ORDERING DISORDER: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE TRAINING IN HAITI, 1994-2001

By

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We accept this thesis as conforming
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Abstract

This study evaluates the effectiveness of international civilian police [CIVPOL] training in helping to realize an effective domestic policing agency for Haiti. Such training aimed to develop basic skills and leadership capacities within the Haitian National Police [HNP]. Despite well-intentioned efforts to foster professional conduct and introduce modern policing principles, the outcomes of mentorship and training by CIVPOL throughout the 1990s had been largely negligible in developing a police force legitimate in the eyes of Haitians. This study reveals that the efforts to develop the HNP in the 1990s were adversely affected by a number of factors, both within the HNP and also in the strategy of the international stakeholders, which served to mitigate the larger effort to build the HNP's capacities in a sustainable fashion. This study acknowledges the importance of engaging police reform within a broader strategy of concurrent development of ancillary security sector actors.

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Chapter 1
Introduction and Methodology

1.0 Context of this study

In August 2006, researchers Athena Kolbe and Royce Hutson from the Wayne State University released a study which detailed the extent of criminality in Haiti following the departure of President Jean Bertrand Aristide. Their twenty-two month study between February 2004 and December 2005 surveyed approximately 5720 individuals in the Port-au-Prince area and noted the problem of crime in Haiti. From their study, Kolbe and Hutson extrapolated that twelve murders were committed each day and one in every nineteen girls were sexually assaulted annually. Even more disturbing were revelations from the surveys which noted that 21.7% of murders and 13.8% of sexual assaults were committed by members of the Haitian National Police and other government security forces (Kolbe & Hutson 2006, 564). The problem of crimes against the person was echoed in a November 2008 report released by Amnesty International titled, *Don't Turn Your Back on Girls: Sexual Violence Against Girls in Haiti,* which noted the poor security situation in Haiti and the ramifications of such on vulnerable groups in Haitian society. Together, reports like these serve to paint a portrait of a country besieged by criminality and challenged by domestic security institutions unable to fulfill their mandate of protecting citizens under its charge.

The Republic of Haiti, challenged by political and economic problems, was ranked the 14th state most vulnerable to state failure as assessed in joint Fund for Peace/*Foreign Policy*'s 2008 Failed States Index.(Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace 2008) Among the indicators, the report noted the 'poor' state of the security apparatus in Haiti which was ranked as a highly unstable rating 8.9; this is only a slight improvement from two previous years where the report rated Haiti's security apparatus as 9.3 and

9.4, respectively.(Burbank 2008) The report noted that, "[despite] progress made toward combating the gang violence, including a UN-led initiative in the most violent shantytown, Cité Soleil, the government generally does not have the capacity to investigate and prosecute these crimes, leading to an atmosphere of impunity."(Burbank 2008) The vulnerability of Haiti's security apparatus is notable since it is one of the least stable indicators according to the report. And stable security institutions can serve as a key contributor—or destabilizing factor—to Haiti's greater social, political and economic stability. Corruption is also an endemic factor affecting all institutions in Haiti, the security institutions are no exception. In the 2008 Corruption Perception Index released by Transparency International, Haiti ranked 177th out of 180 countries on perception of governance corruption. The dim view of Haitians towards the integrity of their public officials and politicians is only eclipsed by those surveyed in Iraq, Myanmar and Somalia (Lambsdorff 2008). The authors of the Fund for Peace report drew upon this and specifically referenced the Haitian National Police as being "extremely corrupt and is suspected of collaborating with Haiti's many armed gangs." Furthermore, the report noted that despite the United Nations' ongoing efforts to train and professionalize the HNP, "the results are still uncertain."(Lambsdorff 2008) This is the context in which this project's research is warranted.

1.1 About this essay

This essay analyzes the international community's capacity building for the Haitian National Police [HNP] to determine the effects of training and mentorship on the ability of the police to ensure the security of Haitians. The research focuses on the effectiveness of international efforts in Haiti to train the Haitian National Police between

1994 and 2004. Specifically, what were the effects of the police training by CIVPOL in Haiti on the capacities of the HNP to ensure the security of Haitians? As the sustainability of CIVPOL efforts is dependent on a number of variables—notably the development and efficacy of other security sector institutions and overall governance reform—the qualitative research undertaken for this project explores some of the ways in which CIVPOL capacity building efforts have resulted in mixed outcomes for both the HNP and CIVPOL. Despite substantial investment by the international community in the development of Haiti's security sector—notably in the Haitian National Police—the returns on this investment have been minimal in the face of overwhelming political and economic influences which have militated against substantial progress to professionalize the policing sector.

1.2 Relevance of this research

This essay aims to isolate the unique contributions of policing organizations towards the realization of human security in Haiti and the extent to which training and mentorship plays a role in realizing ameliorated security in post-conflict environments. It elaborates on the key factors of resources and political commitment and complex dynamics between institutional maturation and the domestic political and economic situation, which influences the establishment of a viable policing capacity in Haiti. This project will reveal the effectiveness of strategies used by CIVPOL trainers and detail the circumstances affecting the viability of these practices. In doing so, this essay will contribute to the body of knowledge informing future international civilian policing missions both in Haiti and elsewhere. By recognizing the potentials and limitations of a sector specific intervention such as police training, this analysis will serve to extend

appreciation of the interconnectedness of various issues in an effort to address human insecurity. Additionally, by analyzing police training as one essential component of security sector reform, this essay illustrates the practice behind the theory of sector specific interventions in realizing holistic development and long term security. Day and Freeman alluded to the importance of security reform as a vital component of peacebuilding; "rule of law and a functioning "licit" economy are the pillars, and they must broadly satisfy local ambitions if a society is not to succumb to shadow actors pursuing war aims through crime and terror (Day and Freeman 2005, 140)." Annika Hansen also noted the role that security sector reform plays in ensuring overall peace "security is the key to a 'new social contract' between the population and its government (in Donais 2004, 946)."

This project on police training in Haiti will also underline the reality of mutual vulnerability as a theme within human security discourse conceptualized by Nef and Head. Nef noted that increased technology, the decline of ideological barriers and increased economic consecutiveness have changed the foundations of the world system such that security issues often have a transnational nature and vulnerability is 'mutual (Nef 1999. 5-11).' Silver also noted the rising insecurity brought by globalization, an "integration process knitting increasingly more extensive, complex and interdependent relations among countries (Silver 2004)." The concept of mutual vulnerability is especially relevant when considering the political incentives motivating international contributions to security sector reform in Haiti.

1.3 Methodology

In the initial stages of this project, it was conceived that progress in policing capacity could be measured by rates of criminality. Indeed, this is one of the indices used by comparative surveys, such as the Failed States Index, to justify their remarks when noting an improvement in the security apparatus of a state. However, due to the subjective nature of crime statistics, the use of crime rates is less useful in a particular case. Moreover, it became apparent during the information gathering stage of the project that consistent and accurate crime statistics are not available for Haiti between 1994 and 2001.

For these two reasons—the availability of information and the validity of project results—other indices of HNP effectiveness were sought. These areas of inquiry were revealed in the course of research interviews with informants and a review of documentary evidence relevant to this study. The qualitative research which informs this essay aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of international civilian police [CIVPOL] training initiatives by looking at whether there has been amelioration in the capacity of the HNP to execute their duties in a professional and effective manner as a result of the mentoring and technical training provided to the HNP by the international community.

For this project, active interviews with practitioners provided the best means of describing efforts undertaken by CIVPOL mentors and advisors (Holstein and Gubrium 1995). Analysis of interviews with CIVPOL advisers involved in the training of the HNP helped to reveal the retention and synthesis of training into the work methods of officers of the HNP. Additionally, interviews with three members of the Haitian diaspora living in Toronto, Canada served to add further perspective on environment in which CIVPOL's efforts were being undertaken. Interviews with members of this latter group helped this

project realize a holistic attempt to gauge the effectiveness and shortcomings of CIVPOL efforts in Haiti. Moreover, the small number of interviews conducted for this research offer a possible segway for replication and expansion of this research in the future.

1.4 Ensuring Validity

In order to ensure credibility in the findings of this study, during the information collection phase of this project, efforts were made to verify responses from one respondent by reference to the responses of another respondent. For example, to ensure that the corruption noted by one interviewee was valid, the question of corruption was added to subsequent interviews. The credibility of the findings of this study were also reinforced, to a large degree, by comparing trends revealed in the course of interviews with documentary evidence—notably progress reports on the HNP by the UN Special Representative.

Equally important is ensuring the results are relevant to future deployments of CIVPOL in a training capacity. To ensure such external validity, this project identifies the elements of security sector reform [SSR] common to post-conflict scenarios—in Haiti and elsewhere. By identifying the common threads that Haiti's police and security sector share with other developing countries, and subsequently identifying the results of actions in the Haitian experience, the findings of this study are relevant to Haiti.

Small sample size was an unavoidable problem. Time and resource limits and the availability of respondents limited the study to just eight interviews. On balance, however, these were quality sources who were well-placed to shed light on the operational problems of interest. Their evidence was mutually reinforcing, and accorded

with secondary sources. This increases confidence in the small sample. On the other hand, confidence in the results should be subject to further study, and this work should be regarded as exploratory rather than definitive.

Unfortunately, due to the limited resources and finite amount of time allocated to the completion of this study, only eight interviews were conducted in total. The small number of interviews conducted may have

1.5 Sources of Information

This analysis of CIVPOL efforts in Haiti drew from a number of complementary sources. First, research interviews were conducted between October and December 2008 in the cities of Toronto, Ottawa and Gatineau. Individuals interviewed represented groups of Canadian police who had gone to Haiti in the 1990s and more recently. A subset of this group included interviews with two high level RCMP officers who helped to contextualize the policy of Canadian CIVPOL efforts in Haiti since 1993 and helped to frame the potential contributions of Canadian police in the future. Finally, interviews were also conducted with three individuals representing the Haitian diaspora in Canada, including the Honorary-Consul for Haiti in Toronto.

Complementing these research interviews was an analysis of both primary and secondary documentary evidence. Documents which helped to contribute to this project's findings included Reports of the Secretary-General which provided updates—in wording for public consumption—on the various UN missions in Haiti over the course of each mission. Also, detailed information about the current state of affairs of the Haitian security sector, HNP included, was gained from reports from a UN Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] survey mission to Haiti in July 2006. These included

detailed minutes of meetings with numerous officials within security sector institutions including the HNP.

Ancillary primary documentation supporting this study's analysis included a substantial number of situation reports, mid-mission reports and memorandums forwarded informally to the principal researcher by individuals involved in UN missions in Haiti over the previous decade. A total of two hundred and fifty six pages of internal documents detailing the Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA] programmes in Haiti were accessed through the Access to Information [ATI] facility; however, as these documents were only received in late March 2009, not all the information was accessible for this project. Some of the data from an evaluation project of the Canadian bilateral institutional development program for the HNP was integrated into the project. Other reports which were provided under ATI but not utilized included a CIDA evaluation of the police academy in Haiti and diagnostic report on the status of women in the HNP. These are available to review upon request, to further develop recommendations.

1.6 Bias in Information Collection

According to Gubrium and Holstein, it is a fallacy to assume that interview respondents are neutral "vessels of answers" (Gubrium & Holstein 2002, 13, 15). Instead, they argue that the responses in an interview are actively "constructed" based on the respondents life experience, interview setting and the interviewer.

> Because the respondent's subjectivity and related experience are continually being assembled and modified…the value of interview data lies both in their meanings and in how meanings are constructed (Gubrium & Holstein 2002, 15).

Because the researcher was not able to travel to Haiti to conduct research, interviews had to draw on conversations with three prominent Haitian Canadians living in Canada. In doing so, this researcher recognized that the experiences of these Haitian Canadians were unrepresentative of the Haitian majority, by virtue of residence in Canada for over a decade. Nevertheless, the Haitian-Canadian perspective provides relevant context for Canadian efforts in Haiti.

Although it is impossible to entirely eliminate bias in information collection, this study aimed to mitigate the potential for interview bias by using multiple sources of data and by triangulation (Leedy & Ormrod 2005, 99). Multiple data sources included primary and secondary documentation to validate interviews. Triangulation was achieved by judiciously balancing information from interviews with Haitian Canadians and Canadian police with selected documents.

Second, the themes presented in this study are guided by interviews with Canadian police officers who participated in the planning and executing the missions in Haiti. These interviews were useful in revealing the applied insights of CIVPOL mentors. However, as these individuals gained their experiences as elements within a larger policing organization, it was necessary to discern the “voices” of the individual respondents from the ‘institutional voice’ describing the objectives and ideals of their policing agency. Gubrium and Holstein noted the importance of making the distinction between individual voices and that of their organization (Gubrium & Holstein 2002, 22). Admittedly, the interview methodology did not have a protocol to recognize or distinguish between the voices of the individuals and their policing organization. Along with a heavy reliance on documents from international organizations and organizations

external to Haiti, this study's findings echo the institutional voices on progress in Haiti. Recognition of this serves to reinforce the validity of this study's results.

1.7 Outline of this study

This argument is comprised of five chapters in total. The first two chapters detail the aim of the study, describe the historical context of policing reform in Haiti and situate the study within broader scholarly literature pertaining to this subject. The third chapter outlines CIVPOL inputs, including skills training and modelling appropriate conduct, to the HNP and the subsequent consequences for both the HNP and international partners. Chapter four discusses a number of common issues which were revealed to have undermined international efforts to build the HNP; these challenges are rooted both in Haitian political issues and also decisions taken by the international community on the structure and mandate of the CIVPOL component in Haiti. Chapters three and four use the qualitative findings of this study to advance the argument that there has been mixed progress to build the capacity of the HNP since 1994 but also notes that the contributions of CIVPOL in Haiti have served to further the knowledge base of policing reform.

The last chapter of this piece explores the methodology guiding this research project and elaborates on the problems encountered in the course of study. It further notes areas of future study related to policing development in Haiti in order to address some questions raised in the course of the present research; notably in areas of political influence and the role of culture in realizing sustainable security sector reform. Finally, the closing chapter of this project makes some suggestions for the continued efforts to

reform the police and the greater security sector in Haiti both in the present and in the future.

Chapter 2
Historical Background and Literature Review

2.0 Understanding the historical context

In order to understand the effects of police mentoring and advising efforts in Haiti, one must recognize the many political and cultural influences rooted in the country's history which affects security sector reform in the present day. This chapter briefly outlines the history of Haiti with particular emphasis on events in the past which have shaped the public perception of domestic security organizations; this will contextualize the environment in which policing reform takes place today and in the period of study. Finally, this chapter outlines the contemporary efforts to establish a Haitian police force and outlines common scholarly impressions on the development of the HNP. The purpose of this chapter is to situate the objective of this project—specifically, researching the effects of CIVPOL mentoring and advising—within the broader literature on security sector reform in Haiti.

2.1 Historical Background

2.1.1 Haiti's struggle for independence

A result of a decade long struggle against colonial powers, Haiti finally gained independence from France on January 1, 1804. With its independence, Haiti—derived from the Amerindian name for the island—earned the distinction of being the only state in the world to be created from a successful 'slave revolt (Pezzullo 2006,36)(Robinson 2007,6).' The newly formed Republic also earned the unique distinction of being the first country in the world to entirely abolish slavery (Robinson 2007, 16)(Nicholls 1979,35)." Many have noted the deep seated resentment towards the new Republic of Haiti by European colonial powers and also the United States. The colonial powers of Britain, France and Spain were particularly frightened at the threat of other successful insurrection by black slave labour in their respective realms (Nicholls 1979,36). "…the

spectre of a free Negro republic that owed its independence to a successful slave revolt frightened slave holding countries as much as the shadow of Bolshevist Russia alarmed capitalist countries in 1917," noted African-American historian Rayford Logan (Heinl & Heinl 2005,143). The abolition of slavery as proclaimed in the constitution of Haiti was an affront to the nearby United States, especially the plantation owners of the southern states.

Owing to these issues, the European powers, the United States and even the Vatican were slow in recognizing Haiti as a sovereign, independent country (Heinl & Heinl 2005, 143). Robinson even argued that the resentment towards Haiti's has led to 'active hostility' from the world powers even to the present day; which he highlighted by referring to the long line of economic sanctions and political interference by international players in Haiti up to the present day (Robinson 2007,18-19). He was particularly critical of the United States: "In Haiti's case, the United States, directly or indirectly through its Haitian collaborators, blocked every path the poor, through their elected leaders, took to win for themselves a less painful existence (Robinson 2007, 70)"

2.1.2 American occupation of Haiti (1915-1934)

Under the pretext of re-establishing calm in the midst of substantial political turmoil, the United States invaded Haiti on July 28, 1915. Two explanations emerge for this intervention by the United States. The first was an economic rationale which saw the invasion as motivated by commercial concerns over the rights of foreigners to own land in Haiti (Nicholls 1979, 147). The second possible motivation was for a strategic base in the region. With the Panama Canal scheduled for opening in 1915, strategic maritime considerations came to the fore and the Haitian port of Mole St Nicolas was sought as a naval base for the presence of American power in the Caribbean and routes leading to Mexico and Latin America(Wilentz 1989,77) ((Nicholls 1979,144).

Regardless of the rationale for the invasion, the occupation of Haiti by the United States in the early twentieth century saw the beginnings of modern policing in Haiti. While under US control, order in Haiti was maintained by a small number of US Marines and a larger number of troops from the Haitian Gendarmerie. The two thousand seven hundred Haitian members of the Gendarmerie were led by American officers from the Marine Corps. The force had the mandate towards "the preservation of domestic peace, the security of individual rights" and noted the specific functions of "supervision and control of arms and ammunition, military supplies and traffic therein, throughout the country (Balch 1927, 130)." In 1927, Balch noted that the Haitian Gendarmes were being trained as soldiers—not police—and he questioned what the effect of such training would be following the departure of the American force. "One possible result is self-maintenance in power of whomsoever has control of this force…" his hypothesis would foreshadow the activities of the Haitian constabulary in the following decades (Balch 1927, 131).

Generally, the results of the American occupation were arguably mixed with both positive and negative testimonials outcomes. For instance, by 1929 the 'Traveaux Publics' could boast of over a thousand miles of roads built. And in 1924 a fledgling telephone system with over 1250 miles of lines was functioning where only a decade earlier the French phone system had "sputtered into silence (Heinl & Heinl 2005, 435)." However, the nineteen year occupation had a divisive effect on the politics of governance in the country. Increasingly, perception grew that the benefits of the occupation accrued disproportionately to the lighter skinned 'mulattos.' Traditionally, the mulattos were the elite of Haiti and the American occupation reinforced this by installing individuals from this group in the governing hierarchy. In August 1934, after a friendly investment climate was created, political stability returned and a professional

'Haitianized' government had been established, the United States withdrew militarily from Haiti (Heinl & Heinl 2005,456-457; Nicholls 1979,151-152).

2.1.3 The Duvalier Regime

Although the United States had ended its occupation of Haiti in August 1934, the impact of the American occupation was felt in the decades which followed. As noted earlier, the occupation served to further divide the politics of Haiti, with the mulatto elites forming the government of Haiti in the decades following the withdrawal of American forces. "Faithful to their class and to the tradition of open thievery by the faction in power, these regimes reinforced the sense of alienation of the middle class," noted Malone about the mulatto administrations which ruled Haiti between 1934 and 1956 (Malone & Einsiedel 2006, 43). With the resignation of President Paul-Émile Magloire in December 1956, a provisional administration organized elections for September 1957. Drawing on the unhappiness of the underrepresented black middle class and the support of the army, Dr. François Duvalier was elected as president on 22 September 1957 with well over 70% of the votes cast (Nicholls 1979, 208-209).

President Duvalier—popularly referred to as 'Papa Doc'—undertook efforts during the early years of his presidency to consolidate his power and eliminate potential rivals. In the early Not entirely trusting of the army, the president set about creating a paramilitary organization operating separately from the army and loyal only to him. The '*Tonton Macoutes'* served to counterbalance the army and further weakened the ability of any one organization to depose him from power (Heinl & Heinl 2005, 549). Confirming the fears that Balch expressed three decades earlier, the policing culture which emerged under the Duvalier regime was repressive and ceded to the political ends of the absolutist leader. The police and Duvalier's Tonton Macoutes militia were

used not only to eliminate or detain political opponents, but were also used to shut down the press (Rotberg & Clague 1971, 207)

According to Nicholls, the policies of repression and division eroded the strength of the mulatto elite. It also served to severely denigrate the traditional guarantors of security in Haiti, with substantial efforts made to corrupt and weaken the army to pre-empt a potential risk to the ruling regime. Repression of the population by force was also felt in the employment of the Tonton Macoutes militias to brutally eliminate detractors of the regime. Another effect of François Duvalier's rule as president was the pervasiveness of corruption in all institutions of Haiti. Trouillot noted that a characteristic of the Duvalier State was "…not so much the admittedly high degree of administrative corruption that prevailed within it, but the total disappearance of an ethical veneer. (Malone & Einsiedel 2006, 47)" Furthermore, mismanagement under Duvalier led to low rates of literacy and limited incentives for private wealth creation (Rotberg & Clague 1971, 267, 272). The result was such that many Haitians lived in poverty without economic opportunities which undoubtedly served to further antagonize Haitians towards the police who were appropriately viewed as instruments of the ruling elite.

Duvalier's weakening of state institutions, the fostering of corrosive behaviour for political ends and the use of force to repress detractors would all be elements continued during the rule of his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier; more significantly, these effects continue to have an effect on the development of the police and the legitimacy of politics and the police in the eyes of Haitians in the present day as the subsequent chapters will highlight.

With the death of his father in April 1971, Jean-Claude Duvalier—nicknamed 'Baby Doc'—assumed power. Policies of the junior Duvalier mirrored the preceding administration of his father, this partially a result of the inertia from the high level

bureaucrats appointed by the elder Duvalier. Specifically, this meant that the forceful repression of dissidents by agencies of the state was continued, albeit further secluded from the public eye. “Just as a new generation of technocrats was on the rise, so too was a new generation of police and army officers well skilled in the means necessary to allow the regime to keep its grip,” noted Heinl (Heinl & Heinl 2005,623). However, Baby Doc was also distinguished from his father by his lesser adherence to the isolationist ideology of his father (Nicholls 1979, 240). Notably, efforts were made to open up Haiti to the international community, with particular emphasis on extracting foreign assistance from the international community. His efforts to show a ‘friendlier’ Haiti were eagerly received and development assistance represented 40% of budget revenues by 1982 (Malone & Einsiedel 2006, 46). And this softer image that Baby Doc presented to the world seemed to resonate with the elite classes of Western Europe and America who harboured romantic notions of Port-au-Prince and Hispaniola. Describing the scene at the Francois Duvalier Airport in 1974, “Jumbo jets poured in from Europe with those seeking ‘something different.’(Heinl & Heinl 2005, 621).

By the early 1980s, the conflation of declining prices for export commodities, centralization of power, and years of agricultural and economic mismanagement led to discontent among ordinary Haitians. Meanwhile, Jean-Claude Duvalier’s decision to marry an elite mullato woman further divided Haitians among class lines and would result in the erosion of support from the ‘black’ middle class base upon which his father based his original support. Ultimately, social discontent would force Jean-Claude Duvalier and his wife into exile. As the US aircraft carrying Baby Doc and his wife departed Haiti on 7 February 1986, it marked the end of the repressive Duvalier era. The provision of a US aircraft to transport Duvalier and his family into exile is significant

and highlights the decades long trend of American interest and global intervention in the affairs of Haiti.

2.1.4 Aristide on stage

Following the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haiti's politics were thrown into a state of turmoil. After several years of caretaker governments, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected as president in December 1990. As a Catholic priest who studied in Quebec and witnessed the vulgarities of the Duvalier regime, Aristide was well positioned to win the minds of Haitians and international stakeholders (Robinson 2007, 28). Campaigning on a populist platform of "participation, transparency and justice," Aristide vowed to put an end to the lingering Tonton Macoutes which continually terrorised citizens even following the end of the Duvalier era (Hallward 2007, 16; Heinl & Heinl 2005, 695). Revealing the tide of popular support against the politicized police and militias, Aristide was elected to office by 67% of voters (Pezzullo 2006, 21). In a decision which would later prove to be problematic, Aristide quickly moved to put the military under strict controls and dismissed much of the leadership of the military while appointing an army officer, Raoul Cédras to the position of army chief (Heinl & Heinl 2005,698). Also, the new president took initial steps to "clamp down on smuggling and drug running," activities which benefited the corrupt members of the military. This action further antagonized the leadership of the military against Aristide and his Lavalas political party. On 31 September 1991, under the leadership of Aristide`s appointment, General Raoul Cédras, the Forces Armées d'Haïti [FAd'H] stormed the national palace and forced President Aristide into exile. This action highlighted the close and often fractured relationship between Haiti's governments and the politicized army and partisan paramilitary Tonton Macoutes in government service.

In 1991, the Duvalierist militias and the anti-Lavalas officers in the army were the drivers of that year's insurrection. Accounts following the 1991 coup indicated the strong role that the United States played in displacing Aristide from power (Robinson 2007, 280). The populist and nationalist platform that Aristide advanced, and the practical decisions taken by him to enact foreign-trade controls worried the US government. As one US official stated, "Aristide—slum priest, grass roots activist, exponent of liberation theology—represents everything that the CIA, DOD and FBI think they have been trying to protect this country against for 50 years(Hallward 2007, 37)."

In the first year alone under the Cédras regime, one estimate by a Haitian human rights organization put the number of deaths related to the coup at over 2000. This was in addition to the hundreds of extra-judicial killings and the 300,000 Haitians displaced from their homes in the first year alone (Malone & Einsiedel 2006, 72). In outrage, the international community responded with stiff economic sanctions and an embargo which further eroded the living standards of regular Haitians. The result was felt outside of Haiti's borders with record numbers of refugees arriving on the Florida shores of the United States. With the support and encouragement of the United States, General Cédras and President Aristide held a meeting at Governor's Island, New York where an agreement was reached to transition back to democratic governance under Aristide. In return, the leadership of the coup was given amnesty and reforms to the security sector were pledged (Heinl & Heinl 2005, 709). However, in October 1993 when the vanguard of the UN peacekeeping force arrived in Port-au-Prince, crowds—probably orchestrated by the coup leaders—prevented the ship from docking and orders were given to abort the landing in the midst of the non-permissive environment. The turning point came in July 1994 when the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 940 which authorized the use of "all necessary means, including military force" to reinstall

President Aristide to power. It also established the United Nations Mission in Haiti [UNMIH] which would serve as a peacekeeping force after the intervention force had stabilized the security environment (Bailey, Maguire, & Pouliot 1998; Kumar 1999, 380). As the intervention was orchestrated entirely outside of Haiti—continuing a theme inextricable from Haiti`s history—it failed to properly appreciate the feelings of Haitians towards politics, police and army. The lack of accountability led to a sense of resignation and delegitimized the newly established HNP in the eyes of many Haitians who continued to view the police as a tool of the elites, imposed by outsiders.

2.2 Literature review

This section situates this project's broader inquiry by highlighting four main themes which emerge from the larger body of literature. These four themes note the multipronged approached which was taken by the international community towards the issue of intervening in Haiti and reforming the police. Second, the broader literature commonly notes the dichotomy between longer term engagement and a political desire which called for an expedient solution to establishing a civilian police force. Thirdly, this section highlights the perception that the international strategy in Haiti failed to take into account the complex cultural antagonism which surrounded the army and the police force. Many scholars have noted this cultural legacy as a mitigating factor for a policing reform strategy based solely on technical and institutional development. Finally, this section notes the observation that holistic security sector reform was not achieved in light of the focus on establishment and institutional development of the HNP.

2.2.1 Architecture of Intervention

The most visible component of the international efforts to reform policing in Haiti was through the commitment of the UN's Civilian Policing component. Through the UN,

nineteen countries contributed personnel to the CIVPOL component of the early UNMIH mission between 1994 and 1996(UN Security Council 1995f, 14). Similar to the policing reform objectives of the UN mission in Haiti today, the UN's early intervention in Haiti assisted in the establishment of the newly formed HNP and also served to build the initial capacity of its personnel to discharge policing duties with due regard to democratic policing principals. The UN missions in Haiti during the 1990s relied on international civilian police officers to provide on-the-job training to field level recruits and later missions attempted to build the leadership capacity of the HNP.

Security functions in Haiti during the initial period following the return of civil government were undertaken primarily by the MNF. However, efforts were soon made to transition security functions quickly to the Interim Police Security Force [IPSF]. The IPSF was a temporary organization created with the intent of serving to provide security in the interim while the permanent Haitian National Police [HNP] was stood up and developed. Concurrently, the UN Mission in Haiti, comprised of both military and police personnel, made initial efforts upon its arrival in October 1994 to establish and build the capacity of the HNP. The advance elements of the UNMIH played a pivotal part in the selection and initial staffing and resourcing for the newly established HNP. Throughout 1995, major efforts were made by the United States (through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program [ICITAP]) and Canada towards training the goal of 5000 members for the HNP by the end of the UNMIH mandate in February 1996.

Complementing the multilateral intervention, policing development in Haiti was also reinforced through bilateral projects between Canada, the United States and Haiti. Concurrent with the UNMIH mission, the RCMP and the US Government's ICITAP program developed the curriculum which served as the basis for UN CIVPOL's training

efforts in Haiti (Bailey et al. 1998, 4). Furthermore, between 1997 and 2000, Canada initiated an institutional development program which deployed police experts to Haiti to help develop niche management and operational capacities within the HNP.

Regionally, the Organization of American States played a pivotal role in establishing the political stability following the Cédras coup which was necessary for subsequent institutional intervention. For example, OAS observers participated in the International Civilian Mission [MICIVIH] in Haiti during 1993 which monitored human rights violations (Bailey et al. 1998, 3; Coates 2003, 17) which motivated the international community to intervene forcefully in Haiti.

2.2.2 Expediency of the multilateral intervention

Although the international presence in Haiti under the auspices of the United Nations has been continually involved in the country up to the present day, it is important to note that the UN presence has been comprised of a series of missions, with multiple mandate extensions. In chronological order, the international missions authorized by the United Nations Security Council were:

- United Nations Mission in Haiti: (Sept 1993 – June 1996)
- United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (June 1996 – July 1997)
- United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (August 1997 – November 1997)
- United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (December 1997 – March 2000)
- International Civilian Mission in Haiti (April 2000 – February 2001)

Although the first UNMIH mission was tasked with the establishment of a safe and secure environment, it soon became the leading vehicle for efforts to build the capacity of the HNP. The subsequent missions undertaken by the United Nations built on the accomplishments of the first mission and were focused on developing the competencies of the HNP as an institution and as a service provider.

Many commentators have argued that the relatively short timeline accorded to the task of establishing, selecting and training of the Haitian National Police was a prime obstacle to HNP development and remains a challenge to the present day (Beer 2004,125; Malone & Einsiedel 2006, 153; Mendelson-Forman 2006, 14; Mobekk 2001, 97). Donais states that amidst the "perennial international preoccupation with exit strategies, speed became the overriding priority of the early effort to get the HNP up and running…and getting new officers onto the streets as soon as possible (Donais 2005, 275)." With expediency being the overriding factor, it became necessary to "select in" former members of the military who had the requisite skill sets, with inadequate attention paid towards possible human rights abusers(Mendelson-Forman 2006,18). Meanwhile, the short timeline accorded to developing the human resources needed required unique strategies, including the training and deployment of members of the Haitian diaspora in Canada and the United States. Although well-intentioned, the training program adequately equipped the Canadian Trained Haitians [CTH] with the technical competencies, but did not factor in the difficulty of integrating these individuals into the organizational culture of the HNP. As Thomas noted, "…it appears that a 'them versus us' attitude seemed evident a year after the arrival of the CTH (Thomas 2005, 235)"

Furthermore, quick efforts to develop the HNP between 1995 and 1996 concentrated on generating the field officers necessary to police the country, but failed to account for the management capacity of the organization. As Beer stated, "the need to develop…through a "bottom up" approach was overshadowed by the absence of managerial and administrative systems." (Beer 2004, 125)

As both the example of the CTH and the leadership incapacity highlighted, the short timelines of the missions contributed towards expeditious efforts which arguably affected the quality of resources provided to the HNP.

2.2.3 Failure to understand the cultural and political antagonism towards the police and army

After the American led Multi-National Force [MNF] had allowed for the peaceful return of President Aristide to Haiti, immediate efforts were undertaken by Aristide to entirely disband the FAd'H. The idea of totally dissolving the armed forces was a domestic initiative which ran contrary to both the agreements of the Governor's Island Accord [GIA] and the advice of the international community. However, coming on the heels of the latest military dictatorship under Cédras, there was an overwhelming popular movement of Haitians towards "getting rid of the cancer"—referring to the country's armed forces (Mobekk 2001, 97). Aristide, who was against a strong military institution, ceded to the wishes of Haitians and in November 1994 essentially disbanded the military. In retrospect, many scholars and commentators have noted the action of disbanding of the forces armées d'Haïti [FAd'H]—and the speed with which it was done—as a major contributor to instability in the decade which followed. Mobekk argues that although the dissolution of the FAd'H was symbolically powerful, it also dismantled "one of the few functioning institutions" which could have served as the nucleus of security sector reform in the decade which followed (Mobekk 2001, 99). Instead, the rapid dissolution of the military, and the insufficient employment alternatives given to the unemployed former soldiers, worked to contribute to increased social instability. The lack of proper demobilization and reconciliation with Haitians also served to add to the social tensions existent in society. Although there was a 'Truth Commission' which was created with the notion of bringing to account those responsible for human rights under

the Cédras coup, no action was taken by the Haitian government towards bringing perpetrators of violence to action. The lack of justice and reconciliation has been noted as a key mitigating factor to the public's acceptance of reform efforts to the security apparatus (Kumar 2005, 272; Malone 1998, 124-125; Malone & Einsiedel 2006, 153; Mobekk 2000, 30)

Haitians have long been exposed to a disordered political environment whereby repression by the politicized army, police and Tonton Macoutes were the prime manifestations of the state. Many commentators have noted the legacy of the illegitimate use of force on Haitians throughout its history and how this has affected the legitimacy of police in the eyes of Haitians. Likely it is the cultural legacy of the politicized police which impeded the efforts of CIVPOL in the 1990s to make community policing an accepted practice in Haiti—by the police and also by Haitians. According to Mintz, there exists a culture amongst Haitians of distrust towards their rules and the policies of the ruling elite. This serves to explain the challenge of reforming the security sector actors into legitimate organizations in the eyes of the public. "The present situation is the outcome of 200 years of a war of attrition against the people by a ruling class," Writes Mintz (Mintz 1995, 86). The antagonistic relationship between Haiti's security forces and Haitians has been fostered by nearly two hundred years of "predatory behaviour," whereby "security forces have traditionally served as tools of repression." (Donais 2005, 271-272; Kumar 1999, 388-389; Mendelson-Forman 2006, 16).

It is in this cultural environment where the international community has worked towards reforming the security sector since 1994. With recognition from both domestic and international partners of the importance of professionalized and competent security forces in realizing political stability, continuous efforts have been undertaken to

dramatically transform the organs of state security in Haiti through regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives. However, the international intervention in Haiti failed to take into account the repressive policing culture which was the norm in Haiti during the Duvalier regime. According to Law, this lack of a complete understanding of the political and cultural situation in Haiti by intervening parties ran contrary to the tenets underlying a successful security reform strategy (Law 2006, 3)

2.2.4 Insufficient attention paid to other security sector actors

Another common theme which permeated the literature was the disproportionate amount of attention paid towards developing the judiciary and penal systems. Although police reform is an important component of security sector reform, it was hampered by the lack of commensurate progress in the justice and correctional systems of the country. As the newly established HNP began to arrest criminals, "accused criminals were more plentiful than courts to try them or prisons to hold them."(Mendelson-Forman 2006, 21) Also, the lack of holistic security sector development served to undermine the morale of HNP members, as was evidenced in cases of questionable behaviour.

To illustrate the disillusionment of the police with the dysfunctional justice system, Donais stated that "many HNP officers preferred to provoke gunfights with the intention of killing suspected criminals rather than turn them over to the judicial system, an action widely viewed as tantamount to releasing them (Donais 2005, 276)." Corruption and incompetence are widely cited as issues affecting the ability of the judiciary to tackle the cases brought before the courts. Resource challenges ranging from money to infrastructure were also major issues which were obstacles to recruiting and retaining the necessary personnel to run a justice system (Mendelson-Forman 2006, 21; Muggah 2005, 40). Mendelson-Forman and others have noted that building the HNP will only partially address the problem of insecurity in Haiti and that appropriate

attention needed to be paid to ameliorate the judiciary and penal systems (Beer 2004,128-129; Donais 2005, 270; Mendelson-Forman 2006,25; Mobekk 2001,107).

2.3 Situating this project's enquiry

As this review notes, the literature discussing policing reform in Haiti highlights four common themes. First, the architecture of the international intervention in Haiti was such that it encompassed multilateral, regional and bilateral efforts to build the police in Haiti. However, the efforts of the international stakeholders in Haiti were tempered by the desire of international stakeholders to achieve institutional development as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the international interventions in Haiti failed to grasp the complex cultural and political dynamics at play in Haiti which further mitigated the broader effects of technical police training in Haiti. Finally, the international strategy in Haiti failed to adequately address policing reform within a broader strategy of security sector reform addressing incapacity in the penal and judicial sectors. These themes were common in the literature and serves to further add perspective to the complexity of international involvement in Haiti.

This project finds its relevance in the lack of evaluation of the performance of technical police training in Haiti. There has been little research which has been conducted to determine the effect of the technical training given to members of the HNP in isolation of the political and social influences. As Thomas writes, "needed in all attempts to reform policing is more detailed follow-up, *measurement of effectiveness* and auditing of programs [emphasis added] (Thomas 2005, 236). The need for robust assessment of police training initiatives is also echoed by Coates and Last who note the importance of evaluation as a component in successful police assistance programs (Coates & Last 2005, 215). Complicating this project's objective of evaluating the

CIVPOL initiatives in Haiti, Beer noted that evaluation and follow-up "were not part of the process (Beer 2004, 125)." Over the course of four months, research was undertaken to shed light on the area of police training effectiveness as it pertains to the training of the Haitian National Police since 1994. In the following chapter, it will be shown that the common themes which were noted in the literature are issues which are intrinsic influences to the CIVPOL mentoring and advising initiatives despite efforts to isolate the effectiveness of the aforementioned training.

Chapter 3
Inputs and Outputs of CIVPOL Mentoring and Advising

3.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, discussion focused on the broader history of Haiti with the aim of contextualizing security sector reform in Haiti over the last fifteen years. The review of the existing literature on security reform in Haiti outlined the major themes which have confronted Haitian policing reform initiatives and serves to further situate this project's inquiry. In this chapter, the discussion narrows its focus towards addressing the main question of this project; specifically, *what was the effect of CIVPOL mentoring and advising on the capacity of the HNP to discharge its duties?* This chapter will underline the observation that CIVPOL efforts to develop the capacities of the HNP have resulted in mixed progress made towards increasing the abilities of the police to discharge their duties as would be expected from a policing agency within a democracy. What this chapter reveals is that policing reform is negatively affected by issues external to the technical training and mentorship provided by CIVPOL. Interestingly, this chapter will note that although the progress of HNP institutional development has been minimal, the police mentoring and advising efforts since the establishment of the force in November 1994 have served to contribute to the repertoire of lessons learned and best practices for CIVPOL program delivery.

3.1 Mixed progress in developing the HNP

As universally acknowledged in the course of interviews and in a careful analysis of publicly available statements from the United Nations, the pace of developing the Haitian National Police has been slow and progress since the original intervention in 1994 has been minimal. In July 2006, there were 7651 police officers of the HNP responsible for the assurance of security for all of Haiti and its 8.5 million inhabitants

(Leroy 2006, 61). The police to population ratio in Haiti is approximately 1:1153 and is substantially higher than the ratios in other Caribbean countries as shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Police to Population Ratios in Selected Caribbean Countries

St. Lucia	1: 285
Barbados	1: 166
Jamaica	1: 200
Trinidad and Tobago	1: 162
Grenada	1: 128
Bahamas	1: 120
Haiti	1: 1153

(Greene 2006, 147)

According to Bernard Leroy, a Senior Inter-Regional Legal Advisor for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the HNP is currently characterized by insufficient resources, too few personnel and a workforce which is young and inexperienced(Leroy 2006, 61). Further, there is reluctance from within the institution to address issues of reforms. “Les responsables de la police sont réticents dans la mesure où ils entendent être les décideurs en ce qui concerne les réformes. Ils sont susceptibles et veulent être associés aux décisions, sinon ils recourent à ce qu’ils nomment le « marronnage », c'est-à-dire à une forme de sabotage systématique (Leroy 2006,25).” Information gathered in the course of this project’s research paints a portrait of a policing organization which has exhibited mixed outcomes as a result of CIVPOL efforts to establish and develop a viable and effective policing organization. For issues of clarity, outputs of CIVPOL mentoring of the HNP have been noted as satisfactory and unsatisfactory outcomes (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: Outputs of CIVPOL mentoring and advising of the HNP

Unsatisfactory Outputs	Satisfactory Outputs
• **Poor standards of professional conduct:** Despite CIVPOL efforts to model and encourage high standards of conduct, professional standards since 1995 have not improved and continue to be an issue of concern to the present day. • **Ongoing institutional corruption:** Implication of members in criminal activity continued despite CIVPOL efforts to train and model appropriate standards. • **Institutional mismanagement and leadership deficiencies:** Managers within the HNP who continued to lack basic supervisory skills and strategic foresight.	• **Introduction of community policing:** Despite challenge of introducing notion of community police and uneven adoption amongst HNP membership, it serves as a basis for future learning and has helped to improve ties with public. • **Introduction and practice of basic police skills:** CIVPOL's technical advisors and mentors served to equip and empower field level HNP members with the basic policing skills necessary for a policing agency. • **Fostered maturity of CIVPOL program delivery:** Serves as a basis for which lessons learned can be gained for future missions. • **Bilateral programs:** Highlighted the importance of bilateral programs in complementing UN CIVPOL activity.

Although the specific outputs revealed in the course of research have been summarized in satisfactory and unsatisfactory categories, it should be noted that in many cases, there are negative and positive dimensions to each outcome. Also, Figure 3.2 notes the outcomes of CIVPOL training as it affects both the HNP and CIVPOL; this is significant since this analysis reveals that the provision of CIVPOL training has resulted in more sophisticated approaches by the UN and contributing states towards the aim of policing development.

3.2 Information on sources

As noted in earlier chapters, the themes which formed the basis of this chapter are derived from multiple sources. Many of the themes presented in this project are based on the observations of interviewed police officers who served as mentors or advisors to the HNP during the mid-1990s and more recently. Complementing the limited amount of interviews with members of the CIVPOL contingents were three interviews conducted with members of the Haitian diaspora now living in Canada. Although these Haitian Canadians are not subject matter experts in policing, their experiences living and working in Haiti during the previous fifteen years serve to add a further perspective of the effects of policing reform from the eyes of the population. As discussed in the first chapter, due to the possibility of bias, this analysis is still predominantly weighted on information gleaned from interviews from the first group since the bias emanating from their Haitian experience is more readily identifiable.

The themes which emerged from the interviews are reinforced by information yielded from documentary sources including UN mission reports, reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, and also governmental reports such as the US Government's annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Though the majority of documentary sources were produced between 1994 and 2001, this report also utilizes raw information gleaned from an assessment mission of the Haitian security sector by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in 2006. Together, the combination of interviews and documentary study serves as this project's basis for identifying the common benchmarks which have been noted by individuals and reports as indicators of the HNP's development. The common progress indicators which emerged from the information available to this study highlight the HNP's mixed progress towards realizing

increased policing capacity. The information reviewed also served to illustrate some unique and unexpected outcomes of the international community's efforts in Haiti—notably, an increased sophistication in the methods used to address institutional shortcomings in the HNP.

3.3 Organization of this chapter

The first part of this chapter presents the inputs by CIVPOL to build the capacity of the HNP. The second section then notes the outcomes of CIVPOL inputs on the organization. Despite the notable inputs of CIVPOL and the international community, the second part demonstrates the limited areas of progress and areas that have not improved despite the efforts of international mentors. Continuous data are not readily available, but evidence from early and later in the mission is provided for each indicator. Of particular concern is the lack of adherence to professional standards by members of the HNP. In the third section, this chapter briefly discusses CIVPOL's unexpected contribution of expanding the repertoire of best practices for subsequent policing reform missions in Haiti and similar missions elsewhere. Notably, these improvements are illustrated in the increased length of mandates and also the use of bilateral programs to target niche areas of institutional development. Finally, the fourth section concludes this chapter by broadly noting the improvements in the program delivery of CIVPOL, including the importance of holistic development, and long term engagement.

3.4 CIVPOL efforts to develop the HNP

This section details a number of inputs by CIVPOL to build the capacity of the HNP. It discusses the areas of focus by international mentors and trainers and serves to give perspective to the needs of the HNP in the years following its establishment.

Emphasized are CIVPOL's efforts to encourage professional standards through mentoring, leadership development and assistance in institutional development. All of these inputs assisted the intended aim of fostering a policing methodology which is effective and in line with the standards expected of a police force in a democratic society.

3.4.1 Encouraging professional standards and discipline in the HNP

When it was first established, the HNP was envisioned as a remedy for a security sector which had long been characterized by corruption and politicization. The resolutions of the Security Council authorizing the UN interventions reinforced the HNP with the training and mentorship necessary to break free of the corruption which characterized the Haitian security agencies in the past. Security Council Resolution 1063 (1996) authorized the creation of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti [UNSMIH] and reinforced the necessity of developing a professional police force which would be able to consolidate democracy and "revitalize" the justice system(UN Security Council 1996e,2). Similarly, Resolution 1141 (1997) establishing the United Nations Civilian Policing Mission in Haiti [MIPONUH] "welcomed" continued progress towards professionalization of the HNP(UN Security Council 1997, 3).

3.4.2 Modelling professional conduct

Recognizing that the confidence of Haitians in their newly established police force would be eroded by corruption and disreputable conduct, efforts were made by CIVPOL to model appropriate conduct to their HNP trainees and partners. The effort to model proper conduct in the field complemented the theory taught in training and also the institutional guardian of professional standards such as the Office of the Inspector-

General. The Report of the UN Secretary General in January 1995 noted the importance of demonstrating reputable conduct when it stated that "[CIVPOL's] presence throughout Haiti and the example set by its personnel will have a favourable impact on the manner in which police work is, and will be carried out in Haiti (UN Security Council 1995b,11)." In the field, CIVPOL mentors modelled appropriate behaviour and reinforced the importance of developing a transparent and respectful relationship of service with their constituents.

Furthermore, as the UN presence in Haiti progressed to developing more specific and specialized capacities within the organization, such as narcotics and crowd control units, conscious efforts were also made towards promoting professional standards within those specialized branches of the police. This is illustrated in the reports on the UN Transition Mission in Haiti [UNTMIH] between August to November 1997. One report noted the presence of international CIVPOL towards "…reviewing the practices of the rapid intervention team to ensure its adherence to Haitian law and the spirit of civilian policing (UN Security Council 1997a, 5)."

3.4.3 Institutional instruments of professional conduct

From the earliest contact of recruits with the HNP, there was emphasis placed on compliance with professional standards. All recuits were required to swear an oath of service which obliged these new members to "conduire en tout temps comme un auxiliaire honnête et digne, subordonné aux ordres des autorités établies par la Constitution (République d'Haïti [Ministère de la Justice] 1996)." This was further reinforced in the curriculum guiding the classroom training; incoming HNP recruits at the training academy devoted time to presentations on corruption, elections and the

constitution of Haiti with the goal of mitigating the potential for police corruption (République d'Haïti [Ministère de la Justice] 1996). The curriculum dedicated a significant proportion of the 191 hours training toward such subjects as “Médiation et résolution de conflits,” “Stratégies de résolution de problème,” in addition to numerous sessions on “Dignité Humaine,” and “Principes de la Démocratie.” These all aimed to promote and reinforce the HNP’s motto of “Protéger et Servir.”(République d'Haïti [Ministère de la Justice] 1996)

In 1996, with the assistance of CIVPOL advisors, a binding “code of service discipline” was introduced with the objective of reinforcing the ethical standards of the police (UN Security Council 1996d, 7). Furthermore, the Office of the Inspector-General was established with technical assistance by CIVPOL advisors and was tasked with investigating reports of inappropriate and corrupt conduct by HNP members. The UN Support Mission in Haiti [UNSMIH] between June 1996 and July 1997 provided human rights training to front-line members of the HNP and reinforced development of the HNP Inspector-General’s office. In the first three years following the establishment of the HNP, investigations of misconduct and corruption by the HNP Inspector-General resulted in the termination of 215 members of the HNP and the suspension of 500 others; this number represented approximately 10% of the total HNP strength at the time. (UN Security Council 1998b, 5)

3.4.4 Developing the leadership

While the predominant thrust of the UN missions after 1995 was developing the skills of field level HNP members, there was recognition by CIVPOL leadership and mentors of the high number of vacant management positions within the HNP. This issue

of leadership incapacity impeded the ability of the HNP to develop the organization. Many sources have independently been critical of the leadership incapacities of the HNP, despite the efforts through CIVPOL and bilateral programs to address this critical area of strategic concern. In February 1996, one UN report noted that "the most serious concern is the absence of competent senior officers and overall leadership" with the effect being excessive force being used and lack of discipline among the ranks of the HNP (UN Security Council 1996b,4-5, 12).

The UN mission's CIVPOL component worked to address this shortage of leadership personnel by offering accelerated courses to train commissaires, directors and inspectors from 1996 through early 1997(UN Security Council 1995a,5). By 1998, the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti [MIPONUH] worked to specifically address problems with personnel and property management in the mid-level leadership of the HNP (UN Security Council 1998b, 4). Additionally, as subsequent sections will note, leadership development was a prime issue of Canada's bilateral program between 1997 and 2001 which complemented the capacity building efforts of the UN missions. A significant thrust of that program saw approximately fifteen Canadian advisors—comprising the bulk of the advisors deployed—dedicated towards strengthening the capacities of the HNP and the agency's personnel in the areas of the Inspector-General's Office, Department of the Judicial Police, Department of administration and general services and the Office of the Director-General (Menard, Ostiguy, & Boisvert 2000,12).

3.4.5 Ensuring community-centric policing

Community-centric policing was a relatively new concept to Haiti which for decades past had witnessed abuses at the hands of politicized paramilitaries. Under preceding regimes, Haiti's policing and security forces arguably revolved around those in power. This was a common theme noted in Chapter 2 in literature by Mendelson-Forman, Donais and Kumar. For example, under Jean-François Duvalier, the Tonton Macoutes militia were used for political objectives, notably to counterbalance the power of the army in order to maintain power (Garnier 2008). In this context, all the UN missions have led a push towards realizing a consultative and democratic methodology of policing. In light of this, community based policing principles were emphasized in both theory classes and throughout the practical mentoring by CIVPOL mentors in the field. During their training at the academy, the importance of community policing was impressed upon recruits' implicitly through discipline and explicitly through courses in democratic policing. Concurrently, it was envisioned that the recruits, while at the academy, would be immersed in an implicit culture of being empowered by the community which they served. The training philosophy of the police academy intimated the intrinsic relationship between the community and the police:

> …la Police Nationale a des devoirs envers tous les citoyens indistinctement en leur garantissant les droits-sécurités, les droits-libertés. Cette garantie n'est cependant fondée que si tous les citoyens, y compris les policiers eux-mêmes, jouent à fond la règle démocratique, dans une projection en une unité effective et permanente. (République d'Haïti [Ministère de la Justice] 1996, 6)

In the field, CIVPOL mentors modelled the tenets of community policing to both the HNP and the community—which up until 1995 understood the police as instruments of the elite and not guarantors of security for all. The emphasis that was placed on

community policing by CIVPOL mentors was noted by the Canadian mentors interviewed for this research. The push for community policing was especially pronounced during the initial mandate of the UNMIH mission when a Canadian officer Neil Pouliot was the UN Police Commissioner. Between 1994 and February 1996, Pouliot impressed upon his CIVPOL staff the importance of teaching the tenets of community policing to the HNP. "I know some of the officers who saw me, while we started doing [community policing], some of them said… 'I am learning a lot; I never realized that this was such a learning tool' (Pouliot 2008)." Similarly, Canadian mentors in the field taught and modelled community based policing strategies to the HNP and encouraged the development of such methods amongst HNP members. "We were going out in vehicles, windows down, saying hello to everyone in Creole. And we were walking also in the community…if you go out in the population and with the PNH and you're talking with the population, of course the PNH will talk to [the community]," noted one Canadian police officer (Girard 2008). Hefkey also noted his efforts to impress upon the HNP members the importance of community engagement with latitude given to the Haitian officers to adapt it according to their cultural nuances; "…we [didn't] want to attempt to impose our Canadian values of community policing on another country. They need to make it culturally appropriate…whatever that model [of community based policing] was, was dependent on Haitians to decide how it was going to work," noted Hefkey (Hefkey 2008).

3.5 Outputs of CIVPOL efforts to train and mentor the HNP

In the previous section, this chapter noted the various inputs made by international civilian police mentors with the objective of strengthening the capacity of the HNP and its members to discharge policing duties in Haiti. Through a combination of theory, institutional reforms and mentorship, the CIVPOL staff aimed to promote professional standards and policing practices consonant with those expected from a community centric policing service in a democracy. This section highlights the mixed progress that CIVPOL training had on the capacity of HNP members to properly discharge their duties. Considerable effort has been accorded by CIVPOL towards developing community policing principles in the HNP; however, the successes in this area are concurrent with very little progress in adherence to professional standards by members of the HNP.

3.5.1 Professional standards of conduct within the HNP

To the credit of the HNP's Inspector-General's Office, notable efforts were made in the mid-1990s towards addressing the unprofessional conduct of HNP members which hindered public confidence in the force. In 1997, the office investigated 765 'complaints of misconduct' which resulted in disciplinary action against 142 members—82 of which were subsequently dismissed from the HNP. (UN Security Council 1997a, 5). This was in addition to the 500 members suspended—representing approximately 10% of total strength—between 1996 and 1997. Also, there were statements on the behaviour of HNP members made in mission reports from the Secretary-General which were encouraging. In the initial months following the establishment of the national police force, the replacement of the army with a civilian police force fostered optimism amongst Haitians. One report in July 1995 noted that the members of the then seven

month old organization were “warmly welcomed by the population (UN Security Council 1995c, 6). In November 1995, signalling further progress, a report noted that criminal activity had been reduced as a result of increased public cooperation with the new police force (UN Security Council 1995d,5).

In the course of interviews, a general theme emerged that highlighted the lack of adherence to professional standards by field level members of the HNP during the initial UN missions to build the capacity of that organization. According to Dan Hefkey, who served as a CIVPOL mentor on the UNMIH mission in 1995-1996, approximately 10% of the HNP members under his charge were committed to the tenets of community policing, well motivated and respected human rights. Another 10% of HNP members were the contrary and were described as “bullies.” The large balance, however, “could be swayed either way.” The majority of HNP members that Hefkey observed “would try to work, but when there were small challenges, things that caused them to stretch, they found it difficult.” This is similar to what another field level mentor with UNMIH noted of a situation in Cité Soleil when in the midst of a potentially dangerous and angry crowd, the two HNP members she was working with seized up and failed to adequately execute their duties in a professional manner.

Throughout the various mission reports released by the UN Secretary-General on the progress in Haiti, there are many instances when the reports noted the poor progress of professional standards development in members of the HNP. From the onset, the statements made in reports of the Secretary-General noted “unbecoming conduct” or instances of excessive use of force. For example, by October 1995, over 1400 officers had been trained by international trainers for duties as HNP officers.

Although it is reasonable to assume that the materials taught were still fresh in their minds, the report of October 1995 noted "several incidents involving abuse of authority, unbecoming conduct or disproportionate use of force (UN Security Council 1995e, 4)."

Later statements were even more critical, indicative of the greater pervasiveness of unprofessional behaviour. The report of the Secretary-General of October 1996 noted that vigilante justice at the hands of regular Haitians was increasing and was affecting public confidence in the police. Further, the status report noted that incidences of abuse of authority and human rights violations were concurrently on the increase (UN Security Council 1996c, 2). The statements highlighting the unbecoming conduct of HNP members were a consistent theme among the mandated Secretary-General reports of all the missions, and even the presently ongoing UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti [MINUSTAH]. Briefly illustrating this, as recently as 2007, there were noted instances in the Reports of the Secretary-General on the MINUSTAH mission noting the questionable conduct of HNP members. In June 2007, the second largest drug raid in Haitian history saw the arrest of a dozen individuals, "half of whom were police officers (UN Security Council 2007, 1)."

Beyond statements articulated in the Reports of the Secretary-General, information gathered from other sources indicated that CIVPOL's mentoring efforts to promote professional behaviour in the HNP corps led to little progress in developing a professional police force. Labelled for internal distribution only, the mid-mission assessment report for UNMIH released in 1996 was blunt in its assessment of CIVPOL progress to promote professionalism within the ranks of the HNP. Although the report

specified that the mandate of CIVPOL was to "train the HNP and to observe activities that threaten law and order in Haiti," it also noted that:

> The HNP's response to public agitation is either withdrawal or use of firearms, giving rise to the criticism that the HNP has not moved away from the tendency to use force to suppress public demands…Discipline, leadership and institutional organization are concepts not widely understood within the new police force and are even viewed by HNP officers as symbols of the past, not as tenets of an efficient police force…police misconduct and abuse of power is not uncommon. (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] 1996, 18-19)

Internal reports by UNMIH staff officers further illustrated the failure of members of the Haitian security forces—both the HNP and the then-Interim Public Security Force—to retain and synthesize fundamental skills related to them by their CIVPOL trainers and mentors. In particular, situation reports created by the UNMIH Operations staff noted that the HNP "…consistently display a willingness to resort to firearms first rather than less lethal means. Also, there are concerns with the conduct of several searches/raids in response to the Government's recent disarmament campaign where proper legal procedures were overlooked and/or violated in their zeal to locate illegal weapons. (UNMIH Deputy Chief of Operations [U3A] 1995,4)" Illustrating this, during one disturbance in November 1995, a large unruly crowd of people had gathered in Cité Soleil to protest the death of a young girl who had been allegedly shot by a member of the HNP. With the intervention of CIVPOL staff, the situation had appeared to calm down; however, the situation immediately escalated into a violent incident when members of the CIVPOL trained Interim Public Security Force [IPSF] intervened with gunfire into the air (UNMIH Deputy Chief of Operations [U3A] 1995, 1). The issue of unprofessional standards is reinforced by a Canadian police officer who related a

conversation he had in 1998 with a young Haitian officer who stated that, “I have no faith in the justice system, I’d rather shoot and then ask questions later (Pouliot 2008).” The result of the lack of adherence of the HNP to their training was such that mission reports had noted that Haitians were becoming more disenfranchised by the ineffectiveness of the HNP towards providing security to citizens. “Anecdotal evidence indicates that the local population is losing faith in the HNP and feel that vigilante activity is the only way to solve the problem (UNMIH Deputy Chief of Operations [U3A] 1996, 6).”

3.5.2 Institutional corruption within the HNP

Despite these efforts by CIVPOL to reinforce the ability of the HNP to investigate cases on its own, cases of corruption have been reported since 1995 and have been a theme in UN reports and in the testimonies of individuals interviewed. The US Government’s annual narcotics control reports have noted the role that corruption has played to facilitate the transit of drugs through Haiti. The 2003 narcotics control strategy report noted a relationship between criminal elements and the HNP, “there is strong evidence of interference by Haitian law enforcement officials, particularly leaking information on planned operations, as well as considerable involvement in trafficking (Department of State [United States]. 2004).” During her tour in 1996, one Canadian CIVPOL mentor who worked with the HNP in Cité Soleil suspected the local HNP detachment chief of engaging in corrupt practices. The detachment chief was often implicated in local gang wars between rival gangs operating in the neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the chief was suspected of having more direct links with the local drug trade:

> …les deux [gangs] voulaient s'approprier les camions de drogues qui passaient. A chaque fois qu'il y avait un camion, on savait qu'il y avait un camion de drogue. Lorsqu'il y avait un camion de drogue qui passait, ce chef était là. Il n'était pas là chaque jour, mais quand ça se passait il était là. Il y a eu une enquête, puis suite à ça, il a perdu ça job (Girard 2008).

Despite the efforts by CIVPOL to reinforce the ethical and professional standards of the HNP, political developments external to the organization heavily affected the ability of the organization to remain impartial and resist the scourge of corruption. Although the issue of corruption is affected by the larger economic situation of Haiti, the roots of corruption in the HNP are nebulous and the relationship between corruption and salary levels is a tenuous proposition. To illustrate, in 1997, a Haitian police officer was paid approximately $330 a month; although paid irregularly, this figure was substantially higher than the average per capita income of $400 *annually* (Department of State [United States]. 2000a; Rotberg 1997,105). However, as this section notes, despite the efforts of the international community through CIVPOL, institutional efforts to root out corruption within the HNP have produced few sustainable results in the organization.

3.5.3 Institutional mismanagement and leadership deficiencies

Despite efforts on the part of the UN to develop the skills and abilities of the HNP management, there continued to be significant management deficiencies at all levels of the HNP, particularly in the initial three years following its establishment in 1995. During his tour, Hefkey noted that HNP commanders and supervisors he worked with lacked vital management skills in all areas including scheduling and personnel management. To address this, Hefkey and his CIVPOL contingent emphasized basic supervisory skills to the HNP detachment supervisors he dealt with and worked towards empowering

them with the basic skills necessary to run and manage a police detachment. Although there are examples where mentors recognized the deficiency and worked to address them—as the Hefkey example illustrated—the leadership and management of the HNP was a noted area of concern in both written documentation and in interviews with CIVPOL mentors who worked in Haiti.

However, despite this effort by CIVPOL, the lack of leadership and the negative effect this was having on the effectiveness of the HNP was consistently remarked upon in subsequent reports to the Security Council between 1995 and 1998 (UN Security Council 1996a,4; UN Security Council 1997c,5). Furthermore, although the leadership of the organization was responsible for setting an example of professional competence and conduct for their staff, there have been instances of questionable conduct by those in leadership positions. Christine Girard noted that during her 1996 tour in Cité Soleil, the HNP detachment commander demonstrated poor judgement when he accidentally discharged a seized firearm in his office and was eventually fired amidst allegations of corruption. Despite this anecdotal example, there is evidence to note that the issue of incompetent and corrupt leadership was prevalent in ranks of the upper leadership of the HNP during the 1990s. For example, by early 1997, eleven commissaires were dismissed for breaches of professional or ethical standards (UN Security Council 1997b, 4). Institutional corruption continues to be mentioned as a mitigating factor for policing development even in the current day as was noted by the 2006 UNODC assessment report.

It should be noted that the initiatives to build the capacity of the HNP leadership seemed to have a positive effect from 1998 to 2001, with a change in language used to

describe the abilities of the HNP to police effectively in those years. Potentially, this is due to both CIVPOL efforts to develop the leadership capacities and also bilateral efforts to develop the management capacities of high ranking HNP staff. However, the importance of adequate and competent leadership cannot be understated as an essential factor in realizing the strategic objectives of an organization. Significant leadership incapacity was noted in the early years of the mission and despite CIVPOL efforts to train the rank and file of the organization, the leadership deficiency mitigated the effectiveness of the training given to the regular members of the organization.

3.5.4 Introduction of community-based policing methods

One common challenge which affected the uniformity of training was the wide range of policing philosophies as a result of the cultural diversity of the UN missions. Contingents from different countries had different understandings of policing and the role accorded to the community. As such, although community policing was emphasized by the CIVPOL staff in the early days of UNMIH, when a commander from another country took over command of CIVPOL, the emphasis on community policing principles were often reprioritized. Training by international police in community policing techniques was not uniform and depended heavily on the nationality of the CIVPOL mentor. “There is no continuity,” admitted Pouliot.

The effects of the training in democratic policing and community policing techniques are mixed and inconsistent amongst HNP members. There has been anecdotal evidence noting that community policing has been more readily accepted in smaller HNP detachments serving rural communities. According to one Haitian educator, Marie Monique Jean-Gilles, who established a school in the rural community

of Borel, the relationship between the local HNP members and the community are notable and positive; “the relations that the community and the police have are good; people know them,” noted Jean-Gilles. Owing to the inconsistency of HNP members and their practices in different places, and the dynamics of urban and rural policing, other opinions have also noted the contrary.

The mixed progress of the HNP in assimilating the CIVPOL training and mentorship in the area of community policing is an issue which highlights the inconsistent effects of CIVPOL’s training of the HNP. On its own, the demonstration of community policing by certain HNP members is a positive indication that institutional development is starting to change the cultural mores which framed policing in Haiti. However, the inconsistent nature of adoption of these strategies is evidence that significant work remains to be done. Empowering the HNP members with the skills and confidence necessary to engage positively with their constituents is necessary.

3.5.5 Sophistication of international police program delivery

In the previous section of this chapter, it was shown that efforts to develop the capacities of the HNP by CIVPOL have resulted in mixed outcomes. Although there has been some progress in reinforcing community-centric policing methods and developing the skills of leaders, the HNP also concurrently suffered from poor discipline, institutional corruption and links to organized crime. Recognizing these mixed effects of UN training in its original structure, the lessons learned from the early years of the UN’s efforts to build the capacity of the HNP have served to change the way that CIVPOL mentoring and advising is conducted in Haiti. For example, the linguistic shortcomings of CIVPOL staff in the early years of UNMIH led to articulation of linguistic prerequisites

for participating international staff. Also, the mixed progress and shortcomings of CIVPOL inputs led to development of bilateral programs which addressed very specific needs within the HNP. These renewed inputs highlighted sophistication in the methods in which CIVPOL and the international community have used to further capacity building efforts of the HNP.

3.6 Changes to the UN CIVPOL program delivery

David Beer, the Director-General of International Policing for the RCMP spoke of the ad-hoc nature which characterized the implementation of the CIVPOL program in Haiti, both in the processes of contributing agencies such as Canadian police and also at the international coordinating bodies.

> …the multilateral model of policing development, or policing intervention is crude…it needs the sophistication and the maturity of the military; of military interventions. Not that military interventions are done right [all the time], but you know what you get when you have a military mission. There's consistency from one country to the next about how their militaries are structures, what they bring to the table, what they're able to do…For the police, it's simply a mishmash of experience and talent, it comes from all over the world.(Beer 2008)

The experience of UN CIVPOL supporting the establishment and training of the HNP between 1994 and 2000 has had the effect of 'maturing' the program delivery of CIVPOL initiatives. That is, the experience of CIVPOL mentoring and advising in Haiti during the 1990s added to the repository of best practices and highlighted what needed to be changed in order to realize policing reform. By addressing some of the impeding factors—to be outlined in Chapter 4—CIVPOL and the UN has made progress in approaching policing reform in a way which may have greater chances of progress. This is particularly evident in the recognition that longer term engagements are required and

the lengthening of mandate lengths and also a clearer delineation of what skills CIVPOL staff needs to possess in order to be effective mentors and advisors. The effects of this renewed practices is beyond the scope of this project but is a worthy area of research in the future as the best practices become integrated into the methodology of CIVPOL in the future.

3.6.1 Longer mandate lengths and holistic approaches

Foremost is the recognition amongst decision makers at the United Nations of the necessity of long term engagement in order to realize positive and sustainable results to develop the police of a country. As noted in Table 4.2, the initial UN mandates in Haiti were of a short duration, however, between December 1997 and February 2001, the mission lengths were of one year duration—an increase from the inconsistent and relatively short mandates up until that point. Second, policy makers have recognized the importance of holistic development of the security sector; one branch cannot be addressed in isolation. Following the initial UN intervention in Haiti, there was significant emphasis placed on building the capacity of the HNP with little commensurate attention paid to the judiciary and penal systems. The intrinsic relationship between police development and the judiciary was noted in March 1997 in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, "continued progress in the institutional development of the police is linked to reform of the justice system, which is currently hindered by the lack of a consensual strategy (UN Security Council 1997b, 8)." The open recognition of this shortcoming in the international strategy for policing development served as the catalyst for complementary bilateral justice development initiatives and multilateral

support for judicial development. And it highlights recognition on the part of policy makers to situate CIVPOL mentoring and advising within a broader strategy for SSR.

3.6.2 Appropriate traits and skills for CIVPOL personnel

States contributing personnel for international policing assignments have also benefitted from the experience of sending police officers as CIVPOL advisors in Haiti. Many individuals and sources have noted the importance of sending adequately experienced and competent individuals on mission. This had not been the case with the early UN missions in Haiti and the issue of competent CIVPOL participants was reiterated in an early mission assessment report of the UNMIH mission submitted in March 1996. The report noted that "…only police officers with proven experience in law enforcement and language skills should be assigned to UN duties. Basic knowledge of human rights issues is also a prerequisite (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] 1996, 18)." The experiences of sending personnel on mission served to further mature the selection processes for policing agencies and allowed them to have an informed basis for choosing appropriate individuals to send on international policing assignments. For example, Ontario Provincial Police officer Dan Hefkey used the experiences he attained while as a mentor in Haiti to help better inform the OPP's selection process for international policing assignments. Having experienced the inconsistency of skills amongst CIVPOL staff in Haiti and recognizing the importance of certain vital qualities, Hefkey's experiences in Haiti were used to better select appropriate individuals for international assignments in Haiti or elsewhere. "We went through interviews, had supervisors providing references and we asked them specific

questions…is this person a team player? Does this person contribute to your unit goals? How is this person when it comes to stakeholder relations," noted Hefkey.

3.7 Institutional development through bilateral programs

Bilateral programs are direct initiatives between a donor country and Haiti; often these initiatives address niche areas of the donor country's expertise or priorities and also the developmental needs of the HNP. The HNP has been the recipient of bilateral assistance from France, the United States and Canada, in addition to the institutional development assistance from the UN. The CIVPOL activities in Haiti had the effect of highlighting the important role that bilateral programs play in complementing multilateral UN initiatives with subsequent benefits for the various actors involved including the external contributing countries, the United Nations and the HNP. Also, because of resource and personnel issues inherent to the structure of CIVPOL, certain issues donor priorities were insufficiently addressed. The impetus for bilateral initiatives is derived from a combination of institutional issues with the HNP, the UN's development strategy and a desire from contributing states to develop specialized capacities within the HNP.

Foremost, the push for bilateral programs is derived from an early recognition of the widely divergent skill sets between CIVPOL mentors deployed to participate in the UN missions of the 1990s. Adding to this, there were indications that the selection process for CIVPOL staff was lacking and countries were not selecting and sending capable or qualified individuals. "Member states should also resist the temptation to promote officers for the express purpose of fulfilling a rank requirement set by the United Nations," noted a 1996 UNMIH report (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

[DPKO] 1996, 18). Reinforcing this concern, one Montreal police officer with knowledge of the bilateral initiatives between Canada and the Haiti noted the link between the inconsistent qualities of CIVPOL participants and how this has provided the impetus for bilateral programs. "…I've seen some great [CIVPOL staff]. But some countries send people for simply economic reasons… And they have to pay their bosses to go on missions. It's sad, but that's the reality of it. And I don't think we're gonna solve that problem tomorrow, and this is why we're trying to look at putting together bilateral programs, it's to try and get that accountability and to get direct results," he noted(Durocher 2008).

The bilateral programs offered a vehicle for donor partners to promote their individual domestic priorities. For example, Haiti has served as a transit point for a large proportion of the drugs which arrive in the United States from South America. Illustrating the problem, in 1999 the US Government estimated that 14 percent of all cocaine originating from South America transited through Haiti (Department of State [United States]. 2000b). As narcotics' trafficking is a major concern for the US Government, it is potentially the reason for the significant bilateral aid that the United States government has provided to develop the niche capacities of the HNP's drug units. In 1999 alone, the US Government provided the HNP through the Government of Haiti approximately $620,000 for "counternarcotics assistance," and law enforcement training in this specialty. This assistance was outside of the UN assistance framework and it highlights the way that bilateral programs can more specifically target priority areas of donor interest in a way that contributions of resources and funds to CIVPOL cannot readily accomplish. On the contrary, bilateral aid can be detrimental to the receiving agency

because it can shift priorities away core functions. For example, due to the US concern about narcotics transiting through Haiti, much effort has been put into developing the specialist counter-narcotics capacity which reduces the force strength available for community policing thus lowering public confidence in the HNP (Last 2009).

Bilateral programs also complemented the previous and ongoing efforts by UN through CIVPOL to build the capacity of the HNP. For example, in 1997, Canada initiated its first bilateral program with the HNP outside of the UN framework. The joint RCMP-CIDA Institutional Development Project for the HNP had a budget of $15 million and was active between December 1997 and March 2001. Approximately 20-25 highly experienced technical advisors from Canada were sent to Haiti to help advice the HNP's development of niche institutional competencies. The objectives of the bilateral program addressed the management and strategic planning capacities of the organization, including:

1. La mise en place et le bon fonctionnement des systèmes de planification, de gestion, de suivi et de contrôle à la Direction Générale.
2. Le renforcement du niveau professionnel des agents de la PNH par la formation d'appoint et la formation de formateur (Gagnon 2000, 5).

Practically, this Canadian initiative was aimed at building the skills of middle managers—HNP members ranging from detachment commanders to —a diverse range of skills including personnel management, leadership and supervision. "…the Canadian strategy was to influence these middle managers within the policing environment with a view to one day they would be the executive managers and we would have influence accordingly," noted David Beer.

Because of immense institutional need to concurrently build up various capacities, and due to the inability of CIVPOL to devote adequate resources to address institutional shortcomings, bilateral programs were seen as an alternative which ensured accountability for donors while addressing specific areas of institutional development.

3.8 Conclusion

Based on a study of available documents and interviews with a number of individuals who have previously served as CIVPOL personnel, this chapter noted the various inputs by CIVPOL to help build the capacity of the HNP over more than a decade. Largely, these inputs aimed to ensure the professional standards and becoming conduct of HNP members and the development of a policing methodology consistent with the ideals of a democratic society. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of CIVPOL personnel to model appropriate behaviour and to help develop instruments to ensure compliance there is evidence which indicated that discipline and corruption continued to be areas of deficiency. Additionally, the institutional management of the HNP continued to suffer from shortages of competent personnel which affected the ability of the entire organization to achieve its mandate.

In broad terms, this chapter alluded to the importance of long-term engagement which holistically addresses policing in conjunction with justice development. As the section devoted to discussing the progress of professional standards noted, the dearth of justice reform has led to a certain sense of futility informing the actions of field level HNP staff. The findings of this chapter replicate the conclusions of many commentators who have previously analyzed policing reform in Haiti as noted in Chapter 2. Donais previously noted the importance of sustained and holistic efforts to concurrently address

the development of other security sector actors and governance deficiencies specifically in the case of Haiti (Donais 2005, 270). Similarly, Law noted the necessity of long-term engagement in any SSR scenario. “To assume that [the international community] can, in half a generation or so, build structures security the accountability of the security sector, where little or none existed pre-conflict, is unrealistic,” states Law.

Finally, this chapter has shown that the lessons learned by CIVPOL since 1994 have served to articulate best practices for policing development in Haiti. These lessons learned have informed the development of concurrent bilateral training programs targeting niche areas of the HNP and have also further informed the selection of candidates for CIVPOL duties. This highlights the necessity of ongoing evaluation as a tool to help attune international assistance according to the needs a particular scenario. In this vein, Coates and Last stated the importance of a successful SSR strategy to “judge the impacts, and to adjust the balance of police assistance over time to achieve stability and security (Coates & Last 2005, 223).” Broadly, this chapter’s observation of the importance of early CIVPOL initiatives as a basis of best practices for future missions has been echoed by Colin Granderson, head of the International Civilian Assistance Mission in Haiti [MICIVIH] who also saw the value of police development in Haiti as “illuminating areas where police reform efforts have been lacking and donor assistance ineffective. Lessons learned from the positive gains in the Haitian reforms…can be taken to make future reforms more successful (Ziegler & Nield 2002,44).” In the following chapter, this discussion will outline and elaborate on a number of mitigating factors—both, internal to the execution of the CIVPOL missions, and external to the HNP—which impeded efforts to develop the HNP.

Chapter 4
Factors Impeding HNP Development

4.0 Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter, there are numerous by-products of CIVPOL efforts to establish and reform the Haitian National Police. Overall the results have seemingly been mixed, with both positive and less successful outcomes for both the HNP and CIVPOL. Also, as the indications of the last chapter alluded, there are numerous external issues which have affected the ability of CIVPOL to build the capacity of the HNP. This chapter's discussion will expound on the common issues which were revealed to have impeded international efforts to build the HNP. Surprisingly many of the challenges which were noted in the course of interviews and document analysis seemed to highlight the a few core obstacles which are rooted in the design of these multinational missions and in decisions taken by the international community.

Figure 4.1: Factors Impeding HNP Capacity Building Efforts by CIVPOL

- Inconsistent skills of mentors and the lack of continuity of training
- Lack of long-term engagement and continuity of UN missions
- Over tasking of the HNP
- Lack of concurrent penal and justice system development
- Poor resourcing of HNP

4.1 Inconsistent skills of mentors and lack of program continuity

An intrinsic element of any UN mission is the mixture of personnel from various member countries. The UN missions to Haiti during the 1990s and to the present day has seen over a dozen countries contribute members for CIVPOL activities. One issue which was raised as a result of this diversity was the inconsistency of skills and experiences of mentors and advisors who served with the CIVPOL contingents in Haiti since 1994. This issue has been noted previously in the literature, and was again raised as a consistent issue of concern by individuals interviewed.

Chief Superintendent (Retired) Neil Pouliot served as UN Police Commissioner in Haiti between July 1994 and February 1996. At the peak of the UNMIH mission in June 1995, Pouliot had approximately 850 civilian police personnel under his command. These CIVPOL personnel came from nineteen contributing member states. The top contributing countries for the CIVPOL mission by numbers included, Jordan, Canada, France and Bangladesh. Even Mali, Togo, Benin and Nepal contributed to this very diverse multinational effort to the train the HNP. However, this diversity led to some issues of concern for Pouliot. Notably, the lack of language skills from many participant contingents placed the burden of mentorship on a much smaller cadre of individuals who spoke French. Some contingents were further impeded by limited English skills. Attempting to mitigate the inconsistency of skills of some of his personnel, Pouliot made a conscious effort to "blend" his personnel such that each CIVPOL team would have an equivalent amount of policing experience and a minimal amount of local language capacity. Despite this, he stated that during his time in charge of the CIVPOL contingent, a proportion of the international staff did not have the requisite skills to contribute to the mission; "not always the best officers go on a mission," Pouliot admitted.

Although this situation was recognized in the early days of the UN intervention in Haiti, it would seem to be an intrinsic obstacle for UN missions due to the need for inclusion of participants from a number of member states. As such, the issue of inconsistent skills of mentors deployed continued to be an issue of concern even a decade following the initial CIVPOL missions.

According to RCMP Chief Superintendent David Beer, the mixture of so many different personnel from different countries resulted in a "mishmash of experience and talent." While he was serving UN Police Commissioner in Haiti between 2004 and 2005, Beer had over 2000 CIVPOL personnel under his command. However, of that figure, only 50% had the requisite skills and abilities to be used in an institutional development role. Further, only 250 individuals had the necessary language skills to be placed in a direct mentoring and advising role. The balance of the CIVPOL personnel under his charge were used as formed units for security purposes. According to Beer, the inconsistent skills of the deployed CIVPOL personnel was such that, "lots of those Haitian police officers that they were supposed to be mentoring and advising had way more experience than the people who were coming in from various…countries. By virtue of the fact that they had been in the organization during all the American and Canadian training in the nineties (Beer 2008)."

Beyond linguistic incapacities of CIVPOL operators, the multinational effort to establish and develop the Haitian National Police was also hobbled by the diversity of policing philosophies from which these various CIVPOL contingents brought forth. Although the initial UNMIH mission benefited from a uniform curriculum taught to HNP recruits in the classrooms, the field mentoring portion of the training saw a mixture of policing styles being taught to recruits which mirrored the differing policing philosophies of the various CIVPOL contingents. The different policing styles also led to significant directional changes when the leadership of the CIVPOL mission changed to officers of different countries. For instance, field mentoring was a vital part of the training provided by international mentors when a Canadian officer held the office of UN Police

Commissioner between July 1994 and February 1996. However, when the position was subsequently passed to a French police officer—who came from a different policing philosophy—the field mentoring program was stopped (Pouliot 2008). At a field level, it has been noted that with each rotation of international personnel comes a period of 'reintroduction' with domestic counterparts; this period disturbs the continuity of reform programs and affects the overall objective of developing a reliable and effective policing agency. "It takes a while to build your credibility and very often just when you're at the point of trying to accomplish something, it's the next rotation. Back to square one," noted one former CIVPOL mentor (Durocher 2008).

These issues of inconsistent experiences and continuity of program delivery are not new concerns and have been recognized as matters affecting multilateral institutional development initiatives. An early UNMIH assessment report reiterated the importance of CIVPOL officers which "proven experience in law enforcement and language skills," and called on contributing states to "resist the temptation to promote officers for the express purpose of fulfilling [a vacancy on mission] (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] 1996, 18)." Additionally, the issue of continuity in face of different policing philosophies and ongoing rotations is an issue which—although recognized—continues to be a confounding factor in efforts to reform the HNP.

4.2 Lack of long-term UN engagement and short mission mandates

Efforts to build the capacity of the HNP have been negatively affected by short mission mandates and unrealistic deadlines. A review of resolutions by the UN Security Council revealed that the initial length of UN missions in Haiti during the 1990s have

been less than one year in length, with most initial mandates of a six month duration (Figure 3.3). During the crucial early period of the HNP's development—in the immediate period following the establishment of the HNP in January 1995—the UN missions were based on mandate extensions every six months. The resolutions extending these missions set arguably unrealistic objectives for these six month periods. Concurrently, the resolutions of the Security Council in the 1990s often placed extremely restrictive limits on resources allocated for these efforts. For example, the Security Council resolution authorizing the initial six month mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti welcomed the "…assurance that the Secretary-General will be alert to further opportunities to reduce the strength of the mission so it can implement its tasks at the lowest possible cost.(UN Security Council 1996e, 2)

Altogether, the short mission lengths, lofty objectives and resource constraints led to the difficulty of sustaining progress and served to compound the frustration of international staff international staff who realized the necessity of long term engagement. On this issue, one officer noted that, "…it's pretty illogical to expect to be able to plan for sustainable development in six month increments. You might lay out a plan for four or five years but you're probably not going to see that sort of commitment by the international community (Beer 2008)." Indeed, the issue of short mission mandates can be seen to have indirectly affected the quality of personnel who form the backbone of the HNP. Due to early UN resolutions which called for the UN missions to meet quantitative benchmarks on HNP recruits trained, a proper vetting process was often times not undertaken. Without proper vetting, many undesirable personnel tainted the public's perception of the force from its early days. The problem of short mission

lengths and the lack of long term commitment by the international community is an external issue which has confounded efforts to realize sustainable progress in the development of the HNP. The reasons for these short mission lengths are symptomatic of the dichotomy between political considerations at the Security Council and the practical realities on the ground. Although beyond the scope of this project, further research is warranted to discuss the political underpinnings of Security Council decisions and the political reasons for these short mandate lengths, both as it relates to Haiti and more broadly.

Figure 4.2: UN Missions in Haiti [1993 – 2008]

- United Nations Mission in Haiti
  - September 1993 – March 1994 (Initial Mandate)
  - March 1994 – June 1994 (S/RES/905 1994)
  - June 1994 – 31 July 1994 S/RES/933 (1994)
  - August 1994 – January 1995 S/RES/940 (1994)
  - February 1995 – July 1995 S/RES/975 (1995)
  - August 1995 – February 1996 S/RES/1007 (1995)
  - March 1996 – June 1996 S/RES/1048 (1996)
- United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
  - July 1996 – November 1996 S/RES/1063 (1996)
  - 30 November 1996 – 5 December 1996 S/RES/1085 (1996)
  - December 1996 – July 1997 S/RES/1086 (1996)
- United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
  - August 1997 – November 1997 S/RES/1123 (1997)
- United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
  - December 1997 – November 1998 S/RES/1141 (1997)
  - December 1998 – November 1999 S/RES/1141 (1997)
  - December 1999 – March 2000 S/RES/1277 (1999)
- International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti
  - March 2000 – February 2001 A/RES/54/193 (1999)
- United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
  - June 2004 – November 2004 S/RES/1542 (2004)
  - December 2004 – May 2005 29 November 2004
  - June 2005 – July 2005 S/RES/1601 (2005)
  - July 2005 – February 2006 S/RES/1608 (2005)
  - February 2006 – August 2006 S/RES/1658 (2006)
  - August 2006 – February 2006 S/RES/1702 (2006)

- February 2006 – October 2006 S/RES/1743 (2007)
- October 2006 – February 2007 S/RES/1702 (2006)
- February 2007 – October 2007 S/RES/1743 (2007)
- October 2007 – October 2008 S/RES/1780 (2007)
- October 2008 – October 2009 S/RES/1840 (2008)

4.3 Over tasking of the HNP

Closely related to the issue of unrealistic mission objectives is the problem of overburdening the HNP with too many concurrent responsibilities. With the exception of the one year period between November 1994 and November 1995 when the Interim Public Security Force [IPSF] was active, all law enforcement duties in Haiti were the responsibility of the HNP. Having been established in January 1995, the organization faced the challenge of developing institutional processes and resources, including recruiting and training the mandated numbers of personnel, while at the same time taking over responsibility for security functions in the country. As early as March 1995, the IPSF was being gradually disbanded as recruit classes for the HNP began graduating from the Haitian training academy.

The numerous mentions of the relative inexperience and poor management by the leadership of the HNP are symptomatic of the problems associated with tasking full operational responsibilities to an organization still in the incipient stages of institutional development. This problem was alluded to in a UNMIH mission report of March 1996 which highlighted an organization which did not yet have the trained staff and structures to deal with operational demands. The report noted, "…the HNP's problems is the need to set up effective law enforcement structures from the bottom up and new officers have to be trained and inducted at all levels. *The relative inexperience of senior officers does not contribute to effective command and control*… The CIVPOL's leadership has also

been hampered by the lack of counterparts in the HNP with whom they could cooperate effectively [emphasis added] (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] 1996, 18)."

Furthermore, there are ongoing opinions that the institutional development and operational responsibilities continue to place an undue burden on the abilities of the HNP to execute either task effectively. For instance, 'community policing' has been one focus of the CIVPOL's training provided to the HNP. However, as noted earlier, efforts to foster the notion of preventative community policing has been tempered by preconceived cultural biases and decades of malevolent behaviour by Haitian security organizations. Further, efforts to equip field level HNP officers with skills in community policing seem to be ineffective because of the sheer volume of best practices that the international community is trying to instil in the HNP. In addition to emphasizing community policing, as early as July 1995, efforts were underway to concurrently provide specialized training in areas of computer usage, statistics compilation and develop close protection, airport and seaport security units (UN Security Council 1995a, 6-7), "There's only so much than an organization can absorb in terms of knowledge, or practices. We're trying on one end to fit community policing, you gotta fit the laws, you gotta fit human rights, you gotta fit gender…there's too much," as one Canadian officer noted (Durocher 2008).

The issue of over tasking the HNP with a large amount of institutional development objectives at the same time making it responsible for security within the country is an issue which has continually impeded the ability of the organization to do either task successfully. Furthermore, the development of the organization has been

tempered by overzealous initiatives to introduce a plethora of institutional best practices without first solidifying the core skills necessary for a policing organization, namely basic policing skills and effective operational leadership. The division of security responsibility in the early days of UN intervention in 1994 could be further researched as a model for overcoming this issue. Notably, the placing of operational security duties with an Interim Public Security Force for a longer period of time could have allowed the HNP to develop and train to an adequate level before having to take over operational responsibilities. Complementing this, efforts should be made to ensure that a basic level of competency is attained by field level HNP staff and the necessary competencies are accrued by the leadership of the organization; this should be emphasized and evaluated before more advanced policing methods—such as community policing and gender dimensions—are introduced into the organization.

4.4 Lack of concurrent judicial and penal capacity in Haiti

Judicial and penal reforms are intrinsic elements of security sector reform; in the case of Haiti, the lack of commensurate development in these areas have impeded CIVPOL and the international community's efforts to develop a viable and effective policing agency as embodied in the HNP. As early as 1994, UN reports recognized the importance of such a holistic effort to reform the Haitian security sector, however, substantive development of the judiciary and the correctional facilities in Haiti have lagged the development of the police and have consequently increased effects of the HNP have not been followed through by the courts and prisons. Particularly disappointing is the poor state of the judiciary; despite efforts of bilateral initiatives by the United States, Canada, France and the OAS during the mid-1990s, there have been

few additional resources allocated to the judiciary, and the ability of courts to process cases has not kept up with the increased number of arrests as a result of increased HNP responsibilities and personnel. The progress of substantive justice reform was also consistently qualified in mission reports to the Security Council as “slow” and “uneven” throughout 1997 to 1999 (UN Security Council 1997b,5; UN Security Council 1998a,4; UN Security Council 1999a,5). One report in 1999 by the Secretary-General to the Security Council criticized the lack of justice development and clearly linked the issue to the development of the HNP,

> …there has been little progress in the reform of the justice system. Judicial reform has not kept pace with the building of the Haitian National Police. There are major structural weaknesses in the system that undermines the rule of law and civil liberties. The absence of a properly functioning justice system remains the most significant obstacle to the effective protection of the human rights of all Haitians (UN Security Council 1999b, 6).

Problems affecting the judiciary can be classified into two broad categories; first, the judicial system in Haiti has been tempered by insufficient resources—both in terms of personnel, funds and infrastructure. Illustrating this, throughout the 1990s and from information as recent as 2006, the Haitian justice system has been characterized by insufficient trained judges and support staff, irregular and low salaries for these individuals and “dilapidated and unsanitary” facilities (International Crisis Group 2007a, 15). The quality of competent judicial personnel has not improved over the last decade, and has continued to be a confounding obstacle. In July 2006, Gervais Charles, the President of the Bar Association of Port-au-Prince cited “l’incompétence et la corruption

des juges" as the fundamental issues confronting the Haitian justice system (Leroy, Guidice, & Albertin 2006).

Secondly, there is a lack of institutional processes to deal with the increased case load as a result of the increased personnel and arrests by the HNP. The high numbers of pre-trial detainees and missed court dates due to lack of records are indicative of this issue. In 1996, it was estimated that 80% of individuals in prison were in pre-trial detention, with progress to improve the justice system's ability to handle increased number of cases as "slow." (UN Security Council 1996d, 9) Despite the previous decade of international intervention in Haiti, the state of the justice system has not improved markedly. One report noted that over 96% of individuals currently being detained are in pre-trial limbo as of 2006. And an internal UNODC assessment that same year also noted that judges "ne sont pas généralement très compétent" and that corruption "est évidente à tous les niveaux."(Leroy 2006, 27-28) The result of these two interconnected issues is that cases before the courts are not being dealt with in a timely manner nor with the impartiality and protections which would normally be accorded individuals who face justice. As noted earlier, the unprofessional behaviour of field level HNP members could partially be attributed to their lack of confidence in the justice sector's ability to follow through with their arrests. The failure of the international community to develop the judicial system has impeded efforts to capitalize on gains made in developing the HNP.

4.5 Dysfunctional prisons

Further impeding an effort to holistically develop the security sector in Haiti is the lack of commensurate prison reform. The lack of facilities, unsanitary conditions and

insufficient staffing has made prison facilities unable to keep up with the number of detainees being arrested by the HNP. In parallel with international best practice, there have been a number of occasions where mass releases from prisons were authorized in order to alleviate the vast overcrowding within the facilities. For instance, in December 1998, over 300 detainees in pre-trial detention were released from Port-au-Prince prisons (UN Security Council 1999a, 5). This has contributed to a sense of apathy amongst HNP members some of whom—having lost faith in the justice and penal systems to process their arrests—have resorted to less professional ways of dealing with suspects.

Haitian prisons have been unanimously criticized by NGOs, the UN and in the media. In the words of one former Canadian CIVPOL officer, “you don’t want to be in a jail over [in Haiti]. In a small room, you have twenty prisoners. And, you’re aware of the climate conditions over there, how hot it is. No sanitary facilities. Children being mixed with adults (Durocher 2008).” The issue of prison reform has been a subsidiary concern to reform of the judiciary, and only cursory notice has been paid to penal reform in the periodic mission reports to the Security Council throughout the missions of the 1990s. Due to this lack of proportionate attention to the penal systems, the correctional facilities in Haiti have been a weak point in the international response to ameliorating the security sector; the failure of the international community to apply commensurate attention towards developing the correctional capacity of Haiti has impeded efforts to capitalize on gains made in developing the police.

4.6 Inadequate resources for the HNP

Although there has been significant effort made by the international community towards providing mentors and technical advisors to train members of the HNP, international training initiatives have been impeded by the lack of material resources available to both the HNP and CIVPOL. Chief Daniel Hefkey who served in Haiti a mentor in 1996 noted the numerous resource challenges he saw at the time amongst field level members of the HNP. He noted that there were insufficient vehicles, firearms and protective equipment which negative affected the ability of the HNP to execute their duties. During his tour, it became obvious the challenge of mounting an operation to arrest a wanted felon when the HNP officers under his charge lacked such basics as holsters for their pistols and pouches for handcuffs. Furthermore, without the transport provided by the UNMIH military contingent, the HNP contingent charged with executing a particular warrant would not have been able to get to the location of the operation (Hefkey 2008). Further illustrating the limited resources at the disposal of the HNP during the 1990s, another member of Canadian police who served as a mentor to the HNP officers in Cité Soleil related how the local HNP detachment had no vehicles and depended heavily on CIVPOL for mobility. Although they had a vast array of skills to teach their trainees, the HNP's limited mobility directly affected their ability to put the newly acquired competencies to practice in the field. The officer illustrated her point,

> We had programs to teach them, such as teaching in domestic violence and stuff like that. But that's very good on paper, reality was very different. They had no vehicles, and when they did get some vehicles from the republic of China. It was tiny little cars that couldn't keep tracks of the road, because there were bumps on the road, and all the cars were damaged in less than a week. Another problem, they didn't have any gas to put in the cars. (Girard 2008)

The problem of inadequate resources for the HNP is a common theme which permeates UN reports and interviews of individuals who have been deployed to Haiti. The problem of inadequate resources for the Haitian police affected even the IPSF deployed in the initial months of the UN intervention. The April 1995 Secretary-General report to the Security Council noted that the IPSF lacked basic equipment such as vehicles and communications, in addition to irregular pay (UN Security Council 1995f, 4). This concern was also raised when the first recruit classes of HNP members graduated from training, in November 1995, the UNMIH report labelled the equipment shortfalls as an area which needed "urgent attention," and called upon UN member states to contribute the "basic equipment necessary" for HNP members to fulfill their policing obligations (UN Security Council 1995e, 5-6). However, this issue was not resolved and the issue of resource challenges was a consistent concern in the mission reports to the Security Council. The resource challenges noted in official correspondence was reinforced by the statements of individuals who had participated as CIVPOL mentors in Haiti. There have been anecdotal examples of how some international partners, working on their own initiative, have worked to provide the basic necessities for HNP members. Illustrating a few cases:

- In 1996 and 1997, the Ontario Provincial Police in collaboration with Air Canada sent numerous skids to Haiti with basic safety equipment including secure holsters, handcuff pouches and even notebooks (Hefkey 2008).
- In 1999, the United States Government donated a large refurbished and retrofitted trailer for the use as an office for the HNP's Bureau de Lutte contre le Trafic de Stupéfiants [BLTS](Haiti Department of State [United States]. 2000b).

- In 1996, the United States Government in collaboration with American Airlines donated two trained police dogs for the HNP's drug units—which served as the nucleus for a capacity which had not yet been developed in the organization up to that point (Girard 2008). Similarly, the French government donated a dog and provided specialized training in France for the HNP dog handler(Haiti Department of State [United States]. 2001).

However, despite many examples of international partners donating policing essentials to the HNP, there has been a consistent lack of adequate resources policing. As was noted earlier, this issue was a recognized 'urgent' concern in the early UN interventions in Haiti. However, despite this recognition, the lack of adequate resources for the HNP continues to be an obstacle for institutional development and effectiveness even to the current day. In the periodic reports of MINUSTAH to the Security Council, the issue of inadequate material resources has consistently been stated (UN Security Council 2006, 7; UN Security Council 2008, 4-5).

The lack of resources and essential equipment for the HNP had also been mirrored—to a limited extent—in the resources allocated to CIVPOL. As an official report duly noted in March 1996, "the CIVPOL component of UNMIH also suffers from general insecurity for its officers and inadequate logistics support, especially the supply of vehicles and radios." The lack of resources and equipment was especially pronounced with CIVPOL contingents from lower-income countries. The issue was less of a concern for larger contingents from France, United States and Canada who largely relied on their own equipment. This discrepancy in availability of equipment for CIVPOL highlights an area of concern for DPKO planners; and this suggests a need for either

better resourcing of missions by the UN or stricter criteria for participation in capacity building missions such as the missions undertaken in Haiti.

4.7 Conclusion

By understanding and appreciating the interconnectedness of issues and the fine balance of variables which must be carefully managed if CIVPOL training is to succeed in developing a policing agency. Furthermore, this chapter draws to issue the necessity of commitment by both contributing states and also the receiving agency if sustainable results are to be realized. Furthermore, this chapter noted the fallacy of addressing one issue in isolation and failing to understand the interconnectedness of issues. Policing reform cannot happen in isolating and must be managed holistically with due attention paid to the other security sector actors, the internal and external political considerations and also the cultural realities unique to each circumstance.

Chapter 5
Conclusion and Recommendations

5.0 Introduction

The goal of this project was to identify the capacities and limitations of international police training and mentorship as a component of peacebuilding in post-conflict situations. Specifically, this project analyzed the case of Haiti and the work undertaken by UN CIVPOL to assist in the establishment and capacity building of the Haitian National Police. From the conception of this project, it has been intended that the findings serve to contribute to the larger body of best practices for policing development in Haiti and in similar scenarios. Despite unforeseen challenges that arose in the course of the research, the original objective was achieved. This chapter will discuss the general findings of the project, lessons learned from the methodology and potential areas for future study.

5.1 Findings of this project

This project noted the mixed effects of CIVPOL mentoring and advising in Haiti between 1994 and 2001. It also discussed the internal and external factors that affected the progress of the HNP's capacity-building efforts. Broadly, the research reinforces the general theme existent in the current literature on Haiti of the necessity for holistic and long-term engagement of the security sector if substantive progress is to be realized toward developing the HNP. The findings noted that the emphasis on community-based policing by CIVPOL trainers has improved the way police relate to their constituents, especially in rural areas. And the emphasis on community-based policing may serve as a platform for the further development of community centric policing philosophies in the future. Additionally, the various efforts by CIVPOL to develop the HNP served to add to the repository of lessons learned for police capacity building in Haiti and in similar

scenarios. It highlighted the importance of concurrent multi-track approaches, combining bilateral initiatives within the broader strategy of multilateral engagement, and the necessity for a long-term strategy if sustainability of progress is to be realized. However, in light of these positive outputs for the contributing actors, the outcomes of CIVPOL training and mentoring in the 1990s were — with few exceptions — negligible toward improving the discipline and professionalism of HNP members.

In Chapter 4, discussion focused on a number of factors that impeded the efforts to develop the HNP. Factors that negatively affected the progress of developing the HNP included issues that were internal to the program delivery of CIVPOL and also institutional problems related to the organization of the HNP. For example, the short mission lengths in the early years of the UN intervention adversely affected the ability of CIVPOL to build the institutional competencies of the HNP in the critical period following its establishment. Illustrating the institutional problems intrinsic to the HNP were the perpetual resource challenges the organization faced, both in terms of personnel and equipment. The broader theme emerging from that section of this project's discussion was the lack of a comprehensive strategy that integrated a long-term commitment by the international community within a holistic strategy for the Haitian security sector as a whole. This is consonant with the broader literature on policing reform in Haiti. Scholars such as Donais, Mendelson-Forman and Mobekk have separately noted the critical importance of addressing corrections and justice reform concurrently with police training. "The police, as well as the population, will become disillusioned when the non-functioning judicial system leads to minimizing the benefits of the police force's work. This happened in the case of Haiti," noted Mobekk (Mobekk 2001, 107).

5.2 Challenges encountered — despite a suitable project design

Largely, the goal of this project — to analyze the effects of CIVPOL activities in Haiti on the capacity of the HNP — has been achieved. Information from multiple sources was gathered and synthesized to gain perspective on the effectiveness of the training and mentorship efforts by CIVPOL. Included in these sources of information were interviews with selected Canadian police officers who had previously served as CIVPOL mentors and advisors — at all levels — to the HNP. Additionally, interviews were conducted with three individuals of the Haitian expatriate community currently living in Ontario; included in this group was the Honourary Consul for Haiti in Toronto. Complementing these interviews to a large degree was a document study of various UN publications, including periodic reports by the Secretary-General on the UN missions in Haiti and internal mission documentation from the UNMIH mission between 1994 and 1996.

Largely, the methodology that was articulated at the beginning of the project was adhered to without significant changes. Nevertheless, there were a number of minor issues that arose in the course of research and which necessitated minor changes to the research plan. Although it was originally conceived that interviews with an equivalent number of informed Haitian expatriates would be conducted, owing to logistical difficulties in finding appropriate persons, only three interviews were conducted with Haitian-Canadians. This necessitated a greater weight devoted to the interviews conducted with members of police and the associated document study. To a limited degree, the additional perspective representing the viewpoints of the Haitian community

being served by the HNP were not represented in this research as was originally intended. Second, despite the multinational nature of the CIVPOL contingent in Haiti, the research phase of this project failed to attain interviews with representatives from police officers outside of Canada. Primarily this was due to the lack of sources for initial lead generation of names. Further, it is arguable whether interviews with non-domestic Canadian sources would have been feasible given the finite resources allocated to this project. The lack of interviews with members of CIVPOL from other countries does not limit the validity of this study's findings, but it does serve to limit perspective on the unique outputs that participation in the UN missions might have had on contributing agencies from non-Canadian countries.

Finally, it was planned from the onset that this project would validate results by cross referencing findings from interviews with documentary evidence. However, due to substantial delays in acquiring information through the Government of Canada's Access to Information (ATI) facility, the bulk of the documentary evidence analyzed was based on readily accessible public information. The majority of the documentary evidence comprised mission reports by the UN Secretary-General. However, as these reports were predominantly for public consumption, there was the added filter of diplomatic nuances, which added a layer of ambiguity when it raised issues of concern. A number of internal documents from the UNMIH mission were retained, and graciously contributed to this study, by Canadian staff officers involved in that mission. And although they provided important internal insight to the UN presence in Haiti between 1994–1996, the amount of information from those documents was relatively small compared to the publicly available material. The effect of the inefficient ATI process

caused the documentary analysis component of this research to base its findings on public material from the UN, which could have introduced a particular bias based on the political factors at the Security Council or at the highest levels of the UN missions.

Given more allowances for time and adequate resources, a future project on CIVPOL of a similar nature would be well served to integrate the observations of various stakeholder groups beyond Canadian police officers. These additional perspectives would include interviews in Haiti with Haitian community groups both in urban and rural areas, and police officers from other CIVPOL contributing states. Furthermore, the perspectives gleaned from additional interviews would continue to be cross-referenced and reinforced through a document study; a future project must also take into account the lengthy wait for documents requested through the ATI facility. Although incorporating additional sources of information, the original qualitative design of this project would remain generally the same.

5.3 The need for a comprehensive and holistic development strategy

The issues raised in this project are derived from a historical study of the situation of CIVPOL in Haiti during the 1990s; however, the findings of this analysis relate both to the present situation in Haiti and also the broader issue of security sector reform in post-conflict situations. In the case of Haiti, the findings of this study reinforce best practices which understand that the development of the HNP is greatly affected — negatively or positively — by a multitude of political and social variables beyond the direct technical training offered through CIVPOL. Institutional progress to develop the HNP, or other similar agencies, can only happen with an adequate understanding of the

nexus between the security sector and the greater socio-political issues at play in the domestic and international spheres. The necessity of acknowledging the political dimension echoes Donais, who similarly assessed that sustainability of results cannot be achieved if emphasis is disproportionately placed on technical police training while neglecting the political and economic factors affecting the society at large ((Donais 2005,278)).

The results of this project suggest that the issue of policing development can only be successfully addressed as part of a broader strategy involving the security sector as a whole. The findings of this project are consistent with the greater literature on the subject of policing reform in Haiti and serve to reinforce the importance of addressing training within a broader engagement of the security sector. The need for holistic approaches to police reform requires an engagement not only on the part of contributing police agencies such as the RCMP or ICITAP, but also policy-makers in contributing states and at the United Nations. As such, the limitations of CIVPOL training and the factors that need to exist for successful policing reform to take place must be considered not only by international police but also governmental decision-makers.

Separately, as this project reinforces the necessity of holistic engagement of the security sector, it has briefly noted the inadequate progress of correctional and judicial reform in Haiti. Nevertheless, future research should be devoted toward discussing, at length, the process for ameliorating these complementary branches of the security sector. Needs assessments and commentaries have highlighted the problems facing the judicial and penal systems. For example, as recently as 2007, the International

Crisis Group (ICG) has written detailed briefings on the state of the prison systems and the judiciary, highlighting the complex challenges and very clear symptoms facing these respective areas. The ICG has also contributed suggestions for alleviating the immediate burdens in those areas, including calls for newer prison facilities and establishing new training schools for judges ((International Crisis Group 2007a,13; International Crisis Group 2007b,6)). Further study in this area may include a systematic review of the existing literature in penal and judicial reform initiatives toward determining the feasibility and the effectiveness of developmental approaches for engaging these vital areas of the security sector based on prior efforts in other countries.

Furthermore, although a great deal of literature — including this study — has been devoted to discussing the technical aspects of CIVPOL and security sector reform, there is relatively less analysis focused on the political issues that affect institutional development in Haiti. Further research is warranted to discuss the political underpinnings of Security Council decisions and the political reasons for particular mandate lengths or the number of personnel authorized for a particular mission. A good starting point for such research would be literature by David Malone, who has previously written on decision-making within the UN as it pertains to Haiti. Second, this study's research was limited in its ability to analyze the cultural legacy of Haiti's past on present-day attitudes toward security sector actors and governance reform. In the second chapter of this discussion, the conflicted history of Haiti leading up to the 1990s was briefly noted. A worthy area of future research might be a sociological study to determine how the cultural legacy of Haiti's conflicted past has affected the perceptions of Haitians toward the security sector and governance in general.

5.4 Success as seen through the optics of human security

This project set out to determine the effects of CIVPOL technical training on the ability of the HNP to provide quality policing services to the Haitians, complementary to democratic ideals. Largely, this project has achieved its intended aim, and the research undertaken for this project further noted internal and external issues that have affected the ability of the HNP to capitalize on the contributions provided through the UN CIVPOL program. In doing so, this project reinforces the findings of previous research, which underline the interconnectedness of policing development and the larger socio-political influences in Haiti. The reiteration of this important point is applicable not only to Haiti and the development of its security sector, but also to other security sector reform initiatives around the world. The efforts of CIVPOL training and mentoring initiatives are vital components of ensuring the viability of a country's security sector to realize human security in conflicted states. To that end, human security is best served when international police training is gauged not simply through the narrow confines of institutional development benchmarks but rather on its contributions to societal development as a whole. The outcomes of international police training in Haiti can be debated at length, but it is ultimately the HNP's prime constituents — the civilians whom the organization serves — who will judge its successes or failures.

Appendix A: Persons Interviewed

- Beer, David (C/Supt): Director-General of International Policing, RCMP
- Durocher, André (Insp): CIVPOL Mentor/Advisor, MINUSTAH
- Garnier, Eddy (Mr.): Haitian-Canadian author and artist
- Girard, Christine (Cst) : CIVPOL Mentor/Advisor, UNMIH
- Hefkey, Dan (Chief): CIVPOL Mentor/Advisor, UNMIH
- Jean-Gilles, Marie Monique (Mrs.) : Principal of 'La Reine Soleil École de Formation Internationale' in Borel, Haiti
- Pierre, Eric (Dr.) : Honourary Consul for Haiti in Toronto
- Pouliot, Neil (C/Supt, Ret'd): Former UN Police Commissionner, UNMIH

Ancillary Information

- Coates, Doug (Supt) : Director of International Peace Operations, RCMP
- Thomas, Roy (Maj, Ret'd): Deputy Chief of Operations (U3A), UNMIH HQ
- Saget, Jean Erick (Mr.): Retired Investigator, HNP
- Guidice-Saget, Anna (Mrs.): Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer, UNODC
- Donais, Timothy (Dr.): Global Studies, Wilfred Laurier University

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