POLICING CHANGES: MULTIPLE MANDATES OF URBAN POLICING IN HALIFAX CENTRAL

by

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DEDICATION

To my parents, Mike and Joyce, for teaching me to ask questions.

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ABSTRACT

This study sought to understand how foot patrol (or 'beat') police officers acted and viewed their actions in a unique urban setting. Using interviews and observation, the thesis examines the outcome of the Halifax Regional Police Service's newest management initiative, the Enhanced Community Response Model of policing. Exhibiting many characteristics typical of policing in late modernity, the new model provided a rich environment for the advancement of the empirical base in policing scholarship. By comparing results from two adjacent policing districts in Halifax's urban core, the study found that, within the bureaucratic and civic constraints of policing in Halifax, fundamentally different approaches to police service could exist on an almost street-by-street basis. In turn, the thesis argues that policing scholarship must pay attention to the idiosyncratic effects of local conditions if we are to understand the potential for variable outcomes of discretionary policing models. The paper further develops a conceptual model for understanding the process of front-line policing strategy formulation under a 'new' policing model such as the one found in Halifax.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

COP	Community-Oriented Policing
CRO	Community Response Officer
ECRM	Enhanced Community Response Model of Policing
HRM	Halifax Regional Municipality
HRP	Halifax Regional Police
HRPS	Halifax Regional Police Service
ILP	Intelligence-Led Policing
NYPD	New York Police Department
PPA	Protection of (Private) Property Act
PSEPC	Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Policing Changes

In late modernity, the guiding theories of public policing have shifted from a paramilitary and reactive operation to an emphasis on proactivity and cooperation with citizens. This has happened in conjunction with wider neo-liberal reforms to governance. Police are now sharing their traditional monopoly on order-maintenance activities with other actors, including private security, volunteers, and non-governmental organizations. Under this new model, police have both begun to hope for and to expect that responsibilities commonly held only by the state will be taken up voluntarily by engaged citizens, either contractually or informally, especially in those areas where criminal activity cannot by reduced by police alone.

The partnerships between these groups have been characterized by a variegated focus on community as the locus of, and possible solution to, order maintenance issues and police priority and agenda-setting. Communities, neighbourhoods, citizens' groups, and the like, have become collaborators in the provision of policing, as well as the barometer by which policing activities are judged. This has increased the dramatic[1] component of policing activity significantly. While Manning (1997) noted this factor in policing as early as 1967, the need for policing to "be seen to be done" has become much more salient and tangible in recent years (DeLint et al 2007).

In 1986, the Halifax Police Department made its first attempt at implementing a community policing model (Clairmont 1988). They re-organized this model in 1996 (as outlined in Hayward 1994), when Halifax city amalgamated with neighbouring districts to become Halifax Regional Municipality, and the HPD became the Halifax Regional Police

[1] In Goffman's sense of the word (Manning 1997).

(HRP). In 2006, HRP again developed a new administrative model for its policing services. Now in its second full year of implementation, the Enhanced Community Response Model is made up, both on paper and in practice, of a number of elements drawn broadly from the trends toward community-oriented policing (COP) and zero-tolerance policing, which can reasonably be said to be the most significant policing models to have emerged in the Anglo-Western world in the past three decades, and represent what Stenson and Edwards (2000) have called the new technologies of crime control. These models are described in further detail in Chapter 2

As these changes have been occurring in the world of policing, a gap in empirical knowledge has grown regarding the effects of these models on front-line policing – those activities of police agencies that interact with and negotiate the demands of citizens (Huey 2007). Some academics (e.g. Zhao 1996, Goldstein 1987) have suggested that COP models represent a more effective way of setting the policing agenda and connecting the police to the community. Others (e.g. Crawford 2006) have argued that they are a driver of social capital within communities. By extension of this, similar arguments have also suggested that COP models increase 'collective efficacy', or the ability of a neighbourhood or community to mobilize resources for a particular purpose (e.g. Schneider 2007). Others, however, argue that COP models are extensions of a paradoxical and troubling confluence of neo-conservative social control ideologies with neo-liberal rationalization of service delivery (e.g. Garland 2001, Murphy 2004, Ericson 2006). This argument is in line with the Foucauldian (1991) concept of the governmental *dispositif,* that modern governance is designed to make people "do as they ought", without requiring the threat of coercion. Similarly, zero-tolerance policing models have been subject to conflicting claims that, on the one hand, they are increasing

neighbourhood efficacy, and on the other, they are ineffective models that promote overly-punitive neo-conservative visions of social control (Garland 2001).

However, within these debates one rarely finds an injection of empirical data that clarify what is actually occurring 'out there' in the world of policing. Indeed, in the formative years of these new policing models, scholars such as Mastrofski (1988) regularly suggested that COP may be more 'rhetoric' than 'reality'. Others, such as Stenson and Edwards (2000) and De Lint et al (2007) suggest that manuals, policies, and bureaucratic reorganization toward new models may be little more than a representation of the way policing *should be* (or should not be) done, and tell us little about the way that it *is* done.

Multiple mandates

This study is therefore concerned with the way policing is done. In the summer of 2008, I completed an ethnographic study with patrol officers in the HRP's Central Division. I rode, biked, and walked along with 8 officers who were the central participants of the study. I spent over 40 total hours in the field and collected 4 hours of interviews with my participants in June and July 2008, which produced 41 pages of field notes and 78 pages of interview transcripts. This study focuses centrally on the Community Response Officer (CRO) position, and the significance of this position is explained in Chapter 2. My participants were all either CROs themselves or were brought into the study through their CRO. Each CRO is assigned to a particular patrol area, and the majority of my fieldwork was completed in the Uptown and Downtown patrol areas.

Halifax's Downtown police patrol area is Halifax's central business district. The Downtown also houses a significant homeless population. Until recently, the downtown had the highest incidence of violent crime in all of the HRM territory, but it also remains

the major entertainment destination for most Haligonians from diverse socioeconomic, age, race, and gender backgrounds. The policing style in Downtown can be characterized as 'zero-tolerance' policing, which focuses on eliminating minor signs of disorder such as graffiti, panhandling, and open-air drug dealing.

Directly adjacent to Downtown is the district known as the Uptown patrol area, which is a poor primarily residential area. This area includes public housing projects, a number of addiction-treatment centres, social and housing services offices, and a small commercial section. While walking along with officers Uptown, I observed virtually zero enforcement of helmet or smoking by-law infractions. Official sanction in the form of ticket or arrest was used rarely, and avoided when possible. The policing style in Uptown would properly be referred to as community-oriented policing, concerned primarily with community partnerships in policing activities, and far more lenient on low-level criminal violations than the Downtown approach. Police Uptown regularly interact with residents' groups and social service providers, and co-produce neighbourhood projects such as a community garden and charity efforts.

Downtown and Uptown are separated by a single street, and both exhibit 'skid row' characteristics (e.g. Huey 2007, Bittner 1967). However, the policing of the populations of each community changes significantly over a small geographic distance. In the following pages, I will argue that the result of the implementation of the Enhanced Community Response Model (ECRM) in Halifax was to establish multiple, and in many ways contradictory, policing mandates in close geographic proximity to one another, all organized under the same bureaucratic structure. From these observations and interviews, I suggest that we cannot understand late modern policing only by reviewing police policy manuals, bureaucratic structures, or organizational philosophies. While these

organizational attributes constrain, enable, and shape the actions and attitudes of officers, they cannot be equated with front-line policing outcomes in a straightforward manner. Rather, I argue that, as policing models become more de-centralized and thus more local-context-specific, we can expect to see significant variations in the ways in which front-line police officers employ available crime-control and public order strategies, not only between policing districts, but within them as well.

Outline

This paper is broken down into four sections after the introduction. Chapter Two situates the ECRM in a broader trend towards a 'late-modern' form of policing that has become common in the Anglo-Western world. The chapter then describes the local political context of Halifax, as possibly Canada's most violent city, and the specific contexts of Uptown, Downtown, and the politics of policing at the time the study was undertaken. Chapter Two also includes a timeline of recent significant criminal, political, and structural events impacting the vision for and delivery of policing in the HRM.

Chapter Three discusses the philosophical orientation of the institutional ethnographic methodology employed in the fieldwork, and orients the reader to the exploratory nature of the study. Chapter Three also outlines the interviewing and observational strategies employed, and some of the lessons I learned as a neophyte field researcher.

Chapter Four presents the results of the study, by presenting interview and observational data on the major themes uncovered in my field work. These include the role of the CRO; the function of the 'beat' as a policing tool; indications of participants' community policing strategies; the use of ticketing for public order outcomes Downtown; the officers' recognition of the 'PR' or politician aspect of community policing; and the

officers' statements and actions that defined their beliefs about the community(ies) they serve, and what they expect in turn from the community to achieve mutually desirable outcomes.

Chapter Five situates these results in ongoing debates about the lived realities of late-modern policing. As noted above, I argue that the Halifax model of community policing exhibits some discrepancies between its policy model and the front-line police provision of services, and that these services will be variable on an almost street-by-street basis. However, I do not contend that policing service under models such as the ECRM will be random or capricious. Rather, I contend that examining the combination of bureaucratic and civic constraints on police actions provides a predictive model for how policing will occur on the front lines. In turn, these constraints shape the choices of which technologies of crime control will be mobilized in particular times and places.

CHAPTER 2 – POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF POLICING IN HALIFAX

The Enhanced Community Response Model (ECRM) for policing in Halifax was developed in 2006 and finalized in 2007. The organizational structure it proposes was in its second year of full implementation at the time of this study. The ECRM emphasizes police visibility, community safety, traffic safety, and public order as persistent problems that it seeks to address.

The ECRM in the Halifax Regional Municipality did not arise out of a vacuum. It was not invented there, although it is particular to that place. Virtually all of its components, ideas, guiding philosophies, and organizational mandates have appeared elsewhere, in other policing models, districts, best-practices literatures, and academic works. In this chapter, I will first outline the historical process that brought policing to its current formulation throughout the Anglo-Western world. Beginning with the ascendance of neo-liberal governance, I will discuss the ideologies and practices that have become popularized in policing as a result of a combination of wider governance trends and enterprising police policy models. Focusing on the two most prevalent policing models of late modernity – zero-tolerance or broken windows policing and community-oriented policing (COP) – I will discuss the police mandates that these models suggest, namely, 'pre-crime' and simulation in place of prevention and reaction.

COP and zero-tolerance policing, while often in conflict with one another, both mobilize 'communities' in one way or another as witness of these emerging policing regimes. Thus, the chapter will continue by outlining the variegated ways in which community is conceived, invented, and enlisted in late-modern policing activities.

Finally, I will discuss the local political context in which the ECRM is being implemented. Halifax has, as recently as 2005, been designated as Canada's most violent city. While the actual level of violence in Halifax is not an issue that my fieldwork was designed to engage, it is nonetheless apparent in readily-available data in the HRM that crime and violence disproportionately concern Halifax's citizens, when compared to other citizens of Atlantic Canada. I will thus outline the historical political initiatives and 'signal' events that have been significant in shaping the deployment of police resources in Halifax, in an effort to give readers a sense of the context in which my study took place.

The Road to Late-Modern Policing

Generally, late modernity may be conceived of as concurrent with the ascendance of neo-liberal reforms across what is commonly called the Western world, and is often seen as a reactionary trend to Keynesian social democracy (cf. Hall et al 1978; Garland 2004: viii). Garland (2004: 98-99, italics his) characterizes late modernity in terms of the following reforms:

> "'Neo-liberalism' (the re-assertion of market disciplines) and 'neo-conservatism' (the re-assertion of moral disciplines), the commitment to 'rolling back the state' while simultaneously building a state apparatus that is stronger and more authoritarian than before... If the watchwords of the post-war social democracy had been *economic control and social liberation*, the [new framework is] *economic freedom and social control.*"

The entrance of policing into late modernity occurred in the mid- to late-1970s, when paramilitary-bureaucratic policing models gave way to mixed/community policing models in North America (Zhao 1996, Garland 2001). There is no clear distinction between policing styles before and after this moment; current police practices in many ways mirror police practices pre-dating the 1970s (Manning 1997; Zhao 1996). However, in late modernity there are some core changes to the modern policing models that clearly

differentiate the functions of police and the activities of policing today from those of the past.

Among the many commonsense notions regarding public police that must be discarded in contemporary debates on policing is the idea that the police force is the only agency involved in policing. Along with governmental forces whose mandates are in many ways related to those of public police forces, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the North American context, there are also many governmental and non-governmental agents that are currently providing security in one form or another. Private security forces patrol gated residential neighbourhoods and secure shopping districts and public spaces; actuarial scientists predict risk and develop emergency response plans for disasters of all sorts; neighbourhood watch groups keep eyes out for suspicious behaviour; and medical science keeps us up-to-date on possible risks to life from non-human actors.

Policing is therefore different from 'police force,' although for the better part of the 19th and 20th centuries they were virtually considered synonymous (LCC 2007). In many ways, this is a positive development. The conflation of police and policing in the modern era led to a near-monopolization of policing functions by police forces; in turn, police were looked to by both citizens and the state as actors who were both responsible for, and capable of, curing a wide range of social ills. This process may be seen as the de-coupling of crime control and society where "Crime became something 'the authorities' should do something about, a problem that professionals are paid to deal with." (Garland 2001: 31-2) This shift to professionalization of the police forces in Western society was concurrent with a larger societal shift toward managerialism and bureaucratic rationality (Zhao 1996: 5-6).

States would soon find out that this focus on police as the paramount locus of social control was not sustainable over a long period of time, as it eroded natural forms of social controls centered in everyday practices of regular people. As Garland (ibid) writes,

> From the 1890s until the 1960s, when steep rises in recorded crime and violence began to undermine this perception, the criminal justice state was widely believed to be capable of winning the war against crime, or at least turning back the tide of crime and disorder that industrialism had brought in its wake... Probably these were false credentials. It is more likely that the success of the police... was a vicarious one, dependent upon quite other forces and social arrangements.

Policing Models – Broken Windows and COP

> It is possible to distinguish three focal clusters of technologies of crime control that have crystallized in recent years... These include: punitive sovereignty, that attempt to regain control of public places from perceivably disorderly groups...; target hardening, linked with actuarial justice, that try to reduce the opportunities for crime and apply the logic of risk assessment and management to crime and criminals...; and community security technologies that try to link crime control efforts to defend affluent neighbourhoods and regenerate decaying or disorderly localities. The latter interventions have become linked with other 'local' and 'community'-oriented initiatives, including the internationally fashionable emphasis on problem-solving, community policing, and community/restorative justice.
> -Stenson and Edwards (2000: 72)

As the dream that command-and-control bureaucratic policing would be capable of maintaining order in liberal democracies began to vanish, a debate on the future of policing emerged. Many people did not blame inefficiencies in modern-style policing for the breakdown in crime control or the developing state of insecurity. There remains a persistent and significant body of thought in criminology and criminal justice literature that suggests the causes of increased crime and violence has been a relaxation of social controls and state-based social monitoring, also referred to as the "permissive society" thesis (Hall et al 1978). This logic blames welfare and non-punitive justice measures for the state of society, and suggests that more police officers with a wider mandate, alongside stiffer penalties for lesser crimes and greater controls on offenders and quasi-

offenders, are the best ways to confront social disorder. This approach to criminogenesis can be found in Hall et al's (ibid) account of the rise of neo-conservatism in the UK (see also Garland 2001; Wacquant 2004, for similar accounts).[2]

As Hall et al (1978), Wacquant (2004), and Caldeira (2000) have noted, this decidedly American penal theory and practice is becoming global, making its way to Canada, Western Europe and South America. According to Waquant (2004), Caldeira (2000), Garland (2001), Schneider (2007), Huey (2007) and others, the "crucible" trend of this approach to social control has been the Manhattan model of Kelling and Wilson's "broken windows theory." The broken windows theory posits that signs of generalized disorder encourage deviant and criminal behaviour, and this helps to explain increased crime rates in areas with clear signs of disorder, such as graffiti and open-air drug dealing. Thus, the police in Manhattan began an aggressive campaign against panhandling, low-level disturbance, street dealing and prostitution, alongside other city efforts towards less litter, graffiti, and so on. Though it is widely recognized as ineffective in decreasing crime rates, but effective at increasing arrest and sanction rates for minor offences, broken windows-style policing and other neo-conservative policing reforms generate widespread public support and media attention, while other, less control-oriented approaches have received popular neglect or disdain (Garland 2001: 32-33; see also Wacquant 2004: 166).[3]

The late-modern era has been marked by two trends in governance, often in tension. If the "broken windows" approach to policing is the neo-conservative watershed,

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[2] It may appear obvious to the reader that this illogic is actually saying, "Increasing activity in strategies that aren't working is required to make the system work better." It is, indeed, saying this.

[3] Of course, broken windows policing should not be seen as the sole force in the neo-conservative policing strategy; increased border regulations, tighter controls on dissent and subversive thought, and Total Information Awareness-style policies towards citizens and non-citizens alike are also significant policy directions for the neo-con agenda (cf. Ericson 2006: chapter 2)

then the rationalization and privatization of police and security services are a result of the ascendance of neo-liberalism. As Murphy (2001: 7) writes, rationalization in neo-liberal governance involves "A more business like approach to managing and operating public services [that] is judged necessary to make public services more fiscally rational, cost efficient, and politically accountable." The concomitant service-delivery trends of the rationalization agenda include "cost efficiency considerations, productivity and performance measurement, organizational restructuring and service innovation." In other words, rationalization is the process whereby government bureaucracies justify their pre-existing services, staff complements, and procedures, and remove or modify those that are considered ineffective, superfluous, *ultra vires*, or that can be replaced by a privately- or mixed-funded and -operated option at a lower cost.

The results of this process on modern-type police bureaucracies were significant. As police began to be seen as responsible primarily for reacting to service calls, forces across North America began removing foot patrols and replacing them with car patrols (Zhao 1996). Narrowing definitions of police roles relegated highly visible community services such as public education, property checks, and traffic support to an officially secondary role in police force service provision, and some functions, such as police escort services, were eliminated altogether, in some districts (Murphy 2001: 16-19). Further, government bureaucracies reorganized themselves to address the growing number of private and mixed policing activities. In the UK, the Home Office undertook this reorganization (Crawford 2006: 461) through the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, and Canada and the United States created new security coordinating bureaucracies: Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) and the Office of Homeland Security, respectively (Murphy 2005: 13; see also Ericson 2006, LCC 2007). These

changes in police structure and activities can be seen as a response to the late-modern diversification of security and policing actors, and have resulted in what Ericson and Haggerty (2000) refers to as 'surveillant assemblages.'

Interestingly, as community functions of public police decreased and private actors became increasingly involved in police and security activities, overall spending on police force budgets nonetheless steadily grew (LCC 2007: 16, Murphy 2005: 5-6) in response to the neo-conservative pressures on increased policing. This agenda in turn brought with it a set of new police responsibilities not previously associated with public police forces, particularly the nebulous task of policing risk through increased surveillance activities and Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) initiatives. These new responsibilities have spawned a debate over the appropriate role of public policing.

Rationalization in late modernity is also associated with the development of the "post-regulatory" state. Crawford (2006: 450), synthesizing the work of a number of authors, suggests that this is a trend towards "nodal" or "networked", as opposed to centralized, governance, in an effort to increase overall systemic efficiencies. Using a nautical analogy, he writes that previous governments undertook the tasks of "rowing" and "steering" state service provision, such that, in the modern era, governments were responsible for both setting policy and enforcing those policies through either providing services or sanctioning the actions of citizens, businesses and so on. However, in the late-modern era, most government services, from education and health care to policing and intelligence, are provided by a combination of private and public actors. Thus, Crawford asserts the post-regulatory state's function is developing into one of "anchoring", which

means ensuring an acceptable level of service provision to citizens through fostering collaboration between state and non-state actors.[4]

The second major late-modern policing model is related directly to the ascendance of post-regulatory governance, and occurs in part as a reaction to the devolution of police functions at the neighbourhood level. Both relatively cost-effective, in line with neo-liberal reforms, as well as arguably increasing state and policing capacities, germane to neo-conservative demands, Community-Oriented Policing (COP) has become a widely used and misused tool of police forces struggling for legitimacy in late modernity, often conflated with broken-windows style policing at the implementation level[5] (cf. Huey 2007). Understood optimistically, COP-style policing is "a flexible, participatory, science-based structure... It is designed for effectiveness in serving the needs of citizens rather than autocratic rationality of operation. It is democratic in that it requires and facilitates the involvement of citizens." (Zhao 1996: 6)

Operationally, COP is a strategy that encourages police participation in local and community activities, and it commonly manifests itself in storefront-style community police offices, community liaison officers, neighbourhood policing advisory councils, the development of Community Crime Prevention (CCP) programs, and, in Halifax, the creation of the Community Response Officer, discussed below. There is no single COP model, as it is implemented differentially throughout districts, since it is intended to be responsive to specific community needs. Unfortunately, COP implementation often conflates community with geography, which leads to some problematic practices,

[4] His is essentially a normative argument, although abundant evidence of these anchoring practices is developing (ibid).
[5] Certainly my favourite example of this was the quote from a police sergeant in Huey (2007), where he states, "Community policing is fixing the broken window."

assumptions and novel forms of exclusion (Huey 2007). Nonetheless, community policing in its various forms has been the dominant model of Western policing for the past two decades.

Policing mandates – Pre-crime and Simulation

These two models of police administration and priority-setting – broken windows and COP – have ascended in response to political pressures for increased levels of sanction and control, increased fiscal accountability and market reforms, and a demand for localized, consent-based police practice, respectively. However, recall also that they emerged as a response to increasing police inability to engage in crime control, ostensibly the core mandate of the public police. As the police's capacity to cure society's ills has not appreciably increased over the past twenty years, the mandate of the public policing has shifted from stopping crime as it occurs and apprehending offenders after-the-fact (although these functions persist) to stopping crime before it is ever realized.

Zedner (2007) terms this preoccupation with the pre-emption of criminal behaviour as 'pre-crime'. In this formulation it is appropriate to see 'criminal' behaviour in similar terms to Ericson (2006), as a category inextricably connected to risk. In a society obsessed with security, argues Zedner, the state acts less towards controlling crime than "addressing the conditions precedent to it." (ibid: 265) Broken windows and COP models both theoretically work in this way.

Of course, even these new models are largely unable to control crime or decrease crime rates, and thus states have further shifted their preoccupation, from pre-emption of crime to eliminating fear of crime. This is directly related to the tenets of the broken windows theory, which suggest that fear of crime breeds crime by weakening social solidarity (Innes 2004: 335). However, criminalizing generalized disorder through the

Manhattan model is ceasing to be considered adequate for maintaining the consent of the governed, and as a result new methods for attacking fear of crime have developed.

Innes (ibid) argues that certain types of crimes manifest a disproportionate level of fear in citizens. Despite the fact that they are highly unlikely to occur and present a relatively low risk to most individuals, unprovoked assaults, burglary, robbery and other similar crimes, as well as generalized disorder and high-profile crimes such as murder, have a communicative effect. The message that comes across, Innes argues, is that average citizens who are doing their best to minimize personal risk through the available measures are still not safe when they leave their homes, or when they enter particular geographical areas. These 'signal crimes' are not interpreted uniformly across social groups, but nonetheless augment risk perceptions by individuals, which generate demands on policing services.

Since, however, neither modern nor late-modern policing models have been particularly adept at targeting and eliminating serious crime, it has become more useful for police forces to exhibit the administration of justice to the public. This mandate in policing has been around at least since the 1960s, when Goffman applied the dramatic metaphor to agents of social control (Manning 1997: 35-39); its late-modern policy manifestations have become movements such as 'reassurance policing.'

De Lint et al (2007: 1644) write that in late-modern social control relations, "There is a tripartite or spatialized matrix in which the viewer in effect becomes the target or object. Thus A [the agent of control] instrumentalizes B [the offender] in a controlled dramatization and object lesson for witness C." This formulation suggests that the communicative effect of policing activities is essential to these activities. Realizing this, social control agencies have directed their activities towards those transgressions that are

unsettling to citizens, in a sense similar to Innes's signal crimes, and where the control of those crimes can be seen by a public. This dramatic facet of police action includes such moments in recent history as the mass arrest of "terror" suspects in Toronto and the "shock and awe" intimidation displays of the NYPD in the wake of 9/11; but it also includes public relations work, publicly-visible training exercises, and the development of 'best-practices' literature. (ibid)

What is most important in this formulation, more important than the actual control of crime, is that the public believe that control activities are ongoing and vigilant; in turn, dramatic activities that engender public confidence and consent towards a perpetuation of the policing regime have become a component of virtually all policing agencies, private and public. This process may be termed 'simulation' and, perhaps more than any other late-modern trend, it satisfies the conditions outlined above that characterize this era in policing – it is cost-effective, control-oriented, and amenable to securitizing agendas and networked governance models, and moreover, it maintains public consent in line with the governmental *dispositif.* In this next section, we begin a discussion of the creation of community in the late modern era as subject, object, and witness of these regimes.

Communities of Consent

In 1972, Gerald Suttles remarked that the widespread belief in community in urban settings is a reassertion of a 'folk model' of community which does not accord to modern urban realities. Writing a quarter-century later, Frug makes similar claims on the nature of community in suburban settings:

> "Virtually every suburban city in America is predominantly populated by strangers. What distinguishes many suburbs from central cities is not the presence of strangers but the fact that strangers who live in a suburb often think of themselves as constituting a coherent group." (1999: 116)

This phenomenon marks the urban and suburban experience of late modernity. In this context, it is hard to understand how it came to be that 'community' is the focal point of late-modern policing practices in the urban setting.

The first hurdle in the struggle for community safety is finding an adequate definition of community in theory, one that alerts policy-makers towards what community is, and how it can be mobilized. The problem among academics has been to differentiate between normative and descriptive accounts of community. For example, Schneider writes:

> "Within the crime prevention field, community is also conceptualized in sociological terms, as an organic collective of people who are bounded together by personal ties and networks, a high level of social interaction and cohesion, a shared identity and goals, and a sense of wholeness... A dominant etiological theory of crime... is that the loss of the socially cohesive community has contributed to crime and disorder within Western societies." (2007: 22)
> ...
> "Social cohesion, informal social control, and collective efficacy are the products of an aggregated sense of local belonging and attachment among individual residents, which have also been cited as a direct determinant of participation in collective crime prevention." (ibid: 42)

This conception views community as a measurable capacity within a bounded geographical area, which is certainly a step ahead of the conflation of community and geography. Its constituent parts – social cohesion, informal control, and collective efficacy, appear in other literatures as, for example, common values, social order, and social solidarity (Kearns and Forrest 2000); and are related to concepts such as social capital, defined by Putnam (1998, in Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1000)[6] as "the norms and networks of civil society that lubricate co-operative action among both citizens and their institutions." The consequence of this view of community is twofold. First, it follows that populations within a geographic area exhibiting higher levels of cohesion, control,

[6] See also Granovetter 1985 for a discussion of social capital and community.

and efficacy will have lower levels of crime and disorder as well as a greater ability to react to community problems as well as collaborate with state-level partners. Second, it suggests that these components of community can be manipulated within a geographical area to make struggling communities stronger (ibid; see also Schneider 2007; Frug 1999).

Both of these claims, however, become dubious under scrutiny. The notion that it is social cohesion that leads to community safety and response capacity is challenged by the simple fact that high levels of cohesion, control, and efficacy are found largely in middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods (Schneider 2007) where crime is less likely for numerous reasons unrelated to efficacy. Even in the suburban areas described by Frug (above), there is low social cohesion while there are also relatively lower rates of disorder and criminal victimization. That crime perpetually is higher in neighbourhoods with lower socio-economic status or in downtown city centre areas suggests that, even in late modernity, crime is still largely predictable through patterns of opportunity and relative deprivation.

Further, the achievement of widespread social control in late modern society is much more adequately theorized by the tenets of the governmental *dispositif* than deference to some pre-existing local social norms; as Turner (1991, in Kearns and Forrest 2000: 998) suggests, the existing order is not accepted by people at the urban level because of an active or passive internalization of values shared with their neighbours. Instead, order is accepted pragmatically as a matter of routine that does not acquire the legitimization hoped for by proponents of social capital manipulation.

The New Contractualism[7]

> Hand-in-hand with the rationing of services to make limited resources work to their full advantage for police, we are seeing the state's side of the social contract, its obligations to provide peace and security, increasingly being fulfilled by police working through and with 'outsiders'. Other government agencies, community organisations, the business community and individuals in various capacities are entering into formalized arrangements of reciprocity with the police. This 'contractualisation' of policing is evident in relation to both the core work of policing and behind-the-scenes aspects of police work.
>
> -Ayling 2008, p. 343

There appears, in the literature, to be something of an ambiguity regarding whether the 'new contractualism' represents the increased use of explicit contracts between the state and non-state agencies, individuals, and communities, or whether it represents something more akin to a re-drawing of the hypothetical social contract. These are not exactly interchangeable concepts, although they may be used in conjunction. In any case, Ayling's description of the relationship as it relates to public policing is adequate for the purposes of this essay, so long as readers are willing to accept a broad conceptualization of 'formalized arrangements'.[8]

Fundamentally under this arrangement, citizens have become explicitly responsible for the co-production of their own security. As previously noted, this widespread self-policing is not fundamentally new; as Foucault (1991) points out, a central precept of modern governance is to make the use of force unnecessary, which is to say that people will act appropriately without either coercion or the threat of coercion. However, the threat of coercion remains in collaboration in policing activities, even in those activities that are considered co-productive or voluntary on the citizen's part. Sulkunen writes,

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[7] A modified version of this section appears in Giacomantonio 2008b.

[8] Which, in policing, could mean anything from co-production of community events to paid informancy to regular meetings with neighbourhood organizations.

> The contract is an illusion that disguises relations of domination as voluntary partnership. It stresses agency to a point where autonomy is not only granted to but demanded of even those who have little or no capacity for it. The illusion of the contract has real consequences on how societies are governed and how they relate to each other. (2007)

In policing, perhaps more than other new contractual arrangements, this illusion is thinnest, and it may be thinning further.

As a result, different types and qualities of policing are available to different communities, depending on, in large part, their ability to co-produce their own security, either through the purchase of private or extra-duty security patrols or the development of volunteer-based policing activities and groups. Communities that do not or cannot develop these types of extra-state protections can often be treated by authorities as irresponsible. Their characterization as irresponsible is exacerbated by the fact that most state, provincial, and federal governments offer grants for the development of community-level resources, voluntary associations, and policing activities.

The availability of grants is at best double-edged, however, since grants require the existence of some level of association coherent enough to be described as a community, and they require that communities, where they exist, fall in line with available government mandates. Further, those groups that achieve some level of funding tend to become synonymous with 'community' in the eyes of the governing agencies, while those individuals who either belong to non-funded/non-recognized groups or to no group at all run the risk of becoming 'denizens' in their own place of residence (see, for example, Chaskin 2003; Stenson and Edwards 2000). Thus, it appears that the kind of communities theorized by policy-makers in line with the tenets of social capital or new-contractual theories are lacking in their ability to facilitate non-state partnerships to control crime and disorder.

However, the fact that the concept of 'community' is hard to pin down does not refute the existence of communities, and both the persistence of the concept and my research suggest that there is something observable that we may call community that can be drawn on for governance purposes. This is not to say that 'community' only exists for the purpose of enabling better governance; rather, it is to say that communities – definable populations with shared values and common interests (e.g. Frug 1999) – probably exist even in the urban setting, and therefore may be partners in governance where they are willing. This is also not to say that this gives us a clearer or singular definition of community, but rather that communities, variously defined, may be mobilized by state and non-state actors both for and against state interests.

Policing agents have realized this at the public, private, and neighbourhood levels. Two conceptions of the 'communities' that have been mobilized by law enforcement agencies provide useful illustration. The first, outlined by Loader and Walker, is the national political community:

> First, to the extent that the state is the capsule... of a sense of national political community... it helps generate an identification with the needs of strangers of the kind that underpins people's preparedness to fund general welfare, including general security provision. Second, and more specifically, the sense of membership of a community of attachment can lead to more active support for and cooperation with the police that represent that community, generating a 'virtuous circle of crime control.'[9] (2001: 28)

This is the community being targeted through the witnessing process outlined by de Lint. In this conception, social cohesion is manufactured on a level that can evade personal interaction and can be achieved between strangers; and acceptance of control transcends pragmatism, as it becomes a matter of welfare. This is related to the second conception of community, outlined by Murphy and Clarke:

[9] Incidentally, Loader and Walker's piece was written before 9/11.

> The community or public can be seen as a distinct resource for policing and security. In this context, community can be understood in a range of ways: for example, as a formally organized group of stakeholders, as individual citizens, or as distinct community sectors (residential or commercial ratepayers). (2005: 217)

This conception focuses less on developing a community that will work as a whole to prevent crime, and more on developing collaborators for policing activities. This conception, again, addresses the realities of community in the urban setting, and reverts largely back to the conception of community as people within a given space. This conception, however, results in exclusive practices, and creates degrees of citizenship.

Citizens and Denizens

Social control practices have always resulted in exclusion. While above we have seen the types of community that are liable to be partners with social control agencies, their inclusion in policing strategies rely largely on those communities' willingness or interest in collaborating with policing goals. Communities unwilling to engage in collaboration risk becoming marginal communities in the eyes of law enforcement. They are nonetheless communities, and still liable to mobilization, although the state's approach to these groups has historically been less accommodating and more 'republican' (Staehli and Thompson 1997), imposing responsibilities on these groups, as suggested by Sulkuunen (2007), above.

This is not a late-modern trend; it is a structural correlate of judging a group or person within the law, and others without. In different forms Hall et al (1978), Huey (2007), and Lyon-Callo (2007) argue that this is not total exclusion. For Hall et al, persons and populations that constitute a threat to social order acquire the status of 'denizen', second-class citizens not fully excluded from society as they still serve both labour and common enemy functions. Similarly, Huey invokes a similar concept in the

skid row context. She develops the concept of "coercive inclusion," and suggests that while neo-liberalism has certainly exacerbated some aspects of what is traditionally conceptualized as exclusion, what we actually see in western liberal societies is a political model aimed at strategies of widespread inclusion, in line with the governmental *dispositif*. Coercive inclusion, then, represents those strategies that punish members of problem populations in order to give them an opportunity to benefit from and be productive in a liberal society. Lyon-Callo also argues a version of coercive inclusion, suggesting that 'helping practices' under neo-liberal regimes produce 'homeless subjects' and reiterate their denizen status.

Nonetheless, and as Huey (2007) affirms, the ascendance of late-modern governance has exacerbated problems of citizenship and place in the community (see also Lyon-Callo 2007; Schneider 2007; and Staehli and Thompson 1997). She argues that policing models that privilege collaborators create the category of denizen by separating those who cannot or will not collaborate with policing efforts. Staehli and Thompson similarly argue that these groups are accused of shirking their responsibilities as members of the community, and thus lose rights that derive from membership (ibid: 37).

Schneider elaborates on the late-modern structures that facilitate exclusion:

> In their calls for community mobilization, neo-liberal governments favour a "communitarian" approach that narrowly stresses the moral duty of individual citizens and communities to address local crime problems... [T]his neo-liberal crime control triumvirate ostensibly targets property crimes typically committed by the poor... [which] serves to divide communities between the so-called 'criminal class' and the law-abiding citizen. (2007: 183)

This late-modern definition of community also presents problems for counter-cultural groups whose deviance is by no means criminal, but nonetheless results in their being subject to exclusion. As Staehli and Thompson (1997: 31) write, "Countercultural groups

claim rights to occupy cultural space, yet they do not necessarily seek inclusion in the mainstream community that guarantees rights of access to citizens." Squeegee punks, homeless persons, and to a lesser degree, students and artists, who often do not maintain residence in an area for an extended period of time, can become excluded from the purportedly democratic decision-making processes promised by COP and related programs.

Halifax and the ECRM

The preceding discussion in this chapter remains as prelude to a discussion of the actually-existing reality of community-oriented policing in Halifax. The Enhanced Community Response Model (ECRM) represents many of these late-modern policing trends, particularly in its treatment and mobilization of communities, its focus on visibility as a central task of front-line police workers, and to some degree its de-centralization of police decision-making and setting of mandates and goals for a given area. However, the principles and framework of the ECRM, as we will see, can result in many different policing strategies, often in conflict with one another. While some of these strategies would properly be called neo-liberal or neo-conservative, other resulting strategies would not.

This disparity between the potentialities of neo-liberal programs and their observed realities occurs because the application of these reforms has to conform to local realities (Edwards and Hughes 2007). O'Malley (2001: 100) reminds us that not all activities of liberal governments are unmitigated steps toward neo-liberalism. Further, as Brenner and Theodore (2002) explain, neo-liberal reforms have a "path-dependent" quality. Thus, governance reforms, based on these principles, must conform, to some

degree, to pre-existing structures and local constraints, and must filter from national to local levels through relevant agencies and actors.

Edwards and Hughes (2007) have made a similar argument regarding 'community safety' promotion in the UK. The UK community safety movement in many ways parallels the ascendance of COP and zero-tolerance policing in the North American context, and the ideologies underpinning them can be used interchangeably. They argue:

> Again, the capacity of the concept of community safety to escape any neat and coherent association with any particular political rationale, like the difficulties of associating it with the function of regulating capital accumulation strategies, reiterates its polyvalence.

Likewise, I argue in this thesis that the implementation of the rhetoric of community policing can be bent toward virtually any policing tactic. This is not a novel argument in and of itself, and arguments of this kind have already been referenced in the preceding text. However, the comparative cases I reference from, for example, Huey (2007) and Edwards and Hughes (2007) on the implementation of 'community'-oriented projects are across districts, while my study focuses on a single district. This trend of taking the policing district as the object of measure began, perhaps, with Wilson's (1967) classic study, *Varieties of Police Behaviour*, and has been continued in modern scholarship (e.g. Liederback & Travis 2008). The ascendance of de-centralized and discretionary models, however, may require a more up-close examination to understand what is occurring at the front lines.

Thus, where others have identified differential implementation of similar policing models between policing districts, I have found significant differences within a district under a single policing model, and between adjacent neighbourhoods at that. Chapters 3 and 4 will examine how I reached this conclusion; the remainder of Chapter 2 will outline

some of the major mechanisms, social and political events that made this policing outcome possible.

Canada's most violent city

In 2005, the GSS victimization survey suggested that Halifax was, by incident per capita, the most violent city in Canada (Statistics Canada 2005). Halifax is regularly within the top 10 most violent Canadian cities by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data, and recent surveys place crime and violence at the top of citizens' concerns, which is a significant departure from the concerns of citizens in cities in other Atlantic provinces (see Table 2.1).

This concern with crime remains stable, despite a trending downward of actual incidence of street and property crime in Halifax for some time. Table 2.2, also taken from Clairmont 2008 (p. 13), illustrates the downward trend in violent and property crimes for a ten-year period. As a result of persistent concerns about crime, the Mayor's office commissioned a Roundtable discussion to address persistent violence problems in

Table 2.1 - *What is the single most important issue facing your community? (2007)*

HALIFAX		
Crime/Safety	**Traffic/Public Transportation**	**Environment**
27%	9%	9%
MONCTON		
Environment	**Taxation/Too Much Tax**	**Health Care**
11%	9%	8%
SAINT JOHN		
Environment	**Health Care**	**Unemployment**
12%	9%	9%

Source: The Urban Report, 2007, First Quarter. Corporate Research, in Clairmont 2008, p. 12.

October 2007, a process in which I was able to participate as a researcher and scribe.

The report produced by the Roundtable (Clairmont 2008) suggests that this stability in fear of crime is likely because, despite the lowered incidence of violent offences in Halifax, the nature of violent offences in Halifax remains disturbing to average citizens. For example, in November 2006, an American sailor was killed while trying to stop a fight in the Downtown entertainment district. The following summer, three teenage girls were apprehended by police after attacking a 60-year-old woman in a public park and assaulting her with metal table legs. Newspaper reports suggest that the practice of 'swarming' – where groups of teens and young adults attack random and unsuspecting individuals, for fun or profit – is once again a threat to citizens. These are the 'signal' crimes described earlier (Clairmont, ibid; see also Innes 2004), and while most Haligonians will never be victim to this type of activity, this type of violence causes more anxiety toward crime than do high reported rates of violence.

Both signal violence and persistent alcohol-related disturbances have been particularly damaging for the Downtown business and entertainment district. Signal crimes and general disorder in the downtown have left many Haligonians, especially those residing outside of Downtown, wary of going Downtown for fear of violent victimization or harassment. Further, intoxicated persons frequenting Downtown nighttime establishments cause disturbances and property damage on all nights of the week, victimizing business owners and residents of both Downtown and adjacent areas (Murphy and Giacomantonio 2008).

Table 2.2 - *Crime Trends in HRM (Adapted from Clairmont 2008)*

HALIFAX				
YEAR	**Violent Crime**		**Property Crime**	
	Rate	**Rank**	**Rate**	**Rank**
1997	1164	7	5794	6
1998	1016	9	6047	5
1999	1062	7	5914	5
2000	1094	7	5053	6
2001	1235	5	4915	7
2002	1297	5	4626	8
2003	1349	3	4805	8
2004	1360	3	5342	8
2005	1306	3	4883	8
2006	1261	5	4454	8

Violent and property crime, however, are not the only problems concerning Halifax; Halifax's relationship between its black and white populations, characterized by unofficial neighbourhood segregation, high socio-economic disparity, and forced ghettoization through housing projects has been likened to American race relations, which is a decidedly unfriendly comparison (McNeil 2005). Racial and socio-economic tension mark the experience of Haligonians, as rich and poor live in close geographic proximity, and rich and poor neighbourhoods are often, though not always, 'white' and 'black' neighbourhoods. According to Statistics Canada[10], Halifax is 92.5% white/non-visible minority, while 3.6% of the population identifies as black. Halifax Central Division (Figure 2.1), covering the Halifax peninsula and according generally to what was considered Halifax City pre-amalgamation is typically divided in terms of South, North, West and Central, where the South End is the affluent and largely white area, while the

[10]Accessed on Oct. 24/2008, at: http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/profiles/community/Details/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CSD&Code1=1209034&Geo2=PR&Code2=12&Data=Count&SearchText=halifax&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&B1=All&Custom=

North End, and particularly the Uniacke Square and Mulgrave Park areas, are considered black neighbourhoods. These areas are decidedly lower in socio-economic status than the South End, Central area, and parts of the West End.

Halifax is also the major destination of immigrants to Nova Scotia, claiming 41% of Nova Scotia's overall population and 61% of its immigrant population. Clairmont (2008: 20) reports that race and immigration-based crime rates are hard to determine, as these statistics are not part of most official reports on criminal incidents. While there appears to be a belief among Halifax's officials that the immigrant populations exhibit lower crime rates than the general population (ibid), both my experiences in the Roundtable process and my fieldwork suggest that city officials hold a much more pessimistic opinion of the native black populations of the HRM.

Despite this tension, Halifax is a city that has a traditionally high opinion of its police forces. Both internal HRP documents[11] and community surveys (Clairmont 2008) consistently place satisfaction with police at above 80% across communities, with little variation between neighbourhoods. Thus, majorities in both affluent and poor communities are happy with the work of the police, and are much more critical about the effectiveness of the rest of the Canadian Criminal Justice System (CCJS), such as the courts and the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which regularly come under fire from both local politicians and community members.

Halifax also houses a significant student population, with a community college, an art college, and three universities all within city limits. Students are a major driver of the local economy, as Halifax imports many of its students from out-of-province, and they are said to bring in as much as $300 million annually to Halifax (Clairmont 2008).

[11] APB (HRP newsletter) July 2008.

Students are not seen by police as serious crime perpetrators; however, because of their alcohol consumption, they can become victims of predatory crime, and are major contributors to minor disorder, property damage, and low-level violence such as bar fights. One of my participants estimated over $50,000 of tickets to students for noise, intoxication, and other public-order offences in the month of September 2007 alone.

Policing Halifax and the ECRM

Halifax boasts one of the largest police forces per capita in Canada (Stats Can Daily 16-11-2007), and presently has 495 sworn staff (senior management, sergeants, and constables), employed in various functions across 35 departments (HRP Website 2008-11-12). They are governed by the Board of Police Commissioners, which provides civilian oversight to policing activities in the HRM.

In 2006, HRP senior management began to implement the Enhanced Community Response Model of policing in the HRM. The ECRM emerged from what appears to be approximately five years of preliminary research by members of HRPS management in an effort to identify practices and policy models that could be implemented in HRP to address consistent community concerns. As stated in Chapter 1, this is the third major change to the policing administrative model in Halifax in the past two decades. In many ways, this new model replicates many facets of previous models; however, it also created a number of new community-oriented functions for the HRP that had previously been either absent from policing activities altogether, or were otherwise minor components of the mandate of the HRP.

These functions include the establishment of the Community Response Officer (CRO) position; increased utilization of foot patrols in targeted areas Uptown, Downtown, and in areas of Dartmouth; an augmentation of the Quick Response Unit, which in my

observations was described as a city-wide CRO unit; and a focused initiative on the Uptown/Uniacke area, the *Uniacke Square Safer and Stronger Community Project.* The model stresses community and external partnerships in community safety and efficacy in the Uptown area, while maintaining the HRP's central role in public safety provision. The ECRM document also outlines the particular responsibilities of pre-existing and newly-created HRP sworn staff positions in implementing the ECRM strategy. The document makes clear that the CROs and foot patrol officers are the cornerstone positions in the HRP's community agenda. The CRO position's description can be found at the end of this chapter.

Halifax is the only municipality in Canada to have both its own municipal force and a contracted police service through the RCMP. The HRP is responsible for urban core policing in the HRM, as well as the suburban areas just outside the urban core, known as the Sambro Loop and the Purcells Cove – Herring Cove Loop. The RCMP are responsible for all other areas of the HRM (HRP Website 2009-01-26). The HRP was created following the amalgamation of the municipalities of Halifax, Dartmouth, Bedford, and Halifax County (MacDonald 2006). Police service in the HRP's jurisdiction is divided across three divisions, West, Central, and East. The Central division, which is the area of concern to this study, is further subdivided into five patrol zones, as seen in Figure 2.1.

At the time of the study, patrol zones 1, 2 and 3, which are mixed residential/commercial and include the most affluent neighbourhoods and the major shopping plazas for the Halifax peninsula, were assigned one CRO to cover all three zones. Zone 5, the North End, which is primarily residential had one dedicated CRO. Zone 5 also houses a military base and a commercial/industrial area. However, the

military base is under the jurisdiction of the Military Police, and is not generally the concern of the HRP.

Figure 2.1 – Halifax Central Division – Adapted from HRPS Website



The Uptown area and the Downtown area are located in patrol zone 4, and Uptown has two dedicated CROs, while Downtown has one. Since the study has been completed, the HRPS has added two more CROs to the Bayers/Westwood housing project area in zone 3. As noted above, there are targeted beat patrols in the Uptown and Downtown areas, and there are bike patrol constables who patrol throughout the whole city. There is one beat, or foot patrol area, in Uptown, while there are three beats Downtown. Each beat has at least two constables on it at any time, 24 hours a day. Most beat patrol activities in the Central division are funded through a provincial initiative, and while beats are not a new policing strategy in Halifax, their current iteration has a particular relationship to the local political climate.

The return of Foot Patrol

The central focus of this study is the implementation of foot patrol and CRO activities in two neighbourhoods in the Halifax Central Division. It is important for the reader to understand that foot patrol is a very small component of the overall policing picture in Halifax, and most of what is commonly associated with police work – investigation, arrest, responding to calls, and so on – does not make up the bulk of the work of beat officers. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, foot patrol was interesting to me not because it would be exciting, but because it is all about visibility. As previously stated, foot patrol activities, like other late-modern policing trends, are intended to increase citizen confidence in and satisfaction with police activities, without necessarily directly decreasing criminal activity. This is by no means a policing secret or even a criticism; many authors, particularly in what is known as the 'reassurance policing' movement, argue that increased citizen confidence in police assists police in achieving their objectives, and is a necessary condition for police success (Edwards & Hughes 2007).

Foot patrols are also not new to HRM; once a standard fixture of policing in Halifax, the city had virtually eliminated its foot patrol activities in the 1980s in line with the kinds of neo-liberal reforms described earlier in the chapter. The current ECRM programme therefore includes a re-instatement of foot patrols in Halifax, and should be seen by the reader as a response to a problem of citizen perceptions of police efficacy in Halifax. The recent high-profile signal violent incidents, along with the longstanding problems related to alcohol consumption in Downtown, had mobilized a number of

communities[12] and media outlets to call for improvements to police service (Clairmont 2008), [13] and increased foot patrol was one of the HRP's responses.[14]

Again, however, it is important to keep in mind that foot patrols and CROs on their own are not generally either intended or expected to greatly affect crime rates, and are a small component of the overall parcel of policing services in the HRM. As we will see later, foot patrol is a useful tool in public order policing, as beat officers are more effective than other patrols at dealing with certain types of behaviours, particularly related to signs of disorder such as public drunkenness, open-air drug dealing, and panhandling. More importantly, foot patrol has an undeniable public-relations function, as it is among the most public and most highly-visible activities that a police service can engage in. Concurrently, the study is about the ways in which public order and public confidence are maintained by a late-modern police organization.

Conclusion

It is important to recognize that Halifax's newest policing administrative model has been developed not only through the local policy-making process but also through influence from a series of international governance trends affecting policing and other social services across the Anglo-Western world. This process has been ongoing for the better part of three decades, and is concurrent with the late-modern era. The ascendance of neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideologies in Anglo-western governance has resulted in significant changes to the ways in which citizens interact with the state, and COP and

[12] Incidentally, the two communities at the centre of this study – the Downtown business community and the Uptown residential community – are among the more vocal communities in all of HRM, and their actions generate media interest, which in turn fuels or fans issues of police confidence.
[13] These incidents also led to the development of vocal citizens groups, such as the Commons Watch and the Guardian Angels, who organized citizen patrols to deter criminal activity.
[14] For elaboration, see the message from the HRP Chief of Police at: http://www.halifax.ca/Police/Departments/chiefsmessage.html

broken-windows policing are the most influential policing ideas to have taken hold in this era.

Halifax's response to these trends, the ECRM, has been enacted on a city with a high rate of violent victimization and a history of racial tension, and was implemented on a large, well-established, and respected police force that had been facing a crisis of public confidence. In the remainder of this thesis, we will explore, through reference to my interviews and observations in the field, how the implementation of foot patrol activities under this new bureaucratic model has interacted with these pre-existing social factors, and what this interaction suggests about understanding policing in late modernity.

Figure 2.2 – Community Response Officer
Description adapted from ECRM document

Presently there are a number of Community Response Officers working out of the three Divisional offices, of which there are two types: **Foot Patrol** and **Flexible Patrol**. The **Foot Patrol CRO** (currently Uptown, Downtown HRM and North Dartmouth) are utilized in areas with a heavy concentration of pedestrian traffic, dense residential or business areas and/or communities with identified needs. The CRO is assigned to a smaller geographic area to facilitate a focussed one-on-one police-community interaction. They are required to be highly visible and accessible within their assigned communities. Their patrol can be augmented with the use of bicycles to extend their range but maintain their approachability within the community. The **Flexible Patrol CRO** has the same objectives but is responsible for a larger geographic area due to demographics, both in population and crime trends. They strategically combine foot and vehicle patrol tactics and are flexible enough to move from neighbourhood to neighbourhood and address community specific issues.

The CROs, with the exception of the Uptown Beat, North Dartmouth Beat and Downtown Beat detail which follow the 12-hour shift work schedule, are assigned to their respective Divisional office and report directly to the respective Divisional Commander. They work 80 hours bi-weekly as directed by the nature of community issues and crime patterns.
This strategy allows for consistent productive dialogue between the Zone officers and the CRO for the area. The CRO is responsible for identifying emergent community issues and effectively addressing these issues by:

- communicating the issue(s) to the Divisional Commander, Patrol members, HRP Support Service Units, other HRM business units, HRM Community Response Team, community leaders (formal/informal).
- developing and implementing problem solving strategies/responses focussed on early intervention and outcome oriented
- developing and maintaining a cooperative network of partners that will allow a multi-disciplinary response in the local community
- responding to general calls for service when not otherwise detailed
- providing information, as it relates to their respective neighbourhood, to Community Response and zone officers, and the divisional Crime Analyst.

When not assigned to or addressing a specific complaint, the CRO engages in routine patrol of their assigned areas to provide enhanced police visibility. This activity includes response to calls for service, special checks, foot patrol, and traffic enforcement etc.

As with the Zone Policing strategy, the objective of assigning a CRO to a specific area is to provide a consistent point of contact for the neighbourhood. This allows the CRO to become intimately familiar with historic and emergent community problems as well as crime patterns. A single point of contact also allows for the development of productive dialogue between Councillors, community leaders, and the general community. The CRO familiarity with a particular issue or problem area reduces the time from initial complaint to the development of an action plan. In initial addressing of a community complaint, the CRO implements the following decision model:

- initial assessment indicates that the problem is of a nature that individual intervention by the CRO is sufficient
- initial assessment indicates that additional police resources are required, at which point the CRO may make a decision to petition the Divisional Commander to request additional operational support resources

• when additional operational resources are required they may include but are not limited to Quick Response, GIS, Major Crime, Vice, Drugs, CRCP, and Traffic Services
• initial assessment indicates the need for a multi-business unit response at which point the CRO may contact the required support unit (a) directly, (b) through the Divisional Commander, (c) through the HRM Community Response Team.

The objective is to have the CRO position develop to the point where the CRO is capable individually of mobilizing the required resources to address a community issue/problem. At this point, service delivery will be positively impacted by the shortening of the time period from problem identification to problem solving. This end state is not automatic and will continue to take effort on the part of supervisory staff to encourage CROs to accept ownership of issues in their area of responsibility. The Divisional Commander and the Superintendent of Patrol will take steps to be aware of the activities of the CRO and determine if the officer is adequately resourced internally and externally to resolve the problem.

The CRO will be central in fostering a positive relationship between HRP and the diverse community. An integral component of the CRO will be to maintain continuous community contact with the various racial, religious, socio-economic and lifestyle zones of their community. This will involve regularly scheduled meetings (formal and informal) with community leaders. The CRO's efforts in this area shall be closely linked to the efforts of the HRP Diversity Coordinator.

Neighbourhood Watch is an integral part of this model insofar as promoting a sense of community partnership with the police. The CR/CP Section will continue to maintain responsibility for the development of Neighbourhood Watch instructional materials. Together, the CRO and CR/CP are tasked with the development and maintenance of Neighbourhood Watch, and are the primary police contacts for a Neighbourhood Watch Program in their area. The City Watch system remains one of the primary communication systems between the police service and the Neighbourhood Watch groups.

Nothing in the above strategy should be viewed as removing overall accountability for the response to issues in a Division from the Divisional Commander. The intent of this model is to promote issue ownership by the CRO to ensure timely, consistent, and appropriate response to community problems.

CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY

> Local political struggles over policies and practices of crime control involve a very complex and varying combination of elements that cannot be uncovered through a perusal of policy documents alone. General political strategies are filtered through the prism of, for example, local sensibilities of place... As we shall see, this applies to both lay citizens and professional networks.
> -Stenson and Edwards (2000: 74-5)

As noted at the outset of this paper, there has been sparse ethnographic data on front-line police work since the ascendance of late-modern policing managerial models such as COP or zero-tolerance. This is not to say that the field of police research has been stagnant in the interim; there has indeed been a good deal of research directed at, and increasingly by, police forces and policing institutions in the past quarter-century. However, few studies directly offer insight into what an officer undertaking community policing activities looks like, especially how policing under these new models compares to the traditional or bureaucratic forms of policing described in the classic ethnographies. It is my contention that a good deal of policing scholarship continues to rest on the assumption that police officers still engage in their daily routines in much the way described by, for example, van Maanen (1972), Ericson (1982) and Manning (1997). These accounts likely still offer insight into the nature of police work and culture, and give us a starting point from which we can gauge our expectations of what is happening in policing 'out there'. However, given the broad changes to policing in the past quarter-century described in Chapter 2, it is intuitive to suggest that policing today on the front-lines has transformed in some way as a result.

In this study, I intended to begin exploring the effects of emerging police policies on the ways in which patrol officers understand their work. I was comfortable from the outset with the possibility that I would find little difference between the police I observed

and the police I had read about. Nonetheless, as I still believe, with social institutions, especially those as central as police, it is imperative to regularly engage in research of their mundane and routine activities, even if only to confirm that things are as they were. Fortunately, my findings give me reason to believe some traditional assertions about police work do indeed need re-examination, which really gives you a reason to keep reading.

Observation and Interviews

I proposed my study to examine very broad questions about the nature of police patrol work today, such as, how do patrol officers view their work, what do they feel they are accomplishing or contributing to, and what does this suggest about the difference between policing now and policing a quarter-century ago? Given resource and time constraints, it was not practicable for me to attempt to replicate studies such as Ericson's (1982), which employed a team of researchers over a total of 349 separate shift observations, and in turn was capable of employing a systematic approach that produced both quantitative and qualitative data. Ericson's study remains perhaps the most comprehensive account of police patrol work in the North American context, and so it is not within the scope of my project to suggest a direct comparison between my findings and that study. However, a number of claims that appear in his work and other work from that era would hopefully come under scrutiny based on my observations.

To engage these questions, I decided to study the re-implementation of foot patrol in the HRM. The use of foot patrol by police forces is almost entirely about promoting police visibility, which speaks to the simulation mandate described in Chapter 2. For obvious reasons, neither foot patrol officers nor supervisory staff members expect foot patrol activities to result in a significant number of arrests, nor do they expect foot patrol

officers to attend as many calls for service as other patrol units. Reaction to crime and apprehension of criminals are the traditional activities of patrol constables, and thus foot patrol officers, at least within these new crime control technologies, represent something fundamentally different from the reactive police models of the mid-20th century.

Foot patrol was particularly interesting to me for a number of reasons. First, it is a central tool in both community and zero-tolerance policing, and is a stalwart of the best-practices literatures.[15] Second, prior to my study, it was not altogether clear to me what foot patrol officers actually do, and I could not find an account of it in current literature. Third, I was relatively confident that, of all of the types of officers that were employed by HRP in various functions, the activities of the foot patrol would be least likely to put me in danger or to expose me to sensitive information or activities that may reflect badly on the organization. I believed this because, in the first case, I had been told informally that foot patrol is largely the domain of young or inexperienced officers, that it is considered worse or less interesting than patrol or investigation work, and that foot patrols, due to their lack of available rapid transportation, are less effective as responders, and are therefore utilized less when dispatch receives a call for service. In short, foot patrol officers generally get significantly less 'action' than many other (although not all other) officers. While these claims were not entirely supported by my field research, they coloured my initial choice of a field site and participants. Further, since the activities of foot patrol officers are not only public in the legal sense, but also generally in public view, I felt that foot patrol work was not below the radar, in the way Ericson (1982) suggested,

[15] I make this assertion based on my experiences in 2007 on another research project, where I reviewed COPS problem-oriented policing strategies and other best-practices literatures on reducing crime in urban business districts. Foot patrol activities are regularly examined in these literatures as potential solutions to problems with public confidence in police, as well as providing an approachable police presence in areas where loitering, drug dealing, panhandling, and minor violence occur regularly (e.g. Chamard 2006, Scott and Dedel 2006).

and was therefore work that the HRP would not be worried about exposing to research activity.

Due to these factors, I believed that HRP would see little problem with me engaging in frequent observations over the summer months, when ride-along activities are usually suspended due to increased frequency of incidents. This was based on a simple assumption that, the less risky the activity, the more likely a risk-averse organization like a public police force would be to allow it. Since it was not important for me to see 'action' in the field (and, in fact, I was really in search of the mundane examples of 'community' police work), foot patrol suited my interests just fine.

I made contact with a HRP superintendent through my thesis supervisor and proposed walk-along activities, and the superintendent and later the chief approved the proposal. They put out notice of the study to all beat constables through the Halifax Central CROs, who in turn encouraged anyone interested to make contact with me. The CRO is, as previously discussed, also functionally a beat officer, although with a peculiar set of responsibilities. As participants made themselves available, it became increasingly clear that I would be studying CROs, and using data from observations of my regular and beat patrol participants as a mechanism to put the CRO's activities and comments into context.

I began my study with one CRO, who put me in contact with virtually all of my other participants. In total, I had eight officers – one supervisor and seven constables – participate in interviews, and all seven constables participated in observation over a total of nine shifts. All of the participant constables were beat officers either previously or at the time of the study. Only one constable was female, while the rest were male, and I

therefore cannot make any useful conclusions about comparative patrol realities of men and women officers.

It is also worth noting that all of my participants volunteered to participate. This almost certainly skewed the observations in the following way. Virtually everyone I walked with or otherwise observed noted that there were officers in the force who engaged in work avoidance of some sort, or were otherwise sub-par. This is very much in line with Ericson's (1982) findings on the presence of 'easing' behaviour and variable levels of effort among police workers. By their own and others' accounts, the officers who I observed were hard and competent workers, and appeared to generally represent above-average patrol officers whose intentions were in line with the new ECRM mandates. Further, the beat officers who I observed were all on foot patrol voluntarily, which may not be a consistent pattern, as many beat officers engage in foot patrol while waiting to be assigned to a car or other police work. Thus, the accounts of my participants suggest that my observations have omitted the presence of HRP officers who are not pulling their weight in either community or proactive police work.

As well, my participants ranged in experience from one year to over ten years, and ranged in age from early thirties to mid-forties, while some participants noted that the beat was generally reserved for the young and inexperienced, and thus my group is not likely age-representative. Finally, the relatively small group of participants[16] suggests

[16] While I had set and reached a minimum participant number of 8 before entering the field, as the study progressed I had hoped to secure increased participation from Uptown and Downtown beat officers. While others, including a business owner, Quality Control sergeants, and a school liaison officer had all expressed a willingness to participate and thus increase the sample size, this did not seem useful, as the study had become focused on Uptown and Downtown beat policing. The results of those potential observations and interviews would not likely have garnered much useful data for my emerging arguments. Unfortunately, I was unable to secure further beat officer participants in Uptown or Downtown; nonetheless, I feel confident that my claims regarding the existence of differential policing styles in the two neighbourhoods will stand up against scrutiny.

that there are likely a number of attitudes and approaches toward beat, zero-tolerance and community policing in the HRP that have not surfaced during my work. These gaps in knowledge could bear on the strength of my conclusions, and should therefore be kept in mind by the reader.

My observational methodology was developed in consultation with my thesis committee. Prior to my first field observation, I created a reminder sheet to review before each observation, to ensure that I was keeping an eye out for similar behaviours, comments, and encounters. The sheet can be seen at the end of this chapter (Figure 3.1).[17] The key themes identified in it remained generally useful and relevant throughout my observations, as is reflected in Chapter 4.

Once I had completed field observations with a participant officer – a process which is detailed in the next chapter – the participant and I would engage in an interview. This usually happened during a break, lunch, or some other convenient time, although it was sometimes necessary to do interviews in brief sections in public places, and even once during a ride in a squad car. My initial interviews were semi-structured, and loosely followed an outline that I had developed prior to my observations. This can also be seen by the reader at the end of this chapter (Figure 3.2).

However, unlike my 'key themes' sheet, my preliminary interview plan did not hold up as well in the field as I had hoped. A number of issues that I had assumed to be significant for police in Halifax were simply not a part of my participants' day-to-day realities, and in turn, as my observations continued, I was required to draft new questions based on my observations, often during observations or just prior to an interview, sometimes requiring a false washroom break on my part.

[17] I conceived of this research tool after reading MacDonald (2006), who used a similar strategy.

For example, violence in Halifax was a subject that I expected to be of interest to every participant, but this expectation was not met in my interviews and observations. Very few participants discussed violence spontaneously during walk-alongs or ride-alongs, and the reader should not take this as evidence of a lack of rapport between myself and my participants. Many participants often shared with me their candid opinions on race and racism, Tazer™-ing incidents,[18] drugs, street people, and so on. By my analysis, violence in Halifax would not be taboo as a topic of conversation, and they would have been free as participants to re-iterate the official HRP position that violence has been steadily declining in HRP for years.[19] However, they simply did not discuss it, because they did not experience Halifax as a particularly violent place, and certainly not violent in a noteworthy way.[20] Thus, when I inquired about violence in an interview, it was usually met with a strikingly similar dead end in conversation:

> I wouldn't say it's violent, no more violent than anywhere else. You're going to have issues and problems, you know, we deal with them as they come up, but you were walking with me for the last little while, you don't see random violence in your face. Things are going to happen and issues are going to arise but you know, we deal with them. It's no more violent than any other city.
> -Uptown Constable

[18] During my observations, there were a number of on-going investigations in Nova Scotia, as well as elsewhere in Canada and the US, that reflected negatively on the use of Tazer™ guns by police officers.

[19] See, for example, APB (find reference). As well, in an interview with a superintendent, the statistical position was consistently reinforced, which presents an interesting contrast with the comments of constables regarding statistics:

> "Crime was on a steady increase, or it was high, for, well, the last decade. 2007, which was our first full year of implementing these beat programs and the community response model, crime dipped significantly, and the first quarter of 2008 it's still dipping. So, crime is down, in particular violent crime, which is a major concern to everyone, and the other thing is that public satisfaction is up."
> -Supervisor

[20] Perhaps others in areas such as Halifax East would disagree, and this certainly does not suggest that all or even most HRP patrol officers do not feel Halifax is particularly violent. It does, however, suggest that beat patrol officers and particularly CROs in HRP rarely deal directly with interpersonal violence (although one may expect that night-time beat patrols in Downtown Halifax deal with alcohol-related violence, which Downtown participants suggested was minor or 'meaningless' and more annoying than concerning).

But as far as it being a violent city, I don't worry about it being any more violent than any other place. I know there's much worse places out there, that's, I don't worry about it too much.
-Downtown Constable

The stats from last year, all these reports, it's funny because, as much as we have all these people saying there's all these issues, you can look at numbers, you can make numbers say whatever you want, you already know that... The Commons, I look at the Commons, it's not that bad, we do have a few major assaults there.
-Downtown Constable

I don't think there's any more violence than anywhere else. I think that, it's all statistics-driven.
-Uptown Constable

In turn, in my later interviews, I limited my questions on violence[21] and focused more on community issues and policing styles. Other issues that were not significant in my observations were the Guardian Angels and Commons Watch, and The Mayor's Roundtable on Violence.

Before being observed or interviewed, each participant was given a consent form outlining the purpose of the study. The consent form can be found in the appendices of this document. A separate consent form was used each time I quoted an officer from an interview in the final thesis. Interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder and transcribed into Microsoft Word format, and no recording devices were used during field

[21] Although I always asked participants about their perceptions of violence, in later interviews I generally ceased my questioning on violence once the participant had indicated that violence was not a big issue. It is, of course, very interesting that many participants referred to 'statistics-driven' claims about violence as essentially fabrications of fact, but this issue was unfortunately out of the scope of the research.

observations. Field observations were recorded in a notebook, often during a break in activity. I made a point in my observations to avoid writing notes while participants were stating an opinion, in an effort to encourage candour. Similarly, I made a point to avoid writing notes during interactions with non-participants – shoppers, street people, other officers, arrestees, and so on – as those individuals had not given consent to participate in the study. In notes taken after an interaction with a non-participant, I would not record names or identifying details of the non-participant or the incident in my notes.

Further, since my study was not about crime in Halifax *per se*, I did not record many of the 'exciting' details of my observations. For example, as mentioned earlier, I was present during an investigation into a shooting that occurred in the patrol area that I was observing. However, details about the outcome of that incident will be absent from this report, as they are not germane to the issues that this report seeks to address.

Thus, all of the quotes in the following sections come from participants only. While non-participants often offered their opinions on policing in Halifax, there remains an ethical barrier to using these quotes in a verbatim manner. Nonetheless, the views and actions of those individuals who I came across during my observations, where they were both knowingly speaking to a researcher, and where their ideas or actions help to put the participants' statements or actions into better context, are reflected in certain places in this thesis.

It would be a mistake on the reader's part to continue through this text assuming that my observations and interactions during my field work were dispassionate. I hold a number of strong beliefs on the police, and that is certainly why I study policing. While at all times I took precautions to avoid inducing bias, reluctance or insincerity in the responses or activities of my participants, what I studied, how, and why were all guided

by principles that supersede a general thirst for knowledge, although this certainly played a part in my undertaking this research.

Incidentally, I believe that this is not just a good way for research to be done, but in fact the only way that it is done, as few research choices can ever truly be classified as 'neutral' or detached. As previously mentioned, this paper is influenced by Smith's (2005) institutional ethnographic method. In the remainder of this chapter, I will draw out the elements of her approach to standpoint ethnography that have been important to this study of policing.

Institutional Ethnography

Standpoint theories have developed as a critique of a sociological epistemology that privileges the researcher as 'knower' and people as objects of study (ibid: 9-10). Smith thus suggests that we cannot assume that studies that begin by focusing on the well-being of society or the state will have benefits for people. Sociology's task ought instead to be to understand the experiences of people that result from processes of rule and domination, and allow this evidence to aggregate into understanding the macro, instead of the other way around. She writes,

> "The problematic isn't discursively constructed from what is particular to an individual; it may well start in an individual's experience, but as it moves to explore the social relations in which that experience is embedded, it necessarily brings under scrutiny relations that aren't peculiar to that individual." (ibid: 41)

This methodology points out that it is more effective to understand a group by understanding it as an aggregation of individuals' experiences, as opposed to the traditional sociological method of understanding the experience of the group and filtering assumptions to the individual level. This methodology is also opposed to the practice of

approaching an individual as 'representative' of the group, and rests squarely in the idiographic tradition (Edwards and Hughes 2005) of sociological inquiry.

Standpoint epistemologies have traditionally been concerned with giving voice to oppressed, marginalized, or otherwise disempowered people. Initially a feminist approach to inquiry, standpoint techniques have been used also to demonstrate queer, black, labour, activist, and third-world experiences. Disappointingly, often in the approaches promoted by standpoint ethnographers there appears to be little space for an expression of the understandings and experiences of those who find themselves among the empowered, yet the core critiques that drove the development of standpoint ethnographies seem most relevant to a study of the powerful.

Believing this, I have attempted in this study to begin from the standpoint of front-line officers, who have historically engaged in policing as blue-collar work, even though they may in some instances be expanding or reinforcing an unjust state order. However, unlike traditional standpoint ethnographies, I have done this not to empower the particular participant group of the study, but rather to make the day-to-day reality of their work accessible to people who want to understand it so they can affect it.[22]

Despite many factors that make police institutions insular, the community era of policing presents novel opportunities for engaged citizens and activists to resist the potentially (and often materially) repressive policing activities of the past and perhaps change not only the attitudes of some officers but also of entire institutions. Public policing remains a fundamentally local activity, and social science that universalizes policing, police culture, or police politics does a disservice to those, like me, who believe

[22] Those who want to affect policing could of course be police officers, managers or administrators as well as laypeople and activists. This strategy is also suggested by George Smith, a "Political Activist Ethnographer" (in Smith, D. 2005; see also Smith, G. 2006).

that a police force is necessary in modern society, and not necessarily a necessary evil, so long as citizens remain actively knowledgeable about how police work and what they do. In turn, I have written this thesis in the hope that my contribution, however modest (and in some areas of the world, irrelevant), will shed light on some small but important details of Western policing in the late-modern era that have gone largely unexamined in recent scholarship.

Figure 3.1 – Key Themes for Observation

Halifax Police Walk-Along/Ride-Along Observation
Key themes – What to watch for

1. Purpose of Patrol

    a. Comments made about the **rationale for patrol activities**, including movement, stops, citizen and offender interactions
    b. Indication of **attitude toward utility of patrol activities**, position of patrol activities within the **hierarchy of police work**

2. Mapping of Patrol

    a. **Foot or car path travel patterns** – patterned vs. randomized, mandated or discretionary, wide or narrow within ostensible patrol area

3. Initiatives and new Mandates

    a. Comments made about **police Department Orders** or other **mandated police work** actions, regarding both patrol and other policing activities
    b. Comments made about **local political initiatives** such as Roundtable, Nunn, CPS, CYS, new officers
    c. Activities undertaken with direct reference to these mandates

4. Oversight mechanisms and Supervision

    a. References to or observed instances of **supervision of patrol activities**
    b. Comments made about supervision

5. Interaction outside of the Police Service

    a. Instances of officers' **interaction with any non-H.R.P.S. actors**
    b. Comments regarding **community groups or initiatives** – Commons Watch, Guardian Angels, Spring Garden Business Association, etc

6. The Problems

    a. References to individuals, groups, or processes that hinder the work of police or decrease the **quality of life in Halifax**
    b. References to acts of **violence occurring in public places**

Figure 3.2 – Preliminary Question Schedule

I have organized the questions under the following themes. As interviews will be semi-structured, questions and orders are not exact.

1. Motivations for joining
    a. Why did you want to become an officer?
    b. How did you choose HRPS?
    c. Do you expect to continue policing? With HRPS?

2. Understanding of recent events in Halifax
    a. Is violence increasing?
    b. If so, in what way? Who is involved? What are the causes?
    c. If not, is the perception of violence changing?
    d. How do you view the claims about violence in Halifax being made in the media? Are they accurate?

3. Understanding of recent policing initiatives
    a. How has your job changed since the death of Damon Crooks?
    b. What are the benefits of the local community policing model? What are its drawbacks?
    c. What do you think has been/could be accomplished by:
        i. The Mayor's Roundtable?
        ii. The provincial 'safe communities' initiative?
        iii. Increases to police budgets?
        iv. Commons Watch?
        v. Guardian Angels?

4. Role of police
    a. What can the HRPS do about issues of violence and safety?
    b. What is the HRPS doing currently?
    c. What should the HRPS do that it is not already doing?
    d. What obstacles are in the way of the HRPS's work?
    e. How have the new HRPS initiatives affected your work?

5. Role of community in policing activities
    a. What responsibility should community groups take for violence?
    b. What non-police groups should be involved in prevention? What role?
        i. Private security
        ii. Private business
        iii. Community groups
        iv. Individuals/Leaders/Parents
    c. Has the role of community changed in policing? For better or worse?
    d. Who have been the most significant non-police groups or individuals in Halifax in helping the police achieve their goals?

CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS

Field observation with participant officers generally consisted of either meeting up with them at the HRP station or being picked up at home by them or one of their associates in a police car and being driven to their beat area. Meetings at the station were generally just before or just after 'fall-in', which occurs twice daily – 6:45 a.m. and 6:45 p.m. Fall-in is the chance for patrol and beat constables to register their radio numbers for the day as well as any special equipment they will take on shift – Tazer™ guns, radar, and so on. The sergeant on duty also informs the patrol constables during fall-in about any particular issues that may have come up prior to the shift – particular persons at-large and 'arrestable'[23], or minor organizational directives or mandates that need to be carried out, such as special checks[24] on certain locations.

After fall-in, it was relatively common for the participant officer to suggest to me that s/he would try and find some interesting things for me to see. I made repeated attempts to clarify that their mundane activities were actually interesting to my work, and additional effort to make the shift a memorable one would actually hinder my research. It was admittedly hard to get this notion across to my participants without making them feel as though they were under a microscope or that I was waiting for them to perform some action that would prove some theory.

Thus, in most cases, when a participant suggested that there was something interesting to go see, I generally capitulated. Fortunately, there was rarely anything interesting that could be manufactured at the whim of the officer; as we will see later in

[23] This term means precisely what it says – that the individual in question can and should be arrested on sight, as a warrant has been issued for them. Their expected whereabouts are also communicated to the constables at this time.

[24] Since patrol officers are generally expected to check certain problem areas regularly, a check was only 'special' if it was irregular in some way (e.g., it was outside a particular person's patrol area but relevant to them, or it was a place that was an emergent persistent problem).

the chapter, much of the day-to-day reality of a beat officer and a CRO is generally considered 'make-work' by the officers themselves, a point to which I will return later in this chapter. Thus, even while the officers were on the lookout for something interesting to occur – and plenty of interesting things (read: "action!") did occur during my observations, including a shooting, a bank robbery, and a high-speed bicycle chase – they could not help but allow me a window into their overall approach to mundane police work.

In this chapter, I will look at some of the general aspects of policing in Halifax. The chapter examines six broad conceptual areas that generated significant data in interviews and fieldwork that also give us an insight both into the application of the ECRM in Halifax, as well as into the multiple meanings that 'community policing' takes on between districts. The areas are:

1. **The CRO** – Under this heading, I discuss the nature of the CRO position, and in particular the ways in which the CROs see themselves as different from general patrol or beat officers.
2. **The Beat** – This section will discuss the officer's perceptions of both the practice and utility of beat policing, as well as the ways in which they see beat policing as unique police work.
3. **Community Policing Strategy** – The characterizations of tactics, measures of success, and perceived goals of community policing by the officers. This section is perhaps the most significant in detailing the fundamental differences between Uptown and Downtown policing.
4. **Tickets and Public Order** – Ticketing was a tactic observed and discussed almost exclusively with my Downtown participants. This section will outline the

ways in which tickets are used by beat officers and CROs, which should add illustration to the differences between Downtown and Uptown discussed in the previous section.

5. **PR and 'Politicians'** – Virtually all officers made note of the Public Relations aspect of beat and community policing. This section discusses the ways in which this aspect of police work under the ECRM is perceived by participants.
6. **The Community** – This section engages participants' views regarding the community to which they are responsible – who are its members, where does it start and stop, and what is expected from the community to assist policing and public order efforts.

Examples illustrating these major thematic areas will be drawn from both field notes and interview quotations. All of the quotes will be given anonymously, and attributed to either an "Uptown Constable" or a "Downtown Constable" where appropriate. The sole participant who was from neither Uptown nor Downtown will be quoted as a "Downtown Constable", as this participant regularly crosses jurisdictions and partners with Downtown officers. In discussion, he maintained that his responsibilities are similar to those of Downtown constables, and believes the two areas are similar in policing approach. Classifying his comments as "Downtown" therefore appears to be the best approach to achieving clarity in expressing these results, and it is my belief that this analysis does not gloss over any significant points of difference between the policing strategies in the two patrol areas. Having established these terms of inquiry, let us move on to the areas of interest.

The CRO

> It's great for the community...you see people talking to you on a positive level as opposed to hiding away from you and not speaking and you know and they're coming to me with questions, not just related to police work... We need balance in arrests as well as community, but I think we can have a happy balance there... We have the time to stop and talk to people, whereas patrol does a great job but they're answering calls, they're answering immediate calls from call to call, where we are allowed to take a little extra time to talk to people and hear their story and kind of create that relationship and kind of follow through with it... So we're able to follow that a little bit extra.
>
> -Uptown Constable

As the job description in Chapter 2 suggests, the Community Response Officer appears to be a central figure in the setting of community policing strategies, methods, and goals in their particular area of responsibility. The CRO's work is set out in broad policy terms in the ECRM manual, and the CRO is generally conceived of as the first HRP point of contact for community members, especially for partnerships in addressing long-standing or persistent problems in a proactive way.[25] Community members, in this case, may be variably defined, and often achieve a variable rank-ordering for both beat officers and CROs – a tourist Downtown is certainly less a member of the community than a business owner, and a resident Uptown is probably more of a priority than a heroin addict using the local treatment centre but residing elsewhere. However, as the above quote suggests, the CRO is generally more likely than other officers to go the extra mile for anyone crossing their paths, so long as that person is in or near their zone.

While the CRO is a constable, and in a technical sense s/he is therefore of equal rank to other beat and patrol officers, s/he oversees and directs a good deal of the

[25] ECRM Manual, Appendix C.

'community' policing work in a given area. S/he is expected to be an information clearinghouse for fellow patrol officers, and appears to have influence on fellow officers regarding public order maintenance mandates. The CRO is also the one type of patrol officer who carries a dedicated cell phone at all times, and is therefore regularly in contact with City services such as waste disposal, parks, and social services, as well as community members. S/he can therefore call on services that deal with public order more efficiently than other constables, because of these connections.

Most patrol work, including the work of the CROs, is largely unsupervised. While patrol officers, including CROs, are required to file a written report on their daily activities to their supervising sergeants, the CROs regularly intimated in both interviews and observations that a good deal of their work remains undocumented in reports or elsewhere. CROs, in their own estimation, require a higher degree of autonomy than patrol officers, so that they can build trust-based relationships with community members. Thus, they will regularly withhold reporting of certain meetings or information from standard reporting formats[26], so that information they gain through their community role does not end up being used immediately by other divisions.[27]

For example, one CRO has a semi-monthly group of at-risk youths with whom he meets to discuss anything of importance to the youths, including criminal activity that they know of or have engaged in. He claims that the group adheres to a code of strict confidentiality – "what gets talked about in group, stays in group" – and this ethic appears regularly in many information-gathering aspects of CRO work.

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[26] Although they claim that they often will discuss this type of information informally with the Central division Staff Sergeant.

[27] If it is not immediately clear to the reader why this non-communication is important, imagine the consequences for a CRO's relationship to the community if information told in confidence led immediately to an arrest.

Of course, similar activities occur in regular source development work – clandestine or telephone meetings with citizens with valuable information – by patrol officers. I had a chance in my observations to be present at a few source-development meetings, and I also had opportunities to observe officers on patrol receiving tips about presently-occurring or imminent criminal activity.[28] My observations suggest that patrol officers develop sources with the explicit intent to use source information to further specific law enforcement ends, particularly in getting warrants or preventing specific crimes; in turn, the benefit for the patrol officer's source appears generally to be assistance or leniency from the police. On the other hand, CROs, especially in the Uptown area, develop sources so that they can better understand the community context in which they work, and so that they can take proactive measures, such as meeting with parents of at-risk youth. The sources for the CROs benefit by having someone they can call on if they find themselves in trouble, and in some cases by developing a partnership with the police for co-productive community safety activities.[29]

Policing and 'Hugging Babies'

This contrast between general patrol and CRO source-development work is indicative of the general conflict between those constables' attitudes that privilege 'real' police work, and those who believe that community engagement is important and is not just "hugging babies". "Hugging babies" and other similar (generally good-natured) epithets to community policing surfaced regularly in my observations. Both CROs and

[28] Unfortunately, the terms of my observation agreement with HRP does not allow me to give details on the content of my observations in these cases.

[29] This statement appeared to be equally true for the Uptown and Downtown CRO activities. The difference between the two districts was largely that the Uptown CRO sources were social service providers or citizens, while the downtown CRO sources were generally small business owners and managers.

other participants alike expressed the belief that CRO work is not 'traditional' police work:

> I don't go out and visit every shop, and I didn't when I was on the beat. I got hired and I want to be, not to say that they're not police officers, but I want to be the police officer who's charging people, making a lot of arrests, and investigating things. Maybe later on in my career when I'm on the wind down I might be interested in doing something along those lines but, you know, there are positions for that and I feel that those positions take care of that... I'm not going community, or, house to house and business to business ... again, that's what I feel [the CROs] can do.
> -Uptown Constable

> I'm born and bred patrol. I don't like to be in plainclothes, that's not my type of thing, I like to know my days off, I enjoy going out and answering calls and making arrests, that's me... I'm not a very good person to deal with communities, I know that about myself, I have no problem speaking with people but dealing with community issues is just not where I feel comfortable.
> -Downtown Constable

Part and parcel with the unsupervised nature of the CROs' work is a mandate that is ambiguous. This is not to say that the position is ineffective, but rather that it has unclear boundaries, expectations, and measures of success:

> It's never been 100% set in stone... there are no lines drawn, we sort of set our own [boundaries]. And sometimes we expand over into others' [districts], depending [on circumstances].
> -Downtown Constable

This procedural flexibility in the administration of the CRO position appears also to be connected to the ways in which CROs are selected for their position. Three of the four CROs I observed had been hand-picked by police management and previous CROs for

their position after having been judged appropriate for a community policing role. As we will see in the section discussing officers' community policing strategies, this selection and oversight process has implications in the community policing outcomes in different neighbourhoods. By selecting their community officers in this way and subsequently granting them greater autonomy than average constables, the HRP either deliberately or accidentally ensured that community policing strategies would be shaped primarily by the priorities of the person holding the CRO position.

CRO work, despite its 'baby-hugging' aspect, remains attractive to a number of officers, some of whom had never thought of themselves as the community-oriented type. This is in part because CROs work an 8-hour day, five-day week, where most officers work four days on, four days off, 12 hours per day. CROs regularly discussed the benefits of the CRO position for those with families in these terms:

> Most people, I think, it's the family life, it's having that regular 9-5, 8-4 job, so you can get home and spend time with your family.
> -Downtown Constable

However, CRO work brings with it a level of uncertainty about work life that is not present for other officers. CROs will often take on unpaid hours, for example to answer calls at home from community members or to attend a community event. Both CROs and beat officers suggested that the 'four-on-four-off' schedule was a benefit, because the working hours were set in stone, and officers could easily pick up extra-duty shifts and get overtime pay for court time, which can increase an officer's income by tens of thousands of dollars annually:

> There's pros and cons to what we're doing. I mean, we lose a lot of time off, because instead of working 4 on 4 off, I work 5 on 2 off. 8 hour day could easily be a 10 hour day, I get called at home, while I'm at home, my cell phone will ring,

> I answer it. Not everybody would do that, but probably most of us will, so there's a little difference there... Which is fine, but that's sort of what's going to be one of the drawbacks, is you lose some overtime.
> -Downtown Constable

CROs expressed an ownership for their area of responsibility, which appears to be common among officers, CRO and patrol alike, who have spent some time in an area. All participants agreed that this type of ownership was effective policing, as knowledge and ownership of an area by one officer was seen to increase the intelligence capacity of all officers on the street.

In my observations, the CROs were regularly utilized by other officers for information that could not be found in police records, such as where people of interest were from, who they hung out with, and so on. Conversely, all officers agreed that it was a problem that most officers on beat and many officers on car patrol had only been in their positions for a short period of time. For example, aside from the Downtown CRO, the most-experienced beat officer downtown has two years with HRP and one year of beat service, while most beat officers downtown have less than a year's total policing experience. Similarly, both the Uptown CROs and the Uptown beat officers have relatively short policing histories; as one Uptown patrol officer lamented during observations, when he entered the Service, it was not uncommon to meet constables who had been patrolling an area for ten years. These days, he suggests that five years in an area makes someone a senior authority. Another officer commented:

> I don't think it would work if you changed the beat officers up every year. I plan to stay on the beat for a long time. But if you change them up yearly...new guys get hired on and you're going to the beat right away. It's great for that new person to learn, but I don't think it's good for the model. You should have to know

> people downtown... I think beat officers should be guys with a few years on, before they even go out as a beat officer.
> -Downtown Constable

This discrepancy between what is seen as effective and what is actually done brings into question the utility of leaving community policing responsibilities largely in the hands of relatively inexperienced patrol officers. As we will see in the following sections, this does not necessarily result in policing that is either poor in quality or against the public interest; however, it does result in policing that is both variable and perceived as variable by the officers involved.

The Beat

> In the foot patrol it's twofold...you're challenged to find a balance between enforcement and proactive, or, community work. So they're enforcing the laws in the area, which will help to lead to a feeling of safety for people in the area, but they're also building relationships and partnerships with citizens, business owners, and other people in the area. So really what we want people to do on the foot, and it's community policing in general, it's getting to know people in the area, the good people and the bad people, get to know the area, make sure they get to know you, build those relationships so there's a better relationship between the public and the police.
> -Supervisor

> I'm not a politician. Community Response Model basically is, beat officers on the ground, boots on the ground, getting involved in the community. Showing the flag, getting involved, and that's what we're doing. And that's about as simple as I can make it.
> -Downtown Constable

As previously noted, the bulk of foot patrol work is self-directed or 'make-work'. While beat officers respond to calls where possible or convenient, they generally spend time

doing very simple activities such as being visible through walking or standing, chatting with citizens, and checking in on places and people that have been persistent public order problems, such as alleys frequented by homeless people. Daytime beats are done by solo officers, while night time beats are undertaken by two officers working together. As I was told in observations, this is apparently because one officer is thought to be approachable by the public, while two officers are considered intimidating. Thus, in the daytime, solo officers encourage citizens to chat, while at night time, a pair of officers will deter alcohol-related mischief.

Beat walking patterns do not follow a strict routine, although it would be unreasonable to say that they are random; instead, the participants were trying to remain visibly available to citizens as often as possible, while ensuring that most or all corners of their beat area got some attention during the course of their shift. Special events in their area, such as concerts, also understandably received special attention from beat constables. Without question, my participants were always on the lookout for 'action' – calls for service, arrestable persons or people in breach of sentencing conditions, or things 'out of place', from illegally parked cars to known troublemakers, reported or seen in their patrol area.

Perhaps it is fair to say that their primary goal is to be seen by the public, to 'show the flag' of the police. In terms of gross time spent during shifts, the visibility function for beat constables appears to far outweigh other functions such as deterring or detecting criminal activity. This high level of visibility is sometimes seen as getting in the way of police work.

For example, one of the duties of beat officers is to undertake 'stand-points' throughout their shift. A stand-point is an activity where an officer stands at a position on

the street that sees high levels of pedestrian traffic. Ostensibly, the officer is both making him or herself available to anyone who has a question or concern or needs police assistance, as well as keeping an eye out for suspicious activity. However, it was regularly suggested by officers during observations that it was highly unlikely that a beat officer would catch anyone in the act of committing a crime while on stand-point, since visibility of police is likely to deter visible crimes such as open-air drug dealing or graffiti 'tagging':

> We've asked a few times, can we even just do half a shift in plain clothes, just let me sit and watch out of uniform, because there's ten times more things going on. And [our supervisors say] no you can't because then you're not visible, and this is all about visibility. But, I could be solving problems on my street. For six hours of not wearing [my uniform], I could see what really goes on, and prove to myself what I already know.
>
> -Downtown Constable

The stand-point therefore has little direct law-enforcement value, although it does have a crime displacement[30] value.

The stand-point is also, incidentally, an administrative grey area for both constables and superior officers. While stand-points are an official duty of beat constables, my participants suggested that they generally do not report them during their shifts, as they do not want to be marked as unavailable by the dispatcher during the course of their stand-point. This is for a number of reasons – the officer wants to be able to attend any calls that may come up within walking distance, and the officer does not want superiors to see records of beat officers who are regularly listed as unavailable on

[30] Displacement activities are further elaborated in this chapter. Displacement here refers to encouraging criminals to engage in criminal acts in other areas (such as taking drug dealing off of main streets and to back alleys and houses).

the dispatcher's reports. This is clearly an absurd series of considerations, since a stand-point is actually a time when an officer is most available to citizens, as s/he is in a fixed location and highly visible. Nonetheless, this bureaucratic glitch has led to confusion on the beat regarding how and when beat constables should engage in and report stand-points.

As well, as previously noted, beat patrol is generally considered entry-level work, and while my participants probably represented some of the keener and more capable beat patrollers in the HRP, they were not immune to this recognition. They maintained, however, that it was a good thing to stick with beat work for an extended period, even when offered potentially more exciting work, such as car patrol, elsewhere:

> We've already gotten ourselves established, we know the projects we want to work on, we know the stuff that we want to do there, and it would be absolutely useless to the area if I just got in a car because I wanted to get in a car.
> -Downtown Constable

Beat patrols were seen as an important policing tool by all of my participants, and beat officers I observed, like CROs, expressed an ownership for their area and satisfaction with their work, even when it was not strictly 'policing':

> Six months ago we wouldn't be saying this, but we've taken ownership. Because this is our job, right? ... You'll notice a lot of those [things we do] are not actual police matters, it has nothing to do with the law...the way we look at it is, it's all urban decay. And if we don't say [something about it], who else is going to say it?
> -Downtown Constable

Keep in mind, of course, that my participants were generally keen about beat work. There are probably many beat officers who maintain a diminished enthusiasm for public-order maintenance and community work, and who would rather be doing more exciting

police work. Nonetheless, even those participants who acknowledged that community engagement is not their area of specialty recognized that foot patrol offers a certain type of interaction that complements other HRP activities:

> It's self-motivated work and that's the biggest difference. People see you out at all times. There is different respect for driving by in a car and walking by.
> -Uptown Constable

> In a car, you draw so much attention to yourself even by the traffic going by if you're on ... a main street... The crowd is going to instantly gather if you have your lights on or your sirens on, but if you're on foot you can confront somebody in a matter of seconds, and it's done with and nobody knew the difference.
> -Uptown Constable

Similarly, all participants recognized that the work of beat officers was fundamentally different from other police work, and needs to be conceived of differently in terms of measures of effectiveness:

> [Beat officers] shouldn't have the same requirements put on them ... that a regular patrol officer would have. It's just not feasible... If you're going to judge somebody by statistics, that's got to be different.
> -Downtown Constable

Overall, as with community policing generally, there appears to exist a paradoxical belief structure surrounding beat work. While all participants believed that the beats were useful – "The beat officers have been around, and they do work" – they were similarly unanimous that there was a side of beat work that was unsatisfactory to the average officer's disposition toward law enforcement, making arrests, and so on.

Community Policing Strategy

> Yeah, somebody's gotta do [it], and, that's what's called taking pride in your street, as far as moving street kids along, or making the street more presentable

so...people aren't all laying out on the sidewalk... it looks bad. You know, nobody's breaking the law, but it just looks bad, so that's part of the job. It isn't actual policing, no one's breaking the law, but you're trying to keep the street, I think it's relative order, that's what it is, just social order.
-Downtown Constable

Family issues are what we deal with mainly. Seems to be the underlying issue, whether that be food sources, food bank issues, or behaviour problems with children, or just between neighbours or relatives or things like that. Family issues are the biggest, and then drugs would be there. I guess drugs would take precedence over the whole area, but family issues for us as community officers, we're mainly dealing with, you know, youth and parents, and stuff like that.
-Uptown Constable

In the previous two sections, we have seen some of the similarities and general patterns that mark beat and community police work in the HRP context. In this section, we will begin to examine the differences that occur between districts in Halifax Central division, by contrasting the community policing strategies exhibited and discussed by the Downtown and the Uptown constables.

Zero Tolerance vs. Community-Oriented policing

The Downtown beat and CRO policing strategy can be characterized as 'zero tolerance' policing that emphasizes eliminating minor signs of general disorder. The majority of my time on patrol with both the CRO and the beat officers was spent dealing with panhandlers, street people and teenagers. These types of activities included telling panhandlers who were sitting down to stand up (as sitting violates a City by-law about impeding walkways), moving people along where their presence had become a disturbance, enforcing smoking bylaws in an effort to clear doorways and walkways, and engaging in 'staring contests' with groups of youths. Staring contests involve sitting or

standing at a visible distance from a group of known trouble-makers (generally youths) and writing notes in a notepad. When the youths realized that they were under surveillance, they would generally disperse.

Downtown beat work also included a significant amount of ticketing. This is both in response to unofficial encouragement from management – not precisely a quota, but rather positive recognition for those officers who are proficient ticketers. Also, and particularly in the case of parking tickets, ticketing often occurs in response to complaints by business owners about cars parked illegally in their lots or in front of their stores. This latter trigger for ticketing was looked on with disdain by downtown constables:

> We serve, I mean, I don't want to serve the business owners, I'm not there to serve them, we're there to serve everyone really.
> -Downtown Constable

In one case during my observations, we were stopped in the street by a business owner who wanted to see a particular car towed, as it had been parked illegally for some time in front of his establishment. Instead of towing it, however, we walked to a local open-air concert and asked them to announce the impending tow. The car's owner removed the car immediately, and while the business owner was frustrated that we let someone off the hook, the officers' felt their actions were in support of their broader community responsibilities.

Tickets Downtown were also given out or threatened for helmet violations for skateboards and bicycles. For those under 16 years old (and thus not ticketable), they were liable to have their skateboard or bicycle confiscated. The HRP had undertaken an initiative that summer to significantly increase ticketing on helmet violations in an effort to give teeth to a helmet bylaw that had been often ignored by Haligonians, especially

teens, since its recent inception. Thus, this type of ticketing was also commonplace downtown. Further ticketing strategies Downtown are described in the next section of the chapter.

On the other hand, ticketing in Uptown was virtually non-existent as an activity. As previously stated, the Uptown beat and CRO strategy can be described as a community-oriented policing strategy that emphasizes partnerships and interpersonal connections between residents, service providers, and police. Where the make-work projects downtown included keeping track of graffiti tags and ensuring that street people were not crowding walkways, constables Uptown regularly walked by people sitting on the street without comment, and in some cases even recommended to street people or addicts that they sit on the sidewalk when they were tired or stressed. Helmet and smoking violations were regularly overlooked, as were traffic and parking tickets. Constables regularly justified this non-enforcement as part of an effort to appear understanding and compassionate to community members.

The pet projects of constables Downtown and Uptown also reflect this difference in policing styles. In Downtown, one constable had made it his mission for the summer to enforce the helmet by-law; another had made street cleanliness a primary concern, and a third was interested in eliminating graffiti. In contrast, the Uptown CROs' projects included improving the conditions for staff at the local methadone clinic, participating in a community garden project with a group of at-risk teenage girls, and helping to plan and find supplies for a community festival.

As I will discuss in the next chapter, it would not be fair to suggest that the Downtown officers were avoiding the types of duties that the Uptown officers undertook. For example, there is no methadone clinic or community garden in the Downtown beats,

and so Downtown constables could not possibly do this type of work in some cases, even if they wanted to do it. Instead, a combination of bureaucratic constraints imposed by the ECRM and civic constraints imposed by the local area and residents in each patrol area has resulted in this differentiation.

Measures of Success

Another characteristic that differentiates Downtown and Uptown beats is the value placed on displacing criminal activity. Downtown constables regularly commented on successes they had had in removing criminal activities, particularly drug dealing, from public view in their patrol area. They understood that the activities would become a problem for another area of town. They also certainly believed that an ideal outcome would be to eliminate the activities altogether instead of merely moving those crimes to another area. However, where this was not possible, they were satisfied with displacement activities in the Downtown:

> We've taken it (drug dealing) out of the public eye, and now it's gone into the back lanes, it's gone into houses, things like that. So now what we do is, now we police the back lanes. So now we know, when we see that drug dealer going into a back lane, we're going to go follow him into the back lane, to try to solve that problem, and move it one block further. One block at a time. And that's how, if it takes me six months to move a problem one block, I've accomplished something, I'm still moving them along, eventually they're going to get fed up and move somewhere else.
> -Downtown Constable

> I've got, the streetkids that have been there, they've started to move along a little bit. We've bugged them, they're hanging out, and we keep moving them, moving them. After a while they're just getting fed up with us telling them to move. They know they have to move, but they're just getting fed up. And if we just keep

> going and going and going, eventually they're going to stop. Or they're going to go somewhere else. Sometimes all we're doing is taking the problem and moving it somewhere else.
> -Downtown Constable

> It doesn't eliminate the problem, but it does for that particular area, which is what I'm responsible for.
> -Downtown Constable

> Now, it's working, because when we get feedback from [our supervisors] and other people saying that, we're well-known down there now, things are getting a lot better down there, the drug deals are almost zero now on the street. They're going on still but other places, we have shop owners saying we're doing a good job, so, we're doing something right.
> -Downtown Constable

Another displacement technique that I observed in Downtown included getting people 'banned'. This strategy appears to work in the following way: if an individual – delinquent youth, vagrant panhandler, or otherwise suspected minor criminal – is becoming a nuisance to an area, in the opinion of a constable, the constable will talk to local business owners in an effort to build a case for a Protection of Property Act (PPA) order against that individual. A PPA order is akin to a restraining order, and requires the person to stay away from a particular place on pain of arrest. This order in turn gives a constable the grounds required to arrest these nuisance individuals in the future, and is intended to discourage their return to the area.

This type of displacement activity simply did not come up in observations or interviews as a significant day-to-day strategy for Uptown officers. This may or may not suggest a more compassionate approach by Uptown officers as compared to Downtown

officers, however. It may be the case that displacement is not a viable strategy for Uptown officers, since Downtown criminals generally live outside of Downtown, while Uptown criminals and trouble-makers are often Uptown residents as well. Further, as I have previously argued with regard to ticketing, Uptown officers have a greater stake in engagement with their local residents than their Downtown counterparts, which regularly inhibits their options in enforcing order.

Despite these constraints, it appeared in both interviews and observations that constables Uptown felt a level of ownership for the activities of 'their' residents and wanted to preside over the life changes of people who normally reside, or even simply regularly utilize social services, in their patrol area. In turn, they appear to measure success by the degree to which local area residents accept them as a part of the community, and the impacts they have had in the lives of their community members:

> If someone could talk to me on the street, and not worry about who's watching...that's the best thing that could happen. I'm not, some people are driven by crime statistics... but as a personal accomplishment, being able to come here, being able for someone to be able to call me up and tell me that they have some concerns about this or they want some information on how to get their GED or something like that and they feel comfortable approaching me, that in itself is a success there. Right, because it's a two-fold type of position, because not only are you here to protect and here to serve as well, and I think that goes in the same sort of thing as, I'm not a social worker, but at the same time too, just given the life experiences, you can help a lot of, you can help a person a lot.
> -Uptown Constable

> I would say involvement from the community, would be my way of measure. You know, if people are participating in the garden program that we're starting, if they're calling me with information or with their problems that they're having and

> feel comfortable talking to me about them, then I would say that I've been successful in creating a bond with the people in the community and, you know, or, maybe even some kind of a difference in someone's life. It may not be significant difference, but enough that maybe they're back to school or child care for someone while they're trying to go back to school and they're a young mother, single parent, want to go back to school, and we've connected them with community services, or they're making connections with people. So if someone can turn their life around and do something different in their life, then I think it's been successful.
>
> -Uptown Constable

This responsibility to help the disadvantaged in one's patrol area was not absent from participant Downtown constables. However, both the rationale that they employ when seeking help for an individual, and the institutional partnerships they utilize, are different from those of the Uptown participants. Uptown constables often act as a sort of triage to different social services, and the literature (e.g. Huey 2007) suggests that this 'social worker' role has been an historically consistent function of 'skid row' police.

> If a certain group of individuals or a person needs services from all different agencies then that kind of I consider what part of my job would be to get those services for that person, you know? And a little bit of what we're supposed to be doing, the mandate seems to be to connect to these agencies, it just seems to be the easiest way, is I have connections and I have relationships with people and we kind of bring them together and relay the message.
>
> -Uptown Constable

On the other hand, while the Downtown participants from time to time acted in the social worker role, the Downtown officers' partners in connecting people to social services are often business associations, where Uptown the partners were government social services, rehab clinics, and so on. Here we find another example suggesting that the Downtown

policing mandate emphasizes public order outcomes such as minimizing panhandling activity and facilitating business activity.

> We'll always have people on the street... But if we can eliminate, take two or three out of that group every six months of the year, there's three people, somewhere, that we've made a change in their life, helped move them along and gotten them back into what we consider mainstream society. They're working, they're no longer on the street, they're no longer trying to bum for money. The business association [says] every panhandler on the street they say hurts businesses. And, it's a perception thing, people asking for money. Even though they might not be aggressive, tourists don't like them.
> -Downtown Constable

> I mean society is broken into a lot of different groups, there are groups that absolutely don't want them down there, they're bums, they're disgusting, they're dirty and they're drug addicts. A lot of people think that. There's a group of people who think we should leave them alone because they're human beings and they need to grow and don't force society rules on them, right? And then there's us. We have to take a little bit of everything and apply it in equal measures kind of thing, and at the same time make sure streets are safe.
> -Downtown Constable

The business associations have recently been at the forefront of Halifax's Downtown-area diversionary programs for troubled youth and street people. For example, through a number of programs, the Spring Garden Road Business Association offers entry-level employment, skills training, and some housing assistance to those individuals who are persistently on the street downtown, and the Association's chairperson has regularly spoken out in local media sources calling for increased social services for those street people with mental illnesses. Downtown, social service provision therefore appears to be a largely privately-funded matter intended to facilitate conditions for business and

tourism, and responding to a gap in service left by government. Uptown's social services, on the other hand, include a number of public services, such as the Community Health Centre, the Dixon Community Centre, and partially grant-funded programs such as the needle exchange and the methadone clinic. The orientation of the Downtown social service programs thus represents another constraint on the options available to Downtown officers in policing their area.

Relationships with Business

As an extension of the Uptown-Downtown contrast in policing styles are the impacts and functions of businesses in the day-to-day actions of beat constables. The Uptown constables maintain a significantly different relationship with business owners and employees than Downtown constables. Both Uptown and Downtown beat constables deal with businesses on a day-to-day basis, but they build these relationships for different purposes. In both cases, police visibility remains the fundamental goal of making these connections. However, the approach employed by Downtown and Uptown participants differed in the level of knowledge they themselves sought about the lives and well-being of not only the businesses but the individuals involved in the businesses:

> You know, I try and get into the different stores and talk to the managers, you know, here I am, here's my card, what can I do, how are things going, what are the problems, what can we do to help. And we try and build those relationships. -Downtown Constable

> We have relationships with all of the businesses, but however, they don't seem to need our attention as much as individual people in the community. We kind of do more one-on-one or like small groups of people, as opposed to dealing with [a downtown business] where you go in and talk to the girl at the front desk, and give them your card, you know they're going to call you if they need something.

> Where, here, we kind of like to deal with each individual staff member to make sure that they're comfortable and they all have good experiences with the police and that their kids have all had good experiences with the police and try to make positive experiences for everyone involved.
> -Uptown Constable

My observations tended to confirm this difference. Where Downtown police officers would regularly know managers and owners, and made the connection with these individuals to give them the knowledge that the police were there to help with business-related issues (e.g., persistent vandalism, illegal parking, or loitering), the Uptown constables often knew personal details of both the employees and the owners of Uptown businesses (which are admittedly smaller, and often family-run establishments). These relationships were fostered in Uptown both to encourage partnerships in addressing persistent issues, as well as to develop further connections to the community.

Perceptions of the Other area

In my observations, I was initially alerted to the peculiar nature of policing Uptown while I was on my first Downtown beat walk-along. Both the Downtown and the Uptown participants agreed that the other patrol area each required different policing styles. Downtown was generally seen by my participants from both areas as a place where the 'community' policing aspect of police work included Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) considerations and minimization of signs of urban decay, where business owners and associations were the primary community contacts, and where the public by-and-large was receptive and happy to see police out on the street and accessible.

This characterization of downtown was verified in both my observations and interviews. Regarding public satisfaction, on more than one occasion, we were stopped

during our walk-alongs by citizens who wanted to make a point of letting the officers know how much they appreciated the officers' presence, and all of my downtown participants could recount many more stories of citizens who were elated to see beat cops return to Halifax. In turn, my beat participants Downtown suggested that they would much rather work in their area than walk a beat Uptown, as they were well-received Downtown and expressed an ownership of the area.

Similarly, all participants agreed to some degree that Uptown policing required the service of officers whose personality was able to let minor offences go unpunished, and who were willing to capitulate to the requests and needs of a community that was not always particularly cooperative or law-abiding.

> The downtown is hey, how are you doing, a lot of people are receptive to that, and [Uptown] we're still trying to break grounds, and I think we've come a tremendous pace from what the other officers have done previous to myself, where they are with the community.
> -Uptown Constable

I was constantly reminded of a phrase that an officer who had worked both Uptown and Downtown had coined: "Downtown, they wave at you with all five fingers." It is therefore probably no surprise that the previous Uptown CRO had been awarded the HRP "Officer of the Year" designation for his service; all Downtown participants regularly suggested that they would be discouraged by the day-to-day the type of work required by the Uptown beat, as it takes a great degree of patience and ability to deal with frustration. Interestingly, Uptown officers similarly suggested that they would not enjoy Downtown policing, as it does not allow as deep a connection to the community, and the persistent problems Downtown, particularly alcohol-related crime, were not considered satisfying work over a long period of time for the Uptown personalities.

> [Downtown] you're dealing with a business district, basically. You get your bars at night, you get your Spring Garden Road heavily busy, you've got all of your, basically, you've got either your people who come in there for work purposes or some type of business, and then they leave. [Uptown], these are people's lives... And it's family oriented, they're all connected, a lot of them are connected, they have family members here, and they're tightly knit. And it's hard to, you know, whether it's criminally or something socially, to be able to get your foot in that door to help or to enforce. And, you know, trying to be politically correct about it, it's just a different zone where it just takes time for you to get in there and really make a difference.
>
> -Uptown Constable

As previously discussed, ticketing is a tactic used Downtown to maintain public order, and the application of ticketing practices Downtown – compared to the comparatively miniscule use of ticketing in the Uptown – represents one of the most significant signs of difference between the two patrol areas. The next section of this chapter should help to elaborate the practice of ticketing Downtown, which should give the reader a clearer picture of the practice of public order maintenance in the business district.

Tickets and Public Order

Tickets are a staple of Downtown policing, and are a tool used for many policing ends. Most parking tickets are actually written by Commissionaires – a quasi-police service employed by the HRP to undertake administrative functions and minor policing activities at a fraction of the cost of fully-trained police officers. However, beat officers downtown also write a significant number of parking tickets, and also ticket for helmet violations, public drunkenness and other disorderly conduct, and smoking near doorways. They also ticket for by-laws such as blocking a sidewalk or illegally entering traffic, both of which are measures to discourage persistent or aggressive panhandling.

Tickets are also used to enforce public order generally, and ticketing for one offence may be used to deter another offence, or to achieve a public order goal that is not strictly a policing matter. For example, the smoking by-law is regularly enforced to clear spaces in front of businesses, and underage smoking can be used as a technique to execute a search on a teen suspected of possession of other substances:

> I take all of those other small acts that I can use to my advantage... any person under 19 cannot smoke cigarettes. There's no chargeable offence, but they're not allowed to smoke, so you can take their cigarettes. You take their cigarettes, now they have seven days to appeal it, after that, you destroy the cigarettes. It also gives us permission to search them. So, those are the things that we do for advantage.
>
> -Downtown Constable

Similarly, the Private Property Act can be used to keep unwanted people away from downtown generally. Recall the technique of getting someone 'banned'. If PPA orders have been served to an individual on the right combination of businesses downtown, it makes it virtually impossible for that individual to walk in downtown Halifax without at some point being in violation of one of their orders and thus at risk of fine or arrest. PPA and Park bylaws were also utilized by participants to discourage sleeping, drinking or gathering in public places after a certain time of night:

> Anybody that was standing around, sitting on benches past 10pm, I cleared them all out, they're not allowed in the park so we kicked them all out. And that's better than the regular occurrence, where, you go up and try to clear the park out, and what happens is, we leave, two hours later people come back in. We go, we try to clear it out as much as we can.
>
> -Downtown Constable

> How to use it to your advantage, how to enforce it, to use it to enforce other things, to keep the criminals off the streets, to keep the problems, order on the streets. For example, we use PPA for private property, we can also use it for public property if there's signage there... Most people think City property is automatically public, but it's still owned by the City, so it's not, if the signage is there, you can actually enforce it. So, we use that to our advantage, we use that at the skate park to ban repeat offenders.
> -Downtown Constable

Tickets and non-criminal offenses, such as failure to comply with conditions of a sentence, are also a way for officers to increase the penalty that an individual may receive for minor violations. For example, a number of the alcoholics downtown are under conditions to not be in possession of alcohol. Thus, if they are found publicly intoxicated, they may be subject to a fine for intoxication, as well as an increased sentence or jail time for failing to adhere to conditions:

> 95% of people who go to court also have tacked on failed to something, whatever conditions the judge let you go on you have no regards to, and you're still out committing crimes, so not only we're getting you with this new crime, but you failed to adhere to conditions.
> -Downtown Constable

One of the most interesting uses of tickets to increase the impact of arrest was recounted to me during my observations. At the time of the story, I was in the field with two constables, and we had just spent a few hours attempting to get two vehicles towed from a private lot. As it turns out, this requires a significant amount of paperwork, and this paperwork helps to explain why towing was rarely considered as an option by my participants. This story is outlined in my field notes:

> While we wait for a patrol van to show up, we discuss [public-order enforcement] tools further. [My two participants] ... talk about a recent bust down in the

> Uniacke (Uptown) area. Apparently, marijuana possession will often have very low fines, in the $80 area. However, during this bust, a known dealer was riding his bicycle ... without a helmet. He hopped [his bicycle] from the street to the sidewalk over a curb, and then threw his bike down. This gave officers an ability to ticket him for $600 for three traffic offences, whereas processing [the] possession [charge] would likely have resulted in a lower fine and higher court time.

There was not unanimity among participants about the necessity or utility of ticketing consistently. Some believed that it was important for Downtown constables to give a uniform message about loitering, helmets, smoking, and so on, and that a high level of enforcement would achieve the desired public order results. However, the dominant perspective in both Downtown and Uptown observations appeared to be that the threat of ticketing and ticketing were both equally effective tools:

> So every day that I'm on Spring Garden Road, any person I see, I haven't enforced it as a ticket yet, but I've put the message out there that if I see someone starting to light a cigarette, sorry, you can't smoke here...It hasn't eliminated the problem, but it's now controlled. What it controls is people hanging out in front of the...building, so that's a control mechanism.
> -Downtown Constable

> I don't need to write tickets, I'm not under any mandate to write tickets, I have no quota to fill, so I mean, if I can get the word out that, if the violations aren't noticeable, then the community's going to be happy and I've done my job.
> -Downtown Constable

While it has already been pointed out in previous sections, these strategies around ticketing, if employed in the Uptown area, would not be considered effective options. The threat or practice of ticketing, in the estimation of my Uptown participants, would

generally only serve to increase feelings of alienation between the community members and the police, particularly because many of those ticketed would not be able to pay the fine. My participants felt that common sentiments among Uptown area citizens regarding ticketing suggest that ticketing is not real police work, and more important issues, such as countering drug use, drug dealing, and related violence in the Uptown area, should be the policing priority.[31] In contrast, in Downtown, participants felt that it was necessary for police to give out a number of tickets for the both public and particularly the business owners to maintain confidence that the police are doing their jobs and serving their community. This difference in how a constable applies available policing tools requires that constables gauge community perceptions of policing activities, which is a civic constraint that my participants regularly referred to as 'politician' work.

PR and Politicians

> Part of being a beat officer or a bike officer is public relations. And I think it's an integral part of what we do... I guess, being in the [policing] field, I see through it, but most people think it's great.
> -Downtown Constable

> And it's tough as a police officer, especially in this role, because you're police, enforcement, slash, politician, you know, helpful hand, lean on, type of person, right? And that's why on my business card my phone is always on.
> -Uptown Constable

My participants exhibited a heavy degree of scepticism regarding their role as part of the public relations efforts of the HRP. The core assertion that community police officers were on some level 'politicians' was hard to pin down, in a definitional sense, particularly

[31] Incidentally, one of my participants who regularly deals with disorderly university students suggests that he also encounters this attitude when he is attending noise or public intoxication complaints.

in interviews. This is likely because the term 'politician' is to some degree an epithet about the nature of the work, similar to 'hugging babies'. It is also probably because being a 'politician' also means being 'politically correct', so it in turn amounts to a constraint on their public speech (and my interviews, in the participants' estimation, were probably considered public speech, despite my efforts to let them know that they did not have to consent to quote).

During observations and interviews, my participants generally reiterated a view of real police work as making arrests and fighting crime, and where police officers are not necessarily supposed to be likeable or public figures. Thus, during observation, most participants regularly disparaged work such as walking in parades and attending public events. However, the CRO participants, while disapproving of the 'politician' aspect of their jobs, nonetheless appeared to enjoy some of their public relations work, particularly when it afforded them an opportunity to speak to youths, at high schools, universities, summer camps, and so on. They consistently reiterated the theme that it is most important to connect with young people before they become afraid of the uniform:

> So, I just think you've got to get that message out, and build those relationships. I mean, you need the community, so let's start where we are. Let's start where police are human, before they become pigs, 5-0, right, po-po, whatever they refer to us. Get to them before that stage so that they realize we're working.
> -Downtown Constable

> I want to meet you, and then I want to go meet your family, and then I want to come into your house, so that if I ever have to come to you for some reason, or if you run across the police you're not afraid, you're not basing it on stereotypes and you've actually made a connection with a police officer on a positive level.
> -Uptown Constable

> Dealing with the kids, I think that's where my initial focus is right now because they're the next generation and I think they're the most open-minded, they're the most vulnerable to acceptability, and if they can get in and they can get used to seeing me then I can be here for a while.
> -Uptown Constable

Ericson (1982) suggested that front-line police work could generally avoid public scrutiny. However, my findings suggests that, at least in the work of beat constables and CROs, front-line police workers must take more care both in their statements and in their activities than they did a quarter-century ago. As one might expect, they are not particularly happy with this outcome. However, they also recognize that this aspect of their police work does have the capacity to help them build the trust they require in a given patrol area to be considered part of the community and thus to increase their effectiveness and partnerships in policing activities.

The Community

As outlined in Chapter 2, the concept of community in both sociology and policing is problematic at the best of times. By creating a conceptual community, the creator of the community necessarily excludes those who do not fit into their definition. In the Halifax context, this problem of community becomes salient in both the Downtown and Uptown experiences.

In Downtown, there are relatively few organized residents, and the only residents' organizations in the patrol area are those with shared property, such as condominium associations. There are many business owners, although many of them do not reside downtown. There are many patrons of downtown business, although most of them do not live in the area. There are students who go downtown to engage in drinking, and bring the trouble associated with alcohol consumption, such as noise and vandalism, back to

their residences and university neighbourhoods. There are street people who use social services in Uptown and elsewhere, but come downtown to panhandle. And, there are tourists, who may not have the slightest feelings of ownership toward the Downtown properties, but must be kept happy due to their contributions to the Downtown economy.

In this milieu, how does one define community? In turn, when seeking community partnerships, who can police turn to? My participants both Downtown and Uptown recognized this difficulty with the Downtown area. If we evaluate 'inclusion in the community' as a function of the responsiveness to needs that my participants granted to certain segments of the downtown milieu, we find a crude priority rank-ordering of people in the downtown area. My participants appeared to place businesses at the top of this hierarchy, daytime patrons a close second, and all others – bar patrons, street people, youths – become potential obstacles to peace and order. In response to this latter group of troublemakers, one participant noted that a common ironic interpretation of the 'community' in 'community response model' was little more than, "Get out of my community!"

As previously noted, the primary community contacts for police in the downtown area are private security forces, business associations, and business owners and managers. Business in turn appears to receive most of the police attention downtown, and beat officers are required to be responsive to their needs. However, the demands of business owners on beat and front-line officers was often seen as offensive by my participants, and the reader will recall earlier in the paper the following quote:

> We serve, I mean, I don't want to serve the business owners, I'm not there to serve them, we're there to serve everyone really.
> -Downtown Constable

Concurrently, my Downtown participants generally expressed that they were most satisfied when they contributed to the Downtown being a welcoming place for daytime and early-evening patrons and tourists. Patrons of downtown businesses rarely enter into policing partnerships, however, since there is no organized group of patrons that can be easily accessed for co-productive activities or to deal with persistent problems. In turn, the activities of 'stand-points' and walking the beat as a solo officer, while not effective criminal deterrents, appear to be the best ways to engage this portion of the community. Their attitude toward daytime patrons suggests that they believe Downtown is the property of Halifax, and therefore the City as a whole is the community that they serve. My Uptown participants shared this view of downtown – that a good deal of the work consisted of being visible and friendly with people who reside outside the area.

However, my participants generally extended this positive attitude to only daytime and some night-time patrons, and the remainder of those downtown were targets of suspicion at most times:

> The community, I deal with the business associations, that's my main objective, is to deal with the businesses. But … downtown changes pretty much at 6 p.m. Once the businesses are closed… you have a daytime atmosphere to a nighttime atmosphere, you have totally different issues from your daytime to your nighttime. -Downtown Constable

Bar patrons downtown, while a major economic contributor to the local economy, were seen by participants generally as a group from whom any member could emerge on any given night as a potential threat to order and public safety:

> Downtown Constable 1: I mean, you can have the nicest university girl in the world, and she can go downtown and get drunk and be the meanest nastiest thing you've ever seen, alcohol-fuelled, right? So…

Constable 2: I'm nodding my head on tape (laughter)

Constable 1: I mean, you take the nicest people, you feed them alcohol... someone's going to be Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.

The disorder caused by this aspect of policing downtown was seen to open the door to another, more significant threat, which includes groups of youth and local gangs who go downtown to look for trouble. The Downtown Constables describe these groups as violent, generally going downtown in large groups or driving around in cars looking for either other groups that may also want to fight, or helpless individuals to rob or assault with little fear of consequence.[32] They are also reputed to drive around looking for women to seduce into sex work. In the rank-ordering of Downtown community members, these individuals would appear at the absolute bottom, and the police Downtown are constantly seeking strategies to limit or eliminate the abilities of those involved or suspected of involvement in these activities from accessing Downtown. This characterization of these individuals, and promotion of exclusionary strategies, was also evident in the Roundtable discussions on Downtown violence.

Regarding street people and panhandlers, my Downtown participants expressed some ambiguity regarding their views on the appropriate treatment of these individuals. To a person, they oscillated from a position that suggested that street people were one of many competing interests Downtown who, since they were not breaking the law, must be

[32] It is worth noting a few things regarding this problem in Halifax. As noted in Chapter 2, there have been many well-publicized violent incidents involving 'swarming' near Downtown, or Downtown patrons otherwise being victimized by these groups. As well, while I was writing this thesis, I was witness to such an event while working at a restaurant on Pizza Corner, and I have been witness to others as a college student in the area. This threat to safety Downtown is therefore, at least to some degree, real in fact.

accorded their rights, to a position that suggested that, if my participants had the power, they would forcibly remove panhandlers from the area.

Perhaps surprisingly to some, my observations generally suggested that the former position was the one in practice. All of my Downtown participants had a rapport with the panhandlers and knew them by name. This, of course, has a surveillance and pre-crime function – if any of the street people ever become violent, go missing, or get involved in other criminal activity, the officers already know their name, description, and usually a good amount of their personal history. However, the participants also shared with me their stories about panhandlers and other street people with a level of compassion, and regularly had funny or interesting stories about the street people in their neighbourhoods. They also had, on occasion, sought help for these street people, although this appeared to be far less common Downtown than Uptown. Nonetheless, while Downtown panhandlers achieved a relatively low rung in the social order, and consequently experienced more harassment than aid from beat officers, they were nonetheless accorded a degree of respect and inclusion that was not present for drunk and disorderly downtown patrons, or for those violent predators that are seen to plague Halifax.

Uptown experiences less visitorship than Downtown, and participants therefore expressed less confusion about who is included in the Uptown community. All participants, when asked directly, defined their community geographically, which to me was an unexpected adherence to official policy:

> Uniacke Square, and the surrounding residences and businesses. Anywhere from Cogswell Street to North Street, north down to, west would be Agricola Street down to Barrington and Brunswick, so that whole diameter there. So everything in the box, we'd be in there.
> -Uptown Constable

However, as discussions continued, it became clear that participants' conceptions of community generally extended to those who were not physically resident in the area, but regularly or at one time resided in otherwise utilized the area. For example, one Uptown participant, after a shooting Downtown, suggested that they suspected it was one of 'our' people that was involved in the incident, meaning a member of the Uptown community had been part of a criminal act Downtown. This ownership of criminal activity occurring outside of the officer's patrol area did not appear to be a part of the Downtown policing reality.

> [The community that we serve is] anyone that either live[s] here and sometimes people will venture out, you know, there are some kids that did things... so they all went to Citadel (a local community centre outside of Uptown), so most of those kids are from this area. But they're working at Citadel. So we kind of try and keep a connection with them, because we'll have to have a connection with them back during school year. So we'll keep those kids. But it can be anyone that's in our area. Land-wise.
> -Uptown Constable

Uptown participants also had a different approach to the homeless and others who were 'local' but without a fixed address, such as regular users of shelters and services within the Uptown area, and there was virtually no observed behaviour or comments from participants that suggested a wish to remove the homeless from the neighbourhood. In fact, in meetings with operators of shelters and services that I had a chance to observe, these local social service users were often included in discussions about how police can best assist the goals of the social service providers and users. Again, this reiterates the non-displacement ethic observed in Uptown beat and community policing efforts, as Uptown was seen as 'home' to these individuals:

> We have a lot of the food banks and a lot of the soup kitchens are right here in our land area. A lot of the shelters in the winter time… all these places, they're all in our area, so you're going to have people migrate to this area because they can get all the means, all the food that they need.
> *CG: And then, downtown would be basically...*
> Downtown would be more of a, like a panhandling, kind of a work-place area.
> -Uptown Constable

Expectations from the community

> [The community] has to be [part of the solution]. If the problem is… a community issue, if it's a problem that is established in the community, you need the community to be part of the solution. You need every stakeholder in order for a successful conclusion. You can impact it with limited help from the community… but if you really want to tackle the problem you need everybody on board.
> -Downtown Constable

As Chapter 2 suggests, the confluence of nodal governance, the re-drawing of the social contract, and the ascendance of community policing models have placed expectations on citizens to aid in policing activities, and to undertake responsibilities that had previously been monopolized by the state. Halifax's ECRM has similar expectations, and in both Uptown and Downtown these expectations stem from the belief that, for policing to be effective, it needs the support and assistance of the community. However, as the previous analysis in this paper would suggest, the expectations in Downtown and Uptown exhibited important differences.

As the reader might assume, Downtown constables placed the majority of the responsibility for partnership and co-production of policing outcomes on the shoulders of business owners. In the views of participants, so long as retail businesses refused to 'target-harden' or take measures to discourage vandalism or other criminal activity

toward their businesses, or so long as bars and pubs continued to serve cheap drinks to over-intoxicated patrons, the Downtown would continue to have the problems that have been a consistent fixture in Halifax.

For example, I have mentioned a few times in this paper that I attended the scene of a shooting during my observations. The particular club at which the shooting took place was owned by a local businessman who did not employ a doorman or security staff. Those officers with whom I discussed the incident generally agreed that this was a problem he had brought on himself. Whereas most bars downtown employ a security staff that refuses entry to, or at least engages in weapons checks of, the type of element that may engage in deadly violence – the predatory gangs described earlier in this section – this particular business felt that this was unnecessary. In turn, these officers[33] suggested that this shooting at this particular location was no surprise, and held the owner at least partly responsible. In this way, this particular owner had violated the social contract, and had suffered the consequences.

Conversely, Downtown participants spoke well of those businesses that took steps to secure their properties through, for example, monitoring or blocking access to their back alleys, placing security cameras at their street entrance (which also was seen as aiding other nearby businesses and police efforts by providing surveillance), and regularly cleaning graffiti and other signs of disorder from their property.

Uptown conceptions of community obligations to police were clearly different from those Downtown. Primarily, Uptown officers felt that they needed to partner with local residents, residents groups, and social services to achieve their mandates, and business appeared to be a secondary partner in policing Uptown. Further, and more

[33] Along with other acquaintances who had frequented this club.

importantly, Uptown participants felt that they had a responsibility to earn this assistance, where Downtown participants felt that it was an obligation of businesses to assist in policing. This attitude toward the community appears to stem from the tenuous relationship between the police and residents Uptown. Participants felt that sustaining community partnerships there required an ongoing recognition of the shaky start of the Uptown community policing presence, and they felt that there was much to lose from pushing the community to assist police in areas where it was not willing.

> *CG: Who helps you get your job done?*
> Actually, who helps me get my job done should really be reversed. Like, how do I help these people get their job done really, that's the way it really should be... Say that's a home, and say that the home is not really receptive to police, but, [this officer], he's willing to help so, I know if I'm going to get into a situation, I can give him a shout.
> -Uptown Constable

> We went to Uniacke Square, first when we started a community office, they said we won't let you, we don't want you here. Even the tenants association said, wrote a letter, to the mayor, and chief, saying, we don't want the office...And now if we tried to move the office out of there, it would be an outcry. The short term pain, I guess, the long term gain... so we'll get that, from time to time, some people don't feel they want or need us.
> -Supervisor

Concurrently, Uptown participants maintained that there was a lot of work to be done by the HRP in securing community participation in policing activities before police could reasonably expect any person to assist their work. Due to the close proximity – either through relationships or geography – of most Uptown residents to criminal activity,

residents were seen by participants to be initially fearful of repercussions for assisting police efforts.

> I think the mentality has to be there, where I think it is there, it's just going to take time, more and more time, that they don't have to live in fear. So retaliations, repercussions, and that sort of thing. And I think that comes through with any area where... someone comes up and tries to progress the place forward and tries to make it a safer place... once you get that mentality there with everyone on board, then that would be a tremendous move forward.
> -Uptown Constable

Concurrently, all Uptown participants could recount stories of times where they had unwittingly put a resident into a bad situation by talking to them in public, and as a result would be subject to public shows of disrespect or disregard by that resident. Uptown participants perceived that local residents regularly had to save face in these situations, and understood that the treatment they would receive in public versus in private from most residents would be very different. This type of tactic speaks again to the particular policing style required Uptown; many officers would be unwilling to be disrespected in this way, and yet both Downtown and Uptown participants saw it as a requirement of Uptown policing.

Toward an understanding of Multiple Mandates

The findings of this study have suggested that two fundamentally different approaches to policing exist in very close geographical proximity to one another, even though both of these approaches exist under the same bureaucratic policy structure. To understand this outcome, we should examine the factors described above – the bureaucratic constraints of the ECRM, the civic constraints of the demands of residents and users of the geographical regions of Uptown and Downtown, and the personal approaches employed by CROs and

beat officers in these areas – as mediating factors (Edwards 2008) in creating these disparate policing outcomes.

In the final chapter of this thesis, I will situate this examination the HRP policing model in the wider debates about the reality of front-line policing in late modernity, by suggesting that an accurate picture of policing requires an examination of these mediating factors in understanding how policing philosophies translate into policing outcomes.

CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION

Interpreting multiple models of policing

In this last chapter of the thesis, I will present two main arguments regarding the results of this research, both of which have been prefaced by comments earlier in the paper. The first, and most fundamental argument, is that Halifax, under the ECRM, exhibits two fundamentally different policing approaches between two adjacent neighbourhoods. That Uptown is a COP model of policing, while Downtown is a zero-tolerance approach, is evident in both my interviews and observations. That these differences can exist within a single district, I argue, suggests that traditional studies that take the policing district as the unit of analysis will miss some important information about the outcomes of late-modern policing models on front-line policing.

From this, I make my second argument – that policing outcomes should be seen as a result of mediation between the bureaucratic and civic constraints facing front-line officers. Through these constraints, officers will enact available technologies of crime control based on their personal style. This is not a novel argument – as previously stated, many other authors have argued that local politics in one way or another impact the way policing is done. However, again, in this thesis I am not taking the HRM as the relevant unit of political context, although it certainly had an impact in the formation of the local bureaucratic constraints of the ECRM. Rather, I am taking the civic constraints of the Uptown and the Downtown as separate sets of influences on separate sets of officers, and I argue that an adequate analysis of the effects of these kinds of local social conditions will be increasingly relevant in assessing the impacts and implementation of late-modern policing technologies.

In the final section of this chapter, I will discuss directions for future research based on these findings. I will argue that, while the results of this research appear to make a persuasive argument for the appropriateness of the policing methods observed Uptown and Downtown, the reader must keep in mind that virtually all of this research comes from the perspectives of community-focused constables, and a more complete analysis requires an understanding of how both included and excluded citizens and communities interpret the situation. By extension, I argue that this research potentially supports Klockars (1988) claim, referenced below, that community policing is primarily a tactic to 'mystify' the purposes and tactics of police. The implementation of police models that officially endorse high levels of front-line officer discretion does not necessarily result in better policing outcomes, and better understanding the views and experiences of the communities being policed in this study is essential to comprehending the results of these policing strategies.

Zero-tolerance and Community Policing

Inclusionary and exclusionary practices in both the Uptown and Downtown suggest that citizens in HRM are being treated differentially by HRP constables, not only based on personal characteristics such as criminal record, drug use or resident status, but also based on which street they find themselves on at a given moment. However, it would be facile to conclude from the preceding chapter that the variegated policing outcomes being experienced in different areas of Halifax could easily be reconciled or brought in line with one another. Some readers may perceive a problem of fairness in the administration of justice upon observing these policing outcomes, as fairness in liberal governance is generally associated with equal treatment by the state.

However, the reader must keep in mind that community policing activities emerged in the Anglo-Western world largely in response to a crisis of legitimacy in public policing, and by some accounts, the most significant goal of this type of late modern policing is to maintain legitimacy and consent in the eyes of those policed. In turn, to remain legitimate in each of these adjacent areas, constables in each area perceive, probably accurately, that they must engage in significantly different activities from the other area.

The civic and bureaucratic constraints of the HRM and ECRM as set out in Chapter 2 of this thesis provide the boundaries through which these policing outcomes should therefore be evaluated. By my analysis, it appears that the general community policing strategies applied in the Downtown and Uptown areas can be understood when one examines the demands of the community, the present mandates of the HRP, and the policing possibilities outlined in the ECRM. In turn, to maintain legitimacy, police are bound by more than recourse to procedural justice when employing their discretion.

Consequently, while the 'broken windows' style of policing employed in the Downtown patrol area has, in broad academic and policy critiques, been called an ineffective policing strategy, this is, in my opinion, a narrow view of the concept of effectiveness, and an overestimation of the possible policing alternatives in a central business district. Similarly, those who would want to see the community-oriented policing model in Uptown expanded to other areas of the city, or those who wish it were more punitive and repressive, have also misjudged the potential for policing outcomes in a low-income high-crime area.

At the moment, it will be useful to re-establish the differences between zero-tolerance and community policing and demonstrate the reasons that I have concluded that

they apply respectively to the Downtown and Uptown patrol areas in Halifax Central. It has been noted earlier in this paper that late-modern policing strategies escape neat definitions. However, Greene (2000) provides a decent starting point for categorizing these different policing approaches, and it will suffice for the purposes of this paper.

Zero-tolerance or broken-windows policing is characterized by a focus on controlling public-order problems in an effort to eliminate higher-order criminality. Based in the work of Wilson and Kelling, zero-tolerance or 'broken windows' policing is a proactive policing strategy utilizing criminal, civil and administrative laws to minimize visible low-level disorder, such as graffiti, open-air drug dealing, panhandling, public intoxication, and groups of youth in public places. In zero-tolerance policing, officer discretion is constrained by these public-order mandates, limiting officer discretion to ensure that minor disorder remains controlled. Community involvement in police agenda-setting is 'low and passive' under this model.

Community policing is also a proactive strategy, and also utilizes multiple modes of law to achieve desired results.[34] However, this model of policing focuses on 'community building' activities to limit serious crime in a given area. These activities include partnerships between police and other community groups; developing 'community-based' intelligence; connecting community groups and individuals to other resources, both public and private; and reduction of fear through 'reassurance' activities. Community involvement in police agenda-setting under this model is 'high and active'.

In Chapter Four, there were obvious instances where community policing strategies were being used Downtown, as Downtown participants were seen to partner

[34] This is to be contrasted with 'Traditional' (Greene 2000) forms of policing, which primarily use criminal law to achieve their ends.

with local, albeit business-oriented, community groups; as well, they discussed helping street people get access to social services. However, recall that I also observed beat officers Downtown regularly enforcing minor public order offences under direction from the CRO, through ticketing or warning for helmet violations, smoking in prohibited areas, and blocking the sidewalk. I further found that police Downtown rarely interact with residents' groups, and they encourage co-productive security measures for businesses such as target-hardening and maintaining records on local homeless persons. Patrol officers Downtown admitted that they consider it a success if they displace criminal activity from their patrol area to elsewhere in the HRM, and during my observations we regularly moved people 'along', although to no specific place. Thus, while we must recognize the path-dependent nature of these policing reforms, we can confidently assert that a mediated version of the zero-tolerance policing model is being employed in Halifax's downtown, at least by the participants I observed.

In contrast, while walking along with officers Uptown, I observed virtually zero enforcement of helmet or smoking by-law infractions. Official sanction in the form of ticket or arrest was used rarely, and avoided when possible. The policing style in Uptown would properly be referred to as community policing, and it is far more lenient on low-level criminal violations than the Downtown approach. Police Uptown regularly interact with residents' groups and social service providers, and co-produce neighbourhood projects such as a community garden and help to distribute charity goods such as furniture, food and housewares. Co-productive security measures encouraged by Uptown officers include meetings with at-risk youths and their parents in partnerships with other local programs. As well, contrasting the Downtown displacement-as-success ethos, Uptown officers were seen to take ownership of criminal activity from 'their' locals, even when

the actual crimes take place outside of Uptown.[35] These differences are summarized in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 – Comparison of Zero-tolerance and COP strategies in Uptown and Downtown

Social Interaction or Structural Dimension	**Zero Tolerance Policing**	**Downtown Examples**	**Community-Oriented Policing**	**Uptown Examples**
Focus of Policing	Order Problem	- Panhandling - Street Youth - Alcohol-related issues	Community building through crime prevention	- Community Office - Community Garden/Parenting Centre partnership
Forms of Intervention	Proactive, uses civil, criminal, and administrative law	- Ticketing - PPA orders - 'Banning'	Proactive, uses civil, criminal, and administrative law	- Meetings with at risk youth&parents - Regular contact w/local social service providers
Range of Police Activity	Narrow – location and behaviour focused	- CPTED interventions - Stand-points	Broad crime, order, fear, and quality-of-life focused	- Co-production of community festivals - Community and business drop-ins
Level of Discretion at Line level	Low, but primarily accountable to police administration	-High enforcement of public order offences	High and accountable to the community and local commanders	- Non-enforcement of public order offences
Locus of Decision-making	Police-directed, some linkage to other agencies where necessary	- Partnerships with Spring Garden Rd. Business Assoc. etc - Regular contact w private security -No partnership w/ residential assoc's	Community-police co-production, joint responsibility and assessment	- Co-productive partners include service providers, community leaders, even marginalized community members

Adapted from Greene 2000: 13

There are constant debates in both best-practices and academic circles regarding which of these models is most appropriate or effective, and there is a good deal of critical literature aimed at the claims of proponents of either model. Chapter Two outlined a number of the arguments against zero-tolerance policing – it encourages punitive policing, marginalization of the already marginal, and neo-conservative ideologies in law enforcement. Community policing is also subject to criticism; particularly, it has been claimed that community policing efforts invent communities to whom they subsequently

[35] A version of this passage also appears in Giacomantonio (forthcoming).

provide exclusive service. These critics argue that COP models are designed to create consent from imagined populations, so that police may continue to operate without scrutiny; as Klockars (1988, in Greene 2000) suggest, COP is an approach to policing "whose purpose is to conceal, mystify, and legitimate police distribution of nonnegotiable coercive force."

An historical weakness of much of the debate over how policing is done is, as noted in Chapter 1, that the policing district is taken as the unit of analysis for inquiry into the differences and different outcomes of particular policing styles. However, as we have seen in the Halifax example, a single policing policy model has facilitated the application of zero-tolerance policing in one area, and community-oriented policing in an adjacent district. While this would not appear surprising to residents of both areas – as I have argued earlier in this paper, transplanting the COP mandate onto Downtown, or the zero-tolerance approach Uptown would be damaging to either area – this possibility of multiple mandates is not currently prominent in debates about what occurs within policing models.

This is not to say that present or past policing scholarship does not recognize the importance of local conditions in shaping policing outcomes. Both classic and contemporary research suggests that, for example, 'political context' (Murphy and Clarke 2005), local demands (Huey 2007), 'local political culture' and government type (Wilson 1967, Liederbach & Travis 2008), and similar factors impact on the mediation between police policy and front-line actions. What this study has shown, however, is that it is important to move past the local administrative district – municipality, city, or town – as the unit of analysis, to understand the impact of policing policies under particular local conditions. While this micro-level research may not have been necessary at a time in

police history when most police organizations were organized in similar bureaucratic style, as decentralized and proactive policing models proliferate, the constraints placed on front-line police officers will become more and more neighbourhood-specific.

Indeed, Wilson recognized the need for local observation at the end of his classic work:

> This exercise has also confirmed the judgement offered in the beginning of this study – that a full explanation of police style requires first hand observation of the behaviour of the police in order to discover what the style is. (1967: 277)

I therefore propose that this variability between local conditions within a single district be taken into account in analyses of potential outcomes of policing models. This argument should not be limited to zero-tolerance and COP models, and should be applicable to any policing administrative approach. The following is not a value judgement about the appropriateness of establishing these policing mandates in the Halifax setting; rather, it is an analysis that attempts to make sense of the constraints that have created particular policing results in the Halifax Central division.

Bureaucratic and Civic Constraints

Chapter 2 outlined the general bureaucratic constraints of the ECRM. For the purposes of this essay, 'bureaucratic constraints' may be considered those official actions of government, either in written policy or in daily orders to constables that limit a constable's options in achieving a particular policing outcome. For example, the CRO's mandate to maintain community relationships limits a CRO's abilities to engage in more traditional police work. Similarly, a beat patrol constable's requirement to engage in stand-points is a bureaucratic constraint on the likelihood that s/he will observe criminal activities leading to arrests.

However, outside of these constraints, there remains a good deal of officer discretion, and therefore a particular officer's policing style impacts his or her policing outcomes. For instance, a constable has choices regarding frequency and severity of ticketing activities, and has a number of options available in order-maintenance activities. In any given interaction with a citizen who has broken a law or by-law, the constable has the choice of being friendly or threatening; to give an official sanction or to let someone off with a warning; to record their information into police records, or to let them remain below the radar; and, in some cases, to arrest or to release a person or persons.

These choices are certainly made with consideration to a number of personal factors particular to the officer. For example, my observations took place in the summer, and I therefore had a chance to discuss the downside of walking in warm weather with a mandatory flak jacket and nylon clothing (there is, unsurprisingly, a big downside). Thus, on hot and uncomfortable days, many participants admitted that they may be likely to treat an individual more harshly than if it were cooler outside, simply because of the mood that the weather had put them in. Similarly, as has been noted elsewhere (e.g. Ericson 1982), officers' preconceptions about the individual they are dealing with will impact the treatment that person receives.

However, these types of factors cannot fully explain the differences between policing Uptown and Downtown. Many similar problems – related to drugs, homelessness, and juvenile delinquency – can be found in both districts, and yet constables in different districts consistently mobilize different strategies to controlling these problems. The other bureaucratic constraint that therefore appears to be relevant here is the HRP's selection of certain constables for certain areas. Recalling that Downtown and Uptown participants were selected for their beat or CRO roles by HRP

management, and participants admitted they were not interested in policing the 'other' area, we can see that personal policing style is something that is purposefully aggregated by the police management to encourage particular policing outcomes in particular places. Thus, choosing patient officers who want to be personally connected to residents for Uptown patrols, while choosing zero-tolerance oriented constables for the Downtown, is an important point to recognize in understanding the genesis of the policing approaches employed in each area.

Let me reiterate that these choices by management are not arbitrary. The perceived realities of citizen life and civic priorities in Uptown and Downtown also shapes both the selection of constables for an area, and the actions those constables can reasonably take in a given situation. Uptown and Downtown are two very different communities, both in the estimation of the police, and in fact. They differ in virtually all demographic categories. Downtown is the central business district of Halifax, which takes in hundreds of thousands of visitors annually, and whose persistent problems stem largely from homelessness and over-consumption of alcohol by Downtown patrons, while Uptown is a poor residential district faced with a history of racial tension and social problems such as family issues, drugs and related violence, and poverty. While they are geographically proximate, these differential civic constraints figure centrally into policing strategies.

Huey (2007) argues that communities get the policing they want. What she means by this assertion is that communities, where communities exist through the interaction of governmental conceptions of community and citizen actions to establish leadership or presence, assert a vision of crime control outcomes. These visions are shaped by available legal constraints, but this nonetheless presents a relatively wide spectrum from

which the community can exercise some level of agency in producing the policing it becomes subject to.

In Downtown, the priorities of the community are set by businesses, in response to the demands of Downtown patrons. Downtown constables are therefore under pressure to literally keep everyone happy, since virtually all of Halifax, and a significant amount of the rest of the world – tourists, students, and so on – use and contribute financially to Downtown. In this situation, it is hard to imagine a police force being employed to facilitate the involvement of those who live in or frequent the area but do not contribute financially, such as the homeless, youth, violent gangs, and the overly-intoxicated. Participants Downtown believed that other sections of society – the private sector, social services, and so on – ought to be predominantly responsible for providing opportunities to these marginal groups, as the HRP cannot rectify this mandate with their fundamental order-maintenance responsibilities in Downtown.

This approach to policing is founded in the officers' beliefs about who the relevant community is, and the officers' estimation of that community's wants and needs. While this approach to policing relies on officer (and, in some cases, police supervisory) analysis of the situation, there is little reason to believe anything other than the majority of the Downtown 'community' is happy with increased public-order policing, and would likely remain satisfied with even higher enforcement.

As previously argued, Uptown policing has many different constraints on its enforcement. Fundamentally, participants estimated that a very high percentage of the residents in their area were either involved in criminal activity or closely related to those who were. High levels of enforcement in this area, especially against minor violations and public-order offences, would result in increasing alienation between citizens and

police. The presence of known criminal activity in the area, particularly around the methadone clinic and needle exchange, was a stressor on participants' abilities to achieve law-enforcement outcomes. However, by letting smaller offences go unpunished, Uptown participants were able to establish a rapport with community members, businesses, and service providers, so that larger problems in the community – family and social breakdowns, at-risk youth, and so on – could be addressed more effectively. In contrast to Downtown, there is little reason to believe that many residents Uptown would want to see increased public-order policing, and in fact, some Uptown residents continue to contend that Uptown policing is presently too punitive. Concurrently, it is more cogent to believe that policing in both areas is shaped by the constraints placed on officers by the communities that they[36] (or their superiors) answer to.

Multiple Mandates – A conceptual model

The preceding is not an argument that the policing style Uptown is 'right' for Uptown, or that Downtown (or central business districts generally) can only be policed by a zero-tolerance model. Instead, this is an argument that says that the types of circumstances perceived by constables and the HRP organization Uptown will result in different policing ethics, approaches, and outcomes than those resulting from the circumstances found Downtown, especially in a policing model such as the ECRM that emphasizes 'make-work', proactivity and officer discretion.

Resultantly, front-line officers under this type of model can variably mobilize available technologies of crime control (Stenson and Edwards 2000). They retain the

[36] While the findings in this study remain ambiguous regarding whether the front-line constable or their supervisor is more answerable to the public for the constable's actions, this is immaterial. What is important is to recognize that the public, now perhaps more than ever, have a say in the way policing is evaluated.

discretion to utilize punitive sovereignty technologies – those zero-tolerance approaches, such as ticketing or harassment for minor offences and disorderly activities, as well as selective use of arrest for public order violations. They may also act through community security technologies, by holding meetings with community members, at-risk children, or service providers, 'hugging babies', or any other tactic to secure community consent. Their choice to engage in these tactics is mitigated by their personal policing style and their assessment of the community's demands.

This mediating process may be conceptualized, as in Figure 5.1, in the following way. The first, and potentially most important, constraint on police activities is the civic constraints that occur in the form of public opinion, historical events, and neighbourhood demographics and circumstances. These factors limit the reasonable potential strategies for policing a given area, and therefore influence the development of the police administrative model. The resulting bureaucratic constraints of police administration further limit the available technologies of crime control in that area, and from these available technologies, the front-line officer's personal style dictates which approach is best suited to a given situation[37] at a given time. In the figure, where the wishes of the community overlap with the possibilities dictated by the policing model, we find the potential appropriate policing tactics for a given situation. Where these overlap with the tactics that suit the officer's style, we find the technologies of crime control available to the officer. The greater the amount of overlap, the more options are available to a patrol officer for achieving desired ends; where there is less overlap, the officer and organization are more constrained in selecting strategies, and where there is no overlap,

[37] In this conception, a 'situation' may be a particular criminal event or a persistent criminal or non-criminal order problem.

the officer's style or the bureaucratic model may not be suited to the situation or patrol area.

Figure 5.1 – Conceptual model of Policing Strategy Formation



This is an iterative process, of course; returning to the Halifax example, as the HRP readily admit, they are ever-fine-tuning the ECRM to suit the needs of Halifax's different neighbourhoods.[38] Thus, particular officer's (and particularly CRO's) choices or styles may in turn elicit community response, which may cause changes in bureaucratic actions (in the forms of department orders, re-assignment to different areas of the city, and so on), which will place new limits on the options available to front-line patrol constables. Further research will be required to understand the degree to which this conceptual model applies in other districts and neighbourhoods, especially since this research focused on a particular – and very community-oriented – sub-set of police officers.

[38] See, again, the HRP Chief's Message online (supra).

For the moment, considering late-modern policing as a mobilization of clusters of 'technologies' appears to explain the situation more accurately than the attempts in academic and best-practices literatures to classify policing by district-level activities. By making the focus of our inquiry the policing district, we obfuscate the particularities and hybridities that are a necessary outcome of the unique combination of civic and bureaucratic constraints that will impact the implementation of any policing model. Concurrently, to discuss the 'consequences' of either the broken-windows or COP policing technologies as something stable across districts overlooks the possibility that, in a given district, many technologies may be present, and each technology will have different consequences in different areas.

Further, where each technology is applied, it is not necessarily done as either a top-down or a grassroots measure. In most cases, it appears that HRPS management have facilitated particular policing outcomes in particular areas, suggesting a top-down approach. Conversely, as we have seen through this analysis, the relevant 'communities' in both Downtown and Uptown have either initially requested or come to reiterate the call for the particular policing approach applied in their area. Huey, referenced above, has claimed that a community gets the policing it wants. If we accept the notion that uniform application of police discretion across populations and communities is not the paramount outcome of a just administration of policing services, we must also accept that it is not necessarily problematic that different technologies of policing are applied differentially.

However, this is not to disregard the issue of justice in police administration. Rather, it is an argument that the police as such are not the administrators of justice, but instead that police constables by and large perform their functions in response to constraints and demands from both their management and their communities. While it is

possible that this results in different outcomes for different communities, this may only be a problem if these outcomes are unjust for the particular community. In the case of Halifax, we can see how the application of the Downtown policing technologies would be unjust in the Uptown, and vice-versa. Concurrently, we can also see how a blanket application of one technology or the other across the HRM would produce a policing model that would challenge both the legitimacy and efficacy of the HRP, and seriously inhibit the ability of police foot patrol constables to fulfill their fundamental functions, which in all districts is fundamentally to promote the appearance of safety and police accessibility.

This is not a purely relativist argument, either; there are necessary limits on available actions within police discretion that are put in place by the bureaucratic constraints of a police administrative system, alongside, of course, the available legal protections of the rights of the individual. Critics of this new order in policing are right to point out that high levels of officer discretion without the proper constraints presents a number of potential risks to justice. However, the constrained nature of police action suggests that changes to the actual potential outcomes of the interaction between civic, bureaucratic and officer style constraints cannot come from policy documents alone, and must address the locally-existing conditions that shape the realities of front-line policing in late modernity.

Directions for future research

It is important for the reader to recognize the things that we cannot conclude from this study. First and foremost, as previously stated, we cannot conclude that the outcomes I observed in the HRM under the Enhance Community Response Model were objectively 'right' or appropriate for those patrol areas. We can conclude that the officers employing

them generally did so with good reason and in direct recognition of their perception of community needs. However, this does not necessarily equate to these observed practices being just, effective, or appropriate.

To better understand how these practices affect the community and produce positive or negative outcomes for citizens, it would be necessary to engage in discussions and research with both the included and excluded communities in Uptown and Downtown to see how they interpret these strategies. This would include discussions with the communities revealed through this study as relevant to police agenda-setting, such as business owners, business patrons, residents, social service providers, and service users. As well, a more complete understanding of the effects of these policing strategies would require investigation into the existence and experiences of communities that are marginal to the agenda-setting of the HRP, which would likely include youth and especially at-risk youth, as well as low-level criminals and criminal service users, such as drug dealers, addicts, 'johns', prostitutes and pimps. Lastly, as the study's participants were primarily foot patrol officers with under five years' experience, a more complete study would include research with other police officers employed in different functions within the HRP organization.

By understanding the experiences of not only those in the police organization, but also those citizens who are subject and witness to police strategies (the 'community', broadly conceived), we could begin to understand whether or not these community-oriented strategies of late modernity are in fact an effort to make policing more responsive and democratic, or whether they serve largely or entirely to mystify and legitimize the use of coercive force by the state.

Moments in my research suggested that the former argument holds water, as the constables I observed were regularly and spontaneously congratulated for the efforts by average citizens, both Uptown and Downtown. As well, available metrics of community attitudes suggest that community connection to and satisfaction with the HRP have all increased since the adoption of the ECRM. However, as most of the available data is filtered through institutional channels – official surveys, officer self-selection for participation in research, and so on – the reader may safely retain some scepticism regarding the utility and purpose of these policing strategies until these important gaps in knowledge have been resolved.

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APPENDIX A - RESEARCH CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Securing the Commons – Policing and Public Safety: the Changing Mandate in Halifax

Introduction

We invite you to take part in a research study being conducted by Chris Giacomantonio who is a graduate student at Dalhousie University, as part of his requirements for the Master of Arts in Sociology. Your participation in this study is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time. Your employment performance evaluation will not be affected by whether or not you participate. The study is described below. This description tells you about the risks, inconvenience, or discomfort which you might experience. Participating in the study might not benefit you, but we might learn things that will benefit others. You should discuss any questions you have about this study with Chris Giacomantonio.

Purpose of the Study

This study seeks to understand how police officers in Halifax, Nova Scotia, understand their work on a day to day basis, especially in light of recent reported increases in violent victimization in Halifax Regional Municipality. It also seeks to understand what impacts recent local government and policing initiatives have had on the way officers' view their work. Lastly, it seeks to understand what role officers feel is appropriate for the police service, especially with regard to policing activities undertaken by people who are not police officers, such as community volunteers and private security guards.

Study Design

The research will be conducted solely by Chris Giacomantonio (the Principal Investigator). The Principal Investigator will accompany Halifax Regional Police Service constables as they undertake their day-to-day patrol activities. The Principal Investigator will spend four (4) to six (6) four-hour shifts with each constable who agrees to participate. After the patrol shifts are completed, the Principal Investigator will interview each constable that has agreed to participate, and each interview will last between one (1) to two (2) hours. After this research has been completed, the interviews and observations will be analysed by the Principal Investigator, and a report will be written about the Principal Investigator's findings.

Who can Participate in the Study

You are eligible to participate in this study if you are a constable with the Halifax Regional Police Service who currently engages in patrol work with the HRPS, and if your participation has been approved by your relevant supervising officer.

Who will be Conducting the Research

This research will be conducted solely by the Principal Investigator, Chris Giacomantonio.

What you will be asked to do

All participants will be asked to accommodate the presence of the Principal Investigator for four (4) to six (6) shifts of four hours each as the participant undertakes his or her regular patrol and other duties as an HRPS officer. This will include accommodating his presence in car patrol and foot patrol activities, as well as his questions regarding the work that he is observing.

Participants will also be asked to partake in a one (1) to two (2) hour audiotaped interview with the Principal Investigator after the patrol shifts have been completed. This interview will be done at a private location at Dalhousie University, or may be completed at a location of mutual agreement between the participant and the Principal Investigator.

Participants are under no obligation to answer any particular question.

Possible Risks and Discomforts

Participants face minimal risk of physical or psychological harm from participation in this study, and no more harm than they would risk through normally accommodating a citizen presence, such as in the HRPS ride-along program.

Possible Benefits

It is not anticipated that participants in this study should receive any direct personal benefit for their participation. This study is intended to benefit the research and policy community more generally by creating new knowledge about policing practices, which may improve policing policies and practices in the future.

Compensation and Reimbursement

Participants will not receive compensation for their participation in this study. Participants are not expected to incur any additional costs due to their participation in this study, and will therefore not receive reimbursements from this study.

Confidentiality and Anonymity

All information gathered by the Principal Investigator during his observations of participants during their work will be recorded in handwritten notes. These notes will then be scanned and translated into Microsoft Word documents, which will be kept on the Principal Investigator's home computer under password protection.

Interviews with participants will be audiotaped. The taped interviews will then be re-recorded in a digital audio format. Interviews will also be transcribed into Microsoft Word documents. The digital audio and Word documents will be kept on the Principal Investigator's home computer under password protection.

All information gathered in this study will be treated confidentially. No other participants, their supervisors, other researchers, or any other persons other than the Principal Investigator will have access to the Principal Investigator's notes, interview audiotapes, or interview transcripts. Should this information be subpoenaed in any future court proceedings, the Principal Investigator will surrender this information. After the final report has been completed, all information will be kept securely in electronic format in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Dalhousie University for five years, at which point it will be destroyed, in line with University policies.

All notes and interviews will be recorded anonymously. This means that participants names and personal information will be absent from all final transcripts of interviews of observations. The final report will also be written without reference to information that could identify any participant. Should the final report find it useful to directly quote any participant, the Principal

Investigator will seek explicit permission from the participant for any quote longer than one sentence or including any remark that may identify the participant to his or her fellow officers or other acquaintances. No names or personal information of participants will be included in the final report.

Participants should be aware that their participation in the study is likely to be known to their fellow officers and supervisors. While the Principal Investigator will take all reasonable efforts to ensure that the participants' personal views cannot be identified in the final report, each participant faces the risk of fellow officers attributing quotes or ideas to them, whether or not these ideas are in fact those held by the participant. Participants thus face a possible risk of tension in the workplace as a result of participation.

Final Report

Before the final report is completed, participants will be given an opportunity to view a late draft of the report, and will be able to communicate comments and concerns about the report to the Principal Investigator. These comments will be taken into consideration before the final report is released; however, final authority regarding the report's content rests with the Principal Investigator. The final report will be submitted as a Master's Thesis to the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Dalhousie University, and modified versions of the report may appear in academic and other publications.

Questions

Any questions that participants may have about the study may direct them to Chris Giacomantonio at (902) 220-1344, or by email at ch451698@dal.ca

Problems or Concerns

If you have any difficulties with, or wish to voice concern about, any aspect of your participation in this study, you may contact Patricia Lindley, Director of Dalhousie University's Office of Human Research Ethics Administration, for assistance at (902) 494-1462, patricia.lindley@dal.ca

Signature Page

General Consent

I have read the explanation about this study. I have been given the opportunity to discuss it and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent to take part in this study. However I realize that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time.

Name (Please Print) _____

Signature _____

Date _____

Consent to Audiotape

I hereby consent to having my interview with the Principal Investigator audiotaped, and to having this audiotape recorded and transcribed into digital format, to be securely stored by the Principal Investigator for five years.

Name (Please Print) _____

Signature _____

Date _____

Consent to Quote
(A new form will be used each time consent to quote is sought from a participant)

I hereby consent to the use of the following quote(s) to be included without reference to my name or any of my personal information in the final report of this study:

[insert quote(s) here]

I affirm that this is indeed a quote from me that arose during my participation in this study.

Name (Please Print) _____

Signature _____

Date _____