An Examination of the Destabilizing Impact of the United Nations International Civilian Police Mission in Kosovo

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
IN
CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT

We accept this thesis as conforming
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August 2005

Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-35414-8
Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-35414-8

ABSTRACT

Currently, United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL) participates in 13 different missions around the globe. Following the end of hostilities in 1999 between Serbian Security Forces and the ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army in the former Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo, CIVPOL, have played an invaluable role in the reconstruction of law and order in Kosovo. Unfortunately, these CIVPOL have unwittingly destabilized this fragile, post-conflict environment. Entrusted to bring law and order to an extremely complex and often violent post-conflict environment, CIVPOL work without any standard organizational policing philosophy to guide their efforts. As a result, no common approach to conflict resolution exists when dealing with the population of Kosovo, increasing the incidence of conflicts between the CIVPOL and the population they serve. This research project studies the aforementioned phenomenon with an aim to create an awareness of the shortcomings of the CIVPOL within the United Nations Mission in Kosovo.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The inspiration for my major project ultimately came from my day-to-day monitoring of the post-arrest violence on behalf of United Nations Security in Kosovo. My involvement allowed me to have an intimate association with UNMIK Police officers at all levels in the chain of command, as well as with various stakeholders in the Kosovo-Albanian (K-A) population.

I gratefully acknowledge the dedicated men and women of the UNMIK Police who assisted and supported me with this project. I offer my sincerest appreciation for their frankness and desire to assist me throughout the long completion of this project. Special appreciation is also extended to the individual K-A respondents who graciously shared their often-tragic experiences in an effort to create, for me, a better understanding of the shared trauma and history of the local K-A population. These interviews were invaluable in helping me to understanding the actions and reactions of a complex and extremely proud ethnic group.

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Personal experience and observation: The origin of a research topic

Prior to the Conflict Analysis and Management program at Royal Roads University, several personal experiences initiated my own exploration of conflict resolution and its relevance to peacekeeping missions. In 1993, I served with the Canadian Armed Forces as an Infantry Platoon Commander with the UN Protection force in Croatia. There I was involved in the separation the ethnic Serbian and Croatian forces following their short, but brutal, civil war. During training for this mission, I questioned the lack of conflict resolution training that Canadian Armed Forces personnel received before deploying to a post-conflict environment. In response, the chain of command explained that Canadian soldiers do not require such specific training because the existing military training regime already fulfills this need.[1] I realized how shortsighted this view when I was confronted, on an almost daily basis in Croatia, with the need to negotiate with and mediate between the warring factions in my area of operations. At the time, I made countless mistakes, and found I was forced to learn by experience, or more appropriately, by error.

My keen interest in the area of conflict resolution and peacekeeping eventually led to my assignment at the Canadian Armed Forces' Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) in Kingston, Ontario, where Canadian Force's personnel deploying to peacekeeping missions around the world receive specific, mission-based, peacekeeping training. While with the PSTC, a colleague and I were able to introduce a cutting edge conflict resolution training program for peacekeepers deploying overseas. Subsequently, we published a training manual, still used by the Canadian Armed Forces today to instruct members in conflict resolution techniques.

Upon leaving the military in 2001, I accepted employment with United Nations Security within the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) where interest in this

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[1] During the period described, there was no negotiation or mediation training provided to Canadian Armed Forces personnel deploying to peacekeeping missions during pre-deployment training. The training for formed contingents during this period, as experienced by the researcher, primarily consisted of military skills refresher training and weapons familiarization.

research topic began to develop. My research project choice originates from my role as the supervisor of the UN Security Information Coordination Cell (UN SICC) in Kosovo, where I monitored postwar crime arrest violence. In this role, I was responsible for gathering security related information to determine future trends to develop strategies for the protection of UNMIK civilian staff. From May 2001 until March 2004, I worked intimately, but separately, with various units and elements within UNMIK police. It was during this ongoing collaboration that I accepted the unique opportunity to observe UNMIK police operate on a daily basis at all levels of the organization. Following several ongoing public order disturbances by the local K-A community, I began to notice a distinct lack of consistency in the response to these incidents by the UNMIK police, and questioned how the lack of consistency seemed to continually lead to increased violence from assembled crowds.

During the spring and summer of 2002 and 2003, these public incidents became increasingly common, highlighted by large-scale, long-term demonstrations and often followed by acts of subversion and terrorism directed against UN staff, property and facilities. While the exact data relating to these demonstrations will be introduced later in the paper, the sheer size and violent nature of the demonstrations continued to bother my colleagues and me in the UN SICC. Upon reflection, I wondered whether much of the conflict I witnessed stemmed from a lack of understanding on the part of UNMIK police of basic conflict resolution techniques, and whether the police's lack of cultural understanding also worsened the situation.

During this timeframe, I began to draw parallels between my service in Croatia and the conduct of CIVPOL officers in Kosovo. Ironically, the dismissive attitude of my own chain of command in 1993 was not unique. I heard similar responses from the various senior UNMIK Police commanders. Most commanders indicated that conflict resolution training was not required for UN CIVPOL because all CIVPOL are expected to be fully trained police officers when they deploy to the mission area.[2] Again, the question arose for me: to what standard should CIVPOL officers be trained for a mission like Kosovo, and based upon what set of organizational circumstances?

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[2] This attitude was confirmed as policy during later interviews with the Officer in Charge of the UNMIK Police Training Center in Oct 2003. This officer was again interviewed in Feb 2005 and confirmed that the philosophy remained unchanged.

As my time in the mission grew, I observed and participated in the planning of operations to deal with the increasingly violent unrest resulting from arrests related to crimes committed during and after the war and trial verdicts in Kosovo. The UNMIK Police experienced a lack of cohesion or standard responses to these situations. At every level of command, each response was different, depending upon the nationality and experience level of the international officers.

This realization, and the many discussions with my unit following large scale UNMIK Police operations, illustrated to me the level of indecision over the application of conflict resolution techniques and philosophies by UNMIK Police when responding to public disorder or demonstrations; and that the United Nations Headquarters in New York issued no common approach concerning the subject. I also realized that if such a shortcoming existed at the macro scale of the UNMIK Police who operated in large, formed units to deal with public disorder situations, then the problem was likely present in the day-to-day individual policing tasks of the approximately 4,500 International CIVPOL operating in Kosovo at the time. These professional observations led to the development of my research focus and hypothesis.

1.2 Research focus and hypothesis

The origins of UNMIK Police resulted from Article 11(1) of the UN Resolution 1244 (SC 1244) of 1999, which was the Security Council Resolution that led to the creation of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. UNMIK Police were mandated to maintain law and order through the deployment of international police personnel and through the establishment of a local police force known as the Kosovo Police service (KPS).[3] The UN Secretary General's report of July 12, 1999 as cited within the UNMIK Police Annual Report for 2000, describes the methods by which this was to be achieved.

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[3] UNMIK Police are comprised of two groups, the International Civilian Police contingent (CIVPOL) and the newly formed Kosovo Police Service (KPS). CIVPOL officers held all command positions within UNMIK from 1999 until 2003 when the command of selected individual stations began to be transferred to KPS officers. As a result, CIVPOL officers made all command decisions involving this combined force during the period of time this paper focuses on. Therefore, when the term UNMIK Police is used in this paper, it is to be considered synonymous with CIVPOL. When actions taken by the KPS are discussed, they will be explicitly attributed to the KPS.

In the first phase, KFOR, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military presence in Kosovo, would be responsible for law and order until the international civil presence could assume responsibility. The UNMIK Civilian Police would advise KFOR, on policing matters while establishing ties with local and international counterparts. In the second phase, UNMIK Police would assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order from KFOR who would continue in a supporting role; and the UNMIK Police would commence the training and monitoring of local police, while UNMIK Special Police Units (SPU) carried out public order functions, such as crowd control and area security. In the third phase, the responsibility for law and order would transfer to the KPS while UNMIK Police reverted to a training and advisory role, with SPU in support (UNMIK Police, p. 10, 2000).

SC 1244 (1999) laid the foundation for the creation of UNMIK Police and provided them with their overall mandate. The mandate, as cited in the UNMIK Police Annual Report of 2000, except for the section indicated, continues to be in force today:

- To advise and assist the international security force (KFOR) in the maintenance of public security and order during the initial period following the withdrawal of FRY forces (completed in early 2000).
- To maintain, for a limited period, law and order through the deployment of international police personnel in Kosovo (ongoing).
- To establish, monitor, advise and continually assess a permanent Kosovo Police Service (ongoing).
- To protect and promote human rights (ongoing).
- To assist the activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Kosovo (ongoing).
- To monitor the borders and establish a Kosovo Border Police (ongoing)(UNMIK Police, p. 11, 2000).

In addition to these tasks, the international community embarked on an ambitious, long-term project to secure and rebuild the entire security sector within Kosovo. As time passed and the post-conflict environment in Kosovo began to stabilize, the UNMIK Police and the UNMIK Department of Justice (DOJ) increasingly focused on investigating and punishing both K-Albanians and K-Serbians who had allegedly committed acts of violence against the civilian population during the fighting, during and immediately after the end of the NATO air campaign against the Serbian Security Forces in Kosovo. Since many of these alleged acts were not technically considered war crimes

under the mandate of the ICTY, UNMIK Police became the primary agency investigating and arresting those alleged to have committed offences such as illegal detention, torture and murder. They also policed the post-arrest public order disturbances and anti-UNMIK propaganda emerging from these arrests.

Due to the large number of arrests and the demonstrations against the arrests in Kosovo, and the resulting violence, this study focuses on the conflict between UNMIK Police and the K-A community during these demonstrations. This narrow approach considers that most Kosovo-Serbian perpetrators of war crimes fled Kosovo following the end of the conflict in 1999 and, as a result, fall outside of the jurisdiction of UNMIK Police. Because of these limitations, this paper focuses only on the conflict with and the perceptions of the K-A community who were, and are, primarily involved in conflict arising from arrests for crimes committed during the fighting and the demonstrations that followed.

Unfortunately for the UN Mission in Kosovo, holding certain K-Albanians accountable for their actions during the 1999 fighting resulted in the opposite effect. By arresting those who committed crimes during wartime, the international community hoped to re-establish the rule of law and accountability in a post-conflict environment. But, in Kosovo, the arrests created further violence and dissention amongst the K-A population, pitting an internationally imposed and enforced justice system against K-A national popular heroes. The local population exhibits ongoing dissatisfaction with UNMIK and UNMIK Police through public demonstrations and confrontations with the international CIVPOL forces. In turn, the often uncoordinated and conflicting responses of the UNMIK Police, demonstrates a lack of understanding of the K-A community that has inflamed, rather than mitigated the outcomes of these events.

In light of this situation, the central research questions for this study are

- What are the causes of conflict between UNMIK Police and the K-A population during demonstrations following war crimes related arrests and convictions?
- How might the UNMIK Police reduce the destabilizing effect that their approach to conflict has on the K-A population?

The following assertions together form the hypothesis that the research question serves to confirm or deny:

- Conflict analysis and theoretical application is necessary prior to intervention by UNMIK Police in a public demonstration.
- Stability can be restored without the use of violence.
- Conflict prevention and conflict resolution techniques can mitigate the requirement for coercive measures when dealing with the general public following war crimes arrests and convictions.
- Academic and civilian models of conflict analysis and conflict prevention can be integrated into the training of CIVPOL officers deploying to a UN mission in a fashion similar to military forces deployed to the same mission.
- The negative stereotype of the role of police in K-A society resulting from decades of ethnic Serbian control of Kosovo can be improved through proactive education campaigns and positive street level contacts with culturally aware CIVPOL officers.

The Hypothesis:

> Current UNMIK policing practices have, for the most part, failed to adequately resolve and may, in fact, exacerbate the very problems they are designed to address when dealing with conflict involving the K-A population in Kosovo. If training in a consistent philosophy of conflict analysis, conflict prevention and front line conflict resolution can be imparted upon international CIVPOL serving in Kosovo, using force as the primary means to control large-scale, ongoing public demonstrations may be avoided.

1.3 Project overview

Following the introduction, Chapter **two** outlines the methodology utilized in this study.

Chapter **three** provides a review of the literature that forms the basis of this paper, with an emphasis on UNMIK Police doctrine and publications, CIVPOL Training literature, Kosovo post-conflict environment literature, and general conflict theory.

Chapters **four**, **five** and **six** outline the conflict environment within Kosovo during the period described in this paper, beginning with a historic examination of the K-A experience, and provides both quantitative and qualitative data on the specific conflicts in

Kosovo between UNMIK Police and the K-A population following the arrests and trial of K-A for crimes committed during the fighting.

Chapter **seven** provides an analysis of the conflict described in the previous sections through the utilization of various conflict theories that are directly applicable to the destabilization in Kosovo following the arrest and trials of K-A for crimes committed during the fighting. This analysis allows the researcher to understand the true nature and causes of the conflicts described.

Chapter **eight** examines the role that conflict analysis and conflict resolution techniques might play in day-to-day policing in Kosovo. Specifically this chapter examines whether conflict analysis might help mitigate post-arrest disorder by enabling UNMIK Police to engage key stakeholders in a positive way to diffuse tension and anger within the K-A community before it becomes a public order disturbance.

Finally, chapter **nine** summarizes the study conclusions, including a synthesis of research and findings and recommendations to enhance the capacity of UNMIK Police in responding to and preventing post-arrest disorder by the K-A population.

RESEARCH PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Interview goals

The primary goal of the interviews was to solicit respondents' views, perspectives, knowledge and experience of policing in Kosovo. Their responses have been analyzed and integrated, when appropriate, throughout the study. The interview findings also inform the development of the proposed training and conflict analysis model for use by UNMIK Police.

The second goal of the interviews was to gauge the UNMIK Police's level of understanding of conflict resolution philosophies and concepts relating to police operations; and, also, to gain an understanding of K-Albanian responses to existing UNMIK Police tactics and procedures.

Two sets of interview questionnaires were developed based upon the researcher's personal experience with police operations and the general observations of K-Albanian reaction to police operations over a two-and-a-half year period. The questionnaire, although comprised of standard questions, encouraged each major group of respondents to expand on areas of personal interest. These discussions often led to additional questions and the many unique and fascinating responses appear in the interview summaries.

2.2 Respondent profiles

In addition to informal discussions with selected members of the UN SICC and the Advisory Unit for Security, a total of 14 CIVPOL officers serving with UNMIK Police, and 10 K-Albanians were invited to participate in interviews for the project.[4] The

[4] As described in the introduction, the researcher was the supervisor of the UN Security Information Coordination Cell (SICC) and it was the responsibility of this unit to gather and coordinate security related information within Kosovo while analyzing the potential affects of the overall security situation on the staff of UNMIK and the Balkans in general. As a result, the researcher was intimately involved in the preparation of all reports and round table discussions by this unit as pertains to the subject material. These reports are included in later sections of this paper. Due to this fact, only 2 separate interviews with the staff of the SICC were seen as required. These interviews were for context and, where necessary, are included separately from CIVPOL responses. The Advisory Unit for Security (AUS) was a unit with a similar role except that it advised and reported solely to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of UNMIK. The two units worked side by side on a daily basis and as a result, the opinions and thoughts of the staff of the AUS were also first hand knowledge to the author and, therefore, did not require further interviews.

police officers were invited by electronic mail or in person. The K-Albanian respondents were approached and invited as a group during a form of town hall meeting at the UNMIK Main Headquarters building. Of those asked, fourteen police officers and 10 K-Albanians accepted the invitations to be interviewed in person over a five-month period. Each interview was face-to-face and lasted approximately three hours. The respondents received copies of the questions a week before the interviews occurred. If uncomfortable, the K-Albanian respondents were empowered to decline to answer questions that required recounting of personal experiences with police officers.

Of the 14 UNMIK Police respondents, three occupied senior command positions—one as a Director of the UNMIK Police Public Information Section, and the remainder individual unit commanders, station commanders or senior staff officers. Of all the UNMIK Police respondents, four had previous experience as CIVPOL with other UN mandated police missions. In one case, a senior UNMIK Police commander had served as a CIVPOL officer at least three other peacekeeping missions where International Police were deployed.

UNMIK Police interview candidates were invited based upon the following criteria. Some officers meet more than one criterion:

- Previous experience as CIVPOL with another peacekeeping mission – 4
- Experience in or knowledge of UN CIVPOL training and policies – 5
- Orientation training at the UNMIK Police Training Center upon arrival in Kosovo – 14
- Currently hold command or training appointments within UNMIK Police – 14
- Involvement in incidents within Kosovo that required conflict resolution tactics and strategies – 9

Together, the UNMIK Police respondents have on average an impressive 12 years experience as police officers in their home nations and were considered extremely experienced and knowledgeable about policing.

All 10 K-Albanian respondents lived in Kosovo prior to the war of 1998-99 and all had personally experienced the attempted ethnic cleansing of K-Albanians in the spring and summer of 1999 by the Serbian security forces. Also, while these individuals currently work for UNMIK in different capacities, none were employed with UNMIK Police in any way. Of note, while the K-A respondents were, at the time of the

interviews, living in the cities of Pristina, Peja and Gnjilane, six of them lived in smaller villages in Kosovo prior to and during the fighting of 1999. As a result, this population sample provided a great deal of diversity in response to the questions posed.

2.3 Interview Process

Once the 14 UNMIK Police respondents and 10 K-A respondents agreed to be interviewed in accordance with a letter of agreement stipulating the terms and conditions of the interview, specific appointments were established for each three hour interview. Respondents received as much advance notice as was practical. The interview questions (unique to each group of respondents), as well as an executive summary of the purpose of the research project, were then delivered to each respondent to review, with the intent to reduce the anxiety of the K-Albanian participants. Of note, each K-A respondent requested that his or her identity remain anonymous when the paper was published. Of the CIVPOL respondents, 10 requested their identity remain anonymous when the paper was published. The names of the remaining four respondents are included in Appendix B.

With permission from each individual respondent, the interviews were recorded by hand and by micro-cassette recorder. The responses were transcribed within three days of each interview. Interviewees were then shown a copy of the transcription and provided an opportunity to add and/or delete information to ensure accuracy.

Once transcribed, the information was organized according to the various sections of the research project. This information was then analyzed for consistency of response and for specific conflict theory that could be applied each interview responses. Finally, all respondents were assured that their summarized interviews would remain confidential, retained in the private care of the researcher, until the paper was published, after which they would be destroyed.

2.4 Data Gathering

While commonalities existed, each group of respondents received questions specifically for each subject group. to elicit responses on the role each played in the overall conflict.

UNMIK Police respondents

The questionnaire for UNMIK Police respondents consisted of 32 questions, delivered and answered orally. The exchange often deviated from the scripted questions for the sake of clarity. Individual responses often led to follow up questions from the author that was recorded in the interview minutes. Individual questions were deliberately open-ended so as to elicit the most detailed and comprehensive response possible. Questions posed to the respondents are included at Appendix B.

Kosovo-Albanian respondents

The questionnaire for K-A respondents consisted of 30 questions, delivered and answered orally. More so than the CIVPOL interviews, these exchanges were often emotional for the respondents who often deviated for long periods into subjects and issues that they felt were essential to the answers of the primary questions. Since English was often the respondent's third or fourth language, these interviews required many follow-up questions to clarify responses. These follow-up questions and responses were recorded in the minutes of the interviews. The questions posed to the respondents are included at Appendix B.

2.5 Research Ethics

As previously described, the methodology used in this study was Action Research Theory. Since human subjects were the focus, an ethical review was constructed in accordance with the Royal Roads University Major Project Handbook (2004). As the researcher, I went to great lengths to ensure that respondents were treated fairly and ethically at all times during the research process.

Members of the international community who participated in the project, such as UNMIK Civil Administration and UNMIK Police, fell into two categories of participants. Some groups were very much open collaborators in the process, such as the members of the UNMIK Police. Others acted only as willing informants, including elements of the Civil Administration, UN Security and the majority of the K-A respondents.

Once general consent was achieved within the K-A population, informed individual consent continued to be the basis for all interviews. The main risks of the

research included the effect that some questions might have when individual K-A respondents describe experiences before and during the war in Kosovo in 1998-99. Anticipating some of the personal experiences might bring out a very emotional response to that period, K-A respondents were informed prior to and during their interviews that they were free, at any time, to withdraw their participation from the project if the questions too difficult to address.

LITERATURE REVIEW

When I began a literature review for this paper, my goal was to break my literature search into four components:

1. Literature describing UN CIVPOL operations and philosophies;
2. Literature describing UN CIVPOL training;
3. Associated literature involving historical examinations of K-Albanian culture and their reaction to police and the rule of law prior to and during the fighting of 1999; and
4. Conflict theory relating to the major project research question.

3.1 UNMIK Police Literature

A number of specific mission resources exist that proved fundamental to my understanding of the methods by which the UN, UNMIK and UNMIK Police operated since the beginning of the 1999 mission in Kosovo. The majority of sources were primary documents in the form of manuals and operating procedures as well as living documents designed to monitor violence throughout Kosovo. Many other smaller documents of a similar nature were not included in this section but are adequately elaborated upon in the body of the document.

The primary document that acts as the umbrella for all police activity in Kosovo is the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 adopted on June 10, 1999, in response to the conflict in Kosovo. This document created the UNMIK mission authorizing the Secretary-General to establish an interim civilian administration led by the UN in Kosovo. In particular, resolution 1244 called upon UNMIK to perform the following basic civilian administrative functions:

1. Promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;
2. Facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo's future status;
3. Coordinating humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies;
4. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure;
5. Maintaining civil law and order;
6. Promoting human rights; and
7. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

Of particular interest to this paper, was the mandate to maintain law and order within the resolution that led to the creation of UNMIK Police.

Outside of resolution 1244 , the most useful document is the *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines* (2000), published by DPKO. This version of the manual is the main reference text for International CIVPOL police commissioners and officers serving in any peacekeeping mission. The document outlines the basic policies and procedures when serving within a police component of a peacekeeping mission.

The *UNMIK Police Policies and Procedures Manual* (1999), published by the UNMIK Police Commissioner, is an important document that articulated the specific policies and procedures in place for UNMIK Police under the umbrella guidance of the *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines* (2000) as published by UN DPKO. This specific set of SOPs outlined the exact organization, policies and procedures to be followed by all CIVPOL officers operating in Kosovo as police officers.

Guidelines for Police Contributing Countries to the UN Special Police Units in UNMIK (2001) as published by the UN DPKO Civilian Police Division also a very useful document outlined the specific training and organization of the sizeable Special Police Units throughout Kosovo, primarily employed in crowd control and large scale civil disorder tasks.

Every year, both the UNMIK Police and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Police Service School issue annual reports that speak to the role each of these organizations plays as well as their individual states of development. These documents are invaluable in the understanding of police training and operational philosophy within Kosovo at the time of their publishing. For the purposes of the study, the *UNMIK Police Annual Report* for the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 as published by UNMIK Police and the *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Police Service School Annual Report* for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 as published by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe were extensively referenced.

As most of the material is written for serving police officers who either have, or are about to deploy as CIVPOL officers on a peacekeeping mission analysis and

interpretation of documents by a non-police officer, posed the greatest challenge. The literature was reviewed for any philosophies or direction with regard to specific conflict resolution strategies when operating as police officers in Kosovo. None of the primary documents describe specific philosophy and methods for conflict resolution, outside of policies concerning the use of force and crowd management. While the concepts of negotiation and mediation are mentioned within three of these documents, none of them provide any specific outline or instructions as to how this should be carried out.

3.2 CIVPOL Training Literature

In addition to the primary documents researched, a myriad of articles and conferences have been devoted to the concept of International Civilian Police deployments and training. This section will examine the key documents that support the concept of specific training for CIVPOL officers and the introduction of Conflict Theory into peacekeeping operations.

One of the key documents on the issue of training for CIVPOL officers is the article entitled "CIVPOL Certification: A Model for Recruitment and Training of Civilian Police Monitors" *by* E. Latham (2001). The article spells out how professional police standards vary drastically throughout the world, resulting in often-unqualified officers on CIVPOL missions. The article went on to review the training mandated by DPKO for CIVPOL officers, and that, if all officers deployed met the qualifications outlined by the United Nations, they would still lack some of the fundamental skills necessary to effectively perform duties assigned to CIVPOL.[5] To address these ongoing shortcomings, Latham prescribes the development of a comprehensive training program, suggesting comprehensive standardized training and certification in CIVPOL tasks at central UN or host nation facilities, regardless of police experience level.

Another group of other articles suggested similar change for UN Civilian Policing around the world arising out of the International Peace Academy and the United States Institute of Peace. These various articles and reports entitled "Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations" by Lewis, Marks, and Perito (2002), "Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations: Advancing Best Practices" by Schoenhaus

[5] These training standards will be examined in detail in later sections of the paper.

(2002) and the conference report entitled *Policing the Peace: towards a workable paradigm* published by the International Peace Academy (2000), all stated that CIVPOL today are expected to exercise executive authority in a relatively hostile environment where they have little or no knowledge of local language, culture, traditions, laws and the local crime situation. All articles acknowledged that the current DPKO orientation and standards for CIVPOL officers were not properly equipping these officer for service in peacekeeping missions and went on to indicate that the UN needs to update its UN Police Officers Course to reflect current political and operational realities. Currently, all CIVPOL training focuses a disproportionately on basic police skills, neglecting of other specialized CIVPOL personnel. Ultimately, the reports emphatically state that policing requires a different approach and needs to develop a more direct relationship with the local population in post-conflict environments.

Another document that sheds light on CIVPOL deployments and training, entitled, "Creating a force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice" by K.C Field and R. Perito (2002) supports CIVPOL efforts. Field and Perito describe standardization in their article as one of the drawbacks to the rapid deployment of CIVPOL to mission areas and prescribe pre-training and the establishment of set units ready to deploy as a way to secure peace and stability in a post conflict environment.

While the aforementioned key documents all address revisions to the CIVPOL structures and training in peacekeeping missions, none of them directly reference the role of conflict resolution while policing in post-conflict environments. Each of the documents reviewed, references the requirement for standardization, cultural awareness, comprehensive specialized training and greater care when selecting officers to serve in these missions. Each of these areas represents important cornerstones towards improving the quality of CIVPOL on peacekeeping missions and are incorporated in this paper. However, none of these suggested improvements will ultimately deal with the issue of ongoing conflict and violence within the environments that CIVPOL officers find themselves deployed.

One article, entitled "Culture, Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeper Training and the D Mediator" by C.A. Leeds (2001), dealt with the issue of training of peacekeepers in conflict resolution. Leeds concurs with many of the other authors who mention that

peacekeeping training traditionally concentrates on technical skills, with less attention to historical and cultural background elements relevant to specific conflicts. Leeds does feel, however, that one of the key roles of CIVPOL officers in executive authority peacekeeping missions is to act as third parties to improve relationships between disputants. As a result, additional emphasis needs to be placed on creating the conditions for conflict resolution through training (p.93).

As a result, Leeds (2001) indicates that training for peacekeepers (including CIVPOL officers) could usefully cover "the understanding of two cross-cultural dimensions, low context-high content and individualism-collectivism; their association with types of mediation and suitable strategies in a particular cultural context; and their link to the persistence and termination of intractable conflicts" (P. 94). These theories will be examined in greater detail in the context of conflict theory.

3.3 Kosovo Conflict Literature

Extensive information was also collected from texts and articles on the subject of Kosovo and the conflict that led to the creation of both UNMIK and KFOR as a way of gaining greater understanding of the K-A culture, and the effects that recent and historic conflicts effected on this population. Books, such as *Kosovo: A Short History* by N. Malcom (1998), *Kosovo Crossing: The Reality of American Intervention in the Balkans* by David Fromkin (1999), *Kosovo: War and Revenge* by Tim Judah (2000) and *Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath* edited by M. Buckley and S. Cummings (2001) provides excellent background information concerning the historical bases for the fighting of 1999.

I also discovered that International Crisis Group (ICG) reports offered upon for descriptions of theoretical issues on the main research question itself. Reports such as "Kosovo Report Card" (2000a), "What Happened to the KLA" (2000b) and "Religion in Kosovo" (2001) all provided insight into the interests and motivations of the K-A population in their interactions with the international community and UNMIK. The report, "Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo" (2002), provided useful material concerning the nature of the justice system in Kosovo now and the role the UNMIK Police and International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia played in war crimes

arrests and trials. *Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* by Ignatieff (2003) provided insight into the role of the international community following the end of the conflict in 1999. The text provides an excellent snapshot of the realities faced by UNMIK when it first formed in Kosovo and attitudes of the K-A population towards the Serbs and towards themselves as a people who "were all potential victims of a crime against humanity that failed only because both NATO and the KLA came to their defense" (p. 66).

Finally, I also found a series of texts concerning the culture and attitudes of the K-A population invaluable in gaining a greater understanding of the collective nature and attitudes of K-Albanian society both before and after the war in 1999. *Kosova: Separate Worlds* by S. Maliqi (1998) provided me with excellent insight, from a K-A perspective, on the thoughts, attitudes and actions of the K-A community prior to and during the war. Furthermore, I gained insight into the K-A culture as perceived by the Serbian nation in *Serbian Tendencies for Partitioning of Kosova* by N. Spahiu (1999). This text detailed the national ideologies of both the Albanian and Serbian nations in Kosovo and outlined in clinical detail the formal and informal education systems of both ethnic groups were designed to foster attitudes of superiority over the other. Finally, *A Dictionary of Albanian Religion, Mythology, and Folk Culture* by R. Elise (2001) acts as the main source of research into the nature and effect of tradition and culture in K-A society from ancient history through to today.

3.4 Conflict theory literature

Understanding the nature of conflict within a post-conflict environment is essential prior to the deployment of CIVPOL personnel. The study of the conflict is even more essential when selecting an organizational and philosophical culture that the incoming CIVPOL force will adopt. It became clear as the literature review of UN DPKO and UNMIK Police documents concluded, that conflict theory had yet to be incorporated into DPKO or CIVPOL operations. Because of its importance to the hypothesis of the paper, the subject of Conflict Theory, its application to UNMIK Police and the police's relationship with the K-A community will be covered independently in Section Seven of

the paper, where the discussion provides an analysis of the conflicts between UNMIK Police and the K-A population.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNMIK POLICE AND THE K-A POPULATION

Having outlined the hypothesis of this research project and the methods by which research was conducted, the following three sections will outline the conflict between UNMIK Police and the K-A population following arrests of K-Albanians for crimes committed during and after the fighting of 1999. The first step will consider the foundation of the conflict environment in present-day Kosovo by examining the long-term effect that police in Kosovo had on the population prior to the end of hostilities in 1999, and on the post-conflict environment that UNMIK Police faced. This examination will then be followed by a description of the deployment, organization and training of UNMIK Police officers during the period of study to provide insight into the conflict's origins.

4.1 Role and effect of Police in Kosovo prior to 1999

K-A population of Kosovo maintains certain triggers for violence when confronted by the CIVPOL officers serving in Kosovo in the present day, not surprising when you consider the effects of CIVPOL actions on a population in a post-conflict environment, struggling with shared traumas of oppression and violence at the hands of police officers. The following descriptive account from *Kosovo: A Short History* (1998) offers excellent insight into the role that predominantly Serbian police played in Kosovo between 1990 and 1999 and the role's effect on the population:

> "Arbitrary arrest and police violence [became] routine. Serbian law allow[ed] the arrest and summary imprisonment for up to two months of anyone who [had] committed a 'verbal crime' such as insulting the 'patriotic feelings' of Serbian citizens. It also permit[ed] a procedure known as 'informative talks', under which a person [could] be summoned to a police station and questioned for up to three days— in 1994 15,000 people in Kosovo were questioned in this way, usually without being told the reason for the summons. In 1994 alone, the council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms in Kosovo recorded 2,157 physical assaults by the police, 3,553 raids on private dwellings and 2,963 arbitrary arrests" (Malcolm, 1998, pp. 349-350).

Malcolm's (1998) account offers a basic perspective for understanding the current behaviors and attitudes of the K-A population towards the institutions of law and order in Kosovo, and, later, provides a context for comments by K-A respondents. While many respondents indicated that Kosovo Albanians welcomed UNMIK Police at the end of the 1999 fighting, this short-lived honeymoon; eventually, KFOR troops and then UNMIK Police officers began to confront the population as law and order was restored. Not to suggest that force didn't need not be applied in 1999 and 2000 to restore law and order, but this account does demonstrate that the population was, and is, quick to view police institutions with suspicion, and at times, hostility, depending upon the tactics used by CIVPOL. Ultimately, CIVPOL contingents, unaware of the trauma felt by many within the K-A population, easily ignited the triggers, overlooking possible alternative methods more suitable when engaging the K-A population.

Examining the historical attitudes and actions of the K-A population when confronted by structures of law and order helps predict the outcome of encounters between the groups post-1999. Several descriptions by the K-A author Shkelzen Maliqi of an average demonstration by K-Albanians during the 1990s provides powerful insight into the collective consciousness of the K-A population that exists to today:

> The students' mood is understandable: they were impatient and believed in their right to peaceful demonstration of their demands for the return of their school buildings, which had been violently occupied by the Serbian authorities six years earlier.... Demonstrations were crushed. Armored vehicles and helicopters surrounded the area where the students had gathered, and demonstrators were attacked with tear gas and clubs...the swift suppression of the protests does not come as a surprise (Maliqi, 1998, p. 177).

It is this attitude that many in the K-Albanian population carry with them when they rally to the streets, demonstrating against the arrests of fellow K-Albanians for war crimes. As a result, the sheer presence of UNMIK Police officers during demonstrations often acted as a trigger for K-A demonstrators. Over time, the initiation of triggers by UNMIK police and the often heavy handed crowd control methods of the SPUs create another connection with the past, and encourage popular solidarity against the structures of UNMIK. Maliqi elaborates:

> The eruption of terrorism was sparked by the murder of Armend Daci, a 20-year-old student, on the night of April 20-21, 1990, who was shot by Zlatko Jovanovic, a Serb. In similar cases before, Albanian authorities in Kosovo managed to ensure maximum of restraint. But this time Albanian restraint has broken. For the first time in many years in Pristina mass demonstrations were staged in front of the building where the crime took place. About 10,000 women gathered, without seeking permission from the Albanian authorities. Albanians did not see the crime...as a personal, individual transgression; they addressed their grievances to the Serbian regime...and proclaimed that all forms of repression against Albanians were illegitimate (Maliqi, 1998, p. 144).

The K-A population's shift in attitude and its inability to directly confront the better armed and equipped Serbian police often sent the struggle underground, the frustration of the population expressed in terrorist actions as further described by Maliqi:

> At relatively synchronized intervals, in the towns of Decani, Peja, Mitrovica and Stimle, five Serbs were killed and five wounded [in response to the murder of Armend Daci]. In one of the killings, in a café in Decani, the targets were civilians, but elsewhere the victims were policemen (Maliqi, 1998, p. 144).

In the face of a better-armed and equipped force, these acts of subversion and terrorism became increasingly violent throughout the 1990s until they evolved into the formation of the KLA and into open confrontation with the Serbian security forces in Kosovo.

The long-term oppression of the K-A population in Kosovo before and during the 1990s has had lasting effects on the society as a whole— and it is this community that UNMIK Police are charged with policing. As a result, the aforementioned issues are extremely important for UNMIK Police to monitor and understand when dealing with the K-A population in any situation involving actual or potential conflict. This timely understanding of the historic and often violent role of police institutions in Kosovo prior to 1999 by UNMIK Police is essential to understanding potential actions and re-actions of the K-A population when confronted with conflict, and more importantly, potential triggers.

4.2 Influences contributing to UNMIK Police responses to conflict

"Conflict resolution and conflict facilitation should be the philosophy used by UNMIK Police when dealing with public order situations involving the population of Kosovo. Currently, this is not the case."

-UNMIK Police Director of Operations

Role and Organization of UNMIK Police in Kosovo

To accomplish the UNMIK Police mandate (1999), created by the UN Security Council as described in the introduction of this paper, the International CIVPOL component of UNMIK Police in Kosovo are comprised of three separate but coordinated components of international Police Officers: the UN Civilian Police, the UN Special Police Units and the UN Border Police.

The UNMIK Police Commissioner reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) who is the diplomatic head of the UNMIK mission through his Deputy SRSG for the Police and Justice Pillar of UNMIK and is assisted by three Deputy Commissioners.

The UNMIK Police are deployed in each of the five Administrative Regions of Kosovo (Pristina/Prishtina, Pec/Peja, Prizren, Gnjilane/Gnjilani and Mitrovica/Mitrovice) and continue to operate out of 32 stations and sub-stations.[6]

The UNMIK Police Headquarters are co-located with UNMIK Headquarters in Pristina. Within the UNMIK Police chain of command, UNMIK Police HQ supervises various specialized sections as well as the three aforementioned components of UNMIK Police. Regional UNMIK Police Headquarters then directly supervise various police stations located in their area of responsibility. Special Operations units whose roles involve the conduct of high risk and confidential mission activities such as dignitary protection and hostage rescue are also directly controlled by UNMIK Main Headquarters.

At the time that research was conducted for this paper, the UNMIK Police were to be commanded and controlled by senior CIVPOL officers, although senior KPS officers now shadow most positions with an aim to eventually take over from the CIVPOL.

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[6] Officially, UNMIK uses two names for every village, town, city and region in Kosovo. One spelling reflects the name used by the K-S population and the second is the name used by the K-A population, as they are often quite different. For the purposes of this paper, only the K-A names are used to avoid confusion.

The role and relevance of UNMIK Police Special Police Units in dealing with conflict involving the K-A population

The SPUs were, and are, a distinct component of UNMIK Police. The 11 SPUs in existence in 2002 and 2003 came from around the world: India and Jordan each provided two units. Poland and Ukraine provided one unit and a canine unit each. Romania, Argentina and Spain contributed the remaining units to the mission. The manpower of each SPU was approximately 115 police officers, able to perform any policing function necessary (interview with Director UNMIK PTC, November 2003).[7] The units were, and continue to be, deployed throughout Kosovo in each of the five administrative regions.

The main tasks of the SPUs are to respond to public disorder and provide manpower and assistance to other components of the mission upon request. One of their main tasks is simply to maintain a high state of readiness through continuous training while they await deployment, based upon national standards in accordance with the UNMIK Police Policies and Procedures Manual (1999). All SPUs were involved in an escalating number of crowd control operations during the year 2002 and early 2003, involving increasingly volatile demonstrations against the arrest of K-Albanians for war crimes, as will be demonstrated in Section 5 of this paper.

Overall operational management of these units rests with the SPU Special Advisor to the Commissioner of UNMIK Police. However, operational control of individual SPU Sub-Units is more often devolved to Regional UNMIK Police commanders during periods of crisis or large deliberate operations (interview with UNMIK Police Director of Operations, Nov 2003).

The UNMIK Police commissioner develops tactical and operational standards for the deployment and operational use of formed police units who must be trained in the standards (DPKO, p. 49, 2000). As a result, instructions for SPUs on crowd management are included under this title within the UNMIK Police Policies and Procedures Manual (PPM) (1999). A synopsis of this instruction is included at Appendix F.

When reading through this instruction, little specific guidance exists for SPUs concerning exact tactics and procedures for deployment. When engaged in crowd control

[7] Again, as of February 2005, when this research was updated, these units still operated in the same manner and with the same level of manpower. With that said, the units are expected to reduce in number by the winter of 2005, according to current UNMIK Police Director of Specialized Units.

activities, decisions leading to the deployment of SPUs tend to reside with the appropriate regional police commander. While this decentralized operational command relationship does empower individual police commanders to make timely decisions, consistent response to a crowd control situation cannot be guaranteed based upon these general guidelines.

In addition to these limitations, the instruction is re-active rather than pro-active in nature. Ultimately, the assessment of the situation, based upon this instruction is to only be done once a demonstration has developed.[8] The concept of negotiation is also mentioned within the instruction, but without any direction as to what approach should be utilized i.e. rights based, interest based, etc.[9] The insertion of key action words is included throughout the PPM without explanation or guidance on their interpretation. This lack of clarity is compounded by the fact that UN and UNMIK Police do not provide any training on how to approach negotiations during these situations, as will be described later in this section.

This instruction as core guidance for regional commanders and SPUs resulted in quick assessments on the ground during demonstrations, which often resulted in force being presented or applied in amounts disproportionate to the threat faced, due to a concern over officer safety as well as a lack of understanding of the crowds' nature and their purposes for demonstrating.

The training of UNMIK Police Officers

During the time period of this paper's focus, all arriving international CIVPOL officers received orientation for their duties in Kosovo during a 10-day training package conducted by the UNMIK Police Training Center (PTC) in Pristina.[10] The UNMIK

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[8] This methodology allows for many missed opportunities due to the fact that UNMIK Police often knew in advance of when demonstrations would occur and had many opportunities to engage the organizers of the demonstrations and leaders within the community before the demonstrations arose (Interview with UNMIK Police Director of Operations, Nov 2003).

[9] There is no specific definition of negotiation or any description of what this process entails within the PPM. The concept is laid out in a manner that assumes all officers share a common understanding of the process.

[10] As of February 2005, this orientation had been reduced to five days and covered the same material, but in a shorter period of time (interview with Director of the UNMIK PTC, Feb 2005).

Police Commissioner charges the PTC with the selection and orientation of newly arrived CIVPOL officers in Kosovo.

When the bulk of the research for this paper was conducted in November 2003, the Police Training Center fell under the authority of the Deputy Commissioner for Administration and was staffed with 21 CIVPOL Officers and two local staff members representing 17 different nationalities.

Upon arrival in Kosovo, the PTC formally tests new CIVPOL officers in the following competencies: English language competency, driving competency and personal weapons handling competency. Once these three criteria have been met, orientation is conducted for all CIVPOL officers in Pristina. Subjects included in this orientation are outlined at Appendix E. Information is also provided to arriving CIVPOL officers concerning the applicable law, judicial system and criminal procedure utilized by UNMIK Police in Kosovo. Approximately 11,198 officers, including SPU officers, had undergone the training when the research for this paper was gathered in December 2003 (briefing by the Director of the UNMIK Police Training Center, Dec 2003).

Interestingly, as outlined in the DPKO manual on Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines (2000), "When performing executive police duties, CIVPOL personnel must rely only on UN endorsed criminal justice standards. Nevertheless, CIVPOL personnel must be thoroughly briefed and intimately conversant with the laws they are required to enforce and the judicial system through which alleged perpetrators will be processed" (p. 40). The Manual also goes on to state, "While possessing executive police authority, CIVPOL personnel must also have an excellent understanding of the culture(s) of the host country. Police practices, while adhering to the UN endorsed standards, must be cognizant of the needs of the population and be adaptive to them" (p. 48). Of interest, these statements were specifically lacking in the UNMIK Police orientation training as experienced by the researcher.

During the time when the UNMIK Police Deputy Commissioner for Administration gave the researcher permission to attend an orientation session of UNMIK Police in October 2003, both the critical areas of the applicable law in Kosovo and cultural awareness were given little coverage and certainly provided the officers attending little in-depth understanding of these critical areas. The subject of cultural

awareness, particularly, was taught in one 60-minute class by a K-Albanian who covered both the Albanian and Serbian cultures within this time frame. Not surprisingly, the Serbian portion of this presentation received only ten minutes with a distinctly negative inflection, of no use to those officers designated to serve in Serbian dominated areas of Kosovo. Of more importance to this study, was how little information was presented concerning the Albanian culture in this presentation. Based upon the notes the researcher took at the time, the presentation only covered the following points:

- Basic introductory phrases in Albanian
- A description of the geography of Kosovo
- A brief revisionist version of Albanian history in the region that made little effort to mask anti-Serb bias[11]
- A brief and general description of Albanian society and its social habits

With near two years experience in Kosovo before the attending this presentation, the researcher was truly shocked at how little training the officers received concerning either K-A or K-S culture in light of the importance of this subject to their duties in Kosovo. As the lecture concluded, I made brief notes on what I felt had been omitted from the presentation that would have been invaluable to CIVPOL officers serving in K-A areas of Kosovo. The presentation might have also included:

- Accurate and unbiased lessons concerning the history of the Albanian people in Kosovo with specific emphasis on role of traditional clan structures and customs as they impact K-A society today
- In depth understanding of the role that the police and judiciary had historically played in K-A society from multiple K-A points of view
- In depth understanding of the shared trauma of K-Albanians who lived and experienced both the repression of the Milosevic regime and the fighting of 1999 from multiple K-A points of view
- In depth understanding of the role that the KLA played and that former members continue to play, within K-A society in Kosovo from multiple K-A points of view.
- Understanding of any triggers within modern K-A society that may spark violence as well as an understanding of traditional methods by which the K-A population deal with conflict.

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[11] The term revisionist is used due to the fact that the version of history presented during this orientation often deviated from recorded historical fact and focused on popular K-A folklore concerning specific historic events.

While this list is far from exhaustive, it reflects my own thoughts at the time of the presentation as well as my experience as an instructor at the Canadian Forces Peace Support Training Center where similar cultural training was provided to military personnel deploying to peacekeeping missions over a full day period. The presentations given to Canadian Forces personnel deploying to peacekeeping missions contained the basic detail I suggest above and were specifically tailored to each post-conflict environment.[12] In general, survivors of a conflict will carry biases with him or her concerning the antagonists. These biases may help gauge attitudes and belief systems in the post-conflict environment as long as it is given context by someone within the appropriate UN chain of command. However, if CIVPOL officers are exposed to these attitudes without this important "reality check", as was the case during the orientation the researcher observed, many will conduct their duties with very significant misconceptions of the societies. At the end of the presentation, newly arrived officers walked away from that familiarization without any real understanding of the culture they would police a few short days later.

[12] As an example, when soldiers deployed to the mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2001, presenters from both cultures provided soldiers with as much exposure to both groups and their individual cultures and norms as possible.

ACTION-REACTION CYCLE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN UNMIK POLICE AND THE K-A POPULATION IN KOSOVO

> *When force is used, you leave a bruise and it takes a long time for a bruise to heal.*
>
> - UNMIK Police Director of Operations, Oct 2003

This section of the paper demonstrates the effects, both short-term and long-term, of conflict between the UNMIK Police and the K-A population following the arrests and convictions of K-Albanians as outlined in the introduction. This data demonstrates that this conflict can be predicted and mapped into a cycle of action and reaction, a useful tool for UNMIK Police that may have mitigated the violent incidents.

With this in mind, specific demonstrations about war crimes related arrests, trials and convictions of 2002/2003 will be examined to highlight the key events that influenced or exacerbated the K-A population and UNMIK Police conflicts described in the previous section. This examination will also highlight an identified trend of post-arrest and demonstration violence, often more destructive than the face-to-face conflicts between the UNMIK Police and the K-A population during the demonstrations themselves.

5.1 Demonstration violence

> *The impact of individual police actions is felt by members of the community for the long term.*
>
> - Special Assistant to the UNMIK Police Director of Operations, Oct 2003

Extracted from UN Security Quarterly Reports during the period in question, the following describes demonstrations throughout 2002 and 2003 after the arrest, trial and conviction of various K-Albanians for offences against both civilian ethnic populations in Kosovo during the 1999 fighting. The data is broken down into quarters for ease of understanding. Detailed descriptions of the incidents referenced in this section of the paper are included at Appendix C. Each description highlights the number of war crime-related demonstrations that occurred during that quarter, the number of demonstrations

that resulted in violence between UNMIK Police and the K-A demonstrators, and descriptions of violence, vandalism or terrorism attributed to these demonstrations.

Quarter of 2002

In the 1st Quarter of 2002, 35 demonstrations related to either war crime arrests, trials or convictions involving an estimated 25,955 persons were held in 16 different locations in Kosovo. These demonstrations involved an estimated 150-5000 persons at different times. Of the 35 demonstrations, two included significant incidents of violence following encounters between UNMIK Police and the K-A population present at the scene. This violence resulted in injuries to 10 CIVPOL officers, 11 KPS officers, damage to 17 UN CIVPOL vehicles and an unknown number of K-A injuries. Following these demonstrations, there were 14 incidents of vandalism directed against UN and UN CIVPOL vehicles and a further five vehicles damaged during an impromptu demonstration against UNMIK Police at a vehicle checkpoint (UN Security Quarterly Report, Jan-Mar 2002).

2nd Quarter of 2002

In the 2nd Quarter of 2002, 17 demonstrations related to either war crime arrests, trials or convictions involving an estimated 8,450 persons were held in seven different locations in Kosovo. These demonstrations involved an estimated 150-5000 persons at different times. Of these 17 demonstrations, one developed into a violent confrontation between UNMIK Police and the K-A population present at the scene. This incident resulted in a small number of arrests but no injuries (UN Security Quarterly Report, Apr-Jun 2002).

3rd Quarter of 2002

In the 3rd Quarter of 2002, 49 demonstrations related to either war crime arrests, trials or convictions involving an estimated 26,260 persons were held in 13 different locations in Kosovo. These demonstrations involved an estimated 150-5000 persons at different times. Of these 49 demonstrations, two included significant incidents of violence following encounters between UNMIK Police and the K-A population present at

the scene. This violence resulted in injuries to two CIVPOL officers, eight KPS officers, one KFOR soldier and damage to five UN CIVPOL vehicles. An unknown number of K-A injuries resulted from the use of tear gas and rubber bullets during the incident. Following the demonstration, one incident of vandalism directed against a UN CIVPOL vehicle and a hand grenade was thrown at the residence of five UN CIVPOL officers (UN Security Quarterly Report, Jul-Sept 2002).

4th Quarter of 2002

In the 4th Quarter of 2002, 16 demonstrations related to either war crime arrests, trials or convictions involving an estimated 6,800 persons were held in 16 different locations in Kosovo. These demonstrations involved an estimated 150-1000 persons at different times. Of these 16 demonstrations, one developed into a violent confrontation between UNMIK Police and the K-A population present at the scene due to the aggressive posture adopted by the SPU officers present at the scene as perceived by the demonstrators involved. This incident resulted in a small number of arrests but no injuries. Following this demonstration, there were 36 incidents of vandalism directed against UN, UN CIVPOL and KPS vehicles. There was also a drive-by shooting directed towards a UN Police Station in Western Kosovo (UN Security Quarterly Report, Oct-Dec 2002).

1st Quarter of 2003

In the 1st Quarter of 2003, 45 demonstrations related to either war crime arrests, trials or convictions involving an estimated 69,400 persons were held in five different locations in Kosovo. These demonstrations involved an estimated 150-10,000 persons at different times. Of these 45 demonstrations, one developed into a violent confrontation between UNMIK Police and the K-A population present at the scene. This incident resulted in damage to one UN CIVPOL vehicle, a small number of arrests but no injuries. Later that evening hand grenades were thrown at two UN Police stations (UN Security Quarterly Report, Jan-Mar 2003).

2nd Quarter of 2003

In the 2nd Quarter of 2003, 13 demonstrations related to either war crime arrests, trials or convictions involving an estimated 3,200 persons were held in the town of Decani only. These demonstrations were weekly events and involved an estimated 150-1,000 persons at different times. This modification in tactics by the K-A population reflected a change from more overt displays of aggression towards UNMIK Police and began to reflect the characteristics of entrenched opposition in the form of weekly demonstrations in certain areas of Kosovo. At this time, parallels to the opposition by the K-A population as previously expressed towards the Serbian regime of the 1990s is becoming increasingly apparent (UN Security Quarterly Report Apr-Jun 2003).

5.2 Action-reaction cycle

While the aforementioned descriptions of demonstration and post-demonstration violence do not specifically pinpoint the cause of the violence described in the narratives, they do outline a trend that was identified by the author and the members of the UN SICC during that timeframe. This trend would predictably follow an incident of conflict during a demonstration, and in many cases would also follow large-scale exhibitions of force by UNMIK Police in response to peaceful demonstrations. Following these events, the trend would, very often, include incidents of terrorism or vandalism directed towards UNMIK Police stations, property or officers utilizing tactics similar to what the K-A population against the Serbian police between 1990 and 1999 as described by historical accounts of this period by K-Albanians outlined in Section 4.1.

Arguments were made within the UN SICC and the AUS in 2003 that triggers were being set off within the K-A community in response to how UNMIK Police and SPU units conducted themselves during the demonstrations, and that this conduct, as well fellow K-Albanians' arrests for war crimes, resonated with the shared trauma of many K-Albanians, often ending in seemingly irrational violence. As a result, the researcher began to examine the transference of violence from direct conflict between UNMIK Police and the K-A population to incidents of anonymous terrorism or vandalism to determine whether a cause and effect relationship existed that could explain the violence.

In the researchers role as the Supervisor of the UN SICC during the time period studied, it became easy to focus specifically on the incidents of violence between UNMIK Police and the K-A population from the perspective of law and order. Ultimately, it was the opinion of UNMIK Police that those arrested for alleged war crimes in 1999 and those that supported them were both guilty of committing criminal acts. However, that approach provided little understanding as to why the population would often become aggressive at the mere sight of UNMIK Police or SPU units in riot gear as demonstrated in the incidents outlined at Appendix C. Or why, after a confrontation with duly appointed international law enforcement authorities, attacks would be carried out, often at night, against these same institutions; that is, until the UN SICC and AUS began to examine the role that trauma, visual triggers and propaganda played in perpetuating this violence as outlined in Section 4.1, and how single incidents often developed into longer-term disruption of public order.

This study of the shared experience of K-Albanian people and their historical reaction to police tactics provided great insight into the actions taken by the K-A population as captured in the statistics of 2002 and 2003. It was this understanding and experience of the demonstrations on which the researcher based a simple flowchart at Appendix F. The flowchart offers a visual explanation of the violence witnessed during this timeframe. The chart shows predictable events based on common timelines during the events and the descriptions of the triggers that initiate the events.

5.3 Long-term effects of the conflict between UNMIK Police and the K-A population

After exploring the potential causes of the violence and the role unwittingly played by UNMIK Police in the creation of the situation, the following narratives demonstrate the long-term effects of this violence on the overall security of the mission itself. The narratives are extracted from the executive summaries of the UN Security Quarterly Reports sent to UNHQ New York at the end of each quarter as a means of gauging the overall security situation in Kosovo at the time. The entire summaries are included for reference at Appendix D. Each of the excerpts illustrated below indicate the growing impact of the instability following the aforementioned arrests and

demonstrations in Kosovo at the time. None of the summaries attribute responsibility for this unrest with the UNMIK Police. However, in light of the historical description of K-A action in the face of law and order institutions and the descriptions of the K-A respondents in the next section, the following executive summaries provide valuable insight into the action-reaction nature of the destabilization outlined.

Excerpts from UN Security Quarterly Reports January 2002 to December 2003

1st quarter 2002

> Pristina experienced its first distruptive protest over the arrest of former KLA/UCK members .... Expect more protests over the arrest of persons for crimes committed during war, especially from the rank/file of the UCK/KLA. Crime will continue to be directed against UN property (UN Security Quarterly Report, pp. 1-2, Jan-Mar 2002).

2nd Quarter 2002

> The first month of this quarter the issue of implementing the 'rule of law' involving the arrest of former KLA/UCK members for crimes committed during war directed against Kosovar Albanians from the Pec Region was considered pivotal. Of note, during the post-arrest periods, UNMIK staff and property were the direct targets of threats, arsons of personal property and other forms of intimidation (UN Security Quarterly Report, p. 1, Apr-Jun 2002).

3rd quarter 2002

> In regards to arrests of Kosovar Albanians, additional arrests occurred and demonstrations occurred in the areas of the former KLA member's zones of operations. Civil disturbance erupted in Decani between K-Albanian protesters and law enforcement authorities resulting in the first use of tear gas and other crowd control procedures in this region (UN Security Quarterly Report, p. 1, Jul-Sept 2002).
>
> .

1st quarter 2003

> With the first ICTY-level arrests against Kosovar Albanians, protests were organised at a Kosovo-wide level.... A new emerging trend has been the direct targeting of UNMIK Police Stations following high profile war crimes arrests or convictions.... There continues to be follow on violence and property damage after the demonstrations have completed (UN Security Quarterly Report, p. 1, Jan-Mar 2003).

2nd quarter 2003

> The current pattern of events continues to fall within the following trend of direct targeting of UNMIK Police and Judicial structures. (UN Security Quarterly Report, p. 1, Apr-Jun 2003).

3rd quarter 2003

> "Incidents continue but with an increase of frequency especially following major court decisions involving the KLA/UCK" (UN Security Quarterly Report, p. 1, Apr-Jun 2003).

Ultimately, as described in both the short and long-term actions of certain K-A segments of society following encounters with the UNMIK Police, the K-A response to arrests of fellow K-Albanians for crimes committed during the war became relatively predictable. Furthermore, their actions, following exposure to extremist propaganda when in contact with UNMIK Police could also have been foreseen. It is the contention of the researcher that the action-reaction cycle that developed during this timeframe was potentially preventable if cursory pre-operation conflict analyses had been conducted by UNMIK Police concerning the situations to be encountered, described in later sections.

OVERALL EFFECT OF UNMIK POLICE TRAINING AND ACTIONS ON K-A SOCIETY

6.1 Kosovo-Albanian attitudes towards security structures in Kosovo

> *"NATO and the United Nations were seen as saviors by Albanians in Kosovo in 1999. They were seen in the same light as the Kosovo Liberation Army fighters. However, as the arrests of Albanian war heroes goes on, UNMIK is seen as increasingly oppressive...like the Serbs, but without the brutality."*
>
> -24-year-old Kosovo-Albanian respondent

Obviously, from the point of view of experiences, and given the historical pretext outlined in Section 4.1, interviews with K-Albanian respondents were some of the most difficult to complete. This was due to the sensitivities each respondent possessed concerning the line of questions in relation to their personal experience during and after the Serbian dominance of the Province of Kosovo during the Milosevic Regime. Ten K-Albanians ranging in age from 21 to 42 were interviewed during a one-month period in person. It became clear as the interviews progressed that this particular group of respondents seemed exceedingly eager to help me understand the K-A perspective of the conflict and the role played by police officers before, during and following the fighting in Kosovo in 1999.

Category: Phenomenological Oriented Questions relating to the personal experiences of K-Albanians during the spring and summer of 1999

When the interviews discussed what it was like for K-Albanians to live in Kosovo before and during the Serbian dominated Milosovic regime, most respondents gave very similar answers. The following quotes from various respondents well represent the perspective of K-Albanians who lived in Kosovo between the years 1989 and 1999:

> *"It was an occupation....a bad dream."*
>
> *"They were oppressive and paranoid times...the key to survival was not to attract attention from the Serb security forces."*

"I would not want anyone to live in those conditions."

"The Serb regime pretended to be gods during the 1990s. They were the law."

Each K-A respondent had a unique and most often tragic story to tell of their life before the withdrawal of Serb forces following the NATO air campaign in the summer of 1999. Every person interviewed had lost at least one family member in the actions conducted by the Serbian security forces in 1999, which included systematic expulsion of the majority of the K-Albanian population of Kosovo. In one case, a female respondent had lost every member of her immediate family during this time except for one younger sister. Since the vast majority of these acts were carried out by Serbian dominated Yugoslav police, military forces and more often paramilitary forces, I began to gain a greater understanding, as the interviews progressed, of the hatred and mistrust most K-Albanians felt towards security structures in general.

When questioned about the role played by K-Albanians who fought against the Serbs as members of the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998-99[13], every respondent was quick to voice praise and respect for their actions. According to all respondents, the majority of K-Albanians viewed those who served in the KLA as heroes during the war, as they were seen to be defending the K-A population from the Serbian security forces. This perception of those who served with the KLA goes almost unchallenged wherever you go in Kosovo. Unfortunately, as described in previous sections of this paper, these individuals have also been accused, following years of investigation by International CIVPOL, of committing many crimes against Serbian security service personnel, Kosovo-Serbian civilians and a significant number of K-Albanian civilians, who were labeled as collaborators with the Serbian regime.

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[13] The KLA actually came into existence in the early 1990's. It was a small organization comprised of various diehard nationalists who felt that the non-violent tactics utilized by then existing K-Albanian leadership to counter Serbian aggression achieved little and that armed action was the only method by which to liberate Kosovo. This group did conduct a form of limited guerrilla war against the Serbian Police and Military forces in Kosovo throughout the 1990's. However, these actions were generally small and achieved little militarily outside of provoking large and often violent reprisals from the Serbian security forces. The KLA only became an internationally recognized military body in late 1998 as they began to attract larger numbers of recruits and received formal military training and support in Albania and later from the USA (ICG, "What Happened to the KLA," 2000).

These facts, however, have had little impact on the opinion of the majority of the K-A population, as voiced by one respondent who stated that "[they are] unsure of what they [members of the KLA] are accused of having done." Also, with the lack of the aforementioned transparency in the criminal justice system in Kosovo at present and the effective propaganda campaigns created by supporters of these former KLA members, one respondent stated that "no one is really sure whether they [members of the KLA] are guilty or not... Regardless of the arrests, they will always be seen as the defenders of the Albanian people."

This attitude also speaks to the role played today in K-Albanian society by the KLA Veterans Association and KLA War Invalids Association. These groups were extremely influential after the fighting of 1999. Interestingly, this situation has changed slightly as time passes and information about their activities comes to light. According to many respondents, these groups are still given much respect today, but are not really leaders in society at the moment due to rumors about their involvement in illegal activities and extortion. With that said, without any information from UNMIK following an arrest, these groups tend to gain in position and influence since they are the only ones distributing any information to the K-A population about the arrests. These groups are generally behind the organization of demonstrations against arrests, trials and verdicts and are also believed to be responsible for much of the anti-UNMIK propaganda distributed following arrests.

When the interviews moved on to inquire who were the leaders and people of influence in local K-A society today, a number of responses were received. While these respondents may have had personal biases towards one leader or another, one respondent summed up what all indicated in one way or another when he stated that leaders to K-Albanians are "those that have defended the Albanian people throughout time with either the gun or the pen." Leaders were and are also those people who "look to unify the Albanian people." With these statements in mind, one gets a feel for what leadership characteristics are respected within K-A society and why they continue to revere historic leaders by comparing existing leaders to heroes of previous centuries. Interestingly, many respondents also indicated that mediators within individual villages and communities

were also highly regarded and fulfilled a number of leadership roles within K-Albanian society.

Category: Historically Oriented Questions concerning the traditional role played by police and courts in Kosovo

At this point in the interviews, the questions were designed to gain an understanding of the historic role played by the police and court systems within Kosovo. To begin this area of the interview, each respondent was asked what images were brought to mind when they thought of the police and courts as an institution prior to 1999. The following quotes from different respondents gives an understanding of the perceptions of the K-A population that stays with people to this day:

> *"Brutality, Killing and suffering based upon nationality."*
>
> *"The police present in Kosovo after 1992 were chosen based upon their belief in Serbian nationalist ideals."*
>
> *"They [the police] represented the Serb state and were not here for our [K-A] protection from criminals."*
>
> *"If you had a problem, you dared not call the police to help as they would only make the situation worse."*

When asked about the role and effectiveness of courts and the rule of law in Kosovo during this same period, the respondents were fairly consistent in their answers. The following quotes represent the role of the courts and the rule of law as perceived by many K-Albanians prior to 1999:

> *"The police and the courts in Kosovo were traditionally used as tools of oppression of the Albanian People over the last hundred years."*
>
> *"These institutions have always been used as tools of brutality. This perception is very strong within the Albanian community and is passed on from generation to generation. It was slightly different under Tito's regime in the 1970s, but not by much."*

In light of this obvious mistrust of the entire security sector in Kosovo by the K-A community, especially during the years of the Milosevic regime, respondents were asked

how the K-A culture traditionally dealt with conflict, crime and corruption within its society before and during this period of time. Due to the distrust felt by the K-A population, efforts at conflict resolution occurred within the community or village social structure only. This was true for most functions of society during the years of Milosevic when K-Albanians both forcibly and voluntarily withdrew from most Serbian dominated aspects of society[14]. The result of this mindset during the 1990s was for communities to resolve conflicts amongst themselves, to include criminal matters, through mediation or other low level means of conflict resolution. This activity was normally handled peacefully and informally so as to ensure that the Serbian security structures were not involved.

This specific process of low-level conflict resolution normally began as a conversation between the aggrieved parties utilizing principles from ancient Albanian tribal law known as the Kanun[15] as a first resort. If this did not work, and the conflict remained, then a village leader or a member of a local respected family could be asked by the families involved to act as a mediator. Interestingly, according to many respondents, the Kanun is not used as much anymore as it tends to result in the use of violence too often due to the basic premise of the code which was that Blood could only be avenged by blood.[16]Upon further discussion, it was disclosed by the older respondents that the

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[14] A political party was founded in 1990 known as the Democratic League of Kosovo (abbreviated LDK in Albanian) by certain notable K-A academics and leaders in opposition to the Serbian crackdown on rights and freedoms for Albanians became a mass resistance movement in Kosovo. This party was dedicated to forming an independent republic of Kosova. While not prepared to engage the Serbs militarily in the early 1990s, the leaders of the LDK pursued a policy of systematically denying the legitimacy of Serbian rule by boycotting participation in Serbian state structures, thereby creating the outlines of a separate government. Starting with health care and education, the LDK organized their own parallel system of clinics and schools for Albanians, mainly in private residences funded by the new 'republic of Kosova' through an income tax of three percent levied, on a voluntary basis, in the Diaspora K-A communities around the world. By 1999, these parallel structures performed most key functions expected of a small nation state to include defense and international relations (Malcolm, 1999, pp. 348-349).

[15] The Kanun of Leke Dukagjini is the most famous compilation of Albanian customary law. This initially unwritten code originating in the 14th Century governed social behavior and almost every facet of life throughout much of Northern Albania (which included parts of modern Kosovo) for centuries. The Kanun was strictly observed by the tribes of Northern Albania and had priority over any other laws, ecclesiastical or secular. It is believed that with the help of this ancient code, the highland tribes were able to preserve their identity, their autonomy and their way of life though they were ostensibly part of the Ottoman Empire for five centuries. As a result, the Kanun remains widely respected by all Albanian peoples today as a unifying code of conduct (Elsie, 2001, P. 147).

[16] Blood taking is a reflection of Albanian Customary Law as codified in the Kanun. It was and is practiced as a means of exercising tribal justice in Northern Albania. Behind the blood feud is the principle that a man cannot cleanse his honor until he has given satisfaction in blood for a crime or infringement upon his

Communist regimes in both Yugoslavia and Albania encouraged the concept of involving mediators rather than strictly adhering to the Kanun due to the amount of blood shed and disturbance created by blood feuds in ethnic Albanian areas. As a result, while the Kanun is still a very important document within K-A society, it is also very common for people in Kosovo to resolve their personal disputes through the use of mediation. It was further indicated by all the respondents that, before their removal by the Milosevic regime, K-A police also performed mediation for low-level disputes without having to include the aggrieved parties in the justice system. Since 1999, members of the KPS have also tried to perform this function, but according to the majority of respondents, have done so unsuccessfully.

This lack of success was often attributed by many of the respondents to the presence of International CIVPOL during the mediation efforts. With that said, a number of the respondents did indicate that if international and national police were provided with the right training, they could take on the role of mediator much more effectively without having to escalate what are often family or village disputes into a matter for the already overburdened justice system in Kosovo. To do this successfully, however, the police would need to be seen as completely impartial, which ironically could be easier to achieve for international CIVPOL than some KPS officers due to their individual family links.

Category: Questions concerning K-A attitudes towards the war crimes process in general an UNMIK Police in particular since the end of the fighting in 1999.

When the interviews commenced with this particular group of respondents, they were all very forthcoming in their admiration of the efforts put forth by NATO and the UN towards their liberation and the reconstruction of their lives. The term "saviors" was used frequently in reference to the international community immediately after the fighting in 1999.

However, as time has past and UNMIK still maintains executive control over the administrative and financial organs within the newly constituted government, increased

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honor or upon the honor of a member of his family. In 1991, it was estimated that some 60,000 people in Northern Albania did not dare leave the security of their homes because of blood feuds (Elsie, 2001, pp. 44-45).

resentment was felt by many of the K-A population of Kosovo. UNMIK is seen as making too many unilateral decisions that affect the lives of the K-A people on a daily basis. This situation has created, over time, a feeling amongst the K-A people that they are not in a position to make decisions involving their own future, which speaks to the shared experience of K-Albanians under Serbian domination.

Nowhere is this felt more by the respondents interviewed than when arrests of K-Albanians for war crimes are carried out by members of UNMIK Police. These arrests, often for reasons of operational security, are carried out in secret and frequently at night when resistance is expected to be the weakest. Unfortunately, the K-A people see these tactics as very similar to the tactics employed by the Serbian regime prior to 1999. Added to this, many, if not all of those K-Albanians being arrested are former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army and are seen as popular heroes by a large segment of the K-A population. As a result, all of the respondents indicated that many in their extended families are beginning to see UNMIK Police and the administration of UNMIK as increasingly oppressive and parallels to Serbian rule were discussed much more openly. This attitude, according to all of the respondents has only increased over time.

When asked about their opinions concerning the perceptions and performance of the International CIVPOL and the newly formed Kosovo Police Service (KPS) components of UNMIK Police, the respondents indicated, at the time of the interviews, that both groups were currently viewed as one institution as they are all commanded by International CIVPOL and trained by the international community at large. The respondents stated that both these groups were viewed as generally competent, but are seen as increasingly authoritarian and aggressive in the performance of their duties particularly when carrying out arrests for war crimes and responding to post-arrest demonstrations. The one area that the respondents did make a differentiation between the two policing bodies in Kosovo was when it came to understanding culture. There is a strong perception that CIVPOL officers have little understanding of the local culture or shared experiences of K-A people. As a result of this, they are often seen as unsympathetic to the shared traumas and experiences of the K-Albanians they are empowered to assist in their areas of responsibility.

When asked why the arrests of K-Albanians for crimes committed during the war was such a contentious issue for many within the K-A community, the general indication from respondents was poor or no communication on the part of UNMIK. One respondent stated that, "UNMIK waits too long to tell the local people about the reasons for the arrests, which allows troublemakers and extremists to fill the vacuum." He went on to say that "Information, when it finally comes out, is too little and not in formats that most local people can understand or pay attention to." Ultimately, all respondents agreed that the K-Albanian people do not yet understand, nor have faith in the fact, that the system of justice is for their benefit. The reasons for this were many, but tended to revolve around the feeling that the UNMIK administered justice system is not yet seen to be transparent by the local population and, as a result, people have trouble understanding that trials are fair. Also, when there are gaps of information following arrests, people see similarities with the arrests that occurred under Milosevic. The only way for people to gain faith in the system of justice, according to many of the respondents, is for information to be passed to the people quickly in order to educate the masses in formats they can understand.

There was indication by many of the respondents, however, that while there is skepticism, some people are slowly starting to recognize the connection between what those K-Albanians arrested by UNMIK Police may have been accused of and corresponding rumors about their wartime and, more importantly, post-wartime conduct within their own community. This is leading to slight increases in faith in the justice system. There is a perception that if the people arrested are found to be not guilty, they will continue to be treated as heroes by the people, if they are proven to be guilty in a transparent process, they will loose the large-scale support that many of those arrested enjoy and use to mobilize the population during demonstrations. Interestingly, their conduct before, during and after the war is viewed as different by the K-Albanian community and it still proves difficult to change peoples views about those that fought with the Kosovo Liberation Army during the fighting of 1999 regardless of the nature of the crimes they are accused, and/or, convicted of.

6.2 CIVPOL Perspectives on the causes of conflict between UNMIK Police and the K-A population

Having examined the role that organization and training of UNMIK Police may play in the conflicts between UNMIK Police and the K-A population during the period studied, The researcher attempted to clarify many of these issues through interviews with key UNMIK Police respondents. The data extracted from the 14 CIVPOL interviews conducted are organized into themes reflecting the assumptions affecting International CIVPOL officers that formed the hypothesis of this paper.

After having completed a number of interviews with CIVPOL respondents, it became increasingly clear that each respondent relied upon their own personal experience as police officers to respond to situations in Kosovo rather than any specific training or indoctrination from UNMIK or the Civilian Policing Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. While this was not unexpected, it did serve to indicate some of the vastly differing philosophies being applied to day to day policing in Kosovo by this international group of Police Officers.

As described in Section two, each of the respondents interviewed held some form of command appointment of units directly involved in training of UNMIK Police or involved in coordinating or responding to large scale conflict with the local population.

Category: What training/orientation do incoming police officers receive when they arrive in Kosovo?

While each of the respondents indicated that they all had received some form of training provided by their own nations prior to deploying to Kosovo, they often indicated that this training was to no specific standard and covered a varying degree of subjects with little consistency between nations. Primarily, all respondents indicated that there is an expectation that all CIVPOL officers arriving in a mission such as Kosovo require little training due to the fact that individual officers are fully trained police officers in their own countries.

Once in Kosovo, all respondents indicated that they received approximately ten working days of orientation provided by the UNMIK Police Training Center (PTC) as previously described. All respondents indicated that the orientation provided by the PTC in Kosovo was almost entirely theoretical in nature and that there was no common

philosophy for policing provided to newly arrived CIVPOL officers during this orientation outside of information provided in the United Nations Civilian Police Handbook (1995) authored by DPKO.[17]

Those officers involved in commanding or coordinating the activities of SPU units indicated that these units train extensively for public order control tasks while in Kosovo and that this training is based solely upon national standards as these units receive no training in this area from the PTC.

When asked what training CIVPOL officers should receive before and after their deployment to Kosovo, Most respondents agreed that any training provided must be based upon an assessment of the needs of the society being policed and the environment in which these services are to be provided. All officers interviewed indicated that training provided must be heavily oriented to the needs and culture of the people within the society being policed. Taken even further, some officers felt that pre-training and mission orientation training should involve social awareness, understanding of historical actions involving the population, understanding of the historical impact of conflict on the population and, most importantly, the role played by the former police force within the society.

Category: UNMIK Police responses to public order disturbances and their affects on the local population.

In describing a typical Police response to public disorder or demonstrations within Kosovo when the interviews were conducted, the majority of Western European police respondents indicated that a graduated response to the disorder was essential if UNMIK Police were not to unduly raise the tension of the situation. While many shared this concept as expressed primarily by the Western European police respondents, it was

[17] The United Nations Civilian Police Handbook was originally designed for CIVPOL officers deploying on police observer mission and is not oriented towards an executive authority-policing mission such as Kosovo. Therefore, when it comes to specific police operations and tasks, individual officers are expected to bring their own personal experiences and organizational culture to their day-to-day policing duties in Kosovo. One of the drawbacks to this situation, according to many of the Western European respondents was that local Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers receiving field training from international CIVPOL are forced to adapt themselves almost daily to the differing styles of each international CIVPOL officer that they are assigned to field train under.

clearly not shared by all nationalities represented within UNMIK Police. It was during these early stages of the interview process that cleavages began to show between the philosophies of Western European and Canadian police forces who felt that people have the right to protest as long as they are peaceful and other respondents who either did not see a positive benefit or else felt less positively towards the rights of the population to take their dissatisfaction to the streets.

In the opinion of the then UNMIK Police Director of Operations, there were two cases in 2002 in the towns of Pec and Decani in Western Kosovo, where pre-emptive aggressive tactics chosen by the on-scene commander of the Argentinean Special Police Unit (SPU) led to an unnecessary direct confrontation with crowds of demonstrators utilizing non-lethal means of crowd control. These actions taken by the SPU unit created an unnecessary "fight or flight" response in the crowd that resulted in casualties amongst the police present and to a greater degree amongst members of the crowd often trapped by the tactics employed by the SPU. These injuries primarily resulted from rubber bullets and strikes with batons by members of the SPU. The Police injuries were mostly from thrown projectiles such as rocks.[18]

When asked how such situations should be handled by UNMIK Police in the future, most interviewed acknowledged that multiple different methods have been employed in the past to deal with such situations, but no one common approach was agreed upon by all respondents. The tactics employed by the UNMIK Police present at such incidents tended to be based upon the personal experience, nationality and organizational culture of the police commander directly involved. The only issue that all respondents were able to agree upon was the fact that the public demonstrations were a drain on limited manpower within UNMIK Police as even a small demonstration required 200-300 officers to be present if you included the requirement for traffic control.

All respondents further indicated that the UNMIK Police units most directly involved in policing demonstrations arising from post-war crimes arrests, trials and verdicts were the nine individual SPUs. While the organization and strengths of these SPUs have been described earlier in this section, they also possess a number of problems directly relating to the hypothesis of this paper according to many of the respondents.

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[18] This incident is described in detail in Appendix D of the paper.

These problems tend to involve language issues and differing training and operating standards. These units deploy with the tactics and attitudes they use in their home countries, which commonly are not compatible to the situation in Kosovo due to the degree of force commonly used by these units in their home countries. Also, the majority of police serving in SPUs do not speak English and require their instructions presented to them by their commanders, who themselves, often have a weak grasp of English[19].

These units, in turn, are then directed by individual Regional UNMIK Police Commanders who do not have day-to-day operational control over the SPU units in their area of operations and are often of a different nationality. The result of this unique command arrangement is that SPU units, who themselves have no common training or deployment philosophy, are then deployed and directed by individual Regional Police Commanders who they often have never worked with and who also have no consistency in approach for reasons previously described. In summary, all respondents agreed that the approaches and philosophies of different public order units within Kosovo have been, and continue to be, affected by their differing national and organizational policing cultures. It goes without saying the effect that this lack of cultural understanding must have on the relations between the UNMIK Police and the K-A community during conflict situations.

Category: Is there a common philosophy for conflict resolution applied by UNMIK Police when dealing with conflict involving the local population.

When the interview moved from general training issues to the more specific theme of conflict resolution training, it became clear from the responses of the respondents that there has never been any common philosophy for conflict resolution provided at any level within UNMIK Police. Where the concept of conflict resolution has been incorporated into training or practice in Kosovo it has been done at the local, or station level on the initiative of local commanders who may have had some background in the utilization of conflict resolution techniques.

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[19] SPU commanders and policemen were not required to possess the same degree of language skills as other front line CIVPOL officers by DPKO due to the fact that they are expected to be units of last resort and are not required to interact with the general population as are other CIVPOL officers. As a result, entire riot control units are deployed from donor nations in order to maintain unit cohesiveness without concern over their ability to speak and understand the mission language (interview with Director of the UNMIK PTC).

All respondents felt that some standard approaches or philosophies towards conflict resolution would be useful for all CIVPOL officers serving with UNMIK, since it is difficult to know what training or experience in this subject that officers from different countries possess before they arrive in Kosovo. Added to this, the officers also felt if this training were to be provided to newly arriving CIVPOL officers, it would also have to contain a great deal of local cultural awareness training involving in-depth understanding of how the local population has historically dealt with conflict.

One senior German UNMIK Police Commander who had held a number of command appointments within UNMIK Police during his time in Kosovo provided a very simple example of his experiences with differing approaches to conflict by CIVPOL officers. As an example, he stated that when American CIVPOL officers were coordinating responses to demonstrations or conflicts with the local population, the response tended to be aggressive and uncompromising. On the other hand when he observed British or Northern Irish CIVPOL performing the same function, the responses by UNMIK Police to these situation were intended to be seen as low key and graduated. The philosophy carried by the officers from the United Kingdom was one of protest facilitation within the boundaries of the law. As this same senior officer stated later in his interview "controlled demonstrations can be a form of positive conflict for the local population to vent frustration without resorting to violence." It became clear as the interviews progressed, however, that this attitude was not shared, nor understood by all CIVPOL officers.

6.3 Summary

The overall effects of the aforementioned conflict on the K-A population are well articulated by the K-A respondents in Section 6.1. These increasingly entrenched negative attitudes as displayed by a good portion of the K-A population interviewed stemmed, as previously described, from shared experience and the lack of cultural understanding of the majority of UNMIK Police when encountering the population during the period studied. The violence and conflict as outlined in this section of the paper only serves to further highlight the effect of these shortcomings as they concern the mission of UNMIK Police. The following description of the role, or lack thereof, that

psycho-social healing has in a post-conflict environment provides interesting insight into the trends previously attributed to the post-war K-A population:

> The healing of the psychological wounds of violence and the reconciliation of antagonistic communities is the most long-term activity in the post-settlement peace process. Reconciliation encompasses many different activities undertaken in the aftermath of a violent conflict. It can mean acquiescence (willing or otherwise) to a given situation, the harmonization of divergent versions of history, and the restoration of friendly relations. [Ultimately, this] is a long-term process that may take generations (Reynolds, 1999, Para 9).

This quote only serves to highlight the effect of actions taken by UNMIK Police during the demonstration of 2002 and 2003 on the K-A population as articulated in the opinions expressed in Section 6.2. With this in mind, this section will conclude with a prescription, based upon further interviews with two K-A respondents in February 2005 that would serve as a starting point from which the International CIVPOL officers in command of UNIMIK Police during 2002 and 2003 may have broken the action-reaction cycle previously outlined. While only a starting point, the K-A respondents recently interviewed felt that if International CIVPOL officers possessed a basic understanding of the K-A population when they arrived in Kosovo, this could, in the opinion of the respondents, help prevent the violent reactions outlined previously in this paper. The respondents strongly suggested that the following critical cultural information, if imparted upon International CIVPOL officers could have helped prevent the violence and conflict demonstrated in the period examined for this study. This cultural information would need to be imparted by a K-Albanian in order to create the depth of understanding required and should consist of:

- Understanding of the role that history plays in K-A society.
- Understanding, specifically, the effect that the last 20 years of existence within the Serbian Republic has had on the K-A collective culture.
- Understanding of the role played by Serbian law and order institutions between 1990 and 1999.
- Understanding of the role that the family and clan structure plays in K-A society
- Understanding the changing role that family members continue to play in K-A society since the end of the fighting in 1999.

In addition, when asked what general triggers to violence International CIVPOL Officers should be aware of when encountering the K-A population in demonstrations, in order to prevent the conflict outlined in this section, a number of points were made by the K-A respondents. Specifically, the respondents felt it was essential that International CIVPOL Officers were aware that the following issues, specifically applicable to the police, act as triggers to violence for most of the K-A community:

- The posture, equipment and attitudes of police, regardless of nationality.
- Any conflict between Serbians and Albanians over any issue can result in conflict well out of proportion to the event.
- Any negative incident involving Serbians and Albanian children, regardless of the severity.
- Any action by the police resembling that taken by the Serbian Police in the 1990s
- Lack of positive exposure to the International CIVPOL Officers can become a trigger over time, as the police will increasingly be associated with the actions of the Serbian Police in the past.

These suggestions could have been used to form the basis for a conflict analysis structure for International CIVPOL officers prior to engaging the K-A population in demonstrations following the war crime arrests, trials and convictions that occurred during the period examined and certainly should be provided to CIVPOL during pre-training and orientation. The concept of using this locally determined awareness as a foundation for conflict analysis efforts when encountering the K-A population either during demonstrations or day to day policing will be examined in following sections of the paper.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT PRESENT BETWEEN UNMIK POLICE AND K-A SOCIETY

This section of the paper will now build on the quantitative and qualitative data provided in the earlier sections with an aim to gain a more thorough understanding of the conflicts identified by the researcher. This will be achieved by applying specific conflict theory to the phenomenon described in order to gain greater insight into causes of, and motivations behind, the violence that resulted from encounters between UNMIK Police and the K-A population in 2002 and 2003.

As a starting point, the researcher attempted to understand the context of the phenomenon present during these conflicts through the utilization of General conflict theory. Three theorists provided a useful framework from which to examine the environment within which conflict existed in Kosovo during this time frame. The first theorist identified by the researcher who provided insight into this conflict environment was Georg Simmel who studied the area of group affiliations and their role in conflict. Specifically, Simmel (1955) believes that shared conflict experiences brings groups and individuals together in a very tight and at times irrational bond that is very resistant to outside influence. Simmel further believes that this action can cause members of the group to be blind to improper motivations of members within that group, which can create willing followers and obedience outside of an individual's normal behavior (as stated in Tidwell, 1998, pp.62-63). This description of group cohesion sheds a great deal of light on the K-A community and their adoration for former members of the KLA regardless of their current activities.[20] Due to the shared experiences of K-Albanians before and during the war, it appears, based upon Simmel's research that many in the K-A community are pre-disposed to support these individuals, regardless of the circumstances present which is little understood by the majority of UNMIK Police interviewed for this paper.

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[20] Many of the former members of the KLA arrested for allegedly committing war crimes during the fighting in 1999 were also the focus of various criminal investigations by UNMIK Police for involvement in various criminal activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking and prostitution following the end of the war.

Another theorist who offered valuable insight in understanding the general conflict environment in Kosovo was Lewis Coser (1956), who believed that conflict is not necessarily always negative, and that positive conflict can exist. With that being said, for conflict between parties to be constructive, it should be facilitated so that it does not become destructive as in the case of Kosovo during the period studied. Coser felt that positive conflict needed to be facilitated due to the fact that it is often confrontational in nature and always has the potential to evolve into negative conflict between the parties (as stated in Tidwell, 1998, pp. 63-65). As will be described later by another theorist, K-A society exhibits many signs of a society that suffers from too much conflict.

A third theorist built on the aforementioned concepts and attempted to go beyond basic methods to control conflict in a place like Kosovo. Rather, he tried to focus on whether conflict could be made productive. Morton Deutsch (1991) in his article "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution" believes that for conflict to be made productive, we need to understand the natures of both destructive and constructive conflict. Deutsch believes that social interaction is the key to this understanding. This requires a subjective approach to conflict analysis due to his belief that if one party in a conflict believes a conflict exists, then there is a conflict regardless of the view of the other party. He believes that conflict is heightened when parties are in constant contact with each other and that even a perception of incompatibility can influence conflict. This theory speaks to the evolution of the relationship and attitudes between UNMIK Police and the K-A population during the period studied in this paper.

In his studies, Deutsch (1991) determines that cultural use of conflict is a predictor of future behavior in any society. In order to make this potentially predicted conflict productive, conflict resolution must be applied and that the more skillful the party, the more likely that the conflict will be resolved in an effective manner. Therefore, Deutsch is a strong supporter of the concept that conflict resolution is best facilitated by skills training due to the requirement to enhance accurate perceptions and stimulate communication between the parties to a conflict (pp. 27-28). These general prescriptions concerning the nature of conflict and conflict resolution provided a useful base for the researcher from which to examine the conflict in Kosovo from the perspective that the conflict might not be intractable. These theorists also provided practical suggestions as to

how UNMIK Police, through the provision of skills training, might address the conflict they were confronted with in Kosovo.

7.1 History affecting conflict resolution efforts

In order to accurately analyze the causes, motivations, and likely evolving scenarios of conflict in Kosovo, the researcher felt it was important to understand whether the conflicts represented in this paper were isolated events or manifestations of a deeply rooted, historically based conflict associated with less tangible needs, values and identity issues that are perceived by the affected population to threaten their very existence. This understanding is important to the study of the conflicts between UNMIK Police and the K-A population since the stakes and risks may be higher when the motivations are deeply rooted and ingrained in the shared history of the affected population.

Alan Tidwell (1998) describes the role played by history in the creation and more importantly the maintenance of conflict in chapter six of his text *Conflict Resolved: A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution.* He indicates that:

> History plays a central role in the resolution of conflict. Most models of mediation have as one of the first steps that the parties in conflict describe the story, or the past, of the conflict. This is a clear recognition that one cannot plan for a resolution today without taking into account what has transpired in the past. This process of detailing the history of a given conflict serves several important purposes. First, it offers an opportunity to learn about the conflict from all sides. Second, it illustrates how the various parties perceive the conflict; it will highlight the similarities and the differences. Third, it will underscore the level of emotional commitment that parties have to the conflict. (p. 124)

This quote only further serves to shed light upon the importance for UNMIK Police to understand not only history but also the shared trauma of the K-A population if they are to interact with them appropriately during any level of conflict. To understand the role that history plays within a population, the police must be prepared to derive this knowledge from first hand accounts rather than an academic lecture in history and culture during an orientation session as was the case during the period of time examined in this paper.

Tidwell (1998) goes on to describe the role that history plays when analyzing an existing conflict. He states "to analyze history of conflict, the analyst of conflict does not look for the 'objective' version of past achievements, but rather the version of past achievements which guides and motivates the actions of parties" (p. 124). Based upon the experiences of the researcher, and further confirmed by the K-A respondents' comments, this is particularly essential in understanding conflicts in the Balkans due to the history of ethnic divisions and their connections to conflict in this region. Of the two main ethnic groups in Kosovo, both the K-A and K-S populations maintain ties to the geographic area based upon their version of historical events and the perceived roles played by the 'other' group in the conflicts that have occurred in the region over centuries.

Tidwell (1998) provides useful insight into the current conflicts in Kosovo by exploring methods by which to analyze the role that history may be playing in conflicts encountered today. Pruitt and Rubin (1986), as cited by Tidwell (1998), further discuss how history might be analyzed. They indicated, according to Tidwell (1998), that before conflicts occur, key human needs or values must be articulated in the terms of goals or standards, which they entitle "aspirations." The authors indicate that a group with high aspirations is more likely to be involved in conflict rather than those with low aspirations. Pruitt and Rubin indicate five specific determinants that can be examined within a society that may help assess the role that past conflicts or experiences may be playing.

The Five categories of aspirations that Pruitt and Rubin (1986), as cited by Tidwell (1998), feel worthy of study are:

a. Past achievements;
b. Perceived power in regards to how parties have come to see their own power the way they do;
c. Rules and norms within a society or group;
d. Comparison with others in geographic or cultural proximity; and
e. Formation of Struggle groups do deal with perceived imbalances of the aforementioned aspirations (pp. 120-121).

Tidwell further commented, "It is important to observe that each of the five determinants is tied to some sense of the past. The achievements of the past need not necessarily be linked to any recent past, but can be tied to the distant past instead" (p. 122). From the

perspective of the researcher, this point is critical in understanding conflicts in the Balkans regardless of the party involved and speaks to the heart of the matter in relation to the attitudes of the K-A population.

Tidwell (1998) also describes the role that historically perceived weakness plays in the perpetuation of attitudes that may lead to conflict. He indicates, "Weak parties will cling to their sense of history much more tightly than those with relatively more power. In this way it is clear that history is a powerful and valuable resource in the conduct of conflict. It is also a strong force to grapple with in attempting to resolve conflict" (p. 123). This situation is certainly the case amongst the K-A population of Kosovo who were for many centuries a people ruled or controlled by another ethnic group. This trend only fuelled their own perception of weakness that, evidently, lives on today after the fighting of 1999 even though they are certainly the most powerful group in Kosovo. This phenomenon only further emphasizes the powerful effect that historical conditioning can play within a group or population and how this attitude effects the current relationship between the UNMIK Police and the K-A population.

In his conclusion on the subject, Tidwell (1998) looks at the conflict in Northern Ireland and how it has been made more tenacious by virtue of the history of all sides to the conflict. These pasts cannot be erased, nor can they be easily wiped away. Montville (1992), as quoted by Tidwell argues that:

> Healing and reconciliation in violent ethnic and religious conflicts depend on the process of transactional contrition and forgiveness between aggressors and victims.... This process depends on the joint analysis of the history of the conflict, recognition of injustice and resulting historic wounds. (p. 123)

This comment has direct relation to the situation in Kosovo and, whether, besides forgiveness, can peoples with an ingrained sense of shared trauma concerning the role of an organization such as the police learn to interact with a new and productive replacement organization using the same methods?

7.2 Cross cultural issues and conflict in Kosovo

One area of conflict that appears to contribute to the current environment of conflict between the K-A population and UNMIK Police is that of the challenge of

culture and communication. One scholar who sheds light on this issue is Raymond Cohen (1991) who, in chapter three of his book entitled *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* lays out the potential pitfalls of conflict resolution efforts in a multi-cultural environment. The chapter in question is entitled, "Intercultural Dissonance: a Theoretical Framework" and focuses upon the different ways in which the meaning of a message within intercultural negotiation can be lost in the transmission of the actual message due to various cultural obstacles.

Cohen (1991) bases a great deal of his argument upon the model cited from Lorand Szalay (1981). Szalay, as cited by Cohen (1991), argues that in multicultural negotiations, there is a more complicated concept at work than just moving information from the sender to the receiver. He states that due to various cultural differences, there is great potential for the actual message contained within the information to be lost in the transmission. Ultimately, he feels that once one party in a negotiation has physically received a message, it still has to be comprehended. Comprehension, he argues, is a matter of psychology in that comprehension of a particular message is based upon an individual's frame of reference (p. 20). Szalay very much believes that for parties to a negotiation to demonstrate true understanding of a message, they must draw upon matching assumptions. For this to occur, the parties must therefore share cultural experiences in order for them to interpret a particular message in similar ways (p. 21).

Cohen (1991) takes the premise of this model by Szalay and builds upon it in order to apply it to specific problems of intercultural negotiations. He does this by observing the difficulties experienced between western and non-western societies during the negotiation process and attributing these difficulties to a number of factors. In essence, Cohen feels that intercultural negotiations between the western and non-western world are ineffective due to the contrasting: focus of culture, roles of language, views of time, and the methods of transmitting messages between these sets of cultures (p. 22).

While Cohen (1991) does make the admission that his theory neglects to focus more specifically on the considerable differences within interdependent cultures, he still argues that his proposed model has an important role to play in the analysis of problems experienced in multi-cultural negotiations (p. 22). Specifically, he alludes to the differences in style between high context and low context cultures and their styles of

negotiation and as a result, the methods of most conflict resolutionists from the western world tend to be as Cohen describes: individualistic, direct, time obsessed and issue focused (pp. 22-23); Cohen implies that the west, where much of conflict theory has originated, must learn to adapt its style to the other cultures with which it is negotiating.

This is an extremely important point in regards to the conflict arising from day to day dealings UNMIK Police have with the K-A population. What few models of conflict resolution that are applied by UNMIK Police when dealing with individuals or groups in Kosovo tend to be based upon these concepts and reflect the aforementioned approach. This is specifically the case for UNMIK Police Officers from Western Europe and North America who occupy the majority of command positions within UNMIK Police.

Ultimately, Cohen (1991) provides interesting insight into the current and potential conflicts outlined in earlier sections of this paper concerning communication and negotiation in a multi-cultural environment like Kosovo. The challenge for UNMIK Police lies in how to overcome these differences with proper analysis and training and whether such programs could be instituted at this advanced stage in the mission cycle to better effect. No doubt, proper analysis, sensitivity and the willingness to compromise in an equitable way might be the cornerstones of this new approach to negotiations if further explored by UNMIK Police.

7.3 Clash between low context and high context cultures

Another conflict theorist that provides insight into the culturally based conflicts outlined in this paper is Stella Ting-Toomey (1985) who talks about culture and conflict and its relation to low-context and high-context cultures, which supports the aforementioned concepts outlined by Cohen.

Ting-Toomey (1985) argues, that possible conflict arises from differences in culture. While Ting-Toomey describes in great detail how conflict arises from, and between, different cultures, it is her specific descriptions of high and low context cultures that provide background to this specific study. She defines a low-context culture as groups of cultures that value words, or what is actually said (p. 76). They also tend to focus on the individual within that society over greater issues of the collective. A high-context culture is defined as groups of cultures that put the needs and goals of the group

first. This is more of a we-identity (p. 76). Within a high context culture, more emphasis is put on the relationship when dealing individuals or groups. Low context cultures, on the other hand, respect the value of specific words and tend to literally interpret the meaning of conversations.

Ting-Toomey (1985) believes these different cultures can clash when they encounter one another regardless of the issue. Specifically, she indicates that in a low-context culture, two people in a conflict can argue, yell, and curse at each other while still remaining friends (p. 77) whereas to do the same in a high-context culture is a severe insult. This causes both parties to "lose face" (p. 77).

Ting-Toomey (1985) also examines the differences in how these two culture types react to conflict. In the West, argument tends to be based upon the factual-inductive style of argument, which is based upon the study of facts to move toward a conclusion (p. 81). She states that the West utilizes "hard bargaining", while high-context cultures are more prone to use "soft bargaining" in order to save the face of the group (p. 82). Both of these methods have specific implications when it comes to time invested in the event. Negotiations involving low context cultures focuses on the effective use of time in order to determine the facts in order to come to a hasty conclusion. High context cultures, on the other hand focus on the maintenance of the relationship, painting a picture of an event that all can agree upon and saving face, which are all time intensive events. What becomes interesting to consider in light of this theory is the fact that the majority of UNMIK Police commanders interviewed for this study came from low-context cultures but they were providing police services for a high-context community heavily influenced by clan and kinship where folklore and images bestow meaning upon events for that population far in excess of individuals words.

The final section of Ting-Toomey's (1985) article also possesses significance for this study when she indicates that culture and conflict go hand-in-hand. One of the final ideas she presents is that conflict is viewed as functional and dysfunctional based on the culture and the situation (p. 83). This simple concept has great significance when considering the perceptions of conflict between UNMIK Police and the K-A population and within these groups themselves. UNMIK Police are made up of officers from over 40 nations that are a mixture of high and low context cultures. The creation of a single

organizational philosophy towards conflict is essential for this force. However, the challenges of creating such a singular philosophy within an organization represented by these differing cultural styles and approaches to conflict is one of the greatest challenges that the UN and UNMIK Police continue to face. Ultimately, performing a cultural analysis as a component of an overall conflict analysis, prior to any intervention by UNMIK Police is essential. This will help CIVPOL officers, who initially viewed a situation as abnormal, to view the situation through another lens that applies meaning and puts the situation into greater perspective.

7.4 Roots of Identity based conflict in Kosovo

In support of the other theories expressed in assessing the motivations and characteristics of past and current conflict between UNMIK Police and elements of K-A society, it was important for the researcher to identify and establish the potential source of the conflict between these groups. Ideally, any actions taken by UNMIK Police involving the K-A population will vary greatly depending upon the type of conflict identified. Currently, UNMIK and KFOR have identified the conflict that arises during large scale policing operations in Kosovo as one of criminal disregard for UNMIK's authority and the rule of law. However, upon closer examination, it appears that this conflict bears most of the characteristics of one that is identity-based as described by Jay Rothman (1997). In this theory, Rothman indicates that the sources of identity conflict are the needs and values of that particular group. That threats to, or frustration over, such identity needs as dignity, safety and control fuel this conflict. He further argues that characteristics of such conflict tend to be rooted in intangibles such as history, psychology, culture and belief systems that comprise the abstract and complex goals of that group (p. 17).

Based upon K-A respondent interviews, the K-Alb community feels that many of those arrested by UNMIK Police are members of their own family due to their perceived past deeds. As a result, many in the population see the arrests of these individuals as a threat to their very identity. Their needs for safety and control over their own future is of the utmost importance to the K-A community, especially for those members suffered greatly under the Serb dominated Yugoslav regimes of the past. The K-Alb cultural

identification with being the 'underdog' in the Balkans also feeds into this paranoia about cultural survival. Ultimately, any conflict management system employed to rectify the ongoing conflicts between UNMIK Police and the K-A population of Kosovo will have to take these issues to heart and allow the community to voice these concerns in a productive forum or else the police may continue to be seen as symbols of ongoing oppression in the eyes of K-Albanians.

7.5 Organizational conflict as it affects a population

When first trying to understand the rationale behind the violence experienced during and after the major demonstrations of 2002 and 2003, the researcher found the tables prepared by D. Kolb, J. Osland and I. Rubin (2000) extremely useful. While understanding that the tables concerned were designed as methods for understanding organizational conflict, I felt that the tables for diagnosing conflicts among groups (p. 310) and intervening in conflict among groups (p.313) were extremely helpful in better understanding the potential dynamics at play in the conflict between the international community, UNMIK Police and the K-A community of Kosovo. Ultimately, the situation in Kosovo would appear to fall under the type of an area suffering from the symptoms of too much conflict. These symptoms, as described by Kolb, Osland and Rubin fall under three categories: attitudes, behavior and structure.

Attitudes

- Blind to interdependence
- Unaware of dynamics and costs of conflict
- Elaborated stereotypes favorable to own and unfavorable to the other group

Behavior

- High cohesion and conformity with the capacity for high mobilization
- Overly competitive style
- Aggressive, exploitative behavior capable of preemptive attack

Structure

- Separate or undefined common larger system
- Few rules to limit escalation

- No inhibiting third parties available
- Impermeably bounded groups obsessed with own interests (p.310)

The K-A community fits almost all of these aforementioned categories of organizationally based conflict. This community has an elaborated stereo-type of their own plight, extremely high cohesion, aggressive defensive strategies that lead to preemptive attack, an inability to limit escalations of violence, and an obsession with their own interests. With this in mind, the strategies for dealing with such an organization as suggested by Kolb, Osland and Rubin (2000) take on great significance for any hypothetical UNMIK Police intervention strategy. Any strategy employed within this community would need to work to depolarize these self-sustaining stereotypes, emphasize interdependence with other minority communities and the international community in Kosovo, attempt to integrate more aggressive nationalist groups such as veterans organizations and students unions into a structure of common hierarchy as well as emphasize the potential costs of increased escalation to the entire community. Looking at this model, it forces those conducting the analysis to more closely examine the motivations of the K-A community rather than just superficially react to their expressions of anger as UNMIK and KFOR have historically done. This theory would clearly indicate that it is essential that International CIVPOL or DPKO conduct this kind of analysis prior to the deployment of any International CIVPOL to a mission area like Kosovo.

7.6 Escalation Theory and conflict in Kosovo

Another theory that helps to shed light on the actions of the K-A community when dealing with UNMIK Police is escalation theory. According to research conducted by Robert North, as cited by D. Sandole (1993), in situations of high involvement, parties to the conflict will tend to over perceive the level of violence in the actions of their adversary and to overreact to the actions of the adversary (p. 15). When this happens, a downward escalatory spiral may occur that seems outside of the parties' control to halt or reverse.

Signs that a conflict is escalating can also be found in an article by Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) who state that the following five transformations are very common in the escalation of conflict within or between societies:

- Heavier tactics such as threats, irreversible commitments and violence supplants light communication,
- Issues proliferate; additional resources committed,
- Specific issues give way to general issues; relationship deteriorates; general intolerance of each other evidenced,
- A Party's goal of simply doing well for itself is replaced by a competitive spirit of outdoing or hurting the other even more than it has been hurt in the process,
- Increased support and muscle of like-minded associates secured (pp. 58-59).

Based upon first hand observances by the researcher of K-A crowds during demonstrations and their reactions to UNMIK Police attempts at control, it would appear that the K-A population of Kosovo does possess many of the traits as described by Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994). These signs are extremely important for UNMIK Police to monitor and understand when dealing with the K-A population in any situation surrounding conflict or of emotional significance. This theory provides extremely useful insight into the potential actions of a K-A and more importantly, possible triggers to be avoided.

7.7 The effect of Emotional Intelligence on conflict resolution efforts

For many of the changes in attitude to occur which have been indicated as essential to the resolution of conflict as specified by the previously described theorists, an assessment as to the state of emotional intelligence and emotional competence of the K-A community might prove extremely useful to the preparation stage of any conflict resolution strategy by UNMIK Police. This concept as described by Cherniss and Goleman (2001) would be a very important consideration when evaluating this community's ability to accept change.

Cherniss and Goleman (2001) feel that emotional intelligence is made up of a person's basic, underlying capacity to recognize and regulate emotions. The K-A community within Kosovo has demonstrated time and again an inability to act without using violence when emotional intensity is high, decisions are tough and information about the security situation is incomplete. Ultimately, at present, the K-A community does not possess emotional self-control, the ability to adapt to new realities or the ability

to use their initiative in order to understand the greater political, military and social environment within which they find themselves in Kosovo. It has been the lack of these competencies that has sabotaged most low-level conflict resolution efforts to this point and must be considered in any conflict management strategy established by UNMIK Police.

FRAMEWORK OF PROPOSED CONFLICT RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES

> *"Conflict Resolution and conflict facilitation should be the philosophies used during public order incidents (demonstrations). Currently, the public receives a very mixed message from UNMIK Police due to our different approaches to police work."*
>
> – Former UNMIK Police Director of Operations

The hypothesis for this paper stated that current UNMIK Policing practices have, for the most part, failed to adequately resolve, and may, in fact, exacerbate the very problems they are designed to address when dealing with public demonstrations in Kosovo. The assertion of this paper is, therefore, that if training in a consistent philosophy of conflict analysis, conflict prevention and front line conflict resolution can be imparted upon international CIVPOL officers serving in Kosovo, the requirement to use force as the primary means to control large-scale, ongoing public demonstrations can be avoided.

The many sources of this conflict have been outlined in previous sections of this paper. The two most significant of these, lack of cultural understanding and the lack of centralized organizational philosophy within UNMIK Police have been shown to be significant contributing factors to this conflict and were, according at least to the majority of the K-A respondents, mostly preventable. Ultimately, these basic flaws have detracted from the good work done by the International CIVPOL component of UNMIK Police and were only magnified by the close interaction between the UNMIK Police and the K-A population during war crimes related demonstrations in 2002 and 2003.

This section of the paper will now examine existing methods of conflict mitigation that might be of utility in addressing the shortcoming identified in this paper if employed by International CIVPOL serving within UNMIK specifically, and other missions generally. Ultimately, it is proposed that the implementation of some, if not all, of the philosophies and methodologies suggested in this section might have helped to eliminate the conflicts examined in this study and may prove to be a foundation for training of CIVPOL officers for future peacekeeping missions where CIVPOL forces are deployed either as monitors or in the executive authority role. These methodologies are not intended to be taken and utilized verbatim, but rather, may form the foundation of any

conflict resolution training program that would, in turn, he specifically adapted to the needs of the UNMIK Police and the conflicts they face.

8.1 Examination of possible Conflict Analysis and Conflict Prevention philosophies for UNMIK Police

In light of the lack of formal conflict analysis structures within UNMIK Police, the researcher began to explore other organizations involved in peacekeeping in the Balkans to determine whether basic conflict analysis tools already existed that might be appropriate to deal with the conflicts identified in section 7. This research led the researcher to examine current conflict analysis practices of the military forces serving with KFOR in order to understand how these forces managed conflict with the K-A population.

Two sources of material were most useful when attempting to determine what methods of conflict analysis might have proved useful to International CIVPOL during the period examined by this paper. The first document comes from the Canadian Armed Forces and the second comes from the United States Army. The Canadian contribution, to be examined first, derives from the publication entitled *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers: Negotiations During Peace Support Operations* (Canadian Armed Forces, October 2001). This publication is a form of training manual published by the Canadian Army Lessons Learned Center and was co-authored by the researcher while serving with the Canadian Armed Forces. This manual was published in order to address shortcomings, similar to those described in this paper that affected Canadian military conflict resolution efforts in peacekeeping missions and provides useful insight into the possible utilizations of conflict analysis in peacekeeping operations.

According to *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers: Negotiations During Peace Support Operations* (2001) there are three key stages in preparing for and conducting conflict analysis for military personnel deploying on a peacekeeping mission. These basic guidelines also provide an example as to how International CIVPOL officers might also be trained to conduct conflict analysis when deployed in a peacekeeping

mission. The three phases to the conflict analysis process for Canadian Forces personnel begins even before the soldiers leave for the mission area. These three phases occur:

1. Prior to deployment;
2. it is little that was used was not much of cash Upon arrival in the mission area; and
3. Immediately prior to actual engagement in conflict or conduct of a negotiation or mediation (pp.7-8)

According to the Canadian military in this publication, the foundations for effective conflict analysis are laid prior to deploying to a peacekeeping mission through extensive training and orientation. These foundations consist primarily of historical and cultural education regarding the mission area. This training consists of first, detailed lessons in history as it affects the region and the parties involved in the conflict. This education involves both an understanding of ancient history affecting the region and the immediate history of the conflict that led to the creation of the peacekeeping mission. This training is then followed by lessons in key phrases in the local language that will aid with the conflict resolution efforts. These lessons also cover the subject of local body language and how it might differ from the culture of the peacekeeper. Finally, in conjunction with the other subjects, lessons concerning the norms and culture of those peoples in the mission area also form a cornerstone of this training. Expatriates from these areas now living in Canada are contracted by the Canadian Forces to teach all these subjects[21]. This instruction goes beyond training the soldiers to avoid offensive behavior and focuses primarily on issues such as how the cultures represented in the mission area deal with conflict, whether they are high-context or low-context, their style of communication, etc (p.7).[22]

In the case of the Canadian Armed Forces, this training is conducted in Canada before deployment overseas. In the case of International CIVPOL officers, this training

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[21] Individual lessons in language and culture are provided for each ethnic group represented in a mission area. As an example, if a soldier deployed to Kosovo, they would receive two sets of language and culture lessons. One taught by an expatriate Serb and one taught by an expatriate Albanian as there is no guarantee that the soldiers will only encounter one ethnic group when deployed to the mission area.

[22] Currently, this training is conducted for Canadian Forces Personnel at the Canadian Forces Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) for individual augmentees to peacekeeping missions or is conducted by Training Assistance Teams from the PSTC at individual Canadian Forces Bases in the case of large formed units deploying overseas for peacekeeping duty.

could be provided in the officers' home countries or, possibly, at regional training centers operated by either the United Nations or a group of contributing nations.

Once soldiers arrive in a mission area, *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers: Negotiations During Peace Support Operations* (2001) recommends further, more detailed, preparation for future conflict analysis in the form of orientation. The soldiers who are being replaced by the soldiers deploying often provide this orientation due to their recent experiences in the mission area. This type of orientation might prove useful for UNMIK Police and could be provided by the UNMIK Police Training Center when officers arrive in the mission. This orientation consists of lessons concerning the specific history of the conflict in the geographic area the soldiers are deploying to and again focuses on both the most recent conflict and older conflicts involving the same adversaries. The orientation then becomes more specific concerning the individual personalities the soldiers will deal with during their tour of service in the mission area. The aim of this orientation is to understand the unique differences of these personalities and to avoid the attitude, common amongst peacekeepers of lumping the actions of a population together simply because of their ethnicity (p.7).

The final stage in the Canadian Forces education process in support of conflict analysis according to *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers: Negotiations During Peace Support Operations* (2001) further narrows down the issues. Specifically, the onus is placed on self-education on behalf of the soldier who is about to engage in some form of conflict resolution with an aim to educate him or herself concerning the problem at hand. Specifically, the aim is to create an understanding, from the perspective of the ethnic group involved, why the issue that is creating, or potentially creating the conflict, is important to them. This understanding also involves gaining an appreciation of the history of the issue at hand as the conflict may have its roots in events not readily apparent to the soldier (p. 7). Ultimately, the aim of this level of conflict analysis is to develop some understanding of the interests shared by those involved in the conflict prior to encountering these different parties. This method of conflict analysis deals specifically with the lack of cultural awareness described by the respondents and the data presented earlier in the paper by directly addressing issues that might arise from Cross cultural

misunderstandings and would prepare the peacekeeper to mitigate the effects of low context and high context cultural clashes.

In support of the last stage in the conflict analysis process as described above, Canadian Forces personnel are encouraged to conduct an interest analysis for both themselves and the persons with whom they are potentially in conflict. This concept is based upon the theory of interest-based conflict resolution put forth by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their text *Getting to Yes* (1981). According to the manual, and based upon the writings of Fisher and Ury, interest-based negotiating is useful for this process as "it is based on the idea that interests are a truer measure of the negotiators' goals, and that finding mutually satisfying outcomes and maintenance of positive relationships is desirable. By focusing on interests, the negotiator(s) are getting at the real motivations, more quickly and in a more integrative and successful way" (p. 4). It is a vitally important, therefore, as part of the final stages of conflict analysis to identify the potential interests of those with whom the soldiers will be encountering.

From this analysis, according to *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers: Negotiations During Peace Support Operations* (2001), the military peacekeeper should be able to determine what they or their organization desires from an encounter, what the potential belligerent parties to the conflict want, and where they might have common interest which greatly aids the peacekeeper in adopting a conflict mitigation or conflict resolution strategy appropriate to the situation. Ideally, this strategy could also help the peacekeeper understand the effects of traumas experienced by the K-A population. This understanding would provide insight into how history, identity based conflict, organizational conflicts, and other conflict theories might influence the actions of the K-A population during confrontations. All of these considerations would then effect the degree of force to be required and, or, displayed during encounters between UNMIK Police and potential demonstrators in the context of the hypothesis of this paper. While elements of this process may not be directly applicable to UNMIK Police, it may form a useful foundation from which to build or tailor a conflict analysis strategy that could mitigate the shortcomings expressed by the respondents themselves.

Another form of conflict analysis utilized by the United States Army in Kosovo provides possible tools that could be employed by UNMIK Police when confronted by

conflict. This concept is articulated in a position paper entitled *Framework Scenarios for Kosovo and the Western Balkans* (KFOR, 2001). This paper was distributed within KFOR, and to UNMIK Police and UN Security following conflicts between ethnic Albanian extremists and the Serbian security forces in southern Serbia in 2001. This conflict occurred along the Eastern boundary of Kosovo and created significant instability along the boundary region between the Province of Kosovo and Serbia proper. As a result, the United States Army began to visualize future scenarios where this kind of action could affect the security and stability in Kosovo. These scenarios were then used as a form of conflict analysis by KFOR in anticipation of future conflict.

When determining which scenarios to utilize, the position paper put forth several criteria that could potentially be used to enhance any conflict analysis procedure employed by UNMIK Police. In essence, these scenarios were based upon first identifying the relevant actors that may be engaged in future conflict. Secondly, the goals of these actors in the terms of preferred end states to their actions were identified. Finally, the means and capacities by which these actors could seek to achieve their goals were examined in detail (KFOR, p. 2, 2001).

When examining the relevant actors potentially involved in conflicts, the paper makes important distinctions when it states that treating actors as a single entity tends to obscure the fact that several differences exist within most, if not all, groups playing a part in conflict in Kosovo (KFOR, p. 2, 2001). Distinguishing between extremists and moderates by and large captures the main divergences within the groups differing on policy issues. However, the paper argues that this distinction is not so much related to their basic goals, which tend to be massively pro-independence throughout the K-A community, but more to the means by which the goals are to be reached. In this context, extremists are prone to adopt means that are considered illegitimate, e.g. all forms of violence or terrorist acts. Whereas moderates tend to abide by generally accepted basic rules as long as their primary interests are met. The paper goes on to indicate that the extremists then go on to aggressively promote conflict in Kosovo by acting as conflict entrepreneurs (KFOR, p. 3, 2001).

With this in mind, the paper goes on to provide interesting insight into the concepts contributing to the conflicts outlined in section 7 of this paper when the author

states, "led by extremist political leaders in collusion with organized crime bosses acting as conflict entrepreneurs, the Albanian population increasingly becomes susceptible to political propaganda that portrays the international community as the major hindrance to economic development and political independence" (KFOR, p. 7, 2001).

When examining and determining what the various actors' desire, the paper indicates that those conducting the analysis must understand that as actors differ within regions, so do their ultimate goals. If these ultimate goals can be identified before hand, then the task of conducting interest analysis as described in earlier paragraphs of this paper becomes much simpler. To do this, the position paper suggests that the framing of the goals of all major actors identified in terms of what their end-states or ultimate goals are within the context of anticipated conflicts in the simplest way possible to achieve this aim.

Overall, while concepts provided within this position paper are proposed with military strategic war gaming in mind, the fundamentals offer useful tools that could also be utilized by UNMIK Police when conducting proactive conflict analysis well before events such as war crimes related demonstrations occur. In light of ongoing indictments being issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the recent voluntary detention of the Prime Minister of Kosovo on war crimes charges, this process would currently seem to be a useful and prudent course of action that could have also been valuable in 2002 and 2003. In the end of the day, argues the author of this paper, a solid effort at actor analysis will allow various planning units within KFOR, and potentially within UNMIK Police, to conduct strategic analysis which will form the foundations for conflict planning and subsequently consequence analysis concerning the potential reactions to these aforementioned plans (KFOR, pp. 14-15, 2001). Ultimately, this type of analysis aims to provide improved and enhanced understanding of the K-A populations thinking and behavior below the strategic level, which would allow for the greater engagement and appropriate planning by UNMIK Police before demonstrations even occur.

While neither of the aforementioned concepts are perfect solutions to the conflicts outlined in this paper, the endorsement of cultural awareness and interest articulation

included in both methodologies could, provide the philosophical foundation for potential conflict analysis efforts employed by UNMIK Police in Kosovo.

8.2 Options for conflict resolution training

When considering potential methods for conflict resolution training for International CIVPOL officers, The researcher examined a number of existing conflict resolution training programs utilized to train military personnel and civilian personnel serving with peacekeeping missions. In addition to these programs, systems for training police officers in non-peacekeeping environments were also considered. What became clear when examining all these programs was the fact that drew much of their content from the concept of principled negotiation as put forth by Fisher and Ury (1991).

The Philosophies espoused by Fisher and Ury (1991) have permeated every training program examined by the researcher. Ultimately, and of direct application to this paper, these authors demonstrate that there is an alternative way to negotiate conflict which requires neither the overt use of force, nor capitulation. The method they propose decides issues on their merits rather than through a haggling process focused on what each side says it will and won't do. Ultimately, this method focuses on the examination of mutual gains whenever possible, and that where interests conflict, the results should be based on some fair standards independent of the will of either side (p. xviii) which would go a long way towards addressing the conflicts identified earlier in the paper.

Fisher and Ury (1991) best describe how this concept may be of use in the situations described in this paper when they explain, "every negotiation is different, but the basic elements do not change. Principled negotiation can be used whether there is one issue or several; two parties or many; whether there is a prescribed ritual, as in collective bargaining, or an impromptu free for all, as in talking with hijackers...[ultimately] principled negotiation is an all purpose strategy" (p. xix). The flexibility of this strategy makes it well suited to the sometimes-chaotic environment of a peacekeeping mission due to its basic premise, which instructs those engaging in conflict resolution efforts to not bargain over positions due to the fact that it will only serve to entrench those positions.

With this methodology in mind, three diverse examples of training programs incorporating these principles were specifically examined with the goal of better preparing officers to deal with the conflicts outlined in this paper. This paper will not attempt to scrutinize all the key components of the three packages of conflict resolution training material, but rather will compare and contrast how this training is delivered and the major components of each training program. The aim will be to then suggest components of a training program in conflict resolution for International CIVPOL officers that could address the shortcomings of CIVPOL training and employment highlighted in the hypothesis of this paper.

The first training program examined is currently utilized by the Canadian Armed Forces based upon the principles outlined in the previously described manual, *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers: Negotiations During Peace Support Operations* (2001). The second source examined was a training package entitled *Introduction to Conflict Resolution* (2002) produced by Drouin Learning Solutions for front line officers of the Edmonton Police Service and that has formed the foundation for conflict resolution training for the Edmonton Police Service since that time.[23] The third program examined is an instructional package produced by the UN Training and Evaluation Service of DPKO entitled *Communication and Negotiation* (2003) that was accessed from the DPKO web site in Dec 2004. Each of the three sources of conflict resolution training offer slightly different takes on the models proposed by Fisher and Ury and will each, in turn, be explored in order to determine which components would be of most use to International CIVPOL officers serving in a post-conflict environment. The results of this comparison are demonstrated in the table included at Appendix G.

Possible foundations for conflict resolution training

While many of the aspects of these three diverse training programs differ, there exists a solid commonality of conflict resolution training principles, which if extracted could be, in the experience of the researcher, utilized as the core of a training program for

[23] This training package was provided to the researcher in February 2004 by a Constable within the Edmonton Police Service who was responsible for training and standardization with this force. This Constable indicated that this initiative was driven by senior management with the Edmonton Police Service as part of a long term program to standardize the training and organizational philosophies of this Service. According to the Constable, this training program was somewhat unique amongst Canadian police services.

International CIVPOL officers in any peacekeeping mission. As a result, the researcher extracted these common conflict resolution principles and recommends that the following framework would be well suited to form the foundation for the training in conflict resolution techniques of any International CIVPOL officers deploying to serve in future peacekeeping missions.

All three models propose that training delivery should be split between formal instruction and active role-play and should, if possible, not lasting less than approximately three hours. With that being said, based upon the experience of the researcher in training military personnel in these subjects, this training should, at a minimum, last approximately one full eight-hour day for the principles and skills to be absorbed by the students. In addition to this, the subject matter should be presented by serving International CIVPOL officers with previous peacekeeping experience and, ideally, with current experience in the applicable mission, if possible.

A common philosophy for conflict resolution efforts by International CIVPOL in any mission area, as derived from the training packages examined, would, most usefully, consist of the concept that conflict should be managed through the utilization of win-win concepts with an aim to create voluntary cooperation with the police without the requirement to utilize force.

The components of the proposed training package for International CIVPOL officers should also include instruction in basic interest based conflict resolution techniques. This training would ideally also include instruction and experience in intercultural negotiation and the use of interpreters. All of these components should be exercised through role-play, ideally utilizing role-players from the regions where the International CIVPOL officers are deploying to serve.

Finally, common principles that could be included within the proposed components of the training for International CIVPOL officers might emphasize the utilization of conflict analysis as described in Section 8.1, interest examination and the minimization of cultural barriers through education.

It is important to again emphasize that the aim of this examination was not to espouse any one particular method of conflict resolution, but to identify whether these three very different training packages contain common philosophies of interest based

conflict resolution that might be useful in the creation of a unique training program for International CIVPOL officers. It is clear from this examination based upon the material outlined at Appendix G that the aforementioned list of common conflict resolution training components would be of most utility in the creation of a conflict resolution training program for UNMIK Police.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATING THE DESTABILIZING IMPACT OF UNMIK POLICE IN KOSOVO

Over the past four years, as a practitioner and researcher, I have had the opportunity to study the UNMIK Police in Kosovo as they dealt with conflict involving the K-A population. I have also witnessed the stagnation the organization has experienced in regards to any attempts at implementing an organizational philosophy of conflict resolution.

Ultimately, as confirmed by the researcher as late as February 2005, there remain no consistent standards of conflict resolution for CIVPOL officers serving in Kosovo. As indicated by the data, there needs to be a single philosophy applied to police reactions to public order incidents in order to prevent the situations that occurred in 2002 and 2003 as well as those that may occur as the K-A population continue to press for independence from Serbia. This philosophy must primarily influence the attitudes of CIVPOL officers serving with UNMIK Police in order to mitigate the effect that the perceived role of police in Kosovo has on ongoing conflicts involving the K-A population.

At the beginning of this project, the researcher hypothesized that if training in a consistent philosophy of conflict analysis, conflict prevention and front line conflict resolution could be imparted upon international CIVPOL serving in Kosovo, the requirement to use force as the primary means to control large-scale, ongoing public demonstrations could be avoided. Following on this hypothesis, if this end state could be achieved then the wastage of valuable police resources to monitor and control multiple large-scale demonstrations could be avoided while at the same time improving the perception of the police by the K-A population, helping to break the action-reaction cycle previously described. Ultimately, this paper suggests that conflict resolution and conflict facilitation should be the core philosophy used by UNMIK Police during public order disturbances. In the opinion of the researcher and based upon the data presented, these philosophies could help facilitate controlled, non-violent demonstrations and protests which could act as a form of positive conflict for the K-A population to vent frustration in the troubled post-conflict environment of Kosovo, thereby helping to prevent future incidents of demonstration violence.

9.1 Major Observations

As outlined in the earlier sections of this paper, the sources of conflict between the UNMIK Police and the K-A population during demonstrations stem from the structural, philosophical and cultural challenges that existed within UNMIK Police at the time of the study. These challenges, in turn, have manifested into long-term relationship conflicts between these two groups. The conflict theory examined earlier in this paper indicates that for the affects of the existing structural conflicts to be reduced, effective and adequate communication is needed between UNMIK Police and the K-A population through the establishment of a fair and mutually acceptable decision making process as espoused by the interest based negotiation model advocated by Fisher and Ury (1991). This also would help to promote the resolution of most existing relationship conflicts between these groups by strengthening their relationship through effective culturally relevant communication.

The results of the data also conclude that many of the UNMIK Police respondents interviewed see the benefit of dealing with day to day conflict in Kosovo through the use of conflict resolution techniques, rather than through the continued utilization of the flawed win-lose methods employed at the time of the study. Further, these CIVPOL officers consider conflict resolution efforts necessary to the organization because they can be an effective, time efficient and positive means of handling conflict with the population. Ultimately, these effects have the potential to reduce the violence that occurs during conflicts between the police and the K-A population during demonstration and more importantly, the clandestine violence that occurs after violent demonstrations. Unfortunately, the respondent data did indicate a general feeling that certain officers, based upon the organizational philosophies towards conflict that exists within their national police services, would see little benefit in this training. This is especially prevalent for officers who come from primarily authoritarian political and social systems.

With this in mind, the majority of respondents who promote the concept of conflict resolution training for International CIVPOL officers feel that a doctrinal shift of organizational philosophy of CIVPOL missions towards the use of conflict resolution by the leadership of DPKO is a necessity in order for the proposed organizational transition to occur in Kosovo or any peacekeeping mission involving CIVPOL officers.

Based upon the cross section of International CIVPOL officers interviewed, it is clear that there is generally wide support for this training amongst a large number of CIVPOL officers at all levels of leadership and that there is a perceived need for more of this type of training, not only for conflict arising from demonstrations, but also for day to day policing efforts.

9.2 Foundation of an Organizational Philosophy

In regards to the foundations of a philosophy of conflict resolution that could be utilized by UNMIK Police during future demonstrations, the former UNMIK Police Director of Operations offered valuable insight from his many years of police experience in Northern Ireland. In the end, his philosophy for non-violent demonstration facilitation is directly attributable to the conflicts examined by the researcher and could be boiled down into three simple principles of direct application to the proposed foundation of such a philosophy for UNMIK Police:

1. Resolve conflict before it develops into a demonstration. This is to be achieved by engaging demonstration organizers and the grassroots of the population in dialogue as the first course of action.
2. Resolve the conflict during the protest through positive engagement of the demonstration organizers and the participants themselves through conflict facilitation. The Police should be seen as working with the demonstration organizers in order to facilitate a safe and orderly demonstration rather than create an environment of confrontation.
3. Continue to resolve conflict after or between protests. This effort involves constant positive engagement of the identified elites in the society, demonstration organizers and the grassroots of the population after demonstrations occur and before future demonstrations are organized. The aim is to create a collaborative environment between the police and these different levels of society concerning conflict facilitation during periods when emotions may not be as highly charged. If this is principle is effectively employed, it also may help to successfully break the action-reaction cycle.

9.3 Recommendations for Further Study

Ultimately, the researcher is able to draw final conclusions from the data presented, indicating that there will be little change within UNMIK Police unless the senior management of UNMIK Police and the DPKO Civilian Policing Division change their philosophies concerning support for conflict resolution training and techniques for

CIVPOL officers in Kosovo. Interest based conflict resolution training needs to be fostered and nurtured over time within the DPKO Civilian Policing Division in order to create a trickle down effect that will reach the mission environment. In order for any transformation to occur, not only should all International CIVPOL officers receive training in conflict resolution techniques upon arrival in a mission area, but there should also refresher courses and advanced workshops available for officers in command positions or for officers serving in the mission for longer than one year.

Top down training is only the first step in this process of revitalization. Philosophical transformation amongst rank and file CIVPOL officers will also positively affect the whole force thereby achieving a bottom up influence on the greater organization. UNMIK Police leadership needs to support any and all attempts of International CIVPOL officers to utilize the conflict resolution techniques described in this paper. Early on in the proposed transformation, officers need to feel supported by UNMIK Police leadership in their efforts to implement new ways of dealing with conflict involving the K-A population. UNMIK Police leadership has an obligation to encourage more effective problem solving strategies and communication whenever International CIVPOL officers have contact with the K-A population, regardless of the situation involved.

These changes require the commitment of senior CIVPOL and UN civilian leadership. Ultimately, policy changes that make interest based negotiation training a mandatory component of both pre-training and orientation training for all International CIVPOL officers deploying to Kosovo, would assist in solidifying this commitment. UNMIK Police leadership needs to recognize that change such as recommended here, takes time. The qualitative and quantitative data presented in this paper support the need for this change to occur and the desire amongst many International CIVPOL officers to make this change happen. Ultimately, in the opinion of the researcher, if this type of organizational and philosophical change can be achieved within the UNMIK Police, then the majority of future demonstration violence and follow on acts of subversion and terrorism could be avoided.

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Appendix A

Index to Acronyms

AUS	Advisory Unit for Security
CIVPOL	Civilian Police (international civilian police force)
HQ	Headquarters
ITCY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
K-A	Kosovo Albanian
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO led)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC	*Trupat e Mbrojtjes se Kosoves* (Kosovo Protection Corps)
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
K-S	Kosovo Serbian
LDK	*Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves* (Democratic League of Kosovo)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ORC	Office of Returns and Communities
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PTC	Police Training Center
SAT	Selection Assistance Team
SICC	Security Information Coordination Cell
SPU	Special Police Unit
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo

Appendix B

List of interview respondents and questions

Of the 14 CIVPOL officers interviewed for this paper the break-down of their nationalities were as follows:

- Canada - 2
- United Kingdom - 3 (1 with the Ministry of Defense Police and 2 from the Northern Irish Police Service)
- Norway - 1
- Germany - 1
- France - 1
- United States - 2
- Italy - 1
- Argentina - 1
- Jordan – 1
- Czech Republic – 1

UNMIK Police interview respondents

Name	Nationality	Appointment
Robbie Pedlow	British (Northern Ireland)	UNMIK Police Director of Operations in 2002 and early 2003. Mr. Pedlow later became the UNMIK Police Deputy Commissioner for Investigations.
Sven Mewes	German	UNMIK Police Director of Specialized Units
Christian Pedron	French	UNMIK Police SPU Coordinator
Robert Foster	British	Special Assistant to the UNMIK Police Director of Operations
Vlad Krizan	Czech	UNMIK Police Deputy Director of Specialized Units

Note: the remaining nine CIVPOL officers interviewed asked to remain anonymous

UNMIK Police Interview Questions

Interview candidates who agree to respond to the following questions, do so in agreement to the conditions outlined in the letter of consent. The interview will be conducted in person and although respondents are not expected to conduct research prior to the interview, they may wish to review the following questions prior to the interview in order to collect their thoughts. In addition to the following questions there may be additional questions asked aimed at clarifying or probing the answers provided by respondents

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Name of respondent:
Position with UNMIK Police:
Number of years served as a police officer:
Number of previous missions with the United Nations:
Do you have any restrictions on the use of your name associated with any comments you are about to provide? Yes ( ) No ( )

If so, please elaborate.

We will revisit this issue at the end of the interview at which time you will be able to reassess the confidentiality issue.

Demonstrations

1. How many police are deployed during various demonstrations weekly?

2. What was the largest deployment of Police officers since the weekly demonstrations began?

3. Have police officers been injured in the performance of their duties during these weekly demonstrations?

4. Have any members of the K-A public been injured as a result of police action during any of these demonstrations?

5. What methods for police public disorder have been employed by Police to deal with post-war crimes arrest violence?

6. What police units have been directly involved in policing post war crimes arrest demonstrations and/or violence?

7. Who directs Police responses to public order disturbances?

8. Describe approaches and philosophies of different public order units within Kosovo at the moment.

Information Operations

1. Describe the role of Information and Public Affairs units within police at the present time.

2. Describe a typical Police response to public disorder or demonstrations within Kosovo at the present time.

3. What will be achieved by arresting and convicting individuals accused of war crimes within Kosovo?

4. What is your opinion of the local propaganda that is available to the population that is anti-arrest in focus?

Training Questions:

1. What training/orientation do incoming police officers receive when they arrive in Kosovo?

2. How long is this training?

3. What does the training consist of?

4. Within this training, is there any component that touches on a common method of conflict resolution to be employed when the officers are operating in Kosovo.

5. To your knowledge, is there any documented common UN standard for CIVPOL operations?

6. Does the Training/orientation for CIVPOL officers contain any component on public demonstrations or public order training.

7. At the Vushtri Police School, how much time is dedicated to conflict resolution training?

8. At the Vushtri Police School, how much time is dedicated to training in response to public demonstrations and public order disturbances?

9. What is the general approach to conflict resolution as taught at the Vushtri Police School?

10. Do officers serving in Kosovo (CIVPOL or KPS) receive refresher training at any time?

11. In your experience, what are skills most required by CIVPOL police officers that serve in Kosovo?

12. In your experience, what are skills most required by KPS police officers in Kosovo?

13. What are the relations like between the KA population and the Police (CIVPOL and KPS)?

14. What could be done to improve relations between UNMIK Police and the KA Population?

Philosophy:

1. Is there a common philosophy for conflict resolution applied by UNMIK Police or KPS when restoring public order?

2. What was your philosophy as _____ for dealing with Post arrest demonstrations by the public in Kosovo?

3. What philosophical orientation towards training, in your opinion, should UNMIK Police officers receive on their arrival in the mission?

4. From your perspective, what type of qualities and experience should police possess to serve in command positions within UNMIK police?

5. What are the views of Police towards the war crimes arrest process conducted by the ICTY in February?

6. How integrated are the operational philosophies of International Police Officers and KPS within UNMIK Police?

Any other comments or suggestions you would like to add?

At the start of the interview, I mentioned we would revisit your desire for anonymity in responding to these questions. May I clarify with you that your wish remains the same?

Thank you very much for taking the time to be interviewed. Your comments will contribute greatly to an understanding of some of the main issues surrounding CIVPOL training and deployment during war crimes related demonstrations in Kosovo.

Kosovo Albanian Interview Questions

Interview candidates who agree to respond to the following questions, do so in agreement to the conditions outlined in the letter of consent. The interview will be conducted in person and although respondents are not expected to conduct research prior to the interview, they may wish to review the following questions prior to the interview in order to collect their thoughts. In addition to the following questions there may be additional questions asked aimed at clarifying or probing the answers provided by respondents

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Name of respondent:
Address
Age:
Years spent living in Kosovo:
Do you have any restrictions on the use of your name associated with any comments you are about to provide? Yes ( ) No ( )

If so, please elaborate.

We will revisit this issue at the end of the interview at which time you will be able to reassess the confidentiality issue.

K-A Attitudes Towards Arrests

1. What is the underlying intent of the demonstrations protesting the arrest of K-A for war crimes?

2. What are the common assumptions by the K-A Population about the arrests?

3. What are the methods used by the KA Population to express dissatisfaction with the arrests of fellow K-A for war crimes and why?

4. Whose interests are served within Kosovo by the current ongoing public reaction to the arrests of K-A for war crimes?

5. What are common metaphors used by the K-A population to describe K-A reaction to the arrests?

6. What does the constant link between actions of UNMIK and attacks on 'war values' mean to the K-A population?

7. Who has the ability to influence opinion within the greater K-A community?

8. What does the constant focus by local leaders on 'war values' distract the KA population away from?

9. What do the K-A persons arrested for war crimes represent to the population?

10. Why do the people of Kosovo feel that these individuals were arrested?

Phenomenological Oriented Questions

1. What was it like to live under the Milosovic regime?

2. Tell me of your experiences during the spring and summer of 1999.

3. What images are brought to mind when you think of the police as an institution?

4. From your perspective, what did those K-A arrested for war crimes do for the population during the war?

5. What were your feeling toward the UN and NATO following the war?

6. Has that opinion changed over time?

7. Do you feel that UNMIK Police/UNMIK DOJ have communicated the reasons why the arrests for war crimes have occurred?

8. What do you feel about organized crime in Kosovo?

9. What role does the immediate family/clan elders have in forming public opinion of the family members?

10. What role do veterans associations/invalids associations have in forming K-A public opinion regarding the recent war crimes arrests?

11. Do you feel that those recently arrested for war crimes may be linked to organized crime any way?

Historically Oriented Questions

1. How have K-A traditionally viewed the role of the police and the court system?
2. What role did police and courts play traditionally in Kosovo?
3. Does the K-A population view International and National Police as different organizations?
4. How does K-A culture traditionally deal with conflict/crime/corruption within its society?
5. Who were the traditional leaders in local K-A society?
6. Who are the leaders today?
7. How is the population affected by editorials in local papers?
8. Do these editorials affect their views towards the recent war crimes arrests?
9. Where does the K-A population look to gain information about what is happening in Kosovo (the world)?

Any other comments or suggestions you would like to add?

At the start of the interview, I mentioned we would revisit your desire for anonymity in responding to these questions. May I clarify with you that your wish remains the same?

Thank you very much for taking the time to be interviewed. Your comments will contribute greatly to an understanding of some of the main issues surrounding the attitudes of the K-Albanian population as they pertain to the International CIVPOL officers serving with UNMIK Police in Kosovo.

Sample Research Consent Form

This research project is part of the requirement for a Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies.

The student concerned is **W. Scott Raesler**. Mr. Raesler's credentials with Royal Roads University can be established by telephoning Dr. Jim Bayer, Dean of Peace and Conflict Studies, Royal Roads University at xxx-xxx-xxxx

This document constitutes an agreement to take part in a research program, the objective of which is to examine the role of UNMIK Police in the destabilization that results following arrests for war crimes in the post conflict environment of Kosovo. The research will consist of a number of open-ended discussion topics and is foreseen to last between two and three hours. The foreseen questions will refer specifically to the group being interviewed. However, each set of questions will look to examine the following issues from the respondent's point of view:

- The security situation in the post-conflict environment of Kosovo;
- The training and employment of UNMIK Police in Kosovo;
- The perceived experiences of Kosovo Albanians;
- The utility of information operations in support of UNMIK Police in Kosovo; and
- The possible uses of conflict theory by UNMIK Police in Kosovo.

Information will be recorded using a tape cassette recorder and hand-written notes. Information will then be appropriately summarized, referencing only the position title and nationality of respondents, in the body of the final report. At no time will any specific comments be attributed to any individual unless specific agreement has been obtained beforehand.

A copy of the final report will be housed at Royal Roads University.

Prospective research respondents are not compelled to take part in this research project. If an individual does elect to take part, she or he is free to withdraw at any time with no prejudice.

By signing this letter, the individual gives free and informed consent to participating in this project.

Name: (Please Print): _____

Signed: _____

Date: _____

Appendix C

Incidents of violence during war crimes demonstrations in 2002 and 2003

Note: These descriptions are extracted from the UN Security Quarterly reports for the periods indicated. The text included within these descriptions was only altered for continuity and clarity. The content of the descriptions remains unchanged.

Appendix D

Extracts of UN Security Quarterly Report executive summaries for 2002 and 2003

Appendix E

UNMIK Police Training and Regulations

Subjects covered during UNMIK Police Orientation conducted at the UNMIK Police Training Center:

- General Information
- **Code of Conduct**
- Report Writing
- Control of UN Property
- Map Reading
- Security Briefing
- **History and Cultural Awareness**
- First Aid
- Media Address, radio Procedures and Lotus Notes
- Sexual Harassment & HIV Education
- Winter Driving
- Officer Survival
- Mine Awareness
- Weapon Authorization Card Regulations

Crowd Management Section of the UNMIK Police Policies and Procedures Manual (1999)

UNMIK Police will make every effort to contain a crowd/roadblock or demonstration and determine whether or not Special Police Forces are required. An assessment of the seriousness of the situation and the impact on the community must be made in order to determine the appropriate level of response.

Assessment Levels:

Level One: Minor impediment, small number of participants in the crowd (20 30 people), willing to negotiate with Police.

Level Two: More vocal crowd (50 – 100 people), greater impediment to flow of traffic/pedestrians, potential for escalation, less negotiations with leader(s) of the crowd, appearance of objects/projectiles.

Level Three: Full escalation of violence in the crowd, major impediment to traffic and pedestrians, no apparent coordination or leadership in the crowd, projectiles being thrown, danger to life.

The UNMIK Police Supervisor at the scene will decide on the resources need to handle the situation (Special Police, KFOR, etc.). In addition the Supervisor will attempt to identify the leaders of the incident and begin to negotiate. The Supervisor will also ensure that the Station Commander, Regional Commander and the Director of Operations are notified as soon as possible (UNMIK Police Policy and Procedures Manual, pp. 32-33, 2002).

Appendix F

Demonstration violence flowchart
(as prepared by researcher)



Appendix G

Sources of Conflict Resolution Training

	Canadian Armed Forces	Edmonton Police Service	DPKO
Training Delivery	Delivered over 8 ½ hours involving a mixture of instruction and role-play Training is delivered by instructors with first-hand experience with peacekeeping operations and facilitated by expatriates from the appropriate conflict area	Delivered over 3 days involving a mixture of instruction, self examination and role-play Training was delivered by a private contractor who specialized in conflict resolution training	Delivered over 2 ¼ hours involving a mixture of instruction and general discussion Training is designed to be delivered by instructors with first-hand experience with peacekeeping operations
Philosophies of the Training	Promotes interest based negotiation techniques Promotes win-win approach to conflict resolution, emphasizing voluntary cooperation with negotiated solutions rather than enforcement	Promotes the examination of the individual cost of avoiding conflict Promotes the examination of the positive function of conflict Promotes win-win approach to conflict resolution	Promotes successful conflict resolution through management of conflict and containing it at manageable levels Promotes the management of conflict through communication and negotiation
Components of the Training	Theory of interest based negotiation and mediation Negotiation process Intercultural communication skills Use of interpreters	Conflict theory Use of language Dealing with anger-arousal cycle[24]	Understanding communication and negotiation Negotiation process Working with interpreters

[24] The Anger-Arousal Cycle, as described in this training, outlines five phases leading to possibly violent conflict. These phases include: the trigger phase; the escalation phase; the crisis phase; the recovery phase; and the post-crisis depression phase. This cycle was presented in this training as a method by which police officers within the Edmonton Police Service could deal with their own anger and the anger of the population during conflicts with an aim to limit the requirement for the use of force during these encounters.

Key principles of conflict resolution training	Conduct of conflict analysis Extensive preparation for conflict resolution to include interest analysis Actively exploration of the interests of all parties Reduction of barriers to intercultural communication	Establishment of positive environment in which to resolve conflict Clarification of issues affecting the parties Clarification of interests expressed by the parties Problem solving rather than imposition of solutions	Understanding of own interests Understanding of interests of other party Understanding of historical and cultural contexts for conflict