-Tibetan Border Police commandos in Afghanistan for the protection of its personnel employed by the Border Roads Organization. This is the first time since its independence that India has its

military personnel deployed in Afghanistan, something that has obviously not gone down well with Pakistan.

This relationship is considered vital in both the short (protecting the over 3000 Indian nationals working in Afghanistan) and long (establishing India's position as a provider of Central Asian security) term. It is also, ultimately, geared directly towards Pakistan.

Indeed, the evidence suggests that broader strategic interdependence has followed Pakistani and Indian interests into Afghanistan, leading competition there to assume a similar posture. This goes a long way in confirming the importance of influence in Afghanistan as an unresolved issue, as argued above, and therefore its status as a component of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry. As Wirsing (2007: 161) ominously observes: "Afghanistan's slow transformation into a surrogate battlefield of the two traditional South Asian rivals is unmistakable." Of course, the volume of strategic balancing taking place in Afghanistan remains *relatively* limited; particularly when compared to the long history of covert operations that have punctuated the region of Kashmir. Once again, however, the dynamics of enduring rivalry help to accentuate the importance of such operations; rampant suspicion, from both sides, counts *multiple* enemy agents wherever there is proof of at least one.

### 3. *Psychological Manifestations of Enmity*

This suspicion derives from the third dynamic outlined by Maoz and Mor (2002: 7):

The state of continuous conflict that characterizes enduring rivalries has important psychological implications. Each state tends to develop stereotypical images of the other, and such stereotypes and suspicions tend to be prevalent at both the elite and mass levels. Accommodative statements and attitudes of the opponent tend to be viewed in a biased and suspicious manner, while hostile attitudes are seen as true reflections of the rival's intentions.

Once again, the presence of psychological enmity in the general India-Pakistan relationship is readily evident. In the words of Sinno (2008: 10): "Fear of India, whether justified or not, is very real among Pakistani elites and the Pakistani public." India, conversely, continues to consider Pakistan an unstable and irrational state, bent on integrating the Muslim population of India at all costs (Mukherjee 2009). More important, for our purposes, is determining the extent to which this affects the relationship within Afghanistan.

As previously noted, some authors (Rubin and Ahmed 2008; Wirsing 2007; Mukherjee 2009) highlight the potential for economic cooperation between the two nations. First, a stable and prosperous Afghanistan would constitute a new and proximate market for both Indian and Pakistani goods. Further, because India has no direct land access to Afghanistan, its entry into the Afghan market would largely be dependent on cooperation with Pakistan. Second, the construction of the TAPI pipeline would serve both Indian and Pakistani interests, providing them with access to energy reserves in Central Asia. Yet despite overtures in both instances, cooperation has failed to



materialize. The recently signed Afghanistan-Pakistan trade deal, which covers a variety of issues from import duties to port access, does not include India ('Afghanistan and Pakistan sign a trade deal.' *The New York Times*, July 18 2010). Similarly, the current guise of the TAPI project, as yet uncompleted, has raised considerable Indian concerns, meaning completion of the pipeline will likely be delayed even further ("TAPI members intensify joint efforts." *Trend News Agency*, August 5 2010). This lack of cooperation is likely due in part to the strategic considerations mentioned above, but may also be influenced by a deep seated psychological enmity that leads each state to view all benevolent acts as deceitful and all hostile acts as true reflections of their rivals intentions. Grare (2010: 21) assesses this paranoia amongst Pakistani leadership:

According to Pakistan, whatever India does in Afghanistan is a ploy against Pakistan, be it economic investment, infrastructure, or any related matter... Thus, the reopening of Indian consulates in Afghanistan and the building of roads and other infrastructure have systematically been interpreted by Pakistan as conspiracies against its interests. As a result, Pakistan has ensured that Indian interests would be blocked whenever and wherever possible. It has refused, for example, to give India and Afghanistan transit rights to trade goods across Pakistan.

This does not portend well for cooperation between the two nations in Afghanistan. Instead, it appears unlikely that the two countries will *ever* be able to work together towards a stable Afghan state, whatever the mutual benefits may be; there will simply be

no room for the two deep seated enemies. As Steve Coll (2010: 51) reports in a recent addition of *The New Yorker*:

In March, two Pakistani generals – Ashfaq Kayani, the Army chief, and Ahmed Pasha, the head of I.S.I. [Interservices-Intelligence Agency] – met with [Afghan President] Karzai in Islamabad, and signalled that they could help cool down the Taliban insurgency. In exchange, Kayani said, the Karzai government must “end” India’s presence in Afghanistan. According to a senior Afghan intelligence official, he said, “There cannot be any type of Indian presence in Afghanistan – any type.”

India, similarly, continues to emphasize Pakistani’s duplicity to its NATO allies, insisting that the U.S. “won’t be able to leave” Afghanistan without Pakistan moving to severely destabilize the region (Blank 2003: 152).

#### *4. Repeated Militarized Conflict*

The notion of repeated militarized conflict is crucial to the enduring rivalry model. For instance, Diehl and Geertz (2001: 4) stipulate:

Conceptually, a rivalry is a relationship between two states in which both use, *with some regularity*, military threats and force as well as one in which both sides formulate foreign policy in military terms. (emphasis added)

The authors go on to suggest that a prolonged absence of military conflict is a sufficient indicator of rivalry termination. As mentioned, the India-Pakistan rivalry has not witnessed significant bilateral conventional conflict since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both states. Yet few would argue that the rivalry has achieved, or is even approaching, termination. Instead, the dynamics associated with nuclear capabilities has sufficiently altered each states' conflict behaviour. Specifically, the presence of nuclear deterrence and the resulting stability-instability paradox has meant that neither Pakistan nor India has been willing to launch major conventional military operations against one another. As Ganguly (1995: 326) explains:

This caution, in part, stems from the possibility of escalation to the nuclear level. On the other hand, because conventional conflict is seen to be fraught with dangers of escalation, both sides are instead trying to exploit internal conflicts; decision makers on both sides of the border see the risks of internal unrest as being controllable and calculable.

An obvious example is Pakistan's support for insurgents in Kashmir. So too, however, is the ongoing battle in Afghanistan. The well documented competitive behaviour (see above) playing out in Afghanistan is a clear example of the type of conflicts that are expected in a nuclear rivalry – stability at the bilateral level (the result of nuclear deterrence) being offset by instability at sub-conventional levels.

The important consideration (alluded to earlier) is that competitions such as that in Afghanistan have come to represent the main venues for conflict between the two rivals. The limited, calculated attacks on enemy targets (such as the targeting of Indian workers or Indian embassies) perpetrated by Pakistan is a clear instance of a revisionist state challenging the status quo power through alternative methods. As predicted by the stability-instability paradox (and particularly its South Asian variant) such challenges have become a main (if not the only) option in the face of nuclear stalemate.

With regards to the enduring rivalry model, the presence of nuclear capabilities and an attendant stability-instability paradox requires a reconceptualization of standard measurements of rivalry behaviour. The emphasis on readily observable bilateral military conflict fails to appreciate the importance of indirect, sub-conventional, and proxy confrontations that become tactically important in the face of a nuclear deterrent. Even if military “crises” are included in the standard model (meaning confrontations below the level of war – e.g. the mobilization of military personnel) the use of non-state proxy organizations (such as insurgent groups and terrorists) are not captured. An examination of the South Asian subcontinent reveals an abundance of such tactics (by both India and Pakistan) as neither state seems willing, in the nuclear era, to risk conventional confrontation. The notion of “repeated militarized conflict” should therefore be expanded to include such behaviour. The salience of the enduring rivalry model relies, as Thompson (1995) argues, not simply on the quantitative measurement of arbitrarily defined indicators, but rather on the underlying and persisting attitude of “rivalry” that defines the behaviour of the states in question. Over-reliance on the former risks losing sight of the latter. As he states:

If wars should not be plucked for analysis from their rivalry contexts, neither should one assume that all disputes are equivalent indicators that can be bundled into a rivalry threshold that holds equally well for all sorts of actors, arenas, and eras....One may also miss some significant but more subtle rivalries that do not quite exceed some orthodox threshold for disputes (Thompson 1995: 197).

The inclusion of sub-conventional conflict corrects the erroneous observation that tensions between India and Pakistan have cooled in recent years. Moreover, it satisfies the spirit of the “repeated militarized conflict” criteria in the Moaz and Mor (2002) model; it recognizes that such conflicts are true reflections of ongoing rivalry behaviour in the face of a nuclear deterrent.

This dynamic serves to emphasize the importance of Afghanistan in the context of the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. It cannot be construed as an ancillary competition that will fade with time or be replaced by more important considerations. Damaging Indian interests in Afghanistan – by attacking Indian nationals, sabotaging Indian infrastructure projects, pursuing anti-Indian influence in Kabul etc. – is considered vital for Islamabad because ordering a large-scale military incursion across the LoC is no longer a viable option. This does not bode well for coalition attempts to dissuade counter-productive behaviour in Afghanistan (see chapter 6). It removes Afghanistan from the periphery of the India-Pakistan rivalry and places it firmly at the centre; it underscores the evidence presented throughout this chapter and resolutely confirms Afghanistan’s status as a venue of competition in the enduring rivalry.

## **Conclusion**

The India-Pakistan relationship is a prime example of an enduring rivalry in international relations. Numerous studies identify it as such and work through the implications of this dynamic for various aspects of domestic, regional, and global politics. In this chapter, I have attempted to add the competition over influence in Afghanistan to this body of literature. As an ongoing and unresolved issue, the India-Pakistan competition in Afghanistan displays several strategic considerations that indicate its relevance to the broader India-Pakistan rivalry. This, in turn, fuels continued strategic interdependence, as evidenced by significant overt and covert balancing by the competing intelligence agencies, the RAW and the ISI. Further, strategic interdependence perpetuates the long-standing psychological enmity between the two nations, a dynamic clearly operative in Afghanistan, as any benevolent actions are construed as deceitful, while hostile acts are emphasized, exaggerated, and afforded high levels of importance. Taking note of this progression is key; competitive behaviour and enmity do not materialize out of thin air, but instead must be predicated on tangible and legitimate strategic concerns. The behaviour of states in enduring rivalry is contingent on both structural and psychological factors; the former serves to establish the potential for rivalry while the latter creates and reinforces it.

Crucial to all definitions of enduring rivalry is the proposition that competitive behaviour periodically boils over into overt confrontation and military conflict. This leads to the final characteristic outlined by Maoz and Mor (2002): repeated militarized conflict. As the authors note:

Unlike the three other characteristics, which are difficult to observe in empirical research, the occurrence of repeated militarized disputes is the most observable and also the most significant feature of enduring rivalries. Conflict does not break out all the time between rivals, but the relationship often exceeds the psychological and rhetorical levels of competition and expresses itself in terms of actual uses or displays of force (Maoz and Mor 2002: 8).

In the India-Pakistan context, bilateral conventional confrontation is rare (the last dispute to meet such requirements was the mobilization crisis in 2002 – an event that ultimately diffused without incident) due to concerns over escalation to the nuclear level. As a result, sub-conventional proxy conflicts are more accurate indicators of continued hostility, and thus replace bilateral military conflict in satisfying the spirit of Maoz and Mor's final characteristic. Taken together, the satisfaction of all four characteristics in the Maoz and Mor model clearly indicates the extent to which competition in Afghanistan has become a central component of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry. This being established, I can offer an informed assessment of how current coalition policies vis-à-vis India and Pakistan are likely to play out – a task to which I turn in chapter 6.

## Chapter 6

### *Policy Implications*

The topical nature of the war in Afghanistan has produced numerous policy papers offering advice, prescriptions, and predictions, all designed to shape new strategies, approaches, and plans of action. Whether in the op-ed sections of major newspapers or the pages of prominent scholarly journals there is no shortage of opinions from arm-chair generals regarding the appropriate “way forward” in Afghanistan. Because the impetus for writing this thesis stemmed from a desire to offer a more complete, nuanced and theoretically informed picture of the conflict, its utility for policy prescription relies primarily on its ability to act as a “diagnostic” tool; that is, it attempts first and foremost to “describ[e] how and why things work as they do” (Harvey 1997: 135). Given the inherent complexity of the situation in Central and South Asia, success in this effort would amount to a significant contribution. Further, given the general recognition that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating in recent months, understanding present failures is a necessary first step towards future successes. That being said, the nature of my analysis does suggest at least a few general recommendations, particularly as they pertain to dealing with Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, India. As such, this chapter concerns itself primarily with an evaluation of current coalition policies vis-à-vis the two rivals. Specifically, applying our understanding of Pakistan’s strategic rationale – informed by the discussion of enduring rivalry – provides a realistic lens through which to assess current policies designed to secure meaningful cooperation from Islamabad in the ongoing counter-insurgent (COIN) campaign; cooperation that is, as mentioned, considered absolutely vital for success. With regards to



India, a cooperative relationship is considered no less important, but U.S. interests vis-à-vis New Delhi primarily involve fostering a long term economic and strategic partnership (Feigenbaum 2010). As such, distancing itself from India in an effort to appease Pakistan in the short-run does not appear to be a prescient option for Washington. This does not portend well for policies designed to broker rapprochement over contentious issues such as Kashmir, as India – the status-quo state – will likely resent and resist any such attempts (Mohan 2009). Of course, the belief that rapprochement in Kashmir could dampen Pakistani animosity towards India (and therefore remove the incentive to act antagonistically in Afghanistan) incorrectly assumes that the disputed territory continues to constitute the core issue of contention between the two states. Resolving Kashmir alone will not be sufficient to end the rivalry, as other issues have emerged as sources of hostility. Instead, as our discussion of rivalry termination in the previous chapter suggests, the most likely source of termination is the recognition by both parties of a common external threat. In the current context, therefore, convincing Islamabad that Islamic militants are just as, if not more, dangerous to their interests than New Delhi may represent the most promising possibility for securing future cooperation. Interestingly, the rising tide of Islamic militancy *inside* Pakistan, along with the perception that such groups are increasingly at odds with the civilian leadership, suggests that such a recognition is more likely now than it was just a few years ago under military rule.

### **The “Regional Approach”**

As mentioned, the bulk of this chapter attempts to *explain* how and why current coalition policies fall short of achieving their goals vis-à-vis India and Pakistan. Crucial

to this endeavour is the preceding (chapter 3) analysis of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry, particularly insofar as current policies attempt to influence and/or alter the behaviour of these two states. As has been demonstrated, both India and Pakistan consider Afghanistan a vital venue in which to balance their rival and, further, pursue their own strategic priorities vis-à-vis Central Asia. Of primary importance is Pakistan because, as has been summarized, it is generally acknowledged that Pakistan holds a pivotal role in the Afghan conflict. There is no doubt that Pakistan's aid is required if COIN operations are to be effective. In a practical sense, much of the fighting occurs and will occur near, on, or across the Durand Line. As Grare (2006: 4) observes:

...one cannot refrain from noting that the insurgency is taking place essentially in a corridor 35 miles wide along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, across the provinces of Konar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Zabol, Kandahar, and Helmand. The guerrillas could not operate without the benefit of sanctuaries in Pakistan.

As such, it is considered imperative that Pakistan increase its military efforts to subdue the Taliban and other insurgent forces within the border regions of Kandahar, Helmand, the FATA, Baluchistan, and the NWFP. At the very least, concerted efforts by Pakistan to destabilize the region through its influence with the Taliban and other insurgent groups must stop. In a more general sense, prospects for success in Afghanistan would be greatly augmented if Pakistan genuinely pursued policies that dovetailed with coalition interests. Recognizing this, the U.S. and its allies have attempted to explicitly incorporate Pakistan

into its strategic calculations regarding the Afghan conflict. Though the “regional approach” did not originate with the Obama administration (indeed much of the logic derives from priorities established during the Bush era [see Mohan 2009]) it has certainly become a main focus of it, as evidenced by the 2009 appointment of senior diplomat Richard Holbrooke to the status of “special representative” to both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the concomitant creation of the neologism “AfPak” to describe operational and diplomatic strategies (a term that has since been discarded while its logic remains operative) (Tellis 2010). In an excellent overview of the regional approach, Ashley Tellis (2010: 86) summarizes the core objectives/priorities being pursued:

(1) expanding the Afghan theater to include Pakistan in order to synergize the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns now underway;

(2) integrating Afghan and Pakistani efforts toward securing the common goal of defeating extremist Islam in the greater South Asian region;

(3) incorporating Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s major regional neighbors into a cooperative effort led by the United States and aimed at defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban while stabilizing South and Central Asia; and, finally

(4) unifying the hitherto separate security complexes of South and Central Asia by transforming Afghanistan into a region-wide trade and transit hub.

Clearly, these four priorities reflect different levels of strategic emphasis; ranging from the purely operational (number 1) to political (numbers 2 & 3) to economic (number 4). Tellis suggests that the initial focus of the regional strategy was operational; that is, the military's recognition of the necessity of extending its operations across the Durand Line. Following these initial assumptions, it became clear that political and diplomatic engagement with Pakistan was required in an effort to persuade Islamabad to fulfill its commitment to crack down on militants. As exhortations in this regard continued to fail, the belief that economic incentives and opportunities could induce cooperation led to an emphasis on trade and investment talks, as evidenced by the American-orchestrated trade deal between Afghanistan and Pakistan signed in July of 2010 (New York Times, July 18 2010). Unfortunately, such clear instances of the regional approach at work have been few and far between, as policy makers and military leaders have, for the most part, yet to carefully articulate specific tactics and programs. As Tellis (2010: 86) observes:

For all its emphasis on a regional approach...the Obama administration has never clearly articulated what this innovation actually consists of. While it is obviously triggered by the same conundrum that confronted the Bush presidency—dealing with the Taliban's sanctuary in Pakistan—what Obama's preference for “broadening” the solution specifically entails has not yet been enunciated nor have its prospects of success been carefully assessed.

This offers clear obstacles for any attempts to meaningfully evaluate such a strategy beyond merely critiquing its overall logic. Nonetheless, I believe several key components

of the approach can be isolated and considered in the context of coalition efforts vis-à-vis Pakistan and India. Particularly relevant are coalition attempts to end Pakistan's use and support of Islamic militants within Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies have poured significant amounts of financial and military aid into Pakistan but have received pitifully little for their efforts. What this tactic has failed to appreciate is the deep seated strategic rationale that renders the use of such proxy organizations so attractive to Islamabad. Pakistan is not intentionally undermining coalition efforts because it wishes to see continued instability or considers coalition forces to be the "enemy" per se; rather, it simply perceives the Afghan conflict through a decidedly different lens, and acts accordingly. The coalition effort is considered temporary and transitory in comparison to the long-standing and continuing struggle with India. This guiding perception directly influences several facets of the current coalition strategy that will require serious re-evaluation.

First, Pakistan will be exceedingly reluctant to break its traditional ties with militant groups. The Pakistani military continues to believe that jihadist organizations constitute an important hedge against India in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. Further, the strategic importance of this "tool" is augmented above and beyond what outside observers are likely to appreciate, as predicted by the enduring rivalry model, meaning its resolve to continue current behaviour is well entrenched. Second, Pakistan is unlikely to convert its military into an effective counterinsurgent force due to concerns over potential conventional conflict with India in the future. Instead, Pakistan is likely to use the high volume of military aid it receives to augment its conventional capabilities with an eye on its Eastern – and not Western – border, behaviour that is clearly consistent with continued

strategic interdependence. Finally, any attempts to induce Pakistani cooperation based on enhanced economic linkages and opportunities both within Afghanistan and in the broader Central and South Asian region will be inadequate insofar as Pakistan continues to privilege security concerns above absolute gains related to trade and investment; any efforts to broker economic engagement between India and Pakistan within Afghanistan will be unsuccessful due to deep seated psychological manifestations of enmity.

As regards India, Washington must balance its immediate needs in Afghanistan with a broader more long term strategy of engagement and cooperation. The obvious suggestion that curbing Indian involvement in Afghanistan (e.g. India's substantial aid, investment and infrastructure commitments) might appease Pakistan could jeopardize an expanding economic and regional partnership – a relationship that is widely considered important for balancing against China in the future (Mohan 2009). Moreover, the importance of Afghanistan for Indian interests (see chapter 5) means such a policy would be unlikely to succeed anyway. Like Pakistan, India places an inflated level of strategic importance on securing influence and access in Afghanistan – influence that is considered vital for both its regional and global ambitions. I now turn to a more purposeful discussion of both Pakistan and India in the context of current coalition strategies, and explore how specific tactics are affected by the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry.

## **Pakistan**

The historical ties between the Pakistani military and insurgent militias is extremely well documented (see Johnson and Mason 2008; Ziring 2009; Weinbaum 2009; Mukherjee 2009). Pakistan was active in its support of Afghan mujahideen fighters

during the Soviet invasion of the 1980s, during which time the first roots of the Taliban began to form among the Pashtun tribes along the Af-Pak border (Johnson and Mason 2008). Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, covert assistance to radical groups continued, including “military and political support for the Afghan Taliban”; support that ultimately proved critical in helping Taliban forces capture Kabul in the mid 1990s (Weinbaum 2009: 74). As summarized by Fair (2008: 204), this relationship continued in subsequent years: “From 1994 until 2001, Pakistan provided military, diplomatic, and financial assistance to the Pashtun Taliban movement.” With the events of 9/11, Pakistan was forced to re-evaluate this historical linkage. Under extreme pressure from the U.S. and its western allies (with the Bush administrations staunch admonition that states were “either with us or against us” in the global war on terror) President Musharraf publicly cut ties with Pakistan’s allies to the northwest. In reality, however, America’s strategic priorities did not, at first, demand Pakistani action in this regard:

In the early phase of the global war on terrorism, the United States focused its cooperation with Pakistan on efforts to eliminate al Qaeda but did not insist that Pakistan shut down its support for all militant groups including the Taliban and those groups operating in India and Kashmir (Fair 2009: 151).

In the years that followed American strategies have shifted, and the Taliban has become a (if not the) primary target in Afghanistan. As mentioned, the Obama administration has intensified its pressure on Pakistan in the latest articulation of its strategic priorities. Nonetheless, it remains unclear to what extent Islamabad has begun meaningfully

targeting Taliban fighters. Evaluating recent performance in this effort, Weinbaum (2009: 75-76) concludes that: “Military actions against the Taliban were typically incomplete, inconclusive and, at times, appeared insincere.” Similarly, Fair (2009: 152) notes that “Pakistan did not remand a high-value Taliban asset until the summer of 2007 and did so only reluctantly and after sustained pressure from Washington in light of mounting Afghan, NATO, and U.S. casualties.”

Concomitant to its support for the Afghani Taliban, Pakistan has fostered and aided domestic Islamic militants as part of an ongoing campaign to generate instability in Indian Kashmir (Ziring 2009). As Fair (2009: 158-159) explains:

Unable to change the status quo through military, diplomatic, or political means, Pakistan has cultivated numerous militant groups for decades to attack Indian targets in Indian-administered Kashmir and in the India hinterland, while also relying on various militant groups to secure its interests in Afghanistan.

The “deployment of jihadist organizations in Kashmir” became the “ISI’s central purpose” during the 1980s, and thus became a crucial component of Pakistan’s general foreign policy (Ziring 2009: 69). Recent leanings toward rapprochement notwithstanding, few analysts predict a definitive end to this dispute any time soon. Acts of terrorism continue to punctuate the region, and are likely to continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Further, the presence of Islamist militants in Afghanistan is intimately linked to militant activity in Kashmir; the two theatres of conflict are not mutually exclusive. In the words of Ganguly and Howenstein (2009: 132): “The rise of Islamist militancy on both



sides of the Durand Line also correlates strongly with the rise in militant capabilities in Kashmir and across the Line of Control.” Similarly, several recent accounts of terrorist activity in Afghanistan have suggested that groups who traditionally operated as part of the Kashmiri insurgency may be migrating west (Ziring 2009). The two insurgencies perpetuate and encourage each other; the forces of extremism are fuelled on a broad regional level (which, combined with the dynamics of enduring nuclear rivalry, portends ominously for regional stability – see chapter 4).

The evidence suggests that American efforts to end Pakistani’s reliance on militant organizations and commit to defeating the Afghani Taliban have been unsuccessful, despite significant financial outlay. Between the years of 2002 and 2010, the U.S. spent more than \$15.4 billion on aid to Pakistan, with 70% of that amount being specifically targeted for security-related purposes (Weinbaum 2009). Despite such efforts, however, American policies have “failed in large measure to achieve all but minimal progress toward most of [its] objectives” (Fair 2009: 149). Adequate solutions to this problem have not been forthcoming. In the words of Fair (2009: 155):

Policymakers and analysts grapple with how the United States can persuade Pakistan to comprehensively abandon militancy as a tool of foreign policy and work steadily to eliminate all militant groups operating on its soil.

Even modest efforts by Islamabad in this regard have failed to materialize as Pakistani officials continue to privilege their own interests over those of the U.S. and its allies. As Weinbaum (2009) explains:

Pakistan's stance against militants in the tribal northwest has long been shaped by its difficulty in balancing external demands, especially those from the United States, against perceived domestic constraints. The refusal of most Pakistanis to share American counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan and the FATA region bulks large in explaining Islamabad's often duplicitous responses to American pressures. A deep-seated popular belief exists that combating terrorism serves U.S. interests and not those of Pakistan.

Fair (2009: 152) concurs, noting that "[t]o date, Pakistan has not launched massive offensives against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan." Weinbaum (2009: 86) summarizes the "way ahead" for counterinsurgency along the Af-Pak border in these terms:

At some point Pakistan may have to choose between continuing to provide a safe haven to the Afghan Taliban and other anti-Kabul elements and deciding whether Pakistan's interests are better served by the defeat of all extremists forces, including those in Afghanistan. It comes down to whether Pakistan feels it has more to gain in preserving a body of Afghan loyalists as insurance for the day when it must deal with a disintegrating neighbor, or whether Pakistan's economic interests and ability to defeat its own militants would be best attained in helping to foster a stable, prospering Afghanistan. One choice leads Pakistan on a course incompatible with American objectives in Afghanistan; the other leaves open the

possibility for a constructive, long-term relationship with the United States based on convergent interests.

Unfortunately for American and NATO leaders, Pakistan is exceedingly unlikely to select the second, more constructive, path. Fuelled by its entrenched and enduring rivalry with India, Islamabad will not be persuaded to abandon even limited strategic gains against New Delhi. This explains why pumping money into Pakistan's military is such a failing strategy. Even a minor victory over India in Afghanistan is afforded major strategic value by Islamabad. As Cohen and Chollet (2007: 16) explain:

Most Pakistanis do not perceive the Taliban as a threat to their national interests, but as a potential asset if the United States were to walk away from Afghanistan again, providing “strategic depth” to prevent an Indian-friendly regime on their Western border.

Never mind that the doctrine of “strategic depth” is widely dismissed by Western policymakers (indeed, in isolation it would make little sense), securing influence in Afghanistan is only the latest iteration of a struggle that began in 1947 and will likely continue into the future.

In fact, the perceived prospect of future conflict highlights another facet of the failed and failing American strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan. As has been explained, significant financial aid has not resulted in the abandonment of militant groups as foreign policy tools. This is not to suggest that Islamabad does not itself face significant threats from

domestic terrorist groups operating along the Af-Pak border. Many such groups have eschewed their traditional connections with the ISI, still others have goals that are explicitly detrimental to the Pakistani government (such as ethnic insurgences in Balochistan). Nonetheless, Pakistan has continued to resist taking the necessary steps to transform its military into an effective counterinsurgent force. Once again, a focus on India dictates this behaviour. As Weinbaum (2009: 77) explains:

The ill-preparedness of Pakistan's army for counterinsurgency in the tribal northwest is widely acknowledged. To adapt to this kind of warfare requires a major shift in Pakistan's strategic thinking that has always considered India to be the country's principal national security threat. It would necessitate a change not only in the deployment of Pakistan's 600,000-strong army, but also with new arms procurement policies and reform of the military's curriculum. The army is largely trained and equipped for a conventional ground war on the plains of Punjab.

As mentioned, the U.S. has directed a significant level of financial aid towards the Pakistani military complex. Ostensibly, this has been done in an effort to bolster Pakistan's counterinsurgent capabilities. Many funds are explicitly targeted for such purposes but, ultimately, fail to be used as they were intended. Instead, the evidence suggests that Pakistan uses the funds to augment its traditional military capabilities. In a particularly telling analysis, Cohen and Chollet (2009: 12) state:

Although foreign military financing is often justified to Congress as playing a critical role in the war on terrorism, in reality the weapons systems are often prestige items to help Pakistan in the event of war with India... Looking at the total approved U.S. weapons sales... Pakistan has spent \$8.4 billion between 2002 and 2006. Most of this has been spent on weapons such as F-16s and other aircraft, anti-ship Harpoon Block II missiles, and antimissile defense systems. Few of these weapons are likely to provide much help in rooting out al Qaeda or the Taliban.

Once again, Pakistan's strategic priorities are laid bare: it is far less interested in what it considers a temporary American and NATO effort in the region, and far more concerned with its long-term strategic balance against its enduring rival. Though the nature of an enduring *nuclear* rivalry renders the likelihood of conventional conflict remote, states engaged in "cold war" often continue to behave as traditional pre-nuclear antagonists up until the point of actual war (Basrur 2008), meaning Pakistan's policy of augmenting conventional arms is unlikely to dissipate merely because actually using them is improbable. By implication, any money it receives for military purposes will continue to be used for acquiring conventional arms. Moreover, the U.S. is placed in a difficult position: for the reasons outlined above, it requires Pakistan's cooperation for success in Afghanistan, meaning Washington will be reluctant to desist in its efforts to win real support in Islamabad. Beyond exhortations, forcibly insisting that assistance money be used for counter-insurgent purposes could further fracture an already tenuous relationship – a reluctant and slightly duplicitous Pakistan is still better than an outright enemy.

## **India**

As mentioned, the relationship between Washington and New Delhi exhibits distinctly different dynamics than that between Washington and Islamabad. As Mohan (2009: 175) notes: “While Pakistan holds the key to the success of the U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan, India seems to be the natural partner for the United States in managing the Asian balance of power and a range of other global challenges...” Considerations of India’s involvement in Afghanistan are weighed against these broader concerns, meaning Washington must be delicate in pressuring New Delhi on more immediate issues. The primary avenue through which the U.S. connects India to Afghanistan is India’s relationship with Pakistan and the notion that bilateral tensions between the two states are relevant to the campaign in Afghanistan. Tellis (2010: 89) summarizes the approach well:

Consistent with President Obama’s belief that Pakistan’s troublesome behavior in Afghanistan derived intimately from its problems with India, [special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan] Holbrooke had persistently sought to include the latter [India] in his bureaucratic mandate. By in effect seeking to oversee U.S. mediation of the outstanding Indo-Pakistani disputes, Holbrooke hoped to steer Islamabad away from its counterproductive rivalry with India. If successful, this would have reduced the value Pakistan perceived in supporting various terrorist groups operating against Afghanistan and India, thus not only diminishing internal threats to itself but also becoming a more committed American partner in the larger counterterrorism effort.

Specifically, the U.S. and its allies have attempted to link the dispute over Kashmir with events in Afghanistan (more on this below). More generally, however, India is considered a valuable ally within Afghanistan. Fundamentally, New Delhi profited greatly from the overthrow of the Taliban – a regime that had been inherently hostile towards India and acted as a proxy for Pakistani interests. As Mukhopadhaya (2010: 28) states:

There has been broad congruence between Indian interests and coalition political-military activities in Afghanistan in preventing the return of the Taliban, defeating al-Qaeda, and trying to stabilize Afghanistan around a non-Taliban order. India was a supporter and net beneficiary of the post-9/11 U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and recognizes that the U.S. and coalition presence in the region is necessary, at least for some time, to prevent the return of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

As summarized in chapter 5, India's commitment to reconstructing Afghanistan has been significant, with massive financial outlay, diplomatic support, and infrastructure investment continuing to flow from New Delhi. The rationale behind this support is two-fold: enhance India's economic interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Central Asia; and prevent the resurgence of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan. Indeed, Mukhopadhaya suggests that India may be even *more* committed than the coalition to an Afghanistan free from Taliban and fundamentalist forces. Friction between New Delhi and Washington has occurred over attempts to negotiate with the Taliban, and over the extent to which

Pakistan will have a role in shaping post-conflict Afghanistan. As such, India has routinely called for the inclusion of other regional partners – beyond Pakistan – in developing political and military strategies:

India particularly supports the inclusion of other regional players, such as itself, Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian Republics, rather than relying solely on the Pakistani military, which has a stake in keeping the Afghan Taliban alive in support of its interests in Afghanistan and India. This dependence (in India's view) leaves the coalition vulnerable to Pakistani manipulation and conditions for cooperation that are contrary to the coalition's objectives in Afghanistan (Mukhopadhaya 2010: 29).

Of primary concern is obviously Pakistan's role, as Indian policy makers continue to believe that coalition forces are over-reliant on a Pakistani regime that is inherently hostile, duplicitous, and interested in continued instability in Afghanistan. To the extent that the U.S. and its allies continue to privilege Islamabad's support (ignoring the ample evidence of its bad behaviour) they risk alienating an important regional ally. India remains extremely wary of any attempts to link bilateral India-Pakistan relations to the conflict in Afghanistan: "India...does not accept that Pakistan should be rewarded for its cooperation with the coalition by political concessions from India, when it is, in fact, the Taliban's prime backer" (ibid: 36). This is particularly true for attempts to force concessions from India in the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, an issue to which I will not turn.



## **Connecting Kashmir and Afghanistan**

A major component of Obama's regional approach has been the attempt to connect the ongoing territorial dispute over Kashmir with developments in Afghanistan. Moreover, this strategy has received considerable support from many analysts, academics and advisors. For instance, Mohan (2009: 176) observes: "A number of reports from the U.S. strategic community that came out at the end of 2008 strongly endorsed Obama's ideas on an integrated approach to South Asia..." Indeed, many policy prescriptions, such as that offered by Rubin and Rashid (2008) regarding the establishment of a "contact group" in the region consisting of UN Security Council members and other relevant parties, consider appeasement over Kashmir as an important and essential component of any viable solution to instability in Afghanistan. This sentiment is echoed in various other policy pieces (see Sinno 2008; Mohan 2009; Fair 2009; Weinbaum and Harder 2008; Hasnat 2009). The underlying logic of this strategy is the belief that solving Pakistan's general foreign policy problems might induce more purposeful cooperation in Afghanistan. As Obama (2007: 10) himself articulated:

I will join with our allies in insisting, not simply requesting, that Pakistan crack down on the Taliban, pursue Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants, and end its relationship with all terrorist groups. At the same time, I will encourage dialogue between Pakistan and India to work towards resolving their dispute over Kashmir and between Afghanistan and Pakistan to resolve their differences and develop the Pashtun border region. If Pakistan can look towards the east [India] with

confidence, it will be less likely to believe its interests are best advanced through cooperation with the Taliban.

Unlike the Bush administration, which had emphasized the operational necessity of a regional approach to Afghanistan but also explicitly de-hyphenated the India-Pakistan relationship with regards to Kashmir, Obama insisted on establishing a link between the two problems. Although the Bush approach was generally regarded as having achieved the difficult task of simultaneously improving U.S. relations with *both* India and Pakistan,

Obama persisted with a consistent articulation of the linkage between Afghanistan and Kashmir. His argument was simple: U.S. success in Afghanistan depends on fixing the problems in Pakistan. Those in turn depend upon ending Pakistan's insecurities vis-à-vis India, especially on Kashmir (Mohan 2009: 175).

The core logic of connecting Kashmir and Afghanistan may seem compelling at first blush. It seems to take into account the key argument of this thesis – that the India-Pakistan rivalry is responsible for the ongoing duplicitous behaviour of Pakistan in Afghanistan. It is a strategy explicitly designed to “end” (or at least appease) bilateral tensions between the traditional antagonists by brokering what is generally considered to be the most important underlying and ongoing source of tension. Yet the strategy is a failing one for two reasons.

First, any attempts by the U.S. and its allies to involve themselves in negotiations regarding Kashmir will draw substantial resistance from New Delhi; as the status-quo state, India would have to make significant concessions in order for Pakistan (the revisionist state) to be satisfied. Further, a long history of failed mediation attempts suggests that any new efforts are just as unlikely to succeed. As Mohan (2009: 181-182) summarizes:

Any high-profile intervention, either directly by a U.S. special envoy or an international contact group authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC), would be unacceptable to New Delhi. India's long unpleasant memories of past U.S. diplomatic activism in Kashmir, from the Truman years to the Clinton administration, and the unhappy experience of taking the Kashmir question to the UNSC in the late 1940s are solid obstacles for New Delhi's acceptance of any third-party or international initiative.

As it stands, rapprochement in Kashmir is exceedingly unlikely – following reasonable progress in bilateral peace talks over the issue in the mid 2000s, terrorist attacks (most notably the 2008 Mumbai attacks) have reinforced suspicions and hostility; even the ability of Islamabad to fully reign in Islamic militants has been called into question, meaning Indian leaders can never be fully certain that violence will not occur and, if it does, whether or not Pakistan was directly involved. The intervention of the U.S. and its allies will do little to alter the current probabilities (which are not good) of conflict

resolution. As such, attempting to get involved will only serve to damage a U.S.-India relationship that has, until recently, enjoyed historic highs (Feigenbaum 2010).

Second, the belief that resolving Kashmir is the panacea for hostility between India and Pakistan underestimates the pervasiveness of tension associated with enduring international rivalry. As our discussion of enduring rivalry in previous chapters explained, competition between rivals extends beyond initial points of contention (such as Kashmir) so that a variety of issues come to define the conflictual relationship (Bennett 1993). This is reflected in several accounts of the India-Pakistan dyad. As Ziring (2009: 75) observes: “Too much history has overgrown the original Kashmir dispute...”; Wirsing (2007: 153), for his part, believes that even significant progress over Kashmir does not reflect a more general rapprochement between the two states:

...change going on in regard to the Kashmir territorial dimension of India-Pakistan relations does not ensure, indeed it provides no guarantee at all, that a positive transformation of the relationship as a whole is in the cards. On the contrary, the change now in progress in India-Pakistan relations is entirely compatible with a future as turbulent and inclined to conflict as ever in the past.

Even in the unlikely event that the Kashmir question was resolved to the satisfaction of both states (an outcome that remains remote even as tensions have mildly dissipated), the hostility between India and Pakistan would continue. Grare (2010: 24) further articulates this point:

Pakistan is a revisionist power. It would be a mistake to think that trying to solve the Kashmir issue would help resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. It is not clear whether any measure in this regard would be likely to calm Pakistan's paranoia. It would also send the wrong message—that "terrorism pays"—as the revisionist country would effectively be rewarded for its support for terrorism, and encouraged to continue along the same path in other parts of the world.

Explicitly connecting Kashmir and Afghanistan in diplomatic negotiations is hence a pointless and potentially counterproductive endeavour. Not only would it reward bad behaviour by Islamabad, the U.S. would also be sacrificing valuable political capital vis-à-vis New Delhi with no guarantee it would see tangible results in Afghanistan.

### **The Economic Angle**

Another prominent policy tactic/option advocated by both the administration and analysts alike is the suggestion that significant economic opportunities in Afghanistan could generate increased cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Obviously, a prerequisite for tangible economic gains through investment, trade and infrastructure is stability and security of material interests, meaning if Pakistan could be persuaded of Afghanistan's economic potential it would likely curb its detrimental activities. Tellis (2010: 98) outlines the rationale behind this approach:

The unspoken assumption that underlies the regional approach based on economic integration is that all states, no matter what their political differences, can profit

from the gains from trade. A steady accumulation of such gains would provide enough incentives for all the warring competitors to mute their rivalries or at least to hold them in sufficient check to avoid disrupting the benefits accruing from trade and transit. In other words, regional competitors would value the absolute gains arising from economic intercourse over and above the relative gains associated with their political rivalries.

Again, the logic underpinning this tactic is ostensibly sound. Afghanistan represents a natural trade hub through which the energy-starved South Asian subcontinent could be connected to the rich energy deposits of Central Asia. Stephen Blank (2003), for his part, offers a comprehensive overview of India's economic interests in Afghanistan, calling them "compelling" and "important" components of New Delhi's overall foreign policy strategy. Pakistan, similarly, would greatly benefit from access through Afghanistan to the CARs and, given its geographical contiguity, direct access to Afghani markets for Pakistani goods (Weinbaum and Harder 2008).

That the U.S. continues to push economic integration is clear – on a visit to Islamabad in July of 2010 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was instrumental in pushing through a trade accord between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As reported by the New York Times (July 18 2010):

The United States had prodded the two countries to sign the accord, calculating that it would bolster the Afghan economy by expanding its trade routes and

curbing rampant smuggling. The pact would cover a multitude of trade and transit issues, ranging from import duties to port access.

Though lauded as a major success by administration officials, doubts persist as to the viability of the accord, as significant domestic opposition is expected from lobby groups inside Pakistan. Further, India was conspicuously absent from the talks, and trade and transit deals that would allow for the transport of goods between Afghanistan and India – through Pakistan – have stalled (Pant 2010). Moreover, the uncertainty related to securing material interests due to continued violence makes it difficult for economic activity to be established. This represents a fundamental problem with the economic integration approach: designed to promote stability in Afghanistan, it requires a stable Afghanistan in order to be viable in the first place. Similarly, the mere *prospect* of absolute economic gain will be insufficient to alter Pakistan's strategic priorities – priorities that have been firmly entrenched over time. As discussed in chapter 5, Pakistan continues to privilege security interests over and above potential economic gain. Tellis (2010: 98) observes this phenomenon:

The evidence thus far suggests that at least one critical state, Pakistan, has consistently valued its security-driven relative gains far more than any absolute gains emerging from enhanced regional trade. Consequently, here too, the desired goal of regional integration has been unfailingly stymied because Islamabad's fears about its political interests being subverted as a result of the increased prosperity accruing to others—even if Pakistan itself flourishes in the process—

have prevented it from cooperating in the manner that the votaries of economic integration imagine it should.

As argued earlier (see chapter 5) these “political interests” are unambiguously defined in opposition to Indian behaviour – whatever its manifestation. For instance, Grare (2010: 21) argues:

According to Pakistan, whatever India does in Afghanistan is a ploy against Pakistan, be it economic investment, infrastructure, or any related matter.

Although militarily absent from Afghanistan, New Delhi is undoubtedly a significant contributor to the reconstruction of the country. Thus, the reopening of Indian consulates in Afghanistan and the building of roads and other infrastructure have systematically been interpreted by Pakistan as conspiracies against its interests. As a result, Pakistan has ensured that Indian interests would be blocked whenever and wherever possible. It has refused, for example, to give India and Afghanistan transit rights to trade goods across Pakistan.

The result, according to Tellis (2010: 98), is that the underlying assumptions of the economic integration approach are both “heroic and untrue”. Pakistan and India will be unable to set aside political and strategic differences even in the face of potentially beneficial cooperation. Again, this is an outcome entirely predicted by the enduring rivalry model. The “actor dimension” outlined by Vasquez (1993) highlights the extent to which traditional cost-benefit analysis does not inform states engaged in enduring rivalry.



The key calculus becomes not the stake in question but rather the face of the opponent – a dynamic that is difficult for “rational” policy makers to grasp. If the recent trade accord is any indication, the U.S. and its allies will continue to push the economic angle. This strategy is likely to be just as ineffective as the connection of Kashmir to Afghanistan. Further, to the extent that economic projects are undertaken in Afghanistan prior to stability being established, violence will continue. As evidenced by the repeated attacks on Indian workers and projects by the Taliban and other Pakistani-backed militant organizations, pushing for India’s economic involvement may further exacerbate violence.

### **Rivalry Termination?: The Common External Threat of Extremism**

As our discussion of rivalry termination (see chapter 2) highlighted, the utility of third-party mediation or intervention is exceedingly low, even for merely moderating the ongoing dispute. Diehl and Goertz (2001), for example, found that mediation attempts may in fact exacerbate existing tensions and thus do not offer any suggestions regarding the utility of third-party involvement for rivalry termination. By contrast, the evolutionary model of enduring rivalry is concerned primarily with the *preferences* of states engaged in rivalry, and as such offers the logical assertion that rivalries will end when each state alters their preferences so that termination is considered more desirable than continued confrontation (Moaz and Mor 1996; Bennett 1993). This offers slightly more optimism than the contention from Diehl and Goertz (2001; see also Goertz and Diehl 1995) that “political shocks” constitute necessary conditions for rivalry termination. While such shocks are likely strong catalysts for preference change, they do

not constitute the only avenue through which such change can be achieved. Bennett expresses the implication of this conclusion for international mediators. In discussing his analysis of preference change in enduring rivalries the author states:

In terms of applying the model to the current international situation, these results suggest that policymakers should be alert for situations where the participants in a rivalry can be convinced that they should end their rivalry in order to face external threats...Rapoport (1992), in particular, has suggested that incentives for peace could come if a common enemy is perceived as “a condition adversely affecting both groups.” (Bennett 2996: 180)

That is, if each side of an enduring rivalry believes a third party constitutes a greater (and mutual) threat than their traditional enemy they will alter their preferences, make peace, and shift their focus to the new enemy. Of course, this allows for relatively minimal involvement on the part of peacemakers – amounting essentially to convincing disputants of existing conditions rather than offering material incentives or brokering diplomatic concessions. Nonetheless, the current situation in Central and South Asia may be suited for just such a tactic.

Of course, the rhetorical campaign to convince Islamabad of the danger posed by Islamic militants has been waged from the outset of the Afghan war in 2001. Since the beginning, U.S. and NATO officials have continually stressed that extremists were not only a substantial threat to America and the west, but also to the national governments in the region surrounding Afghanistan. This was obviously true for New Delhi, leading to

the aforementioned congruence of national interests between India and the coalition regarding the elimination of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremist organizations. Publicly, Pakistan also agreed with these goals. President Musharaff was vocal in his general support of President Bush's global war on terror, and of the coalition campaign in Afghanistan in particular. As has been documented, however, such rhetorical commitment was not buoyed by concomitant concrete action. That being said, it would be inaccurate to suggest that Pakistan's support for militants in Afghanistan and the border region approximates anything like complete control over their activities. In fact, Musharraf's decision to publicly align the military with the U.S. and NATO was widely condemned by many elements in the country:

Musharraf's critics saw his actions as both anti-Pakistan and anti-Islam, and even after the general's ouster, the belief persisted among members and organizations of Islamic orthodoxy, most notably the Jamaat-I-Islami, that any Pakistani government, civilian or military, would subordinate itself to the dictates of Washington (Ziring 2009).

The continuing support of militants in both Afghanistan and Kashmir as part of its ongoing campaign against India has inevitably increased the power of such organizations. Increasingly, the target of terrorism has become the Pakistani state itself. As Weinbaum and Harder (2008: 31) observe:

Pakistan has seen growing challenges in recent years to its legitimacy and authority. These challenges have included a surge in militant Islamism, mounting provincial and tribal unrest, and the weakening of its institutional capacity of the state. All three are apparent in its western border areas, and can be traced in large measure to its Afghan policies. By indulging and supporting extremists as a tool to retain and hold influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan introduced changes that undermined its ability to maintain its writ within its own borders. Policies on Afghanistan that altered traditional power structures in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have resulted in wider domestic instability. Not inconsequentially, the reputation of Pakistan's foremost institution, its military, has suffered.

The transition to civilian government and ostensible democratic rule in 2008 further distanced Islamabad from extremist elements. The challenge of containing Islamist organizations is significantly higher for civilian leaders who do not benefit from the historical ties of what is commonly referred to as the "mullah-military alliance" (Haqqani 2005; Behuria 2007). In the words of Ziring (2009: 71): "...the Islamists have become so entrenched in the lives of Pakistan's Pashtuns...that it is impossible to conclude that Islamabad's secular-leaning civilian-run government can manage the challenge." Indeed, this "challenge" must be recognized as significant and real. The seizing of a mosque in Islamabad in 2007 and subsequent clash with government forces by radical elements (known as the "Red Mosque" incident) highlights the extent to which extremist ideology has infiltrated even the country's major urban centres. More troubling is the emergence of

the so-called “Pakistani Taliban” which, although connected to its Afghan counterpart, takes explicit aim against the Pakistani state, seeking to establish the same vision of an Islamic state governed by strict Sharia Law. In an excellent explication of this phenomenon, Ganguly and Kapur (2010: 48) state:

Pakistan’s strategy has given rise to what we call a “sorcerer’s apprentice” problem. The jihadi organizations, like the magic brooms in Goethe’s tale, have taken on a life of their own. Along with the government, the army, and the intelligence services, such groups now comprise one of the main centers of gravity within Pakistan. As a result, the militants are in a position to pursue their own policy. Similar to Goethe’s brooms, they often act against the interests of their creators, attacking security personnel, assassinating government officials, seizing large swaths of territory within Pakistan... Although Pakistan is largely to blame for creating and nurturing the jihadis, it is no longer wholly in control of them...

The authors do not argue that Pakistan no longer supports or manipulates insurgent groups in the pursuit of its interests in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere. Instead, a precarious balance exists between its longstanding strategy and the new threat posed by such groups. Real costs are associated with supporting insurgents:

...the Taliban, whose control of Afghanistan had been strongly supported by the Pakistani government, now seeks not just to retake Afghanistan, but to seize

Pakistani territory as well. Factions such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban, the main Taliban group in Pakistan, have asserted control over swaths of territory to resist the central government, enforce a strict interpretation of Sharia law, and unite with the Afghan Taliban against NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan would benefit from Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan: it would mean a friendly government in Kabul, afford Pakistan badly needed strategic depth, allow it more direct access to the energy-rich states of Central Asia, and reduce Indian regional influence. Islamabad, however, does not wish to cede control of its own territory to Taliban elements... These differences between the goals of the Pakistani state and the Islamist groups it helped to create and nurture have severely undermined Pakistani security in a number of ways. First, they have led to outright violence between the militants and Pakistani forces (for example, the Pakistan army has been battling Taliban elements in South Waziristan). Such conflict is costly, both in military terms and in terms of harm to Pakistan's civilian population. (ibid: 53).

The evidence suggests that despite such concerns Pakistan has continued its policy of supporting Islamic radicals in Afghanistan, Kashmir, the FATA and the NWFP. Further, the utility of using proxy organizations to inflict damage on its enduring nuclear rival (India) means Islamabad likely has a high tolerance for collateral damage associated with such tactics. That being said, it is not inconceivable to suggest that should the threat from the Pakistani Taliban and other similar elements become so great, so imminent, so existential to the leadership in Islamabad they might ultimately reconsider their support and move to purposefully suppress their erstwhile agents.

Such an outcome would correspond to the requirements of rivalry termination as outlined by Bennett (1993). As the author states:

The end of a rivalry marks a noticeable turning point in dyadic relations, after which time the states stop treating each other as primary security and policy threats and typically engagement in more cooperation (Bennett: 161).

Bennett's model is explicitly grounded in the assumption that states are primarily concerned with their own security. State preferences, therefore, are particularly sensitive to security calculations. The result is that "as threats...increase, either threats from third parties or threats from the rival itself, the benefits to a state from ending a rivalry in which it is involved will increase" (ibid: 163). The key point is that a state may choose to end a rivalry if it perceives a more immediate or greater threat emanating from elsewhere. The emphasis on security perceptions explains why financial aid alone will be insufficient for Pakistan to alter its military focus from India to insurgents – Islamabad itself must come to the conclusion that such a shift is necessary. It also explains why the prospect of economic gains will not lead to the abandonment of established strategies – as long as Pakistan considers India to be its primary threat it will sacrifice economic considerations for security ones. Only when faced with an altered strategic picture will state preferences be sufficiently affected to precipitate preference change. When the threat is common to both rivals', the prospect of cooperation may generate rivalry termination. As is further argued by Bennett (1993: 163):

Times at which both rivals' security is affected by a single third party will offer an additional incentive to the rivals to settle their disagreements. When both rivals are concerned with a common enemy, they can both improve their security by ending their rivalry and perhaps gaining an ally with whom they can cooperate against the common foe.

In the event that Pakistan universally renounced and denounced Islamic fundamentalism, it would likely require the Pakistani military, the ISI, and other elements within the state to cooperate with their Indian counterparts in Kashmir and other tumultuous regions. The two nations would be united against a common enemy, which could (but would not necessarily) serve as a catalyst for rivalry termination, as Bennett's (1993) model predicts. Of course, any major strategic shift would generate significant turmoil within Pakistan's domestic political power structure, as different elements (the military, the Islamists, the civilian government) jockeyed for position. In other words, a decisive move against insurgent groups would not necessarily unite India and Pakistan in a common cause – the situation is simply too complex and too many variables exist to make any such definitive assertions. Nonetheless, to the extent that Pakistan's behaviour is driven by its enduring rivalry with India, rivalry termination would clearly eliminate the existing incentives to foment instability in Afghanistan. For this reason, perhaps the most reasonable hope lies in what is, and what is increasingly becoming, a common threat to the two nations: militant Islamism.

As mentioned, this does not allow for significant intervention and mediation on the part of would-be peacemakers. To a large extent the U.S. and NATO has, from the



beginning of the Afghan war in 2001, attempted to persuade Islamabad as to the threat of extremism. The consistent and persistent rhetorical articulation of this argument is a mainstay of public statements, diplomatic entreaties, and state to state correspondence between the west and Islamabad. Yet, as the analysis of Ganguly and Kapur (2010) and others (see Ziring 2009; Johnson and Mason 2008) suggest, circumstances may be becoming more amenable to the message. American and NATO leaders should therefore continue in their efforts to convince Islamabad that their greatest security threat emanates from Islamic militants and not Indian forces. Because Pakistan generally considers India to be an existential threat, this will be no small task. Further, the close connection between extremist groups and the Pakistani military (along with the latter's extreme suspicion of India – over and above even the average Pakistani's) suggests that any move by the civilian government in this regard could precipitate the latest instance of military coup. As will all other aspects of this troubled region, there are no easy answers.

## **Conclusion**

The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows:

- Pakistan has been, and will be reluctant to, break its long established ties to militant organizations. Such organizations are considered vital in its ongoing struggle against India. Financial incentives in the form of conditional aid etc., will not be sufficient to alter these strategic priorities.
- For similar reasons, any financial aid directly delivered to the Pakistani military will be used to augment conventional capabilities (with an eye to India) and not

for retooling the army into an effective counterinsurgent force (as the aid is designed to do). Even if conventional conflict with India is unlikely, Islamabad will still place a high priority on closing the capabilities gap with its rival.

- Any attempts to connect Afghanistan with the dispute over Kashmir will draw resistance from New Delhi. The Indians will resent what they consider to be the rewarding of bad Pakistani behaviour, which could strain what is an important and long term strategic partnership for the United States.
- Even in the unlikely event that the Kashmir issue could be resolved, there is no guarantee that tangible results would be witnessed in Afghanistan. The India-Pakistan enduring rivalry is not defined by any single issue, and the competition in Afghanistan is in many ways approaching the salience of Kashmir for both sides.
- Attempts to promote economic integration in Afghanistan will not cause Pakistan to alter its behaviour. As predicted by the enduring rivalry model, Islamabad will continue to privilege security considerations over economic ones. Further, the economic integration approach is inherently flawed in that it requires its end (stability in Afghanistan) in order for its means to be successful.
- The most promising prospect for rivalry termination (and therefore the removal of incentives for India and Pakistan to behave competitively in Afghanistan) is the recognition of a “common external threat” to both nations. The rise of militant Islamism within Pakistan presents such a possibility, as Pakistan’s erstwhile agents increasingly target the Pakistani state itself. Should Islamabad come to believe that this threat has become greater than the threat from India, the two

states could cooperative in an attempt to defeat a common foe. American and NATO leaders should continue the rhetorical campaign to convince Islamabad of the dangers of extremists.

All of these outcomes can be understood and explained through an application of the enduring rivalry framework. Of course, the complexity of the Afghan war is such that this discussion and its concomitant suggestions touch on but a small portion of potentially relevant policy areas. Questions regarding operational activities (such as the dictates of the current COIN manual), or battling corruption in the Afghan government, or the wisdom of a quasi-withdrawal date in the summer of 2011, and still others, could all be discussed in great detail and offer important insights into the war. Yet I believe my focus is particularly relevant in that it explains and explicates policy implications for what many consider to be the crucial variable: the behaviour of Pakistan. The application of enduring rivalry in previous chapter's helped us understand how and why Pakistan behaves as it does in Afghanistan. This chapter explicitly connects this analysis with current coalition strategies, allowing for the implications of enduring rivalry to be more clearly understood in the context of coalition operations. I believe that the main components of the current strategy benefit greatly from this insight. All of the current coalition strategies vis-à-vis Islamabad (and, to a lesser but necessary extent, New Delhi) are directly affected by enduring rivalry and are thus rendered in more penetrating detail through my analysis. In other words, how and why they have failed can be more comprehensively understood. As mentioned at the outset, the value of this analysis is primarily its diagnostic bent. I do not pretend to offer any panacea for the problems in

Afghanistan (indeed I strip away the most commonly held one – resolution of the Kashmir dispute), but the first step towards future success is understanding present failure. That being said, the prospects of gaining Pakistan's full and meaningful support do not appear great in the short term. There is simply very little American or NATO leaders can do to alter Islamabad's well-established strategic priorities. This is a conclusion that should not be run from – it is a necessary recognition that for the countries involved, this is a battle that began well before September 11, 2001 and will continue long after coalition forces have left Afghanistan.

## **Chapter 7**

### ***Conclusion***

As the war in Afghanistan approaches its 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary, winning strategies continue to elude coalition policymakers – instability reigns, conditions deteriorate, and prospects for success appear increasingly slim. The seemingly intractable problems in Afghanistan have generated an abundance of analysis, opinion, and punditry, as politicians, academics, and the public alike grapple with the realities of a region that remains, to many observers, largely incomprehensible. Since taking office, the Obama administration had placed a renewed emphasis on victory in Afghanistan, even as it has redefined what that “victory” will ultimately look like:

The Obama administration has made some decisive changes to the Afghan policy it inherited. Most significantly, in its first year it committed to a 250 percent increase in the American force on the ground (adding 51,000 troops to the 34,000 in Afghanistan when Mr. Obama took office) and lobbied hard to secure increases in non-U.S. coalition forces. It matched this large increase in force with a major reduction in the goal: from raising a democratic state in Afghanistan to the creation of a state strong enough to prevent a takeover by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or any other radical Islamic group; and to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al-Qaeda (Mathews 2010: 1).

A cursory examination of existing realities highlights the difficulty of achieving even these more limited goals. Nonetheless, the narrowing of priorities similarly narrows the

list of crucial factors associated with success or failure. Or rather, it draws certain factors into the foreground while others recede to the periphery.

By explicitly shifting away from an emphasis on state building, the myriad problems associated with the Afghan government (i.e. corruption, incompetence, duplicity) – while still important – do not represent fundamental obstacles to coalition goals. Similarly, the coherence of the national government, and its writ over the provinces of Afghanistan, are important only insofar as strong governance may prevent the resurgence of Islamic extremism – and not necessarily as ends in themselves. This redefinition of coalition goals came with a concomitant strategic emphasis on the “regional approach” to Afghanistan. Although this approach properly recognizes the interconnectedness of events in South and Central Asia, it is not without problems. As Mathews (2010: 1-2) summarizes:

It has never been clear...exactly what a “regional approach” might mean in practice. The phrase can mean the strictly military necessity of eliminating the sanctuary afforded to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other enemy forces across the border in Pakistan. Or, it can mean something as ambitious as a political, military, and economic collaboration among the coalition partners and more than half a dozen regional states, based on the premise that they all share a common interest in the stability of Afghanistan, and the elimination of a state home for radicals with a regional or global agenda and income from narcotics traffic. In between lies a version that seeks to treat Pakistan and Afghanistan as virtually a single

entity both tactically and politically, and with respect to long-term economic and social development.

It remains unclear, exactly, which version of the regional approach is being pursued by U.S. decision-makers. Certainly, elements of all three can be found in recent policies. Regardless, however, it is clear that the “regional approach” as a general philosophy now constitutes the main strategy of the U.S. (and by extension NATO) in Afghanistan. Again, this highlights the relevance of certain obstacles for success above others.

On a tactical level, the operational effectiveness of COIN efforts requires the integration of the Afghan and Pakistani battlefields. The porosity of the Durand Line and the resulting movement of insurgents throughout the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan renders concerns over international boundaries moot. As U.S. National Security Advisor General James Jones observed: “We have several countries, but we have one theatre” (quoted in Mathews 2010: 2). In the early years of the war, it became clear that insurgents were using Pakistani territory as sanctuary from coalition forces. This allowed the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremist organizations to comfortably plot terror attacks on coalition targets from relative safety. Clearly, this represents a glaring obstacle for day-to-day stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan, an ostensible ally in Afghanistan and in the Global War on Terror, committed publicly to cracking down on such sanctuaries, and vowed to extinguish extremism within its borders. As the evidenced presented through this thesis has indicated, rhetoric has not turned into reality, and many insurgent networks continue to operate with impunity in the North-Western Pakistani

regions of FATA and the NWFP. On a tactical level, therefore, Pakistan hinders – and does not help – coalition efforts to conduct an effective COIN campaign.

Similarly, any ambitions regarding broad political, military and economic cooperation on the part of regional actors in Afghanistan requires a convergence of interests that simply does not exist. As Tellis (2010: 104) highlights in his appraisal of the regional approach, Pakistan remains the one nation most resolutely opposed to coalition goals in Afghanistan – an irony considering the importance placed on Pakistani cooperation by U.S. leaders:

Pakistan, the most critical U.S. ally in the war in Afghanistan and one of Afghanistan's most important direct neighbors, pursues far more divergent aims relative to Washington (and Kabul) than the high American dependence on Pakistan would lead one to assume. Although both Washington and Islamabad have gone to great lengths to publicly emphasize their shared goals in Afghanistan since 2001, a close analysis reveals deep and perhaps unbridgeable gulfs between the two countries, at least in the near term.

Absent Pakistani cooperation, attempts to broker broad regional cooperation over the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan will fail. In other words, the political and economic conceptualization of the “regional approach” is just as contingent on Pakistani behaviour as the limited, tactical and operational necessities of a regional COIN strategy. By focussing on the regional approach, whether at the tactical or political level, the Obama administration has placed Pakistan at the heart of its fortunes in Afghanistan. As



is clear from an evaluation of available evidence (particularly the 91,000 military documents obtained and published by the organization WikiLeaks in July 2010), Pakistan has consistently pursued counter-productive, duplicitous, and destabilizing policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

This thesis has been an attempt, ultimately, to understand Pakistan's behaviour in Afghanistan – a variable considered absolutely vital for establishing stability in the region. The basis for nearly all Pakistani foreign policy has been its ongoing and existential conflict with India. The two states were born of British India in 1947, and the resulting ethnic, religious, and territorial struggles have fostered an enmity that persists to this day. Importantly, the India-Pakistan dyad is considered a crucial case of “enduring international rivalry” – an established theoretical model that places international conflicts and crises in their proper historical *context*. Moreover, the concept of “enduring rivalry” does not constitute a mere description of two states that do not like one another; rather, the models developed by Diehl and Goertz (2001), Maoz and Mor (2002), Thompson 1995, Vasquez (1993), Leng (2005) and others offer dynamic interpretations of both structural and actor-level considerations associated with repeated and recurring conflict within the same dyad.

The two main models of enduring rivalry (punctuated equilibrium; evolutionary) have been applied to the India-Pakistan relationship. Diehl, Goertz and Saeedi (2005) compellingly highlight the structural conditions associated with rivalry onset and maturation in the South Asian context. Leng (2005) explores more purposefully the psychological processes that have led to the compounding of enmity between India and Pakistan over time. Yet neither is able to account for the generally held observation that

bilateral relations between the two states have stabilized in recent years. Given the explicit emphasis on recurring militarized conflict in standard accounts of enduring rivalry, this stability is problematic; particularly as the India-Pakistan dyad has been, and remains, a prominent case in the enduring rivalry literature. In order to account for such an anomaly, I build on the observations of Ganguly (1995), Khan (2005), Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), Basrur (2008) and others, to suggest that the presence of nuclear capabilities fundamentally alters the processes of escalation in the India-Pakistan rivalry due to the presence of a compelling nuclear deterrent against major bilateral conflict. As Ganguly (2005: 329) observes: “The incipient nuclearization of the region has rendered direct, interstate conflict increasingly unlikely. The more immediate threats are likely to stem from domestic turmoil and its spillover effects.” That is, instability in an enduring nuclear rivalry will be perpetuated at a sub-conventional, proxy level. In chapter 5, the underlying escalatory processes of enduring nuclear rivalry were explored, with conflict contagion theory offered as an explanation of how and why Afghanistan became, not an ancillary component of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry, but rather a core issue. To further assess the implications of this reality, I employed the model of enduring rivalry offered by Maoz and Mor (2002) and assessed its applicability to Indian and Pakistani behaviour in Afghanistan. I found all four criteria of the model to be satisfied. First, influence Afghanistan constitutes a long-standing and unresolved issue between the two nations. Second, operations in Afghanistan clearly exhibit high levels of strategic interdependence. Third, the perceptions of both states in reference to their rivals presence in Afghanistan reflect deep seated psychological manifestations of enmity. Finally, I submit that the proxy conflict in Afghanistan satisfies the spirit of repeated militarized

conflict, albeit altered in the context of enduring *nuclear* rivalry. The theoretical foundation of the argument thus established, chapter 6 engaged an explicit discussion of relevant policy implications. The main benefit of applying the enduring rivalry lens was its capacity to act as a diagnostic tool, such that current coalition strategies could be assessed and reasons for their failure presented. Clearly, present attempts to induce Pakistani cooperation through diplomatic endeavours and financial aid fail to account for Islamabad's established and entrenched strategic priorities in Afghanistan. As long as coalition goals run counter to these priorities, cooperation from Pakistan will not be forthcoming. Understanding present failures is a necessary step towards crafting future successes; the insight provided by enduring rivalry theory thus constitutes an important contribution to current policy debates. It places the Afghan war in its proper *context*; and thus renders a complex region more comprehensible for coalition policymakers.

Of course, several potential criticisms arise given my various assumptions and/or omissions. An underlying assumption of this thesis is that the primary units of interest are nation-state actors. This is a conscious and deliberate decision and one predicated on a long-standing assumption in international relations that states continue to constitute the main actors in the international arena. Given the realities of the Afghan war, and indeed the realities of the broader region in question, a compelling case could be made that the interests of non-state actors are highly relevant and ultimately crucial for understanding the present conflict. The war itself was essentially a reaction to the actions of a particularly potent non-state actor: al-Qaeda. Similarly, the relevant regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan are replete with tribal, ethnic, and religious entities that do not identify primarily with a nation-state. Further, the behaviour of Pakistan and, to a lesser

extent, India are discussed in terms of relationships with important non-state actors (the Taliban and other insurgent groups). Ignoring the interests of such entities would inaccurately simplify important dynamics of the current situation. Yet I believe that the focus on states as units of analysis is justified given the specific questions being asked and the specific answers being offered. That is, the interests and activities of non-state actors are important, but primarily as they relate to general strategies being pursued by states (specifically Pakistan). In terms of policy implications, the activities of insurgent groups are obviously relevant, but the implications are self-evident; the coalition either wishes to defeat such groups or dissuade them from continuing to commit violence – these priorities that will not change. Policy discussions regarding non-state actors are thus more useful at a tactical and operational level and less so for broader geopolitical considerations (see for example Johnson and Mason 2008). The relationship between coalition forces and other nation-states (India, Pakistan) present the possibility for new approaches regarding general policies, making these relationships the natural focus for aggregate policy evaluations and prescriptions. In other words, a study of the Afghan war that focuses on non-state actors is an important endeavour – it simply speaks to a different level of analysis than the one presented here; as long as this conceptual division is understood and made clear, the two approaches need not contradict one another.

Another potential criticism of the present argument is the seemingly uncritical application of nuclear deterrence theory. I do not purposefully engage the underlying assumptions of the theory, despite a significant debate in the literature regarding both its general salience and its specific application to the South Asian context (see Mistry 2009 for a sceptical reading of nuclear deterrence in the India-Pakistan relationship). My

response is two fold. First, an uncritical application of nuclear deterrence to the India-Pakistan dyad does not represent an unreasonable leap of scholarly faith – the majority of discussions regarding nuclear weapons in South Asia do in fact support the contentions of standard nuclear deterrence. Second, the most compelling criticisms of nuclear deterrence stem not from a critique of its underlying logic per se, but rather the unforeseen, “illogical” happenstance that make over-reliance on deterrence dangerous in the face of potentially calamitous damage. As Jervis (1990: 29) explains: “War could also come through inadvertence, loss of control, or irrationality.” Krepon (2003: 8) further argues:

Deterrence optimists...presume that “Murphy’s Law” does not apply to nuclear weapons—at least not to the extent that an accident or a chain reaction of miscalculation, error, chance, or misuse of authority would lead to a crossing of the nuclear threshold.

That is, issues regarding command and control, accidental launch, or simple stupidity could conceivable result in nuclear war despite the overwhelming logical imperative to avoid it. Such issues raise legitimate concerns regarding the general utility of nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, they do not undermine the core logic of the theory: that states will not deliberately engage in full-scale war against a nuclear-capable opponent for fear of escalation to the nuclear level. For the purposes of my argument, it is this logic that is of primary importance. The contention that sub-conventional proxy conflicts will be the preferred avenue of competition between enduring nuclear rivals need not account for “Murphy’s Law” to be compelling.

Finally, by highlighting Pakistan's use and support of extremist groups as part of its campaign against India, it might be construed that the present argument implies something like complete Pakistani control over such organizations. Or even that the interests of such groups align entirely with the interests of Islamabad. Instead, ample evidence indicates the extent to which Pakistan has in fact become a target for terrorist acts itself. The work of authors such as Ganguly and Kapur (2010), Behuria (2007), Siddiqi (2009), Ziring (2009) and others, offers compelling evidence of the increasingly divergent interests of militant organizations and the Pakistani state. Instances of violence inside Pakistan have risen, as has the relative strength of the Pakistani Taliban – a group that takes explicit aim at the state and actively seeks to overthrow the government (Ganguly and Kapur 2010). The first week of September 2010 alone saw two major domestic attacks carried out by the group, resulting in 31 (suicide bomb in Lahore) and 50 deaths (suicide bomb in Quetta) ("Quetta rally suicide bomb kills dozens." *BBC News* September 3 2010). Many speculate that the flood disaster of August 2010 has further precipitated extremist violence as the government struggles to retain control over the country. Ultimately, a real and serious threat to the Pakistani government stems from Islamic militants, many of whom the military and the ISI may have supported in the past. The argument in this thesis does not attempt to gloss over this reality, nor ascribe any unreasonable measurement of control to the government, military, or intelligence organizations of Pakistan. Rather, I argue that the importance of its enduring rivalry with India means Islamabad is willing to incur major collateral costs in the pursuit of strategies that help it confront New Delhi. Indeed, the fact that Pakistan continues such strategies in the face of a clear and present threat augments the argument that enduring rivalry with

India remains its most important foreign policy consideration. The key will be monitoring whether the threat posed by Islamists crosses a threshold and becomes so great that Islamabad re-evaluates its preferences regarding confrontation with India and decides to move more purposefully against militant organizations (see chapter 6). Until this occurs, Pakistan will continue its strategy of supporting such groups, even as they may help fuel domestic instability. Concomitantly, prospects for success in Afghanistan (which are contingent on Pakistan abandoning this strategy) remain grim.

Thus, the value of the present thesis is its ability to perform the dual role of illuminating a topical case in international relations while also offering insight into the dynamics of two extant theories of international conflict. Our understanding of the Afghan war is augmented by the application of enduring rivalry theory. A key variable in the current conflict – Pakistani duplicity – is theoretically explained, and the attendant implications explored. Similarly, existing literature on the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry is expanded, and the dynamics of enduring *nuclear* rivalry – informed by the theory of conflict contagion – are tentatively proposed. Though the propositions regarding the connection between enduring rivalry and contagion are obviously not generalizable beyond the immediate case, they offer potential avenues of future research regarding enduring rivals faced with a compelling nuclear deterrent. Unfortunately, the operative dynamics appear to point to further instability in the region of South and Central Asia. The Afghan war itself appears evanescent when compared to geopolitical realities that were established well before 2001 and will remain long after coalition troops depart. If there is to be any chance of success in Afghanistan, U.S. and NATO leaders must come to terms with this complex reality. As policy makers continue to search for the solution to

Pakistan's duplicity in a murky regional environment, the theory of enduring rivalry is the lens that can best focus their vision.



## References

- Indians in Afghanistan are soft targets: Krishna. (2010, March 21). *Times of India*. Retrieved June 2, 2010 from <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indians-in-Afgghanistan-are-soft-targets-Krishna/articleshow/5707963.cms>
- TAPI members intensify joint efforts. (2010, August 5). *Trend News Agency*. Retrieved August 6, 2010 from <http://en.trend.az/capital/pengineering/1731186.html>
- Pakistan, Iran sign deal on natural gas pipeline. (2010, March 17). *Reuters UK Edition*. Retrieved August 6, 2010 from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62G12C20100317?sp=true>
- Pakistan aids insurgency in Afghanistan, reports assert. (2010, July 25). *New York Times*. Retrieved July 28, 2010 from [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26isi.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26isi.html?_r=1)
- Afghanistan and Pakistan sign a trade deal, representing a thaw in relations. (2010, July 18). *New York Times*. Retrieved July 28, 2010 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/world/asia/19diplo.html>
- Is India too late for the Asian oil-guzzling party? (2010, July 12). *Foreign Policy Online*. Retrieved August 3, 2010 from [http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/12/is\\_india\\_too\\_late\\_for\\_the\\_asian\\_oil\\_guzzling\\_party](http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/12/is_india_too_late_for_the_asian_oil_guzzling_party)
- Afghanistan war logs: threat of attack against Indian consulate. (2010, July 25). *The Guardian*. Retrieved August 3, 2010 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/afghanistan/warlogs/7BC2F378-2219-0B3F-9F595237BDDB2B74>
- Afghanistan war logs: Pakistan allegedly offering money for money for assassination of Indian road workers. (2010, July 25). *The Guardian*. Retrieved August 3, 2010 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/afghanistan/warlogs/7BE93069-2219-0B3F-9FC8ADDCFCCA9F38>
- Afghanistan war logs: Clandestine aid for Taliban bears Pakistan's fingerprints. (2010, July 25). *The Guardian*. Retrieved August 3, 2010 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/25/pakistan-isi-accused-taliban-afghanistan>
- The war logs. (2010). *The New York Times*. Retrieved August 3, 2010 from <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/26warlogs.html#report/77416559-2219-0B3F-9F7E4882DB6FBB4E>

- The Great Game revisited. (2007). *Economist*, 382(8521), 48-49. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database.
- Bajoria, J. & Kaplan, E. (2010). The ISI and terrorism: behind the accusations. *Council on Foreign Relations Online*. Retrieved August 3, 2010 from [http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/isi\\_and\\_terrorism.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/isi_and_terrorism.html)
- Behuria, A. K. (2007). Fighting the taliban: Pakistan at war with itself. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 61(4), 529-543.  
doi:10.1080/10357710701684963
- Bennett, D. S. (1996). Security, bargaining, and the end of interstate rivalry. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(2), 157. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9606264897&site=ehost-live>
- Blank, S. (2003). India's Rising Profile in Central Asia. *Comparative Strategy*, 22(2), 139. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database.
- Boulding, K. E. (1962). *Conflict and defense: a general theory*. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
- Buzan, B., & Waver, O. (2003). *Regions and powers: The structure of international security*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohen, C., & Chollet, D. (2007). When \$10 billion is not enough: rethinking U.S. strategy toward Pakistan. *The Washington Quarterly* 30(2). 7.
- Coll, S. (2010, May 24). War by other means: Is it possible to negotiate with the Taliban? *The New Yorker*.
- Diehl, P. (1998). *The dynamics of enduring rivalries*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Diehl, P. & Goertz, G. (2001). *War and peace in international rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Diehl, P., Goertz, G., & Saeedi, D. (2005). Theoretical specifications of enduring rivalries: applications to the India-Pakistan case. In T.V. Paul (Ed.), *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring rivalry* (pp. 27-54). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dossani, R. & Rowen, H. (2005). *Prospects for peace in South Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Fair, C. C. (2008). Pakistan's relations with central asia: Is past prologue? *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 31(2), 201-227. doi:10.1080/01402390801940344
- Fair, C. C. (2009). Time for sober realism: Renegotiating U.S. relations with pakistan. *Washington Quarterly*, 32(2), 149-172. doi:10.1080/01636600902775680
- Feigenbaum, E. A. (2010). India's rise, america's interest. (pp. 76-91) *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=48191506&site=ehost-live>
- Ganguly, S. (1995). Indo-pakistani nuclear issues and the Stability/Instability paradox. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 18(4), 325. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=9512223788&site=ehost-live>
- Ganguly, S. & Hagerty, D. (2005). *Fearful symmetry: India-Pakistan crises in the shadow of nuclear weapons*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Ganguly, S., & Howenstein, N. (2009). India-pakistan rivalry in afghanistan. *Journal of International Affairs*, 63(1), 127-140. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=47480427&site=ehost-live>
- Ganguly, S., & Kapur, S. P. (2010). The sorcerer's apprentice: Islamist militancy in south asia. *Washington Quarterly*, 33(1), 47-59. doi:10.1080/01636600903418686
- Gochman, C.S. & Moaz, Z. (1984). Militarized interstate disputes, 1816-1976: procedures, patterns, and insights. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28(4), 585-616.
- Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. (1993). Enduring rivalries: Theoretical constructs and empirical patterns. *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(2), 147. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9408180163&site=ehost-live>
- Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. (1995). The initiation and termination of enduring rivalries: The impact of political shocks. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(1), 30. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9503212853&site=ehost-live>
- Grare, F. (2006). Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post-9/11 era. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 72. Retrieved from [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72\\_grare\\_final.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72_grare_final.pdf)

- Grare, F. (2010). Pakistan. In Tellis & Mukharji (Eds.), *Is a regional strategy viable in Afghanistan?* (pp. 17-26) Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Hagerty, D. (1998). *The consequences of nuclear proliferation: lessons from South Asia*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Haqqani, H. (2005). *Pakistan: between mosque and military*. Washington: The Brookings Institute Press.
- Hasnat, S. F. (2009). Pakistan's strategic interests, afghanistan and the fluctuating U.S. strategy. *Journal of International Affairs*, 63(1), 141-155. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=47480428&site=ehost-live>
- Houweling, H. W., & Siccama, J. G. (1985). The epidemiology of war, 1816-1980. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29(4), 641-663. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/stable/174247>
- Huth, P. (2000). Territory: why are territorial disputes between states a central cause of international conflict? In Vasquez (ed.), *What Do We Know about War?* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Jervis, R. (1990). The political effects of nuclear weapons,” in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Stephen Van Evera, (eds.) *Nuclear diplomacy and crisis management*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Johnson, T. H., & Mason, M. C. (2008 Back). No sign until the burst of fire. *International Security*, 32(4), 41.
- Kadera, K. M. (1998). Transmission, barriers, and constraints: A dynamic model of the spread of war. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3, Opening up the Black Box of War: Politics and the Conduct of War), 367-387. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/stable/174519>
- Kapur, S. (2005). India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe. *International Security*, 30(2), 127-152. doi:10.1162/016228805775124570.
- Khan, S. (2005). Nuclear weapons and the prolongation of the India-Pakistan rivalry. In T.V. Paul (Ed.), *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring rivalry* (pp. 156-177). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Klein, J. (2010, August 9). The forest and the trees. *Time Magazine*. p. 19

- Krepon, M. (2003). The stability-instability paradox, misperception, and escalation control in South Asia. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center. Retrieved from <http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/kreponmay03.pdf>
- Leng, R. J. (1983). When will they ever learn? coercive bargaining in recurrent crises. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(3), 379-419. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/stable/173921>
- Leng, R.J. (2005). Realpolitik and learning in the India-Pakistan rivalry. In T.V. Paul (Ed.), *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring rivalry* (pp. 103-128). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Maoz, Z., & Mor, B. D. (2002). *Bound by struggle: The strategic evolution of enduring international rivalries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Maoz, Z., & Mor, B. D. (1996). Enduring rivalries: The early years. *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique*, 17(2), Crisis, Conflict and War. Crise, conflit et guerre), 141-160. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/stable/1601300>
- Mathews, J. (2010). Through their eyes: possibilities for a regional approach to Afghanistan. In Tellis & Mukharji (Eds.), *Is a regional strategy viable in Afghanistan?* (pp. 1-6) Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- McGinnis, M. & Williams, J. (2001). *Compound dilemmas: democracy, collective action and superpower rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mistry, D. (2009). Tempering optimism about nuclear deterrence in South Asia. *Security Studies*, 18(1), 148-182. doi:10.1080/09636410802678072
- Mohan, C. R. (2009). How obama can get south asia right. *Washington Quarterly*, 32(2), 173-189. doi:10.1080/01636600902775656
- Most, B., & Starr, H. (1980). Diffusion, reinforcement, geopolitics, and the spread of war. *The American Political Science Review*, 74(4), 932-946. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/stable/1954314>
- Mukherjee, A. (2009). A brand new day or back to the future? the dynamics of india-pakistan relations. *India Review*, 8(4), 404. Retrieved from <http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/14736480903324990>
- Mukhopadhyaya, G. (2010). India. In Tellis & Mukharji (Eds.), *Is a regional strategy viable in Afghanistan?* (pp. 27-38) Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

- Obama, B. (2007). Renewing American leadership. *Foreign Affairs* 86(4), 2-16.
- Pant, H. V. (2010). India in Afghanistan: a test case for a rising power. *Contemporary South Asia*, 18(2), 133-153. doi:10.1080/09584931003674984
- Paul, T. V. (2005). Causes of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry. In T.V. Paul (Ed.), *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring rivalry* (pp. 3-24). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Paul, T.V. (2006). Why has the India-Pakistan rivalry been so enduring? Power asymmetry and an intractable conflict. *Security Studies*, 15(4), 600-634.
- Qassem, A. S. (2007). Afghanistan–Pakistan relations: Border controversies as counter-terrorist impediments. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 61(1), 65-80. doi:10.1080/10357710601142500
- Racine, J.L. (2002). Pakistan and the India syndrom. In Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation?* (pp. 195-227). New York: Zed Books Ltd.
- Rais, R. B. (2008). Afghanistan and Pakistan: difficult neighbors. *The National Bureau of Asian Research* 19(5), 13-24.
- Rajagopalan, R. (2006). What stability-instability paradox? Subnational conflicts and the nuclear risk in South Asia. *Research Paper No. 4*. London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute. Retrieved from [http://www.sassi.org/pdfs/R\\_Rajagopalan.pdf](http://www.sassi.org/pdfs/R_Rajagopalan.pdf)
- Rubin, B. R., & Rashid, A. (2008). From great game to grand bargain. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(6), 30-44. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=34741440&site=ehost-live>
- Saideman, S. (2005). At the heart of the conflict: irredentism and Kashmir. In T.V. Paul (Ed.), *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring rivalry* (pp. 202-224). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sinno, A. (2008). Achieve counter-insurgency cooperation in Afghanistan by resolving the Indo-Pakistani Rivalry. *The National Bureau of Asian Research* 19(5), 3-12.
- Siverson, R., & Starr, H. (1989). Alliance and border effects on the war behavior of states: Refining the interaction opportunity model. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 10(2), 21-46. doi:10.1177/073889428901000202
- Siverson, R., & Starr, H. (1990). Opportunity, willingness, and the diffusion of war. *The American Political Science Review*, 84(1), 47-67. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/stable/1963629>

- Siverson, R., & Starr, H. (1991). *The diffusion of war: a study of opportunity and willingness*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Snyder, G. (1965). The balance of power and the balance of terror. In Paul Seabury (ed.) *The balance of power*. San Francisco: Chandler.
- Starr, H. (2005). Territory, proximity, and spatiality: The geography of international conflict. *International Studies Review*, 7(3), 387-406.
- Starr, H., & Most, B. (1976). The substance and study of borders in international relations research. *International Studies Quarterly*, 20(4), 581-620. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/stable/2600341>
- Starr, S. (2005) A 'great Central Asia partnership' for Afghanistan and its neighbors. Silk Road Paper: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/Strategy.pdf>
- Swami, P. (2007). *India, Pakistan and the secret jihad: the covert war in Kashmir, 1947-2004*. New York: Routledge.
- Tellis, A. (2008). Pakistan's record on terrorism: Conflicted goals, compromised performance. *Washington Quarterly*, 31(2), 7-32. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=32712937&site=ehost-live>
- Tellis, A. (2010). Implementing a regional approach to Afghanistan: multiple alternatives, modest possibilities. In Tellis & Mukharji (Eds.), *Is a regional strategy viable in Afghanistan?* (pp. 85-126) Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Thompson, W. (1995). Principal rivalries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, 195-223.
- Tremblay, R. & Schofield, J. (2005). Institutional causes of the India-Pakistan rivalry. In T.V. Paul (Ed.), *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring rivalry* (pp. 225-248). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Vasquez, J. (1993). *The war puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vasquez, J. A. (1996). Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not: A quantitative comparative case.. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(4), 531. Retrieved from <http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9707254639&site=ehost-live>

- Vasquez, J. & Henahan, M. (2001). Territorial disputes and the probability of war, 1816-1992. *Journal of Peace Research* 38, 123-138.
- Weinbaum, M.G., (2009). Hard choices in countering insurgency and terrorism along Pakistan's north-west frontier. *Journal of International Affairs* 63(1), 73-88.
- Weinbaum, M. G., & Harder, J. B. (2008). Pakistan's afghan policies and their consequences. *Contemporary South Asia*, 16(1), 25-38.  
doi:10.1080/09584930701800370
- Wirsing, R. G. (2003). *Kashmir in the shadow of war: regional rivalries in a nuclear age*. New York: M.E Sharpe Inc.
- Wirsing, R. G. (2007). In India's lengthening shadow: The U.S.-Pakistan strategic alliance and the war in Afghanistan. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 34(3), 151-172. Retrieved from  
<http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=27718338&site=ehost-live>
- Ziring, L. (2009). Unraveling the Afghanistan-Pakistan riddle. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 36(2), 59-78. Retrieved from  
<http://ezproxy.library.dal.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=43202252&site=ehost-live>