INFORMATION TO USERS

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY RETENTION AMONG

SECOND-GENERATION ARAB YOUTHS IN MONTREAL

by

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ABSTRACT

Ethnic and Religious Identity Retention among Second-Generation

Christian and Muslim Arab Youths in Montreal.

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Employing a non-random sample survey and in-depth interview, I explore the relationship between ethnic and religious identity retention among Arab-origin students from five Cegeps in Montreal. Being non-random, this sample is not representative of the whole population of Arab-origin Cegep students in Montreal. Special attention is paid to the influence of three socio-cultural factors: parental socialization, gender-related traditionalism, and perceived discrimination and stereotyping.

I examine how group boundaries among the second generation emerge from re-appropriations of pre-fabricated ethnic labels and identities. Although these youths identify strongly with their ethnic culture and community, nonetheless, they fail to show matching levels of enmeshment in ethnic-based socialization networks. While it may be argued that a symbolic ethnicity is well underway among these second-generationers, I discovered that a symbolic religiosity was even more prevalent. Indeed, religion is more experienced by these youths as a group boundary marker, than as a binding frame of religious prescriptions and rituals. In any case, the data strongly suggest that religion and ethnicity are intertwined

within these youths' identity structure. This connection reflects the refocusing of national Great narratives, in the postcolonial Arab world, on religious symbolism and rhetoric.

Female conduct and sexuality also proved to be a primary locus of ethno-religious identity. However, traditional gender relationships come to be highly problematized as part of these youths' identity building strategies. Furthermore, females are more likely than males to critically engage traditional gender roles

Also, these Arab youths generally feel well accepted by Canadians in their personal life. However, they often downplay the Arab component of their identity as a way to ward off prejudice and discrimination. As well, there is a strong perception among these youths that Canadian people and media have a very low regard for Arab and/or Muslim culture.

Finally, because Canadians lump all Arab groups together, these second-generationers largely come to identify themselves as Arabs. However, the adoption of a transnational Arab identity presupposes the subversion of the Western-made derogatory significations attached to it. Yet, oustide labelling exerts "symbolic violence" on these youths, which leads some, especially Christians, to reject the Arab label, deemed socially compromising.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

1) Objectives and Relevance of the Research

This research focuses on the relationship between ethnic and religious identity retention processes among second-generation Christian and Muslim Arab youths attending Cegep[1] in the Greater Montreal area. Special attention will be paid to the influence of three socio-cultural factors on both processes: 1) parental socialization, 2) traditionalism regarding gender relationships, 3) self-experienced discrimination, and perceived stereotyping.

The Arab community in Canada is one of the most understudied ethnic groups. As underlined by Hayani (1999), since Abu-Laban's first thorough sociological and historical mapping of this community (Abu-Laban, 1980), subsequent studies on Arab-Canadians have been relatively scarce. The paucity of the literature on this group is hardly consistent with the relatively important size of the Arab-Canadian population. Thus, according to Statistics Canada Census data (1996), there were 188 435 persons of Arab origin in Canada in 1996. Furthermore, even less attention has been paid to second-generationers among the Arab community. The present research investigates this latter group's nature of ethnicity, understood not only in terms of self-identification patterns, but also in terms of the ethnic identity retention processes. Our inquiry is informed by the premise that identity retention is driven by socialization agencies who transmit shared patterns of collective meanings to individuals. In the case of the second-generationers born and raised in Canadian society, it will be interesting to measure the extent to which their ethnic self-concept is rooted in ethnic

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[1] The word Cegep was originally derived from the acronym C.E.G.E.P, which stands for "Centre d'enseignement général et professionel". It would be the equivalent of College in English Canada.

socialization, incorporating them into both a shared ethnic culture, and into an integrated ethnic community.

But one could pose the following question: which ethnic cultures and communities are at issue here? Indeed, the Arab world, far from being monolithic, is of course comprised of several sub-groups divided along various national, religious, and sectarian lines. Moreover, within each Arab Nation-State, there are further ethnic-based divisions leading to different group sub-cultures, allegiances, and solidarities. For instance, several Moroccans and Algerians give precedence to their Berber identity over national membership. Also, in certain Arab countries, Kurdish and Armenian identities compete fiercely against national allegiances as a source of collective identification. That being said, focussing on the Arabs as a group is largely justified by the remarkable "sociological unity" of the Arab world, a unity which, according to Baha Abu-Laban, has been maintained in spite of cultural diversity and the fragmentation of the region into a score of politically independent Arab States (Abu-Laban, 1980:49). Nonetheless, because of the plurality of sub-group cultures and allegiances in this region of the world, our inquiry into ethnic identity maintenance will not be about Arab identity per se, but rather about what our Arab-origin subjects perceive to be "ethnic" in their patterns of self-identification and their socio-cultural practices. However, as it shall be further discussed below, our analysis will pay close attention to gender and sectarian variations (Christians vs. Muslims) in patterns of ethnic identity retention and identification among our subjects.

Secondly, this research also aims at analysing how religion operates as an "ethnic-like" identity marker, or group binder among both Christian and Muslim Cegep students of Arab origin in Montreal. The interplay between religion and ethnicity constitutes a largely understudied issue within ethnic studies, with the notable exception of Jewish studies.

Indeed, most studies on ethnic identity retention have neglected to take into account the possible intersections between religion and ethnicity as identity markers. Such an omission is perhaps not of much consequence in the case of researches focusing on most European ethnic groups. For in much of the Western world, religion has become increasingly "privatized", thus loosing much of its importance as a binding force cementing and giving meaning to the notion of national selfhood. However, the same cannot be said about contemporary Arab nations, and hence about the present-day Arab Diaspora. In the post-1970s Arab world, Islam has come to play an increasingly determining role in the re-definition of a post-colonial Arab identity. The fact that Arab national self-narratives are highly loaded with religious references contributes to bring Christian minorities in Arab countries at the margins of dominant national and ethnic boundaries. Perhaps in part because of this exclusionary process, religious minorities in the Arab world often tend to use the language of *their* religion to give a shape and content to their own ethnic boundaries. Moreover, as it will be discussed below, both the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the Arab world starting in the 16th century, and later the European colonial powers, had greatly contributed to crystallize and consolidate Eastern-Christian sectarian identities.

In Canada, the role played by religion in the construction of ethnic identity is likely to be different for Christian Arab-Canadians, as compared with their Muslim ethnic counterparts. Because Islamophobia often fuels Western representations of the Arabs, Muslim Arabs in Canada are all the more likely to use religion as a group boundary marker giving a shape and a content to their ethnic identity. Christian Arab-Canadians, on the other hand, share with their host society a wide range of religious beliefs and symbols. Nonetheless, they often strive –more or less successfully– to remain resolutely distinct from Western Christian denominations and communities. Moreover, within Oriental Christianity,

there are several separate denominations, such as the Maronites, the Coptics, the Melkites, the Greek-Orthodox, each of them giving rise to different group allegiances and solidarities. As a result, Oriental Christians in Canada often tend to regard Western Christians somehow as a religious "out-group", although not to the same extent as Muslim Arabs do. Finally, religion is particularly likely to be used as an identity marker differentiating the in-group from the out-group among both Christian and Muslim Arab communities living in Western societies; for Arab parents raising their children in a Western environment often perceive Western mores and values as a threat to both religious and ethnic identity maintenance across generations. However, it can be expected that, as they develop a dual sense of allegiance to, and a dual familiarity with both, their host society and their ethno-religious group, second-generation Arab-Canadians will occupy a much more ambiguous position in the realm of competing identity discourses pitched against each other. This research attempts to tap into the various cultural re-appropriations and creative transformations by which Arab youths construct of their ethno-religious identity.

Thirdly, this research will also look at the influence of parental socialization on the likelihood that children of Arab immigrants retain their ethnic and religious identities. More specifically, ethnic and religious identity transmission processes will be probed in order to better understand the relationship between the youths' ethno-religious identity structure and that of their parents. The broader question at issue here is how these socially inherited ethno-religious identities are transplanted in a migratory context, and especially how they are adapted by second-generation youths so as to make them fit the largely secularized dominant cultural and identity models prevailing in Canadian society.

Gender issues have become a key component of the merging of ethnicity and religion that has taken place in the post-1970s Arab world. As a result, within Arab communities

settled in the West, gender issues are often assigned a role of cultural buffer contributing to ensure ethno-religious identity retention, and to maintain hermetic frontiers between "Us" and "Them". This triadic relationship (religion-ethnicity-gender) has been largely overlooked by students of ethnic studies. Such a gap in the literature is all the more problematic that many other non-Western ethnic groups in Canada, besides Arabs, tend, for pre-migratory social, political, and historical reasons, to mobilize religion and gender as primary catalysts of ethnic identity maintenance (see for example, the excellent article of Das Gupta (1997) on religion, gender and ethnicity among East-Indian communities in America). This study aims to determine the extent to which gender issues operate as ethnic and/or religious identity markers for Arab-Canadian adolescents. It will also examine the possible discrepancies or correlations existing between the models of gender relationships internalized by Arab-Canadian adolescents, and those prevailing among their parents.

Finally, this research also examines these second-generationers' relationship to their Arab identity, in relation to perceived stereotyping and discrimination. In this respect, this study takes on particular relevance since the September 11th 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre.[2] Since these events, Arab Diasporas in Western cities became all the more vulnerable to ethnic and racial profiling, prejudice, and discrimination. Indeed, in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on U.S. soil, Arab minorities – especially those of the Muslim faith – have received much unwanted attention as the Arab and/or Muslim components of their ethno-cultural background became a priori suspect in the eyes of a great many Westerners. This upsurge in anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments in the West resulting from international politics is by no means unprecedented. The Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Gulf

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[2] It should be noted, however, that data collection for this study took place prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks, namely between January, 2000, and May, 2001.

War, for instance, provide premium examples of such a phenomenon. Furthermore, in the Western popular imagery, Arabo-Muslim and Western "civilizations" are often perceived as being informed by two fundamentally antithetical symbolic and normative systems, one leading inevitably to democracy, liberal ideas, and liberty, and the other to bigotry, tribalism, religious fanaticism, and cultural backwardness (see Said, 1979).[3] Also, in a Western context, groups and individuals of Arab origin tend to be perceived by the majority group as "Arabs", irrespective of national variations, let alone sub-national ones. As a result, the so-labelled individuals and groups, in order to be acknowledged by the host society, are often forced to mobilize and identify as "Arabs", so as to present a self-definition compatible with the majority group's frame of reference.

For all the above reasons, in a Western context, Arab identity tends to be socially compromised and compromising for its holders. However, the Arab label and identity also carry their own self-produced symbolism- rooted in a rich history and language - that can be traced back to the 7th century. As a result, and despite various sub-group allegiances (which indeed undermine pan-Arab ethnic solidarity), a transnational Arab identity and culture can be activated or discarded, made more or less salient by actors of the Arab world and the Diasporas, depending on the political, historical and economic conjuncture, as well as on sub-group and individual pre-dispositions. This study will probe the Arab-Canadian youths' strategies of either re-appropriation, re-invention, or rejection of their Arab identity as a result of both, outside labelling and self-produced group consciousness– two processes which are in fact mutually and dialectically related. Correlatively, we will assess whether the extent

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[3] It should be noted that Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington's much celebrated book *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996) reminds us that scholarly representations of the "Arabs" are by no means devoid of such reductive and simplistic dichotomies.

to which these youths feel culturally and socially accepted by the host society as Arab-Canadians impacts on ethnic and religious identity maintenance.

2) A Socio-demographic Profile of Arab-Canadians

As mentioned earlier, the Arab community in Canada is one of the least studied ethnic groups, which can hardly be explained on demographic grounds. According to Statistics Canada Census data, there were, in 1996, 188 435 persons of Arab origin in Canada, of which 81 680 lived in Ontario (43.35%), and 77 650 (41.21%) lived in Quebec. The third most important Arab community in size is located in Alberta, with a population of 15 520 residents of Arab origin (8.24%). British Columbia and Nova Scotia occupy the fourth and fifth places, respectively, hosting an Arab population of 5545 (2.94%) and 4215 (2.24%) individuals. The bulk of the Arab population in Canada is thus largely concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, which host together 84.55% of the whole Arab-Canadian community. In Quebec, as much as 91.51% of the residents of Arab origin are located in Montreal - a figure in keeping with the particularly marked tendency of ethnic minorities in La Belle Province to be concentrated in the Greater Montreal area (by contrast, only 48.48% of Arab-Ontarians are Toronto residents). Therefore, by focussing exclusively on the greater Montreal area, this research will yield results applicable to the overwhelming majority of Arabs in Quebec (Statistics Canada Census Data, 1996).

In 1991, according to Statistics Canada, 67% of Arabs in Canada were immigrants, while the remainder, 33%, were Canadian-born. Also, in 1991, almost 60% of Arab immigrants were recent immigrants, that is people who immigrated to Canada within the last 10 years. In 1991, 62% of Arabs in Canada were Christian while 32% were Muslim.

However, whereas, historically, Arab migrants have always been predominantly Christian, the Arab immigrants who came to Canada between 1981 and 1991 became more equally split between Christians (55%) and Muslims (41%). The Arab population in Canada is highly educated compared to other ethnic groups ; in 1991, 20% of Arab females and 27% of Arab males had university degrees, and only 13% of the Arab-Canadian community held less than a grade nine degree. The average income for males who had been working full-time for a full-year was 33 980$, while the same figure for females was 22 621$. However, it should be mentioned that women were only half as likely to work full-time and full-year. Finally, in all Canadian provinces, there were more Arab males than Arab females in 1991. In Quebec, for instance, the female to male ratio was 0.8 (Canadian Arab Federation et al., 1999[4]).

The Arab countries accounting for most of the Arab immigration to Canada from 1946 to 1980 are, in that order, Lebanon (44.9%), Egypt (29%), Morocco (11.6%), Syria (6.2%), followed next by Jordan (1.9%). Lebanon and Egypt thus accounted for the great majority (73.9%) of Arab immigration during this period. However, during the last decade or so, the Arab population migrating to Canada has become much more diversified; for the period 1992-1997, although Lebanon remained the most important source country, its share of Arab migration to Canada dropped to 12.7%. The other most important source countries for the 1992-1997 period are, next, Egypt (10.2%), Iraq (10.2%), Saudi Arabia (9.9%), Syria (9.8%), Algeria (5%), Jordan (4.5%), Morocco (4.3%), and Syria (4.2%) (Hayani, 1999:286-289). In Quebec, because of the provincial government's preference for "Frenchified" migrants, Algeria, Morocco, and Lebanon account for the bulk of Arab migration between 1991 and 1996. Furthermore, these latter countries are among the top ten source countries of

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[4] This report is based on Statistics Canada's 1991 Canadian Census Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) data.

all immigrants coming to Quebec for this same period (Statistics Canada 1996 data, cited by the Canadian Arab Federation, 1999).

3) Arab Presence and Identity in Canada: Historical Background

3.1) The Pioneer Cohort (1882-1945)

The pioneer cohort of migrants who came to Canada from what is known today as the Arab world arrived in the late 1880s with Turkish passports. These first migrants almost all came from the Greater Syria region, and more specifically from the mountainous regions of Mount-Lebanon (or modern Syria), territories which, at the time, were still under Ottoman domination (Abu-Laban, 1980; Suleiman, 1999). The overwhelming majority of them were Christians who were affiliated either to the Maronite Church, the Melkite Church, or the Greek-Orthodox Church (Kayal, 1983). The growth of the Arab-Canadian population has been relatively rapid in the formative period of the community; by 1911, there was an estimated 7000 individuals of Arab origin in Canada, both foreign-born and Canadian-born. However, from 1911 to 1941, the rate of growth of the Arab-Canadian community was extremely slow, as Arab immigration dropped to negligible proportions because of two restrictive Orders-in-Council, enacted in 1908 with a view to reduce Asian immigration to Canada in general, and Hindi immigration more specifically. In effect, these measures resulted in considerably restricting Syrian-Lebanese immigration as well. Thus, from 1911 to 1941, the population of Syrian-born Arabs in Canada grew only from 2907 to 3577 individuals (Abu-Laban, 1980:53-56).

The great majority of the early immigrants wanted to accumulate capital so as to return in their home countries and villages as soon as possible. Typically, they had little or no

education, were often illiterate, and, consequently, knew neither English nor French. Some of them worked as unskilled industrial labourers, but the large majority became either peddlers or shopkeepers. They had, in the early years, very nomadic patterns of settlements due to the business activities of the numerous peddlers among them. It should be mentioned that, although many among the second and third generations of Syrian Christians followed their father's footstep by going into peddling, many other moved to new and diversified occupational careers, thus undergoing rapid upward mobility (Abu-Laban, 1980: 98-109).

In the following, we will attempt to throw light on the historical and socio-political context out of which emerged the group identities that the early Syrian-Lebanese migrants brought with them to North America. To do so, we need first to make sense of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the early Arab migrants to Canada were Christians from the Greater Syria Region. Baha Abu-Laban (1980) identified different sets of factors contributing to the large predominance of Syrian-Lebanese Christians among the pioneer cohort. First, he stressed, Syria was geographically very close to the Sublime Porte, and thus was subject to firmer control than other dominions of the Ottoman Empire (Abu-Laban, 1980:74). Also, adds Abu-Laban, whereas the oppression endured by Muslim Syrians was mitigated by their religious affinities with the colonial administration, no such mitigating circumstances existed for Christian Syrians (Abu-Laban, 1980:74). Secondly, sectarian divisions between Christian minorities were exacerbated by the Ottomans, who deliberately played one sect against another by structuring each rite both politically and socially as a separate "nation" (called "Millet") endowed with relative autonomy over matters pertaining to personal status, such as divorce, marriage, and inheritance (Abu-Laban, 1980:74; Kayal, 1983; Naff, 1983). The Millet system set up hermetic institutional walls separating the different Christians sects from one another both politically and socially, thus contributing to

nourish jealousy, rivalry, and suspicion between them. These tensions degenerated into inter-

sect conflicts, which turned out to be a major contributor to Christian migration from Syria to

North America (Abu-Laban, 1980:74-75). Another important push factor is the deplorable

and harsh economic conditions faced by the inhabitants of the mountainous regions of the

greater Syria, in particular modern Lebanon. According to Abu-Laban, these mountain

peasants, many of whom were Christians, were deeply affected by low agricultural

productivity, the downfall of the silk industry, and by population pressures (Abu-Laban,

1980:75).

Finally, perhaps one of the most determining factors accounting for the large

predominance of Christians among Syrian-Lebanese migrants to the New world is the

Western colonial penetration into the region starting in the 19th century. Even prior to the

dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, several European missionaries and traders were sent

to the Greater Syria region under agreements between the Sublime Porte and certain

European powers. Through their emissaries in the region, emerging European colonial

powers were able to set up schools drawing large numbers of Christian locals who, as a

result, came to be strongly influenced by Western ideas and culture (Abu-Laban, 1980:75).

Also, on a more political level, European powers competed for influence in the tottering

Ottoman Empire by exploiting the loyalties and interests of various Christian sects (Naff,

1983: 13). The following quotation from Alexa Naff (1983) provides a partial overview of

the nature and details of these politically motivated alliances:

> "In Syria, the French supported the Maronites and the Melkites; the Russians supported the Eastern
> Orthodox; and England vacillated between the Christians and the semi-Islamic Druze as its interests
> dictated. France encouraged a Maronite dream of political dominance and alienated Muslims, Druze,
> and the Orthodox Christians who tended then as now to support the Muslims in politics. In Egypt,
> England's support of the Copts antagonized the Muslim majority (Naff, 1983:13)."

Western imperialists found a fertile terrain to cultivate sectarian dislocations among Christian minorities, who hoped to benefit from these alliances in order to secure greater economic and political power for themselves (Kayal, 1983:47). The Maronites of Lebanon provides a paradigmatic example of this power dynamics. Thus, as mentioned in the above quotation, their rapprochement with France was indeed strongly dictated by their dream of securing a homeland for themselves in Lebanon (Kayal, 1983:47; Naff, 1983, Abu-Laban, 1980:22). These strong nationalist sentiments are still at work today as the Maronites of Lebanon tend to harbour a strong sense of identification with the land they inhabit, as well as a distinct ethno-religious identity inextricably tied to the history of the State of Lebanon (Abu-Laban, 1980:22; Kayal, 1983:47; Naff, 1983: 13). Thus, in Lebanon and Syria, as well as in other regions of the Arab world, sectarian allegiances and loyalties (and even nationalism in the case of Lebanese Maronites) were fostered and strengthened by European imperialist powers. Furthermore, as underlined by Alexa Naff, the higher socio-economic status enjoyed by the Western-backed Christian minorities led them to treat the already embittered Muslims with arrogance (Naff, 1983:13). This situation resulted in antagonizing Muslim majorities, whose own emerging nationalist discourses and identities were cutting across sectarian and national interests (Kayal, 1983:47). Consequently, Christian minorities often became natural targets for Muslim majorities' growing anti-imperialist sentiments. Furthermore, not only did European interference beget hostility between Muslims and Christians, but it also contributed to accentuate rivalries and factionalism among the various Christian sects (Naff, 1983:13). Thus, by the end of the 19th century, the tradition of accommodation between Muslim majorities and Christian minorities was seriously eroded,

which accounts in large part for the first wave of Christian Syrian-Lebanese who migrated to Canada from the early 1880s up to 1945.

However, at the end of the 19th century, it is very problematic to speak of a Syrian or a Lebanese identity in North America, for these first migrants' concept of nationalism was rather weak. Although some of them thought of themselves as Syrians, the majority found a stronger source of collective identity in their ancestral village, their family, and, above all, their sectarian affiliations (Naff, 1983:9; Kayal, 1983). It should be noted, following Philip Kayal, that when Syria became an independent State, these early migrants started to call themselves Syrians only to find that the "Lebanese" among them resented that appellation once Lebanon also became a free and separate entity (Kayal, 1983: 48). Thus, the ethnic self-concept of these newcomers was extremely weak since it was not rooted in the history of a Nation-State operating as a unifying frame of references. This lack of inclination towards ethnic identity maintenance was compounded by their strong religious and cultural affinities with Western culture. The end result is that, according to most authors, pre-World War II Syrian communities in Canada and in the U.S.A. underwent high rates of acculturation from one generation to the next, starting with the offspring of the first immigration cohort. Thus, following the first migratory wave, subsequent generations of Arab-Canadians and Arab-Americans rapidly lost their ethnic language (Abu-Laban, 1980: 203; Suleiman, 1999: 9), contracted mostly inter-ethnic marriages (Naff, 1983:21, Kayal, 1983:53), and were, and still are, among the least residentially segregated ethnic groups (Abu-Laban, 1980: 63).

The only ethno-cultural buffer on which early Syrian-Lebanese communities in Canada relied to ward off assmilationist forces were their sectarian identities. But because of the sojourner mentality of these migrants, their high geographical mobility (due to peddling), and a dramatic lack of priests, it took them a while before they were able to institutionalize

their faith, which they eventually did in Montreal and Toronto at different periods depending on each Church (Abu-Laban, 1980:129). Thus, the first Syrian Orthodox Church, St-Nicholas, was founded in Montreal in 1905, while the first Maronite Church was established in the early 1920s, and the first Melkite Church, Saint-Sauveur, came into being in Montreal in 1924.[5] However, according to Philip Kayal, the early Syrian-Lebanese migrants had difficulty in securing an institutionally viable community outside of the religious sphere (Kayal, 1983: 49). Also, the maintenance of a viable ethno-religious identity across generations was severely impeded by Syrian-Lebanese migrants' emphasis on economic prosperity and material wealth, which was further increasing their desire to assimilate (Kayal, 1983:49). Finally, Eastern Christian Churches were considerably weakened as a result of a sharp decline in their membership, which was constantly lost to non-Arab Churches established for a longer period of time. Thus, while the Russian Orthodox Church attracted the Syrian Orthodox, the Latin Churches recruited large segments of the Melkite and Maronite populations (Kayal, 1983, Naff, 1983:18). Ironically, in response to disaffection and defection among their faithful, several Syrian Eastern-Rite and Latin-Rite Churches further contributed to accelerate their own decline by Westernizing and North-Americanizing their services and rites (Naff, 1983:18). Furthermore, although group identity among early Syrian migrants was, for a while, more or less successfully maintained through sectarian solidarities and networks, this ethno-religious model soon became obsolete, as the ethnic culture it was fostering became too superficial to require the institutional support of the various rites and religions of the Syrians (Kayal, 1980:54). The end-result is that, by World War II, second, third, and fourth generations of Canadians and Americans of Syrian

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[5] Although the first mosque in Canada was founded in Edmonton in 1938, the Canadian-Muslim population has been so marginal in size up until World War II (only 645 Muslim residents were recorded in Canada in 1931)

origin had turned into an ethno-cultural group almost completely undistinguishable from their host society's majority groups (Suleiman, 1999:9).

3.2) Post-War Migrants : from 1945 up to now

While the overwhelming majority of the pioneer cohort came from Syria and Lebanon in relatively small numbers, during the post-World War II period, Arab immigration to Canada both diversified and increased dramatically. First, of the 324,160 Arab migrants who came to Canada between 1882 and 1997, as much as 313,478, namely 96.7%, came during the post-1950 period, of which 273,535, namely 84.4%, came during the 1970-1997 period alone.[6] (Hayani, 1999:286).

Second, the post-war cohort was much more diversified in terms of national origins, and did not migrated only for economic reasons, as the earlier cohort did, but also for political motives. Thus, during the late 1950s and the 1960s, large numbers of Egyptian Coptics and Maronites migrated to Canada, along with a smaller number of Egyptian Muslims. These Egyptian nationals often felt either politically or religiously alienated by, and disaffected with the socialist Revolution undertook by Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1952 (Abu-Laban, 1980: 78. Hayani, 1999: 286). Also, Lebanon can claim a large share of the political refugees fleeing to Canada through the mid-1970s. Thus, says Hayani (1999):

> "The precarious balance that had kept in check volatile and explosive religious forces in Lebanon came apart with horrendous consequences for the Lebanese people in the mid-1970s. Ten of thousands of Lebanese came to Canada, where most already had relatives who could sponsor or nominate them. Some came under the new immigration category of business investors, and others came as refugees. Many of the latter category were probably of Palestinian origin (Hayani, 1999:286-7)."

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that its organizational infrastructure remained extremely limited throughout this entire period (Abu-Laban, 1980: 128-140).

[6] More specifically, 64147 Arab migrants came during the 1970s, 75899 during the 1980s, and 133489 from 1990 to 1997 (Hayani, 1999:286).

The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and its subsequent expansionist policies (most notably during the Six Days War) produced overall around 3 millions of Palestinian refugees, of which significant numbers migrated to the U.S. and to Canada. Also, immigration from Arab Gulf countries, which was almost insignificant prior to 1945, became far more important during the post-War period, as 18000 Arab migrants came from this part of the world. Finally, immigration from Jordan, Syria, and North Africa has also contributed to swell the ranks of post-War Arab migrants to Canada.

As mentioned earlier, another important characteristic of this new migratory wave is that it is split more equally between Muslims and Christians, although, during the 1945-1967 period, Christians still formed the majority of immigrants of Arab origin. Also, and this is fundamental, there are important class differences between the pre-War and the post-War cohorts. While most early Arab migrants arrived in Canada as unskilled and illiterate peasants, the post-War cohort was comprised of large proportions of university students, and university-educated professionals such as lawyers, professors, teachers, engineers, and doctors (Abu-Laban, 1980:118-120; Naff, 1983:24; Suleiman, 1999:9). The Arab migrants who came to North America between 1945 and 1976, both Christians and Muslims, were typically secular and largely Westernized, and had often been schooled in either Western or Western-type institutions. Contrary to the earlier cohort, their ethnic identity tended to be informed more by national than by religious origin. Moreover, large segments of the post-War cohort were under the influence of Nasser's Pan-Arabist ideology, and were thus prone to identify as Arabs, and even as Arab nationalists (Abraham, 1983:99; Suleiman and Abu-Laban, 1989:4, Suleiman, 1999:9-10). According to most authors, Pan-Arabist sentiments and identities were exacerbated by the creation of the State of Israel, by subsequent Arab-Israeli wars, and, above all, by the common thread running through all of these latter events,

the plight of the Palestinian people. However, it should be stressed that a Pan-Arab solidarity structured around the Palestine issue has been severely undermined, in the Arab world at least, by the Arab military defeat of 1967 (Abraham, 1983: 99), and by conflicts between Arab nations, most notably between the Lebanese Maronites and the Palestinians (Abu-Laban, 1980, 1988; Naff, 1983; Suleiman and Abu-Laban, 1999:4).

In North America the formation of an Arab-based ethnic bond was fostered by the biases and hostility directed at individuals of Arab origin, irrespective of national, religious, sectarian, or other sub-group differences (Abraham, S., 1983:100; Kayal, 1983; Suleiman, 1989:4-5). Furthermore, as stressed by Abu-Laban (1988:88), while intolerance and prejudice concern all non-Western ethnic groups in Canada, Arab-Canadians faced an additional problem threatening their acceptance in Canada in the form of Zionism. To justify their project of creating and maintaining a Jewish State in Palestine, Zionists launched a propaganda campaign, which included derogatory portrayals of Arabs (Abu-Laban, 1980:88, 1988; Suleiman, 1988; Kayal, 1983). Thus, in part but not only because of the Zionist ideology, Arab-Canadians of various national origins and sectarian allegiances found themselves lumped together, in the Western media, as one undifferentiated ethno-cultural entity. According to Suleiman (1999:10) and Abu-Laban (1980:112), the Six-Days War marked the height of the tide of the development of an ethnic and political Arab consciousness among Arabs in North America. More generally, this growing Arab self-consciousness was informed by a desire to keep in check the disparaging stereotypes of the Arabs conveyed by North American media in their treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflicts (Suleiman, 1999:10).

Among some of the unexpected consequences of the 1967 Six Days War, and the ensuing blossoming of Pan-Arab sentiments, has been a rapprochement between older and

newer Arab-Canadian communities, and, correlatively, the emergence of a Pan-Arab consciousness among the former group (Kayal, 1983:55-57; Naff, 1983:25; Suleiman and Abu-Laban, 1989; 4-5; Haddad, 1994:79; Suleiman, 1999:10-11). On the eve of the Six Days War, Christian Syrian-Lebanese of the second, the third, and the emerging fourth generation, both in Canada and the U.S., were on the verge of "dissolving" as a distinct ethnic group into North America's mainstream ethno-cultural fabric (Kayal, 1983:55). Because the Palestinian issue was construed and presented in North American media as an Arab versus Jewish question, the Syrian Christians were led to probe their history and ethnic identity, in relation to other Arab groups (Kayal, 1983:55). As a result, several Syrian Lebanese Canadians and Americans, who were largely culturally incorporated, started to identify as Arabs in order to be heard by a host society continuously confronting them as such, thus reminding them of an inescapable "Arab-ness". It should be mentioned, however, that many other Arab second-generationers, instead of re-appropriating positively their Arab-ness, preferred to de-emphasize their Arab origins, and to stress instead other less socially compromised identities such as national membership (e.g.: Egyptian, Lebanese, Algerian, etc...) or sectarian membership (Coptic, Syrian-Orthodox, etc...) (Suleiman, 1999:11).

3.3) The Arabo-Muslim Differentialists: from the 1970s up to now

By the mid-1970s, another cohort started to enter Canada and the U.S. in increasing numbers, at a time where incoming flows of secular, nationalist, and Westernized Arab migrants were declining. This new cohort was comprised of Muslim Arab migrants who were striving to transplant in their new Western environment a strong religious identity, either coexisting with, or even in some cases prevailing over their national and/or Pan-Arab identities. This Arabo-

Muslim identity is largely a by-product of the post-1970s Islamic revival in the Arab world, movement which grew increasingly stronger after the 1967 Arab military defeat to the Israeli army. Thus, whereas most of the Arab migrants coming to Canada between 1945 and the early 1970s were secular and highly educated, this new migratory wave included many semi-educated and religious migrants, who rapidly felt the need to institutionalize their faith in their new homeland through an institutional network of Mosques and religious organizations. Furthermore, this cohort often rejects secularism and Westernization, and is thus more committed to maintaining an ethno-religious identity rooted in an Islamized notion of culture (Haddad, 1983, 1994:63-82; McIrvin Abu-Laban, 1989). According to Yvonne Haddad (1983:73), these new Arab-Muslim religious orthodox migrants tended to assign a more strictly devotional role to Mosques and religious organizations, compared with their secular American-born ethno-religious peers of the second and the third generation, whose implication in religious networks and Mosques, if any, often assumed a social role of community binder. Furthermore, the Differentialists' strong emphasis on gender segregation and traditional gender roles – both inside and outside of religious institutions – rebuffed most Arab Muslims of the second and the third generation (Haddad, 1983, 1994:63-82; McIrvin Abu-Laban, 1989).

3.4) Canadian-born Arab Youths Today: Which Ethnic and Religious Identity?

Today the different brands of ethnic and religious identities transplanted and cultivated in Canada by previous migratory cohorts are likely to continue to colour, to various degrees, the ethno-religious self-concept of Arab-Canadian youths. First, because, at present, the majority of Arab-Canadian youths are children of Arab migrants who arrived in Canada in the late 1970s, and in the 1980s, the Muslims among them are likely to have an

ethnic self-concept with significant religious underpinnings. As mentioned, in the Arab world proper, this Islamized, and thus somehow exclusive ethnic identity flourishing among Muslim Arabs, certainly contributed to re-activate among Christian minorities a well-entrenched tendency to retreat into their own sectarian identities, which can always easily re-surface, depending on the conjuncture. Consequently, at present, Christian Arab-Canadian youths also tend to hold on to an ethnic identity with marked religious undertones. However, the acute Westernization and Americanization underwent by both Muslim and Christian Arab second-generationers are hardly consistent with a rigid and conservative religious framework, such as the one imported by their more traditional parents from their home country (Haddad, 1999:75). It will thus be interesting to explore how these youths re-invent the ethno-religious traditions and identities of their parents in order to reproduce them in a viable form in a Western and more liberal context.

At the same time, other external factors are at work to foster the reproduction of a trans-national Arab ethnicity among these second-generationers. Put differently, some of the elements of the post-War dynamics which contributed to foster Arab-Canadian and Arab-American identities transcending sub-group differences are still at work today in North America. Thus, since the first Palestinian Intifada (1988-91), and especially the Gulf War (1990-91), Hollywood movies featuring fanatic, violent, and sexist Arab terrorists have dramatically mushroomed. Such negative stereotypes (mediated through Hollywood movies and the media coverage of Middle-East politics) definitely contribute to foster trans-national solidarities among Arab-Canadian youths of various backgrounds, who are confronted by biases and hostility directed against the "Arabs", construed as an undifferentiated and monolithic entity. However, other Arab-second-generationers are likely to respond to

derogatory ethnic profiling by downplaying the Arab component of their identity as a way to

ward off prejudice and discrimination.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

1.1) Ethnic Identity

1.1.1) Contributions and Limitations of Post-Structuralism

Over recent years, theories of ethnic identity have tended to be torn between two opposite epistemological camps, each of them informed by two very different assumptions about the relative importance to be accorded to the notions of agency and structure. The first approach embraces the post-structuralist notion that ethnic identity formation is the result of a series of choices, decisions, creative transformations and adaptations leading to a largely negotiated and always moving identity. The second one, more theoretically orthodox, envisages ethnic identity in a more unproblematic fashion, positing a top-to-bottom relationship between the subjects and the cultural frameworks supplying them with the various norms, values, and roles drawing the contours of what comes to be seen as a largely ready-made collective ethnic self.

The post-structuralist perspective challenges traditional theories of culture and identity on the ground that they essentialize notions of culture and identity by regarding them as reified monolithic blocks. According to Gerd Bauman (1996), this approach to ethnicity rests on a fallacious reasoning according to which individual ethnic identities are derived from an all-encompassing ethnic culture, which is itself produced by an unified ethnic community. To Bauman, such a discourse tends to reduce socio-cultural groups to homogeneous and stable communities, which in turn delineate the boundaries of stable and quasi-ontologized identity structures.

The anti-essentialist camp sets against concepts of culture and identity as reified and fixed entities a counter-definition defining these notions as rather contextual and dialogical processes continuously re-negotiated through history and individual experiences. Thus, authors such as Homi Bhabha (1990), Stuart Hall (1990), Jonathan Rutherford (1990), Gerd Bauman (1996, 1997), Pina Werbner (1997), Alberto Melluci (1997), Caglar (1997), and Steven Vertovec and Alisdair Rogers (1998) all call for the understanding of culture and cultural identities as a "production which is never complete, always in process (…) instead of an already accomplished fact." (Hall, 1990: 222) With the de-essentialization of the concept of culture, several epithets have come to be celebrated: "hybrid", "creolized", "hyphenated", which are all aimed at dismantling the fiction of a monolithic pre-given and reified culture from which would be derived the actors' ethno-national identities (Caglar, 1997: 170).

Furthermore, some authors are going even further by arguing that, in general, the Mutliculturalist discourses, found both in universities and within anti-racist social movements, are flawed with the same essentialist and reified notions of identity and culture. Their main argument is that, although Multiculturalist discourses have efficiently challenged the culturally reductive and exclusionary character of Western universalism, they still conceive of culture as a stable and unchanging frame of references and meanings, which transcends history while subsuming individuals' identities under the all-encompassing and levelling notion of the Nation. In order words, these authors contend that Multiculturalist discourses end up re-essentializing the idea of culture for the purpose of de-constructing essentialized racist representations of non-Western cultures. Thus, concludes Hall (1990:223), the essentializing of culture was critical to both colonial movements and post-colonial struggles (Hall, 1990; Bhabha, 1990; Rutherford, 1990; Calgar, 1997). In my

opinion, such warnings are as highly relevant to policy makers elaborating Multiculturalist policies as they are to academics researching ethnic groups, for both groups often overlook the crucial role played by agency in the formation of ethnic identities among minority and majority groups.

As a result, for most tenants of this anti-essentialist approach, the process of ethnic identity building performed by children of immigrants is bound to allow for negotiation, creative transformations, and heuristic re-appropriations. Such an argument challenges the traditional view that second-generationers are necessarily experiencing an identity crisis as a result of being positioned in-between two crystallized cultural poles competing to gain their allegiance (Werbner, 1997; Bauman, G., 1997, 1996; Caglar, 1997). Gerd Bauman remarks that the phrase "between two cultures", as applied to children of immigrants, is resolutely in keeping with the essentialist view of culture: "the image it evokes is not of young people performing culture as a process of making sense of each other and of adult others, but of a culture-less flock lost between two immovable objects named *cultures* (Bauman, G., 1996: 212)." Bauman argues that what makes the in-betweeness thesis most problematic is that it wrongly pre-supposes the existence of homogeneous and bounded cultures. Indeed, the notion that children of immigrants are floating somewhere in-between two cultural blocks becomes obsolete once the idea of a pure bounded culture has been rejected. Pina Werbner, acknowledging the full implications of such an argument, suggests that the notion of "cultural hybridity", as applied specifically to migrant youths, should be deserted as well, since, by definition, culture is necessarily hybrid: "Despite the illusion of boundedness, culture evolves historically through unreflective borrowings, mimetic appropriations, exchanges, and inventions. There is no culture in and of itself (Werbner, 1997:4)." Similarly, Caglar rejects the notion of "cultural hybridization" understood as a process by which elements from disparate cultural systems are fully synthesized

without their contradictions and specificities being eroded. In other words, for these authors, theories emphasizing the hybridity of ethnic identities risk embracing the very reifications they seek to overcome. Therefore, the term "ambivalence" is often substituted for hybridity in post-structuralist theories of ethnic identity. (Werbner, 1997:16) It is deemed that such a notion better reflects the fluid, unfixed, and equivocal character of post-modern identities, which are seen as open fields in which actors are manoeuvring in response to their environments (Melluci, 1997).

Once the notion of culture has been problematized and de-constructed with a view to expose its fluid and ambiguous nature, the task of the student of migrant youths' identities undergo a radical shift; rather than being aimed at unfolding the process by which migrant children are socialized into one or another cultural community, it should be re-directed toward the study of the strategies by which migrant youths move away from both their host society's and ethnic community's discursively fabricated ethno-national boundaries.

The anti-essentialist approach to ethnic identity highlights in an interesting fashion how migrant youths can re-appropriate the dominant social significations attached to ethnic categories. But more generally, it emphasizes the social interstices through which the individual can pass so as to turn to his or her advantage the dominant discourse's frame of norms. This perspective is derived from the post-structuralist notion that individuals are autonomous agents able to appraise and even transform social norms rather than purely predetermined social beings. It implies that actors are not bound to follow to the letter a pre-written "social script", but can improvise around it. In other words, the subjects are continuously engaged in a (virtual) dialogue with the prescriptions attached to the social roles they are called to "play" - a process through which they can produce new creative interpretations of the dominant social norms (Werbner, 1997, Melluci, 1997, Calgar, 1997).

However, the post-structuralist view that ethnic identity is a purely open space that actors can freely shape and transform at will in a social vacuum needs to be challenged. This subjectivist framework often claims to be indebted to Fredrik Barth's definition of ethnicity. In the Barthian conception, "ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves (Barth, 1969:10)." But it must be made clear that Barth never implied that ethnic categories were totally disconnected from the socio-cultural environment in which actors are enmeshed. Rather, argued Barth, ethnic groups will selectively draw certain defining characteristics from a pool of commonly shared symbolic resources. Once these characteristics are "socially activated", they become available symbolic material for the group's identity construction process. Thus, explains Barth in a now famous passage: "socially relevant factors alone become diagnostic for membership, not the overt objective differences (Barth, 1969: 15)." As Isajiw (1974) pertinently remarked, in general, even the most radical subjectivist theorists consider that the criteria shaping the symbolic contour of ethnic identities are derived from commonly shared attributes. However, some of them have recently adopted the radical subjectivist position that ethnic identity building is largely sheltered from the influence of the various social groups into which actors have been socialized. Thus, for Calgar (1997), dominant theories of ethnicity are flawed because they continue to envisage ethnic identity as being rooted in ideas of bounded cultural communities. Calgar, fully liberating the subject from his/her social anchorages, consider that cultural phenomena- including ethnic identity- should be considered as "market commodities". In this perspective, actors become "free to negotiate their own cultural self-definitions through exchanges and collective consumption (Caglar, 1997:180)". This metaphor of culture as a free market is informed by the post-modern notion that the sources of identity are "practice-bound rather than pre-given (Calgar, 1997).

This radical (a-sociological) subjectivism yields a limited and one-sided conception of ethnic identity formation. Although the latitude actors have in the process of constructing their social self must indeed be acknowledged, the "negotiability" of (any) identity is necessarily limited and constrained by the pre-given symbolic universes produced by the social groups in which individuals have been socialized throughout their life. These groups can be called "involuntary groups (Isajiw, 1974)", for they have not been chosen by actors, but have rather been assigned to them through socialization processes. It follows that the realm of meanings, roles and discourses that actors can activate for the purpose of identity formation is not unlimited and constitutes a relatively finite set. In other words, although the range of identity choices, and cultural innovations possibly performed by individuals is extremely wide, the boundaries of such a range are restricted and conditioned by various pre-determined forms of sociality, based, for example, on ethnicity, gender, class, age, etc. Thus, the subjectivist/objectivist opposition may well be an irrelevant one if ethnic identity is to be seen as the result of an interactive and creative dialogue between agents and the various socio-cultural universes to which they have (collective) access.

Such a perspective is largely in keeping with the "situational" or "contextual" approach to ethnicity as developed by authors such as Joane Nagel (1994), Jonathan Okamura (1981) or Steve Vertovec and Alisdair Rogers (1998). These authors, drawing on Barth's seminal work, recognize the unstable and changing nature of ethnic identity, which can take different forms depending on which culturally shared items are mobilized by individuals in their quest for meaningful self-definitions. Ethnic identity then becomes a flexible structure which can be modified depending on the context in which actors perform social interactions. Thus, says Nagel (1994), "as the individual (or group) moves through daily life, ethnicity can change according to variations in the situations and audiences encountered. (...) The chosen ethnic

identity is determined by the individual's perception of its meanings to different audiences, its salience in different social contexts, and its utility in different settings (p.14-15)". Culture must then be seen as a "tool kit" providing actors with various sources of meanings from which they can draw to create and re-create identities on a day-to-day basis. The notion of situational identity is particularly well suited for the study of ethnic identity formation among migrant youths. Children of immigrants indeed learn very quickly how and when to switch cultural codes appropriately depending on the different arenas in which they move in (Vertovec, 1998; Wilpert, 1989). However, as Okamura (1981) clearly stressed, the situational approach to ethnicity, although conveniently avoiding to reify culture and identities, should not drift into an excessive subjectivism overlooking the structural constraints that limit the decisional power of actors to choose any given identity. For instance, the position of one's group in the socio-economic power structure, as well as the way members of this group are perceived by the host society, all impact on the degree to which one can freely adopt, or opt out of, ethnic labels.

1.1.2) Ethnic Identity Retention in Relation to Social Incorporation Processes

At this point, it is important to theorize in a more systematic manner the notion of ethnic identity, for there seems to be much confusion surrounding such a concept in the literature. The most commonly found shortcoming is generally that the external/objective and the internal/subjective dimensions of ethnic identity are not analytically differentiated (Isajiw, 1974). Following Isajiw (1974, 1997), Breton et al. (1990), and Isajiw, Sev'er, and Driedger (1993), we will conceive of ethnic identity as a situational and varying structure comprised of both an internal and an external dimension. Whereas the former dimension refers essentially to subjective feelings of belonging, and attachment to an involuntary group and its commonly

shared cultural universe, the latter refers to the processes of socialization of individuals into one or more of these groups.

Furthermore, the present research posits that the process by which individuals establish subjective ties to one or more ethnic groups and its corresponding shared cultural universe(s) (the internal aspect of identity) should necessarily be analyzed **in relation** to the processes of socio-cultural incorporation by which these same individuals become socially and culturally competent actors within one or more community (the external aspect of identity). A self-concept taken in its pure subjective form is not of much sociological relevance if it is not related to the external social processes in which it is rooted. As Isajiw puts it, "locating oneself in relation to a community and society is not only a psychological phenomenon, but also a social phenomenon in the sense that the internal psychological states expresses themselves objectively in external behaviour patterns that come to be shared by others (1990:35)." Such a definition allows the researchers to take into consideration the complex dynamic that comes into place between these two processes. Even more interesting, from the perspective of a research on second-generationers, is that it allows to identify the possible discrepancies existing between the external and the internal aspects of ethnic identity (this point will be further discussed below).

The phenomena covered by the internal and the external aspects of ethnic identity encompass two different sorts of processes: the social/structural ones, and the cultural ones. The cultural domain of ethnic identity refers to the processes of learning, accepting, and internalizing some or all patterns of behaviour of one or more ethnic group (Isajiw, 1974:122, and 1997). The social/structural processes pertain to the entrance of individuals into primary groups such as family and circles of friends, as well as into secondary groups such as systemic institutional organizations (economic, politic, educational, etc.), and voluntary associations (cultural, professional, religious, etc..). These two sets of conceptual

distinctions, internal/external and social/cultural, will inform the notion of ethnic identity as employed in the present research. Thus, the concept of ethnic identity includes, on the one hand, the (internal) commitment to an ethnic group and its culture and, on the other, the (external) processes of socialization by which one becomes familiar with his/her ethnic culture and gets incorporated into ethnic primary groups, and formally organized ethnic networks (Isajiw, 1974, 1993, and 1997).

Most contemporary students of ethnicity have rejected the old linear model of assimilation which has exerted a dominant influence in the field of ethnic studies up to the 1970s. Such a model, generally associated with Robert Park's Chicago School of Sociology, took the form of a "straight-line theory" positing an ineluctable process of assimilation for the first generation of migrant settlers and the subsequent ones. Thus, Gordon (1964)'s seven step linear model posited that, as assimilation into the social fabric of the host society would take place, ethnic identity loss would naturally follow. Over the past three decades, several authors have challenged the hypothesis of a mechanical relationship between socio-economic integration and ethnic identity retention (Glazer and Moniyan, 1975; Reitz, 1980; Breton, et al., 1990; Isajiw, 1997). For instance, one study conducted in Toronto by Breton et al. (1990) has empirically invalidated the assumption that "if members of a group are fully incorporated in Canadian society, they have (necessarily) abandoned all elements of their ethnic identity and background. Similarly if a group shows a low degree of ethnic retention, it does not necessarily follow that they are highly incorporated in the social fabric of the society (p.263)". In other words, ethnic identification, the maintenance of an ethnic culture, and structural incorporation, should be considered as relatively autonomous processes that do not necessarily evolve in the same direction.

1.1.3) Second-Generationers and the Concept of Symbolic Ethnicity

These analytical distinctions can be particularly relevant to the study of ethnic identity among children of immigrants. Numerous pieces of research have shown that, among second-generationers , a strong ethnic self-concept is often coupled with a low degree of retention of the ethnic culture, and a high degree of structural incorporation into the host society. Put differently, even though the second generation has generally gained significant access to majority group institutions, got predominantly socialized into the host society's primary groups, and has become more familiar with the dominant culture than with their own ethnic cultural background, they persistently display strong feelings of identification with their ethnic group and culture. This amply well documented phenomenon (Okamura, 1981; Alba, 1990; Breton et al. 1990; Waters, 1990; Gans, 1994; Nagel, 1994) has led several authors to use the notion of "symbolic ethnicity" to designate this lingering ethnic self-concept largely cut off form the cultural and social ethnic environment that would normally sustain and reinforce it. Herbert J. Gans (1994) argues that "symbolic ethnicity, and the consumption (...) of ethnic symbols is intended mainly for the purpose of feeling or being identified with a particular ethnicity, but without either participating in an existing ethnic organization (formal or informal) or practicing an ongoing culture (p.578)". Thus, an ethnic identity becomes increasingly symbolic as its external aspect fades away and is superseded by its internal dimension; for the former generally implies strong social obligations to a larger community whereas the latter can be sustained (symbolically) with a minimum amount of socio-cultural investments in socialization groups (Waters, 1990).

The symbolic ethnicity hypothesis also implies that agents, being estranged from an actual "ethnic community", are to a large extent left to themselves in re-creating and

maintaining their (almost mythical) ethnic identity. Therefore, the re-production of a symbolic ethnicity obliges one to imagine what it means to be "ethnic" by means of numerous cultural amalgamations and collages on a day-to-day basis. Such a phenomenon is well captured by the notion of "invented tradition" as understood by social historian Eric Hobsbawm (1983). Invented traditions, argues this author, are regularly produced by nations, as well as by social groups, which often need to adapt their old collective identities when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which old traditions had been designed. Similarly, it could be said that children of immigrants, by attempting to maintain an ethnic identity uprooted from its corresponding socio-cultural environment, while lacking the adequate competence needed to carry on the ethnic culture in its "original" form, are obliged to perform several symbolic inventions of traditions and mores in order to give meaning to their re-born ethnicity. To do so, they need to draw from a pool of symbolic material various cultural items that are recycled in order to be "ethnicized" in a form that is viable in an immigration context. In the process, ethnicity becomes largely symbolic as these "ethnic markers" are often freely picked from a "cultural grab bag" which constitutes a mix of (often stereotypical) traits, practices, and attitudes, reflecting the youth's image of what he or she believes to be ethnic (Waters, 1990).

Thus, the symbolic approach to ethnicity embraces the post-structuralist acknowledgement that agency plays a critical role in the creation of ethnic identity. However, contrary to what is assumed by a radical anti-essentialist perspective, it distinguishes ethnic self-definitions that are derived from an actual socialization process from those whose communal basis has been seriously eroded (the symbolic ones). Post-structuralist advocates would probably deem the notion of symbolic ethnicity irrelevant since they have discarded the idea of a pure and bounded culture, from which individual ethnic identities could then deviate to

various degrees. In the context of the present research, it will be posited that, although second-generationers have indeed much latitude in the construction of their ethnic identity, the repertoire from which they can draw to invent ethnic behavioural and attitudinal patterns diminishes as they get culturally and structurally incorporated into the host society. As Gans remarked, while "micro cultural inventions" goes on all the time, most second and third generationers are incapable of "macro cultural inventions" because of the dramatic repletion of the pool of symbolic material on which they can rely for the purpose of re-inventing a new ethnicity (Gans, 1994).

Authors such as Mary Waters (1990), and Isajiw (1977) have offered interesting explanations to account for the emergence of a symbolic ethnicity among the second and subsequent generations of "ethnic" individuals born and raised in Western societies. For these authors, because the ethnic identity of these groups has ceased to be driven by a process of socialization perpetuating the ethnic culture, it has largely become a matter of personal choice which fulfills socio-psychological needs. Mary Waters suggested that, in the United States, the rapid development of symbolic ethnicity can be accounted for by the fact that American culture is simultaneously characterized by two opposite tendencies: exacerbated individualism on the one hand, and conformity resulting from mass society on the other. A symbolic ethnicity, she argues, is the perfect solution to mitigate the contradictions resulting from this situation; it provides individuals with a sense of community, which they lack as a result of American individualism, while at the same time giving them the feeling of being different (as "ethnic-Americans"), which they also lack because of the conformism stemming from our standardized and industrialized mass culture. According to Waters, the main advantage of a symbolic identity is that it provides a sense of belonging to an imagined, and therefore costless community. Indeed, because no commitments or obligations are required from an illusory community,

symbolic ethnicity becomes a convenient identity marker and meaning provider, which does not threaten American values such as individuality, and flexibility (Waters, 1990, 1996). Similarly, Isajiw (1977) has suggested that the pervasive instrumental rationality characterizing our contemporary technological culture has created a symbolic vacuum in the life of agents who, through ethnic rediscovery, attempt to replenish their identity structure with meaning.

Nonetheless, the notion of an optional symbolic ethnicity which can be discarded at will by agents may not be applicable to all ethnic groups, and to every situation. As underlined by Waters (1990), and Okamura (1981), visible minorities, contrary to White immigrants and their offspring, have less latitude in deciding whether they will downplay or emphasize their race and/or ethnicity. The structural racial and ethnic discrimination that still permeates Western societies can sometimes magnify the importance of race and ethnicity among non-White groups, regardless of how much their members want to define themselves in ethnic or racial terms. It must then be kept in mind that ethnic boundaries can sometimes be set from outside the group (Isajiw, 1974:122; Juteau, 1997). Also, ethnic-based prejudice and discrimination can lead to the growth, among second-generationers, of what Ballard (1979:126-129) called a "reactive ethnicity", that is a defensive ethnic consciousness that has been primarily activated in response to racism and exclusion (this point will be further discussed in section 2.2).

1.2) Religious Identity

In this section, we will outline our approach to religious identity, an approach very much informed by the conceptual and theoretical frame put forward in the section on ethnic identity. In the process, we will draw on certain pieces of research pertaining to the sociology of religion in order to examine their relevance to our own inquiries. Finally, using a historical perspective, we will attempt to highlight the socio-cultural factors that led to the interweaving of religion and ethnic identities in the contemporary Arab world.

1.2.1) Religious Identity: a Sociological Approach

There are two different ways of looking at the concept of religious identity. The first approach measures essentially religious identity by focussing on the subject's familiarity with beliefs associated with his or her religion on the one hand, and his or her level of observance of religious practices on the other (see for instance Glock, 1973). From this angle, the researcher's role consists in measuring the extent to which the practices and beliefs of the subject are actually in conformity with the frame of rules prescribed by his or her religion. Such a research strategy leads the analyst to measure one's actual religious behaviours and beliefs against a set of socially approved criteria determining what ought to be proper religious behaviours and beliefs. The latter criteria are derived from either the sacred book, or from the socially dominant interpretation of this same book. In other words, this approach understands religious identity exclusively as the internalization and observance of a given religious system, or, put more simply, in terms of the level of religiosity of the believers. From this perspective, questions such as "How often do you attend Church, the Mosque, or the Synagogue?", "Do you eat kosher?", or "Do you respect the Islamic ban on alcohol?" become highly relevant to the researcher's

empirical inquiry. This approach will inform partially our understanding of religious identity. Indeed, our research will provide a picture, although rough and incomplete, of the level of religiosity of the subjects. However, this research will primarily rely on a second approach to religious identity, which puts the focus on the social use of religion by believers. More specifically, it will look at the extent to which religion contributes to strengthen group solidarity among the members of the ethno-religious community. The main question at issue here is thus whether religion operates as a social binder, or again, whether religion is an important factor in the structuring of the various social and cultural relations in which the subjects are enmeshed.

1.2.2) Religious Identity and Second-Generationers

According to several authors, religion among second-generationers often tends to act as a vehicle for the affirmation of a distinct ethnic identity, that is for the maintenance of group solidarity and identification across generations. In such cases, the children of immigrants tend to adopt a more "secularized" religious identity, which denotes their incorporation into the host society, both culturally and socially. This does not mean that the religious identity of these "soft" believers is entirely devoid of genuine piety. What it does mean, however, is that, for this category of subjects, religious identification becomes subordinated to the production of ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, these second-generationers' understanding of religious norms and prescriptions is, as it is often the case for their "Canadian" peers, personally adapted in order to reflect their more Westernized liberal values and lifestyle.

In the literature, the studies which have perhaps best discussed and analyzed this ethnicization of religious identity among second-generationers are those pertaining to the maintenance of a Jewish identity across generations in North America. In fact, the notion itself

of ethnicized religion has stemmed from these researches. For instance, Stephen Sharot (1973) has empirically demonstrated, with his sample of second and third generation American Jews, that Judaism has become a central factor in the re-production of group solidarity among second and third generationners, but at the same time has largely been freed from its religious component per se. He finds, among other things, that the recent rise in synagogue attendance in several Jewish communities across America is not at all predictive of a high level of religious observance. Moreover, he shows that synagogue attendance tends to be understood by Jewish youths more as an institution allowing for social activities and networking, than as a religious experience per se. In Canada, Leo Driedger (1980), in his study on Jews living in Winnipeg, concludes that, although the religious basis of Jewish ethnicity may be increasingly fading away, its social, cultural, and ideological bases are successfully maintained. The author finds that the high level of ethno-religious retention found among this community can be accounted for by the fact that group boundaries are maintained through residential segregation, unifying ideological discourses, and high levels of social distance and institutional completeness. Herbert Gans (1994) referred to this phenomenon as a symbolic religious identity, a concept which he draws directly from his earlier researches on symbolic ethnicity. According to Gans, a symbolic religious identity denotes a poor and fragmented knowledge of religious norms, a low level of ritual observance, but yet a strong feeling of identification with religion and the religious community. The notion of symbolic religious identity, largely documented for the Jewish community, could turn out to be relevant as well for the study of religious identity among second-generationers of other ethnic groups, such as the Arabs; it would allow researchers to probe the ways by which these youths perform heuristic re-appropriations of religious labels and norms, which are freely recycled into symbolic material feeding the construction of their ethnic identity.

In order to measure quantitatively the socio-cultural use of religious identity in the construction of group boundaries among our sample of Arab youths attending Cegep, we will rely on a scale informed largely by the above discussed Isajiw scale (1990) measuring ethnic identity. More specifically, the concept of religious identity will be analytically broken down into its internal/subjective and external/objective aspects. Whereas the former dimension refers to the subjective identification of the subject to its own religious culture and community, the latter refers to the extent to which this religious identification is articulated to a coherent religious practice, or at least to a coherent social use of religion. Also, the research will distinguish the social from the cultural manifestations of religious identity's internal and external aspects. Thus, in short, the social/internal and the social/external aspects relate, respectively, to the subject's identification, and levels of interaction with his or her religious community. The cultural/internal aspect of religious identity refers to the subject's personal identification and sense of belonging to his/her religious culture, whereas the cultural/external aspect will refer to the subject's level of observance of religious rituals. Thus, the concept of religious identity will be operationalized through a scale tapping into four distinct but yet interrelated dimensions, each referring to a different form of socio-cultural use of religion.

1.2.3) The Construction of a Post-Colonial Arab Identity: the Role of Religion

In the case of the Arab population (both in the Arab World and in migration contexts), one can hardly ignore the important role that religion has recently started to play in the re-definition of a post-colonial Arab identity freed from the remnants of Western cultural influences. It is safe to contend that, in most Arab countries, and despite certain national variations, the post-1970s era has witnessed the rise of an Arabo-Islamic nationalism

establishing strong connections between religion and ethnicity (Donohue, 1980). In the following, we will briefly examine the socio-historical conditions that have contributed to this re-drawing of the collective Arabic identity along religious lines. We will then discuss the implications of this revamped post-colonial Arabo-Islamic identity for the Arab Diaspora transplanted in Western societies.

For most of the newly "free" Arabic countries, the post-independence era did not mark the end of the struggle against the West. After the departure of colonial powers, the pervasive influence of Western cultural models remained untouched, thus exacerbating an identity crisis permeating Arab societies. One of the most important catalysts of this identity crisis is the disruptive impact of post-war modernization. The movement towards modernization initiated by ruling elites in order to emulate the West in achieving technological and economic development has also been coupled with the importation of non-indigenous behavioural norms and values. This process of "cultural colonization" was particularly acute within limited circles of élite groups, who often indulged blindly in the mimicry of Western modes of dress and behaviour, considered by many to be contrary to traditional Arabo-Islamic values and practices. This situation resulted in a sharp gap between the rulers and the ruled, a gap exacerbated by pronounced class differences related to the unequal distribution of economic wealth, and by the generalized corruption prevailing in state institutions. For all these reasons, the national self-narratives offered by post-colonial regimes and élites became unappealing to large segments of the increasingly pauperized and uneducated masses (Farah, 1987; Dekmejian, 1995).

As mentioned in the introduction, the only ideology which, from 1952 to the late seventies, almost succeeded in occupying a dominant position within the realm of discourses

competing to provide a post-colonial Arab identity is Nasser's Pan-Arabism.[7] Secularized and

socialist, it was oriented towards the construction of a collective Arab identity resolutely

independent from Western influences. According to authors such as Raouf (1984), Mellah

(1985), and Ajami (1987), Nasser's personal charisma was the main pillar on which was based

the popularity of Nasserism. This latter fact could explain in part why Nasserism, although it

had a tremendous impact throughout the Arab world, has not been able to outlive its founding

father, who died in 1970. There is also a consensus among scholars that the Arab military defeat

of 1967 over Israel precipitated a sharp decline in Pan-Arabist sentiments. Experienced by Arab

masses and intellectuals as a humiliating event, it therefore largely discredited the ruling élites

of the time- including Nasser himself- whose "political capital" was, at this point, seriously

eroded (Raouf, 1984; Mellah, 1985; Ajami, 1987; Farah, 1987).

Pan-Arabism and Western-type liberalism's failure to provide the principles needed to

shape a post-colonial identity triggered a search for new normative grounds giving meaning to

the idea of "arabness". Within this ideological vacuum emerged a new Arabo-Islamic

nationalism asserting a collective identity freed from the remnants of the former "colonized"

identity imposed by the West. Islamist discourses and movements became increasingly

politicized and militant, advocating for the Islamization of social structures both in public and

private domains. Furthermore, over the past three decades, and despite certain national

variations, this religious nationalism (stemming essentially from the basis) has led to the

embodiment of orthodox Islam-based values in state institutions and in the family. Islam as a

means of national assertion expresses the Arabs' need to re-emphasize the value of their own

ancestral traditions and customs which, under colonial domination, have been systematically

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[7] Note that Pan-Arabism, the ideology calling for the creation of a unitary Arab state, is not an original creation of Nasser. Its emergence goes back to the end of the 19th century (Farah, 1987).

disparaged. Thus, one can safely contend that religion has tended to become inextricably interwoven with National Selfhood in the post-1970s Arab world (Donohue, 1980; Mimouni, 1992; Shukrallah, 1994; Dekmejian, 1995).

To the extent that this process of re-creation of a post-colonial identity in the Arab World should indeed be seen as a movement of symbolic emancipation from the West, the same dynamics are perhaps even more likely to be at work in the case of Arab minorities striving to maintain a distinct identity and culture in a Western context. Thus, from the 1970s onwards, one can observe a shift in the content and orientation of the ethnic identity of the "ideal-typical" Arab Muslim migrant who re-settled in the United States and in Canada. As stressed earlier, whereas Muslim Arabs who migrated in the 1950s and in the1960s tended to be secular, Western-educated, while assimilating in large numbers into the host society, the post-1970s cohort was actively striving to retain an Arab and/or national identity solidly anchored in Islamic culture and traditions (Haddad, 1994). Therefore, one can say that, for the most recent cohort of Arab Muslim immigrants, Islam cannot be separated from national membership, and refers to the status of Islam in their country of birth. (Cesari, 1998: 28).

This intersecting of religion and ethnicity is a phenomenon that does not concern exclusively Arabs of the Muslim faith. Thus, the strong emphasis placed by dominant national self-narratives on Islam, in the Arab world, contributed to make religion a central axis of religious minorities' own group identity as well. In this respect, as Juteau (1997) reminds us, minority groups' external boundaries are always negotiated in relation to the majority group's own self-definitions. This does not prevent the religious material shaping Oriental Christians' self-narratives from being drawn from their own self-produced history, and reservoir of symbols and references, thus delineating internal boundaries. But the language of their identity assertion process tends to echo the language in which are encoded the majority group's own identity

struggles. This explains in part why, in post-colonial Arab societies, Christian minorities have not been immune to the ever-growing influence of religion on collective as well as individual identity building processes. In addition, Arab Christians tend to be excluded, and to exclude themselves as well, from these all-encompassing (post-colonial) national Great Narratives structured along the lines of Islam. Furthermore, among Oriental Christians, religion was very unlikely to become a mobilizing force structuring discourses of resistance against Western neo-colonialism, as it has been the case for Arab Muslims[8]. Nonetheless, as much as the Islamization of Arab societies' symbolic and institutional structures contributed to alienate religious minorities from Muslim majority groups, it also led, perhaps in a reactive manner, to the increasing salience of religion within the identity structure of these same religious minorities.

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[8] This does not mean, however, that colonialism as well as neo-colonialism were not resented and opposed as well by many Christian Arabs. However, it must be said that large portions of this group's commonly Europeanized upper-class members were sympathetic to Colonial occupation, in which they had a vested interest.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Only a small fraction of the existing body of research on ethno-religious identity transmission and socialization among second-generationers of Arab origin have been conducted in North America. The large majority of studies on this topic have taken place in Europe, and most specifically in France, given this country's large Maghrebi population of second and third generations (also called, in French, "Beurs"). This imbalance is in part due to the fact that, all things being equal, Europe has attracted much larger proportions of Arab immigrants during the post-war period than have Canada and the United States together. The overwhelming majority of these Arab-Europeans are Muslims, and came from North Africa, namely Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. For obvious historical reasons, the Maghrebis of Europe settled first and foremost in France, which is home today to an estimated 3 to 4 million Arab-speaking individuals. Furthermore, Arabs of Maghrebi ancestry currently living in France represent close to 50% of the total migrant population, and as much as 5% of the total French population. Apart form mere demographic reasons, perhaps the primary factor accounting for the fact that European Arab second-generationers received so much scholarly attention (particularly in France), compared with their North American counterparts, is the rather conflictual character of their relationship with European majority groups. The same could also be said about European Muslim youngsters of other ethnic groups, such as South Asians in England, and Turks in Germany. Such inter-ethnic tensions are of course deeply rooted in Europe's recent colonial past and its corollary, dysfunctional socio-economic integration and racism, which, in turn, have largely contributed to making salient the Islamic dimension of Muslim Europeans' ethnicities.

Because issues of merging of ethnicity and religion among second-generationers are directly in keeping with our own inquiries, our literature review will draw heavily on European case-studies in order to complement the dramatically scant body of research probing this same question in a North-American context. Furthermore, although studies tackling the issue of ethno-religious identity retention among French-Beurs are of more direct relevance to the present research, the abundant literature on the formation of an "ethno-Islamic" identity among other Muslim minority groups living in Europe will also be taken into account. This can be justified by the fact that, upon scrutiny of the literature, there seems to be striking similarities between the experiences of all Muslim migrant families, regardless of their ethnic origin. Examples of these commonly shared experiences include 1) inter-generational conflicts related to gender relationships, 2) the gendering of child-rearing practices, and 3) a tendency to use Islam as a strong identity marker assuming a role of defensive shield against exclusion and discrimination. Therefore, the following literature review will not be limited to the case of Arabs, but will also draw on studies focussing on other European Muslim ethnic groups, with a strong emphasis on German-Turks and South Asian-British.[9]

2.1) Ethno-Religious Identity Transmission: From the First to the Second Generation

In an empirical study conducted by Yalcin-Heckmann (1998) on the religious socialization process among Turkish migrant families in Germany, the large majority (92%) of the parents who were interviewed acknowledged the need for their children to take Koranic

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[9] Certain references to, and parallels with the young Sikhs and Hindus of Great Britain will even be made, for as their Muslim counterparts, they were socialized into an ethnic culture whose prescriptions and prohibitions are also deeply rooted in a religious rhetoric often clashing with the moral and cultural liberalism prevailing in Western societies.

courses given by either mosques, other Islamic institutions, or qualified private instructors. Also, in Vertovec's work on young Muslim South Asians raised in England (1998:98), as well as in Lans and Rooijackers' study of young Turks living in the Netherlands (1994:113), it has been found that the majority of the interviewed and/or surveyed children had attended some form of Islamic class at one point or another in their lives. However, in most cases, Islamic teaching was dropped by the time children had reached their teenage years. In Yalcin-Heckmann's study (1998:11), parents were asked what were their motivations for inculcating their children with Islamic principles. They responded, among other things, that it would allow their kids to acquire the proper "social skills", to develop a sense of attachment to, and identification with the ethnic group, and to learn proper moral values.[10] It thus appears that, to Muslim parents, Koranic teaching is more than a mere instrument of religious socialization; it is also a means of socialization into the ethnic community. These findings are in keeping with Haddad's contention that Mosques in North America, as several ethnic churches, serve as centres for community bonding and social integration. Haddad specifies that the majority of the Muslim parents who send their children to religious schools are not involved in organized religion (Haddad, 1994). Thus, these case studies all confirm the view that not only Muslim migrants seem unable to separate religion from ethnicity, but that most of them also actively attempt to transmit their ethno-religious identity to their offspring.

If Muslim parents seem to make little distinctions between their religious and their ethnic identities, Muslim youths tend to problematize pre-given notions of how ethnicity and religion should relate to each other. As it will be shown below, Muslim children creatively re-assign new meanings and roles to Islam as an ethnic identity marker, with a view to re-

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[10] However, many parents reported being dissatisfied with the religious instruction provided to their children.

appropriate and transform any form of "ready-made" ethno-religious identities originating from the community. The vast majority of the case studies reviewed here suggest the presence of a strong and generalized feeling of attachment to Islam among young Muslims, born and raised in Western settings. They also offer strong indications that structural and cultural incorporation into the host society have dramatically affected the second generation's knowledge of, and commitment to religious prescriptions and practices. Cesari (1998) argues that, although the subjects of her sample of French-Arab youths have a very positive perception of Islam, and define themselves as Muslim believers, they are merely making a symbolic assertion which is not always connected with their everyday life (Cesari, 1998:29). According to the author, they are not practising Muslims, and Islam has little implications for their social life. Cesari remarks that the religious symbols and norms used by young Beurs in the construction of their Arabo-Muslim identity are not uncritically absorbed through an assimilation process dictated by the family and the community; they are rather chosen among "salvation goods" according to preference. Similarly, Nimat Hafez Barazangi (1989) showed that, among her sample of both Canadian and American Arab Muslim families, parents tended to interpret Islamic prescriptions "out of context", while, inversely, their offspring tended to contextualize and adapt these principles, so as to make them consistent with their Western socio-cultural environment. Finally, in his research on young Muslims living in Keighley (England), Steve Vertovec (1998) brings to our attention a discrepancy between the internal and the external dimensions of religious identity. He indeed found that a great many of his respondents firmly believe in their faith, and are deeply attached to their Muslim identity, regardless of the degree to which they observe religious rituals. In fact, most of his respondents openly declared their negligence of religious prescriptions, and their poor religious knowledge, but were nevertheless resolutely staunch in their Muslim identity (Vertovec, 1998).

As mentioned above, the overwhelming majority of case studies concerned with ethno-religious identity formation among second-generation Arabs have been conducted in French settings. According to several authors, a significant proportion of young Beurs appear to be well on their way of developing a symbolic Arabo-Islamic identity as a result of structural and cultural incorporation into the host society. For instance, Olivier Roy's fieldwork (1992) has offered a portrayal of the young Beurs as a highly acculturated group whose relationship to the Arabo-Islamic culture is rather remote and de-substantialized. He found that, among young Arabs, religious observance is minimal, being limited to a public assertion that one is Muslim, adhere to the principal rites of passage (ex.: circumcision), does not eat pork, and fasts during Ramadan. The first practices to lapse, says Roy, are the ban on alcohol, eating "halal" food, the 5 prayers, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. According to Leveau (1992), the Beurs' theological knowledge is generally negligible and distorted, as what they perceive as Islam is often an assortment of basic Koranic prescriptions, popular religiosity, folklore, and tradition (Leveau, 1994:2). Also, among the second-generation, the loss of Arabic, and the shift to French is rapid, while Arabo-Islamic cultural models compete and clash with the new subculture that has emerged in the marginalized suburban ghettos (also known as "les Cités") (Roy, 1992; Leveau, 1994). Bastenier (1998) argues along the same lines when he points out that the young Beurs increasingly opt for the street as their primary space of socialization, thus drifting away from the codes and norms of the family. Thus, the typical Beur of the Cité speaks more "Verlan" (urban street slang used by French youths) than Arabic, listens to Rap, and goes to McDonald's. (Roy, 1992)

Leveau (1997) has reported the results of a 1989 *Gallup/Le Monde/IFOP/RIL*-sponsored survey showing that young Maghrebis' levels of identification with, and embracement of French culture are particularly high. According to this survey, 70% of the respondents wished to

settle permanently in France, and, most surprisingly, 71% of them answered yes to the question "do you feel closer to the way of life and to the culture of the French people than to that of your parents?". Furthermore, between 25% and 30% of the sample fully adhere to secular values and norms (Leveau, 1997).

In light of the above stated research findings, it appears that the religious identity of young Arabs living in an immigration context tends to become increasingly symbolic. As seen in Chapter 1, Gans (1994) argued that his notion of symbolic ethnicity could relevantly be extended to the process of religious identity formation among ethnic youths of second and subsequent generations. The present literature review seems to reinforce such an hypothesis, as Muslim youths appear to indulge in the "consumption of religious symbols, apart from regular participation in a religious culture and in religious affiliations - other than for purely secular purposes (Gans, 1994: 583)."

Nonetheless, it would be reductive, perhaps even inaccurate, to conclude as Roy does that, "even though the Beurs conduct themselves and want to be perceived as Arabs, or Maghrébins, yet they portray virtually no signs of the Arab culture or the Muslim religion (Roy, 1994:65)." Other authors, more cautious, are suggesting that although the Beurs' cultural incorporation into French society seems to be well underway, their attachment to Islam and their ethnic culture is not fading away. Thus, for Begag (1990), while the Beurs have relinquished many religious norms and concepts of their parents, they are certainly not rejecting religion as an identity marker, even though neither of them has a deep knowledge nor follows a devout practice of Islam. Begag, along with Bastenier (1998) and Nijsten (1996) among others, acknowledge the prevalence of a situational use of religion and traditions among Maghrebi youngsters; Islam will come to the foreground not as a fixed set of religious rituals and behavioural rules, but as a mere vehicle of a distinct and separate identity that can be

downplayed or emphasized depending on the context. In the process, the young Beurs often come to maintain two or more separate spheres of interaction, each corresponding to a different aspect of their multi-ethnic self. For instance, school and family call for two different types of attitudes and behaviours (Begag, 1990; Bastenier, 1998; Nijsten, 1996).

But it should not be assumed, at least in the case of French-Maghrebis, that the second-generation's Arabo-Islamic identity is systematically confined to the private sphere without ever encroaching upon the public arena. Interestingly, Leveau reports that 30 % of his respondents who were favourable to integration were also in favour of greater visibility of Islam in public spaces (Leveau, 1997). The now famous "affaire du voile" provided a premium example of how Islam can be assigned a political value and function by the young Beurs. In 1989, after three girls refusing to remove their headscarves in the classroom had sparked a national debate, numerous Beurs and Beurettes mobilized in defence of the "free choice" camp. However, their protest has to be understood as more than a mere sign of religious piety; it was chiefly the expression of a symbolic struggle for their cultural, social and political recognition by the majority group (Bloul, 1998). Thus, the young Beurs who have a strong Arabo-Islamic self-concept- likely the majority according to the literature- are not necessarily following an isolationist strategy, or the path of self-segregation; on the contrary, they might be engaged in a politics of recognition aimed at forcing their entry into the mainstream socio-economic structure, from which a great many of them are currently excluded (this point will be further discussed in section 2.2 of the present chapter).

However, it should be mentioned that there is a second group of Arab youths, clearly forming a minority, for whom the use of Islam in the construction of an ethnic identity is more than purely symbolic. This group is comprised of young orthodox Islamists who are extremely pious and strict in their observance of the Islamic rules of conduct. Contrary to the trajectory

typically followed by the majority of Arab youngsters, that of Islamist youths is running parallel to mainstream institutional and cultural systems. Whereas the former group tends to pick selected ethno-religious cultural items compatible with the Western socio-cultural models they have internalized, the latter attempts to conform rigorously to a "quasi-mythical" and rigid body of behavioural and normative prescriptions legitimized on religious grounds (Bastenier, 1992:212-213; Cesari, 1997:31). Whereas ultra-orthodox Arab youths generally foster the creation of separate institutions where their Islam-based ethnicity can be completely shielded from Western influences, their more culturally and structurally incorporated peers are trying to carve out a space in the public arena where they can be accepted simultaneously as Arabo-Muslims and full members of the host society.

2.2) The Role of Prejudice and Discrimination in Strengthening Ethnic and Religious Identities

The formation among second-generationers of an ethno-religious identity, be it symbolic or behaviourally and normatively grounded, cannot be properly understood without taking into account the role played by prejudice and discrimination. The re-appropriation of religion as an ethnic marker by young European Muslims is regarded by several authors as a reaction to Western stereotypical representations of Islam. Moreover, theses neo-colonial representations, when coupled with socio-economic exclusion, are even more likely to beget either Islam-based "neo-communalist" tendencies, or a mere process of Islamization of ethnic identity's internal dimension. Once again, the case of French-Maghrebis is particularly illustrative of this phenomenon since a large fraction of the Beurs are known to share with the African-American underclass the same bleak socio-economic profile (Jazouli, 1995). In the impoverished suburban

zones, Franco-Maghrebi youths, being denied decent educational opportunities and employment, are significantly over-represented among young offenders who commit random acts of violence, and engage in petty criminality (Lapeyronnie, 1987; Begag, 1990; Roy, 1994; Gross et al., 1997; Leveau, 1997). In the Lyon area for instance, 70% of the Beurs aged from 16 to 25 years old are unemployed or without any vocational training (Begag, 1990:26). Such an ethnically segmented socio-economic structure constitutes a fertile ground for the growth and development of an ethno-religious consciousness. However, for authors such as Lapeyronnie (1987) and Bastenier (1998), this Arabo-Islamic "Us" emerging as a result of discrimination and exclusion, although fed by a common experience of racism, does not reflect a shared sense of belonging to a culturally distinct community. The high degree of cultural acculturation experienced by young Beurs exacerbates their frustration stemming from standing at the margins of the socio-economic structure. More precisely, realizing the extent of the gap between the cultural goals they have internalized and the means available to them, the Beurs are retreating into a reactive ethnic and religious consciousness. Thus, paradoxically, the idea of cultural distinctiveness increasingly gains support among the French Beurs as their actual cultural differences are fading away in the course of the "incorporation" process (Lapeyronnie, 1987; Bastenier, 1998).

Contrary to French-Maghrebis and other Muslim ethnic groups scattered elsewhere in Europe, North American Arabs are not negotiating a migrant identity with a majority group which once represented direct colonial domination to them. Also, they do not suffer from structural discrimination and socio-economic exclusion to the same extent as the former groups do. Therefore, in the case of North American Arabs, it is not clear to what extent religion or ethnicity will emerge as a similar reactive force, or as a protective buffer, in the construction of the group's consciousness. Nevertheless, there is a strong feeling among

North American Arabs from both the first and the second generations that their ethno-religious background is denigrated by Westerners. For instance, Abu-Laban and Abu-Laban's Edmonton study (1999:150) showed that a total of 63% of their sample of Arab-Canadian youths (both Muslims and Christians) felt that television either often (19%) or sometimes (44%) portrays Arabs or Arab culture in a biased and unfair manner. Ibrahim Hayani's study (1999:299), reporting the findings of a 1993 survey of Arabs in Ontario, showed that 80% of the respondents indicated that Canadians regard Arab rather poorly. These perceptions seem to be largely confirmed by a study cited by McIrvin Abu Laban and Abu-Laban (1999). These authors reported the results of a 1977 national survey of Canadian attitudes showing that Arabs fare very poorly at the level of popular imagery; in a list of 27 ethnic groups, Arab-Canadians were ranked 24th by Anglo-Canadians, and 23rd by French-Canadian respondents (cited in McIrvin Abu-Laban and Abu-Laban, 1999:115). However, and this point cannot be overstressed, Hayani reported that the Arab respondents participating in the 1993 Ontario study felt that there was relatively little discrimination directed against them. As Hayani legitimately remarked, these relatively low rates of reported discriminatory experiences are surprising given "how poorly Canadians regard Arabs, their culture, and their way of life (Hayani, 1999:300)." This discrepancy between perceived stereotypes and self-reported discriminatory experiences need to be taken into account in the present research.

These perceived cultural biases towards their ethno-religious traditions are much likely to deter Arab migrants living in North America from identifying with their respective majority group. Even second-generation Arabs, regardless of their level of social, cultural, and economic incorporation, can be induced on retaining their ethno-religious identity in reaction to what they perceive as Western-made misrepresentations of their cultural heritage. It should be reminded

that certain international events have increased the level of Western stereotypes of Arab and Islamic culture. First, as previously mentioned, many authors stressed that the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the pro-Israel US policy that ensued, have contributed to the emergence of a reactive ethno-religious identity among the Arab Diaspora (Abu-Laban, 1980:83-94; Suleiman, 1988, 1999). But Arab youths born and raised in the West in the post-1970s era have been particularly affected by more recent events, such as the Rushdie Affair in 1989, the Gulf War in 1990, and most recently, the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. These are all events that have contributed to reinforce anti-Arab stereotypes and prejudices. Finally, fundamentalist movements in the Middle-East, already influential in the 1970s but growing in size in the 1980s, have also contributed to fuel pre-existing generalizations in the Western mind, such as the mechanical association of Arabs and Muslims with terrorism and religious fanaticism (Lapeyronnie, 1987; Begag, 1990; Wilpert, 1989; Haddad, 1994; Gross et al., 1997; Leveau, 1997; Bastenier, 1998). Thus, all these factors have contributed to reinforce, to various degrees, ethno-religious retention among second-generation Arab youths.

2.3) Traditional Gender Role Models as an Ethno-Religious Identity Marker

As mentioned above, one can hardly ignore the fact that religion and ethnicity have become tightly entangled in the post-1970s Arab world. Furthermore, several authors have argued that, in numerous Third World nations, anti-(neo)colonial nationalisms were not only articulated along religious and traditional lines, but were also, and still are, powerfully gendered (McClintock, 1997:89-90 ; Loomba, 1998:217-220; Nagel, 1998:252-253). In the case of Arab and other Muslim countries, the emphasis given to the issue of women in this context of cultural resistance was particularly strong. Thus, in the view of several Arab natives, traditional gender

relationships were the symbol and the epitome of a genuine Arab and Islamic identity. This close connection between gender and nationalist issues in newly independent Arab countries was expressed by Lama Abu Odeh (1993) through the telling image of the woman's body as "a battlefield where the cultural struggles of postcolonial societies were waged (p.27)." Shukrallah (1994) is even more explicit: "women, as a category, are central to the process of the re-creation of the [Arab] community due to their role as symbolic cultural bearers of national traditions (p.16)." (Ahmed, 1992; Abu Odeh, 1993; Shukrallah, 1994). Hoodfar (1993) provides a premium example of this marriage between religion and ethnicity in the Arab world through the case of the hijab: "the veil (...) since the nineteenth century has symbolized for the West the inferiority of Muslim cultures... (p.5)." She then adds that, in the resistance narratives, "the mostly man-made images of Oriental Muslim women continue to be [seen as] a mechanism by which Western dominant cultures re-create and perpetuate beliefs about their superiority (p.5)." Therefore, in the post-colonial Arab social imagery, the new veil (hijab) came to symbolize, not the inferiority of the native culture but, on the contrary, the recovered dignity of native customs (Ahmed, 1992: 164; Hoodfar, 1993; Geadah, 1996; Vertovec and Rogers, 1998:10).

With this in view, the issue of women can hardly be ignored in a study aiming at identifying a series of ethnic markers deployed by migrant groups, such as Arabs, in the negotiation of their group identity in a Western context. The entanglement of gender and ethnicity has often been neglected in the literature on ethnicity. This constitutes a serious, if not mistake, at least shortcoming, in the case of studies dealing with any migrant groups in the eyes of which gender issues are capital to the maintenance of group identity across generations. Thus, Kristine Ajrouch (1999), who researched Arab American families, makes the argument that female conduct constitutes the "locus" of Arab ethnicity among Arab-Americans. Similarly, in her article "What is Indian about You? A Gendered , Transnational Approach to Ethnicity",

Monisha Das Gupta (1997) addresses the issue of gender and ethnicity among East-Indian families in America. Interestingly, were the groups targeted by her study had been Arab ones, the following citation would have also been perfectly relevant:

"The authenticity of Indian culture transplanted in what the first generation perceived as an alien setting depends on the place that immigrant women are expected to occupy in their ethnic community. The policing of women's sexuality lies at the center of defining that place (Das Gupta, 1997:582)."

As Das Gupta further adds in her article, from a feminist perspective, the deconstruction of the notion of culture allows the researcher to unveil a gendered power differential, which often informs the construction of the national group or community's collective identity. Thus, in the case of Arab families, the following literature review shows how, very often, some gendered child-rearing practices forces second-generationers living in the West, both males and females, to engage traditional gender roles in the negotiation of their ethnic identity.

Arab parents living in Western societies often feel the need to be more vigilant and controlling when it comes to child-rearing practices. The underlying objective is to shield children from behaviours and norms that are deemed too liberal when measured against parental cultural and moral standards. However, several case studies on family socialization within migrant Arab families have concluded that parental strictness is not equally applied to children of both sexes, for girls appear to be subjected to more constraining rules and control than boys (Ajrouch, 1999; Keck, 1989, among many others). The issue that seems central to Arab parents (and to Muslim parents in general) is that of their daughters' sexuality; one commonly held view is that the honour and the reputation of the family is dependent upon the "purity" of its female members (Ajrouch, 1999). Hence, a high level of social control over the girls' conduct is deemed necessary to make sure, for instance, that they do not engage in dating or pre-marital sex. As a result, the spatial mobility and the freedom of females, especially that of young

teenagers, is often limited within Arab families living in Western settings. As Begag (1990) underlines, controlling the females' mobility and sexuality, "appears to be in the males' minds, a means of preserving [the group's] identity. It remains above all, a means of avoiding contact with Western society and ensuring a certain impermeability, symbolic of the purity of the inherited culture (p.7)." (Begag, 1990; Brouwer, 1998; Kucukcan, 1998; Lacoste-Dujardin, 1994; Rooijackers, 1994; Afshar, 1993).

Lacoste-Dujardin (1994), in a research on the religious identity of young French-Maghrebi girls, argued that the Beurettes are rejecting any parental prescription deemed incompatible with the liberalism prevailing in French society. This is perhaps too simplistic a view, which overlooks the complexity of the contradictory gender patterns and roles in which these girls are enmeshed. Young Muslim girls living in Western settings are torn between two competing social influences; on the one hand, they are still considered by their community as the bearers and keepers of tradition and culture, and, on the other, they are expected by the host society to engage with new and more liberal Western-based cultural models. As the literature review seems to suggest, while Muslim girls tend to question (more than boys) the older generation's traditionalist norms and values, they can hardly dispose at will of the gender role models fostered by their parents and their community.

According to Nijsten (1996:166), a majority of Dutch-Moroccan youngsters of both sexes tend not to endorse traditional views on gender relationships. However, several case studies have shown that young Muslim girls schooled and socialized in Western societies undergo more difficulties than boys in dealing with parental expectations, which they often experience as encroachments upon their freedom. Kucukcan (1998), in a quantitative study on British-Turkish teenagers' attitudes towards their parents' cultural and traditional values, showed that girls (73%), more than boy (33%), feel that they are subjected to excessive parental

control. Similarly, when asked whether there were disagreements between them and their parents, 69% of males, compared to 90% of females, answered positively. Finally, whereas only 14% of males declared that their parents do not approve of them having a girlfriend, 88% of female respondents said their parents are opposed to them having a boyfriend. Thus, parents seem to be more concerned with the chastity of their daughters than that of their son because, as an interviewed father said, "girls are responsible for the honour of the family, and honour must be protected (quoted in Kucukcan, 1998:111)." During the interviews, reports Kucukcan, the girls were very critical of these gender-based double standards. Similarly, both Rooijackers (1992:70) in her research on young Turkish living in the Netherlands, and Leveau (1997: 153) in his study on French Beurs, concluded that girls tend to oppose traditional values and norms more than boys. In another research, Lenie Brouwer (1998) reported that many among her young Moroccan and Turkish female respondents living in the Netherlands underlined the contradictory attitude of boys, who typically do not mind sleeping with girls before marriage, while being at the same time very adamant about marrying a virgin. However, it should not be assumed that young Muslim females have rejected the gender models derived from their family culture altogether. For instance, Rooijackers (1994:104) reports that, when asked "what does it mean for you to feel Turkish", 40% of her young female respondents evoked constraining rules and restrictions derived from either culture or religion, which none of her male respondents did. And according to Raissiguier (1995), young Muslim girls, although often rebelling against their male kin's controlling attitudes (perceived as "double standarded"), are not willing to embrace unquestioningly Western views on female sexuality. In particular, says Raissiguier (1995:86), Algerian girls disapprove of French girls' sexual attitudes, which they perceive as excessive.

On one level, family and community play a significant role in regulating young girls' behaviours and attitudes (Brouwer, 1998; Morck, 1998). Morck (1998), who interviewed young

Muslim girls living in Copenhagen, concluded that gossip plays a great part in this control system. For instance, one of Morck's subjects, speaking about members of her community, said in the interview: "they are faster than CNN (p.137)." However, according to Brouwer (1998:150), and also Afshar (1993), the level of social control exerted on young Muslim girls' behaviours varies across class: "as we move up the social ladder, there is a less strict approach to daughters' activities (Afshar, 1993:62)"

On the other hand, school represents a space where young Muslim girls can escape the controlling gaze of family members. It is mainly through school socialization that they come to adhere to models of gender relationships that, if not clash with, at least depart from the ones cultivated at home. School gives the young girls access to an important power resource that can be mobilized to challenge parental authority. In this respect, according to several authors, the fact that Beurettes are far more successful in school than Beurs has to be understood as a (unconscious) female strategy to escape family control and pressures (Begag, 1990:7; Kuusela, 1993:49; Raissiguier, 1995:90-91; Brouwer, 1998:153) In conclusion, it can be said that young Muslim girls are actively engaged in the work of positioning themselves somewhere between, within, and against different competing discourses.

The few Canadian and American case studies on the relationship between gender, ethnicity, and religion among second-generationers largely confirm the above stated research results pertaining to European settings. As mentioned earlier, Kristine Ajrouch, who undertook an in-depth qualitative study cf Muslim Lebanese families in Dearborne, Michigan, concluded that, for both the first and the second-generation, gender constitutes a chief aspect of Arab identity (Ajrouch, 1999: 130). More specifically, she suggested, based on interviews and focus group discussions, that female virtue and dignity are tied to ethnic and religious identity maintenance (Ajrouch, 1999). McIrvin Abu-Laban and Abu-Laban (1999)'s study on 62

young people of Arab ancestry in Edmonton revealed that 70% of females and 49% of males felt that Arab-Canadian women face more problems than Arab-Canadian men in adapting to Canadian society. In-depth interviews revealed that these perceived additional problems of adaptation experienced by Arab females revolved around a wide range of restrictions applied to women exclusively. Furthermore, some of the Arab-Canadian informants complained about the double standards informing childrearing practices in Arab culture. Finally, Lois T. Keck (1989) found that her sample of Egyptian-American girls tends to oppose the gender-specific double standards governing child-rearing practices within their ethnic community. Several of these female interviewees, reported Keck, saw in their parents' conservative values an attempt to enforce in America a moral code directly imported from the motherland, a code which, some of them remarked, is probably even outdated in modern Egypt (Keck, 1989:109).

That this parental emphasis on traditional models of gender relationships represents an identity marker meant to ensure the reproduction of the group's cultural distinctiveness is an assumption shared by several authors. However, what remains unclear from reviewing the literature is the extent to which such gendered socialization constitutes more specifically a religious identity marker, an ethnic identity marker, or perhaps both. It should be noted that whether traditional gender relationships are in agreement with the letter and/or the spirit of religious texts is an irrelevant question from a sociological point of view. More interesting is to examine the social and symbolic role played by traditional gender constructions in the process by which Arab parents and children shape their religious and their ethnic identity.

2.4) The Relationship Between Religious and Ethnic Identity among Second-Generation Youths: a Quantitative Approach

Most studies which have dealt with the issue of ethnic and/or religious identity among Muslim migrants have relied primarily on qualitative methods, more specifically on interviews. Clearly, the use of qualitative data provides essential information on the complex web of meanings and symbols of which is comprised one's identity structure. In particular, it sheds light on the various strategies whereby subjects negotiate their identity through heuristic re-appropriations of the symbolic material derived from the cultural frameworks at their disposal. Thus, interview-based studies have provided valuable information about the meanings Muslim youngsters attach to their ethnic and religious identities. For these reasons, our own research will resort to in-depth interviews as well. However, qualitative methods fall short of assessing rigorously the type of relationship between two variables, for they generally focus on each of them taken separately. Therefore, quantitative methods could be of much help to examine the extent to which the intensity of one's religious identity is correlated with the strength of his/her ethnicity. The existence of such a correlation would lend much support to the hypothesis that religion constitutes an important component of young Arabs' ethnic identity.

Few authors have used statistical models to answer such a question. Using regression analysis, Rooijackers (1992) tested the relation existing between "religiosity" and "socio-cultural integration" among a sample of 80 Dutch-Turkish subjects aged between 17 and 26 years old. The variable religiosity was subdivided into three sub-variables, each corresponding to a different dimension of religious fervour: "self-reported importance attached to religion", "observance of ritual", and "adherence to Islamic cultural norms". To measure the latter sub-variable, the author crafted an "Islamic cultural tradition scale", which consists of 12 items

concerning Islamic norms and values, in particular attitudes towards male-female relations, parent-child relations, rules of dress, etc. Interestingly, the measurement of socio-cultural integration distinguished between three different aspects of social incorporation: "social participation", "affective orientation toward the host society", and "ethnic identification". Social participation was measured by asking respondents to report their best friends' ethnicity (Turkish or Dutch), their level of exposure to Dutch media, and their level of involvement in Dutch organizations and clubs. Affective orientation toward the host society was measured by means of a "subjective integration scale" meant to identify the extent to which the youths feel at home and accepted in the Netherlands. Finally, ethnic identification was measured by asking the subjects to self-report, in percentage, the extent to which they feel either Turkish and/or Dutch. After having performed a "correspondence analysis", Rooijackers found that subjects who have a high religious self-concept and hold to Islamic cultural traditions can be characterized as having "an exclusive or predominant Turkish identity and an intermediate or low level of orientation to Dutch society (1992:72)". Inversely, she also found that "a non-religious attitude is linked with general disagreement with respect to traditions, a more multi-ethnic identity, and a positive orientation to Dutch society (1992:72)"

Cecile Nijsten (1996) conducted a similar quantitative study on the relation between religiosity and ethnicity among Muslim-Moroccan youngsters living in the Netherlands. Her variable "Religiosity" includes the same three sub-variables defined in Rooijackers' above stated research (1992). Additionally, Nijsten created a fourth sub-variable of religious commitment, namely "Religious Belief", which refers to the degree of adherence to Koranic statements and prescriptions (e.g. belief in God, prophecy of Mohammad, angels, and day of judgement, etc.). The variable "Socio-cultural integration" has been subdivided into "Ethnic identification", "Social participation", "Affective orientation towards living in the Netherlands",

and "Structural participation". The first three sub-variables are measured as in Rooijackers' study (1992), whereas the fourth one, structural participation, is measured by either school attendance, or participation in the labour market. The regression analysis performed by Nijsten did not reveal any significant relation between the four aspects of religious commitment and structural participation. In other words, socio-economic integration into the host society had no impact on the process of religious identity formation. However, a significant negative relationship has been found between "Social participation" and "Ethnic identification" on the one hand, and all four aspects of religious commitment on the other. More precisely, the more one has contacts with Dutch friends and feels Dutch, the less one attaches importance to Islam, observes ritual practices, embraces Islamic cultural norms and values, and agrees with Islamic belief statements. Finally, the variable "Affective orientation to the host society" was only correlated with "Islamic cultural norms and values". The author concludes by expressing doubts regarding the hypothesis that ethnic and Islamic identities among Dutch-Moroccans will become separated as time goes by. It rather seems unlikely, argues Nijsten, that young Moroccans will perceive themselves as Dutch, while at the same time feeling and acting Muslim. However, the author appropriately remarks that, although there is a definite correlation between the variables "religious commitment" and "ethnic identity retention", it is hard to determine which is the causal one, and which is the dependent one. Finally, she considers as "good news" the fact that a positive attitude towards Dutch society, and a strong religious commitment can go hand in hand (except for Islamic traditionalism).

2.5) Formalized Hypotheses

1) The external (or behavioural) aspects of Arab-Canadian youths' ethnic and religious identities are significantly less developed than their internal (or subjective) aspects. In other terms, Arab adolescents have developed a rather symbolic ethnicity as a result of socio-cultural incorporation.

2) The more the respondents' parents have attempted to transmit their ethnic identity and culture, the more their children will have maintained their own ethnic identity and culture.

3) The more respondents' parents have retained their religious identity and culture, the more their children will have maintained their own religious identity and culture.

4) There is a positive correlation between ethnic and religious identity retention processes.

5) The more respondents endorse traditional gender role models, the more they are likely to retain their ethnic identity.

6) The more respondents endorse traditional gender role models, the more they are likely to retain their religious identity.

7) More parental control is exerted on females than on males.

8) Girls more than boys feel they are subjected to excessive parental control.

9) The more youngsters report having personally experienced discrimination in Canadian society as Arab-origin individuals, the more they are likely to retain their ethnic and religious identities (question relating to discrimination)

10) The more youngsters consider that the host society harbour negative stereotypes against their ethno-religious group, the more they are likely to retain their ethnic and religious identities (question relating to prejudicial stereotyping).

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.1) Data

The target population for this research is Muslim and Christian students of Arab origin from 5 selected Cegeps of the Greater Montreal, aged between 17 and 24 years old, and whose both parents migrated from an Arab country. The sampled Cegeps were selected on the basis of their high concentration of Arab students. The 5 selected institutions are Cegep Saint-Laurent, Cegep Bois-de-Boulogne, Cegep Ahuntsic, Cegep Mont-Morency, and Vanier College. The subjects must have either been born in Canada (or in any other Western country), or migrated to Canada (or in any other Western country) before the age of 12 years old. The term "Arab country" includes the following nations: Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

3.2) Methods and Sample Size

The methods used in this research will be, first, quantitative analysis based on a sample of 250 respondents of Arab origin attending Cegep in Montreal. These respondents were asked to fill out a questionnaire comprised of 85 multiple choice questions. If quantitative methods are of much help to measure the intensity of one's attachment to any given identity category, they fall short of tapping into the various motives and meanings underlying the actor's identity choices and strategies. Thus, the quantitative information provided by the questionnaires were

complemented by a series of approximately 16 in-depth and non-directive interviews conducted

with subjects selected among our 250 respondents.

3.3) Sampling Method

As mentioned above, the universe for this research is confined to Muslim and Christian

Arab students aged between 17 and 24 years old, attending Cegep in the greater Montreal area,

and who were either born in Canada or arrived here before the age of 12. Note that anyone who

wants to pursue a post-secondary degree in Quebec has to go to Cegep to either get a "Diplôme

d'études générales (preparatory degree for university) or a "Diplôme d'études techniques"

(technical degree). Hence, the sample will not be representative of the whole Montreal

population of Arab youths falling into the targeted age group (between 17 and 22 years old) ;

the sample excludes those Arab-Canadian youths who did not pursue a post-secondary degree.

Thus, this research applies essentially to Arab second-generationers originating from urban

middle-classes. In other terms, one cannot generalize to the whole population of Arab youths on

the basis of the results yielded by this sample. However, given that Arab speaking groups

constitute one of the most highly educated ethnic communities in Canada (Canadian Arab

Federation et al. 1999[11]), it can be expected that the proportion of Arab youths who did not

pursue a Cegep degree after high school is relatively low, or at least lower when compared to

the national average.

Not all Cegeps have been sampled for recruitment purposes. Only those Cegeps with

significant concentrations of enrolled Arab students have been selected for the recruitment

process. Unfortunately, none of the Montreal Cegeps keep reliable statistics about the ethnic

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[11] This report is based on Statistics Canada's 1991 Canadian Census Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) data.

origin of their students. Also, in most Cegeps, I was denied access to the list of student names. Consequently, in order to identify the Cegeps with the highest concentrations of Arab students, I had to rely on the estimations given to me by the administration of each Cegep of the Great Montreal area. This method allowed me to single out 5 Cegeps, which, according to my sources, had average or above-average proportions of Arab students.

Having no access to reliable statistics about the exact number of Arab students attending each Cegep, it is difficult to determine accurately an ideal sample size for each of the 5 selected institutions. Hence, it is impossible to obtain a sense of the quantitative representativeness of each of the 5 sub-samples. However, in order to obtain samples both as quantitatively and qualitatively representative as possible, every single French or Philosophy class offered in the 5 Cegeps were visited for recruitment purposes. This way, every student qualifying for filling out the questionnaire has been reached and solicited, since Philosophy and French courses are compulsory at the Cegep level in Quebec. The first step involved in this sampling method consisted in being granted the permission to present my research topic and objectives to French and Philosophy teachers during a Department meeting. I then asked the teachers whether they would allow me to take 5 minutes at the beginning of each of their classes to briefly explain my research project to students, and recruit volunteers. Upon every visit in a class, a meeting time and place were assigned to those students who qualified for, and were interested in filling out the questionnaire. It was originally planned that volunteers unable to attend a pre-scheduled meeting would be offered to have the questionnaire mailed to them with a pre-stamped return envelope. However, none of the students who accepted to participate in the research chose this option. Finally, each respondent was asked, at the end of the questionnaire, whether he or she would eventually be interested in participating in an interview. Out of the 75 respondents who

showed an interest in participating in an in-depth interview, 16 were selected, based on the answers they provided in the questionnaire.

In conclusion, this research will test for possible correlations between ethnic and religious identity retention among Arab youths attending the 5 selected Cegeps. However, these correlations, if any, are by no means generalizable to the whole Montreal population of Arab youths of this age category. Because it excludes those Arab youths with no more than a high school degree, my research concerns exclusively a rather educated middle-class segment of Montreal's Arab population. Furthermore, one would even have to be extremely cautious when generalizing to the whole Montreal population of educated middle-class Arab youths, since not all Cegeps are represented in the sample. However, it should be kept in mind that the sample can be considered, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, fairly representative of the Arab student population found in those Cegeps where Arabs are present in large and significant numbers (the 5 selected Cegeps). Therefore, since the Cegeps which are left out of the sample have very low, and often below-average proportions of Arab students, it can be said that the findings of the present research will provide information about dominant socio-cultural trends among the population of Arab Cegep students in Montreal. That been said, because of a lack of exact figures about my whole universe (the whole Arab student population attending Cegep), and because of the absence of accessible student lists, the results to be found in this research should be considered as only applicable and valid to this sample.

3.4) Descriptive Statistics about the Quantitative Sample

The sample is made up of 118 females and 132 males, aged between 17 and 24 years old. Out of the 250 respondents, 64.8% reported Christianity as their father's religion, while 35.2% reported Islam. These figures are largely consistent with Statistics Canada 1991

Census data, according to which 62% of Canadians of Arab origin are Christians, while 32% of them are Muslims (Canadian Arab Federation, and al. 1999). The majority of the respondents, 64.8%, were born in an Arab country, 31.2% were born in Canada, while the remaining 4% were born in other Western countries. Once again, these figures fit well nation-wide statistics, since, as of 1991, 67% of Arabs in Canada were immigrants, and 33% were Canadian-born (Canadian Arab Federation, et al., 1999). The respondents' fathers come from various Arab countries. Lebanese respondents, with 46.8%, make up for the majority of the sample, followed by Syrians with 16%, Egyptians with 11.2%, Moroccans with 10.4%, and Algerians with 8%. The other national groups represented, namely Palestinians, Iraqis, Saudi Arabians, and Tunisians, account, all together, for a marginal portion of the sample (7.6%). As for the class origin of respondents, it was measured by both the father's level of education and occupation. While 31.6% of the respondents' fathers are professionals, 24.1% are blue collars, 23.5% are independent businessmen, 10.2% work in retails, and 3.2% are executives. An important proportion (59.4%) of the respondents' fathers are university educated, 18.8% have a high school degree or some form of high school education, 11.3% have a college degree or some form of college education, and 9.3% have a primary school education or less. When measured against Canadian-wide data, the proportion of university educated Arab parents in our sample (59.4%) is not representative, since only 27% of Arab males in Canada have a university degree (Canadian Arab Federation, and al. 1999). Therefore, respondents coming from highly educated families are over-represented in our sample. However, as previously discussed, such an over-representation was expected, given the source of data extraction.

3.5) Measurement, Coding and Recoding of Variables

This section will shed light on the making of the various Global scales measuring

dependent as well as independent variables used in this research. Note that information about

the categories, the coding, and the recoding associated with each single indicator making up

these scales are provided in appendix A.

3.5.1) "Ethnic identity" (Global Scale)

Rooijackers (1992) and Nijsten (1996) acknowledge the multifaceted character of ethnic

identity, which they breakdown into social participation, ethnic identification, affective

orientation towards the host society and, in the case of Nijsten's study, structural participation.

Although such divisions are satisfying, Isajiw, Sev'er, and Driedger's ethnic identity scale

(1993) seems to offer a more nuanced and exhaustive measuring device, one that both expresses

and reflects the above discussed conceptual distinctions between 1) the internal and the external

aspects of ethnic identity, and 2) its social and cultural expression. The result is a four-by-four

matrix formed by the external/internal and cultural/social dimensions of ethnic identity. This

matrix can be found below along with the indicators used to measure each of its four

components.

Measurement of the four types of ethnic identities

External/Cultural (EC)

- How would you qualify your knowledge of spoken Arabic? (var. 1 in appendix A)
- Which language do you mostly use when speaking to your parents? (var. 2 in appendix A)
- Which language do you mostly use when speaking to your brother(s) and sister(s)? (var. 3 in appendix A)
- Which language do you use when speaking to your friends of Arab background? (var. 4 in appendix A)
- Do you eat any food that is associated with your ethnic group? (var. 5 in appendix A)
- Do you listen to ethnic group's radio broadcasts, or watch television ethnic group's television programs? (var. 6 in appendix A)
- Do you read any of your ethnic group's newspapers, magazines, or other periodicals (var. 7 in appendix A)
- Do you listen to music associated with your ethnic group? (var. 8 in appendix A)

Internal/Cultural (IC)

- How do you usually think of yourself? As an Arab, a (national group), an (Arab or national)-Canadian, or a Canadian, or other? (var. 9 in appendix A)
- If you had to assign a percentage to the two following parts of your identity, what would it look like (it must add up to 100%) (var. 10 in appendix A) :

        a) The ethnic group(s) you belong to:_____

        b) Canadian or Québécois_____

- How important is your ethnic or cultural background to you? (var. 11 in appendix A)

External/Social (ES)

- How often do you attend ethnic group' s dances, parties, or informal social affairs? (var. 12 in appendix A)
- How often do you go to your ethnic group's vacation resorts or summer camps located in Canada ? (var. 13 in appendix A)
- Think about your three closest friends who are not relatives. Of these friends, how many belong to your ethnic group? (var. 14 in appendix A)

Internal/Social (IS)

- Is it important for you to have a job that will benefit your ethnic group as well as yourself? (var. 15 in appendix A)
- Is it important for you to marry within your own ethnic group? (var. 16 in appendix A)

This matrix resulted in the computation of 4 new numerical continuous variables, namely External-Cultural, External-Social, Internal-Cultural, and Internal-Social. These new variables have been computed by adding up the numerical values assigned to each one of the respondents' answers used as indicators (where the lowest value indicates a strong ethnic identity). Then, each respondent's score was divided by the maximum one could get on the scale. This yielded a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 correspond to the strongest ethnic identity, and 1 the weakest one. Finally, the variable "Ethnic Identity strength" (Global Index) has been generated by computing the average of the four coefficients resulting from the four-by-four matrix. Also, for descriptive purposes (percentage analysis), the variable "Ethnic Identity strength" has been converted into a categorical ordinal variable ("Ethnic identity strength-2") with 5 categories, namely "Very strong", "Strong", "Moderate", "Weak", and "Very weak". Then, the variable "Ethnic Identity strength-2" has been recoded to produce "Ethnic-Identity strength-3", including only two categories "Strong" and "Weak", with a view to get larger cells when performing crosstable analysis.

3.5.2) "Estimated Parental Commitment to Ethnic Identity Transmission" (Global Scale):

In order to measure the influence of family socialization on the youth's ethnic identity structure, another set of questions were asked to respondents. These questions are meant to measure the extent to which parents have actively attempted to transmit their ethnic identity in its various forms to their children. The transmission process will be measured by a set of questions aimed at understanding the extent to which, in the respondent's estimation, his or her parents have attempted to instil into them practices, norms, and values associated with their ethnic group :

Measurement of the Ethnic Identity Transmission process:

-Which language do your parents speak most often to you? (var. 17 in appendix A)

- How important is it for your parents that you know Arabic? (var. 18 in appendix A)

- Is it important for your parents that you attend activities/events offered by your national ethnic group or by the Arab community? (var. 19 in appendix A)

- How important is it for your parents that you retain your ethnic culture and traditions (at least those traditions they deem relevant)? (var. 20 in appendix A)

- How important is it for your mother that you marry someone within your own ethnic group? (var. 21 in appendix A)

- How important is it for your father that you marry someone within your own ethnic group? (var. 22 in appendix A)

The variable "Parental Commitment to Ethnic Identity Transmission" has been computed by, first, adding up the values assigned to the respondent's answers used as indicators, and, second, by dividing the respondent's score by the maximum one could get on the scale. This yielded a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates active parental commitment to the ethnic identity transmission process, and 1 a low commitment. Also, for descriptive purposes (percentage analysis), the variable "Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission" has been converted into a categorical ordinal variable ("Parental commitment to ethnic identity Transmission-2") with 5 categories, namely "Very strong commitment", "Strong", "Average", "Weak", and "Very weak". Then, the variable "Parental

commitment to ethnic identity transmission-2" has been broken down into two categories, namely "Strong", and "Weak", with a view to get larger cells when performing crosstable analyses. The latter variable was named "Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission -3".

3.5.3) "Religious identity" (Global Scale)

The concept of religious identity is defined here based on the same theoretical premises used to operationalize the notion of ethnic identity. As mentioned above, the scale will tap primarily into the socio-cultural uses that are made of religion in order to consolidate group identity and solidarity. Thus, religious identity has been subdivided into the four following components: Internal/Cultural, Internal/Social, External/Social, External/Cultural. The internal dimension is related to the importance of, and the role played by religion in one's self-concept. The external aspect of religious identity refers to the behavioural expression of one's religious self-concept, that is the socio-cultural practices that actors legitimate by drawing on religion, or at least religious symbols. In the scale, the items measuring the Internal/Cultural, Internal/Social, and External/Social dimensions of religious identity are, for the most part, adapted from Isajiw and Driedger's ethnic identity matrix (1993). The items measuring the External/Cultural aspect of religious identity were mostly derived from Nijsten (1996)'s scale, and pertain to the observance of religious rituals.

Internal/Cultural
- How important is religion in your life? (var. 23 in appendix A)
Internal/Social
- How important is it for you to have a job that will benefit your religious group as well as yourself? (var. 24 in appendix A)
- Is it important for you to marry within your own religious group? (var. 25 in appendix A)
- Do you personally feel that you should support the special causes and needs of your religious group in Canada and abroad? (var. 26 in appendix A)

External/Cultural (Observance of rituals)

- On average, in a year, how often do you go to either the Mosque or to the Church (or any other temple)? (var. 27 in appendix A)

- How often do you pray on average? (var. 28 in appendix A)

- In general, do you try to fast during religious holidays during which fasting is prescribed? (var. 29 in appendix A)

External/Social

-How often do you attend religious events, activities, or social affairs (formal or informal)? (var. 30 in appendix A)

- Are you a member of a religious movement or organization? (var. 31 in appendix A)

This four-by-four matrix resulted in the computation of 3 new numerical continuous variables, namely "External-Cultural", "External-Social", and "Internal". Note that the "Internal-Cultural" and the "Internal-Social" dimensions of religious identity have been merged together to produce one single coefficient measuring the Internal aspect of religious identity. Such a manoeuvre was made necessary because the sub-dimension "Internal-Cultural" was measured by means of only one indicator (namely "How important is religion in your life?"). Because a sole indicator is hardly sufficient to qualify as a sensitive statistical measurement tool, this variable could not be treated as a separate component of the religious identity matrix. For this reason, the indicator "How important is religion in your life?" has been added to the three indicators measuring the variable "Internal-social", so as to yield one single coefficient corresponding to the "Internal" aspect of religious identity. This latter coefficient will contribute, along with the two others ("External-cultural", and "External-social"), to compute the Global Index measuring religious identity's strength. However, the indicator "How important is religion in your life" will be considered as a variable of its own for percentage analysis purposes only.

The variables "External-cultural", "External-social", and "Internal" have been computed by, first, adding up the numerical values assigned to each of the respondents' answers used as indicators (where the lowest value indicates a strong religious identity, and

the highest value a weak one). Then, each respondent's score was divided by the maximum one could get on the scale. This yielded, for each dimension of religious identity, a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds to the strongest religious identity, and 1 the weakest. Finally, the variable "Religious identity strength" has been generated by computing the average of the three coefficients resulting from the three-by-three religious identity matrix. Also, for descriptive purposes (percentage analysis), the variable "Religious identity strength" has been converted into a categorical ordinal variable ("Religious identity strength-2") with 5 categories, namely "Very strong", "Strong", "Moderate", "Weak", and "Very weak". Then, the variable "Religious identity strength-2" has been recoded to produce "Religious identity strength-3", which includes only two categories, "Strong", and "Weak", with a view to get larger cells when performing crosstable analysis.

3.5.4) Respondents' Estimation of their Parents' Religious Identity Strength (Global Scale)

As seen above, the role of parental influence on ethnic identity retention was measured through a set of question tapping exclusively into perceived parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission. Parental influence on religious identity retention, on the other hand, was measured differently. This decision was taken on the basis of the results yielded by a pre-test ran on 15 respondents, and on 5 exploratory interviews with 5 subjects. These pre-tests and exploratory interviews suggested that questions meant to measure parental attempts at transmitting their religious identity to their youths were largely inappropriate. Most of these late adolescents reported or remarked that, throughout their socialization process, their incorporation into their religious culture had little to do with their parents' active commitment to passing on their religious heritage to their offspring. At best, parents'

efforts aimed at passing on their religious identity tended to take place during the child's early formative years. However, most of these young adults- especially those who arrived in Canada at an early age - reported that, as soon as they reached early adolescence, religion became a matter that was relegated to the sphere of personal life choices. More specifically, most of these youths started to construe their religious faith as a spiritual framework born out of an act of individual volition. In this respect, the fact that these youths seem to understand religion as a "free access" spiritual frame, of which one can opt out at will, is clearly in line with the privatization of religion at work in Canadian society.

Yet, our preliminary tests and interviews revealed that the exposure of children to their parents' religious attitudes and behaviours influence them in either rejecting or embracing religion as a defining element of their identity. Indeed, parental discourses on, and attitudes towards religion seem to colour these youths' current relationship to God and the sacred. However, such an influence rarely takes the form of active teaching and pressures meant to force the familial religious culture and its corresponding system of beliefs on the children. Thus, it seems that parents' religious identity strength is more likely than parental commitment to religious identity transmission to influence children's relationship to religion later in life.

Therefore, it was considered a priority to tap into parental levels of religious identity retention. Secondarily, we also measured parental attempts at transmitting their religion to their offspring. This prioritization informed our choice of measuring items. Thus, through a series of 4 questions, respondents were asked to assess the intensity of their parent's religiosity. Only 2 questions were added to assess how much parents wish their children to perpetuate their religious heritage.

Also, it was deemed that "perceived parents' religiosity" could not be adequately measured using the same questions as those aimed at measuring the respondents' religiosity. In particular, two questions relating to the internal/social dimension of religious identity referred to attitudes and opinions that can hardly be measured by relying on second-hand sources (i.e. the respondents). Thus, variables # 18 ("How important is it for you that your job benefit your religious group?") and # 20 ("Do you feel that you should support the special causes and needs of your religious group?") are attitudes that could only be reliably measured by asking questions directly to the parents. In addition, variable #19 ("Is it important for you to marry within your ethnic group?") does not apply to respondents' parents, who are already married, and who are almost all so within their own religious group, as suggested by the literature (see Abu-Laban, 1980). Because of these limitations, another scale was created, allowing to tap into parental religious attitudes and behaviours that are more easily accessible to respondents. This scale is made up of 1 item measuring the internal/cultural aspect of religious identity, 1 item measuring the external/cultural aspect, and 1 item measuring perceived parental attempts at transmitting their religious identity to their children. Also, each one of these selected items were duplicated in order to get separate information about mothers' and fathers' respective religious attitudes and behaviours; according to the literature, while mothers are often more committed to ethnic identity transmission, fathers are often more pious and devout on a personal level (Vertovec, 1998). We will then be able to examine in the analytical section the extent to which the respondents' relationship to religion is conditioned by, most importantly, their parents' level of religiosity, and, secondarily, by parental commitment to religious identity transmission.

The following Table sums up the composition of the scale:

Internal/Cultural

- Does religion play an important role in your father life? (var.32)
- Does religion play an important role in your mother life? (var.33)

External/Cultural
- In your estimation, is your father a practising person? (var. 34)
- In your estimation, is your mother a practising person? (var. 35)

Parental Attempt at Transmitting their Religious Identity to their Children
- How important is it for your father that you retain your religious heritage? (var. 36)
- How important is it for your mother that you retain your religious heritage? (var. 37)

Based on the respondents' assessment, a score measuring parents' religious identity strength has been computed by, first, adding up the numerical values assigned to each answer given to the questions used as indicators, (where the lowest value indicates a strong religious identity). Then, each individual score has been divided by the maximum the parents of each respondent could get on the scale. This yielded a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 denotes a strong religious identity, and 1 a weak one. The new computed variable was named "Parents' estimated religious identity strength". Also, for descriptive purposes (percentage analysis), this latter variable has been converted into a categorical ordinal variable ("Parents' estimated religious identity strength-2") with 5 categories, namely "Very strong", "Strong", "Moderate", "Weak", and "Very weak". Then, the variable "Parents' estimated religious identity strength-2" has been recoded to produce "Parents' estimated religious identity strength-3", including only two categories, "Strong", and "Weak", with a view to get larger cells when performing crosstable analysis.

3.5.5) "Traditionalism Regarding Gender Role Models" (Global Scale)

Since, as mentioned, the post-1970s Arabo-Islamic identity has found in gender relationships a fertile ground for its post-colonial re-orientation, we will resort to an attitudinal

scale aimed at determining the respondent's level of cultural traditionalism with respect to gender issues. The subjects will be asked to report the extent to which they agree or disagree with a series of 9 statements (see var. 38 to 46 in appendix A). In order to also examine the relationship between their own normative frame and that of their parents, the respondents will be asked to report what would be, in their opinion, the level of agreement of their parents with the same 9 statements (see var. 47 to 55 in appendix A). This Arabo-Islamic Tradition Scale will be partially informed by the one crafted by Rooijackers (1992), and used subsequently by Nijsten (1996), but will also contain few items either taken from, or inspired by Kucukcan's questionnaire (1998). The items that will be included in the scale are the following :

Arabo-Islamic Tradition Scale (Youths):

- Women should essentially be housewives (var. 38 in appendix A)
- In general, a woman should obey her husband (var. 39 in appendix A)
- Girls should compulsorily remain virgins before marriage (var. 40 in appendix A)
- Boys should compulsorily remain virgins before marriage (var. 41 in appendix A)
- A girl's virginity should be "protected" by her male kin in order for family reputation honour to be preserved. (var.42 in appendix A)
- Male teenagers should be allowed to have a girlfriend before marriage if they want to. (var. 43 in appendix A)
- Female teenagers should be allowed to have a boyfriend before marriage if they want to. (var.44 in appendix A)
- Pre-marital sexual relationships are acceptable for boys (var.45 in appendix A)
-Pre-marital sexual relationships are acceptable for girls (var.46 in appendix A)

Arabo-Islamic Tradition Scale (Parents):

The items making up the parents' scale are exactly the same as those found in the above children's scale (see var. 47 to 55 in Appendix A)

However, Nijsten and Rooijackers used most if these statements as parameters measuring the normative (or "consequential" in Nijsten's terms) aspect of religious identity. By doing so, they presumed that agreeing with these statements is necessarily a reflection of a sense of attachment and commitment to Islamic tradition. They thus ended up discarding the possibility that these gender-related attitudes might represent, in the respondent's identity structure, an ethnic rather than a religious marker, or perhaps both. As it has been argued earlier,

the progressive merging of religion and ethnicity in the post-1970s Arab world have led to considerable overlapping of the symbolic and normative material of which are comprised present-day Islamic and Arab collective identities. As a result, it becomes problematic to sort out which norms and values are peculiar to Islam, and which ones are more specific to Arab culture.[12] Therefore, it appears more theoretically and methodologically sound not to consider, prior to empirical investigation, the respondent's score on this traditional value scale as an indicator of a high degree of either ethnic or religious identity retention. Rather, the respondent's level of cultural traditionalism as regards gender issues will be considered as a variable of its own. Statistical analyses will then reveal **a posteriori** whether the variable "gender-related traditionalism" is more correlated with "Ethnic identity strength", "Religious identity strength", or perhaps both.

The respondent's score on this scale has been computed by, first, adding up the numerical values assigned to each answer given to the questions used as indicators, (where the lowest possible value reflects strong traditional attitudes towards gender roles). Then, each respondent's total score was divided by the maximum score one could get on the scale. This yielded a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 denotes pronounced traditional attitudes, and 1 liberal ones. Another coefficient was also generated for the parents' reported attitudes, using the exact same method.

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[12] Once again, and this point cannot be over-stressed, determining whether each individual norm and value constitutes, intrinsically, a religious or an ethnic feature is not a concern of this research. Rather, it is the current social significations attached to these norms, or the actual symbolic role they play in the process of identity formation, that deserve much needed sociological attention.

These two recoded variables were named, respectively, "Gender-related traditionalism/Youths", and "Gender-related traditionalism/Parents". Also, for descriptive purposes, each of these two latter variables was converted into a categorical ordinal variable ("Gender-related traditionalism/Youths-2" and "Gender-related traditionalism/Parents-2"), with 5 categories, namely "Very traditional", "Somewhat traditional", "Borderline", "Somewhat liberal", and "Very liberal". This categorization is meant to mirror the gradation of levels of agreement associated with the statements making up the tradition scale.[13] Then, these recoded variables were themselves converted into "Gender-related traditionalism/Youths-3", and "Gender-related traditionalism/Parents-3", each being reduced to only two categories, "Strong level of traditionalism" and "Low level of traditionalism", with a view to get larger cells when performing bi- or tri-variate crosstable analysis.

3.5.6) "Perceived Discrimination and Stereotyping"

These independent variables are meant to determine whether ethnic and religious identity retention could be accounted for, at least partially, by perceived discriminatory behaviours and prejudicial attitudes originating from the host society. The respondents will thus be asked to express the degree to which they agree with the following statements:

- Personally, I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians (var. 56 in appendix A)
- There are negative stereotypes against Arabs prevailing among Canadians, (var. 57 in appendix A)
- There are negative stereotypes against my religious group prevailing among Canadians (var. 58 in appendix A)
- The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of the Arabs. (var. 59 in appendix A)
- The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of my religious group. (var. 60 in appendix A)

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[13] The "Borderline" category cannot be associated with any of the categories of the indicators making up the tradition scale (i.e. "strongly" or "somewhat" in agreement", and "strongly" or "somewhat" in disagreement").

Two different scales have been created based on the above listed indicators. First, variables #57 and #59 were used as items making up a scale measuring "Perceived anti-Arab stereotyping". A second scale was also produced, using items # 58 and 60, in order to measure the respondent's perception of Canadians' representations of his or her religious group, or again, "Perceived religion-based stereotyping". Once again, individual scores on both of these scales were computed by adding up the numerical values assigned to the respondents' answers used as indicators (where 0 indicates strong perceived stereotyping). Then, each respondent's score was divided by the maximum one could get on the scale. This yielded a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates pronounced sentiments of being misrepresented by the majority group. Also, for descriptive purposes (percentage analysis), these variables were converted into categorical ordinal variables ("Perceived anti-Arab stereotyping-2", and "Perceived religion-based stereotyping-2") with 5 categories, namely "Very strong stereotyping", "Strong stereotyping", "Moderate stereotyping", "Little stereotyping", and "Almost no stereotyping". Then, these variables were again recoded to produce "Perceived anti-Arab stereotyping-3", and "Perceived religion-based stereotyping-3", including only two categories, "Strong stereotyping", and "Little stereotyping", with a view to get larger cells when performing crosstable analysis.

Finally, var. #56 will be treated as a variable of its own; for it measures "Self-experienced discrimination", as opposed to perceived stereotypes. Indeed, this statement ("In my personal life, I feel well accepted by Canadians") deals much more with the respondent's concrete interactions with Canadians, both in the private and the public sphere, than with the cultural lenses through which Canadians see the abstract entity called "Arabs". Also, for descriptive purposes, the 4 levels of agreement associated with variable #56 were broken

down into 2 categories (I agree and I disagree), thus generating the recoded variable "Self-experienced discrimination-2".

3.5.7) "Gender"

The independent variable "Gender" (var.61 in appendix A) was measured through an open-ended question, and has been treated as a categorical nominal variable with two categories (male and female). No recoding was required.

3.5.8) "Religious Affiliation"

The independent variable "Religious affiliation" (var.62 in appendix A) was measured through an open-ended question asking respondents to report their father's religion. This parameter may appear at first as an inappropriate tool, for it only provides an indirect measure of the respondents' religious affiliation, which, theoretically, could depart from their father's. However, the purpose served by this question was to identify the respondents' religious cultural background, or the religious banner under which they were raised (in any case, it is extremely uncommon, among Arabs, for a youth to adopt a religion different from that of his or her parents). Nonetheless, this question could be regarded as problematic in other respects. One possible shortcoming could be that it overlooks that some respondents raised in religiously mixed family may have been socialized into their mother's religious culture, rather than into their father's. With this in view, respondents were also asked to identify their mother's religion, but not a single case of mixed religious background was reported. One last shortcoming of this question is that it does not allow to flag out cases where the respondent's father is himself agnostic or atheist. However, it must be said that such cases are extremely unlikely to be found among Arab parents of this migratory cohort.

The variable "Father's religious affiliation" has been treated as a categorical nominal variable with two categories, Christian[14] and Muslim. No recoding was required.

3.5.9) "Control Variables"

The variable "Father's Level of Education" (see var.63 in appendix A) is meant to provide an indicator of the respondent's familial symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1979). This control variable will especially be taken into account when investigating traditional attitudes towards gender roles and models; for the literature suggests that, within Arab and/or Muslim families living in Western settings, parental limitations imposed on daughters' activities tend to decrease as we move up the socio-educational ladder. More generally, attachment to traditions among uprooted Muslim and/or Arab communities is significantly weaker within educated circles. (Afshar, 1993; Brouwer, 1998:150). The variable "Father's level of education" has been measured using an open-ended question. Then, it was recoded twice so as to facilitate the crosstable analyses to be performed. The first recoding yielded an ordinal categorical variable ("Father's level of education-2) with 4 categories: primary school years, high school years, college years, and university years. Then, this latter variable was itself recoded, so as to obtain "Father's level of education-3", with two categories, namely "Low Education" (merging of primary and high school), and "High Education" (merging of college and university).

The second control variable is "Self-estimated Ethnic residential segregation" (see var.64 in appendix A), which will be used mainly for regression analysis purposes. The literature in ethnic studies provides clear evidence that ethnic residential segregation is

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[14] Note that several Christians respondents reported their specific Church, instead of the broader category "Christianity". These specifications were ignored during data entry.

generally strongly correlated with ethnic identity retention (Kalbach, 1990). Consequently, the effect of this variable needs to be neutralized in the regression analyses to be performed. It must be said that the measurement of this variable is rather imprecise, as it was done by asking respondents whether, in their estimation, ethnic concentration in their neighbourhood is high, normal, low, or insignificant. Then, this latter variable was collapsed into "Ethnic residential segregation-2", with the categories "high" and "normal" merged together to form an "Above average" category, and the categories "Low" and "Insignificant" merged together to form a "Below average" category.

Finally, the dichotomous variable "Canadian-born vs. Foreign-born" was measured through an open-ended question (see var.65 in appendix A). The variable "Age at arrival in Canada" (see variable 66 in appendix A), which concerns only foreign-born respondents, was also measured through an open-ended question. These two latter variables were then merged together in order to generate "Age at arrival-2", including 3 categories: "From 0 to 4 years old, "From 5 to 8 years old", and "From 9 to 12 years old". Note that Canadian-born respondents were included in the category "From 0 to 4 years old".

3.6) Socio-Cultural Profile of each Informant

16 informants, selected out of the 250 respondents, were subjected to an in-depth interview which lasted from about 45 minutes to 1 hour. Of these 16 informants, 10 were females and 6 were males. The slight male shortage is accounted for by my female respondents' greater propensity to volunteer for participation in in-depth interviews. Also, 10

informants out of 16 are Christians, and 6 are Muslims, a ratio consistent with 1996 Canadian Census figures, according to which 62% of Arab-Canadians are Christian.

In order to ensure confidentiality, each interviewee has been assigned an alphabetical letter that will identify him or her throughout the present research. Listed below are some information deemed sociologically relevant about each informant, namely their gender, their age, their father's country of origin, their father's religion, and their age at arrival in Canada.

A: male, 21 years old, Lebanese, Christian, migrated to Canada at 11 years old.

B: male, 19 years old, Lebanese, Christian, Canadian-born.

C: male, 19 years old, half Lebanese, half Palestinian, Christian, Canadian-born.

D: male, 20 years old, Lebanese, Christian, migrated to Canada at 12 years old.

E: male, 22 years old, Lebanese, Christian, migrated to Canada at 5 years old.

F: male, 20 years old, Algerian, Muslim, migrated to Canada at 8 years old.

G: female, 19 years old, Egyptian, Muslim, Canadian-born.

H: female, 17 years old, Algerian, Muslim, Canadian-born.

I: female, 20 years old, Moroccan, Muslim, Canadian-born.

J: female, 19 years old, Algerian, Muslim, Canadian-born.

K: female, 18 years old, Algerian, Muslim, migrated to Canada at 7 years old.

L: female, 18 years old, Lebanese, Christian, migrated to Canada at 9 years old.

M: female, 18 years old, Syrian, Christian, migrated to Canada at 10 years old.

N: female, 18 years old, Syrian, Christian, migrated to Canada at 6 years old

O: female, 18 years old, Lebanese, Christian, Canadian-born.

P: female, 19 years old, Lebanese, Christian, migrated to Canada at 7 years old.

3.7) Mapping of the Data Analysis Chapters

Throughout the coming chapters dedicated to data analysis and interpretation (chapters 4, 5, and 6), the informants' narratives will be used to illustrate qualitatively the statistical trends underlined by quantitative analysis. More specifically, the qualitative material will allow us to make sense of the actors' motivations underlying correlations and relationships.

Chapter 4 will mainly shed light on both dependent variables, namely ethnic and religious identity retention processes (respectively in section 4.1 and 4.2). It should be noted that Chapter 4 includes a separate sub-section (4.1.6) dealing exclusively with the issue of perceived parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission. On the other hand, estimations of parents' religiosity and commitment to religious identity transmission were not discussed in a separate section. Rather, these results were analyzed and interpreted in conjunction with our discussion relating to religious identity maintenance among respondents/informants (section 4.2). The fact that parents' relationship to religion has not been addressed in a separate sub-section is due to the scarcity of qualitative information pertaining to 1) parents' level of religiosity, and 2) parental attempts at transmitting their religious culture to their offspring.

Chapter 5 will focus on two independent variables, namely traditional gender role models, and perceived stereotypes and discrimination.

In Chapter 4 and 5, dependent and independent variables will be analyzed based on the above described Global Scale/Indexes. However, prior to discussing each Global scale, one or more parameter(s) deemed to be the best indicator(s) of the phenomenon under scrutiny will be analyzed (ex.: the indicator "in-group friendship" for the Scale measuring the

external/social dimension of ethnic identity). Note that each of the selected indicators will be analyzed in relation to three main control variables: "gender", "age at arrival in Canada", and "Religious affiliation". The variables "Father's Level of Education" and "Ethnic Residential Segregation" will also be used as control variables when deemed relevant.

However, in Chapters 4 and 5, the variables measured through Global Scales will not be analyzed yet in relation to one another. Such correlation analyses - meant to analyze the relationship between independent and dependent numerical "global scale" variables - are to be performed in Chapter 6.

As previously mentioned, the respondents' scores on the Global Scales are all expressed through coefficients ranging from 0 to 1. These coefficients were obtained by dividing the respondent's scores on the multiple items scales by the maximum score one could get on each scale. As a reminder, the lower the score on these scales, the more pronounced is the measured variable. Thus, for example, a coefficient of 0.1 indicates a very strong ethnic identity, whereas a coefficient of 1 is a sign of a poorly retained ethnic identity. Also, when needed, and for the sake of providing clear and synthetic frequency distribution tables and crosstables, Global Scale coefficients will be broken into 5 ordinal categories. In other words, the original numerical continuous variables (with coefficients ranging from 0 to 1), were recoded into string variables with either 5, 4 or 2 categories covering each a fraction of the numerical scale (ex.: very strong, strong....very low). Please see section 3.5 for more details.

CHAPTER 4: ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS RETENTION

4.1) Ethnic Identity Retention

4.1.1) Ethnic identity's Index: a Quantitative Outlook

As shown in Table 1 below, our respondents tend to show high levels of ethnic identity retention, as the majority of them (45.4%) have a "Strong" ethnic identity, while an almost equally important proportion (41.9%) fall into the "Average" category. A very small proportion fall into the extreme categories, as only 3.1% scored "Very strong" on the scale, 1.3% scored "Very weak", and 8.4% scored "Weak". When breaking down the variable "Ethnic identity" into its external and internal aspects, it appears that the latter are significantly more developed than the former. Thus, in Table 2, one notices that, on average, the respondents' internal aspects of ethnic identity are significantly stronger than their external aspects, as indicated by the low mean of 0.3711 for the former, and by the higher mean of 0.4586 for the latter.

Table 1: Percentage Distribution for "Ethnic Identity's Global Index"

Ethnic identity strength	Distribution
Very Strong	3.0%
Strong	45.4%
Average	41.9%
Weak	8.4%
Very weak	1.3%
TOTAL	100%

Table 2: Compared means of "Ethnic identity-Internal" and "Ethnic identity-External"*

	Ethnic identity-External	Ethnic identity-Internal
Mean Score	0.4586	0.3711

* : The lower the coefficient, the stronger one's ethnic identity

When comparing to one another the means of the 4 aspects of ethnic identity (see Table 3 below), it appears that the most developed dimension is, by far, "Internal-cultural" (0.1912), followed by "External-cultural" (0.4215), "External-social" (0.4953), and, "Internal-social" (0.550). It thus appears that, among these youths, there is a much stronger propensity to harbour pronounced feelings of identification with their ethnic culture, than to maintain any other aspects of their ethnic identity, as indicated by the much pronounced gap between the average coefficient for "Internal-Cultural" dimension, and the average coefficients associated with the three other sub-dimensions of ethnic identity.

Table 3: Compared Means of the 4 sub-dimensions of the variable "Ethnic identity"*

	External-cultural	External-social	Internal-cultural	Internal-social
Mean	0.4215	0.4953	0.1912	0.5500

* : The lower the coefficient, the stronger one's ethnic identity.

These findings confirm a trend ascertained by numerous pieces of research (see Alba, 1990; Breton et al., 1990, Waters, 1990), namely that a very strong ethnic self-concept tends to persist among second-generationers. Furthermore, this persistence of strong feelings of identification stands strongly in contrast with the other significantly less developed aspects of ethnic identity. These findings lend much support to the symbolic ethnicity hypothesis,

insofar as they reveal an ethnic self-concept which is markedly hypertrophied, in comparison with these youths' actual incorporation into ethnic primary and secondary socialization groups. However, in the case of these second-generation Arab youths, it cannot be said that the communal basis upon which their ethnic self-concept rests is completely eroded. Indeed, the slightly below 0.5 coefficients related to both the "external-cultural" and the "external-social" dimensions of ethnic identity indicate that the respondents are still, to a large extent, efficiently socialized into their ethnic culture and community. One other interesting finding in Table 3 is that the Arab youths of this sample tend to retain their ethnic identity more at the cultural than at the social level. Put differently, the respondents' identification with, and socialization into, their ethnic culture seem to be more pronounced than their degree of identification with, and socialization into, their ethnic community. The notion of costless community, as understood by Mary Waters (1990), may be of use here to account for this phenomenon. The process of assimilating an ethnic culture, although requiring a minimum of socialization into an ethnic milieu, does not necessarily entail the actual social uses of this acquired sub-cultural code. The weaving of strong ties to a community of ethnic peers is significantly more socially demanding than being solely acquainted with a given cultural universe which stays inactivated, or non-operational, at the social level; for being enmeshed in a social network, be it ethnic or else, involves conforming to a certain framework of roles and obligations defined by a community sharing a common cultural code.

In the case of second-generation Arabs, taking on ethnic roles and meeting ethnic cultural obligations generally entail a greater amount of restrictions upon liberties than embracing the roles and obligations related to Canadian society. However, as mentioned, it cannot be said that the communal basis on which rests these Arab youths' ethnic self-concept has completely faded away. In this respect, by being relatively familiar with Arab culture and

language, while being also (at least) minimally enmeshed in a web of Arab primary and secondary groups, these youths depart from those "Ethnic Whites", described by Waters (1990) and Alba (1990), who are largely cut off from both their ethnic culture and community. In other words, these youth's ethnic identity is far from being completely symbolic. However, when engaging in social interactions, they may be deploying a situational ethnic identity (Nagel, 1994) allowing them to selectively activate or downplay certain items drawn from a pool of symbolic material derived from the ethnic culture.

4.1.2) Internal/Cultural Dimension: "Self-Labelling" (var.9 in app. A)

The variable "Self-Labelling" was meant to determine the preferred source of identification for Arab youths of this sample. In a close-ended question, respondents were asked to choose, among a series of labels, which one best reflected their identity. They were asked "How do you usually think of yourself first and foremost?", and were provided with the following choice of answers: "Arab", "Member of a National Arab group (e.g. Egyptian, Moroccan, Lebanese, etc. If so, specify which one_____)", "Arab-Canadian", National community-Canadian", "Canadian", and "Other". Table 4 below displays percentage distributions for the variable "Self-Labelling" by "Age at Arrival in Canada" (where being born in Canada counts as 0 year of age), "Religious affiliation", and "Gender".

Table 4: Percentage Distribution for "Self-Labelling" with selected independent variables

Self-Labelling

		Arab	National Group	Arab-Canadian	National Group-Canadian	Canadian	Other	Total
The whole sample		41.0%	28.1%	21.3%	2.8%	1.2%	5.6%	100%
By Age at arrival in Canada	Between 0 and 4	35.2%	24.8%	30.5%	0%	2.9%	6.7%	100%
	Between 5 and 8	39.7%	30.9%	19.1%	2.9%	0%	7.4%	100%
	Between 9 and 12	50.0%	30.3%	10.5%	6.6%	0%	2.6%	100%
Religious affiliation *	Christians	35.4%	30.4%	24.2%	3.7%	1.9%	4.3%	100%
	Muslims	51.1%	23.9%	15.9%	1.1%	0%	8.0%	100%
Gender	Females	37.3%	28.8%	23.7%	3.4%	0.8%	5.9%	100%
	Males	44.3%	27.5%	19.1%	2.3%	1.5%	5.3%	100%

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Contrary to what could be expected, the most popular answer to this question is "Arab", as opposed to national membership, both for the whole sample (41%), and within each "age-at-arrival" bracket. However, the proportion of respondents who chose the "Arab" label decreases significantly as we move from the "9 to 12" to the "5 to 8" age range (from 50% to 39.7%), but drops only slightly as we move from the "5 to 8" to the "0 to 4" bracket (from 39.7% to 35.2). National membership was the second most popular choice for those respondents who arrived in Canada between the age of 9 and 12 (30.9%), as well as for the group who arrived between 5 and 8 years of age (30.3%). The second most popular choice

for the group of respondents who arrived here at the earliest age is "Arab-Canadian" (30.5%), followed, in third position, by national membership (24.8%). Thus, the majority of the respondents favour the label "Arab" over national membership within each "age-at-arrival" category - and this is true even among the group of respondents who were born in Canada or who arrived here before the age of 4. Also, and this is interesting, although Muslim are more likely than Christian respondents to identify themselves as Arabs (51.1% vs. 35.4%), the fact remains that the Arab label turned out to be the most popular answer even among the latter group. This finding shows that Christian Arabs, despite being more ambivalent towards the notion of Arab-ness, tend nonetheless to firmly anchor their ethnic consciousness in Arab culture and community. This latter finding will be further discussed as part of our qualitative analysis to be conducted below.

The above figures are, for the most part, consistent with the results of a 1993 Ontario survey of Arab-Canadians of both the first and second generations (cited in Hayani, 1999). In this study, (which provided respondents with the same question and choice of answers than those provided to my subjects), the label "Arab" also turned out to be the most popular answer for the whole sample. Among respondents who have been living in Canada for more than 10 years, the most popular answer was "Arab-Canadian" (note that "Arab" actually came in second place). Thus, in both my research and this Ontario study, the label "Arab", whether taken alone or as part of an hyphenated Canadian identity, was favoured over national membership, regardless of time spent in Canada.

However, these findings need to be interpreted with caution, especially in light of the partially divergent results yielded by the interviews. All interviewees, when asked to comment and expand on their answer to this question, made it clear that their home country was the main group or community to which they identify themselves. But, at the same time,

almost all of them consider themselves as belonging as well to the Arab community, and as sharing a broader Arab culture. In other words, almost all of them identify with the label Arab, while being aware of the numerous differences existing between the various Arab groups.

Thus, subject N, a Christian female informant of Syrian descent, declared the following:

> "Arab is a very general term. When one speaks about the Arab people, one speaks of a people who live under the same conditions (...) Maybe at the political level, it is the same, the language also... There are several things which unite us. But essentially, at the cultural level, the mentalities and all that, it's very different. Even if we take, for example, Syrians and Lebanese, who are neighbours, it's a completely different mentality..."

Informant P, a Canadian-born Christian Lebanese female, said:

> "For sure, I'd be more inclined to say I am a Lebanese but, at the same time, I am Arab (...) Of course there are differences but.... It's like if you take Europeans, such as a Spanish and a French, there are a lot of differences, but they remain Europeans. But for them, it's more at the geographic level - it's the same continent – whereas for us [the Arabs], it's more than merely geographical: It's really...the culture, there are several commonalities: the traditions, the mores... There are differences, that's for sure, but still."

Several Christian informants told me they identify as Arabs only insofar as it is understood that this label is not exclusively reserved to Muslims. They resent that both the host society and Arab Muslims tend to equate Arab culture and Islam. Informant B, a Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male, declared that he is first and foremost Lebanese. But when asked whether he also identifies himself as an Arab, he added:

> "Being Lebanese is one part of the Arab community. But only as long as it is made clear that there are Christians among Arabs. Once this point has been stressed, yes, I consider myself as an Arab. I have no problem with that."

Informant P, a Christian Lebanese female who arrived in Canada at 7 years old, when asked whether she made a distinction between her Lebanese and her Arab identity, answered the following:

"Perhaps a Muslim Algerian will say that I am not Arab because Lebanon has undergone too much Westernization and because there are Christians there. You know what I mean? (...) But I say I am Arab because I speak Arabic, I listen to Arab music. We are Arabs in my country after all. To me, being Arab, it's not only being Muslim. It's really more, like, the Arab culture."

Thus, when contrasted with the above narratives, the quantitative finding according to which the Arab label is preferred over national membership should be put in perspective. More specifically, Arab identity is endorsed by most informants for what it actually is, namely a form of overarching identity which, far from superseding national membership, is coupled with it in an additive manner. Moreover, as we have seen, several informants, especially Christian ones, recognize this pan-ethnic label only insofar as it does not negate their national and religious sub-group specificities. How can we account, then, for the fact that, in the questionnaire, a majority of respondents chose the Arab label over nationality as a main source of self-identification? As stressed in the theoretical section, ethnic identity, as any other forms of identity, is not only multi-dimensional, but also situational (Okamura, 1981). Thus, depending on the social context, and on their interlocutor status, these second-generationers can emphasize or downplay selected aspects of their plural ethnic identity. This could explain in part why a majority of respondents chose the label "Arab" over national membership; knowingly participating in a research focussing on Arab identity, respondents may have felt expected to stress first and foremost their identification with the Arab community.

Nonetheless, based on the interviews, it can be said that, although national membership constitutes a chief identity provider, the respondents seem to make significant room, within their identity structure, for their "Arab-ness", understood as a broader pool of cross-national cultural references. One possible way to account for this trend can be found in the notion that a group's ethnic identity is generally delineated by both internal and external

boundaries, which actually structure each other in a complex and dialectical relationship (Barth, 1969, Isajiw, 1980, Juteau, 1997). Internal boundaries correspond to the group's self-produced definitions of its own shared memory, culture, and collective being. Such definitions draw upon an inexhaustible reservoir of symbolic material, of which certain items are selectively mobilized at different periods in order to provide the group with a collective and historically situated Self. However, and this is central to the present argument, internal boundaries are always mediated through one's relationship to the Other. In other terms, the group constructs an "Us" which is necessarily defined in relation to a "Them" (Barth, 1969, Isajiw, 1980, Juteau-Lee, 1997). Furthermore, it must be acknowledged, following Juteau-Lee (1997), that in the case of minority and migrant groups, as well as peripherical and post-colonial nations, internal boundaries always result from an (unequal) dialogue with the "Centre". This unequal dialogue can result either in alienated self-definitions or in symbolic emancipation, as far as periphery groups are concerned. But in any case, self-images stemming from the periphery are always constructed in relation to a symbolic frame defined by the "Centre".

It is interesting to analyze the trans-national Arab identity detected among our sampled subjects in relation to this external/internal boundary hypothesis. To this end, it might be useful to examine the literature on pan-ethnic identity, which can be divided into two camps offering divergent interpretations of this phenomenon. Some authors, embracing a post-Marxist perspective, have stressed the negative power dynamics related to pan-ethnic labelling in some cases. For instance, Alejandro Portes and Dag MacLeod (1996) consider that the adoption of the American-made "Hispanic" label by American-Latino youths should be understood as a form of symbolic violence, whereby external definitions are imposed on minority and/or disadvantaged groups who lack the resources (symbolic, material) needed

"to resist outside labelling and construct a more positive image of themselves (Portes and Macleod, 1996:544)". Inversely, other authors, such as Deirdre Meintel (1993) and Gerd Bauman (1995), underlined the positive aspects of pan-ethnic labelling. For instance, Bauman (1995) noted that his South Asian informants (such as Pakistanis, East Indians, Sikh, etc.) of a highly multi-ethnic London suburb rehabilitated the label "South Asian" by turning into a symbol of pride this over-arching designation under which the British usually lump together various and very culturally heterogeneous national groups. Most authors who reflected on the issue of trans-national ethnicity among Arab diasporas are generally more sympathetic to the latter perspective (Abraham, S., 1983:100; Suleiman and Abu-Laban, 1989:4-5; Kayal, 1983). As seen in the introduction, they tend to stress that the derogatory connotations conveyed by the Arab label as framed in the Western mind contribute to foster Arab-based group consciousness and solidarity in North-America. This perspective is thus largely in keeping with that of Bauman (1995), for it pertinently shows how a derogatory outside label can be re-appropriated by the labelled group, and turned into a symbol of resistance against symbolic domination. However, following Portes and Macleod (1996), it must be stressed that the emergence of, say, a "Canadian-Arab pride", implies a continuous and unequal struggle against the overwhelming influence of the derogatory character of dominant representations of Arabs.

In fact, both perspectives are relevant to the case of Arab-Canadians of the second generation. On the one hand, at present, in Canada as in any other Western country, Arab nations are construed as undifferentiated entities, all lumped together in the popular imagery, as well as in a host of official publications and statistics. With this in view, the popularity of the pan-ethnic Arab label among my respondents has to be understood, at least in part, as an over-determined identity mirroring a definition imposed from the outside. This hypothesis is

all the more plausible because, in the Arab world, as mentioned above, Pan-Arabism today has a relatively low value on the symbolic market of collective identities, in comparison with national allegiances. However, one important question remains: if the outside-labelling hypothesis is true, one wonders whether these youths have also imported from the outside, along with the label, the web of dominant significations attached to it. If that is the case, then one would be largely justified in referring to this external influence as a form of "symbolic violence", since Canadians' perceptions of the "Arabs" are in general highly negative and culturally disparaging. Thus, as reported by McIrvin Abu-Laban and Abu-Laban (1999:115), a 1977 national survey of Canadian attitudes showed that Arabs fare very poorly at the level of the popular imagery. In a list of 27 ethnic groups, Arab-Canadians were ranked 24th by Anglo-Canadians and 23rd by French-Canadian respondents. Note that, in this respect, Canadians certainly make no exception in a broader Western context.

However, those among my informants who commented on the meaning they give to their Arab identity offer support to Meintel's (1993) and Bauman's (1995) portrayal of trans-national ethnicity as a positive badge of pride. It could be, then, that the assertion of a shared collective "Arab identity" on the part of second-generationers of Arab descent represents a form of "reactive ethnicity (Ballard, 1979:126)" triggered by Canadian-made stereotypes and prejudices directed against members of this group. In other words, against the reductive and derogatory representations of "Arabs" derived from the Western cultural imagery is set a counter-image of the "Arab", meant to critically engage these Western-made and ethno-centrist perceptions. However, as mentioned above, the re-appropriation of such a negatively perceived label by the so labelled individuals necessarily entails the subversion of the dominant significations attached to it. This is precisely the kind of symbolic subversion that informant H performed during the interview:

Me: "Do you also identify with the Arab label?"

Informant H: "Well, it depends on what you have in mind. Because often the Arab label [means] that they [the Arabs] are all Mafioso's, thieves, you know, delinquents. There is a lot of that in the label "Arab". But me, it is not with this label that I identify." (Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

The inversion of the polarity of dominant external definitions of the Arabs is facilitated by the fact that, contrary to "Pan-Hispanic" and "Pan-Asian" identities, Arab identity has an history of its own rooted in the countries of origin of individuals who make a use of it in a Western context. More precisely, this pan-ethnic label is derived from a nationalist movement that goes back to the end of the 19th century. Furthermore, Arab peoples were once united under a common political, religious, and cultural block from the 7th to the 15th century. As a result, Arab-Canadians of the second generation can forge their pan-ethnic identity by drawing on a vast array of Arab-made positive symbolic markers and historical references. The following narrative is illustrative of this tendency :

Me: "Is your cultural heritage important to you?"

Informant E: "Yes".

Me: "Despite the criticisms you voiced previously?"

Informant E: "I was talking about a certain mentality. But there are full of good things in our culture. Because I find that being an Arab…there is a history, you know what I mean? The Arabs, it's a people with a history, they left their mark on Earth. I am proud to be Arab!"
(Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male)

Thus, the Arab label can also be associated with an internal form of boundary construction. Indeed, informants can draw on their group's own symbolic resources to resist external derogatory definitions imposed on them by the host society. As we have seen, these symbolic resources allow Arab-Canadians of the second-generation to subvert, for self-identification purposes, the signified externally attached to the signifier "Arab".

Self-labelling patterns do not seem to differ significantly from one national group to another. Thus, the "Arab" label has been chosen by a majority of Algerians (55%), Moroccans (53.8%), and Syrians (67.5%), whereas the most popular answer for Lebanese respondents was "National membership" (40.2%). Finally, the most popular answer among respondents of Egyptian origin was "Arab-Canadian". These patterns are once again fully consistent with the findings of the above stated 1993 Ontario survey (Hayani, 1999). However, since the national groups represented in my sample are from different immigration cohorts, it may be that national membership is simply more popular an answer among Lebanese than, say, Egyptians, for Lebanese are comparatively more likely than Egyptians to belong to a recent cohort. Ideally, self-labelling patterns should be examined within each national group, broken down into three sub-groups depending on the respondent's age at arrival. Unfortunately, the small number of cases in certain cells makes any generalization on the basis of this tri-variate crosstable unreliable. The only national group with enough cases in each cell would be the Lebanese, for whom national membership remains the most favoured answered, regardless of respondents' age upon arriving in Canada. In light of our earlier discussion (see the Introduction), this latter finding can be accounted for by the fact that, historically, in Lebanon, the emergence of group consciousness among Christian Maronites has been inseparable from State-Nation building (Abu-Laban, 1980:22, Kayal, 1983). Among the other national groups of this sample, the "Arab" label remains the most favoured answer, even when controlling for "Age-at-arrival". But, once again, there were too many empty cells, or cells with less than 5 cases, in order to draw reliable conclusions on the basis of these results.

As seen in Table 4 above, the variable "Gender" did not have a statistically significant impact on self-labelling patterns. More specifically, the Chi-Square coefficient yielded by this variable was non-significant at the 0.1 level. The category "Arab" was favoured over national membership among both gender groups, although this preference is stronger for males (44.3%) than it is for females (37.3%). As also seen in Table 4, the variable "Religious Affiliation" (Christians vs. Muslims) was weakly correlated with the variable "Self-Labelling" (p<0.1). The label "Arab" was the most popular category for both religious groups. Muslim respondents, however, are much more likely to identify as Arabs, compared with their Christian ethnic peers (51.1% vs. 23.9%). Note that the great majority of Christians in my sample are Lebanese, a group who, as we have seen, tend to identify strongly with their country of origin. This could account, in part, for the fact that Christian respondents, overall, identify more with their national community than with the Arabs as a group. Another explanation could be that, because both Arabs and non-Arabs tend to commonly, and incorrectly, equate being Arab with being Muslim, the Muslim respondents tend to feel closer to the Arab community than their Christian (but equally Arab) counterparts.

4.1.3) Internal/Social Dimension: "Attitude towards endogamous marriage" (var.16 in app. A)

As seen in Table 5 below, a majority of respondents (41.7%) deem it is "important" for them to marry within their own ethnic group. 32.8% of them consider in-group marriage as an ideal but not necessary option. Finally, 22.3% stated it was "not important" for them to marry within their ethnic group, while 3.2% said they did not want to marry a person of their

own ethnic group. Thus, generally speaking, in-group marriage seems to be a highly popular

option among these second-generation Arab youths.

Table 5: Percentage Distribution for "Attitude toward endogamous marriage"

Level of importance	Distribution
Important	41.7%
Ideally but not compulsorily	32.8%
Not important	22,3%
I don't want it	3.2%
TOTAL	100%

Comparatively, Baha Abu-Laban (1980:161) found that 42% of his 1974 sample of

both first and second generation Arab-Canadians reported that ethnicity was of no

importance in their choice of spouse. By contrast, only 22.3% of the present sample gave the

same answer. Also, while a total of 54% of Abu-Laban's respondents favoured some form of

ethnic endogamy, as much as 74.5% of my sample of Arab-Canadian second-generationers

either want, or would ideally prefer in-group marriage. This discrepancy could appear

counter-intuitive, at first, since Abu-Laban's sample included a higher proportion of

immigrants than my own sample, which is comprised essentially of Canadian-born and

migrant youths who arrived in Canada early in life. However, such a difference may mostly

be the result of cohort variations. Abu-Laban's respondents, in 1974, must have typically

been Westernized and/or Western-schooled Arab immigrants (or their children) who arrived

in Canada in the 1950s and the 1960s, and who were not prone to engage in insular patterns

of ethnic behaviours and attitudes. On the other hand, most youths of my sample come from

families who, typically, migrated to Canada during the 1970s onwards. Their Arab parents

are very likely to belong to a cohort of immigrants much more staunch in their ethno-

religious identity, as compared with earlier migratory cohorts. It could thus be that my

respondents' strong inclinations towards endogamous marriage is the result of stronger parental commitment to ethnic and religious identity transmission. Another factor is that, today, Arab youths committed to in-group marriage can rely on a much bigger pool of potential mates to choose from, compared to 25 years ago.

The interviews provided a wide array of reasons for wanting to marry an ethnic peer. In general, those who favour endogamous marriage often mentioned, as an advantage of such an option, that sharing a common cultural background facilitate mutual understanding between both spouses. The importance that these respondents place on cultural connectedness is justified by various motives. One Muslim Algerian female respondent said that she could not marry a Canadian or a Québécois because he could not understand her, the cultural difference being too great. When asked what a Canadian spouse could not understand, she said:

> "They [Canadians] don't have the same values. They do not place as much importance on the family as we do. There are many different things." (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived here at the age of 7)".

One Christian Lebanese male informant (B) also mentioned that he could not marry a Canadian or a Québécoise because they are not family-oriented. However, interestingly, his understanding of a family-oriented spouse departs from that of the above quoted female respondent:

> "I find the difference [between Arab and Canadian women] lies in the family, family values (...) I don't know, I find that here [in Canada] they [women] want too much freedom. There is "not free at all", and "too free". I am not saying that they [women] should all be left inside the house, but there are limits in all, I find" (Informant B, Christian Lebanese male, Canadian-born)

Similarly, informant C, a Christian Lebanese/Palestinian male, prefers to marry an Arab woman as opposed to a Canadian woman, because the latter would be very likely to "ask for divorce" (Informant C, Christian Lebanese/Palestinian male, Canadian-born). It thus appears that, for these two males, marrying an ethnic peer is important in order not to end up

with a wife who is too "liberty-hungry" in one case, and prompt to ask for divorce in the other. Thus, in the case of some males, the preference for an ethnic peer as a spouse can be accounted for by the perceived threat associated with women's freedom, epitomized above all by Canadian women, deemed too liberal and independent.

Three female respondents (Informants N, I and M) declared that it was important for them to marry an ethnic peer so their parents would get along well with their son-in-laws. Two respondents (N and L) mentioned that they prefer an Arab spouse in order to make sure that their children will later speak Arabic.

Also, according to several interviewees who prefer marrying an ethnic peer, their future spouse would preferably have the same national background, and would have to be Arab at the very least. Thus, explains Informant M, a Syrian female:

> First, he has to be Christian... Wait, I'll tell you: First, Christian, and second, I prefer him to be Arab because I want him to get along with my family (...). So, Christian and Arab. But what I prefer personally would perhaps be a Syrian because my mentality is Syrian. And the people whose mentality is going to coincide with mine are Syrians" (Informant M, Christian Syrian female, arrived here at 10 years old).

Informant N, another Christian female of Syrian origin, declared that she used to want to marry only a Syrian, but that now she is willing to marry someone of another national background as long as he is Arab:

> "He has to be Arab, but who knows whether he'll be Syrian, Lebanese, even Armenian, or Iraqi, or Jordanian. It doesn't matter." (Informant N, Christian Syrian female, arrived here at 6 years old)

Interestingly, the latter Syrian-born subject only mentioned Middle-eastern nations as examples of countries from where her ideal spouse could originate, thus leaving out Maghrebi countries, namely Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Similarly, informant H, a Canadian-born female of Algerian descent, states explicitly that if she does not marry an

Algerian, she could also be content with marrying an Arab-Canadian of another North African nation (Tunisian or Moroccan):

> "He has to be Muslim. Maybe not Lebanese, but from the Maghreb. Because Middle East and North Africa: I think these are two different things. We are all considered as Arabs, but I think we are all different from one another. It's really.... The religion, the values... I think it's different".

Thus, informants M, N, and H, who favour endogamous marriage, would like to find a husband who shares their national background. But if such a thing is impossible, their second choice would be to marry either another Arab or, more specifically, an Arab of the same cultural sub-group as their (i.e. Maghreb or Middle East). This lends support to the argument - discussed in section 4.1.2 - that the trans-national Arab identity of the second-generation tends to be subordinated to more national and regional sub-group identities. However, there seems to be enough identification with, and cultural integration into the broader Arab community for these second generationers to envisage a marriage with members of other Arab groups. Finally, our narratives also suggest that religion is considered by these youths as an even more crucial criterion for choosing the right mate (see Informant M's and H's above quoted narratives).This point will be further discussed in section 4.2.

Two of the subjects who prioritize in-group marriage made similar comments which are worthy of particular interest. Informant H (Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female) and informant M (Christian Syrian female, arrived at the age of 10) both specified that they could not marry a compatriot who just recently migrated to Canada. Rather, they would both prefer to choose their future spouse among their Canadianized ethnic peers of the second-generation. They both dislike the prospect of marrying a "typical" Algerian or Syrian, who, according to them, risks being too dominating and controlling in the couple. Thus, to explain why she could not marry a Syrian from Syria, informant M said:

"They [Syrian men] have conserved a mentality that I don't have anymore. For example, there are guys [in Syria] who say: *My wife doesn't need to work, and she should stay at home.* No, this is non sense! I want someone who is open-minded and who will share the household chores half and half with me." (Informant M, Christian Syrian female, arrived at the age of 10)

Similarly, informant H (Canadian-born Muslim female of Algerian descent), after having declared that men should have the last word as regards family matters, added the following: "It would be complicated if I were to marry an Algerian from Algeria because he would be too controlling." Thus, both informants H and M make the realization that they could not connect with a husband from their country of origin, on the ground that he is likely to have views on gender relationships which depart significantly from theirs. In this respect, informants H's and M's comments are indicative of a desire to find in their future husband traces of this very same cultural hybridity which characterizes their own cultural identity. As pertinently outlined by Gerd Bauman (1996, 1997), second-generation "ethnics" are solicited by different communities (primarily the ethnic community and the host society), which both provide them with essentialized definitions of culture and community. According to Bauman, whereas, at the discourse level, these youths often tend to choose their identity camp in a very definite and essentialist manner, in effect, their ethno-cultural identities and practices result from very fluid processes that cannot be traced back once and for all to one cultural framework or another. In this respect, the reservations that informants H and M have about marrying an "ideal-typical" Algerian or Syrian - or perceived as such by them - illustrate well the ambiguity characterizing their relationship to their own ethnicity, which they want to maintain, but in a form consistent with their high degree of cultural hybridity.

In fact, the degree of ethnic and Canadian culture that these second-generationers wish to find in a Canadian-born compatriotic husband seems to be hardly measurable, which reflects once again the ambivalence informing their own ethnic identity. For instance, female

informant H, after having stated her preference for a Canadian-Algerian husband, as opposed to an Algerian from the motherland, then added the following:

"But I don't want a [Canadian-born] Algerian who lost too much [of his Algerian culture] either, like my brother for example. You see, I couldn't marry someone like my brother. Well, not my actual brother but....You know what I mean?" (Informant H, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

Thus, according to informant H's standards, the line between an Algerian who dropped the proper undesired cultural features, and one who dropped "too much", seems to be a very fine one. Once again, these comments are good indicators of the latitude and flexibility that these youths strive for in the re-construction of their highly nuanced and heterogeneous ethnic identity.

However, it should be noted, as underlined above in Table 5, that a significant minority (22.3%) of the present sample do not consider as important marrying someone of their own ethnic background. Most of the interviewees who expressed this view do not make ethnicity a central axis of their identity structure. One interviewee went as far as saying that she would be more comfortable with both befriending, and getting married with a non-Arab insofar as:

"Arabs are too much into their religion, their ethnic group. Whenever you see a student who is Arab, even here [in the school], most of the times they are with another 10 Arab students. (...) I find that Canada is such a multiethnic country that you have to interact with other countries, other ethnic groups. If you restrict your vision, your attention on, I guess, the Arab heritage, then (...) you are not exploring other fields." (Informant J, Muslim Algerian female, Canadian born)

Isajiw stressed that second-generationers can push their ethnic world aside for different reasons. Thus, he says, they can either distance themselves from their ethnic community and culture, or they can socio-psychologically rebel against them (Isajiw, 1999:195). The above quoted female informant seems to belong to the former category.

Indeed, she does not reject her ethnic culture and community per se, as much as she rejects ethnic cliquishness as well as ethnicity taken as a defining axis of identity.

Also, as seen below in Table 6, although females are more likely than males to favour endogamous over exogamous marriage, this difference is clearly not statistically significant (Chi-square=0.45). Nonetheless, it is revealing that 45.7% of females find it "important" to marry an ethnic peer, while only 38.2% of males hold the same view. Perhaps this difference can be accounted for by the fact that, in the eyes of Arab communities, female conduct is often considered as the locus, or the site of an "authentic" Arab identity (Ajrouch, 1999). Although the value and respect of traditions is ingrained in both genders through socialization, departing from these traditions is often more socially detrimental to females than it is to males. Therefore, the weakening of ethnic culture that inevitably results from exogamous marriages is perhaps seen as less problematic in the case of boys, since identity maintenance is operated mainly through females. Therefore, it is often the case that more social pressures are exerted on females to prevent them from marrying outside their ethnic group.

Table 6: Percentage distribution for "Attitude towards endogamous marriage" with "Gender"

		Attitude toward Endogamous marriage				
		Important	Ideally but not compulsorily	Not important	I don't want it	TOTAL
Gender	Females	45.7%	31.0%	21.6%	1.7%	100%
	Males	38.2%	34.4%	22.9%	4.5%	100%
	Whole sample	41.7%	32.8%	22.3%	3.2%	100%

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Finally, as seen in Table 7 below, Muslim respondents are more inclined than Christians to favour endogamous marriages, although this difference is not statistically significant. Still, 49.4% of Muslims versus 37.5% of Christians reported it was "important" for them to marry within their ethnic group. Also, 25% of Christians, as opposed to 17.2% of Muslims, consider as "not important" marrying within their own ethnic group. Such findings are not surprising since, for Arab Muslims, as opposed to Arab Christians, marrying outside their ethnic group in a Canadian context increases significantly their chances of marrying outside their religious group in addition. Moreover, at present, there are considerable perceived cultural and normative disparities between Muslim and Christian populations, who construe each other as the religious out-group par excellence. These two combined factors could explain, at least in part, why Muslims respondents are more reluctant than Christians to marry outside their ethnic group.

Table 7: Percentage distribution for "Attitudes toward endogamous marriage" with "Religious affiliation"

		Attitudes toward endogamous marriage				
		Important	Ideally but not compulsorily	Not important	I don't want it	TOTAL
Father's religion	Christian	37.5%	35.6%	25.0%	1.9%	100%
	Muslim	49.4%	27.6%	17.2%	5.7%	100%
	Whole sample	41.7%	32.8%	22.3%	3.2%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

4.1.4) External/Cultural Dimension: Language Proficiency and Consumption of Cultural Goods

4.1.4-a) Language proficiency (var.2, 3, and 4 in app. A)

As seen in table 8, quite expectedly, the proportion of respondents whose proficiency in Arabic is "good" decreases substantially as we move from the group who has been living in Canada for the shortest period of time to the group who arrived here at the earliest age. The Chi-square test confirms that there is a significant positive relationship (at the 0.01 level) between one's age at arrival in Canada, and the likelihood of having a "Good" knowledge of Arabic. However, and this is interesting, a "Good" knowledge of Arabic is reported by a majority of respondents, regardless of the period they arrived in Canada. This suggests that the process of ethnic language transmission among Arab communities is successful to a considerable degree. But it must be kept in mind that, in the long run, these figures also point to a gradual and steady tendency towards ethnic language loss, as suggested also by most ethnic identity retention studies (Isajiw, 1990; Abu-Laban, 1980:202-226).

Table 8: Percentage distribution for "Proficiency in spoken Arabic" with "Age at arrival in Canada"

Age at arrival in Canada ***	Self-assessed Proficiency in Spoken Arabic	%
From 0 to 4 years old	Good	41%
	Average	29%
	Poor	18%
	I don't speak it	12%
	TOTAL	100%
From 5 to 8 years old	Good	59%
	Average	30%
	Poor	8%
	I don't speak it	3%
	TOTAL	100%
From 9 to 12 years old	Good	82%
	Average	13%
	Poor	5%
	I don't speak it	0%
	TOTAL	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

The Chi-square coefficients yielded by Table 9 below show that there is a definite significant relationship between one's age at arrival, and one's most commonly used language by context of conversation (i.e.: with siblings, parents, and Arab friends). Thus, quite expectedly, in all three conversational contexts, the younger respondents were when they arrived in Canada, the more likely they are to resort to a Charter language. Inversely, the older they were when they got here, the more likely they are to speak Arabic. Among the group of respondents who were either born in Canada or who migrated before the age of 4, Arabic is the most used language to address parents (51%), whereas French prevails in conversations with siblings (55%). However, among this same "age-at-arrival" group, French and Arabic are both as likely to be used primarily to address other Arab friends. Among the

respondents who arrived in Canada between the age of 5 and 8 years old, we observe a similar pattern: the proportion who address their Arab friends in Arabic is equal to the proportion who address their Arab friends in French (38% in both cases). Parents are addressed mostly in Arabic by a majority of respondents within all three "age-at-arrival" groups. Brothers and sisters are addressed primarily in French only by those respondents who arrived here before the age of 4, and in Arabic by those who got here between 5 and 8, and between 9 and 12 years old. Finally, a majority among respondents who arrived in Canada between 9 and 12 years old use mainly Arabic in every sphere of social interaction.

Table 9: Frequency distributions for "Most used language" by "Age at Arrival" and by "Interlocutor Status"

Age at arrival In Canada	Most used language	With brothers and sisters	With Arab friends	With parents
0 to 4 years old	Arab	22.7%	34.9%	50.9%
	French	54.7%	34.9%	33.0%
	English	17.9%	22.6%	10.4%
	Other *	2.8%	7.6%	5.7%
	Does not apply	1.9%	--	--
	TOTAL	100%	100%	100%
5 to 8 years old	Arab	27.9%	38.2%	70.6%
	French	48.5%	38.2%	19.1%
	English	13.3%	20.7%	4.4%
	Other *	7.4%	2.9%	5.9%
	Does not apply	2.9%	--	--
	TOTAL	100%	100%	100%
9 to 12 years old	Arab	55.3%	61.9%	85.5%
	French	31.6%	22.4%	10.5%
	English	10.5%	11.8%	1.4%
	Other *	2.6%	3.9%	2.6%
	Does not apply	--	--	--
	Total	100%	100%	100%

* = The category "Other" also includes all those who circled two languages instead of one.

One remark deserves to be made based on the informal exchanges I had with the respondents. In the questionnaire, the phrasing of the language-related questions is as follows: "Which language do you use **first and foremost** when speaking to...(only one answer)." It was thus made clear to respondents that they were not allowed to choose more than one answer. Despite this restriction, an important minority of respondents asked me whether they could circle more than one answer, arguing they just could not choose one language over the other. Several respondents were thus unsettled about choosing either French, Arabic, or English as their most used language in different contexts of interaction. The indecisiveness of these respondents made me realize that it would have been more sociologically and methodologically relevant to authorize the circling of more than one answer. Most importantly, this observation suggests, apart from the well established fact that bilingualism is widely spread among second-generationers, that several of these youths function simultaneously in more than one language in various contexts. Indeed, they often reported that they tend to switch from one language to another in the course of the same conversation, even in the same sentence. Perhaps this phenomenon is even more pronounced in Montreal than in any other Canadian city. It has been shown that Montreal's double majority (French and English) contributes to greater ethnic language retention (Anctil, 1984), and to greater rates of tri-lingualism among second-generationers (French, English, and ethnic language) (Jedwab, 1999). Put differently, in Montreal, not only migrant children are in general efficiently "frenchified" (thanks largely to Bill 101), but the "double majority" status of this city leaves much room for other languages to flourish concomitantly (Meintel, 1998:86; Jedwab, 1999). Inversely, in the rest of Canada, English tends more to engulf the other subaltern and minority languages, due to its hegemonic position in the North American

context (Anctil, 1984). This could account in part for the numerous cases of language switching observed among Arab youths of the present sample.

4.1.4-b) Consumption of Cultural Goods (var.6, 7, and 8 in app. A)

The extent of contacts that second-generation migrants have with the material and symbolic "goods" derived from their parental culture is also a good indicator of the degree to which they have been exposed to, and socialized into, their ethnic culture (external/cultural aspect of ethnic identity). As seen in table 10 below, Arab youths of this sample indulge to a large extent in various forms of cultural practices associated with their ethnic background. For instance, the great majority of them eat ethnic food "often" (at least once a week). Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who eat ethnic food regularly remains very high and stable across the three "age-at-arrival" brackets (between 87% and 91%). Such a finding is consistent with W.W. Isajiw's observation that "the tradition of eating ethnic food is maintained from generation to generation more than any other ethnic pattern of behaviour (Isajiw, 1990:67). The second most retained ethnic-related practice in all three "age-at-arrival" categories is listening to ethnic music, followed by watching and listening to ethnic programs. In general, these activities are widely spread among the Arab youths of this sample. Thus, among each "age-at-arrival" group, a majority declared listening to ethnic music, and viewing/listening to ethnic programs "often". The only ethnic pattern of behaviour which is clearly deserted by a great majority of respondents in all three "age-at-arrival" groups is reading ethnic newspapers and magazines. This could be accounted for by the fact that, first, the proportion of children of immigrants who can read and write well in their ethnic language is commonly low, especially when the ethnic language's alphabet

differs from the majority group's alphabet. Second, it must be kept in mind that, in this age of multimedia, reading is largely neglected by teenagers and young adults, irrespective of ethnicity.

Table 10: Percentage distribution for "Consumption of cultural goods" with "Age at arrival in Canada"

HOW OFTEN DO YOU....

Age at arrival in Canada	Frequency	Eat ethnic Food	Listen to ethnic Music	Watch/listen Ethnic Programs	Read ethnic Newspaper
0-4 years old	Often	86.8%	36.2%	19.8%	3.8%
	Occasionally	10.4%	34.3%	34.9%	10.4%
	Rarely	2.8%	20.0%	24.5%	22.6%
	Never	Not an option	9.5%	20.8%	63.2%
	TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
5-8 years old	Often	89.7%	47%	26.5%	7.4%
	Occasionally	8.8%	36.4%	33.8%	11.8%
	Rarely	1.5%	13.6%	20.6%	16.1%
	Never	Not an option	3.0%	19.1%	64.7%
	TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
9-12 years old	Often	90.7%	49.0%	42.1%	11.8%
	Occasionally	4.0%	29.4%	34.2%	23.7%
	Rarely	5.3%	15.1%	18.4%	28.9%
	Never	Not an option	6.5%	5.3%	35.6%
	TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%

Interestingly, from what the interviews have disclosed, whereas eating ethnic food is a practice that seems to go back to the respondent's early childhood, watching ethnic programs and listening to ethnic music, however, are activities which are often part of a certain process of ethnic (re)discovery taking place at the end of adolescence, at a time when these youths endeavour to become more familiar with their ethnic culture. Indeed, the collected narratives suggest that listening to ethnic music, a popular activity according to our quantitative data, is a key element in the ethnic revival experienced by these youths. Thus,

informant P told me that she feels more Lebanese than before in part because of her renewed

interest in her ethnic musical heritage:

> "Last year, I have started being more interested in my country's political affairs, the music (...) To me, the music is also the culture. That's why it [the music] is very important to me."
> (Informant P, Christian Lebanese female, arrived at 7 years old)

4.1.5) External/Social Dimension: "In-group friendship" (var.14 in app. A)

The external/social dimension of ethnicity relates to the youth's degree of social

interactions and involvement with the ethnic community. In-group friendships constitute a

premium example of ethnic-based social interactions in the private sphere. As seen in table

11 below, most respondents, namely 49.8%, reported that their 3 best friends are ethnic

peers, while 24.5% reported that 2 out of their 3 best friends are ethnic peers. Only 8.8%

stated that none of their 3 best friends are ethnic peers. In a Toronto study (Isajiw, 1990), a

sample of first, second, and third generation respondents from 6 different ethnic groups were

asked the same question. The ethnic group with the highest proportion of second-

generationers having 3 ethnic peers as best friends were Jews, with 51% (Isajiw, 1990:57).

This is only 1% more than the proportion of Arab youths of the present sample who reported

having three best friends of the same ethnicity. This shows that, comparatively, these

Montreal Arab second-generationers are very much likely to engage in endogamous patterns

of friendship. The variable "Age at arrival" seems to have a slight (non-significant) impact

on in-group friendship. Thus, the proportion of respondents having 3 friends of the same

ethnicity drops only from 59.2% to 41.9% as we move from the highest to the lowest "age-

at-arrival" range. Also, among each three "age-at-arrival" groups, a clear majority of

respondents declared having 3 ethnic peers as best friends. This suggests that second-generation Arab youths generally tend to be rather cliquish in their patterns of friendship.

Table 11: Percentage distributions for "In-group friendship" with "Gender", "Religious affiliation" and "Age-at-Arrival"

		Number of friends of same ethnicity				
		3	2	1	None	Total
Whole sample		49.8%	24.5%	16.9%	8.8%	100%
By Gender	Males	54.5%	23.6%	12.9%	9.1%	100%
	Females	44.4%	25.6%	21.5%	8.5%	100%
By Religious affiliation	Christians	54.7%	21.1%	16.1%	8.1%	100%
	Muslims	40.9%	30.7%	18.2%	10.2%	100%
By age at arrival	0 to 4 years old	41.9%	26.7%	17.1%	14.3%	100%
	5 to 8 years old	51.5%	22.1%	19.1%	7.3%	100%
	9 to 12 years old	59.2%	23.7%	14.5%	2.6%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Various reasons were given by informants, throughout the interviews, to account for the predominance of ethnic peers within their circle of best friends. First, nearly all subjects who engage primarily in endogamous friendships explained that they were not purposely avoiding non-Arabs. Most of them mentioned they were hanging with a majority of Arab friends (and often more specifically with countrymen/women) because they felt that ethnic peers are more likely to have the same mentality as them, and thus to better understand them:

Informant H: "My close friends are Arabs. Because we have the same values. It's at the level of values that we are gonna be on the same wave length, you know what I mean? Like, there are Québécois who are very open-minded and all...but they don't understand [us]. They say the do, but they don't." (Canadian-born Muslim female of Algerian descent)

Informant B: "I feel more comfortable with Lebanese, but it is not because they are Lebanese. It's just that our mentality, our way of thinking coincided. That's all. But I could have connected with non-Lebanese." (Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male)

Informant N: "It's an ambiguous question because I don't choose my friends based on their ethnicity. I choose my friends based on who they are. But necessarily, because of my mentality, because of my tastes, what I like to do, and all that, I am gonna meet.....I am gonna pick people who have the same cultural background as mine, or even the same religion."
(Christian Syrian female, arrived at the age of 6)

Informant I: "No, not necessarily, except I tend more to choose my friends among people of my culture. This way, it's easier: we better understand each other. The things we talk about. We know what the other is talking about." (Canadian-born Muslim Moroccan female)

Informant M: "It's because our mentalities coincide. If the mentalities coincide.... Maybe it's the Arab mentality that brought us together. But it's not because you're Arab that you are gonna be a friend of mine. No, it means nothing. It just proves that they [the Arabs] have the same mentality."
(Christian Syrian female, arrived at 9 years old)

Few participants elaborated on how or why this cultural connectedness made them end up with a majority of ethnic peers as best friends. One informant suggested that she may have a majority of ethnic peers as best friends because "Arabs are more generous and welcoming towards newcomers. Their heart is wide open (Informant I, Canadian-born Muslim Moroccan female)". Similarly, Informant F (Muslim Algerian male) considers that he has an inclination for making friend with Algerians because they are "warmer" than Canadians. But most of the other subjects who favour in-group friendship were far more evasive, simply saying that they do not feel comfortable with Québécois, who are often perceived as being too culturally different.

However, interviewees were asked a question (not covered by the questionnaire), which provides additional information on the perceived differences between the Arab "mentality" and the Québécois culture. These perceived differences could account to a large extent for the fact that a majority of interviewees declared, not only being more inclined to befriend ethnic peers, but also having very few Québécois among their circle of best friends. The interviewees were asked "Do you think your ethnic group's culture is much different from Québécois or Canadian culture? If so, in which ways do you think it is?" Three recurring themes emerged from the participants' answers: 1) respect vs. disrespect of

parental authority, 2) community-oriented vs. individualistic values, and 3) strict vs. liberal education, which, as we will see, is a strongly gendered issue.

The relationship to parental authority was considered by informants C, K, I, M, and D to be a crucial cultural difference between Arabs and Canadians. For instance, informant C, a Christian Lebanese male, declared being afraid of Québécois values, especially as far as children-parents relationships were concerned: "Once I saw a girl shouting at her mother, and the mother doesn't answer back. Me, if I shout at my father, I get a slap right in the face. So, for sure it was shocking". Similarly, informant K, a Muslim Algerian female, declared:

> "Respect of the family. Especially respect of the father. Here [in Canada] sometimes, when I go at my Québécoise girlfriends' place, and that they answer back to their parents.... I am surprised. Me, I'd get a slap. Also, here, if you hit your child, it's considered as something dramatic. But my father was slapping me when I was young. But he was not beating me."
> (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7 years old)

One other perceived cultural difference which has been frequently evoked by participants is that Canadian culture is too "liberal", especially with regard to permissions granted to children, and to gender relationships. Thus, says informant K:

> "You see, when you're in elementary school, you want to be like them [Québécois]. It's easy in elementary school to adapt. But when comes a time where there are things that are not accepted by your parents, but that are accepted by your friends' parents, it's a whole different thing."
> (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7 years old)

In the same vein, both informants B (Christian Lebanese male) and H (Muslim Algerian female) consider that Québécoises female teenagers are too libertine, or sexually liberated. For example, informant B thinks that girls here have too much "freedom". When asked to elaborate, he declared:

> "For example, when I see a 13 years old girl who speaks about her sexual relations, I find this a little bit exaggerated. And when girls here think that this 16 years old girl is a little bit bizarre because she is still a virgin, I find this to be exaggerated." (Informant B, Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male)

Similarly, informant H thinks that Québécoises female teenagers are excessively promiscuous:

"My Québécoises friends, they go: *Haaa! We went to a Club last night, I drunk, and I woke up in his bed. Ha! Ha Ha! Ha!* And for them, it's really funny. I really don't think it's funny! You know what I mean?" (Informant H, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female).

Finally, another commonly reported cultural difference between Arabs and Canadians is that the former group places greater importance on family and community-oriented values, compared with Canadians, who are deemed more individualistic. The three following comments illustrate this view:

Informant E: "Well if I look at my family... I have the feeling that family is very important for Arabs. And I think that they're absolutely right. They're more bound by their family."
(Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male)

Informant D: "Of course Arab culture is different. First, in Montreal, people are more individualistic, you know? Whereas us [the Arabs], we are trying more to live in community. Take me, for example: I am 21, my brother's 27, and my sister's 24, and we still live at our parents'. Whereas here [in Canada], when they hit 18, they must leave the house and live on their own. I am not saying that they are all like this (...) But in Montreal, from what I've seen, it's like that."
(Christian Lebanese male, arrived here at 12 years old).

Informant F: "Family, the extended family, and friends are so important in Algeria or in the Arab world. There is a human warmth [in Arab culture] that can be found within circles of close relations. And this cannot be found here, or not to the same extent."
(Muslim Algerian male, arrived here at 8 years old)

Also, Table 11 reveals that males are more likely than females to have ethnic peers as best friends (although the Chi Square associated with this relationship is not significant). Inversely, girls are more likely than boys to befriend non-Arabs. These findings seem to be in keeping with McIrvin Abu-Laban and Abu Laban's observations (1999:121) about their Edmonton sample of Arab youths. As these authors remarked, and as confirmed by my own data, Arab girls can sometimes, through out-group friendships, gain a sense of personal freedom and individuality, which they perhaps lack in Arab circles of friends. More specifically, for these girls, out-group friendship often implies the temporary lifting of

normative constraints usually imposed on them by ethnic and religious traditions, and reinforced through the controlling gaze of ethnic peers. Informant K's comment, reported below, supports this interpretation. After having said that she does not hang much with Québécois, this Muslim Algerian female added that she does not like to be surrounded by too many Algerians either:

> "I am afraid of the Algerian mentality. I wouldn't like to hang with too much Algerians. I avoid them, especially boys. I avoid Algerians because they think in a certain way: they're gonna judge you all the time, all the time, all the time. Their mentality....It's as if you were at home 24/7, but even worse." (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7 years old)

Also, one female respondent explained to me, in an informal exchange, that she tries not to get too involved with Arab boys: "You heard how they [Arab boys] talk about girls? They look down on you if you start going out with a boy, or just flirting around with him." Thus, it appears that Arab girls' behaviours are under close scrutiny within certain Arab circles of friends, specifically those where traditional views prevail. This could account in part why, in the present sample, girls tend slightly more than boys to have non-Arabs among their 3 best friends.

Inversely, it must be said that in-group friendship appeals to a certain category of interviewees, both males and females, who hold more traditional values and, hence, who have a preference for like-minded ethnic peer friends. More specifically, contrary to those who stay away from in-group friendship because they suffer from the weight of tradition and conservatism, this group appropriated and internalized a traditional normative framework as a defining part of their ethnic identity. Therefore, they prefer to be surrounded by individuals who share their traditional views regarding issues such as gender relationships, parental permissions, and the like. Interestingly, two interviewees mentioned that they generally get along better, not only with ethnic peers, but also with non-Arabs who come from equally

traditional and religious cultures, or perceived as such (e.g. Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, etc.). Thus, this male informant declared:

> "I have a Jewish female friend, a Muslim female friend, I have Lebanese Friends, I have a lot of Greek friends, Armenian friends, which are all groups with a culture similar to mine."
> (Informant C, Canadian-born, Christian, half Palestinian, half Lebanese male)

One Muslim female, informant H, basically expressed the same view, arguing that Mediterranean girls, such as Italians, are more likely to understand and relate to the parental restrictions imposed on her:

> "Religion doesn't necessarily play a role in my choice of friends, because I have an Italian friend. One of my best friends is Italian. And Italians...I find that they have a lot in common with Arabs. Like, Italian girls, you know, their father is a bit strict, and, like, they can't do everything they want. And we get along very well because we understand each other. Personally, I need someone who's going to understand me if I say: *No, I can't go out tonight, my mom won't let me.* You know, I'm 18. If I say that to a Québécois, he's gonna tell me: *Come on! Who cares about your parents?* You know what I mean? They are gonna tell me this as if it goes without saying, they won't understand."
> (Informant H, Canadian born Muslim Algerian female).

This latter narrative illustrates how, for second-generation Arab females, ethnic distinctiveness is often experienced and perceived as being closely related to the imposition of parental restrictions on liberties, regardless of whether these constraints are perceived negatively (e.g. informant K) or positively (e.g. informant H). In other words, for female second-generationers of Arab descent, very often, the structuring of ethnic identity, both in its external and internal forms, can hardly be dissociated from the restricted latitude they have in negotiating permissions with their parents. In the above cited narrative, informant H considers that, because Italian girls come as well from a "traditional" culture, they are more likely than Québécoise girls to relate to, and understand what she goes through at home, namely being subjected to strict parental control. It thus appears that traditional values and its corresponding set of rules and restrictions contribute to a large extent, especially for female youths, to delineate the contours of ethnic boundaries.

Also, as shown in table 11 above, Christian respondents tend to be more prone than Muslim respondents to befriend individuals of their own ethnicity, although such a correlation is not statistically significant. Thus, 54.7% of Christians, as opposed to 40.9% of Muslims, reported that their 3 best friends share their own ethnic background. Interestingly, such a finding suggests that youths of Muslim background depart, in reality, from the image that Western popular imagery cultivate about Muslims, that is a group with a withdrawn attitude towards the host society, accounted for, either by sentiments of hostility or by what is perceived as insurmountable cultural disparities. The present study showed that, while most Arab Muslim youths favour in-group friendship, they do so to a lesser extent than their Christian ethnic counterparts. Hence, based on this case study, Islam can hardly be considered as a factor reinforcing patterns of self-segregation among Muslim ethnic groups. That being said, it should be kept in mind that the Christian sample is made up of a great majority of Lebanese, a group which traditionally holds on very strongly to its ethno-religious identity.

Finally, 4 interviewees, of which 3 are Canadian-born, mentioned that they only started hanging with ethnic peers when entering CEGEP. These youths, who prior to CEGEP were mainly acquainted with non-Arabs, turned from out-group to in-group friendship once they were integrated into an environment with a critical mass of ethnic peers. Thus, said informant H:

> "To be honest, in high school, I had more Quebecois friends [than Arab friends]. It's more when I got to Cegep Bois-de-Boulogne that... here, in Bois-de-Boulogne, there are only Arabs (laughter).... that I started to join a specific group. It's not as if my parents.... We do speak Arabic at home, but we speak more often French than Arabic at my parent's. But I learnt Arabic with my friends [in Cegep]." (Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

Research has shown that attending a school with a high concentration of ethnic peers increases the likelihood of ethnic-based self-segregation patterns of friendship (McAndrew, 1999). In this respect, the fact that all of the Cegeps selected for the present research have a high concentration of Arab students is, according to the youths themselves, an important factor accounting for this phenomenon. But there could be more to it than a mere matter of ratios. According to Isajiw (1990:37-38), the late teenage years often coincide with a period of ethnic (re)discovery during which the youth wants to become more familiar with his or her ethnic cultural background. Of course, the fact that my respondents all attend Cegeps with a high concentration of Arabs is most certainly an important condition, or perhaps even a trigger, for the arabization of their circle of friends. However, these youths probably would not have turned to in-group-friendship, had they not developed, around the same time, an inclination to either discover, or re-discover their ethnic cultural heritage. Thus, says informant P:

> "I don't know, during the past year, I got closer to....I have started being more interested in my country's politics, and to the music. Even the people....Before, I had no Arab friends, you know? Not even one Arab, really! I couldn't even get along well with an Arab. Now, like, I almost only hang with Arab people. My boyfriend is Arab. It's really a big change!"
> (Informant P, Christian Lebanese female, arrived at 7 years old).

4.1.6) Perceived Parental Commitment to Ethnic Identity Transmission

First, it should be kept in mind that none of the indicators used to measure this variable, but one (namely variable 17 in appendix A) tap into parents' **actual** attempts to socialize their children into their ethnic culture. Rather, they reveal the respondent's estimation of his or her parents' commitment to ethnic culture and identity transmission. Table 12 clearly demonstrates that respondents consider that their parents tend to make a priority of transmitting their ethnic culture and identity to their children: 71.6% of the

respondents' parents fall either into the category "Strong Commitment" (35.8%), or "Average Commitment" (35.8%). Only 13.6% of cases fall into the categories "Weak commitment" and "Very weak commitment".

Table 12: Percentage distribution for "Parental commitment ethnic identity transmission"

Strength of Parental commitment	% distribution
Very strong	35.8%
Strong	35.8%
Average	14.8%
Weak	9.9%
Very Weak	3.7%
TOTAL	100%

The qualitative material provided precious information regarding the various aspects of the ethnic culture that, according to informants, parents want their children to maintain. Interviewees were asked "Which aspects of your ethnic culture your parents want you to retain in particular?", and "How do your parents let you know about it?" These questions deal, respectively, with 1) the "content" of the cultural framework informing parental ethnic socialization, and 2) the strategies deployed by parents, consciously or not, to ensure that children conform to the attitudinal and behavioural models construed as important cultural features to be retained.

Three subjects, all females (informants H, I, and K), mentioned constraints imposed on their liberty as aspects of their ethnic culture which their parents want them to retain the most. It is probably not coincidental that all the subjects who associated ethnic identity transmission with parental restrictions were females. Indeed, parental transmission of the ethnic culture implies far less interdictions and restrictions for boys than it does for girls. For in Arab culture, at least in its traditional form, it is not uncommon for girls to be burdened

with extra controlling rules, which thus become perceived as inseparable from ethnic boundary maintenance. For instance, informant H reported the following:

Me: "Which aspects of your culture do your parents want you to conserve?

Informant H: "The values which they instilled into me. For my mother, this is fundamental (...) You know, my mom was always telling me *Haa! In Algeria, you know, they don't do that, they don't go out with boys, they don't drink, they don't dress this way, yade-yade-yade-ya.*"
(Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

This narrative is quite illustrative of the above mentioned phenomenon insofar as the examples of parental "values" reportedly instilled into this informant all amount to a series of parental interdictions. Implied in this view is the notion that rules and restrictions constitute the foundations on which is laid ethnic identity building. This perceived relation between culture and restrictions could not be better and more clearly expressed than by female informant K's response to the following question:

Me: "Do you speak Arabic?"

Informant K: "I tell them (to my parents): *You are teaching me the mentality and that sort of things. You give me rules. But when it comes to the language, the interesting part of culture.... Well, I am not entitled to the interesting parts of culture.* That's the problem in my family these days: I only get the negative stuff of the mentality. And the nice part of culture, well, I don't get it."
(Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7 years old)

This female informant thus considers that her parents are prone to provide her with the negative side of their ethnic culture, namely rules (equated here with the "mentality"), while depriving her of the positive aspect of this same culture, namely language.

Also, it should be noted that migrant parents who are traditionalist often cling to the very same standards as regards child rearing practices as those they were embracing at the time of migration (Isajiw, 1999:193). This is precisely the idea that informant H is conveying in the following excerpt:

"Hum, I don't know exactly what they [my parents] want me to conserve. The values which they instilled into me I guess. (...) These are not necessarily Algerian values .... Well they are, but they are kind of specific to the values my parents inflicted on me. Because it's been 30 years now that my parents are in Canada, and they still have the mentality that their parents had when they raised them. That's why they raised us the way they were raised (...). That's why I developed preconceived notions. I used to think: *In Algeria, people are really straight!* I went to Algeria 2 years ago. It was a big shock! When I got there, I realized that they [the girls] all did 50 times more stuff than I did: A lot of them drink, go out with boys. Ho yeah! The thing is that their parents have evolved a little bit, whereas my parents raised me the way they were raised. So when I go to Algeria, I am told: *It's funny, but you are more Algerian than the Algerians we have here* (...). I was born in Quebec, you know, so logically, I should have turned Québécoise, but I turned more Algerian than the Algerians from Algeria!" (Informant H, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

As underlined by the above cited informant, there is often a wide gap between migrant parents' idea of which rules and norms qualify as being in accord with their own inherited cultural standards, and the actual cultural and normative standards currently prevailing in their country of origin (Isajiw, 1999:193 ; Khosrokhavar, 2000:95). In other words, some parents end up holding on to "outdated" values, that is values ossified in time, unaffected by the cultural changes which have occurred in their home country since they left it. Furthermore, when traditional migrant parents settle in a Western environment such as Canada, they often feel the need to impose on their children even more rigid rules, so as to efficiently keep in check the numerous liberal influences which risk undermining the phantasmagoric "ethnic" culture they wish to transmit to their offspring.

Paradoxically, towards the end of the above cited passage, informant H implicitly endorsed the very same essentialism that she previously disapproved of in her parents' understanding of Algerian culture. Indeed, after having stressed that her parents' notion of Algerian-ness is fictitious, and would thus benefit from a reality-check, informant H then argued, even boasted, that, when visiting Algeria, her traditional behaviours and attitudes makes her "more Algerian than the Algerians from there". Once again, this example illustrates perfectly Gerd Bauman's observation that second-generationers' ethnic self-representations are heavily indebted to the dominant essentialized discourse of culture,

despite the fact that, in practice, their identity strategies as well as their cultural norms and references, are characterized by hybridity, pluralism, and heuristic amalgamations (Bauman, 1996, 1997).

Other cultural features were also mentioned by various respondents as aspects of their ethnic heritage that their parents want them to conserve. Both informants F (Muslim male) and M (Christian female) said that family-oriented values, and in particular the respect of parents, were the two most important cultural features that their parents endeavour to instil into them. Also, informant E (Christian male) and O (Christian female) declared that their ethnic language was regarded by their parents as the most important cultural legacy that they wish to transmit to their offspring.

Finally, according to informant K, a Muslim Algerian female, her parents want her to retain above all a strong commitment to preserving family reputation. Accordingly, she has been conditioned to be acutely self-conscious about what other people think of her, family reputation being dependent on the behaviour of each family member, and especially of female family members:

> "What other people think is very important for my parents (...). My mom always tells me: *you are your father's daughter*. If someone sees me on the street, he's gonna say: *That's the Abdel-Aid girl*. But in my mind, there were no other people to judge me. I wouldn't see the other people, my parents' friends and all. When you live in a Québécois environment, there's no one to say: *That's Mr. so-and-so's daughter*. My mom still tells me to watch who I talk to, what I do, how I dress (...). Because people can judge you. But here [in Quebec], people don't think this way (...). Take my [Québécois] friends for example; they don't care about what other people think of them. But now I care a lot about what people think. And now it's in me: you cannot humiliate me publicly." (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived here at 7 years old)

This comment illustrates very well the fact that, in Arab culture, as opposed to Canadian culture, family reputation constitutes a highly valuable symbolic capital - in a Bourdieu-ian sense - which has to be preserved by making sure that each family member's conduct is proper. Of course, the value placed on family reputation, and the corresponding

degree of monitoring and pressures exerted by parents over their children, vary from one family to another. In general, parents who attach importance to reputation are those who are generally more traditional in their views, beliefs, and attitudes.

In Arab countries, parental concerns with family reputation are usually fed by the community's collective and multifaceted gaze, which brings deviant individuals or families into social disrepute. However, the situation is significantly different in a context of migration, where this collective "ethnic gaze" often needs to be largely invented , unless the migrant family unit is strongly anchored in ethnic social networks. For instance, according to informant K's above stated narrative, her traditional parents try to present a virtuous image of their family to a public which is, in a sense, if not completely virtual, at least largely indifferent to their "performance". Hence this subject's ambivalence towards the emphasis her parents place on what other people think. To put it in "Goffman-ian" terms, at times, this subject feels she does not "play" for the same public as the one her parents want her to play for. However, towards the end of the citation, she admits that her parents finally succeeded in instilling into her their concern with family reputation ("now it's in me").

Another female subject (Informant L, Christian Lebanese) also declared that the notion of reputation was very much prevalent in her family. But contrary to informant K, this subject opposes more strongly and openly this parental value. She criticized the hypocrisy of her parents, who brag about their daughter's "irreproachable" behaviour in front of their friends, while refusing to admit that this same daughter dates boys. She then added:

> "Image is more important than reality [in my culture]. It's not only about what a single person thinks or does, it's the actions and ways of thinking of the whole family which is at stake. That's why you carry a weight on your shoulders all along; it's not only your own reputation that you either build up or ruin, it's the whole family's reputation." (Informant L, Christian Lebanese female, arrived here at 9 years old)

Once again, it is perhaps not coincidental that the two subjects who declared having suffered from parental pressures aimed at protecting family reputation were females. Family reputation is particularly dependent on the preservation of female family members' respectability and good virtue in the public's eye. In the following excerpt, a Christian male informant explains how protecting the "family name" is a very important concern for him:

> "Your family name is gonna determine who you are, how people are going to perceive you (...). My uncle always used to told me that my grand-father worked very hard to establish our family name. And I don't want to be responsible for giving a bad reputation to the family."
> (Informant C, Canadian-born half Palestinian half Lebanese Christian male)

Interestingly, this informant C (a male), contrary to informants K and L (two females), talked about the importance of preserving family reputation as something rather positive. Indeed, he seems to regard as a source of pride his family name ("built by my grand-father"), and as a positive challenge the fact that part of the responsibility to protect this name is incumbent on him. Thus, based on the above surveyed narratives, it appears that the role of preserving family reputation is more likely to be experienced as a burden by females than by males.

Also, of the 3 interviewees who stressed the issue of reputation as an important parental concern, two are Christians. This suggests that the high value placed on preserving family name and honour is not necessarily a Muslim-specific cultural feature, even though the great majority of researches that have dealt with this issue were about Muslim groups (see, for example, Begag, 1990; Brouwer, 1998; Kucukcan, 1998; Lacoste-Dujardin, 1994; Rooijackers, 1994; Afshar, 1993). Furthermore, as seen in Table 13 below, our statistical evidence largely confirm this latter point. Thus, among our sample, there are practically no differences between the proportions of Christian and Muslim respondents who believe that their parents would

endorse the statement "A girl's virginity should be protected until marriage by her male kin in order for family reputation to be preserved."

Table 13: Parental agreement with the statement "Female virginity has to be preserved for family reputation, by "Religious affiliation"

	Parents would agree completely	Parents would somewhat agree	Parents would Somewhat Disagree	They would Disagree completely	Total
Christians	48.7%	23.4%	12.3%	15.6%	100%
Muslims	51.1%	22.7%	14.8%	11.4%	100%

* $= p < 0.1$
** $= p < 0.05$
*** $= p < 0.01$

It thus may be the case that this parental emphasis placed on family honour and reputation, rather than being related to a specific religious group, would be more accurately connected to communal and family-oriented cultures, in which individual life choices and group status tend to be forged relationally, caught up in a complex reciprocity. This close connection between gender, family reputation, and the maintenance of group boundaries within Arab families, will be further discussed and analyzed in a subsequent section dealing specifically with the respondents' attitudes towards traditional gender role models.

The participants were also asked whether the Canadian part of their identity could sometimes be partially responsible for disagreements, or even conflicts occurring between them and their parents. The most frequently reported "cultural issues" causing inter-generational tensions relate to parental restrictions. Different examples of restrictions were given by informants as examples of generational and cultural conflicts between them and their parents. The most popular example of restrictions evoked by informants is curfew,

followed in second place by dating (especially for girls), and then by changing one's physical

appearance in unconventional ways (ex.: piercing, tattoos, dying hair, etc...). The common

denominator of these conflicting issues is that they all amount to permissions denied to

informants by their parents. Clearly, denied permissions are often a factor of dissension in

parents-teenagers relationships in most societies (although particularly in Western ones).

What is of particular interest here is that these youths construe their desire to gain more

freedom as a specifically Canadian component of their identity which clashes with their

parents' culture. As a matter of fact, quite often, it seems that parents themselves contribute

to reinforce such a representation. Thus, explains informant F (Muslim Algerian male):

> "I go clubbing quite often. And sometimes my mom tells me: *How about staying home more often to be in good shape for school?* Once she went a step further: *If you were in Algeria, you wouldn't be doing this. It's not because you're in Canada that you are allowed to act like Canadians!*"
> (Muslim Algerian male, arrived at 12 years old)

Informant I (Muslim Moroccan female), when she is denied a permission, is often given the

same type of argument by her parents:

> "When I ask why I can't [do this or that], they tell me: *Ha! You shouldn't follow what Canadians do. They do what they have to do, and we do what we have to do. It's their problem.* My parents tell us that, at bottom, we are lucky to be living here because we can come back at 9 pm, whereas back there [in Morocco], kids have to come back at 5 pm." (Informant I, Canadian-born Moroccan Muslim female)

In these two latter cases, the informants are being told by their mother that they

should not expect to be treated according to Canadian standards of what is proper behaviour;

for they remain, respectively, an Algerian and a Moroccan merely living in Canada, and who,

as such, are not exempted from conforming to Algerian and Moroccan cultural norms.

Inversely, in some other cases, the parents, especially when they have been living in Canada

for quite a number of years, compromise more easily on the degree of freedom to be granted

to children. For instance, informant O, a Canadian-born Christian Lebanese female, when

asked whether the Canadian part of her identity sometimes clashes with her parents' culture, responded the following:

> "No, no. Because it's been 18 years since my parents first got here. We share the same religious ideology, the same political ideology, the same social ideology."
> (Informant O, Canadian-born Christian, Lebanese female)

Finally, the conflict management strategies to which resort interviewees are varied. They can range from confrontation, compromise, to provocation. One strategy deserves special attention, for it has been frequently mentioned by participants: keeping things secret in order to avoid conflict. As it could be expected, issues of dating and sex are the most taboo in Arab families, according to most of these youths. And, once again, the great majority of those who reported keeping their romantic life secret from their parents are females. Thus, for instance, informant I, a Canadian-born Muslim Moroccan female, said she would like to be allowed to date boys, instead of remaining single and a virgin until marriage, as her parents want her to be.[15] When I asked informant I whether she had voiced this concern in front of her parents, she answered the following:

> "No. I tried to talk about it with them, but they don't want to. Because they don't talk about this kind of things. It's one of the biggest taboo at my place (...). I guess you could say my mom trusts me. Maybe she knows [that I date boys], but she doesn't want to talk about it. She knows that I live like that, and that I am obliged to.... [because] here [in Canada], to be happy, you got to be like everybody else. You cannot stay in your corner, completely isolated. To live in society..."
> (Informant I, Algerian Muslim female, arrived here at 7 years old)

Similarly, informants P and L, two Christian Lebanese females, said they prefer to do what they want secretly in order to avoid confrontation on certain topics, such as boys. However, some female informants were less comfortable than others with having to keep secret certain aspects of their life. Thus, in the following excerpt, informant L resents the hypocrisy of her parents, who, she says, decide to turn a blind eye on her romantic life:

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[15] Note that the issue of virginity per se will be further discussed in the next chapter.

"What I like about the culture here [in Québec], is that when you do something, your parents know about it. Even if they disagree, at least they know about it, and you don't have to do things in their back. Whereas Arab parents brag to their relatives about you being the best person on earth. And they fool themselves by pretending that certain things you do, which they don't like, don't exist. (Informant L, Christian Lebanese female, arrived at 9 years old)."

Interestingly, one female informant told me that some of her Arab female friends, being forced by their parents to either wear the Islamic veil (hijab), or to simply dress in a conservative fashion, wait until they get to school to get rid of the veil and change clothes:

Me: "We don't see a lot of veiled girls in the Cegep?"

Informant I: "No. It's because, sometimes, those who are forced to wear it take it off once they get to the CEGEP. And after school, just a little bit before reaching home, they put it back on. It's the same with skirts: they cannot wear them in front of their parents, so when they get to school, they go change in the bathroom." (Informant I, Canadian-born Muslim Moroccan)

The absence of dialogue with respect to issues involving dating and sex thus seems to be a problem frequently experienced by these Arab youths in their relationship with their parents. Consequently, some of them often build a façade for the benefit of their parents, while nonetheless engaging in forbidden practices without their parents' knowledge. And this seems to apply particularly to Arab girls, for whom the range of forbidden conducts is significantly wider than in the case of males. Consequently, in certain Arab migrant families-those in which a traditional/gendered education prevail - there could be a large gap between the Selves presented by daughters at home and in school. This discrepancy is compounded by the fact that parental expectations generally stand in vivid contrast to the generally more liberal expectations prevailing within the school environment of these female Arab youths. For all these reasons, in traditional Arab-Canadian families, female daughters who want to fit in at school, while at the same time meeting parental expectations at home, often end up setting up hermetic walls between both spheres of their life. The other case-scenario, as we have discussed in section 4.1.5, is when the female youth accepts as her own her parents'

conservative expectations and gendered double standards, and, as a result, befriends essentially like-minded ethnic peers. In such cases, parents-teenager conflicts are significantly attenuated. Of course, in practice, each specific subject fits somewhere in between these two ideal-types, in a continuum of possible variations. Moreover, each youth's approach towards conflict management can vary drastically depending on the social context, and the issue at stake.

4.2) Religious Identity Retention

4.2.1) Religious Identity's Index: a Quantitative Outlook

It appears that the religious identity of Arab youths in this sample is, in general, less salient, than their ethnic identity. Thus, most respondents (45.4%) scored "Strong" on the Ethnic identity scale (Table 14), whereas, for the variable "Religious identity" (Table 15), a plurality (49.2%) fall into the category "Average", followed next by "Weak" (27.3%). A more accurate way of corroborating this observation is to compare the average means associated with these two Global Indexes. As seen in Table 16, the average coefficient for the variable "Ethnic identity" is 0.4153, whereas that of "Religious identity" is 0.5538, a difference of 0.1385. However, it must be stressed that, because ethnic and religious identity's respective strength were measured using, in part, different indicators, the above results should be interpreted with caution. Ideally, the comparison of these two quantitative variables would have required greater similarities between the two sets of items making up each corresponding scale. However, ethnic and religious identity retention had to be quantified by means of indicators suited to the specific nature of the multifaceted dimensions

associated with each type of process. Nonetheless, our two scales are sufficiently overlapping

to justify the comparison of ethnic and religious identity's respective global index.

Table 14: Percentage Distribution for "Ethnic identity strength's global Index"

Ethnic identity strength	Distribution
Very strong	3.1%
Strong	45.4%
Average	41.9%
Weak	8.4%
Very weak	1.3%
TOTAL	100%

Table 15: Percentage Distribution for "Religious identity strength's global Index"

Religious identity strength	Distribution
Very strong	0.8%
Strong	14.3%
Average	49.2%
Weak	27.3%
Very weak	8.4%
TOTAL	100%

Table 16: Compared means of "Ethnic identity" and "Religious identity" (Global Indexes)*

	Ethnic Identity Strength	Religious Identity Strength
Mean Score	0.4153	0.5538

* The lower the coefficient, the stronger one's identity

As seen below in Table 17, when comparing to one another the average coefficients

of the 4 sub-variables making up the variable "Religious identity", one observes that its most

developed aspect is "Internal-cultural" $(0.4257)^{16}$, followed by Internal-Social (0.4798),

External-Cultural (0.5759), and External-Social (0.7348). Thus, these youths' religious

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[16] Note that the coefficient measuring the strength of religious identity's internal-cultural dimension was computed based on only one question with 4 categories. Therefore, it is perhaps not as accurate a measurement

identity is significantly more salient in its internal than its external form. In other words, respondents tend more to have a strong sense of attachment to their religious culture, and to feel that they are under an obligation to their religious community, than to actually practice their religion, and to be involved with, and socialized into groups of religious peers. Also, the external dimension of these youths' religious identity is significantly more developed at the cultural than at the social level. It follows that, in general, these Arab youths are more inclined to observe religious rituals than to be enmeshed in social groups self-defined along religious lines/boundaries.

In light of these results, Herbert Gans's (1994) argument that a symbolic religiosity could be underway among second-generationers in America is lent partial support. On the one hand, the fact that these youths have a primarily internal religious identity points to the gradual relegation of religion to the private sphere (a trend typical of Western societies). More specifically, among these Arab youths, religion, although appearing as a premium block contributing to self-concept building, plays an extremely minor role as a structuring element of social interactions (as well shown by the high score of 0.7348 associated with the external/social aspect of religious identity). On the other hand, levels of ritual observance (external/cultural aspect=0.5759) among these youths, although really moderate, are nonetheless sufficiently important to call for a qualification of our use of the concept of symbolic religiosity.

The religiosity of these Arab youths, far from being solely expressed at the internal/subjective level, is also **minimally** rooted in social practice, primarily in ritual observance. It will be interesting to further analyze the parameters measuring ritual observance (in section 4.2.4) to determine whether some rituals are more observed than

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tool than the 3 other sub-variables.

others. For instance, prayer frequency, a mostly solitary activity, is less socially involving and engaging than temple attendance, which denotes stronger communal anchorages.

Table 17: Compared means of the 4 sub-variables forming "Religious identity Strength" (Global Indexes)*

	Religion's External-cultural	Religion's External-social	Religion's Internal-cultural	Religion's Internal-social
Mean Score	0.5759	0.7348	0.4257	0.4798

* : The lower the coefficient, the stronger one's religious identity

Also, the data reveal that respondents tend to consider that their parents' religious identity is significantly stronger than their own. Thus, as shown in Table 18, the average coefficients associated with respondents' religious identity strength and perceived parental religious identity strength are, respectively, 0.2678 and 0.5538 (a difference of 0.286). However, once again, the comparison between these two figures should be done with extreme caution. First, it should be kept in mind that the parents' religious identity was measured by relying on their children's perceptions. Second, the questions measuring the youths' religious identity were not the same as those used to measure their parents' religious identity. Nonetheless, the 0.26 point difference between these two figures suggests that these second generationers' religious attitudes and practices tend to be far less orthodox and rigid than those of their parents.

Table 18: Compared means for Parents' and Youths' "Religious identity strength"*

	Perceived parents' religious identity strength	Youths' religious identity strength
Mean	0.2678	0.5538

* : The lower the coefficient, the stronger one's religious identity

4.2.2) Internal/Cultural Dimension: "Importance of Religion in Life" (var. 23 in app. A)

As seen below in Table 19, the majority of the respondents seem to place much importance on religion, as 52.6% of them stated that it plays a "Very important" role in their life, while 30.5% considered it plays an "Important" role. Only 16.8% of respondents find religion to be either "Not very important" (10.8%), or "Not important" (6%). These results are in keeping with the data provided in Table 17, according to which the most salient dimension of these youths' religious identity is the "internal-cultural" one. Gender does not have any significant impact on "Importance given to religion". Also, Christians' and Muslims' responses are distributed rather similarly across the categories of the dependent variable, except for two noteworthy differences: Christians are slightly more likely to regard religion as an important component of their life (54.3% vs. 49.4%), and Muslims are slightly more likely to regard it as unimportant in their life (9.2% vs. 4.3%). Finally, quite expectedly, the older the youth was when he or she got to Canada, the more he or she is likely to attach importance to religion. However, neither gender, religious affiliation, nor "age-at-arrival" is significantly correlated with the dependent variable.

Table 19: Percentage distributions for "Importance of religion in life", with "Gender, "Age at arrival", and "Religious affiliation"

		Very important	Important	Not very important	Not important	Total
Whole sample		52.6%	30.5%	10.8%	6.0%	100%
Gender	Males	53.4%	29.0%	11.5%	6.1%	100%
	Females	51.7%	32.2%	10.2%	5.9%	100%
Religious	Christians	54.3%	29.6%	11.7%	4.3%	100%
affiliation	Muslims	49.4%	32.2%	9.2%	9.2%	100%
Age at arrival	0 to 4	50.9%	33.0%	10.4%	5.7%	100%
	5 to 8	55.6%	25.9%	12.6%	5.9%	100%
	9 to 12	61.3%	26.7%	5.3%	6.7%	100%

* $= p < 0.1$
** $= p < 0.05$
*** $= p < 0.01$

Thus, the great majority of this sample (83.1%) consider religion either as a "Very important" (52.6%), or "Important" (30.5%) element in their life. However, based on the interviews, this apparent religious devotion should not be necessarily understood as a sign of a devout life. Indeed, although religion appears to be an important and pervasive underpinning of these youths' identity structure, its main role often seems to be limited to providing general spiritual guidance, rather than offering a strict normative code governing life in all its respects. Thus, reported Informant N :

> "Yes religion is very important. I think it's one of the most important things for me. What's religion? It's a way to reach spirituality, and spirituality is very important in our everyday life. Because it defines us as human beings. It would be very difficult to go through life - especially in the world we live in now – without spirituality to guide us. And religion is a way to bring us to this spirituality. That's why, to me, it's very important to preserve it." (Informant N, Christian Syrian female, arrived here at 6 years old)

Others see in religion a major contributor to personal as well as collective identity building. This is the case of Informant C, who conceives of religion as a symbolic framework colouring every aspect of his ethnic group's culture:

"Religion defines me as a person. And the way I have been raised, you know....We always went to church on Sunday, I don't go anymore. The priest is well respected, despite the errors he will make. Always on a pedestal, the Church. You can feel that religion is ingrained in the family, in everyday life." (Informant C, Canadian-born Christian, half Palestinian, half Lebanese descent).

Also, many informants seem to embrace a "privatized" notion of religion, for their responses often denote a desire to cultivate their faith outside of any formally organized structures. Thus, says this Canadian-born Lebanese female: "I am a believer. I would lie if I'd say I practice. I am a believer who.... Let's say I practice at home. It's between me and Him in fact." (Informant O, Canadian-born Christian Lebanese). Similarly, according to this Christian Syrian Lebanese female:

"When you reach adulthood, religion is not an heritage anymore, something you have been given. It's not about saying *I believe, ya-de-ya-de-ya*. There comes a time when you ask yourself *Do I believe in God of my own will, because I want to, or do I believe because my parents influenced me*. Now, I start adopting the former approach. Religion is not an heritage: I made a new profession of faith, in a sense". (Informant M, Christian Syrian, arrived at 10 years old).

Another group does not attach much importance to religion. This indifference can be justified by various forms of rationales. Only one informant identified herself openly as an atheist. Others, such as informant L (Christian Lebanese female) and informant J (Algerian Muslim female), said they drifted away from religion, which they regard as too sectarian and exclusive, preferring a more universal system of beliefs. Thus, argued informant L:

"I want to give up religion in order to opt for more universal values. I don't want to end up in Church praying such and such divinity. I start to think that practising a religion is not that important. I still believe there is a God. But I start to find that practising a religion is too narrow-minded. (...) I've asked myself too many questions, and I haven't found answers to these questions. So I may as well drop everything." (Informant L, Christian Lebanese female, arrived at 9)

The case of informant J, a Canadian-born Muslim, is particularly interesting. Although she considers herself as "not being religious", this subject was nonetheless wearing a necklace with a cross on the day I interviewed her. I was of course surprised to see a self-declared "non-religious person" wear a religious symbol. But I was even more startled to see

a person of "Muslim background" wearing a cross. I thus had the following exchange with her to clarify things:

> **Me:** "You told me your parents are Muslims. But I see you wear a cross".
>
> **Irene:** "Yeah, because it's pretty. I am not religious so... My friends got me this for my birthday, and if I don't wear it, they're gonna kill me (laughter)." (Informant J, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

The case of this informant illustrates well how, in today's Western societies, not only religion has been largely evicted from the private sphere, but also how religious symbols have been largely de-sacralized, and emptied of their former collectively shared meaning. Informant J, who reported having been raised by fairly pious Muslim parents, re-assigned, in a typically post-modern fashion, a merely aesthetic function to the cross she is wearing ("it's pretty"). By doing so, she engages, as a great many youths of the majority group, in the free recycling of signifiers severed from their originally "modernist" symbolism. In this respect, informant J, being raised in a Western secular society, was provided with sufficient latitude to extricate from this religious symbol - the Christian cross - the meaning traditionally attached to it. But even more interesting is the fact that this Muslim informant wearing a cross is comfortable with casually crossing religious group boundaries, which she actually does not even regard as such. In most Arab countries, because religion generally occupies such a central position within both individuals' and groups' identity structures, such a casual play on religious symbols would have been socially regarded as a (symbolic) transgression, and hence, would have been impossible, or at least unlikely.

4.2.3) Internal-Social Dimension: "Attitude towards Marrying a Religious Peer" (var. 25 in app. A)

As seen in Table 20, 63.2% of the respondents reported it was "Important" for them to marry a religious peer, while 19.4% consider the prospect of an endogamous marriage as an ideal, but not compulsory option. For 17% of them, religion is irrelevant to the choice of a future spouse. Finally, only one respondent chose the option "I don't want to marry someone of my religious group". Thus, the great majority (63.2%) of the sampled Arab youths prefer marrying within their own religious group.

Based on our previous findings, it appears that these youths are more concerned with marrying a religious than an ethnic peer. It should be noted that, in the questionnaire, the phrasing of the questions measuring the importance attached to endogamous marriage were identical for both ethnicity-based and religion-based marriages. Also, for both questions, respondents were provided with the same choice of answers. Whereas 41.7% of the respondents reported that marrying an ethnic peer was "important" to them, an even greater proportion (63.2%) reported it was "important" for them to marry a religious peer. One obvious reason for this large discrepancy is that, contrary to ethnic identities, which are commonly cumulated by one single individual, religious identities are socially considered as being mutually exclusive.

Table 20: Percentage distribution for "Attitude towards marrying a religious peer", with "Gender, "Age at arrival", and "Religious affiliation"

		Important	Ideally but not compulsorily	Not important	I don't want it	TOTAL
Whole sample		63.2%	19.4%	17.0%	0.4%	100%
Gender	Males	57.7%	24.6%	16.9%	0.8%	100%
	Females	69.2%	13.7%	17.1%	0%	100%
Religious affiliation	Christians	63.4%	19.2%	16.8%	0.6%	100%
	Muslims	62.8%	19.8%	17.4%	0%	100%
Age at arrival	0 to 4	60.6%	23.1%	16.3%	0%	100%
	5 to 8	60.3%	20.6%	17.6%	1.5%	100%
	9 to 12	69.3%	13.3%	17.3%	0%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
**   = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

The qualitative data confirm the prevalence of religion over ethnicity in mate selection strategies among these Arab youths. Indeed, several interviewees said they would not even consider marrying outside their religious group, while being opened, although often reluctantly, to marry outside their ethnic group. Thus, among those informants who consider both religion and ethnicity as relevant factors in their choice of spouse, the majority prioritize the former criterion over the latter. These respondents declared being uncompromising about marrying a religious peer, while often expressing a mere preference for marrying inside their ethnic group. Interestingly, in order to justify their desire to marry a religious peer, none of our informants, but one stressed the importance of sharing a common system of religious beliefs per se. Instead, the most commonly put forth rationale was that a religious peer is more likely to share the same cultural framework and the same mentality. Note that this sort

of argument ("sharing the same mentality") was also frequently brought up by participants to justify their preference for marrying an ethnic peer. Thus, in the mind of several informants, religion seems to be inextricably tied to culture. More specifically, in the eyes of a great many subjects, the value of religion lies in its cultural effects, namely its propensity to colour and inform one's world representations and values. The following comments illustrate this view:

> **Informant P**: "Of course, religion matters in the choice of my future husband, because religion influences personal convictions and behaviours. I wouldn't say I'd never marry a Buddhist or a Muslim. But it would really depends on how his religion affects his character."
> (Informant P, Christian Lebanese female, arrived at 7 years old)
>
> **Informant H**: "(...) I want it [marrying a Muslim] also for me. If I were to marry a non-Muslim, we wouldn't be on the same wave length." (Informant H, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

Among the reasons that were mentioned by participants to justify their desire to marry inside their religious group, two others were also frequently reported: 1) passing on the religious heritage to their future offspring, and 2) ensuring that parents will get along well with their son/daughter-in-law.

The importance placed on religion-based marriage varies slightly according to gender. As in the case of ethnicity-based marriages (see Table 6), females are more likely than males to give preference to an endogamous marriage with a religious peer, although such a difference is not statistically significant. Thus, as shown above in Table 20, 69.2% of female respondents reported that it was "important" for them to marry a religious peer, as opposed to 57.7% of males who circled the same answer. This difference may be attributed to the effect of two combined factors. First, as Kristine Ajrouch remarked in her study on Arab families in Dearborne, Michigan, for Arab parents living in a Western context, group identity maintenance is often regarded as being particularly dependent upon religion. As the author notes: "The most striking theme that emerged from the focus group discussions [with

the parents] was the pervasiveness of religion as a major underpinning of ethnic identity (....) (Ajrouch, 1999:134)" Religion, she adds, is often considered by Arab parents as a moral safeguard against Western values, deemed too lax and liberal (Arjouch, 1999:134). Moreover, in Arab culture, daughters are often considered as being the depositary of the group's ethnic identity. Therefore, the anti-assimilationist efforts deployed by parents to guarantee ethnic identity maintenance target daughters more than sons. Kristine Ajrouch (1999:138) went as far as arguing that daughters come to bear almost the entire weight of maintaining an Arab identity for their families and communities. Our own data lend much support to the latter argument. It follows from the above that because 1) religion is considered by parents as an essential feature of ethnic identity, and 2) female conduct is often perceived as the site or the locus of this identity, girls end up being subjected to more pressures than boys to marry inside their religious group.

Neither "Religious affiliation" nor "Age at arrival" has a statistically significant impact on one's attitude towards religion-based endogamous marriages. As shown in Table 20 above, Christians' and Muslims' response distributions across the categories of the independent variable are almost identical. Also, whether one arrived in Canada at an early or a late stage in life does not impact much on one's preference for marrying a religious peer. One minor exception is that respondents who migrated to Canada between the age of 9 and 12 years old are slightly more likely than the two other "age-at-arrival" groups to report a preference for a religion-based marriage. Thus, interestingly, time spent in Canada has an almost insignificant impact on these second generationers' willingness to marry inside their religious group.

4.2.4) External-Cultural Dimension: Observance of rituals

4.2.4-a) "Prayer frequency" (var.28 in app. A)

According to our data, praying is a highly popular practice among respondents. Thus, as seen in Table 21, the majority of the respondents (51.4%) reported praying at least once a day. The options "once a week" and "never or rarely" almost tied with 20.1% and 19.7%, respectively. The fact that a majority of respondents pray as much as once a day is not too surprising, since praying is a practice particularly well fitted to a privatized approach to religion, or again, to a symbolic form of religious identity; praying does not have to be done as part of an institutionalized and collective ritual, insofar as anyone can engage in it, anywhere, anytime, anyplace.

Table 21: Percentage distributions for "Prayer frequency", with "Religious affiliation", "Gender", and "Age at arrival"

		Once a day or more	Once a week	Once a month	Never or rarely	Total
Whole sample		51.4%	20.1%	8.8%	19.7%	100%
Religious affiliation ***	Christians	55.9%	24.2%	9.3%	10.6%	100%
	Muslims	43.2%	12.4%	8.0%	36.4%	100%
Gender	Males	45.9%	24.4%	9.9%	19.8%	100%
	Females	57.6%	15.3%	7.6%	19.5%	100%
Age at arrival	0 to 4	49.1%	18.9%	13.1%	18.9%	100%
	5 to 8	48.5%	26.5%	4.4%	20.6%	100%
	9 to 12.	57.3%	16.0%	6.7%	20.0%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Based on Table 21, the variable "Religious affiliation" has a statistically significant impact at the 0.01 level on prayer frequency. Thus, the proportion of respondents praying at least once a day is of 55.9% among Christians, as opposed to 43.2% among Muslims. Moreover, the proportion of respondents who "never or rarely" pray is of only 10.6% among Christians, as opposed to 36.4% among Muslims (the second most popular answer for Muslims). Certain considerations must be taken into account before concluding too hastily, based on this observation, that Christians are more pious or devout than their Muslim counterparts. One of the five pillars of Islam is the obligation to pray 5 times a day. By contrast, the Bible does not prescribe any specific number of prayers to be performed every day. As a result, a good many Muslims consider that prayer can either be done 5 times a day or not at all, whereas Christians are generally given more freedom to determine themselves which prayer frequency best meets their own religious and spiritual needs. Also, the Islamic prayer, as opposed to the Christian one, requires a praying area. All this could explain for a large part why, in the present sample, the proportion of frequent prayers is smaller among Muslims (43.2%) than it is among Christians (55.9%). These factors could also account for the fact that such a large proportion of Muslims (36.4%) circled "never or rarely" pray; praying is significantly more demanding and time consuming for Muslims than it is for Christians. Thus, Muslim informants and respondents often reported to me, either in formal or informal exchanges, that they consider praying to be a serious enterprise which can only be undertaken as one reaches adulthood and/or a certain level of maturity. Informant I' s following comment illustrates well this attitude:

"Well, my father prays, he went to Mecca and all. But if I tell my father that I want to start praying, he'll tell me *Wait, you're still young!*. Yeah, he tells me *keep enjoying life*. Because for him, to start praying is a serious business. It has to be followed to the letter. Otherwise, you just don't do it at all." (Informant I, Canadian-born Muslim Moroccan female).

Similarly, because he has not started praying yet, informant F does not consider himself to be a practising person, even tough he actively applies most other religious prescriptions:

> **Me:** "Is your religious heritage important to you?"
>
> **Informant F:** "Very important. Unfortunately, I do not practise. I am a Sunni Muslim. It's really important. I have faith in God, but I just don't practise the way a real Muslim should. It's because I don't pray, which is a very important element of religion. I fast, I have faith in God, I give money to the poor. It's just that the prayer....." (Informant F, Muslim Algerian male, arrived at 8 years old)

Finally, as seen in Table 21, the Chi-square tests showed that the variables "Gender" and "Age at arrival" do not have any statistically significant effect on prayer frequency. Nonetheless, it should be noted that females tend more than males to "pray at least once a day" (57.6% vs. 45.9%). Table 21 also indicates that the group of respondents who arrived in Canada between the age of 9 and 12 are more likely to pray once a day, than those who arrived at a younger age. The proportion of respondents who pray once a day is almost the same in both the "0 to 4" and the "5 to 8" "age-at-arrival" group.

4.2.4-b) "Church/Mosque attendance" (var. 27 in app. A)

As seen in Table 22, the most popular category for the variable "Church/Mosque attendance" is, by far, the option "only for religious holidays" (36.9%), followed by "never or rarely" (21.7%), "once a week" (20.9%), and "once a month" (20.5%), which almost all tied for second place. This suggests that, in general, these youth's religiosity is not sustained through significant involvement in formally organized religious rituals. In this respect, once again, most of these Arab youths' religiosity is clearly in line with their majority group age peers' privatized approach to religion.

Table 22: Percentage distribution for "Church/Mosque attendance", with selected variables

CHURCH/MOSQUE ATTENDANCE

		At least once a week	Once a month	For religious holidays	Never or rarely	Total
Whole sample		20.9%	20.5%	36.9%	21.7%	100%
Religious affiliation ***	Christians	25.5%	26.0%	39.8%	8.7%	100%
	Muslims	12.5%	10.2%	31.8%	45.5%	100%
Gender	Males	22.9%	22.9%	37.4%	16.8%	100%
	Females	18.6%	17.8%	36.4%	27.2%	100%
Age at arrival **	0 to 4	20.8%	26.4%	37.7%	15.1%	100%
	5 to 8	13.4%	13.4%	41.8%	31.3%	100%
	9 to 12	27.6%	18.4%	31.6%	22.4%	100%

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

The variables "Religious affiliation" and "Church/mosque attendance" are strongly correlated ($p < 0.01$). More specifically, levels of church attendance among Christian respondents are significantly higher than levels of Mosque attendance among Muslim respondents. For instance, Christians are about twice as likely as Muslims to attend a religious service either "once a week" or "once a month". Also, as much as 45.5% of the Muslim respondents reported that they "never or rarely" attend a religious service (their most popular response), as opposed to 8.7% for Christians (their least popular response). More than one factor probably account for this surprisingly large discrepancy between the two groups. First, it could be that, as in the case of praying, attending mosque is perceived by Muslims as a serious undertaking which can only take place once the believer starts

observing seriously and scrupulously Islamic rituals. However, the informants' narratives do

not offer any evidence to support this hypothesis. Another explanation may be that, as seen

in Table 23 below, the majority of Christian respondents live in areas with a high

concentration of ethnic peers, while, inversely, the majority of Muslim respondents live in

areas with a low proportion of ethnic peers.

Table 23: Percentage distribution for "Religious affiliation" by "Ethnic residential
segregation"

		High ethnic residential concentration	Low ethnic residential concentration	Total
Religious affiliation *	Christians	65.6%	34.4%	100%
	Muslims	48.3%	51.7%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Therefore, it may be that Christians are more likely to attend a religious service than

their Muslim counterparts because more of them reside in ethnically segregated enclaves,

which are commonly associated with greater institutional completeness, and greater retention

of ethno-cultural traits (Breton, 1964). Also, in Montreal, churches, be they Arab or not, are

of course more numerous and evenly distributed across space than mosques, which are fewer

and only concentrated in specific ethnic neighbourhoods. This allows Arab Christians to

have easy access to a religious service held close to their home, whether they live in an

ethnic neighbourhood or not. Inversely, it may be more difficult for Muslims living outside

the ethnic enclave to find a nearby mosque. For all these reasons, we controlled for the

variable "ethnic residential segregation" in order to test whether the difference in temple

attendance between Christians and Muslims could be attributed to this factor.

Table 24: Percentage distribution for "Religious affiliation" by "Temple attendance", with "Ethnic residential concentration" as a control variable

TEMPLE ATTENDANCE

		Once a day or more	Once a week	Once a month	Never or rarely	Total
High Ethnic Residential Segregation ***	Christians	26.0%	28.8%	35.6%	9.6%	100%
	Muslims	14.3%	9.5%	38.1%	38.1%	100%
Low Ethnic Residential Segregation ***	Christians	25.5%	20.0%	47.3%	7.2%	100%
	Muslims	11.1%	11.1%	26.7%	51.1%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

The Chi square statistics yielded in Table 24 indicate that Christians are still

significantly more likely than Muslims to attend a religious office, whether we look at

subjects living in an ethnically segregated area, or those living in areas with a scarce Arab

presence ($p<0.01$). However, controlling for "Ethnic residential segregation" resulted in a

significant drop in the Chi Square coefficient. This suggests that this latter variable

contributes, at least partly, to the statistical significance of the relationship between

"Religious affiliation" and "Temple attendance". But the fact is that, even when controlling

for ethnic residential segregation, the relationship remains significant at the 0.01 level. It thus

appears that Christians respondents observe much more assiduously this religious ritual than

their Muslim counterparts. Thus, the external-cultural aspect of these Arab youths' religious

identity, at least as measured by ritual observance (prayer frequency and temple attendance),

seems to be significantly less developed among Muslim than Christian respondents.

However, once again, because the indicators used to measure the degree to which

respondents practise their religion take on a different signification depending on whether one

is Muslim or Christian, these results should be interpreted with caution.

4.2.4-c) Ramadan, Ban on Alcohol, and Food Regulations (var. 29, 68, and 67 in app. A)

The questionnaire also includes a series of indicators of ritual observance which apply

either exclusively, or more specifically to Muslim respondents. These questions concern

fasting[17], the Islamic ban on alcohol, and food regulations. These indicators have been

excluded from the scale measuring religious identity's global Index, for their Islam-specific

character would make a comparison between Christian's and Muslims' levels of ritual

observance methodologically problematic. However, it is interesting to examine the results

yielded by these parameters to better tap into Muslim respondents' religious experience, both

at the material and the symbolic levels. Our results echo to a large extent those of other

empirical studies on second-generation Muslim youths living in Western settings. Thus,

confirming Olivier Roy' s study (1992), Table 25 reveals that, for these Muslim youths, one

of the most persisting religious ritual over time is fasting during religious holidays (82.6%),

whereas one of the most ignored prescription is the ban on alcohol (21.7%). Also, as shown

in Table 26, eating "Halal"[18] meat is observed by a majority of respondents either "almost all

the time" (46.3%), or "ideally but not compulsorily" (23.9%).

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[17] Although fasting is also a Christian practice, it clearly takes on greater symbolic value in the Muslim faith nowadays.
[18] A meat is said to be "Halal" (literally "permissible") when the animal has been slaughtered in conformity with Koranic regulations.

Table 25: Muslim respondents' observance of fasting (Ramadan) and the ban on alcohol

	Yes	No	Total
Do you fast when prescribed	82.6%	17.4%	100%
Do you try NOT to drink alcohol	27.1%	72.9%	100%

Table 26: Muslim respondents' observance of food regulations

	Almost all the time	Ideally but not Compulsorily	Only for religious Holidays	Never	Total
Do you eat "Halal" meat	46.3%	23.9%	11.9%	11.9%	100%

The fact that the overwhelming majority of the Muslim sample fast during Ramadan (82.6%), whereas very few respect the ban on alcohol (27.1%), for instance, is not surprising. As opposed to the ban on alcohol, which amounts to no more than a sole ascetic religious restriction, observing Ramadan also gives rise to the formation of social bonds between community members, especially after dusk, when the extended family gathers to share copious meals as the fast is officially broken. Ramadan, being a social binder for many Muslims, may be more closely related to ethnic identity maintenance than to religious devotion per se. In order to corroborate this latter hypothesis, we have produced two percentage tables crossing the variable "Do you fast when prescribed by religion" with, respectively "Religious Identity Strength" (Table 27), and "Ethnic Identity Strength" (Table 28).

Table 27: Percentage distribution for Fasting by Religious Identity's strength (Muslims only)

		Religious Identity Strength					
		Very Strong	Strong	Average	Weak	Very Weak	Total
Do you fast when Prescribed? **	Yes	2.9%	13.2%	38.2%	39.7%	5.9%	100%
	No	0%	6.7%	20.0%	40.0%	33.3%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Table 28: Percentage distribution for Fasting and Ethnic Identity's Strength (Muslim only)

		Ethnic Identity Strength					
		Very Strong	Strong	Average	Weak	Very Weak	Total
Do you fast when Prescribed?	Yes	3.1%	43.8%	42.2%	9.4%	1.6%	100%
	No	0%	0%	54.5%	27.3%	18.2%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Interestingly, as shown in Table 27, a majority of those who reported observing Ramadan scored either "Weak" (39.7%), or "Average" (38.2%) on religious identity's global Index. On the other hand, Table 28 shows that these same fasting observers, for the most part, scored either "Strong" (43.8%), or "Average" (42.2%) on the ethnic identity scale. In other terms, it appears that Ramadan is more than a mere formal religious interdiction; it also operates as a group "solidifier", and, as such, should be understood more as a factor contributing to cement and reinforce ethnic identity than as a practice reflective of strict religious orthodoxy. The following comment made by informant G illustrates well the social role assumed by fasting:

> "Yeah, towards the end [of Ramadan], it's like, we eat, we eat, and then we are tired. But the prayer in the morning also helps. You see people hugging. You don't see it often. I just see it during that time." (Informant G, Canadian-born Muslim Egyptian female)

4.2.5) External-Social Dimension: "Participation in Religious Social Affairs" (var. 30 in app. A)

The majority of the respondents reported participating "occasionally" (56%) in religious events or social affairs. This is quite a high figure when contrasted with the usually very low interest that majority group youths currently take in formally organized religious social activities. The second most popular answer was "never" (28.6%), followed lastly by the option "often" (15.3%). This picture indicates that religion plays a certain role, although on limited occasions, in these youths' participation in formally organized social activities. It should be noted that, in the case of Christian respondents, we can hardly tell, based on our data, whether these religious social activities and events take place within mainstream, or ethnic-specific Christian institutions and organisations.

Unfortunately, no qualitative information has been collected on the nature, and the significance of these youths' participation in religious activities. Nonetheless, from a quantitative point of view, it may be relevant to examine the relationship between religious events/activities attendance, and ethnic and religious identity's respective strength. Upon cross-examination of Tables 29 and 30, it appears, not surprisingly, that the majority of those who attend "often" their religious group's social affairs tend to possess, both a "strong" religious and ethnic identity. On the other hand, and this is particularly interesting, a majority of the occasional participants (56% of the whole sample) scored "average" (67.2%) and "weak" (23.1%) on the religious identity scale, but scored "strong" on the ethnic identity scale (50.4%).[19] Thus, occasional participants to religious social affairs- the bulk of the sample - tend to have a strong ethnic identity, but an "average" religious identity.

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[19] This pattern remains unchanged even when controlling for "Religious affiliation" (Christian vs. Muslim).

Table 29: Percentage distribution for "Religious social affairs" by "Religious Identity strength"

		Religious Identity's Strength					
		Very Strong	Strong	Average	Weak	Very Weak	Total
Religious Social Affairs Attendance ***	Often	5.4%	56.8%	29.7%	8.1%	0%	100%
	Occasionally	0%	9.7%	67.2%	23.1%	0%	100%
	Never	0%	0%	23.9%	46.2%	29.9%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Table 30: Percentage distribution for "Religious social affairs" by "Ethnic Identity strength"

		Ethnic Identity's Strength					
		Very Strong	Strong	Average	Weak	Very Weak	Total
Religious Social Affairs Attendance **	Often	6.3%	53.1%	31.3%	9.4%	0%	100%
	Occasionally	3.9%	50.4%	40.2%	3.9%	1.6%	100%
	Never	0%	33.3%	48.5%	16.7%	1.5%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

These findings suggest that the social affairs organized by religious organizations tend to draw, although occasionally, a majority of Arab second-generationers who, without being necessarily devout and religious persons, are nonetheless holding on strongly to their ethnic background, and have largely retained their ethnic identity. This is a reminder of the structuring role that religion can play in the maintenance of ethnic group solidarity, for it provides the community with a space, both in the literal and the figurative sense, where the

subjective aspect of ethnicity finds the required social and communal basis for its viable retention through socialization networks.

These results also point to a symbolic religious identity operating first and foremost as an ethnic boundary marker among these second-generationers. More specifically, these Arab youths who occasionally attend religious social affairs may tend to instrumentalize religion, to which they assign a function of social binder reinforcing group solidarity. Furthermore, this use of religion as a way to cement group solidarity in a migratory context does not entail strong religious devotion, or perhaps not even a strong religious faith for that matter. For these reasons, it can be said that Herbert Gans' symbolic religiosity hypothesis (1994) is offered strong support by the present findings. Indeed, a majority of our sample attend occasionally religious meetings and events, while being soft believers but yet strong ethnic identity retainers. In other words, it appears that religion is being recycled by these youths into a social vector ensuring ethnic identity retention.

CHAPTER 5: GENDER-RELATED TRADITIONALISM & PERCEIVED STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION

5.1) Attitudes Towards Traditional Gender Relationships

In this section, I will analyze the data pertaining to 4 indicators taken from the scales measuring respondents' level of agreement with gender-related statements, and respondents' estimation of their parents' level of agreement with the same statements. The 5 statements are phrased as follows: 1) "a woman should obey her husband", 2) "girls/boys should compulsorily remain a virgin before marriage", 3) "a woman's virginity should compulsorily be protected until marriage by her male kin in order for family reputation and honour to be preserved", and 4) "Male/female teenagers should be allowed to have a girlfriend before marriage if they want to". First, I will briefly discuss the results yielded by the global attitudinal tradition scale, and then examine respondents' and informants' answers for each of the above mentioned indicator.

5.1.1) Gender-related Tradition Scale: A Quantitative Outlook

As previously mentioned in section 3.5.5, in order to make the understanding of the global attitudinal tradition scale easier, the measuring coefficients, ranging from 0 (high level of endorsement) to 1 (low level of endorsement), were broken down into four categories, namely, "Very traditional", "Somewhat traditional" "Borderline", Somewhat liberal", and "Very liberal". As seen in Table 31 below, the overall tendency among the respondents is to take a relative distance from the gender-related statements included in the tradition scale. Thus, the majority of the sample fall into the category "Somewhat liberal" (34.1%). The category with

the second highest number of occurrences is "Borderline" (26.1%), followed closely by "Very liberal" (24.9%). A small proportion of respondents are either "Somewhat traditional" (13.3%), or "Very traditional" (1.6%). By contrast, the respondents' perceptions of what their parents would have answered to the very same questions suggest a rather different picture. More specifically, it seems that parents are more attached to traditional values and attitudes than their children, at least as far as gender issues are concerned. Thus, Table 31 reveals that, according to respondents, most parents (37.3%) would fall into the "Somewhat traditional" category. The second most popular category would be "Borderline" (33.2%), followed in third place by "Somewhat liberal" (17.8%). Table 32 illustrates well this generational gap with respect to gender issues; respondents' and estimated parents' average scores on the Tradition scale are, respectively, 0.6429, and 0.4690, an important difference of 0.1739.

Table 31: Percentage distributions of youths' and parents' scores on the tradition scale

Gender-related traditionalism	YOUTHS	PARENTS (as reported by respondents)
Very traditional	1.6%	5.9%
Somewhat traditional	13.3%	37.3%
Borderline	26.1%	33.2%
Somewhat liberal	34.1%	17.8%
Very liberal	24.9%	5.8%
TOTAL	100%	100%

Table 32: Youths' and parents' average scores on the tradition scale*

	Tradition Score – YOUTHS	Tradition Score – PARENTS
Mean Score	0.6429	0.4690

* : The lower the coefficient, the stronger one's gender –related traditionalism

In the following sections, we will analyze our quantitative and qualitative data relating to the above mentioned selected parameters. This analytical reflection is aimed at exploring 1) the youths' and their parents' relationship to "traditional" gender role models, and 2) how and to what extent gender issues are mobilized by these Arab youths and their parents in the construction of their ethnic and/or religious identity. The question of whether gender-related traditionalism is related to ethno-religious identity retention processes will be addressed more qualitatively than quantitatively in the present section. Such a correlation, if it exists, will be more accurately identified in chapter 6 through regression analysis.

5.1.2) Indicator #1: Respondents' and Parents' levels of agreement with "A wife should obey her husband" (see var. 39 and 48 in app. A)

If we look at Table 33, it appears that, by far, most of the respondents (45.6%) "Strongly disagree" with this statement. However, it should be noted that the second most popular answer is "I somewhat agree" (23.2%), followed lastly by both "I completely agree", and "I somewhat disagree", each selected by 15.6% of the respondents. Thus, although the general trend among the respondents is to strongly oppose the idea of a wife "obeying" her husband, there is also an important minority (38.8%, or the two combined "Somewhat" responses) who seem to have a more ambivalent position on this issue.

Table 33: Percentages of agreement with "A woman should obey her husband"

Statement about:	Level of Agreement	Respondents	Respondents' Parents (Respondents' Self-Estimation)
Female obedience	completely agree	15.6%	20.7%
	somewhat agree	23.2%	24.1%
	somewhat disagree	15.6%	22.8%
	completely disagree	45.6%	32.4%
	TOTAL	100%	100%

The following narratives will help us get a better grasp of the rationales underlying the respondents' positions on the issue of gender-based power relationships in the private domain. First, corroborating the quantitative data, a majority of informants spoke out unambiguously against the statement under study, stressing that they believe in gender equality in every aspect of life. Most of them argued that couple relationships should be based on mutual respect, and that a husband and a wife have equal rights within the family unit. In this respect, informant M's (female) and D's (male) positions on this topic are quite representative:

> **Informant M**: "Ok, I think that male/female relationships are all really..... about respect, and only respect: It's like: *I don't want to force anything on you that you don't want, and hmm... I cannot force you either. You are an individual. True, we live together, and we make decisions together, but we must find a solution together.*" (Christian Syrian female, arrived at 10 years old)

> **Informant D**: "No. Both men and women have to obey each other. It's mutual respect for both of them. I mean, why should a wife obey her husband, while he can do whatever he wants? No, no, no, to me, both of them have to talk to each other to know.... And if someone is not comfortable with something, the other shouldn't do it. It's called respect. It's not about obeying the husband."
> (Christian Lebanese male, arrived at 12 years old)

Only one informant (C), a Christian Lebanese male, affirmed unequivocally that a woman should be submitted to her husband under any circumstances. But, as the quantitative data have shown, such an extreme position is only endorsed by a minority (15.6%) of the whole sample. Moreover, such a clear-cut view contrasts strongly with the nuances expressed by most other informants, nuances which often found expression, in the questionnaire, in answers such as "I somewhat agree" (23.2%), or "I somewhat disagree" (15.6%). The narratives associated with these intermediate positions should be given particular attention, for they make up 38.8% of the whole sample altogether (see Table 33).

At least 6 informants, 3 men and 3 women, agree more or less with the statement "A woman should obey her husband", each arguing that he or she believes in gender equality,

but with various reservations. The general idea expressed by these subjects is that, although both gender owe each other mutual respect, men should still have the last word over most family matters (except over children education, according to some informants). Also, it was stressed by all of these informants, and even more so by females, that, although he should have the last word, a good husband is expected to consult his wife, and to take her opinions into account before making any important decision. In this respect, informants F (a Muslim Algerian male) and B (a Christian Lebanese male), for instance, both consider that they, as husbands, should have the last word over their wife. Yet, they would allow, and even encourage their respective wife to voice her concerns, and to prove them wrong whenever she disagrees. Thus, explains informant F:

> "Women should obey their husband. But let's not push this too far! Take my parents, for instance. If my father decides something, in general, it's gonna happen. But there are always discussions between the two of them. For instance, the day I wanted to come to Canada, my mom was OK with it, but my dad was not (...) So there's been a discussion between them, and my mom was able to convince my father. But if my father had said *No, he is not going....* The decision is final! But there are always discussions. Some people say that women do not have the right to voice their opposition. I really don't get this! Even the Koran doesn't say that. It says that men are the leaders of the house, that they have the last word, [but] it doesn't say that this word is right."
> (Informant F, Muslim Algerian male, arrived at 8 years old)

According to informant F and B, the husband, although having full control over family matters, should not make unilateral decisions without first consulting his wife to know her perspective. In other words, while fully condoning the notion that men hold the ultimate power within the family unit, these subjects nonetheless believe that this power differential is only legitimate to the extent that the husband considers carefully his wife's views.

Interestingly, three female informants held views that were consistent with those expressed by the above quoted male subjects. For instance, although recognizing males' ultimate authority in the couple, informants H (Muslim Algerian female) and I (Muslim Moroccan female) strongly disapprove of a dominating husband that would confiscate their

freedom of speech, and would disregard their point of view. However, the "in-between" positions expressed by females led to more complex and nuanced answers, compared with their male counterparts. The following exchange I had with informant H illustrates well the ambivalence resulting from Arab-Canadian females' attempts to reconcile two rather conflictual concerns. That is the willingness to be a free and self-assertive wife on the one hand, and the concomitant belief that a husband should yet conserve the ultimate decisional power, on the other:

> **Me:** "For the statement "A woman should obey her husband", you chose "I somewhat disagree" (...) Do you want to comment on your answer?"
>
> **Informant H:** "Well, I am not really gonna obey my husband. It's not.... I don't want to be a submissive woman. I have a good head on my shoulders, and I have things to say. I won't tolerate anything like *No, you won't wear this, you won't see this*. It doesn't work like that with me. Definitely not!
>
> **Me:** OK, why, then, didn't you choose the option "I completely disagree" in the questionnaire?
>
> **Informant H:** Well, of course, there are limits! For sure, your husband....It's not that he's gonna tell me *don't do this, and that*, but you know, I still have to take into account what he's gonna tell me. I mean, I am not gonna marry a loser, you know? The guy I am gonna be with, it's gonna be because he understands me, we understand each other. That's why if he tells me to do something, well maybe it's because he's right. It depends."
>
> **Me:** So could you say that, to you, a man and a woman are completely equal in a relationship?
>
> **Informant H:** Hmm... I don't know. I don't know if it's stupid but, you know, my parents taught me: *Your brother... Your brother, well, it's not the same. Your brother is a guy, and you are a girl.* Whether I want it or not, it's there. Even if deep down inside, I don't like it, it's still there.
> (Informant H, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

There is at least one particularly noteworthy element in this exchange. Informant H attempts to resolve the contradictions that could possibly result from her dual belief in male dominance as well as in womanpower. She does so by asserting that it is quite unlikely that she would marry "a loser" in the first place. More specifically, she will choose a man who understands her so well that his decisions will be naturally in tune with her own desires and interests. It then becomes logical for her to surrender her freedom to a husband regarded as

an "enlightened master", so to speak. Informant H's reasoning should not be considered as a sign of unequivocal disempowerment; this subject's power lies in the fact that her future husband will only come to being thanks to her own enlightened judgement in choosing the right equalitarian mate. Another female subject, informant K, expressed almost the same view in the following passage:

> "(...) I agree that he [my husband] should make the decisions for the family, you see. So if he decides something, if he wants to do this or that, I agree that the husband should make the decisions (...) But I won't marry a guy who wants to discipline me, and who will require obedience from me because he's the master. However, if I marry a guy who is on the same wave length as me, technically, I think that the decisions he'll make will be good for me." (Informant K, Algerian Muslim female, arrived at 7).

We will now turn our attention to the respondents' estimation of their parents' level of agreement with the statement related to female obedience in a couple. As seen above in Table 33, according to the respondents, most parents (32.4%) would completely disagree with the notion of female obedience in the household. Thus, this finding suggests that both respondents and their parents tend to hold relatively liberal views on this topic. However, it should be stressed that the proportion of individuals strongly opposed to female submission is significantly higher among respondents than among their parents (45.6% vs. 32.4%). But besides this important difference, both types of percentage distribution across "levels of agreement" are quite comparable.

Upon examination of the qualitative material, different case-scenarios were ascertained with respect to the reaction of respondents to their parents' views on issues of gender and power in the couple. In certain cases, both perspectives departed drastically from each other, the parents generally being reportedly more conservative on this issue than their children. But none of the informants who reported such disagreements ever mentioned that these differences in opinion translated into parents/child conflicts at home. Rather, the equalitarian subjects whose parents' relationship is informed by patriarchal models of

domination tend mostly to be resigned to being exposed, at home, to unequal forms of division of power between mates. More specifically, these respondents acknowledge that their parents belong to another culture and time, in which the wife's obedience is construed as something natural and justified. The following excerpt illustrates well this attitude:

> **Me**: "First of all, do you believe that the man and the woman are equal in the couple."
>
> **Informant J**: "Me? Yeah! Yeah!"
>
> **Me**: "What about your parents?"
>
> **Informant J**: "Hmm… No, there is always that sense of male superiority, whatever, that I don't agree with. Completely not! Yeah but that's probably from their heritage, or from where they came from. Maybe that's the way they were raised." (Informant J, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

Thus, the youths committed to gender equality were not personally affected by the unequal gender role models structuring their parents' couple. Another case-scenario is when both the youth and his or her parents advocate for gender inequality in the couple. In that case, parental influence was often readily acknowledged by the youth as a factor accounting for his or her current view on the topic. For instance, one Christian Lebanese male (Informant C), who overtly embraces a patriarchal notion of male dominance in the couple, traces back his conservative attitude to his parents' and grand-parents' own patriarchal models of gender relationships. Thus, when I asked this subject to explain why he "completely agrees" with the statement "A woman should obey her husband", he gave the following answer:

> **Informant C**: "My father was the type of man….and I guess the same is true with my grandfather, I can picture him with my grandmother. Once my father and my mother got married, my mom gave up everything. She became a housewife. My grandmother did the same thing. My aunt did the same thing. My other grandmother did the same thing. All my aunts, whether they are blood-related or not, all became housewives (…) I don't know, I have always lived with my parents, and it was always : If my father decides something, my mom would follow. Same thing for my grandfather, on my father's side. Of course the mom is consulted (…), like *What do you think*? But no advices. Just your opinion."
>
> **Me**: "And you want to reproduce the same model with your wife?"

Informant C: "That's it. When my uncle decided to leave for the Arab Emirates, he told his wife "We leave". His wife left with him. She didn't have a choice."
(Informant C, Canadian-born, Christian, Palestinian/Lebanese)

Finally, based on the above literature review, we identified 4 factors that could possibly account, at least partially, for one's likelihood to agree with the notion that a woman should obey her husband. First, as discussed in chapter 2, many case studies have shown that second-generation Muslim females living in Western settings are often more likely than their male counterparts to, if not resist at least oppose traditional gender role models inherited from their parents (Rooijackers, 1992:70 ; Lacoste-Dujardin, 1994; Kucukcan, 1998; Leveau, 1997:153). Hence, we will examine, for this data set, whether there are differences between males' and females' respective levels of approval of male dominance in a couple. Second, we will test whether the variables "Ethnic Identity's Global Index", and "Religious Identity's Global Index" have any impact on respondents' level of agreement with the statement under discussion. Thirdly, given that a traditional orientation toward gender relationships is commonly related to low education, we will also test whether the variable "Father's level of education" impacts on the respondents' level of endorsement of the notion of female obedience. It is expected that a respondent who comes from a family with a high educational capital will be more likely to challenge traditional gender role models. Finally, the bulk of researches that have investigated patterns of social control exerted by some ethnic communities on their female members have focussed essentially on Muslim groups. Therefore, it could be relevant to examine the extent to which Christian Arabs' positions on this topic coincide or not with those of their Muslim counterparts.

Table 34: Percentages of agreement with "A woman should obey her husband", with selected independent variables

Level of Agreement with   "A Woman Should Obey her Husband"

		I Agree	I Disagree	Total
Respondents' level of agreement	TOTAL	38.8%	61.2%	100%
Respondents' estimated Level of agreement of their parents	TOTAL	44.8%	55.2%	100%
By Gender ***	Females	21.2%	78.3%	100%
	Males	54.5%	45.5%	100%
By Age at Arrival	0 to 4	35.8%	64.2%	100%
	5 to 8	35.3%	64.7%	100%
	9 to 12	46.1%	53.9%	100%
By Religious affiliation	Christians	38.3%	61.7%	100%
	Muslims	39.8%	60.2%	100%
By Ethnic identity score**	Weak	28.1%	71.9%	100%
	Strong	42.9%	57.1%	100%
By Religious identity score ***	Weak	32.9%	67.1%	100%
	Strong	50.6%	49.4%	100%
By Father's level of education	Low	42.9%	57.1%	100%
	High	38.5%	61.5%	100%

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

As seen in Table 34, Muslims are as likely as Christians to endorse the notion of female obedience. This finding is quite interesting since, once again, the majority of the numerous studies focussing on gender-based inequalities among ethnic communities pertain to Muslim groups. Based on the present research, it appears that Muslim and Christian respondents approve of the statement under discussion in almost the same proportions. Hence, one must be careful not to single out the Islamic faith as a key element accounting for the entanglement of questions of gender and power among Arab groups.

However, if "Religious affiliation" is not statistically related to the dependent variable, "Religious identity strength" is. Moreover, this relationship is very strong ($p<0.01$). Thus, the stronger one's religious identity, the more one is likely to be in favour of female submission in the household. Ethnic identity strength is also positively correlated with the respondent's level of agreement with the statement under discussion ($p < 0.05$), although to a lesser extent than religious identity strength. It thus appears that those individuals fostering a gendered power differential in the household are more inclined to retain their ethno-religious identity. This suggests that a traditional approach to gender issues operates as a vector of ethno-religious identity retention processes among Arab communities. However, we can hardly tell, at this point, whether ethnic and religious identity's respective strength each has an independent statistical effect on one's attitudes toward traditional gender role models. This question will be further explored in the next chapter dedicated to regression analysis.

The variable "Father's level of education" has an almost insignificant effect on one's level of agreement with the notion of female obedience. Also, quite expectedly, among the most recently arrived youths (between 9 and 12 years old), there are around 14% more respondents approving of female submission than among the two other "age-at-arrival" groups. However, the effect of this variable is not significant.

Finally, Table 34's most striking feature is undoubtedly the large discrepancy between males' and females' attitudes towards the question of whether a wife should obey her husband. Not only this relationship yielded a very large Chi-square of 30.00, but it is significant at the 0.01 level. As seen in table 34, a majority of males (54.5%) agree with the statement at issue, whereas an even stronger majority of females (78.3%) disagree with it. This gap between males' and females' views lends support to the notion, put forward by some authors, that female youths

are more inclined than males to critically engage the gendered double standards to which they are exposed in the course of their socialization.

Now could it be that males and females of this sample have different attitudes towards the above discussed statement, depending on their religious affiliation? The following Table (Table 35) displays the respondents' level of approval of male dominance in the household according to gender, when controlling for religious affiliation. First, whereas a comfortable majority of Muslim males (65.9%) approve of the statement under discussion, Christian males are almost equally split over the issue of womanpower in the private sphere (48.9% "For" vs. 51.1% "Against"). Thus, Muslim males seem to be more comfortable than Christian males with the notion of a woman being submitted to her husband. Finally, as seen in Table 35, among both Christians and Muslims, an overwhelming majority of women oppose the statement. However, this majority is even stronger among Muslim females (86.4%), than it is among Christian females (74.3%). This suggests, for now at least, that Muslim women are slightly more likely than Christian women to resist, and disapprove of their male religious peers' endorsement of patriarchal models of gender relationships.

Table 35: Percentages of agreement with "A woman should obey her husband" by "Gender" and "Religious Affiliation"

		I agree	I disagree	TOTAL
Christians ***	Females	25.7%	74.3%	100%
	Males	48.9%	51.1%	100%
Muslims ***	Females	13.6%	86.4%	100%
	Males	65.9%	34.1%	100%

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

5.1.3) Indicator #2: Respondents' and Parents' Levels of Agreement with "Girls/boys should remain a virgin before marriage" (var. 40, 41, 49, and 50 in app. A)

As seen in Table 36, respondents' positions vary drastically depending on whether the question is about female or male pre-marital virginity. Thus, while 40.8% of the whole sample "completely agree" that a girl should remain a virgin before marriage, about the same proportion (41.6%) "completely disagree" with pre-marital virginity as an obligation for boys. Thus, in general, respondents' views on this issue are acutely informed by gendered double standards. More specifically, pre-marital virginity tends to be considered as a gender-specific obligation applying only to females.

Table 36: Percentages of agreement with "A girl/boy should remain a virgin before marriage"

On the topic of	Level of agreement	For the respondents	For the respondents' parents (Respondents' self-estimation)
GIRLS' virginity	Completely agree	40.8%	75.6%
	Somewhat agree	24.8%	11.6%
	Somewhat disagree	18.0%	7.4%
	Completely disagree	16.4%	5.4%
	TOTAL	100%	100%
BOYS' virginity	Completely agree	13.2%	30.6%
	Somewhat agree	24.0%	29.3%
	Somewhat disagree	21.2%	17.8%
	Completely disagree	41.6%	22.3%
	TOTAL	100%	100%

Table 37: Percentages of agreement with "A girl/boy should remain a virgin before marriage", with selected independent variables

Level of Agreement		Girl should be a virgin before marriage				Boy should be a virgin before marriage		
		Agree	Disagree	Total		Agree	Disagree	Total
For the whole sample	TOTAL	65.6	34.4%	100%		37.2%	62.8%	100%
By Gender	Females	66.1%	33.9%	100%		44.9%	55.1%	100%
	Males	65.2%	34.8%	100%		30.3%	69.7%	100%
By age at arrival ***	0 to 4	53.8%	46.2%	100%		37.7%	62.3%	100%
	5 to 8	70.6%	29.4%	100%		32.4%	67.6%	100%
	9 to 12	77.6%	22.4%	100%		40.8%	59.2%	100%
By religious affiliation *** $$$	Christians	58.6%	41.4%	100%		29.6%	70.4%	100%
	Muslims	78.4%	21.6%	100%		51.1%	48.9%	100%
By ethnic identity's strength ***	Strong	73.5%	26.5%	100%		37.1%	62.9%	100%
	Weak	43.9%	56.1%	100%		36.8%	63.2%	100%
By religious identity's strength ***	Strong	76.4%	23.6%	100%		43.8%	56.2%	100%
	Weak	59.7%	40.3%	100%		33.6%	66.4%	100%
By father's level of education	Low	60.0%	40.0%	100%		37.1%	62.9%	100%
	High	68.6%	31.4%	100%		36.8%	63.2%	100%

* $= p < 0.1$ (for "Girl should be a virgin before marriage")
** $= p < 0.05$
*** $= p < 0.01$

$ $= p < 0.1$ (for "Boy should be a virgin before marriage")
$$ $= p < 0.05$
$$$ $= p < 0.01$

As seen in Table 37, a majority of respondents among all three "age-at-arrival" groups are in favour of compulsory pre-marital virginity for females. However, this majority increases significantly as we move from the "0 to 4" to the "5 to 8" "age-at-arrival" group, jumping from

53.8% to 70.6%. On the other hand, time spent in Canada does not affect significantly respondents' attitudes towards compulsory pre-marital virginity for males.

Also, religious affiliation is significantly correlated with one's level of agreement with pre-marital virginity for both males and females. More specifically, the proportion of female virginity advocates is far greater among Muslim (78.4%) than among Christian (58.6%) respondents. However, whereas Muslim respondents are almost equally split over the issue of male pre-marital virginity (almost 50/50), the great majority of Christian youths (70.4%) oppose male pre-marital virginity as an obligation.

Interestingly, as seen in Table 37, both strong ethnic and religious identity holders are significantly more likely to embrace the notion of compulsory pre-marital female virginity, compared to weak ethnic and religious identity holders. However, whereas a majority (59.7%) of the weak religious identity holders also approve of chastity as an obligation for unmarried women, the dominant trend is reversed among those with a weak ethnic identity, as a majority of them (56.1%) disagree with the principle of compulsory pre-marital female virginity. In other words, a majority of both weak and strong religious identity holders tend to endorse compulsory pre-marital female virginity. On the other hand, a majority of high ethnic identity retainers are in favour of pre-marital female chastity, whereas a majority of low ethnic identity retainers are against it. Therefore, it appears that, compared with "Religious identity strength", "Ethnic identity strength" is a stronger predictor of one's likelihood to agree with the notion of pre-marital chastity for females.

Finally, the variable "Father's level of education" has practically no effect on one's likelihood to agree with the statement under study.

We will now examine the effect of gender on respondents' attitudes regarding male and female pre-marital virginity. First, as seen in Table 37, there is a remarkable consensus between

males and females about compulsory female virginity before marriage, which is fostered by both sexes in almost the exact same proportions (around 65%). Moreover, even the rationales justifying pro-female virginity stances tend to be largely similar for both males and females. However, compared with their male ethnic peers, most female informants who reported clinging to their virginity until marriage adopted a more nuanced and complex position. Thus, female informants K, H, and I said that the prospect of loosing their virginity before marriage was conceivable to them, but very unlikely. They consider that loosing their virginity over a one-night stand, or over a fleeting flick, is not worthy, even unimaginable, given the importance they attach to pre-marital virginity. Thus, said informant I:

> "Yeah! Personally, I say it's important [pre-marital virginity]. Except if it happens, well, there is nothing you can do about it! But if you're able to wait, well, you better wait, you see. There is no hurry! Why ruin everything because of one night? Besides, chances are that, after this one night, you won't even do it again until you get married (...). Me, I am a virgin, you know. But I am 20 years old, so I tell myself (...) "If I have been able to wait until now, why can't I still wait until I reach 22-23 years old, when I get married?" You know, it depends on the person. For me, it's like an objective. It's part of my life. Except if something happens, well be it." (Informant I, Canadian-born Muslim Moroccan female)

According to female informants H and K, if they were in a relationship with someone they loved, they could consider transgressing their self-imposed rule. Thus, declared subject K:

> "My parents are really adamant about that [pre-marital virginity]. It's really important to keep it until marriage. So, for me to go as far as changing my values, it would have to be someone really important to me." (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female)

Among female informants who prefer to remain a virgin before marriage, only one, informant K, mentioned that she was holding on to this rule solely to obey her parents' rules (see the above cited narrative). The majority stressed that they were refraining from getting involved in pre-marital sex for themselves, because they believed in what they were doing. Some referred to their choice as some form of self-imposed challenge or objective. Also, several female informants reported staying away from pre-marital sex on the ground that sexuality had to be conjugated with love, which, in turn, was associated with marriage. Interestingly, many

male informants who expect their future wife to be a virgin put forward the same argument.

Thus, informant B, a Christian Lebanese male, contended that, in the case of girls, sex and love

had to go hand in hand:

> "When a man makes love for the first time, he doesn't need to be in love. It is done mechanically, only for pleasure. But I consider that a woman who looses her virginity [before marriage] is giving away something to a man without really knowing whether he really deserves it." (Informant B, Canadian-born Christian Lebanese)"

In other words, according to this subject, female virginity is a sort of gift which should

be offered only to the male suitor who proves to be worthy of receiving it by making the

ultimate commitment, that of marriage. Another male (Informant F) mentioned that family

honour is an important reason for him to insist on both marrying a virgin, and on making sure

that his sister remains one too until she gets married.

If there is a quasi-consensus between males and females on the issue of female pre-

marital virginity, the same cannot be said about the topic of male pre-marital virginity. As

indicated in Table 37, while 55.1% of female respondents disagree with the notion of

compulsory pre-marital virginity for males, as much as 69.7% of males oppose this same

notion, a difference of about 15%. Thus, although a majority among both gender groups tend to

approve of pre-marital sex for males, female respondents are more split over this issue. These

figures offer partial support to studies arguing that female Arab youths are more likely than their

males counterparts to resist and oppose gendered double standards. Nonetheless, it must be

emphasized again that females tend also to embrace these double standards (although not as

much as males), as a strong majority of them oppose pre-marital sex for girls (66%), while a

majority (55%) accept pre-marital sex for boys.

However, female opposition to gendered double standards over matters of sexuality

would be ill-measured if one were to rely exclusively on statistics. In this respect, the

informants' narratives revealed precious information that quantitative data failed to flag out. Thus, at least three female informants (K, I, and L) who, in the questionnaire, seemed to subscribe to these gendered double standards, critically engaged them during the interview. It turned out that these informants, while opposing gender-based double standards to various degrees, are putting up with them for different reasons. Informant I (Muslim Moroccan female), for instance, resents these double standards, but seems resigned to them because of both parental pressures, and a feeling that it is beyond her power to change a well-entrenched tradition:

> "Personally, I don't see why guys should have the right [to engage in pre-marital-sex], and not girls (...) But that's the way we [Arabs] have always thought. You know, if I speak to my mother, she's gonna tell me *be careful, don't do these kinds of things*, while perfectly knowing that my brother has been with this girl for two years now. And I go *It's not fair, why do you let him*, they answer *Ha! But he's a guy!* When you come to think of it, it's the same thing. We are both human beings, except guys can do it, and girl cannot. Just because that's the way it is!" (Informant I, Canadian-born Muslim Moroccan female)

Informant L expresses similar feelings of powerlessness in front of traditions when she declares:

> "As far as boys are concerned, I am completely in agreement with this statement [*"boys should remain a virgin until marriage"*]. I'd prefer that they.... I completely agree with it. But unfortunately, I think that 99.9% of them are not virgins. And you got to accept it because that's the way society is, and you can't change things" (Informant L, Canadian-born Christian Lebanese, arrived at 9 years old)

One of the sharpest and most lucid criticism, however, came from a female subject (informant K), who reported preserving her chastity in the name of tradition, while questioning the fact that observing tradition represents an extra burden only for girls, not for boys:

> "I think here in Quebec, guys of Arab origin kept a lot the traditional mentality. I would say that they kept it more than girls. Because we, girls, are more receptive to changes, and we seek more to adapt. Also, because guys have so much power, and because they can do whatever they want, they can allow themselves to have the [traditional] mentality; They do whatever they want regardless." (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7 years old)

In other terms, informant K underlines the fact that it is easier for men to respect traditions since doing so requires far less self-sacrifice from them than it does from women. The

above quotation denotes that the "enforcement" of tradition within Arab family tends to be done especially at the expense of girls, who are expected to give up much of their liberty in the process. In the next passage, the same female informant (K) points to some of the costly implications of these double standards for Arab girls:

> "They [boys] want their future wife to be a virgin, but they fool around here and there with girls. And if they sleep with an Arab girl just for fun, they'll judge her. If they see that the girl has no values, they are gonna say, like, *She's an Arab and she's got no values*, and they will have no respect for you. That's why people need to respect you. That's why I manage to be respected." (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female).

The above narrative highlights an important contradiction resulting from these gendered double standards. On the one hand, they allow Arab male teenagers to experience a sexuality relatively devoid of restrictions, and, on the other, they make pre-marital virginity an obligation for females. As a result, sexually active male youths, to the extent they have sex with female ethnic peers, inevitably contribute to deplete the pool of Arab virgin girls, considered by these same males as the sole marriageable women. This, in turn, puts a great amount of pressures on Arab girls, who are expected to actively preserve their virginity, upon which is dependent the public acknowledgement of their respectability. In this respect, the above narrative calls attention to the issue of reputation, which is at the core of the process of ethnic identity building experienced by several Arab females youths. More specifically, for Arab girls, leading a chaste and morally virtuous life constitutes a pre-condition to be considered worthy of respect by ethnic peers, both males and females. As mentioned by informant K, the normative gaze originating from the ethnic community carries a permanent threat that lies heavy on girls, that of being labelled as "having no values". Interestingly, the expression "having no values" has been mentioned more than once, in the course of interviews, in reference to the moral laxity of Canadians girls, whose perceived sexually unbridled behaviours are harshly disapproved of by informants, both males and females. Several interviewees referred to Canadian girls' behaviours

as the antithesis of the "honourable" behaviour expected from a "decent" Arab girl. Their

representations of Canadian girls, based on either first hand observations or media portrayals,

presuppose a lifestyle perceived as sexually and morally unrestricted. The following narratives

illustrate well these representations:

> "My Canadian friends often go *Ha! We went clubbing and I drank and woke up in his bed. Ha! Ha! Ha!*
> And they really think it's funny! I really don't find it funny. You know what I mean?"
> (Informant H, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

> "(...) Sometimes, people think that if it's an Algerian, it's a good girl, and if it's a Canadian, it's a tart.
> Well, it's not exactly that. It's just...Well, actually, it's not too far from the truth (laughter)"
> (Informant F, Muslim Algerian male, arrived at 8 years old)

Thus, for Arab girls enmeshed in traditional ethnic social networks, gaining full

recognition as a legitimate and respectable "member" of the group is thus largely dependent

upon the public acknowledgement of their chastity. And the consequence for girls of

incurring a "bad reputation" is to be brought into social disrepute for having adopted a

behaviour associated with the out-group, namely the epitomical depraved Western girl (read

"easy women with no values"). This is a premium illustration of how female sexuality plays

a crucial role in the formation of ethnic boundaries, which, in turn, contribute to delineate the

contours of the group's collective identity.

Consequently, Arab girls who wish to marry an ethnic peer – and, as seen above, most

of them do – are often forced to closely self-monitor their own sexuality, or more specifically to

offer an a-sexual public image, in order not to incur a bad reputation, which would seriously

undermine their symbolic value on the market of marriageable women. Thus, when I asked this

Algerian Muslim female whether these gendered double standards bothered her, she responded

the following:

> "They [men] force me to keep tradition and all, but they do whatever they please. But if I want to marry an
> Arab, I am a little bit forced to respect traditions. And personally, I think that traditions are important, the
> values and all..." (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7 years old)

Informant K' s relationship to what she referred to as "traditions" reveals an ambivalent position characterized by both, an identification with traditional values ("traditions are important, the values and all..."), and overt criticism of the gendered double standards informing these traditions ("They [men] force me to keep tradition and all, but they do whatever they please"). Such a mixed attitude, which also permeates most of the other cited women's narratives, offers much support to Raissiguier's (1995) observation that Arab girls living in a Western context often critically engage the host society's dominant standards as regards female sexuality, while equally engaging the power effects resulting from Arab males' controlling attitudes and behaviours in the name of tradition.

As highlighted by the above quantitative analysis, Arab male youths, even more so than their female counterparts, seem to cultivate gendered double standards when it comes to defining acceptable sexual behaviours. The qualitative data clearly confirm this trend. Indeed, it can be said that if, on the one hand, Arab girls tend to critically engage these double standards, Arab boys, on the other, tend to accept them unquestioningly. The following exchange I had with informant A, a Christian Lebanese male (who otherwise provided answers favourable to gender equality), is quite illustrative in this respect:

> **Informant A:** "Both girls and boys should be allowed to gain some experience before marriage, I mean sexual experience. Well, I got to say that I wouldn't like that...you know...that the girl I am gonna marry turned out to have had sexual relationships before she met me. I mean not sexual relationships per se. As I said before, it doesn't matter. But I wouldn't marry a girl who had, like, 400 guys before me. (...) Well, if it's clear that she was having sexual relationships because she was in love, that's fine. But if she does it just for pleasure, then that's different. Cause there are two ways to go about it [for girls]: I call it being either a whore or just normal. If she's a whore, she does it only to have fun."
>
> **Me:** "Ok. I understand. And is it the same thing for a boy?"
>
> **Informant A:** A guy? Hell no! As far as I am concerned, my boy won't have the right to come back home before 3 o'clock in the morning (laughter) (Informant A, Christian Lebanese male, arrived at 11 years old)

Upon surveying the qualitative data, it appeared that these gendered double standards among Arab male youths can be accounted for, at least partially, by the quasi absence of parental and social pressures exerted on them to prevent them from indulging in pre-marital sex. This finding stands in contrast to the quantitative data, which could lead one to believe that male sexuality is also subjected to parental surveillance and control. Indeed, as seen in Table 38 below, a majority of parents (59.9%) are thought by their children to either completely or somewhat agree with the notion of compulsory male pre-marital virginity. This figure, although much smaller than the proportion of parents who reportedly believe in compulsory female pre-marital virginity (87.2%), nonetheless suggests that parents are far less imbued with gendered double standards than their own children (see Table 36 for a comparison).

Table 38: Percentages of parental agreement with pre-marital virginity for daughters and sons

Parents' level of agreement with Pre-marital virginity	They would agree	They would disagree	TOTAL
For their daughters	87.2%	12.8%	100%
For their sons	59.9%	40.1%	100%

Thus, a majority of parents are allegedly condemning both male (59.9%) and female (87.2%) pre-marital sex. However, based on the narratives, in the case of Arab sons, such parental condemnation does not seem to be accompanied by strict forms of control, and surveillance. Also, because non-compliant male youths are not at risk of incurring social disrepute and disapproval, parental pressures aimed at regulating their sexual behaviours, when and if they take place, are generally rather soft and symbolic. Thus, when I asked this Muslim Algerian male informant whether the Canadian part of his identity could be held responsible for some conflicts between him and his parents, he gave the following answer:

"(...) Well, there is also the question of sex. She [my mother] is not against it. But she'd prefer me to avoid it. And this is because of religion. She goes *It's not because you're a boy that you have more rights than your sister*. But, in practice, for sure, it [virginity] is more important as far as my sister is concerned. She [my mother] says that our culture, our tradition do not allow us to do such things. But she more or less turns a blind eye, because, in Algerian culture, in Arab culture in general, when it's a boy, we let go. (...) That's the mentality. According to religion, I should preserve my virginity until I get married as well. But as I told you, because I am a guy, I am not bothered. I can fool around left right and centre." (Informant F, Muslim Algerian male, arrived at 8 years old)

5.1.4) Indicator #3: Respondents' and parents' levels of agreement with "Girls/boys can have a boyfriend/girlfriend" (var. 43, 44, 52, and 53 in app.A)

Based on both qualitative and quantitative data, it appears that there is a consensus between males and females over the issue of male dating. Thus, as seen in Table 39, as it could be expected, the right of boys to date girls before marriage is largely taken for granted by almost all respondents, be they males or females. It would be superfluous to expand on the rationales underlying this latter tendency, since they do not differ, in essence, from those invoked by respondents to justify pre-marital sexual activities for boys.

However, we get a rather unexpected picture when looking at the respondents' views on the issue of female dating. Interestingly, as seen in Table 39, the great majority of respondents (78%) agree either completely or somewhat with the statement "Girls should be allowed to have a boyfriend before marriage if they want to." Among females only, as much as 86.4% of respondents approve of pre-marital dating for women. Furthermore, female respondents are in favour of pre-marital male dating in the exact same proportions (86.4%), which means that the great majority of female youths of this sample consider dating as a right to which women are entitled as much as men. Similarly, a majority of male respondents consider dating to be acceptable for both sexes. However, male respondents are more likely to consider dating as acceptable for men (89.4%) than for women (70.5%). Nonetheless, on the whole, these findings

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are quite surprising, since, as seen previously in Table 37, the great majority of both male and

female respondents oppose female pre-marital sex.

Table 39: Percentages of agreement with "Girls/boys can have a boy/girlfriend", by
"Gender"

Level of agreement		Girls are allowed to have a boyfriend before marriage				Boys are allowed to have a girlfriend before marriage		
		Agree	Disagree	Total		Agree	disagree	Total
For the whole sample	Total	78.4%	21.6%	100%		88.0%	12.0%	100%
By Gender	Females	86.4%	13.6%	100%		86.4%	13.6%	100%
	Males	70.5%	29.5%	100%		89.4%	10.6%	100%

Even more surprising are the findings in Table 40 showing that, even among those sole

respondents who endorse pre-marital virginity as an obligation for girls, a majority believe that

girls should be allowed to have a boyfriend if they wish so (note that this majority is much

stronger for female respondents (82.1%) than it is for males respondents (62.8%)).

Table 40: Percentages of agreement with "Girl/boys can have a boy/girlfriend", by "Gender",
and by percentages of agreement with "Girls should remain a virgin before marriage"

Compulsory female Pre-marital virginity		Girls can have boyfriends before marriage		
		I AGREE	I DISAGREE	Total
I AGREE	Whole sample	72.0%	28.0%	100%
	Females	82.1%	17.9%	100%
	Males	62.8%	37.2%	100%
I DISAGREE	Whole sample	89.5%	10.5%	100%
	Females	95.0%	5.0%	100%
	Males	15.2%	84.8%	100%

Thus, it appears that, although pre-marital female sex is harshly disapprove of, and even

sanctioned by means of subtle but yet omnipresent forms of social control, dating is nonetheless

widely accepted for both gender groups. This suggests that a majority of both males and females

do not oppose in-group amorous relationships as long as they do not involve sexual intercourse. This strategy was reported by at least two male informants (B and C), who allow themselves to go out with Arab girls, as long as it is understood between them that her virginity has to be preserved. However, in both cases, this self-imposed rule only applies to Arab girls. The following exchange I had with this Christian Lebanese male exemplifies well this view:

> **Informant B:** "I allow myself to have girlfriends. But if I have one, she's a virgin. I'll never be the one who will make her loose her virginity. I consider that I don't have the right to do that."

> **Me:** "Even if she is Québécoise?"

> **Informant B:** "(Long hesitation and mumbling) I was about to say *there ain't much virgin Québécoises.* No, I think it's only good for a Lebanese or an Arab (...). A Québécoise, on the other hand, I wouldn't mind. But I would never marry her. (Informant B, Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male).

Similarly, another male informant (informant F) sets for himself as a rule to only go out with non-Arab girls, in order to respect Arab girls' virginity. This is a commonly adopted strategy which allows males to resolve the contradiction resulting from wanting to avail themselves of the sexual liberty at their disposal, while expecting their future wife to be a virgin. In this respect, the following exchange I had with informant F, a Muslim Algerian male, was particularly interesting:

> **Me:** "May I ask you a question? You grant yourself the right to have girlfriends. But on the other hand, you think it is important for girls to preserve their virginity. So I wonder whether your girlfriends are Algerian."

> **Informant F:** "Personally, no. I wouldn't want it. I am the one who don't want to. Well, I'll give you an example: just last week, I went out on a date with an Algerian girl I met a month ago, and we only kissed in the movie theatre, you see. But I told her *I can't go any further because when I see you, I see my own sister.* (...) So I told her *I am a guy who likes very much having sex, go out a lot, have fun. And I couldn't do that with you.*" And she thinks the same thing, you see?"

> **Me:** So your girlfriends are Québécoises or Canadians?

> **Informant F:** Or Brazilian, Italian. But not with Muslims. (...) If I go out with an Algerian, she's like my sister. So, because I wouldn't like someone to do this to my sister, I am sure that the boy – because she's got brothers – I am sure that her brother wouldn't like to see me with his sister"
> (Informant F, Muslim Algerian male, arrived here at 8 years old)

One characteristic informant B's and F's narratives have in common is that they both denote a dual and dichotomous representation of women split along ethnic lines. Once again, this type of rationalization is made possible by a differentiation between, on the one hand, the in-group chaste, respectable, "sister-like" Arab girl, and, on the other, the out-group non-Arab girl who, not being bound by the same socio-cultural expectations, is thus made sexually available, and thus less respectable. According to this symbolism, the respectability and reputation of Arab girls rest on the strict maintenance of impenetrable frontiers separating two opposite representations of women: the pure, virgin and marriageable woman (i.e. the Arab woman), as opposed to the depraved sexual female being (i.e. the Western woman). The implications of such a normative framework is that Arab female youths who choose to have a sexual life before marriage are at risk of being associated with the latter category, thus being brought into social disrepute and singled out as culturally deviant. Therefore, female pre-marital virginity takes on a role of strong ethnic identity marker, which contributes to reinforce group boundaries.

Even tough some males, as seen above, are taking on them to preserve Arab females' virginity, this task is largely, although not exclusively, incumbent upon women themselves. Indeed, this cultural framework puts a great many Arab female youths- those who value pre-marital female virginity- in a position where they have to carefully appreciate the seriousness of any boys whom they date, or with whom they go out. Furthermore, it makes many female Arab youths particularly reluctant to dating non-Arabs, who are more likely to expect an active sexual life as part of a "normal" couple relationship. Inversely, as seen from the above narratives, Arab boys tend more to respect their Arab girlfriends' virginity in order not to tarnish their reputation. Thus, according to this Muslim Algerian female informant, who cling to pre-marital virginity,

but who nonetheless indulges in dating, Arab boys are better predisposed to put up with such

sexual restrictions:

> "I went out with a Muslim Moroccan and he broke up with me because of that [him respecting female virginity], because he didn't want to.... Because he has the same mentality, he said to me: "*I don't want to be the one who's gonna make you loose it (your virginity)*. He said *I respect you too much to do this to you* (...). Guys understand that! Well, it depends on the person you are with. But any Arabs who do not understand that is a player toying with you" (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7 years old).

5.1.5) Indicator #4: Respondents' level of agreement with "A girl's virginity should be protected by male kin for family reputation" (var. 42 in app. A)

The issue of family reputation has been addressed on the surface in the preceding

sections dealing with pre-marital virginity and dating, and even more specifically in section

4.1.6, dealing with parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission. In this latter section, it

was argued, based on the informants' narratives, that family reputation and honour was a central

concern to Arab parents. It was also mentioned that the responsibility of maintaining family

honour lied more heavily on daughters than on sons. Also, female sexuality, it was shown, was

at the heart of the process by which a great many Arab families come to secure for themselves a

good name and reputation. In this section, we will further explore the notion that family honour,

in tradition-oriented Arab families, is directly linked to the chastity of its female members.

First, as seen in Table 41 below, respondents seem to be split over the importance to be

accorded to female virginity in the building of family reputation. However, according to

respondents, a great majority of parents (72.7%) would endorse such reasoning.

Table 41: Percentages of agreement with "A girl's virginity should be protected by male kin for family reputation", with selected independent variables

Level of Agreement		Family reputation is dependent on female pre-marital virginity		
		I AGREE	I DISAGREE	TOTAL
For respondents	Total	52.0%	48.0%	100%
For parents (in respondents' estimation)	Total	72.7%	27.3%	100%
By gender ***	Females	39.0%	61.0%	100%
	Males	63.6%	36.4%	100%
By religious affiliation	Christians	50.6%	49.4%	100%
	Muslims	54.5%	45.5%	100%
By father's education	Low	52.9%	47.1%	100%
	High	51.5%	48.5%	100%
By ethnic identity's strength ***	Strong	57.6%	42.4%	100%
	Weak	35.1%	64.9%	100%
By religious identity strength ***	Strong	62.9%	37.1%	100%
	Weak	45.0%	55.0%	100%
By age at arrival	0 to 4	47.2%	52.8%	100%
	5 to 8	50.0%	50.0%	100%
	9 to 12	60.5%	39.5%	100%

```
*    = p < 0.1
**   = p < 0.05
***  = p < 0.01
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One particularly noteworthy feature of Table 41 is the extremely strong correlation between gender and one's likelihood to agree with the statement related to family reputation and female chastity. Whereas a strong majority of females (63.6%) oppose this statement, an equally strong majority of males (61%) agree with it. Unfortunately, informants were not asked to comment on their answers to this specific question, which makes it harder to account qualitatively for this large gender discrepancy. Nonetheless, two male informants clearly stressed that female chastity, in their family as well as in their culture, is closely connected to

family reputation. Thus, for instance, when I asked informant F whether it was important for him that his sister remains a virgin until she gets married, he answered the following:

> "Yes! It's quite mean of me. Sometimes, when I think about it, I think it's unfair that I have the right to deflower girls, to have sex, whereas I want my sister to be always.... It's about family honour. Perhaps I am being selfish, perhaps it's mean. But we are all like that. But it's about family honour."
> (Informant F, Muslim Algerian male, arrived at 8)

It is important to keep in mind that, as seen in Table 37, males and females agree with the statement "girls should compulsorily remain a virgin before marriage" in almost the exact same proportions (respectively 66.1% and 65.2%). However, it seems that this large consensus between males and females does not hold when it comes to justifying these pro-female virginity stances. For one thing, as seen above, the Arab females of this sample, as opposed to their male ethnic peers, seem to reject the family reputation argument. Based on the data, both quantitative and qualitative, whereas several males are comfortable with the use of female virtue as a core mainstay of family honour, a majority of females, on the other hand, are not accepting to see their sexual conduct subjected to strict male surveillance for the sake of preserving the family name. Then, one could wonder which arguments these female Arab second-generationers typically put forward to legitimate their commitment to pre-marital chastity. The data gathered from the interviews suggest that most Arab female youths wish to preserve their virginity for themselves. That is out of personal motivations. In this respect, informant N's following justification for wanting to remain a virgin until marriage is quite representative:

> **Informant N:** "Well, I think it is important that I preserve my virginity, but I do it for myself. It is a choice that I've made, and I want to stick to this principle because.... It's not as if it was a challenge but, I don't know, it's something special."
>
> **Me:** "Do you think that this choice has anything to do with your culture or religion?"
>
> **Informant N:** "It has something to do with my culture and my religion. But if I'd want to do as I please [have sex], I don't think anybody could ever find out. I think I would be the only one to know. And if I'd do it [have sex], I wouldn't be hurting anyone. (...) What I mean is that I choose to preserve my virginity for myself, not for others. It's your life, your body, it's your choice." (Informant N, Christian Lebanese female, arrived at 6 years old)."

Thus, these Arab girls do not want their sexual life to be brought in tutelage, while being nonetheless personally committed to preserving their virginity until marriage. A majority among both my female respondents and interviewees seem to be uncomfortable with the fact that, in Arab traditional culture, the notion of family honour is directly linked to the chastity of female family members. Indeed, our data suggest that they oppose, to various degrees, the fact that the building and upholding of family reputation is dependent on the preservation of their chastity. The narratives as well as the quantitative data indicate that many among these female Arab youths consider their sexuality to be a private matter, as opposed to a collective property deserving, as such, public attention and protection. Ironically, as Ajrouch (1999) pertinently remarked, because, in a Western context, female virginity is perceived by Arab parents as being excessively threatened, parental control and surveillance exerted on second-generation Arab females come to be generally harsher than what it would have been in the home country. Therefore, the issue of female chastity takes on pronounced significance within Arab migrant families, especially those incorporated into traditional ethnic networks. Based on the respondents' estimation, Arab parents seem to be particularly adamant about preserving their daughters' virginity for the sake of protecting family reputation. Indeed, 72.7% of the respondents' parents are reportedly endorsing the statement under discussion (see Table 41). It follows that the normative gap between Arab-Canadian female youths and their parents over this issue is likely to be particularly wide, especially in a culturally liberal context such as Canada.

Finally, as seen in Table 41, the variable "Age at arrival in Canada" does not impact significantly on one's likelihood of linking female chastity and family honour. It should be mentioned, however, that the most recent migrants to Canada (the "9 to 12" age-at-arrival group) are slightly more likely than the two other "age at arrival" groups to agree with the

statement. Also, both Christian and Muslim respondents are endorsing the statement in almost the same proportions (50.6% vs. 54.5%, respectively). This suggests, once again, that Arab Muslims and Christians share, to a large extent, a common frame of traditions, whose maintenance depends largely on females family members. Also, whether one comes from a family with a high or a low level of education has no effect on one's support for the statement "A girl's virginity should be protected until marriage by her male kin in order for family reputation to be preserved". Consequently, originating from a family with a high cultural capital does not prevent one from envisaging female chastity as a safeguard against social disrepute. Finally, Table 41 also reveals that both ethnic and religious identity are positively correlated with levels of agreement with the statement under study. This observation lends support to the hypothesis that female conduct, and especially female sexual conduct, operates as a crucial factor contributing to the maintenance of an ethno-religious identity among Arab communities. However, it is to soon, at this point, to draw reliable conclusions to this effect. The use of multiple regression analysis, in Chapter 6, will allow us to include pertinent control variables in the equation, in order to isolate more accurately the effect of gender-related traditionalism on ethnic and religious identity's respective strength.

5.2) Perceived Prejudicial Stereotyping and Discrimination

First, some preliminary distinctions need to be made between the concepts of prejudice, stereotype and discrimination, which, although related, are nonetheless different. First, whereas stereotypes are preconceived notions based on generalization, prejudice refers to adverse attitudes, judgments or discourses directed against a targeted group. It could be said that prejudice is generally fuelled by negative stereotypes. Therefore, in the following, we will use the expressions negative stereotyping and prejudicial stereotyping interchangeably to designate derogatory attitudes and discourses directed against a minority group. Finally, the notion of discrimination refers to an unfair treatment based on some minority-group characteristics which are socially construed as distinctive. It should thus be clear that prejudice and stereotypes relate to the realm of representations, whereas discrimination pertains to practice. Finally, while prejudicial stereotyping does not automatically lead to discrimination, the latter always involves some form of prejudicial stereotyping.

In section 5.2.1, we will assess the nature and the extent of ethnic and religion-based prejudicial stereotyping, as perceived by our sample of second-generation Arab-Canadians. For evident reasons, the issue of religion-based stereotyping concerns especially Muslim respondents. Indeed, it could appear as nonsense to suggest that Canadians, a Christian majority group, may harbour anti-Christian prejudicial stereotypes. However, Christian Arabs tend to be regarded as well by Westerners as a religious out-group, although far less than their Muslim counterparts. Inversely, Christian Arabs' own religious group consciousness tends to be very loosely connected to Western Christianity. Consequently, it is sociologically relevant to probe, qualitatively at least, how Christian Arab respondents feel that their distinct ethno-religious identity is perceived by their host society.

Special attention will be paid to the media as a premium source of biased representations, as there is now massive evidence that has accumulated over recent decades about how North American media contribute to portray Arab and Muslim cultures in a biased and prejudicial manner (Antonius and Bendris, 1998; Abu-Laban and McIrvin Abu-Laban, 1999:150, Shaheen, 2001). We will thus look at these youths' assessments of how their ethnic and their religious groups are portrayed in the media.

Finally, section 5.2.2 will explore the extent to which our respondents feel accepted as Arabs by the majority group in their everyday life. In addition, informants were asked to expand on how and why they feel accepted or rejected as Arabs by their host society.

5.2.1) Perceived anti-Arab and Religion-Based Stereotyping

5.2.1-a) Perceived Stereotyping among Canadians

As seen in Table 42, a majority of respondents either "completely agree" (28.1%) or "somewhat agree" (49.1%) with the statement "There are negative stereotypes against Arabs prevailing among Canadians". Inversely, a minority of respondents are either "somewhat in disagreement" (15.7%), or "in complete disagreement" (6.4%) with the same statement. Also, Table 42 indicates that a majority of respondents (55%) either somewhat or completely disagree with the statement "There are negative stereotypes against my religious group prevailing among Canadians". However, the latter finding is quite obviously misleading insofar as 64.8% of my respondents are Christians. In this respect, we can expect to find drastically different results when we will look only at Muslim respondents' level of agreement with such a statement. Patterns of responses to this question when controlling for religious affiliation will be analyzed further down the present sub-section.

Table 42: Percentages of agreement with "There are negative stereotypes against Arabs", and with "There are negative stereotypes against my religious group"

Level of agreement	Statements	
	"There are negative stereotypes against Arabs prevailing among Canadians"	"There are negative stereotypes against my religious group in Canada"
I completely agree	28.1%	21.3%
I somewhat agree	49.8%	23.7%
I somewhat disagree	15.7%	22.1%
I completely disagree	6.4%	32.9%
TOTAL	100%	100%

Interviewees were asked whether Canadians portray Arabs in an accurate or unfair manner. Almost all, but one informants mentioned that Canadians generally have a distorted image of Arabs. They were asked to elaborate on the nature of these perceived stereotypes contributing to misportray Arabs as a group. The most commonly reported (prejudicial) stereotype is that Arabs are all terrorists, and that they have a particular predisposition to violence in general. Note that my interviews were completed around April 2001, namely 5 months prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.[20] Yet, the great majority of my subjects (11 out of 16) were already considering that Canadians tend to associate Arabs with terrorism.

For instance, when I asked informant G (a Canadian-born Muslim Egyptian female) whether Canadians perceive Arabs in a favourable light, she answered the following:

"As a bunch of terrorists. A bunch of terrorists. Personally, I don't see that. I mean of course there will be fanatics, but in any culture, any religion, anything." (Informant G, Canadian-born Muslim female of Egyptian descent)

Similarly, another female informant, when asked how Canadians perceive Arabs, responded the following:

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[20] Needless to say, since the September 11th events, the equation of terrorism and Arabs became even more prevalent in the Western popular imagery.

"For them [Canadians], hmm... Personally, I am often being called the terrorist. For them [Canadians], we are a bit aggressive" (Informant K, Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7)

Also, two respondents declared that Arabs are perceived by Canadians as being cunning crooks.

Thus, Informant D declared:

"I know a guy who told me *You Arabs are all a bunch of crooks and you are all terrorists.*
(Informant D, Christian Lebanese male, arrived at 12)

Gender issues were also frequently mentioned as a chief source of stereotyping. More specifically, according to several interviewees, both males and females, Canadians tend to perceive gender relationships in Arab culture as bearing the hallmark of domination. Interestingly, subjects who discussed this issue tended to address it from the point of view of the gender group to which they belong. Thus, males tended to report the stereotype of the Arab male portrayed as a wife abuser, whereas several females mentioned, as examples of anti-Arab stereotyping, the image of the submitted Arab wife. For example, informant I, a Canadian-born female of Moroccan descent, reported the following:

"They think that in every Arab country, women are obliged to wear the veil, and that they cannot talk to a man in the street, or that they can only go out accompanied by their husband. But it depends on which country you're talking about. Like in Saudi Arabia or in Palestine it's kind of true. But Québécois lump together all the nationalities, but it's not an accurate picture!"
(Informant I, Canadian-born Muslim Moroccan female).

As well, this male informant stated the following as an example of anti-Arab stereotypes:

"We are all violent terrorist, and we beat our women." (Informant C, Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male)

Also, it should be noted that some informants criticized the fact that Canadians do not make any distinctions between the various national groups of which is comprised the Arab community. This is what this Christian Lebanese informant underscored:

"For Canadians, it's like, anyone who speaks Arabic is...whether you're Egyptian, Moroccan, Algerian, it's all in Africa. As a matter of fact, they're not even Arabs, they're Berbers."
(Informant A, Christian Lebanese male, arrived at 11).

Other commonly reported stereotypes concern misrepresentations of the economic, cultural and technological level of development of Arab countries. More specifically, several informants mentioned that Canadians, more out of ignorance than racism, reduce Arab societies to a series of clichés such as villages built in the desert, camels as chief means of transport, and a cultural incompatibility with modern technology. The following narratives illustrate this perception:

> "They still picture us on our camels. And what do we know of the outside world? We know nothing! We know nothing of liberal societies, and of liberal ideas. For example, computers, anything related to technology, we don't know that!" (Informant Christian Lebanese female, arrived at 10).

> "I knew this Canadian girl. We were talking and I mentioned I was Algerian. She told me: *Ha! Do you go to school on a camel? Are your streets made of sand?* And she was a student!"
> (Informant F, Muslim Algerian male, arrived at 8).

Thus, in general, these Arab-Canadian youths consider that Canadians and/or Québécois hold much preconceived notions about Arabs. Moreover, they generally think that these misrepresentations take the form of prejudicial and disparaging images. These results are fully consistent with those yielded by Hayani's study (1999:299), which showed that a great majority of Canadian-born Arabs consider that Canadians have a very low regard for their ethnic group(s). However, most of my subjects interpret such prejudicial stereotyping as a form of ignorance coupled with a lack of culture, rather than as a form of blunt racism.

Table 43: Percentages of agreement with "There are negative stereotypes against Arabs", and with "There are negative stereotypes against my religious group", with selected independent variables.

		Statements			
		"There are negative stereotypes against Arabs prevailing among Canadians"		"There are negative stereotypes against my religious group in Canada	
		I AGREE	I DISAGREE	I AGREE	I DISAGREE
Gender	Females	73.7%	26.3%	44.1%	55.9%
	Males	81.7%	18.3%	45.8%	54.2%
Religious affiliation	Christians	74.7%	25.3%	30.2%	69.8%
* $$$	Muslims	83.9%	16.1%	72.4%	27.6%
Age at arrival	0 to 4	72.4%	27.6%	40%	60%
	5 to 8	80.9%	19.1%	50%	50%
	9 to 12	82.9%	17.1%	47.4%	52.6%
Ethnic identity strength	Strong	78.2%	21.8%	44.7%	55.3%
	Weak	76.8%	23.2%	41.1%	58.9%
Religious Identity strength	Strong	79.8%	20.2%	42.7%	57.3%
	Weak	77.0%	23.0%	46.6%	53.4%

* $= p < 0.1$ (for level of agreement with the statement "*There are negative stereotypes against Arabs*)
** $= p < 0.05$
*** $= p < 0.01$

\$ $= p < 0.1$ (for level of agreement with the statement "*There are negative stereotypes against my religious group*)
\$\$ $= p < 0.05$
\$\$\$ $= p < 0.01$

As seen in Table 43, a great majority among both Christian and Muslim respondents think that Canadians hold biased representations of Arabs. However, this majority is stronger among Muslim (83.9%) than among Christian (74.7%) respondents. This slight gap is perhaps due in part to the fact that, as seen in Table 4 (in section 4.1.1), Muslim respondents are more likely than their Christian counterparts to identify as Arabs. This could also explain Muslims' greater awareness of, and sensitivity to anti-Arab stereotyping. Second, because Canadians tend to merge Arab culture and Islam together, as if both were forming one single entity, Muslim

Arabs are perhaps more likely than their Christian ethnic peers to feel personally targeted by anti-Arab stereotypes. In other words, Muslims may be more self-aware of prejudices directed against Arabs since 1) they tend more to identify with this label, and 2) since Canadians tend to posit Islamic and Arab cultures as synonymous.

Nonetheless, as shown above in Table 43, the fact remains that 74.7% of Christian respondents also agree with the statement "There are negative stereotypes against Arabs prevailing among Canadians." Furthermore, our data suggest that Christian Arabs are affected as well by anti-Arab prejudice. First, as seen in Table 4 (in section 4.1.1), the label "Arab" turned out to be the most popular source of identification among Christian respondents, as 35.4% of them preferred it over all the other labels included in the questionnaire, including national membership. Secondly, and most importantly, at least 5 Christian informants mentioned that they also fall victim to anti-Arab stereotypes, be they intentionally directed at Islam or not, since, in any case, Canadians tend to lump together all Arabs irrespective of religious differences. The following citations of Christian informants illustrate well this perception:

> **Me:** "Do you think that Canadians hold negative stereotypes of Arabs? In the questionnaire, you circled "I completely agree". Why is that?
>
> **Informant P:** "Well for one thing, to them [Canadians], Arab=Muslim. Secondly, for them, Muslim=violent, terrorist." (Informant P, Christian Lebanese female, arrived at 7)

Informant N, a Christian Syrian female, made a similar observation:

> **Me:** "Do you think that the image Canadians have of Arabs is accurate? Or is it distorted?"
>
> **Informant N:** "I think it is biased because, right away, whenever they [Canadians] speak of the Arab people, they associate them with peoples of the Middle-East, they associate them with the Islamic religion, with submission, with domination, murders, and all that sort of things. And they think it's horrific, and the veil, and all that…" (Informant N, Christian Syrian female, arrived at 6)

In practice, however, because anti-Arab prejudices are partially coterminous with Islamophobia, Christian Arabs have more power to extricate from the Arab label they embrace

some of the negative connotations attached to it. They can do so by emphasizing their Christianity, as many of them did during the interviews, as a way to divest the Arab label of one of its most socially compromising component, namely Islam. Thus, several of our Christian informants are aware that anti-Arab stereotyping is, to a large extent, informed by anti-Islam prejudice. This gives them all the more reasons to wish to be recognized by Canadians as Arab Christians. Nabeel Abraham (1989) made a similar argument by stressing that Christian Arab-Americans often overemphasize their sectarian allegiances as a way not to be associated with Arab and Muslim culture, which would jeopardize their chances of being accepted by other Americans (Abraham, 1989:21). Ironically, whereas Christian minorities in Arab countries suffer from not being recognized by majority groups as authentic Arabs and compatriots because of their religious difference, Christian Arabs of North America suffer from the majority groups' tendency to lump them together with other Arabs while overlooking their religious difference. In any case, Arab Christians' various modes of conjugating their Arab-ness with their religious identity, depending on the majority group they interact with, constitute a premium illustration of the influential power of outside labelling on ethnic and religious self-concept building among minority groups.

Interestingly, Muslim informants were more inclined than their Christian counterparts to report stereotypes portraying Arab males as dominating and controlling, and Arab females as dominated and submitted. Furthermore, while acknowledging that Canadians tend to associate Arab culture in general with patriarchal gender role models, several Muslim informants stressed that Islam was more specifically targeted by these gender-related cultural misrepresentations:

> "In general, when I say I am Algerian, they say *terrorist*. And when I mention Muslim, they go *wife beater*, or *you guys have 3 or 4 wives*." (Informant F, Muslim Algerian male, arrived at 8)

According to some other Muslim informants, another common gender-related stereotype about Muslims is that all "their" women wear the hijab. Indeed, the question of the hijab was identified by many Muslims as an issue highly loaded with stereotypes, this form of veil wearing being automatically associated with female submission.

It should be noted that one Canadian-born female informant of Muslim background, who scored very low on both the ethnic and the religious identity scales, started by mentioning that Canadians often make incorrect generalizations about the hijab, such as assuming that all Arab women have to wear it. Then, interestingly, she added that some of these generalizations are true, and started to take herself issue with hijab wearers:

> **Me:** "What kind of representations of Arabs and Muslims do you think Canadians hold? Do you think this image is biased, or does it match well reality?"
>
> **Informant J:** "Maybe they [Canadians] generalize. Like, they think that every Muslim woman has to wear the djihab."
>
> **Me:** "You mean the hijab?"
>
> **Informant J:** Yeah yeah! Sorry, I feel so embarrassed [from not knowing the proper term]. And yeah, sometimes, I guess they [Canadians] generalize right!
>
> **Me:** What do you mean by that? What's right about what other people think of Arabs?
>
> **Informant J:** "Hmmm... Hypocrite maybe. I see some girls in the metro, they wear the scarf. But then they wear, like, flashy make-up and blue jeans. It's like, *what are you doing*? I mean you are either gonna [follow the rules] 100%, or you are gonna be 0%. You are not gonna be 50/50."
> (Informant J, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

Firstly, the above narrative points to the cognitive distance of this informant from her ethno-religious community and culture. Take the sentence "They [Canadians] think that every Muslim woman has to wear the *djihab* (our emphasis)." In this sentence, this informant's poor knowledge of her religious culture is denoted by the phoneme inversion she performed in attempting to pronounce the word "hijab", which she mistakenly turned into "djihab". Secondly

and most interestingly, whereas all other respondents but one[21] saw in this question an opportunity to deconstruct negative outside stereotyping, Informant J rather stressed what she considers to be a Canadian-endorsed, but yet correct generalization about hijab wearers. More specifically, this informant, far from engaging derogatory Canadian-made stereotypes, criticized instead the alleged "hypocrisy" of her female religious veiled peers, whose Western life-style, she says, is not consistent with, and even contradict their outwardly religious devotion. Being herself Muslim, at least nominally, informant J authorizes herself more easily to subscribe to what she perceives to be an accurate Canadian-made generalization about her religious female veiled peers. But actually, this informant's response can be more accurately described as a critique from the inside than as a widely agreed-upon Canadian representation of Arabs. In any case, this example suggests that minority members' definitions of what constitutes outside prejudicial stereotyping can vary significantly depending on levels of ethno-religious identity retention. Thus, what can appear as outside derogatory stereotyping to certain minority group members can appear to others as legitimate criticism and/or self-criticism of their ethnic group.

Some other Muslim informants stressed the Islam-specific character of the stereotype of the Arab terrorist. Thus, says informant G, a Canadian-born Muslim Egyptian female: "I do believe that being labelled as a terrorist is really hard for certain Arab people, especially for Muslim people."[22] Thus, it could be said that several Arab-Muslim informants tend to consider that anti-Arab stereotypes largely overlap anti-Muslim ones.

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[21] Informant O, a Canadian-born Christian Lebanese female, also endorses what she perceives to be a legitimate outside stereotype of Arabs. She describes this stereotype as followed: "The image of the typical Lebanese girls and guys, who speak on their cell phone, who check out every girl from head to toe, with this blue necklace that every Lebanese guy wears".

[22] We can reasonably think that, if we were to pose again this question to the same sample in a post-September 11th context, our Muslim respondents would emphasize even more the triadic equation "terrorist=Arab=Muslim".

In other words, they often consider that religion and ethnicity intersect in the construction of Canadian-made stereotypes directed at their group.

Among other trends that need to be underscored in Table 43 is the fact that religious and ethnic identity retention have practically no impact on the respondents' likelihood to consider that Canadians hold negative stereotypes of their religious group, and of Arabs. It thus appears that ethnic and religious identity retention processes have nothing or little to do with one's likelihood of perceiving Canadians as being either Islamophobic or Arabophobic. However, there is one counter-intuitive figure in Table 43. The proportion of respondents who consider that Canadians hold negative stereotypes against their religious group is slightly higher among low religious identity retainers (46.6%) than it is among high religious identity retainers (42.7%). This represents an anomaly that can hardly be accounted for- neither from a theoretical nor from a methodological point of view. However, the percentage difference is so small (3.9%) that it does not call for major investigations aimed at making sense of such small variations. The global picture remains that ethno-religious identity retention seems rather unrelated to these second-generationers' perceptions that Canadians are biased against Arabs and/or their religious group. However, this hypothesis will be put to a more rigorous statistical test in the next Chapter.

Also, according to Table 43, "Gender" and "Age at arrival" do not impact significantly on respondents' level of agreement with the notion that Canadians hold negative stereotypes against their religious group. However, males are more likely than females to perceive anti-Arab stereotyping among Canadians (81.7% vs. 73.7%). This slight gap is not surprising, given that, as shown in Table 4 (see section 4.1.1), males tend more than females to identify as Arabs (44.3% vs. 37.3%, respectively). This factor may explain in part why Arab male youths are more sensitive to anti-Arab stereotyping than their female ethnic peers.

Another explanation may be that the vilification of Arabs is operated mainly through the figure of the Arab male. Arab women, on the other hand, are more represented as disempowered and ignorant victims exploited by their own men. As a result, Arab males, being more specifically demonized through Western lenses, are perhaps more likely to consider Western-made representations of their ethno-cultural community as biased and distorted.

Finally, Table 43 shows that, generally speaking, the variable "Age at arrival" does not impact on these Arab youths' conviction that Arabs are portrayed in a prejudicial manner. Similarly, there is no significant relationship between "Age at arrival" and perceived religion-based stereotyping. However, it should be mentioned that Canadian-born respondents, and those who migrated here before the age of 4, are slightly less likely to perceive both religion-based and ethnic-based stereotyping, than respondents who got here at a later stage of their life (the "5 to 8" and the "9 to 12" age-at-arrival groups).

5.2.1-b) Perceived stereotyping in the Media

As seen in Table 44, there is a large consensus over the notion that Western media contribute to produce a biased picture of Arabs. Indeed, the great majority of our sample either "completely agree" (44,2%), or "somewhat agree" (38,2%) with the statement "The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of Arabs."

Table 44: Percentages of agreement with "Media propagate a biased picture of Arabs", and with "Media propagate a biased picture of my religious group"

Level of agreement	Statements	
	"The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of Arabs"	"The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of my religious group"
I completely agree	44.2%	28.1%
I somewhat agree	38.2%	25.3%
I somewhat disagree	12.4%	20.5%
I completely disagree	5.2%	26.1%
TOTAL	100%	100%

Also, during the interviews, a great majority of informants blamed the media for the fact that Canadians have such a low opinion of Arabs. Furthermore, several of them did so before being even asked the question dealing specifically with the issue of the media's contribution to prejudicial stereotyping. According to most informants, the two mediums which contribute the most to the prejudicial stereotyping of Arabs in the media are television and the movie industry, particularly Hollywood movies. Three respondents consider that Canadians have a negative and stereotypical opinion of Arabs because of television. The two following narratives illustrate this view:

"There are a lot of stereotypes, but it's not their fault, it's more because of the media, of what they show on T.V." (Informant H, Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female)

"Their image of Arabs is biased because, as we all know, it's all propaganda. That's what happens on T.V. especially. And as we all know, every one has a T.V. set at home, which explains why, in the end, Canadians and Québécois have an opinion of Arabs that doesn't match reality."
(Informant A, Christian Lebanese male, arrived at 11)

Hollywood movies were undoubtedly the most frequently blamed factor to account for anti-Arab prejudicial stereotyping. One movie in particular is considered by informants as having been extremely damageable for the image of Arabs in the Western mind: "Never without my daughter." This movie, released in 1991, is about an American woman who manages to escape from Iran with her daughter after her Iranian husband attempted to turn a

supposedly two-week vacation into a permanent relocation and a life of subservience for both her and her daughter. As much as 6 informants mentioned that this film was a major contributor to the misrepresentation and the demonization of Arabs in the Western mind. At first sight, this can be surprising given this movie was released 11 years ago, and has been followed, since then, by a myriad of Hollywood action movies which, if not surpassed it, at least matched it in stereotyping Middle-Eastern groups in a prejudicial manner. Perhaps the fact that this movie was based on an autobiographical book written by an average American woman, contributed to greater viewer identification. But most importantly, at the time of the interviews, it was still easier for North-American viewers to relate to the suffering endured by a mother whose child has been kidnapped and sent in a woman-unfriendly country, than to the improbable danger of a mass-scale murderous terrorist attack on U.S. soil, such as those carried out by Arab villains in Hollywood movies. However, the September 11[th] events have perhaps marked a durable shift in Westerners' (mis)representations of Arabs and Muslims. Indeed, these latter groups are now more likely than ever to be portrayed by the media, and perceived by viewers, as religious fanatics and violent terrorists committed to the destruction of the (Western) free world. However, it should be kept in mind that stereotypes of Arabs, far from being disconnected from one another, are forged relationally, caught up in a complex reciprocity where each one of them contributes to legitimate the others. It could be said, from a Saïdian perspective (1979), that they are integrated into a coherently unified system of auto-referential representations. Thus, the figure of the violent Arab terrorist man, and that of the exploited Arab woman, are mutually reinforcing each other (Antonius and Bendris, 1998).

Another noteworthy element is that, out of the 6 informants who made a connection between the movie "Never without my daughter" and anti-Arab stereotyping, 4 were Christian Arabs. Thus, in the following, two Christian Arabs explain how this movie have contributed to shape Canadian representations of Arabs:

> **Me:** In the questionnaire, you circled "*I somewhat agree*" for the statement "*Canadians have negative stereotypes against Arabs*".

> **Informant B:** "Yes. I would even say "*Completely agree*". Because when I see...When a Canadian tells you "*Ho! You're Arab?*", sure enough the next comment is "*Ho! Never without my daughter*". (Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male)

> **Informant D:** "For sure there are stereotypes! Like for instance, I have a friend who was going out with this Québécoise girl from Lac-St-Jean. She called her family in Lac-St-Jean to tell them she was going out with a Lebanese. The first thing they told her is *Ha! Did you see Not without my daughter?* (Christian Lebanese male, arrived at 12)

The fact that so many Christian informants reported "*Never without my daughter*" as a major contributor to anti-Arab stereotyping is startling, since the vilification of Islam and Muslims was central to the explicit message as well as to the sub-text of this movie. This shows well how anti-Muslim prejudice tends to rebound as well on Christian Arabs, since, as discussed above, Arab culture and Islam are almost interchangeable in the mind of a great many Canadians. As a matter of fact, this movie is not even about an Arab country, which shows also how Canadians tend to lump together all national communities of the Middle-East under the all-encompassing Arab label.

Finally, two recent Hollywood action movies were also criticized by informants, namely "The Siege" (1998), with Denzel Washington, and "Passenger 57" (1992), with Wesley Snipes. These movies, which portray Arabs as violent hate-mongering anti-Western terrorists, were mentioned by informant G and E respectively, as examples of Hollywood's detrimental influence on the majority group's perception of Arabs.

Thus, it appears that television and Hollywood movies were particularly, although not exclusively identified by these Arab-Canadian youths as major factors contributing to anti-Arab prejudice in Canada. These results lend support to Jack Shaheen's discourse analysis of Hollywood's portrayal of Arabs. In this research, Shaheen (2001) convincingly demonstrates how American movies tend to vilify Arabs and Arab culture.

Also, two informants stressed how the media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was particularly instrumental in producing the Western-made stereotype of the violent and fanatic Arab terrorist. Informant C, who is himself half-Palestinian, puts it this way:

> **Me:** "Do you consider that the media contribute to perpetuate anti-Arab prejudice?"
>
> **Informant C:** "Yes. CNN is the worst T.V. channel I've ever seen. It's terrible. It's them who sell their footages to a lot of other companies. So these images are transmitted everywhere. You always see Arabs, Palestinians, who throw stones at Israeli soldiers. But you never see the (Palestinian) babies who were shot dead. I just received an e-mail about this [Palestinian] child, this baby, who was shot in the stomach because a Jew thought he will eventually become a terrorist. But on CNN, you only hear *Poor Jews, stones are thrown at them, poor Jews!* And people end up saying *It's their country, why aren't Palestinians leaving?*" (Canadian-born half-Palestinian and half-Lebanese Christian male)

The above quoted narrative illustrates the frustration felt by many North American Arabs when confronted with what they perceive to be a highly biased coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Similarly, Abu-Laban has also argued that, for most Arab-Canadians, Israeli-Arab conflicts as shaped by North American media constitute an added dimension to prejudicial stereotyping against Arabs in the West (Abu-Laban, 1980:91-93; 1988:111). In particular, this author observed that there is a widely-agreed upon perception among the Arab Diaspora that the interpretive lenses through which these conflicts are filtered in the Western media contribute to, both bring about and strengthen the stereotypical figure of the fanatic

Arab terrorist committed to violence (most of the time in the name of God).[23] As seen below in Table 45, males are more likely than females to think that both the Arabs and their religious group are misrepresented in the media. In section 5.2.1-a, a similar trend had been accounted for using arguments which are equally relevant to explain the present gender variations. First, Arab males show greater levels of identification with the Arab label. Secondly, as seen above, in the mass-media, Arab and Muslim men are often portrayed as violent, power-hungry individuals, both in the private and the public domains. Inversely, Arab and Muslim women are portrayed as submitted victims undergoing exploitation at the hands of their own husband and/or father. As a result, Arab males, being the ones portrayed as aggressors, tend perhaps to feel more directly concerned and targeted by anti-Arab stereotyping begotten by the media.

Also, once again, it appears that, if media representations of Arabs and Muslims are extremely gendered, so is Arabs and Muslims' reception of these same representations. More specifically, the anti-Arab stereotypes reported by our informants tended to be very gendered-specific, males underscoring more the clichés of the Arab terrorist and wife abuser, and females stressing more the stereotype of the dominated and submitted Arab wife.

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[23] Note that scholars such as Michael Suleiman (1988), Edward Said (2000), and Rachad Antonius and Naima Bendris (1998:220-221), have well shown, through studies of media content, that this perception is far from being groundless. Thus, for instance, Edward Said demonstrated that the general picture conveyed by North-American media is that "Israel is so surrounded by rock-throwing Anti-Semitic barbarians that even the missiles, tanks and helicopter gunships that have been used to "defend" Israelis from them [the Palestinians] are simply warding off an invasive force." (Said, 2000:45) The end-result is that Palestinians, argue these authors, are presented as aggressors, and Israel as a victim using self-defence against a bunch of fanatic terrorists.

Table 45: Percentages of agreement with "Media propagate a biased picture of Arabs", and with "Media propagate a biased picture of my religious group", with selected variables

		Statements			
		"The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of the Arabs"		"The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of my religious group"	
		I AGREE	I DISAGREE	I AGREE	I DISAGREE
Gender	Females	74.6%	25.4%	46.6%	53.4%
*** $$	Males	89.3%	10.7%	59.5%	40.5%
Religious affiliation	Christians	77.8%	22.2%	36.4%	63.6%
*** $$$	Muslims	90.8%	9.2%	85.1%	14.9%
Age at arrival	0 to 4	79.0%	21.0%	51.4%	48.6%
	5 to 8	82.4%	17.6%	50.0%	50.0%
	9 to 12	86.8%	13.2%	59.2%	40.8%
Ethnic identity strength	Strong	82.9%	17.1%	51.2%	48.8%
	Weak	78.6%	21.4%	55.4%	44.6%
Religious identity strength	Strong	84.3%	15.7%	50.6%	49.4%
	Weak	81.8%	18.2%	54.1%	45.9%

(for level of agreement with the statement "The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of the Arabs")
* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

(for level of agreement with the statement "The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of my religious group")
$ = $p < 0.1$
$$ = $p < 0.05$
$$$ = $p < 0.01$

As shown in Table 45, the variable "Age at arrival" has an almost insignificant impact on respondents' assessments of the media representations of their ethnic and religious groups. Nonetheless, Table 45 shows that, as we move from the "0 to 4" to the "9 to 12" "age-at-arrival" group, the proportion of respondents who consider that the media portray Arabs in a biased manner increases, although quite marginally (from 79.0% to 82.4%, to 86.8%). Similarly, the proportion of respondents who believe that mass-media are biased in portraying their religious group is slightly higher among the most recent immigration cohort

(59.2%) than it is among the two oldest ones (respectively 50% and 51.4%). Beyond these small variations, the overall picture is that respondents who were born in Canada, or who got here before the age of 8, are practically as likely as the most recent migrant youths to single out the media as a chief contributor to the prejudicial stereotyping of their ethnic and religious groups.

Not surprisingly, as seen in Table 45, Muslim respondents are significantly more likely than their Christian ethnic peers to perceive prejudice against their religious group in the media (85.1% vs. 36.4%). More interesting, though, is that the proportion of respondents who think that the media propagate a biased picture of Arabs is higher among Muslim than among Christian Arab youths (90.8% vs. 77.8%). How can we account for such a discrepancy? As already stressed in section 5.2.1-a, anti-Arab and anti-Muslim prejudices largely intersect to form one common system of (mis)representations. Thus, films such as "Never without my Daughter", or most movies featuring Arab terrorists, such as "Passenger 57" or "True Lies", seldom show an a-religious Arab character. Instead, in most cases, the "evil" Arab male tends to conspicuously display his Muslim faith in a more or less radicalized and fanaticized manner. As pertinently argued by Antonius and Bendris (1998), such a representation is in line with a typically "Orientalist" framework, in which Islam becomes the primary explanatory factor giving meaning to every action and attitude associated with the emblematic figure of the Arab. This could explain why Muslim respondents tend to be more prone to identify anti-Arab prejudice in the media than their Christian counterparts. Yet, it must be kept in mind that the great majority of Christian Arabs of this sample (77,.%) also consider that our media provide a biased picture of Arabs. And most importantly, the above examined narratives showed that Christian Arabs were quite sensitive to, and affected by misrepresentations of Arabs in the media, despite being acutely

aware that Islam constitutes a central axis around which the stereotypical figure of the Arab is structured. This can be accounted for in part because media representations of both Christian and Muslim Arabs are encoded using the same Islam-centred references, which causes both groups to share the same Islam-centred **external** boundaries.[24] However, as mentioned in section 5.2.1(a), Muslim Arabs have **less** power than Christian Arabs to divest anti-Arab stereotypes of their most socially compromising component: Islam. Muslim Arabs' power to resist outside stereotyping of their religious group lies in their capacity to deploy self-definitions which critically engage Western-made pre-notions about Arabo-Islamic culture. Needless to say, such a struggle over symbols is fundamentally unequal since, as theorized by Edward Saïd (1979), neo-colonial groups' representations of their neo-colonized Others are highly self-referential, and, as such, remain largely unaltered by the subalterns' attempts at challenging them. On the other hand, Christian Arabs can more easily, but never entirely, rehabilitate the Arab label they embrace by simply dissociating themselves from Muslim Arabs, both publicly and subjectively, whenever the anti-Arab stereotypes they face rest explicitly on prejudicial representations of Islam.

Finally, as seen in Table 45, neither ethnic nor religious identity strength impacts on perceived prejudice in the media. Thus, the proportion of those who consider that the media misrepresent either the Arabs or their religious group varies only negligibly depending on whether one has a strong or a weak ethno-religious identity. Actually, it even appears that low religious identity retainers are slightly more likely than high religious identity retainers to perceive the media as biased in their portrayal of one's religious group. In any case, these findings suggest that neither ethnic nor religious identity strength is a determining factor in

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[24] Note that it is quite ironic that the mass-media have succeeded in making Arab culture synonymous with Islam - given that 62% of Arab-Canadians are Christians.

these youths' propensity to perceive the mass-media as being prejudiced against their ethnic and religious groups.

5.2.2) Self-experienced Anti-Arab Discrimination

This section is aimed at tapping into these Arab-Canadian youths' experience of anti-Arab discrimination at the personal level. Before going any further, it must be reminded that, contrary to the notion of prejudice, which relates to the realm of negative representations, that of discrimination refers to exclusionary behaviours. Discrimination can take the form of either open rejection or a mere differential treatment based on one or more distinctive characteristic(s). Also, the discriminatory act results in putting at a disadvantage the targeted individual or group. Conversely, in a discrimination-free environment, minority groups would be accepted by the majority group without seeing their distinctive characteristic(s) turned into a social stigma justifying exclusion. As previously stressed, whereas discrimination necessarily entails prejudicial representations, the latter do not necessarily lead to discrimination. However, depending on various factors such as international politics, social class, or education, just to name a few, members of the majority group can always draw on a vast pool of prejudicial representations to socially legitimize discrimination against a given minority group. Thus, there is no mechanical causal relationship between prejudice and discrimination. Yet, the former is generally a prerequisite for the latter to blossom, depending on the socio-cultural, political and economic conjuncture.

In the following, we will assess the extent to which the above documented perceived anti-Arab stereotypes are also coupled with perceived anti-Arab discriminatory practices. To this end, respondents were asked to report the extent to which they agree with the statement

"In my personal life, I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians?" As clearly seen in Table 46, a majority of respondents (57.9%) completely agree with such a statement. Also, the second most popular answer is "I somewhat agree" (32.5%). Only a small minority of the sample either "somewhat disagree" (9.2%), or "completely disagree" (0.4%) with the statement "In my personal life, I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians?" It thus appears that the great majority of these second-generation Arab youths do not experience much ethnicity-based exclusion in their daily life.

Table 46: Percentages of agreement with "In my personal life, I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians"

Level of Agreement	Statement
	"Personally, I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians"
I completely disagree	0.4%
I somewhat disagree	9.2%
I somewhat agree	32.5%
I completely agree	57.9%
TOTAL	100%

We will now briefly contrast the above results with those yielded by two other pieces of research in which self-reported discrimination against Arab-Canadians had also been investigated. First, our results are fully consistent with Abu-Laban and McIrvin Abu-Laban's (1999) research findings. In their study, these authors measured, by means of survey methods and interviews, the level and nature of discrimination experienced by an Edmonton sample of Arab-Canadian youths. They found out that levels of self-reported discrimination among their sample were surprisingly low. Thus, according to these authors:

"Contrary to classic accounts of the marginal position that the second generation occupies in American society, the results from the Edmonton survey do not seem to reflect the marginality of Arab-Canadian youths despite the difficult situation that they experience. (...)" (Abu-Laban, and McIrvin Abu-Laban, 1999:150)

However, later in their article, Abu-Laban and McIrvin Abu-Laban warn the reader against generalizing, based on their sample, to the whole population of second-generation Arab-Canadians. According to them, their results could be attributed to the relatively high socio-economic status of their Edmonton sample. Such a warning is equally relevant to the present study. Indeed, our own sampled CEGEP students belong for the most part to middle and upper-middle classes. First, a high socio-economic status is generally associated with a better understanding of majority group codes, language, and culture. This constitutes a precious capital which allows second-generationers to "blend in" more easily, so as to ward off discriminating attitudes and practices when needed. Secondly, ethnic prejudice and discrimination are generally more virulent within lower socio-economic milieus, where right wing discourses portraying foreigners as economic and cultural threats are more likely to find a fertile ground for their large-scale propagation. Finally, it must be kept in mind that the workplace is generally the institutional setting where ethno-racial discrimination is the most likely to be found (Hayani, 1999:300, reporting results from the 1992 Toronto Star "Goldfarb Minorities Report"). Therefore, much higher levels of reported discrimination could have been detected by the present study, had our respondents been full-time wage earners as opposed to students. In any case, further research is certainly needed to address these specific questions.

Ibrahim Hayani (1999) drew similar conclusions based on a 1993 Ontario study, with respect to the question of discrimination experienced by Arab-Canadians. This author argued that "the Ontario study respondents did feel that there was discrimination directed against

their group, but not as much as one would have expected given their perceptions of how poorly Canadians regarded Arabs, their culture, their way of life (Hayani, 1999:300)." Furthermore, adds Hayani, when compared to levels of discriminatory experiences reported by other minority groups in Canada (as measured by the 1992 Toronto Star/Goldfarb Minorities Report, reported by Hayani, 1999:300), those reported by the Arab-Canadians sampled for the Ontario study are among the lowest.[25] However, Hayani underscored one variation which is particularly relevant to our own research: Canadian-born Arabs, compared with Arab migrants, reported the highest levels of discriminatory experiences. Hayani pertinently explains this surprising variation by saying that Canadian-born respondents are more likely to recognize and object to discriminatory experiences (1999:301).

In my view, the question used in the Ontario study cited by Hayani is actually bound to over-estimate and exaggerate the extent of anti-Arab discrimination in Canada. For this survey, respondents were asked whether they had ever encountered some form of discrimination in various settings (school, workplace, etc..), with no consideration for the frequency of such experiences. As a result, respondents who experienced discrimination, say only once, were lumped together with respondents who experienced it on a regular basis. This prevents us from knowing whether these experiences are generalized, or rather constitute isolated cases in the life of the respondents. In this respect, we believe that our own indicator, being frequency-sensitive (agree/disagree on a scale of 4), provides a more accurate and nuanced measurement of the extent of discriminatory experiences directed against Arabs in Canada. And based on this method, only a small minority of our sample of second-generation Arab youths feel either completely (0.4%) or somewhat excluded (9.2%)

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[25] It should be noted that, according to Hayani, the question used in the Minority Report to measure self-reported discrimination is the same than the one used in the Ontario study.

by their fellow Canadians in their personal life. However, it should be reiterated that these results are not extendable to the whole population of Arab-Canadian youths of Montreal, since they were extracted from a non-representative sample.

We shall now examine the issue of self-reported discrimination in light of our qualitative data. The narratives largely support the statistically-backed observation that second-generation Arab youths tend to be relatively well shielded from discriminatory experiences in their personal life. Indeed, almost all of our 16 informants reported being generally well accepted by their fellow Canadians. However, some respondents reported having encountered some form of discriminatory behaviours or attitudes at one point or another in their life, while adding that such experiences were isolated cases attributable to a small minority of close-minded individuals. The following narrative is quite representative of this category of response:

> Me: "In your personal life, do you feel accepted as an Arab and a Syrian by Canadians and Québécois?
>
> Informant N: "Hmm by most of them yes. Because the only real racists are the extremists. I haven't met too many of them, and it doesn't interest me. But usually, everywhere I go, whether in school, in the workplace, in my personal life, I haven't been affected by discrimination as far as I can remember." (Christian Syrian Lebanese female, arrived at 6 years old).

However, upon closer scrutiny, it appears that the above suggested picture of a tolerant Canadian society needs to be seriously qualified. On the one hand, the narratives examined here suggest indeed that these second-generation youths are relatively well sheltered from actual discriminatory experiences. However, it seems to be the case only insofar as they avoid displaying publicly their ethnicity. More specifically, several of these second-generationers gave to understand that they were spared discriminatory experiences at the price of stripping their social self of any distinguishable signs of their ethnic culture and identity. The following exchange points to this trend. Thus, says informant H:

Me: "Do you feel accepted as an Arab and Muslim by Canadians?

Informant H: "Yes I do. Cause most of them don't know that I am Arab. They don't think…I don't look like an Arab (…). Sometimes at work… I work with Québécois and they'll often say stereotypical comments about Arabs. But they never realize that I am an Algerian, that I am Arab too. You know, for them, it's really the stereotype of the Arab: it's the woman wearing the hijab with 12 kids who comes to the store. (…) And often, they'll say something, and I'll go *Hey, I am Arab too. Me too I…* and then they'll go *No no, you, you're different.* But I still take it as an insult."

Me: "Why do they say *Well, you, you're different* (from other Arabs)?

Informant H: "I don't know. Perhaps because I've adapted to this country. I was born here. I speak like them, I dress like them. That's why they'll say *Ha but you, it's not the same.* Because they have their pre-fabricated image [of what an Arab should be]." (Canadian-born Muslim Algerian female).

Informant G, a Canadian-born Muslim Egyptian female, made a similar comment:

Informant G: "They [Canadians] have pre-notions about Arabs, and that's why I don't like to introduce myself as an Arab. I say *Hi my name is* (censored), because I don't want them to put a stereotype or an opinion on me, when they didn't give a chance to get to know me."

Me: "Right. You want to stay away from pre-fabricated labels ey?"

Informant G: "Labels yeah! That's why I don't emphasize much my Arab origins in the first place. I think it's more my humanity after all. I am a human just like any other Canadian (…)"
(Canadian-born Muslim Egyptian female).

Similarly, Informant B states that he chooses to downplay his Arab-ness when interacting with Canadians, with a view to avoid discrimination or, to put it in his euphemized terms, to "avoid conflict":

Me: "Could you tell me whether you agree with the statement "In my personal life, I feel accepted as an Arab and a Lebanese by Canadians?" Could you also explain to me why?

Informant B: "Yes. I agree completely. Well, since I was born here, I have never felt that I was discriminated against as a Lebanese. But in any case, I avoid this type of conflicts. I mean, I don't position myself as a Lebanese in front of Canadians, just to show them I am Lebanese. I avoid this type of conflicts in order to develop harmonious relationships with them."
(Canadian-born Christian Lebanese male).

The above narratives all share at least two common denominators which are particularly noteworthy. First, as mentioned above, all of these informants seem to imply that their acceptance by Canadians is conditional: it depends on the "de-ethnicization" of their

identity structure. In other terms, for a great many subjects, being accepted by Canadians requires that they "keep a low ethnic profile". Second, as a corollary, the above narratives also reveal the capacity of these informants to adopt or drop at will any ethno-cultural trait which they perceive as being regarded poorly by the majority group. Thus, they shed light on the optional character of these youths' ethnic identity, which can be deliberately activated or downplayed depending on the social context of interaction. Given the numerous prejudicial anti-Arab stereotypes prevailing in our society, several of our subjects prefer not to be perceived and identified by members of the majority group as Arab-Canadians. To this end, they need to conceal as much as possible any culturally distinct sign, be it linguistic, attitudinal, or behavioural, that could betray their ethnic origins. Such a camouflage operation is made possible in the case of second-generationers whose incorporation into the dominant culture is sufficiently underway to allow them to master adequately the majority group's socio-cultural and linguistic codes. The following narrative illustrates eloquently this phenomenon, whereby one's ethnic self is voluntarily confined to ethnic socio-cultural environments, so as to ward off ethnic-based prejudice and discrimination:

> **Informant K:** "There is no such things here [in Canada] as *Hey! We don't want you!* It's more subtle. They say *Ha! You guys* [Arabs] *are different* (...). But when you're been told repeatedly that you're different, that you're not like them, you prefer to stay with those who're like you" (...). Anyway, personally, I don't feel that I am so different from them. Our differences are things that stay in the family. We keep them for ourselves, when we're among ourselves, among Arabs.
>
> **Me:** "So you change your behaviours and attitudes when you're with Québécois?"
>
> **Informant K:** "Yes. I change completely. But everybody does that. Whenever you're among Québécois, you don't act the same as if you were with Arabs. (...) You got to learn to adapt...quick! I think that this is the real difference." (Muslim Algerian female, arrived at 7)

This phenomenon is very well captured by the notion of optional ethnicity, as most brilliantly theorized by Mary Waters (1990) in her study on second- and third generation American ethnic Whites. Thus, similar to the Ethnic Whites studied by Waters, the Arab-

Canadian youths of this sample tend to have a rather malleable ethnic identity which can be arranged and re-arranged, depending on the interlocutors and the social context of interaction. This shows how the ethnic boundaries deployed by these second-generationers are fundamentally fluid, rather than static.

However, there is one fundamental difference between the American "Ethnic Whites" described by Waters and Alba, and these second-generation Arabs: the former are generally encouraged to emphasize publicly their "Europeanized" ethnic background, which has a high symbolic value on the North American market of hyphenated ethnic identities. For instance, Irish-Canadians, Italian-Canadians, Portuguese-Canadians, juts to name a few, tend to exhibit proudly their ethnicity, knowing that, in North-America, European culture is highly valued. By contrast, Canadians have a particularly low regard for Arab cultures and peoples[26], and, as seen in section 5.2.1, Arab-Canadian youths identify much anti-Arab prejudicial stereotyping in Canadian society in general, and in Canadian media in particular. As a result, as shown in the present section, several of my informants feel quasi compelled to downplay or drop, whenever possible, some of their attitudes and behaviours that would betray their Arab origin when interacting with Canadians. Thus, the main difference between the "ethnic options" of second-generation ethnic Whites, and those of second-generation Arabs, is the following: when members of the former group play their "ethnic card", they contribute to enhance their social status, whereas when member of the latter group do the same, they become at risk of incurring stigmatization, and/or exclusion.

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[26] Thus, as reported by McIrvin Abu-Laban and Abu-Laban (1999:115), a 1977 national survey of Canadian attitudes showed that, in a list of 27 ethnic groups, Arab-Canadians were ranked 24th by Anglo-Canadians.

In addition, as Mary Waters argued (1990, 1996), it must be kept in mind that, contrary to many "ethnic Whites", racialized minorities in multi-ethnic societies such as the USA and Canada are much more limited in their ability to choose when and where to assert their ethnic identity. Indeed, members of racialized minorities are much more restrained in their "ethnic options", since the majority group tends to impose on them outside definitions reducing their group identity to their distinctive physical characteristics. In other words, while White Americans of European descent can be said to celebrate "individualistic symbolic ethnic identities", racialized groups are faced with a "socially enforced and imposed racial identity." (Waters, 1996:449). Skin colour is of course one of the main vectors determining the racialization of certain minorities. In this respect, the problematic of racial assignment can also affect Arab-Canadians, although not as acutely as African-Canadians, or other more "visible" minorities. Within the Arab community, there is an almost infinite amount of national as well as individual variations in skin colours. The fact that most of my informants have a relatively light complexion seems to allow them to decide more unrestrictedly when and where they wish their ethnicity to be made more or less salient. However, the following example reported by informant C reminds us that it is not the case for individuals of Arab descent who have a swarthiest complexion:

> **Me:** "In your personal life, do you feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians? You circled in the questionnaire "I completely agree." Does that mean you haven't been affected too much by discrimination and stigmatization?"

> **Informant C:** "Yes. It wasn't too bad for me, even though their mentality was sometimes different from mine. But I remember that my cousin who has a darker complexion, hmm. For him, it was a bombardment! My cousin really got the worst of it! But me, I have always been accepted, and I've never got any problems with that! (Canadian-born half-Palestinian, half-Lebanese Christian male)

We will now examine the effect of selected independent variables on self-reported discrimination. As we can see in Table 47, none of our selected independent variables has a

statistically significant impact on "Self-reported discrimination". Also, the directions of these relationships are almost all identical (with one exception) to the directions of the relationships between these same independent variables, and "Perceived prejudicial stereotypes". Thus, females, Christians, high ethnic and religious identity retainers, are all more likely to feel accepted as Arabs by Canadians than, respectively, males, Muslims, and low ethnic and religious identity retainers. These relationships will not be discussed since it can be reasonably assumed that the impact of these variables on "Self-reported discrimination" can be accounted for using the same arguments than those put forward in section 5.1 to explain their impact on "Perceived stereotyping".

Table 47: Percentages of agreement with "In my personal life, I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians", with selected variables.

Level of agreement		Statement	
		"I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadian"	
		I DISAGREE	I AGREE
Gender	Females	6.8%	93.2%
	Males	12.2%	87.8%
Religious affiliation	Christians	8.0%	92.0%
	Muslims	12.6%	87.4%
Age at arrival	0 to 4	10.5%	89.5%
	5 to 8	11.8%	88.2%
	9 to 12	6.6%	93.4%
Ethnic identity strength	Strong	11.8	88.2%
	Weak	5.4%	94.6%
Religious identity strength	Strong	11.2%	88.8%
	Weak	8.8%	91.2%

* $= p < 0.1$
** $= p < 0.05$
*** $= p < 0.01$

However, there is one counter-intuitive relationship displayed in Table 47, namely the direction of the relationship between "Age at arrival" and "Self-reported discrimination". The group among which respondents are the most likely to feel accepted as Arabs is the one made up of the most freshly arrived migrants (the "9 to 12" age-at-arrival group). Inversely, those respondents who have spent the longest time in Canada are the most likely to feel rejected as Arabs by Canadians. That being said, it must be stressed that the proportion of respondents who feel either completely or somewhat accepted as Arabs by Canadians remains extremely high among all three age at arrival groups (89.5%, 88.2%, and 93.4%, respectively), with a very small percentage discrepancy between the lowest and the highest levels of perceived acceptance.

Nonetheless, it seems difficult, at first sight, to understand why Canadian-born respondents, as well as respondents who got here before the age of 4, would be (even slightly) more likely to feel rejected as Arabs by Canadians. As previously discussed, Ibrahim Hayani (1999), who observed a similar phenomenon among an Ontario sample of Arab-Canadians, concluded that perhaps his Canadian-born respondents were more likely to recognize and to object to discriminatory behaviour (Hayani, 1999:301). Such an explanation is plausible for at least two reasons. First, the very notion of discrimination is highly "problematized" in North-American's political culture, which makes Canadian-born Arab youths more sensitive to its most subtle manifestations. Moreover, it may be that Canadian-born youths are all the more affected and frustrated to see their ethnic community and culture vilified by Canadians, since Canada's official Multicultural policy and discourse strongly emphasizes the need for greater respect and tolerance of ethno-cultural differences.

Before closing this chapter, it is important to account sociologically for the fact that these Arab youths' pronounced tendency to perceive anti-Arab stereotyping stands in stark contrast to their marked feeling of being well accepted by Canadians on a personal level. It was suggested earlier that part of the answer lies in the capacity of these second-generationers to ward off discrimination by downplaying in public any distinctive signs of their Arab and/or Muslim identity. However, the case of Maghrebis of the second generation in France suggests that a situational and adaptive ethnicity is not the sole contributing factor. Thus, French Beurs of the second and the third generation are very much culturally incorporated into their host society. Yet, several pieces of research have shown that they still endure significant socio-economic discrimination in the public sphere, and feel rejected by the majority group in their daily life. (Lapeyronnie, 1987; Begag, 1990; Jazouli, 1995; Leveau, 1997).

Other factors, then, must also be taken into consideration when explaining the discrepancy between Arab-Canadian and French-Maghrebi youths with regard to questions of self-experienced discrimination. First, one cannot grasp adequately France's current relationship to its Arab minorities without taking into account this country's colonial heritage. During the colonial era, native Maghrebi populations were categorized- both at the representational and the juridical level - as (inferior) subjects of the French colonial empire, as opposed to full citizens of the French Republic. According to some authors, such as Lorcerie (1997) and Blancel (1997), this colonial categorization evolved today into more subtle forms, producing the figure of *l'immigré*, whose irreducible otherness - as opposed to inferiority - makes him the perpetual stranger from within. The current marginalization and discrimination experienced by the Beurs is related in part to the neo-colonized status that this group occupies in French society, being confined to the periphery of the labour market, and being regarded as an eternal outgroup by the French population. As a result, there is a profound contradiction between the radical Republican

universalism informing the French model of citizenship, and the poor socio-economic incorporation of French-Maghrebi youths, left on the margins of mainstream institutions in spite of culturally blending in with the French majority group (Taguieff, 1997). By contrast, Arab-Canadians have never been historically caught up in a colonialist/colonized relationship with their host society. This certainly contributes to explain in part why, compared to French-Maghrebis, they are not as specifically affected by structural discrimination, and why their integration into mainstream institutions is not as resisted by the majority group(s). Simply put, ethnic mobilization against anti-Arab discrimination may be much stronger in France, compared with Canada, because current structural discrimination against Arabs is much more pronounced in the former country for reasons that cannot be understood without taking into account the history of French colonialism.

Another factor that could also account for differential levels of self-reported discrimination among Arab-Canadian and French Maghrebi youths may be unrelated to actual levels of anti-Arab discrimination found in each country. More specifically, such cross-national variations may be also related to France's and Canada's different policies of incorporation of migrants. Thus, whereas Canada's Multicultural policy actively encourages minority groups to preserve their ethno-cultural differences, the official French Republican discourse fosters a more culturally coercive model of integration, which requires ethnic minorities to incorporate into the hegemonic French culture. However, it should be noted that authors Jeff Reitz and Raymond Breton (1994) have convincingly shown that Canada's Multicultural policy, compared with the more assimilation-driven policies implemented in the U.S.A., have not yielded greater levels of actual ethnic identity retention among minority groups. Also, and most importantly, Jeff Reitz (1988) observed that, even though cross-national comparisons suggest that rates of racial and ethnic employment discrimination are largely similar in Canada and Great Britain, there are

much more racial and ethnic conflicts in the latter as opposed to the former country. Reitz explained this difference by several factors, one of which being that Canada's brand of multiculturalism mitigates ethnic tensions more by its ideological and institutional promotion of ethno-cultural diversity, than by actually breeding more tolerance towards ethno-cultural minorities among Canadians. More specifically, it is suggested that Canada's Multicultural policy operates as an ideological screen contributing to mask discrimination by focussing essentially on the preservation of minority groups' cultures, while neglecting to address the various manifestations of ethno-racial intolerance and inequality permeating civil society (Reitz, 1988).

Jeff Reitz's argument could be put to use to account for the extremely low levels of perceived discrimination reported by the Arab youths of the present sample, compared with, once again, French-Maghrebi youths. Although Reitz's study is yet to be duplicated so as to make rigorous comparisons between the socio-economic status of Beurs and that of Arab-Canadian youths, the existing body of literature indicates, as mentioned earlier, that the former group undergo much more structural ethnic-based exclusion and discrimination than the latter. Nonetheless, the literature on ethnic inequality in Canada suggests that non-Western racialized minorities in general also suffer from discrimination in the labour and in the housing markets (Reitz, 1988; Lian and Matthews, 1998). Also, Raymond Breton's (1983: 431-3) study has called attention to very low levels of awareness of racial discrimination among visible minorities in Canada. Thus, based on previous research, it could be argued that the low propensity of my sampled Arab-Canadian youths to report self-experienced discrimination could be partially accounted for by the tendency of visible minorities in Canada to overestimate ethnic and racial tolerance among Canadians. In this respect, the positive image of a tolerant and inclusive Canadian society harboured by our respondents may well be a by-product of Canada's

Multicultural policy, which, as argued by Reitz (1988), contributes to deflect minority groups' responses to actual discrimination. To that extent, perhaps the "Canadian politics of recognition", to use Charles Taylor's (1997) expression, operates as the "opium" of visible minorities in Canada, for it numbs their capacity to detect and resist discrimination. In other words, it perpetuates the illusion, both among ethnic minorities and the majority group, that Canadians and Canadian institutions are comparatively more inclusive of, and tolerant towards ethno-cultural and racial differences.

That being said, it should be stressed again that these Arab-Canadian youths' low levels of self-experienced ethnic exclusion should also be accounted for, at least in part, by the very nature of my sample. Thus, as mentioned earlier, my sampled youths are almost all students and, as such, benefit from a relatively sheltered milieu, compared with their ethnic peers facing more pervading discrimination on the labour market. Also, all of our sampled Cegeps host a very multicultural and multiethnic student population, which certainly contributes to cultivate more tolerant attitudes towards ethno-cultural diversity.

CHAPTER 6: REGRESSION ANALYSIS

6.1) Regression Model Predicting Ethnic Identity Strength

6.1.1) In Search of a Preferred model

In this section, we will attempt to identify a regression model that predicts as reliably as possible the variance in the mean coefficient measuring ethnic identity strength. Four different models were tested, each including one or more predictors which, based on the above reviewed literature and theory, are presumed to have a significant impact on "Ethnic identity strength". In addition to its core predictor(s), each model is comprised as well of a series of selected control variables, all presumed to have a significant impact on the variance in the dependent variable.

The core predictor in model 1 is the variable "Religious identity strength". The one in model 2 is "Gender-related traditionalism". The one in model 3 is "Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission" and, finally, those in model 4 are "Perceived anti-Arab stereotyping", and "Self-experienced anti-Arab discrimination ".

Before adding relevant control variables to these 4 models, a series of regressions including only "Ethnic identity strength", and each of its tested core predictors taken separately have been run.

Table 48: Regression coefficients of each tested predictor of "Ethnic identity strength" in bi-variate models

Predictor	Dependent variable: Ethnic identity strength	R square	N
Religious identity Strength	Beta=0.392*** (0.056)	0.153***	215
Predictor	Dependent variable: Ethnic identity strength	R square	N
Gender-related Traditionalism	Beta=0.275*** (0.046)	0.076***	225
Predictor	Dependent variable: Ethnic identity strength	R square	N
Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission	Beta=0.661*** (0.034)	0.437***	221
Predictor	Dependent variable: Ethnic identity strength	R square	N
Perceived anti-Arab Stereotyping	Beta=0.119* (0.047)	0.014*	225
Predictor	Dependent variable: Ethnic identity strength	R square	N
Self-experienced anti-Arab Discrimination	Beta=0.008 (0.014)	0.000	225

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

As seen in Table 48, all 5 predictors, but one are significantly correlated with "Ethnic identity strength". Also, the regression coefficients indicate that the variables "Religious identity strength", "Gender-related traditionalism", and "Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission" are all individually correlated with "Ethnic identity strength" at the 0.01 level. "Perceived anti-Arab stereotyping" was only significant at the 0.1 level, and account for a meagre 1.4% of the variance in "Ethnic identity strength". Finally, "Self-experienced anti-Arab discrimination" turned out to be statistically unrelated to the dependent variable, and has thus been excluded from model 4.

The control variables "Gender" and "Religious affiliation" will be included in each model. However, it should be noted that two bi-variate regressions were performed, showing that neither "Religious affiliation" nor "Gender", at least taken separately, has a significant impact on the dependent variable. Yet, they will be included in the regression models to be tested, with a view to flag out any potential interaction effect between them and any other core predictors. In addition, models 1, 2, 3, and 4 will also include the control variables "Age at arrival in Canada", "Ethnic residential segregation", and "Father's education", on the account that these predictors are traditionally known to be correlated with ethnic identity retention. However, a series of two bi-variate regressions showed that the variables "Father's education" and "Ethnic residential segregation" do not have any significant effect on "Ethnic identity strength". Once again, these variables were nonetheless included in each model, in case their interaction with one or more core predictors ends up affecting significantly the variance in the dependent variable.

Thus, each of the 4 models includes 6 variables: one core predictor to be tested, as well as 5 additional control variables. The 4 tested models are shown below, with their respective R^2 and the significance level associated with each predictor:

Model #1 $(R^2 = 0.285)$***

Independent variables= Religious identity strength***/ Gender/, Religious affiliation/ Father's education/ Ethnic Residential segregation***/ Age at arrival***

Model #2 $(R^2 = 0.212)$***

Independent variables= Gender related traditionalism***/ Gender/ Religious affiliation*/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation**/ Age at arrival***.

Model #3 $(R^2 = 0.465)$***

Independent variables= Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission***/Gender/ Religious affiliation/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation/ Age at arrival***

<u>Model# 4</u> ($R^2 = 0.155$)***

<u>Independent variables</u>= Perceived anti-Arab stereotyping**/Gender/ Religious affiliation/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation***/Age at arrival***

Any variables that turned out to be significant in at least one of the above 4 models

were included in regression model # 5, which leaves out only two of them, namely "Father's

education", and "Gender". All the other significant variables were included in regression

model #5:

<u>Model #5</u> ($R^2 = 0.523$***):

<u>Independent variables</u>= Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission***/ Religious identity strength*/ Gender-related traditionalism**/ Perceived anti-Arab stereotyping/ Religious affiliation/ Ethnic residential segregation/ Age at arrival***

6.1.2) The Preferred Model: a Discussion

The preferred model was obtained by performing a final regression including only the

significant independent variables comprised in model #5. As seen below in Table 49, the

preferred model accounts for 50.8% of the variance in the dependent variable.

Table 49: Regression coefficients for preferred model predicting "Ethnic identity strength"

PREFERRED MODEL

Predictor	Dependent variable:
	Ethnic identity strength
Religious identity strength	Beta=0.137** (0.052)
Gender-related traditionalism	Beta=0.119** (0.039)
Parental commitment to ethnic Identity transmission	Beta=0.545*** (0.037)
Age at arrival in Canada	Beta=0.168*** (0.002)
R square	0.508***
N	210

*   = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

As shown in Table 49, the variables which best predict ethnic identity retention are "Strong parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission", "Arriving at a young age in Canada", and a "High level of religious identity retention". However, most of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by "Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission" (Beta=0.545). This implies, not surprisingly, that the more Arab migrants are actively committed to transmitting their ethnic identity to the next generation, the more their children are likely to actually retain it. These results suggest that parents' efforts at transmitting their cultural framework and identity to their children are largely successful. However, it should be reminded that, as qualitative analysis showed in chapter 4, these youths do not assimilate unquestioningly the normative and symbolic content of their parents' ethnic heritage. Rather, they perform several negotiations meant to operate a functional synthesis articulating elements of the parental culture to the Canadian or Québécois cultural framework. Yet, these results confirm the great importance of

socialization in the retention by second-generationers of their ethnic culture and identity. However, it remains to be seen whether ethnic identity's multifaceted aspects are all equally hinging upon parental socialization. For instance, it may be that parental socialization plays a determining role in the maintenance of ethnic identity's external aspect, but only a negligible one in the retention of ethnic identity's internal aspect, embodied in ethnic identification and consciousness. This hypothesis will be put to the test in section 6.1.3.

The preferred model predicting ethnic identity retention also includes the variables "Religious identity strength", and "Gender-related traditionalism". However, as shown above in Table 49, the significance levels associated with these latter variables (p< 0.05) indicate that they do not predict the variance in ethnic identity strength as reliably as "Age at arrival in Canada", and "Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission", which are significant at the 0.01 level. First, this finding lends (moderate) support to the notion that religion and ethnicity tend to intersect in these Arab second-generationers' identity structure, when holding constant other contributing factors. As well, the hypothesis that traditional attitudes towards gender relationships contribute to ethnic identity retention has been equally lent support, although, once again, this correlation is weak (Beta=0.119), but yet statistically significant (p<0.05). Thus, gender relationships seem to operate as an ethnic identity marker shaping the boundaries separating the in-group and the out-group. More specifically, in light of the above discussed narratives, it can be said, following numerous authors (e.g. Shukrallah, 1994; Geadah, 1996; Ajrouch, 1999), that women as a category contribute to the process of the re-creation of the Arab community, due to their role of "cultural bearers" of ethno-religious traditions. However, it must be reminded, based on frequency distributions (see Table 31), that most respondents' scores on the tradition scale fall into the category "Somewhat liberal" (34.1%). Thus, although "Gender-related traditionalism" and "Ethnic identity strength"

are statistically correlated, most respondents of this sample are "somewhat in disagreement" with traditional models of gender relationships. It would be then be more accurate to say that, while these Arab-Canadian youths critically engage gender-related traditions in their "ideal-typical" form, they nonetheless re-appropriate them in a more equalitarian format for ethnic identity building purposes. Such results are perfectly in line with our qualitative data.

Finally, the preferred model also reveals a significant positive relationship at the 0.01 level between one's age at arrival, and ethnic identity strength. In other words, when holding other contributing factors constant, respondents who were born in Canada, or got here at a young age, are more likely to retain their ethnic identity than respondents who got to Canada at an older age.

6.1.3) Model Predicting Ethnic Identity's External and Internal Dimensions

Drawing in particular on Isajiw's work, we have suggested in the theoretical framework that ethnicity is a multifaceted phenomenon, which is as much over-determined by socialization networks (external dimension) as it is subjectively constructed (internal dimension). Also, we saw that several empirical studies convincingly demonstrate that both dimensions should be analytically treated as independent phenomena that can potentially evolve in, if not opposite, at least divergent directions. Furthermore, the above reviewed theory and literature showed that second-generationers tend to develop a very strong ethnic self-concept, even though their familiarity with the ethnic culture, as well as their socio-cultural involvement in the ethnic community, have largely faded away. This phenomenon was referred to as a symbolic form of ethnicity (Gans, 1994).

As a reminder, in section 4.1.1, it was argued that the notion of symbolic ethnicity was partially relevant to the present sample. On the one hand, the most developed aspect of these Arab second-generationers' ethnic identity is, by far, their internal-cultural one. However, the second most developed dimension of their ethnic identity structure is at the external-cultural level. It was thus concluded that these Arab youths' ethnicity, far from being reducible to a sole subjective construction, was also sustained through socialization into their ethnic culture. However, the two least developed dimensions being at the social level (internal-social, and external-social), it was also suggested that these youths tend more to identify and be familiar with their ethnic culture, than to be subjectively and objectively bound by a community of ethnic peers. In this respect, Mary Waters' notion of costless community turned out to be relevant to the present sample.

However, the objective pursued in the present section is of a different nature. We will put to the test one of the key assumption underlying the symbolic ethnicity hypothesis. We will do so by identifying some of the determinants of ethnic identity's external and internal aspects. If the symbolic hypothesis is true, it would follow that ethnic identity's internal aspect would not require a strong communal basis to flourish. Put differently, its successful retention by the youths would not be dependent on socially structuring factors. Inversely, if the symbolic hypothesis is true, ethnic identity's external dimension should be strongly determined by factors implying sustained socialization processes. To test this hypothesis, we ran two regressions to identify which variables best account for variations in respondents' scores on scales measuring ethnic identity's external and internal aspects. The selected independent variables for both models are the same than those included in model 5, that is all the statistically significant variables flagged out in models 1, 2, 3, and 4. All of these independent variables are, more or less, socio-structural factors involving secondary and/or

primary socialization groups. Therefore, if there is some relevance to the symbolic ethnicity

hypothesis, these combined variables should have a greater predictive power to account for

the variance in ethnic identity's external aspect, than for the variance in ethnic identity's

internal aspect.

Table 50: Regression coefficients for two multivariate models predicting ethnic identity's
internal and external aspects

Predictors	Dependent variables	
	EXTERNAL aspect of ethnic identity	INTERNAL aspect of ethnic identity
Gender-related Traditionalism	Beta= 0.144** (0.053)	Beta= 0.131* (0.053)
Religious identity Strength	Beta= 0.194*** (0.067)	Beta= 0.036 (0.066)
Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission	Beta= 0.431*** (0.047)	Beta=0.478*** (0.048)
Perceived anti-Arab Stereotyping	Beta= 0.051 (0.046)	Beta= -0.010 (0.046)
Age at arrival in Canada	Beta= 0.191*** 0.002)	Beta= 0.096 (0.002)
Religious affiliation	Beta= 0.130** (0.021)	Beta= -0.047 (0.021)
Ethnic Residential segregation	Beta= 0.117** (0.01)	Beta= 0.024 (0.010)
R square	0.481***	0.339***
N	217	221

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

Table 50 largely supports the symbolic ethnicity hypothesis, as the regression

coefficients showed that the above tested variables appear to do a much better job at

predicting the external than the internal aspect of these youths' ethnic identity. Indeed, with

the exception of one, all independent variables turned out to be significantly correlated with

ethnic identity's external aspect. By contrast, only 2 out of these same variables were

significantly correlated with ethnic identity's internal aspect. We shall now examine in more detail these results.

First, "Parental Commitment to ethnic identity transmission" yielded a very high Beta in both regression models (0.431 and 0.478), which indicates that this variable is, by far, the most important predictor accounting for the variance in ethnic identity strength both at the internal and the external levels. It thus seems that Arab youths with parents committed to ethnic identity transmission are particularly more likely to become high ethnic identity retainers, both at the external and the internal levels. This result suggests that ethnic identity's internal aspect is not a purely open space that actors could shape and transform at will in a social vacuum. For one thing, it appears that a strong ethnic self-concept is much more likely to arise among youths whose home socialization was informed by ethnic-based cultural models (Isajiw and Makabe, 1982).

Also, two other variables significantly correlated with "Ethnic identity's external aspect" involve socialization processes: "Religious identity strength", and "Gender-related traditionalism". This suggests once again that the strength of ethnic identity's external aspect is significantly correlated with socio-cultural involvement in socially structuring networks. Finally, 2 other significant variables, "Age at arrival in Canada", and "Ethnic residential segregation", constitute structural factors contributing to reinforce or weaken the capacity of ethnic networks to efficiently socialize second-generationers into their ethnic culture and community. Thus, 4 out of the 6 significant predictors suggest that that ethnic identity's external dimension is strongly determined by socialization processes, themselves influenced by socio-structural factors such as network density ("Ethnic residential segregation"), and length of stay in the host society ("Age at arrival in Canada").

Also, as seen in Table 50, there is a significant correlation at the 0.05 level between being Christian and being a high ethnic identity retainer at the external level, when holding constant the other predictors included in the model. This suggests that ethnic identity's external aspect is slightly more developed among Christian Arab youths than among their Muslim ethnic peers.

Comparatively, out of the 7 tested predictors, only two turned out to be statistically correlated with "Ethnic identity's internal aspect", which confirms largely the symbolic ethnicity hypothesis. Indeed, it appears that these respondents' identification with their ethnic culture, and allegiance to their ethnic community is poorly predicted by socially structuring factors such as those tested in the present research. This suggests that self-constructed ethnic boundaries can be more successfully maintained than ethnic identity's external aspects without being rooted in solid communal ground. However, it should be emphasized that further investigation would be much needed in order to test the effect of other potentially contributing socio-cultural factors on ethnic identity's internal aspect among second-generationers.

One noteworthy element of Table 50 is that "Age at arrival in Canada" is statistically unrelated to ethnic identity's internal aspect. This implies that, when holding constant the other contributing factors of the model, respondents who were born in Canada, or who got here at an early age, are as likely to have a strong ethnic self-concept as those who migrated at a later stage of their life. This finding illustrates how, among these second-generationers, ethnic identity's internal aspect is highly time-resistant, and immune to socio-cultural incorporation into the host society and its institutional networks.

Besides "Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission", "Gender-related traditionalism" was the only other variable to be significantly correlated with ethnic

identity's internal aspect, although quite weakly ($p< 0.1$). This latter correlation is rather surprising when interpreted in light of our theoretical framework. Indeed, based on the symbolic ethnicity hypothesis, ethnic identity's internal aspect should be poorly predicted by ethnic-based socially structuring socialization processes. How can we account, then, for this (slightly) significant correlation, given that traditional attitudes as regards gender relationships are generally associated with this type of processes?

The choice of indicators measuring ethnic-identity's internal-social aspect may account in part for this counter-intuitive tendency. Ethnic identity's internal-social aspect was measured using two indicators derived from the Isajiw scale (1990): "Is it important for you to have a job that will benefit your ethnic group as well as yourself?", and "Is it important for you to marry within your own ethnic group?" These two indicators were employed as measuring devices predicting ethnic identity strength in its internal form, because they refer to hypothetical situations that these youths will not have to face until they get married or find a career in few years. As such, they measure one's subjectively expressed solidarity towards his or her ethnic group. Yet, the situations these indicators refer to (in-group marriage, and job within the ethnic economy) entail a high degree of enmeshment within the ethnic community – an enmeshment of the same kind than that which is associated with "Gender-related traditionalism". Therefore, the fact that these indicators refer to one's (future) commitment to establish close ties with one's ethnic community may be largely responsible for the statistical association between "Gender-related traditionalism" and "Ethnic identity's internal-aspect". We thus put to the test the hypothesis that "Gender-related traditionalism" is mostly correlated with ethnic identity's internal-social aspect, and only weakly, or not at all to ethnic identity's internal-cultural aspect.

Table 51: Regression coefficients for two bi-variate models predicting ethnic identity's internal-cultural and internal-social aspects, with "Gender-related traditionalism" as the independent variable

Predictor	Model 1	Model 2
	INTERNAL-CULTURAL aspect of ethnic identity	INTERNAL-SOCIAL aspect of ethnic identity
Gender-related Traditionalism	Beta=0.155** (0.055)	Beta=0.316*** (0.061)
R square	0.024**	0.100***
N	240	245

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

As seen in Table 51, the variable "Gender-related traditionalism" accounts for 10% of the variance in the coefficient measuring ethnic identity's internal-social aspect, and this relationship is significant at the 0.01 level. Comparatively, the variable "Gender-related traditionalism" accounts for only 2.4% of the variance in the coefficient measuring ethnic identity's internal-cultural aspect, and this relationship is significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, although both relationships are statistically significant, the variable "Gender-related traditionalism" impacts significantly more on the internal-social, than on the internal-cultural aspect of ethnic identity.

To sum up this section, it could be said, at least based on the present sample, that it is much easier to predict the external than the internal aspect of ethnic identity when resorting to socio-structural factors as independent variables. The only reliable predictor of ethnic identity's internal aspect is "Parental commitment to ethnic identity transmission". This underscores the importance of parental influence in the retention of a strong ethnic self-concept. Gender-related traditionalism has also proven to be a predictor of ethnic identity's internal aspect, although to a much lesser extent. Nonetheless, overall, it seems that ethnic identity's external aspect can be

more reliably predicted by socially structuring factors, given its greater sensitivity to socio-cultural environments.

6.2) Regression Model Predicting Religious Identity Strength

6.2.1) In Search of a Preferred Model

In the following, we will attempt to identify a regression model predicting the variance in religious identity strength. A series of 4 models have been tested. Each of them is comprised of at least one or two different variables which, based on the above reviewed literature and theory, are hypothesized to be important predictors of religious identity strength. Model #1 includes the variable "Parents' estimated religious identity strength", model #2 includes "Ethnic identity strength", model #3 includes "Gender-related traditionalism". Finally, model #4 is comprised of "Perceived religion-based stereotyping" and "Religious affiliation". Note that these two latter variables have been included together in the same model, since "Religious identity strength" is likely to be affected differently by "Perceived religion-based stereotyping" depending on whether one is Muslim or Christian.

Before adding other sociologically relevant control variables to any of these models, we ran a series of 4 separate regressions to determine whether our core predictors are significantly correlated with the dependent variable.

Table 52: Regression coefficients of each tested predictor of "Religious identity strength" in bi-variate models

Predictor	Dependent variable: Religious identity strength	R square	N
Parents' estimated religious identity strength	Beta=0.507*** (0.047)	0.257***	237
Predictor	Dependent variable: Religious identity strength	R square	N
Ethnic identity strength	Beta=0.392*** (0.070)	0.153***	215
Predictor	Dependent variable: Religious identity strength	R square	N
Gender-related traditionalism	Beta=0.428*** (0.047)	0.183***	236
Predictor	Dependent variable: Religious identity strength	R square	N
Perceived religion-based Stereotyping	Beta=0.017 (0.035)	0.000	236
Predictor	Dependent variable: Religious identity strength	R square	N
Religious affiliation	Beta=0.122*** (0.022)	0.015	237

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

As seen in Table 52, the Standardized Bs associated with "Parents' estimated religious identity strength", "Gender-related traditionalism", "Ethnic identity strength", and "Religious affiliation" are all significant at the 0.01 level. However, the variable "Perceived religion-based stereotyping" had no significant impact on "Religious identity strength". Note that an additional regression was run, showing that "Perceived religion-based stereotyping" remains statistically unrelated to the dependent variable, even when controlling for "Religious affiliation". The variable "Perceived religion-based stereotyping" was thus excluded from model # 4.

It should be also noted that the positive and significant correlation between "Religious affiliation" and "Religious identity strength" indicates that Christians are more likely than their Muslim counterparts to retain their religious identity. Although the significance level associated with this relationship is quite low (p<0.1), the addition of selected control variables could potentially yield an interaction effect.

Model 1 ("Parents' estimated religious identity strength"), model 2 ("Ethnic identity strength") and model 3 ("Gender-related traditionalism") were complemented by adding to them the following 5 independent variables: "Religious affiliation", "Gender", "Ethnic residential segregation", "Father's education", and "Age at arrival in Canada". Finally, model 4 – now comprised of "Religious affiliation" as its sole core predictor - was complemented by adding "Gender", "Ethnic residential segregation", Father's education", and "Age at arrival in Canada". The regression coefficients associated with each model are shown below:

Model #1 ($R^2 = 0.237$)***

Independent variables= Parents' estimated religious identity strength***/ Gender/, Religious affiliation/ Father's education/ Ethnic Residential segregation/ Age at arrival.

Model #2 ($R^2 = 0.181$)***

Independent variables= Ethnic identity strength***/ Gender/ Religious affiliation/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation/ Age at arrival.

Model #3 ($R^2 = 0.243$)***

Independent variables= Gender-related traditionalism***/Gender/ Religious affiliation***/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation/ Age at arrival.

Model# 4 ($R^2 = 0.029$)

Independent variables= Religious affiliation/ Gender/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation* /Age at arrival.

Model #4 has been discarded altogether since it was not even statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Next, any variables which turned out to be significant in either model # 1, 2

or 3 were included in regression model #5, which will thus be comprised of the following predictors: "Parents' estimated religious identity strength", "Gender-Related Traditionalism", "Ethnic identity strength", and "Religious affiliation". The regression coefficients associated with model # 5 are the following:

Model #5 ($R^2 = 0.428$) ***

Independent variables= Parents' estimated religious identity strength***/ Ethnic identity strength***/ Gender-related traditionalism***/ Religious affiliation***

6.2.2) The Preferred Model: a Discussion

Model #5 was selected to be the preferred model, since all the independent variables included in it turned out to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level. As seen below in Table 52, the preferred model accounts for 42.8% of the variance in the dependent variable.

Table 53: Regression coefficients for preferred model predicting "Religious identity strength"

PREFERRED MODEL

Predictor	Dependent variable:
	Religious identity strength
Ethnic identity Strength	Beta= 0.194*** (0.062)
Gender-related Traditionalism	Beta= 0.372*** (0.046)
Parents' estimated religious identity strength	Beta= 0.391*** (0.047)
Religious affiliation	Beta= 0.149*** (0.019)
R square	0.428***
N	214

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

As seen in Table 53, the predictor which accounts for the greatest part of the variance in "Religious identity strength" is "Parents' estimated religious identity strength" (Beta=0.391). More specifically, the stronger is perceived parental religious identity, the stronger are likely to be the respondents' own religious identity. This finding underlines the crucial role played by parental socialization in religious identity building.

The second most statistically influential variable of the preferred model is "Gender-related traditionalism" (Beta=0.372). This means that respondents who hold traditional views towards gender roles are more likely to retain their religious identity, even when holding other significant contributors constant. Rooijackers (1992) found a similar relationship among her second generation Turkish-Dutch sample.[27] Note that in our model predicting "Ethnic identity strength" (see section 6.1), the predictor "Gender-related traditionalism" yielded the lowest Beta coefficient of all 4 independent variables (Beta= 0.119), and was only significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, it appears that the variable "Gender-related traditionalism" does a much better job at predicting religious identity strength than ethnic identity strength. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that "Gender-related traditionalism" constitutes first and foremost a religious identity marker, while also contributing, although to a much lesser extent, to delineate ethnic boundaries.

Also, it seems that "Ethnic identity strength", when holding other significant predictors constant, is positively correlated with "Religious identity strength". Indeed, as seen in Table 53, the predictor "Ethnic identity strength" is significant at the 0.01 level, and its associated Beta weight is 0.194. This implies that high ethic identity retainers tend also to display high levels of religiosity, when controlling for other sociologically relevant variables. It should be reminded

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[27] However, it should be stressed that Rooijackers' variables were measured differently.

that the other way around is also true. Thus, as seen in Table 49, the preferred model predicting "Ethnic identity strength" was comprised of "Religious identity strength", which was significant at the 0.05 level, and yielded a Beta weight of 0.137. However, based on the significance levels and Betas of each predictor in its respective model, it seems that "Ethnic identity strength" is more efficient at predicting religious identity strength's variance than the other way around. In any case, these combined findings lend much support to the hypothesis that religion and ethnicity largely intersect in the identity structure of these second-generation Arab youths. It thus appears all the more pertinent to apply the notion of ethno-religious identity to these Arab-Canadian youths, since their religious and ethnic backgrounds mutually interweave (when holding other statistically significant predictors constant).

One other important feature of the preferred model is that religious affiliation turned out to be positively correlated with "Religious identity strength" at the 0.01 level. Based on our coding, this relationship suggests that Christians are more likely to have a strong religious identity than Muslims, even when controlling for the other predictors of the preferred model. This finding suggests that, contrary to a well-entrenched pre-conceived notion, Muslim Arab second-generationers are less likely than their Christian ethnic peers to mobilize religion as a cornerstone for group membership building. However, further investigations are needed to find out whether there might be one or more intervening factors contributing to this relationship. In particular, the fact that the great majority of my Christian sample is comprised of Lebanese subjects[28] may account in part for Christian respondents' higher degree of religiosity, in comparison with their Muslim ethnic peers; for in Lebanon, perhaps more than in any other

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[28] Note that the majority of Lebanese in the sample is a mere reflection of the predominant demographical weight of this group within the Arab population of Quebec.

Arab country, national membership and religious affiliation are closely interwoven, both in the public and the private arenas.

6.2.3) Model Predicting Religious Identity's External and Internal Dimensions

As in the section dedicated to ethnic identity's external and internal aspects, the point here is not to verify whether the present sample leans more towards a symbolic or a communally rooted religiosity. This has been done already in section 4.2.1, where a comparative analysis of the respective weight of each dimension of religious identity was conducted. As a reminder, in section 4.2.1, we gathered sufficient evidence to conclude that, in some respects, the notion of symbolic religiosity (see Gans, 1994) was well suited to designate these Arab youths' religious identity. In particular, it was shown that their religious identity was more developed in its internal than in its external form. However, the external-cultural aspect of religious identity turned out to be better retained than its external-social dimension. In other words, whereas these youths tend to stay away from organized religion, their religious identity is nonetheless minimally rooted in social practice through ritual observance.

Similarly to the analysis conducted in section 6.1.3, we shall now test the main assumption underlying the symbolic religiosity hypothesis, namely that religious identity can flourish in its internal form while being cut off from religion-based socialization processes. The corollary of such an hypothesis will also be tested, so as to verify the extent to which a communally rooted religious identity is dependent on incorporation into religion-based socialization groups be maintained. To this end, as seen in Table 54, we have run two

regressions so as to test the relative effect of each of the preferred model's predictors on religious identity's internal and external aspects, respectively.

Table 54: Regression coefficients for two multivariate models predicting religious identity's internal and external aspects

Predictors	Dependent variables	
	EXTERNAL aspect of religious identity	INTERNAL aspect of religious identity
Parents' estimated religious identity strength	Beta= 0.300*** (0.070)	Beta= 0.357*** (0.056)
Gender-related Traditionalism	Beta= 0.363*** (0.068)	Beta= 0.253*** (0.054)
Ethnic identity Strength	Beta= 0.073 (0.092)	Beta= 0.300*** (0.074)
Religious affiliation	Beta= 0.311*** (0.028)	Beta= -0.082 (0.023)
R square	0.323***	0.389***
N	218	221

* $= p < 0.1$
** $= p < 0.05$
*** $= p < 0.01$

As shown in Table 54, in both models, 3 out of the 4 tested predictors turned out to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The only non-significant variable in the model predicting "Religious identity's internal aspect" is "Religious affiliation". However, a bi-variate regression proved that "Religious affiliation" taken alone had never been significantly correlated with religious identity's internal aspect in the first place. All the other tested predictors – implying different forms of socialization processes - were significantly correlated with religious identity's internal aspect. The implications of this finding is that religious identity's internal aspect is significantly influenced by socially structuring factors (such as those tested here). Thus, the more one holds traditional views towards gender-roles, has a strong ethnic identity, and comes from a religious family, the more one is likely to

identify with one's religious culture and community. It follows that, among these Arab-Canadian youths, harbouring strong feelings of identification with one's religious community and culture does not involve a completely "costless community", to use Mary Waters' terms (1990). Rather, it appears that a strong religious self-concept is linked to socialization processes, which inevitably carry their string of socio-cultural obligations. This finding departs from our observation, made in section 6.1.3, that none of the tested structural factors, but one would reliably predict "Ethnic identity's internal aspect. These comparative data thus suggest that a strong ethnic self-concept can be more easily sustained without a communal basis than a strong religious self-concept. Inversely, it appears that self-constructed religious boundaries are less likely to be shaped at will, that is in a pure social vacuum, compared to self-constructed ethnic boundaries.

As seen in Table 54, in the model predicting "Religious identity's external aspect", the variable "Ethnic identity strength" yielded a non-significant Beta of 0.092. However, surprisingly, this same variable yielded a significant Beta at the 0.01 level when tested individually with the dependent variable in a bi-variate regression model. We thus attempted to identify the variable responsible for ethnic identity strength's loss of statistical significance in the multivariate model shown in Table 54. To this end, we tested 3 different regression models with "Religious identity's external aspect" as the dependent variable. In each one of them, a different predictor was successively removed from the initial model to observe which move(s) will cause the variable "Ethnic identity strength" to loose its statistical significance. The predictor "Ethnic identity strength" remained non-significant in all 3 models except for the one from which the variable "Gender-related traditionalism" had been removed. Therefore, it could be concluded that the relationship between ethnic identity strength and religious identity's external aspect is largely spurious, being mediated by an

intervening variable, namely "Gender-related traditionalism". More specifically, when holding the other predictors constant, high ethnic identity retainers are more likely than low ethnic identity retainers to be practising believers involved in formally organized religion, only to the extent that a strong proportion of them hold traditional attitudes towards gender roles.

Finally, Table 54 also reveals that the external aspect of religious identity is more developed among Christian than Muslim respondents, when holding the two other predictors constant. In other words, Christian respondents are significantly more likely than their Muslim ethnic peers to be practising believers involved in formally organized religion, when holding constant "Parents' estimated religious identity strength" and "Gender-related traditionalism". However, once again, further investigations would be needed to control for other (hidden) intervening factors that could account for this relationship. In particular, as mentioned, the over-representation of Lebanese among my Christian sample may account for the fact that Christian Arabs are more likely than Muslim Arabs to score high on the scale measuring religious identity's external aspect.

6.3) Regression Model Predicting Gender-Related Traditionalism

6.3.1) In Search of a Preferred Model

In the present section, "Gender-related traditionalism" will be treated as the dependent variable to be predicted. It can be reasonably expected that "Religious identity strength" and "Ethnic identity strength" will turn out to be reliable predictors of respondents' scores on the gender-related tradition scale, given that, in sections 6.1 and 6.2, the variable

"Gender-related traditionalism" turned out to be a contributing factor to both ethnic and religious identity retention processes when holding other significant predictors constant. It should be stressed that sociological theory is of little help to identify the direction of the causal link suggested by these correlations. More specifically, it can either be that "Gender-related traditionalism" contributes to greater levels of ethno-religious identity retention, or the other way around. It can only be safely inferred from these associations that the process of ethno-religious retention among these second-generation Arabs seems to be linked to traditional attitudes towards gender role models.[29]

It can also be inferred from sections 6.1 and 6.2 that "Gender-related traditionalism" does a much better job at predicting religious identity strength than it does at predicting ethnic identity strength. Thus, while "Gender-related traditionalism" yields a Beta weight of 0.119 significant at the 0.05 level when included in the model predicting ethnic identity strength, it yields a much larger Beta weight of 0.372 significant at the 0.01 level in the preferred model predicting religious identity strength. It can thus be hypothesized that "Gender-related traditionalism" is first and foremost a religious identity marker, and secondarily an ethnic identity marker. The regression analyses to be performed in the present section are aimed at lending additional support to this hypothesis. To this end, "Ethnic identity strength" and "Religious identity strength" will constitute the core predictors included in Model #1.

Also, as discussed in the above reviewed literature and theory, and as demonstrated in Chapter 5, female Arab respondents are more likely than their male counterparts to, if not

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[29] Note that the above examined narratives suggest that these traditional attitudes are often permeated by gendered double standards setting up female virtue as a cornerstone for ethno-religious identity maintenance.

oppose, at least critically engage traditional views as regards gender roles. Therefore, the variable "Gender" will be treated as a core predictor in model #2.

Based on our theoretical framework and on the literature review, it could also be expected that Muslim respondents are more likely than their Christian ethnic peers to hold traditional values towards gender relationships. This hypothesis is made on the account that, as previously discussed, the post-70s Arab world has witnessed the rise of a dominant post-colonial Arabo-Islamic nationalism emphasizing the necessity of re-forging gender roles in accordance with a renewed and traditional reading of Islam. However, our empirical investigations in Chapter 5 have shown that Christian subjects' attitudes towards gender issues do not differ drastically from those held by their Muslim counterparts – except perhaps for female virginity issues. model #3 will thus test whether "Religious affiliation" is a contributing factor to "Gender-related traditionalism" when controlling for other significant variables and, if so, whether this contribution is statistically significant.

Model #4 will be comprised of "Perceived religion-based stereotyping". It is posited that respondents who consider that their religious group is subject to prejudicial stereotyping are more inclined to embrace traditional gender role models. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that "Gender-related traditionalism" has proven to be a strong predictor of "Religious identity strength". However, since no significant relationship was flagged out in section 6.2 between "Religious identity strength" and "Perceived religion-based stereotyping", there is no strong evidence, thus far, allowing us to assume a priori that the latter variable is correlated with "Gender-related traditionalism". Model #4 is thus meant to put this hypothesis to the test.

Finally, the core variable of model #5 will be 'Parents' estimated gender-related traditionalism", in order to assess the extent to which traditional attitudes towards gender roles tend to be transmitted from one generation to the next. We expect this association to be rather

strong since, in section 6.1 and 6.2, parental socialization has already proven to be the strongest predictor of both ethnic and religious retention identity processes.

Before adding relevant control variables to these 5 models, a series of regression including only "Gender-related traditionalism" and each one of its tested core predictors taken separately have been run.

Table 55: Regression coefficients of each tested predictor of "Gender-related traditionalism" in bi-variate regression models

Predictor	Dependent variable: Gender-related traditionalism	R square	N
Religious identity strength	Beta= 0.428*** (0.074)	0.183***	236
Predictor	Dependent variable: Gender-related traditionalism	R square	N
Ethnic identity strength	Beta= 0.275*** (0.090)	0.076***	225
Predictor	Dependent variable: Gender-related traditionalism	R square	N
Gender	Beta= -0.150** (0.026)	0.023**	248
Predictor	Dependent variable: Gender-related traditionalism	R square	N
Religious affiliation	Beta= -0.264*** (0.026)	0.070***	248
Predictor	Dependent variable: Gender-related traditionalism	R square	N
Perceived religion-based stereotyping	0.293*** (0.041)	0.086***	247
Predictor	Dependent variable: Gender-related traditionalism	R square	N
Estimated Parental traditionalism towards gender roles	0.522*** (0.060)	0.272***	239

*   = $p < 0.1$
**   = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

According to Table 55, 5 out of the 6 tested predictors are statistically correlated with the dependent variable at the 0.01 level. These 5 variables and their associated coefficients are, from the most to the least important: "Parental traditionalism towards gender roles"

(R^2=0.272), "Religious identity strength" (R^2=0.183), "Perceived religion-based stereotyping" (R^2=0.086), "Ethnic identity strength" ($R^{2=}$ 0.076), and "Religious affiliation" (R^2 =0.070). The only variable that is only significant at the 0.05 level is "Gender", which also yielded the lowest R square and Beta. It should be noted that, based on the coding, this latter negative relationship suggests that females are significantly more likely than males to disagree with the statements making up the gender-related tradition scale. It also follows from the coding of the variable "Religious affiliation" that Muslims are significantly more likely than Christians to hold traditional views towards gender issues.

Each model (#1 to 5) will be tested with the control variables "Age at arrival", "Ethnic residential segregation", and "Father's education". It should be said that the percentage analyses performed in Chapter 5.1 strongly suggest that "Father's education" is statistically unrelated to gender-related traditionalism's global scale. However, a multivariate model may reveal that higher educational capital is associated with more liberal views as regards gender roles for a specific category of respondents. For instance, based on the literature review, it appears that educated second-generation Arab females are, in a Western context, particularly likely to challenge traditional models of gender relationships (Lacoste-Dujardin, 1994; Afshar, 1993).

The regression coefficients associated with each model are shown below:

Model #1 ($R^{2=}$ 0.196)***

Independent variables= Religious identity strength***/ Ethnic Identity Strength / Father's education / Ethnic Residential segregation/ Age at arrival.

Model #2 ($R^{2=}$ 0.035)*

Independent variables= Gender**/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation / Age at arrival.

<u>Model #3</u> (R$^{2=}$ 0.105)***

<u>Independent variables</u>= Religious affiliation***/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation**/ Age at arrival.

<u>Model# 4</u> (R$^{2=}$0.112)***

<u>Independent variables</u> = Perceived religion-based stereotyping***/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation /Age at arrival.

<u>Model# 5</u> (R$^{2=}$0.270)***

<u>Independent variables</u> = Parental gender-related traditionalism***/ Father's education/ Ethnic residential segregation/ Age at arrival.

All models except model 2 (core predictor = Gender) were significant at the 0.01 level. Similarly, in all models, with again the exception of model 2, the Beta weight associated with the core predictor is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, the weakest of all relationships (in model 2) is the one suggesting that males are more likely than females to hold traditional attitudes towards gender roles.

Based on both the R^2 and the Beta coefficients, it appears that the two variables with the strongest predictive power are, respectively, "Parents' estimated gender-related traditionalism" and "Religious identity strength". They are followed by "Perceived religion-based stereotyping" and "Religious affiliation", which both yields about the same predictive power in their respective model.

It also appears that there is a slightly significant positive relationship between "Ethnic residential segregation" and "Gender-related traditionalism". Based on the coding, this association implies that the more ethnically segregated one's neighbourhood, the more traditional one's attitudes towards gender roles are likely to be. Finally, it should be noted that the variables "Age at arrival", and "Father's education" have not once yielded a statistically significant Beta weight, even at the 0.1 level. They were thus discarded as potential predictors.

The chart below displays the regression coefficients associated with Model #6, comprised of every variables which turned out to be significant in either one of the 5 models tested previously.

<u>Model #6</u> (R^2= 0.453) ***

<u>Independent variables</u>= Religious identity strength***/ Parental gender-related traditionalism*** / Gender**/ Religious affiliation***/Perceived religion-based stereotyping / Ethnic residential segregation*.

6.3.2) The Preferred Model: a Discussion

The preferred model was obtained by performing a regression including only the significant independent variables present in model #6. As seen in Table 56 below, the preferred model accounts for 44.3% of the variance in the dependent variable. However, it should be mentioned right away that the variables "Gender" and "Ethnic Residential Segregation" can easily loose their statistical significance depending on which other independent variables are co-present in the model. These issues will be further addressed below.

Table 56: Regression coefficients for preferred model predicting "Gender-related traditionalism"

PREFERRED MODEL

Predictors	Dependent variable:
	Gender-related traditionalism
Estimated parental gender-related traditionalism	Beta= 0.372*** (0.059)
Religious identity strength	Beta= 0.349*** (0.067)
Religious affiliation	Beta= -0.229*** (0.023)
Gender	Beta= -0.115** (0.022)
Ethnic residential segregation	Beta= 0.088* (0.011)
R square	0.443***
N	226

* = $p < 0.1$
** = $p < 0.05$
*** = $p < 0.01$

As shown in the above preferred model, the most important predictor of respondents' propensity to endorse traditional statements regarding gender roles is "Perceived Parental gender-related traditionalism". In other words, the more traditional parents are, the more traditional respondents are likely to be. This confirms the importance of parental socialization in the transmission of traditional models of gender relationships. Yet, it should be reminded that the comparative percentage analysis performed in section 5.2.1 (see Table 31) revealed that, on average, the respondents deem that their parents' attitudes towards gender issues are much more traditional than their own. Thus as seen in Table 31, on a 5 point ordinal scale where 1 means "Very traditional" and 5 "Very liberal", a majority of respondents (34.1%) scored 4, while a majority of parents (37.3%) would score 2 in their children's estimation. Therefore, although gender-related traditionalism appears to be largely

transmissible through parental socialization, it also seems that these traditional values are significantly mitigated when being passed on from the first to the second generation.

Also, "Religious identity strength" appeared to be the second best predictor of "Gender-related traditionalism". Its high Beta coefficient (0.349) confirms that this variable's relative weight in the regression model is very strong. In other terms, the stronger respondents' religious identity, the more traditional is likely to be their approach to gender relationships. These evidence lend much support to the hypothesis that "Religious identity strength" is definitely more efficient than "Ethnic identity strength" in predicting the variance in "Gender-related traditionalism". Thus, in model #1, it was shown that, when controlling for "Religious identity strength" (among other predictors), "Ethnic identity strength" ceased to be significantly correlated with "Gender-related traditionalism".[30] On the other hand, "Religious identity strength" remains strongly correlated with "Gender-related traditionalism" regardless of which control variables are taken into account. Therefore, the significant association between "Gender-related traditionalism" and "Ethnic identity strength" may well be over-determined by more important factors such as "Religious identity strength". In this respect, confirming section's 6.2.2's observations, these findings suggest that, for Arab youths of the second generation, gender-related issues tend to operate especially, but not exclusively as a boundary marker which contributes to crystallizing and strengthening religious identity.

The fact that gender-related traditionalism is more strongly correlated with Religious identity strength is not surprising, for dominant religious movements and discourses, be they Arab Christian or Arab Muslim, generally place much emphasis on chastity and pre-marital virginity as compulsory moral obligations for believers. Secondly, according to Kristine

Ajrouch (1999), religious references and attitudes are particularly likely to be mobilized by Arab parents to legitimate stringent restrictions imposed on their children's sexual conduct in a socio-cultural environment perceived as threatening because of it moral laxity. In addition, our own data clearly highlighted that traditional attitudes as regards gender roles are highly transmissible from the first to the second generation. It follows that the religious symbolism and rhetoric informing Arab parents' understanding of gender role models are much likely to colour the second generation's approach to gender issues as well. Once again, it must be stressed that, from a statistical as much as from a theoretical angle, one can hardly tell from this relationship whether it is religion that operates as the catalyst of these youths' traditional attitudes towards gender roles, or the other way around. It is safer and actually sounder to suggest that both phenomena are forged dialectically, caught up in a complex reciprocity.

These findings are much consistent with the above examined qualitative data (see section 5.1), which also suggest that traditional attitudes towards gender roles contribute to ethno-religious identity maintenance. It was also shown in section 5.1 that, according to most traditional informants, the weight of tradition places greater pressures on females compared with males. For instance, it seemed specifically incumbent on females not to be involved in pre-marital dating and sex in order to preserve, not only their own reputation, but also their family's. Moreover, it appeared that these restrictions on female conduct were often regarded by respondents as a major element which contributes to separating the "Us" from the "Them", or again to solidify group boundaries. Thus, in an attempt to bridge our qualitative and our quantitative data, it could be argued that female conduct – and more specifically female sexual conduct– contributes to anchor first and foremost, although not exclusively, the religious realm of these youths' ethno-religious identity structure.

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[30] Note that "Ethnic identity strength" remains non significant when added to the preferred model.

Also, based on Table 56, it appears that "Religious affiliation" has a significant negative impact on "Gender-related traditionalism", when holding constant the other predictors of the preferred model. As mentioned above, based on our coding, this implies that Muslim Arab respondents are significantly more likely than their Christian ethnic peers to endorse traditional attitudes towards gender role models. Once again, this finding should be interpreted from a historical as well as from a socio-political angle. Post-colonial Arab societies have witnessed the emergence of a reformed Arabo-Islamic collective identity aimed at challenging disparaging Western-made representations of Arabs and Muslims by means of a search for genuine native historical and cultural symbols. In this post-colonial context, gender relationships were specifically targeted for this process of cultural re-invention, as they tended to be re-cycled into symbols of anti-colonial or post-colonial resistance by either Arabo-Islamic States or by Islamic fundamentalist groups. This close connection between gender issues and ethno-religious identity building in newly independent Arabo-Islamic countries is well captured by Lama Abu Odeh (1993) through the telling image of the woman's body as "a battlefield where the cultural struggles of post-colonial societies were waged (p.27)". This may account in part for the fact that these Muslim Arab youths are more inclined to embrace traditional models of gender relationships than their Christian ethnic peers, even when controlling for other significant predictors.

According to the preferred model, the variable "Gender" is negatively correlated with the variable "Gender related traditionalism". As mentioned, this relationship suggests that, when holding other relevant predictors constant, males are more likely than females to hold traditional attitudes towards gender relationships. However, based on this variable's low Beta and significance level ($p < 0.05$), it appears that the predictive power of "Gender" to account for the variance in "Gender-related traditionalism" is rather weak. Furthermore, after a series

of regression tests were performed, it appeared that "Gender" is only statistically significant when the variable "Religious identity strength" is included in the preferred model. In other words, males are more likely than females to endorse traditional views as regards gender roles only when "Religious identity strength" is held constant in the preferred model. In order to gain better insights into how "Gender" affects the dependent variable under study, the following crosstables were produced. Whereas Table 57 looks at how males' and females' responses are distributed across the "Traditional" and "Liberal" categories, Table 58 looks at this same relationship when controlling for "Religious identity strength".

Table 57: Percentage distributions for "Gender-related Traditionalism" with "Gender"

	Gender-related traditionalism		
Gender	Traditional	Liberal	Total
Females	14,4%	85,6%	100%
Males	30,5%	69,5%	100%

Table 58: Percentage distribution for "Gender-related Traditionalism" with "Gender", when controlling for "Religious identity strength"

		Gender-related traditionalism		
Religious identity Strength	Gender	Traditional	Liberal	Total
Strong	Females	22.5% (+ 8.1%)	77.5% (- 8.1%)	100%
	Males	50,0% (+ 19.5%)	50,0% (- 19.5%)	100%
Weak	Females	8,0% (- 6.4%)	92,0% (+ 6.4%)	100%
	Males	20,3% (- 10.2%)	79,7% (+ 10.2%)	100%

First, by comparing Tables 57 and 58, we notice that holding a strong religious identity makes both females and males more likely to be traditional as regards gender issues. In Table 58 – where "Religious identity strength" is held constant - the percentages in brackets indicate the percentage differences between Tables 57 and 58's respective figures.

Thus, among females with a weak religious identity, the proportion of "traditionalists" decreases by 6.4% (from 14.4% to 8.0%). Similarly, when we focus only on males with a weak religious identity, the percentage of "traditionalists" decreases by 10.2% (from to 30.5% to 20.3%). Inversely, when traditional females with a strong religious identity are isolated, we observe a percentage increase of 8.1% (from 14.4% to 22.5%). All the latter percentage differences fall approximately in the same small range. However, as seen in table 58, when we look only at traditional males with a strong religious identity, the resulting percentage increase is much greater: a 19.5% increase (50% - 30.5%). In other words, the percentage of traditional males increases by 19.5% when we only look at males with a strong religious identity.

In light of the above crosstable analyses, how can we adequately interpret, then, the relationship between "Gender" and "Gender-related traditionalism" in our preferred multi-variate regression model. First, the hypothesis made by many authors, including this one, that second-generation Arab females are more likely than their male counterparts to resist traditional gender relationships needs to be seriously qualified. More specifically, based on the preferred regression model, it appears that, once other contributing factors are held constant, females are **NOT** significantly more likely than males to disagree with traditional views as regards gender roles - **unless we look exclusively at respondents displaying high levels of religiosity**. Furthermore, we strongly suspect, based on Crosstables 57 and 58, that the latter relationship has a lot to do with the fact that religious males are significantly more likely than secular males to endorse traditional attitudes towards gender roles. In any case, the combined effect of "Gender" and "Religious identity strength" on "Gender-related traditionalism" could hardly be attributed to the fact that secular females are more likely than religious females to oppose traditions, since the percentage difference between these two

proportions is rather small (6.4%). Thus, our statistical evidence suggest that "Gender" contributes only moderately to the variance in the dependent variable in comparison with more determining factors such as "Parental Gender-related traditionalism", "Religious identity Strength" or "Religious affiliation". Also, this contribution, if any, seems to be primarily due to the fact that religious males are significantly more traditional than secular males. However, it should be noted that caution is required in drawing parallels, as we did, between the combined effect of "Gender" and "Religious identity strength" in a crosstable, and this same interaction effect in a more complex multiple regression model. Finally, even though the regression analysis did not flag out significant gender variations, our qualitative material - and this cannot be over-stressed - showed that females were often more nuanced and critical than males when providing rationales for agreeing or disagreeing with the items included in the tradition scale.

The control variable "Ethnic residential segregation" was positively correlated with the dependent variable in the preferred model. However, its associated significance level is a low 0.09 (thus barely significant at the 0.1 level), and its associated Beta is a low 0.088, which suggests that this variable plays a very minor role in predicting the variance in the dependent variable. It should be noted that this variable was not significantly correlated with the dependent variable in a bivariate regression model. On the other hand, upon closer examination, it appears that the statistical significance of this variable is extremely volatile depending on which other predictors are co-present in the model. More specifically, when either "Religious affiliation",[31] or "Gender", or both are removed from the preferred model,

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[31] Note that the need to control for "Religious affiliation" in order for "Ethnic residential segregation" to be positively correlated with the dependent variable is understandable; upon verification, it appears that Christians-who are more liberal as regards gender issues - are over-represented in ethnically segregated neighbourhoods, whereas Muslims – who are more traditional as regards gender issues – are under-represented in neighbourhoods of low ethnic density.

"Ethnic residential segregation" becomes non-significant at the 0.1 level. Therefore, because this variable is an extremely weak and unreliable predictor of the dependent variable under discussion, and because also it does not constitute a primary focus of the present research, its effect in the preferred model will not be further analyzed.

Finally, it is interesting to consider that the variable "Age at arrival in Canada", as well as "Father's education" were statistically unrelated to "Gender-related traditionalism" in both bi-variate and multi-variate regression models. Thus, Canadian-born respondents and those who arrived in Canada at an early life stage are as likely to embrace traditional gender-related views as Arab-Canadian respondents who migrated at a later stage in their life. Also, it appears, surprisingly, that inherited cultural capital - as measured through "Father's education" - does not contribute to more liberal views on gender issues among these second-generation Arab-Canadians.

CONCLUSION

1) Ethnic Identity

This research allowed us to gain valuable insights into patterns of ethnic and religious identity retention among a Montreal sample of Cegep students of Arab origin. In the process, special attention has been paid to the structuring impact of gender issues, as well as perceived stereotyping and discrimination, on ethno-religious identity maintenance. In the following, we will reflect on the primary findings that emerged from our research, with a view to underscore how they relate to our theoretical framework and working hypotheses.

First, it appears that these Arab-Canadian second-generationers harbour a strong sense of identification with their ethnic culture. In other words, their ethnic cultural background operates as a strong marker differentiating the in-group from the out-group, thus contributing to accentuate ethnic consciousness. However, this hypertrophied ethnic self-concept (internal-cultural) stands in sharp contrast to the other aspects of their ethnic identity, which tend not to be as developed. This confirms Raymond Breton et al.'s (1990) observation that ethnic identity's internal form is not dependent on communal socialization into ethnic culture and community to be maintained over time.

Second, the symbolic ethnicity hypothesis was only lent partial support. On the one hand, the external aspect of these Arab-Canadian youths' ethnic identity turned out to be sufficiently salient to allow us to conclude that their ethnicity is minimally rooted in communal forms of socialization. In particular, it appeared that the external-cultural aspect of these youths' ethnic identity was fairly well developed. This implies that these second-generationers' self-definitions are not only highly loaded with ethnic references and symbols

(internal-cultural), but are also buttressed, at least minimally, by a knowledge of, and familiarity with their ethnic culture (external-cultural). Thus, for instance, a majority of respondents, in all three age-at-arrival categories, reported having a good command of their ethnic language, although language proficiency in Arabic clearly decreases as time spent in Canada goes by. Also, the most retained ethnic pattern of behaviour is eating ethnic food, a finding commonly yielded by case studies on ethnic identity retention among second-generationers. Listening to ethnic music also seemed to be a fairly popular practice which, interestingly, seems to be part of a process of ethnic re-discovery taking place during adolescence. It was thus argued that these youths' relative familiarity with, and exposure to their ethnic culture prevent us from concluding that their ethnic identity is exclusively reduced to mere strategies of self-identification.

On the other hand, Mary Water's notion of "costless community" was nevertheless employed to account for the fact that respondents' ethnic identity is relatively more retained at the cultural than at the social level. It was suggested that these youths, by retaining more their ethnic identity in the cultural realm, are spared much of the collectively enforced socio-cultural obligations usually required from being enmeshed in ethnic-based socialization groups. Also, assimilating an ethnic culture, without, however, being strictly bound by a normative-symbolic framework enmeshed in social interactions, allows for more latitude and flexibility in ethnic identity building strategies.

However, our quantitative as well as our qualitative data showed that these youths' ethnic identity tends also, in some respects, to be anchored in the social realm - although, once again, not as much as in the cultural realm. In particular, their external-social aspects turned out to be relatively well retained, which once again shows that these Arab-Canadian youths' strong ethnic self-concept is not completely estranged from its communal basis.

Thus, their strong inclinations towards in-group marriage and in-group friendship point to their will to anchor their ethnic culture in primary groups of like-minded ethnic peers. However, it should be stressed that our informants tended to be much more adamant about in-group marriage than about in-group friendship. Parental as well as self-imposed pressures seem to be largely responsible for the great importance placed by these youths on marital endogamy. The most commonly invoked reason for favouring in-group marriage was cultural connectedness, especially as it relates to issues of gender role models. Interestingly, many female informants specified that they adamantly want to marry a Canadian-born ethnic peer, whom they deem more likely to hold equalitarian attitudes as regards gender role models, as compared with a freshly arrived Arab immigrant. This was taken as a sign that these second-generationers' ethnic identity tends to be highly contextualized, which makes it compatible with the more liberal dominant Canadian cultural standards. More generally, it was observed that, while these youths' own self-definitions frequently draw upon essentialized notions of identity, culture and community, their narratives nevertheless frequently denote the fluid and negotiated character of their actual relationship to the varied cultural models to which they are exposed as both Arabs and Canadians.

Our research also explored the meaning these Arab-Canadians of the second-generation attribute to the notion of a trans-national Arab identity. First, it is significant that our respondents tend to favour the "Arab" label (either taken alone or in a hyphenated form) over other sources of group identification, such as national membership and Canadian identity. However, the reviewed narratives suggested that the Arab label, far from superseding national or other parochial allegiances, was rather understood by these youths as an overarching form of group identity. Furthermore, the meaning that respondents attribute to their Arab identity is forged differently depending on their various sub-group identities. Most

notably, Christian Arab youths were more restrained than their Muslim ethnic peers in using the Arab label as a meaningful source of identification. Thus, many Arab Christian informants embraced the Arab label, but at the same time expressed frustration over the fact that, very often, Canadians fail to acknowledge the religious plurality encompassed by the notion of Arab culture. The latter concern reminds us that the "Politics of recognition", to use Charles Taylor (1997)'s expression, is often a driving force behind identity-building among minority groups. In addition, it was suggested that Arab Christians' hesitations about self-identifying as Arabs may be exacerbated by their will to dissociate themselves from a label which, in the Western popular imagery, is often synonymous with a socially compromised identity, that of Islam. Nonetheless, and this cannot be over-stressed, our quantitative data showed that the option "Arab" turned out to be the most popular answer among Christians as well, even if to a lesser extent than among Muslims. This strongly suggests that, at present, both second-generation Arab Christians' and Muslims' respective ethnic identities tend to be enmeshed in a pan-Arab consciousness transcending sub-group differences.

It was also argued that the emergence of a trans-national Arab identity among our sampled subjects was certainly compounded by outside labelling, for Canadians tend to impose an undifferentiated "Arab" identity on Arab-Canadians. However, our data suggest that the adoption of an Arab identity by these youths involves the subversion of the dominant significations attached to the re-appropriated label. That is a derogatory notion turned into a source of pride (Abraham, S., 1983:100; Suleiman and Abu-Laban, 1989:4-5; Kayal, 1983). It was argued, though, that the Arab label as externally defined by Canadians tends to exert "symbolic violence" on the labelled individuals (Portes and Macleod, 1996). This leads some of them— especially Christians – to reject such a socially compromising label altogether.

Our qualitative data also revealed to be very rich in information about generational discrepancies between parents' and youths' notions of a successfully transplanted ethnicity in Canadian soil. Many among the second-generation - especially females - felt that their parents were holding on to an outdated and "frozen-in-time" ethnic identity, which my informants often deemed incompatible with their own highly dynamic and fluid ethno-cultural identity. Quite expectedly, most of my subjects stressed that their parents tended to be too restrictive regarding issues such as permissions to go out, curfew hours, dating, etc. One dominant trend that emerged from reviewing the narratives is that females were far more likely than males to mention restrictions as examples of cultural features their parents want them to retain. This finding lends much support to the notion that, for a great many Arab parents, ethnic identity transmission is closely connected to female conduct. More specifically, in traditional families, Arab migrant parents often implicitly identify daughters as the depositaries of the ethnic traditions they wish to preserve in a Western context. As a consequence, many of my female informants reported trying to avoid conflict or confrontation with their parents by keeping secret from them certain behaviours, such as dating. Arab-Canadian girls frequently find in school an empowering space where they can engage in behaviours, and adopt attitudes forbidden at home. However, in general, my female informants can hardly be said to favour the wholesale rejection of their parents' normative framework. In fact, these female Arab youths - especially those coming from traditional families - were often equally critical of what they perceive as an excessive laxness permeating Western standards as regards child-rearing practices and sexuality issues. As a result, Arab female informants seemed to be more likely than their male counterparts to engage in critical negotiations, and heuristic amalgamations of both Western and "ethnic" cultural models and frameworks.

2) Religious Identity

Our investigations into religious identity retention processes seemed to indicate that the development of a symbolic form of religiosity (Gans, 1994) is well underway among our sample of Arab-Canadian second-generationers. First, our quantitative data suggest that these youths' religious identity is significantly more developed at the internal than at the external level. It was argued that, in this respect, these youths tend to mirror Canadians' more privatized relationship to religion. That is a religious identity which has lost much of its driving force as a structuring element of social interactions, being more confined to the realm of personal beliefs and self-consciousness. It should nonetheless be mentioned that praying was reported by most respondents (both Muslims and Christians) as a relatively common and frequent practice. However, it was stressed that praying is particularly well fitted to a privatized approach to religion, for it leaves much personal latitude to the faithful wishing to maintain this form of ritual. By contrast, religious practices requiring more communal involvement, such as temple attendance and participation in religious affairs, proved to be limited only to special holidays or occasional events.

Both quantitative and qualitative data revealed that religion plays a determining role in the formation of these youths' self-concept. In other words, religion seems to constitute a pivotal axis in their identity structure - and this applies as much to Muslim as to Christian respondents. In this respect, these Arab second-generationers depart from majority group youths, for whom religion tends to be largely dismissed as a collective and/or personal identity provider. However, our qualitative data strongly suggest that the importance that these Arab-Canadian youths attach to religion should not be automatically understood as a sign of strong religious devotion and piety per se. For some, the high value placed on their

religious identity seems to reflect a desire to find general spiritual guidance in life. The majority, however, tended to frame religion as a group identity provider, thus stressing close ties between their religious and their ethnic identity. Indeed, the reviewed narratives suggest that religion contributes to delineate ethnic group boundaries. Even Christian Arabs tended to use their specific sectarian allegiances as identity markers differentiating their group from mainstream (Western) Christians. We argued that these second-generationers' strong religious self-concept can be largely accounted for by the fact that their parents experienced, in their home country, the re-focussing of national as well as sub-group narratives along religious lines. Comparatively, it could be assumed – although this needs to be further investigated – that these youths differ starkly from the previous cohort of Arab-Canadian second-generationers, namely those who were born between 1945 and 1970. Typically, members of the latter group were raised by more secular and Westernized parents, whose own religious self-concept was much more privatized, and only loosely connected to national and/or collective normative-symbolic frameworks.

However, for most of our subjects (and Muslims even more than Christians), their religious identity is generally weakly linked to social networks organized along religious lines. One exception to this latter trend was that these youths place a high value on endogamous religion-based marriage. In fact, marrying inside one's religious group seemed to be more important than marrying inside one's ethnic group. However, upon closer scrutiny, it appears that most informants prioritizing religious endogamy justified their choice by emphasizing the cultural dimensions of religion. More specifically, marrying a religious peer was often explicitly perceived as necessary to ensure cultural connectedness between spouses. In fact, almost none of these informants justified their preference for religious endogamy by emphasising the importance of sharing with their future spouse the

same God, the same religious beliefs, or the same religious rituals. The fact that religion is widely perceived as a cultural binder by these second-generationers can be taken as evidence of an ethno-religious identity delineating distinct group boundaries.

Crosstable analysis of religious social affairs attendance provided further evidence of the strong connections existing between religion and ethnicity among these second-generation Arab-Canadians. First, the great majority of my sample attend religious social affairs only occasionally. But most interestingly, a great majority of these occasional participants in religious social affairs hold an "Average" religious identity, while holding a "Strong" ethnic identity. In other words, religious social affairs draw a majority of Arab second-generationers strongly committed to ethnic identity maintenance, but only moderately (or "averagely") to religious identity retention. The same kind of phenomenon has been observed among Muslim respondents with respect to Ramadan, which seems to assume more a role of ethnic community binder than one of religious faith "strengthener". Indeed, most of the Muslim fast observers tend to hold a "Weak" religious identity, while holding a "Strong" ethnic identity. Thus, according to our data, practices such as fasting during Ramadan, or attending religious social affairs should be understood more as factors contributing to ethnic identity maintenance than to religious identity retention.

Further, the ethno-religious identity of our Arab second-generationers differs in fundamental ways from that of their parents. It tends to be constructed in relation to Westernized, secular and liberal cultural models. In this process of construction, their ethno-religious identity is partially divested of the restrictive and binding communal basis that is prevalent among their parents. As a result, the second-generationers often strive to associate with "Canadianized" peers, who, like them, possess a versatile and hybrid ethno-religious identity.

Finally, our data have shown that the Christian Arabs of this sample tend to be stronger ritual observers than their Muslim ethnic counterparts. Thus, praying is much more frequently observed among Christian than among Muslim respondents. Similarly, the latter group is far less likely than the former to attend a religious service. However, it was mentioned that the very low levels of Mosque attendance recorded among Muslim Arab youths can be accounted for, in part, by the lack of religious infrastructure catering to the Muslim-Canadian population. Also, Muslims and Christians confer upon the act of praying different meanings, which, in turn, could impact on prayer frequency. Yet, it could also be that, all things being equal, religious identity tends to be more strongly anchored in ritual observance among Christian than among Muslim Arab-Canadian second-generationers. Historically, in the Arab world, Eastern Christianity and its myriad of sub-rites became historically interwoven with group identity building among Christian minorities (Kayal, 1983; Naff, 1983). This could explain in part why our Christian Arab-Canadian youths are more dependent on religion than their Muslim counterparts to maintain a distinct ethnic identity.[32] As far as Muslim Arab-Canadian youths are concerned, succumbing to North-American secularism is not as likely to compromise their survival as distinct ethnic groups within Canada's multicultural landscape. Thus, in spite of the Islamization undergone by national self-narratives in the post-1970s Arab world, these Muslim Arab-Canadian youths, while identifying strongly as Muslims, seem to rely less on religious practice to maintain ethno-religious group boundaries.

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[32] However, before drawing such conclusions, it would be important to find out whether ritual observance, for Christian Arabs, takes place mainly within mainstream Canadian Churches, or rather within sect-specific institutions.

3) Gender-related traditionalism

Our research also paid special attention to the role played by gender issues in ethno-religious identity maintenance. One could say that gender relationships come to be highly problematized, as part of both, the patterns of self-identification deployed by these Arab-Canadian youths, and their process of incorporation into the socio-cultural networks of their host society and their ethnic community. This problematization is closely connected to the fact that, for many Arab migrant parents, the excessive moral laxity of Canadian society as regards female conduct calls for gendering child-rearing practices. More specifically, because female family members' moral virtue - embodied primordially in their chastity - is considered by a great many Arab parents as the determining factor in the maintenance of family honour and reputation, second-generation females of Arab descent come to be subjected to stricter parental surveillance and control than second-generation males. These double standards, cultivated by parents and by the ethnic community in general, beget among both male and female Arab youths a perception that there is a profound normative and cultural gap between their ethnic group and the host society. And this perception contributes to reinforce ethnic boundaries, using gender as an ethnic marker producing clear-cut distinctions between two antagonistic representations of women, each one epitomizing a different pole of this Us/Them duality (the pure virgin Arab woman vs. the depraved Canadian/Western woman). However, our data revealed that, although pre-marital female virginity is considered by both gender groups as a legitimate obligation, males and females of this sample seem to disagree with respect to issues of control and surveillance to be exerted on female family members. Whereas male youths tend to follow the strict attitude of their parents on this topic, female youths are more critical of the burden and pressures they

face as a result of these social expectations aimed at them. In fact, female youths' attitudes towards these gendered double standards revealed to be extremely complex and nuanced. On the one hand, female informants frequently resigned themselves to facing restrictions on their freedom. These restrictions are regarded by many as a necessary obligation to conform to their group's expectations - which have also become their own - about proper female behaviour. On the other hand, others are rebelling, to various degrees and often in indirect manners, against the moral and social tutelage under which some men wish to put them. The data revealed that, while a (small) majority of males endorse the notion of female obedience in the household, a (large) majority of females are against it. Also, female youths strongly oppose the view that the preservation of their virginity constitutes a matter of collective interest linked to family honour. In short, our data confirm that female conduct constitutes an important locus of Arab ethnic identity, but the content of this identity is questioned or "problematized" more by female than by male second-generationers.

Also, being Muslim or Christian also impacts on the Arab-Canadian youths' attitude towards traditional patterns of gender relationships. Muslim respondents proved to be more conservative than their Christian ethnic peers with respect to issues of female pre-marital virginity and family honour – a relationship confirmed by multivariate regression analysis.

4) Perceived Stereotyping and Self-Experienced Discrimination

This research also provided insights into the relationship between perceived stereotyping, self-experienced discrimination, and ethno-religious identity retention. First, both our quantitative and qualitative data indicate that a strong majority among these Arab youths are under the impression that Canadians portray Arabs in a very stereotypical and

prejudicial manner. The movie industry, and Hollywood movies in particular, were identified by a large majority of informants as being one of the most important catalysts for the production of anti-Arab and/or anti-Islam prejudice. The North American media coverage of Middle-East politics was identified by only two respondents as linked to anti-Arab or anti-Muslim prejudice. Thus, these Arab youths were much more prone to blame Hollywood than the news coverage of Middle-Eastern conflicts when accounting for the stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists. Yet, data collection for this study occurred in the midst of the second Intifada, which is treated in North-American media from an angle likely to reinforce the "Arab=terrorist" equation in the public's mind. As previously mentioned, many authors argued that a Pan-Arab group consciousness among Arab-Canadians is primarily fuelled by perceived biases in the North-American media coverage of major Arab-Israeli conflicts (Kayal, 1983:55-57; Naff, 1983:25; Suleiman and Abu-Laban, 1989; 4-5; Haddad, 1994:79; Suleiman, 1999:10-11). Our data clearly do not support this argument. In fact, it seems that the Arab consciousness detected among these second-generationers is much more fostered by Hollywood than by media coverage of Middle-Eastern politics. This much stronger emphasis placed on the mass-entertainment film industry as a vector of anti-Arab prejudice may be reflective of the centrality of American culture in these youths' system of cultural references.

Several of my informants also stressed that Canadians' representations of Arabs are closely connected to gender issues. Thus, many of them evoked the figure of the Arab male wife batter, naturally complemented by that of the submitted Arab female wife. These stereotypes were identified as being central to the general North American representations of Arabs.

It was also shown that the great majority of our Muslim Arab subjects tend to consider that, in addition to being targeted by anti-Arab prejudice, they also have to face anti-Muslim prejudice. Quite expectedly, only a minority (30.2%) of Arab Christian respondents considered that their religious group is subject to prejudicial stereotyping. However, the latter proportion is relatively important, since, in this case, both the self-alleged victims of religious prejudice and their alleged tormentors share the same religion. Based on our qualitative data, Christian informants' perception of being confronted with religious prejudice is often informed by their resentment of being lumped together with Muslim Arabs by Canadians. This manoeuvre ends up suppressing a fundamental part of their group identity, namely their sectarian allegiances. For in North American culture, images of Arabs and Muslims are often conflated into one single, but yet Islam-centred representational system. For this reason, we argued that it is more difficult for Muslim Arabs to fight anti-Arab prejudicial stereotyping because, to do so, they also need to engage Western-made derogatory representations of Islam. Comparatively, Christian Arabs have the power, although limited, to increase the symbolic value of the Arab label they embrace by severing it from its Islamic component, and by stressing instead their Christian identities. But our data suggest that this strategy often fails because, once again, Christian and Muslim Arabs are both socially **made** to share the same external Islam-centred Arab boundaries.

Surprisingly, our data have also shown that the great majority of our respondents generally feel well accepted, in their personal life, by their fellow Canadians. However, several informants reported that they often prefer to downplay their ethnic difference in face-to-face interactions with Canadians, hinting that such a choice was made with a view to avoid ethnic profiling, and stigmatization. It thus seems that anti-Arab prejudicial stereotyping deters many among these youths from making their ethnicity salient in social interactions with Canadians.

Such a situational ethnicity is made possible by the second-generationers' good command of mainstream cultural codes, which allows them to play a low ethnic profile, when needed, so as to ward off ethnic prejudice and discrimination. However, our data also suggest that a minority of Arab-origin youths are assigned a "racialized" identity, which, as a result, severely restricts their "ethnic options", all superseded by an externally produced Otherness derived from physical characteristics.

One important implication of our results is that, under certain conditions, members of an ethnic group can be acutely aware of being perceived in a prejudicial manner by their "host" society, and yet feel well accepted by members of the majority group in their daily life. Indeed, these Arab-Canadian youths are highly aware of being disparagingly portrayed at the representational level, but nonetheless do not feel rejected as "Arabs" in their personal life.[33] One could wonder under which conditions these apparently contradictory perceptions can coexist. First, as discussed at length in Chapter 5.2, the large body of research on ethnic conflict in France and Britain suggests that structural discrimination – or rather the awareness of it – is a far more important catalyst of ethnic conflict and resistance than ethnic prejudice per se.[34] For instance, the case of French Beurs provides indications that ethnic prejudice tends to be translated into ethnic protest **only** when members of the targeted group realize that they are prevented from reaping the socio-economic benefits of cultural incorporation, remaining structurally marginalized regardless of how much "ethnic features" they have dropped in the process. Because there is no equivalent in Canada of such structural anti-Arab exclusion, Arab-Canadians are not as likely to mobilize against discrimination. Nonetheless, actual levels of

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[33] Note that these results certainly had something to do with the profile of our sampled subjects, who, as students attending ethnically diverse Cegeps, are relatively sheltered from discrimination, as compared with their ethnic peers on the labour market.

[34] Of course, ethnic tensions in France and Great Britain are aggravated by the scars left by colonialism in the memories of a great many ethnic minorities.

ethno-racial discrimination in Canada are sufficiently high to be considered starkly at odds with ethnic and racial minorities' generally positive assessment of ethno-racial inclusiveness in this country. In this respect, we argued, following Jeff Reitz's (1988) line of argument, that Canada's Multicultural policy and ideology may lead the Arab second-generationers to over-estimate the degree of tolerance of Canadians towards ethno-cultural and racial difference.

By contrast, France's Republican model of citizenship makes excluded minorities all the more aware and resentful of their socio-economic marginalization. At the outset, the Republican model tends to exacerbate frustration among ethnic minorities because it purposely seeks to flatten ethno-cultural differences in the public domain. But most importantly, when in addition to this, members of an ethnic minority are subjected to structural discrimination, they are in fact being denied the sole compensation attached (on paper) to the Republican "trade off", namely equality in exchange for giving up ethnic identity maintenance in public institutions. In such a case, all the conditions are right for the ignition of ethnic conflict. The latter scenario is perfectly exemplified by French-Beurs' profound disillusion with the French Republican model, which efficiently enforces universalism on the cultural level, but fails to fully extend its equalizing scope to the socio-economic domain as well. In any case, a comparative analysis is much needed to get a better understanding of how France's and Canada's respective approach to cultural integration and diversity impacts on their Arab minorities' reaction to discrimination and stereotyping.

6) Evidence from Regression Analysis

Finally, the regression analysis chapter provided solid evidence corroborating many of the relationships flagged out throughout the previous sections. In the following and closing lines, we will attempt to make sense of the profusion of information born out of regression analysis, so as to better outline the implications of the detected correlations in relation to our theoretical framework.

First, it must be stressed that parental socialization is, by far, the most important predictor of both ethnic and religious identity maintenance processes. This confirms that both ethnic and religious identity are communally rooted in family socialization (Isajiw and Makabe, 1982). However – and this cannot be overstressed - our qualitative data revealed that the transmission process, far from mechanically duplicating identities from one generation to the next, rather breeds symbolic re-inventions of the cultural material which these youths draw from their parents' ethno-religious framework.

Besides parental influence, other factors denoting a communally rooted identity turned out to be positively correlated with ethnic and religious identity retention processes. Firstly, the hypothesized relationship between ethnic and religious identity has been corroborated through regression analysis. Thus, it seems indeed appropriate to say that these Arab-Canadian youths' ethnic and religious identities are imbricated together in complex ways. Although the direction of this correlation can of course hardly be identified, it should be stressed that the use of multivariate models including other relevant predictors revealed that ethnic identity strength is a much stronger and reliable predictor of religious identity strength, than the other way around. This leads us to conclude that, comparatively, religious identity building tends more to be harnessed to ethnic identity maintenance, than the reverse. This observation is also lent

additional support in light of our previously discussed findings showing that two religious practices, participation in religious social affairs, and fasting during Ramadan, tend to attract respondents whose ethnic identity is stronger than their religious identity. Therefore, our data strongly suggest that these Arab-Canadian youths' religiosity should perhaps be more understood as an identity marker delineating distinct group boundaries, than as a sign of mere devotion and piety anchored in religious beliefs per se. These findings are in line with Herbert Gans' (1994) argument that the religious identity of second-generationers in North America tends to be divested of its religious content per se, while increasingly serving the purpose of cementing ethnic group solidarity. This hypothesis, which since long proved to be relevant to Jewish studies (i.e. Sharot, 1973; Driedger, 1980), and more recently to the study of ethno-religious identity among Muslim second-generation youths in Europe (Leveau, 1992; Roy, 1992; Cesari, 1998, Vertovec, 1998), seems to be also applicable to the current second-generation of Arab-Canadians. In any case, it appears that this cohort of Arab second-generationers tends, following their parents, to hold an identity structure whose religious and ethnic dimensions largely interpenetrate. It would be interesting to further research this question, but this time from a comparative perspective between the Arab Diasporas, in their homeland, and other ethnic groups.

Another noteworthy regression finding is that ethnic identity's internal aspect is little influenced by socially structuring factors such as "Age at arrival", "Religious identity strength", and "Gender-related traditionalism". This result lends much support to the symbolic ethnicity hypothesis, for it shows that second generationers' ethnic consciousness can easily blossom, and even flourish, without being "socially assisted". More specifically, it confirms that maintaining strong feelings of identification with one's ethnic community and culture does not necessarily presuppose strong socio-cultural enmeshment in them (Isajiw, 1990; Alba, 1990; Waters, 1990;

Gans, 1994). Thus, our data are consistent with the post-structuralist insight that agency plays a crucial and quasi unhindered role in the construction of ethnic and religious boundaries. In this sense, our respondents' ethnic self-concepts are in keeping with the post-modern subjects' tendency to pick identities on some kind of "identity market", where the means of production are definitely more individual than collective. This great latitude in identity building strategies accounts for the fact that so many of my informants reported having undertaken, at the end of adolescence, a process of ethnic (re)discovery, while possessing little knowledge and first-hand experiences of their parents' culture and community (Isajiw, 1990).

Our regression analyses have also shown that religious identity' internal aspect is less cut off from socialization processes than is ethnic identity's internal aspect. In other terms, harbouring strong feelings of identification with one's religious group and culture among these Arab-Canadian youths is more likely to be linked to socially structuring factors. However, it should be reminded, based on previous findings, that the socialization processes fostering religious identity maintenance tend mostly to consolidate ethnic boundaries and group solidarity.

The variable "Gender-Related traditionalism" proved to be significantly related to both ethnic and religious identity retention processes. Thus, it appears that the hypothesis positing a dialectical relationship between gender, religious identity, and ethnicity among second-generation Arabs (i.e. Begag, 1990; Ajrouch, 1999) is offered strong support by our data. However, our regression results strongly suggest that gender-related traditionalism is much more closely connected to religious identity strength than it is to ethnic identity strength. These results imply that the use of women's body and sexuality as group boundary markers is particularly linked to religious identity maintenance. Therefore, it could be anticipated that, as

the Arab-origin youths undergo further secularization in Canadian society, gender issues will gradually loose their centrality to processes of group boundary maintenance.

Also, regression analysis has confirmed that, when holding other contributing factors constant, Muslim Arabs remain significantly more traditional than Christian Arabs as regards gender role models. We argued that this difference can hardly be understood without glancing at the Arab world's recent post-colonial history. During the postcolonial era, in Arab societies, nationalist movements undertook to inverse the polarity of colonial representations of the Arab world. At stake in this symbolic struggle was the rehabilitation of elements of the native culture, which, under colonial domination, were systematically denigrated. In the Arabo-Islamic world, colonial representations of the colonized Other tended, and still tend, to be structured along gender lines. More specifically, in the colonial Western mind, the status of Muslim Arab women best embodied Muslim and Arab cultural backwardness. Almost reactively, anti-(neo)colonial nationalist discourses in the Arab world have tended to turn gender-related traditions into symbols of cultural pride (e.g.: the Islamic veil, or "Hijab") (Ahmed, 1992; Abu Odeh, 1993; Shukrallah, 1994; Eid, 2002). Most importantly, in the process, radical Islamist movements achieved, from the 1970s onwards, to make women's sexuality a priority in the process of re-inventing gender roles for nation (re)-building purposes (Mimouni, 1992; Geadah, 1996; Eid, 2002). Therefore, because most of my Muslim respondents' parents belong to the post-1970s cohort of Arab migration to Canada, they may, as a result, be more inclined to embrace traditional and "double-standarded" gender role models.

At first, multivariate regression analysis seemed to indicate that male respondents were significantly more conservative than female respondents in their attitudes towards gender-related traditions. However, it turned out that an intervening factor, religious identity strength, was essentially accounting for the latter relationship. Furthermore, it appeared that the statistical

significance of the variable "Gender" in this three-ways relationship had little to do with greater anti-tradition dissent on the part of secular females, and more to do with greater levels of traditionalism among religious Arab males. Yet, it should be stressed that our qualitative data revealed that our female informants, although indeed often endorsing traditions, were nevertheless more likely than male informants to critically scrutinize the gendered double standards informing these traditions, especially whenever issues of family reputation, honour, and sexuality intersect.

Finally, no statistical correlation emerged between perceived stereotyping and discrimination on the one hand, and ethnic and religious identity maintenance processes on the other. In this sense, once again, second-generation Arab-Canadians largely depart from French Beurs, whose ethnicity has been often documented as a "reactive" one, begotten by exclusion and racism (Begag, 1990; Leveau, 1997; Taguieff, 1997). Arab-Canadians' ethno-religious identity, on the other hand, seems to be maintained on a more self-sufficient, and less confrontational mode. In other words, based on our data, perceived anti-Arab prejudice does not seem to breed a reactive form of ethnicity. However, a non-reactive ethnicity should not necessarily be taken as an indicator of socio-cultural incorporation into mainstream society's networks and institutions. In this respect, because the overwhelming majority of the youths consider that Canadians have such a low regard for their Arab and/or Muslim culture, they could be inclined to develop insular patterns of ethno-religious identity retention. More specifically, high levels of perceived anti-Arab/Muslim prejudice are more likely to impede the integration of these groups into mainstream networks and institutions. Of course, more research would be needed to further address this specific question, which is well beyond the scope of the present investigation. In any case, insofar as Canada's Multicultural policy is not solely aimed at reducing inter-ethnic conflicts, but also at fostering socio-cultural rapprochement between

majority and minority groups, prejudicial stereotyping targeting "vulnerable" ethnic groups,

such as the Arabs, constitutes a problem that begs for immediate government attention.

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APPENDIX A: CODING AND RECODING OF VARIABLES

Variable 1: "How would you qualify your knowledge of spoken Arabic?"

Categories of the variable:

a) good=1
b) average=2
c) poor=3
d) I don't speak it= 4

Variable 2: "Which language do you mostly speak with parents?"
Variable 3: "Which language do you mostly speak with brothers and sisters?"
Variable 4: "Which language do you mostly speak with friends of Arab background?"

Original Categories of the 3 variables:

a) Arab
b) French
c) English
d) Other_____

These variables have been recoded respectively into "language spoken to parents",

"language spoken to brother", and language spoken to Arab friends", in order to assign a

value 1 to respondents who chose Arab (category a), and a value of 2 to respondents who

chose either French or English (categories b and c). Finally, the self-reported languages

written under the category "Other" were assigned a value of either 1 or 2, depending on the

answer given. Note that, despite the fact that the respondents were explicitly asked not to

choose more than one answer, a minority of them chose two languages. Whenever

French/English, and any ethnic language were chosen simultaneously, the respondent's dual

answer was assigned a value of 1.5 to mark the hybrid character of his or her relationship to

language.

Variable 5: "How often do you eat ethnic food?"

Categories of the variable:

a) often (e.g.: once a week or more)= 1
b) occasionally (e.g.: once a month or so)=2
c) rarely (e.g.: on special Holidays)=3

Variable 6: "How often do you listen or watch ethnic radiobroadcasts or TV programs?"
Variable 7: "How often do you read ethnic newspapers, magazines, or other periodicals?"
Variable 8: "How often do you listen to ethnic music?"

Categories and values of these variables:

a) often (once a week or more)= 1
b) occasionally (e.g. once a month or so)=2
c) rarely (e.g. 5 times a year or so)=3
d) never= 4

Variable 9: Self-Labelling

Original categories of the variable:

a) Arab
b) As a member of a national group (e.g.: Egyptian, Moroccan)
c) as an Arab-Canadian (or Québécois)
d) as a (national group)-Canadian (or Québécois)
e) as either a Canadian or a Québécois
f) Other_____

This variable has been recoded into Self-Labelling-2, in order to assign a value of 1 (strong ethnic identity) to respondents who identify with either the Arabs, or their National group (category a and b), a value of 2 (hybrid identity) to respondents who identify with both the majority group and any of their ethnic groups (category c and d), and a value of 3 (weak ethnic identity) to respondents who identify themselves as either Canadians or Québécois

(category e). Finally, the self-reported identities written under the category "Other" were assigned a value of either 1, 2 or 3, depending on the answer given.

Variable 10: "% assigned to the Ethnic Side of you"

Original Categories of the variable:

a) The ethnic group(s) you belong to_____
b) Canadian or Québécois _____

This variable has been recoded in order to assign values from 1 to 10 to 10 new categories which each forms a bracket covering 10%, where 1 corresponds to the lowest percentages assigned to the ethnic side of one's identity, and 10 to the highest percentages assigned to the ethnic side of one's ethnic identity :

(90% thru 100%=1) (80% thru 89.99%=2) (70% thru 79.99%=3) (60% thru 69.99%=4) (50% thru 59.99%=5) (40% thru 49.99%=6) (30% thru 39.99%=7) (20% thru 29.99%=8) (10% thru 19.99%=9) (0% thru 9.99%=10).

Variable 11: "Importance of cultural background"

Categories of the variable:

a) very important= 1
b) important = 2
c) somehow important = 3
d) not important = 4

Variable 12: "How often do you attend your ethnic group's dances, parties, or informal social affairs?"

Categories of the variable:

a) often =1
b) occasionally= 2
c) never= 3

Variable 13: "How often do you or did you use to attend ethnic summer camps or resorts located in Canada?"

Categories of the variable:

a) almost every summer=1
b) I have been there once=2
c) I have been there more than once=3
d) never=5

Variable 14: "Of your three best friends who are not relatives, how many belong to your ethnic group?"

Categories of the variable:

a) three=1
b) two=2
c) one=3
d) none=4

Variable 15: "Job should benefit ethnic peers as well as yourself"

Categories of the variable:

a) very important=1
b) important=2
c) ideally but not necessarily=3
d) not important=4

Variable 16: "Importance of marrying within your ethnic group"

Categories of the variable:

a) important=1
b) ideally but not necessarily=2
c) not important=3
d) I do not want to marry within my own ethnic group=4

Variable 17: " Which language do your parents most often speak to you?"

Categories of the Original variable:

a) Arabic
b) French
c) English
d) Other_____

This variable has been recoded into "Language spoken by parents to children-2", in order to assign a value 1 to respondents who chose Arab (categories a), and a value of 2 to respondents who chose either French or English (categories b and c). Finally, the self-reported languages written under the category "Other" were assigned a value of either 1 or 2, depending on the answer given. Note that despite the fact that the respondents were explicitly asked not to choose more than one answer, a minority of them chose two languages. Whenever French/English, and any ethnic language were chosen simultaneously, the respondent's dual answer was assigned a value of 1.5 to mark the hybrid character of the linguistic transmission process his or her parents are engaged in.

Variable 18: "How important is it for your parents that you know Arabic?"

Categories of the variable:

a) very important=1
b) important=2
c) ideally but not necessarily=3
d) not important=4

Variable 19: "Is it important for your parents that you attend activities offered by your ethnic group"

Categories of the variables:

a) important=1
b) ideally but not necessarily=2
c) not important=3

Variable 20: " How important is it for your parents that you retain your ethnic culture and traditions?"
Variable 21: "How important is it for your mother that you marry within your ethnic group"?
Variable 22: "How important is it for your father that you marry within your ethnic group"?

Categories of the variables:

a) Very important=1
b) Important=2
c) Ideally but not necessarily=3
d) Not important=4

Variable 23: "How important is religion in your life?"

Categories of the variable:

a) very important=1
b) important=2
c) not very important=3
d) not important=4

Variable 24: "Is it important that your job benefits your religious group as well as yourself"

Categories of the variable:

a) very important=1
b) important=2
c) ideally but not necessarily=3
d) not important=4

Variable 25: "Is it important for you to marry within your religious group?"

Categories of the variable:

a) important=1
b) ideally but not necessarily=2
c) not important=3
d) I don't want to marry within my religious group=4

Variable 26: "Is it important to support the causes and needs of members of your religious group?"

Categories of the variable:

a) very much so=1
b) ideally but not necessarily=2
c) not at all=3

Variable 27: "How often do you go to either the Mosque or the Church?"

Categories of the variable:

a) at least once a week=1
b) once a month=2
c) only on religious Holidays=3
d) never or rarely=4

Variable 28: "How often do you pray on average"

Categories of the variable:

a) at least once a day=1
b) once a week=2
c) once a month=3
d) never or rarely=4

Variable 29: "Do you try to fast during appropriate religious Holidays?"

Categories of the variable:

a) yes=1
b) no=2

Variable 30: "How often do you attend religious events, activities or religious social affairs?"

Categories of the variable:

a) often=1
b) occasionally=2
c) never=3

Variable 31: "Are you member of a religious movement or organization?"

Categories of the variable:

a) yes=1
b) no=2

Variable 32: "Does religion play an important role in your father's life?"
Variable 33: "Does religion play an important role in your mother's life?"

Categories of the variables:

a) very important=1
b) important=2
c) not very important=3
d) not important=4

Variable 34: "In your estimation, is your father a practising person?"
Variable 35: "In your estimation, is your mother a practising person?"

Categories of the variables:

a) a very practising person
b) a fairly practising person
c) a not very practising person
d) a non practising person

Variable 36: "How important is it for your father that you retain your religious heritage?"
Variable 37: "How important is it for your mother that you retain your religious heritage?"

Categories of the variables:

a) very important=1
b) important=2
c) not very important=3
d) not important=4

Variable 38: "Women should essentially be housewives"
Variable 39: "Women should obey their husband"
Variable 40: "Girls should compulsorily remain a virgin before marriage"
Variable 41: "Boys should compulsorily remain a virgin before marriage"
Variable 42: "A girl's virginity should be protected by her male kin for family reputation and honour to be preserved"

Categories of these variables:

a) I completely agree=1
b) I somewhat agree=2
c) I somewhat disagree=3
d) I disagree completely=4

Variable 43: "Male teenagers are allowed to have a girlfriend before marriage"
Variable 44: "Female teenagers are allowed to have a boyfriend before marriage"
Variable 45: "Pre-marital sex is acceptable for boys"
Variable 46: "Pre-marital sex is acceptable for girls"

Categories of these variables:

a) I completely disagree=1
b) I somewhat disagree=2
c) I somewhat agree=3
d) I completely agree=4

Variable 47: "Women should be housewives-PARENTS"
Variable 48: "Women should obey her husband-PARENTS"
Variable 49: "Girls should remain virgins before marriage-PARENTS"
Variable 50: "Boys should remain virgins before marriage-PARENTS"
Variable 51: "A girl's virginity should be protected by her male kin for family
reputation and honour to be preserved-PARENTS"

Categories of these variables:

a) I completely agree=1
b) I somewhat agree=2
c) I somewhat disagree=3
d) I disagree completely=4

Variable 52: "Male teenagers can have a girlfriend before marriage-PARENTS"
Variable 53: "Female teenagers can have a boyfriend before marriage-PARENTS"
Variable 54: "Pre-marital sex is acceptable for boys-PARENTS"
Variable 55: "Pre-marital sex is acceptable for girls-PARENTS"

Categories of these variables:

a) I completely disagree=1
b) I somewhat disagree=2
c) I somewhat agree=3
d) I completely agree=4

Variable 56: "Personally, I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians"
Variable 57: "There are negative stereotypes against Arabs prevailing among
Canadians"
Variable 58: "There are negative stereotypes against my religious group prevailing
among Canadians"
Variable 59: "The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of the Arabs"
Variable 60: "The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of my religious
group"

Categories of these variables:

e) I completely disagree=1
f) I somewhat disagree=2
g) I somewhat agree=3
h) I completely agree=4

Variable 61: "Sex"_____

Variable 62: "Religion of your Father":_____

Variable 63: "Level of education of your father"_____

This variable, originally measured through an open question, was converted into an ordinal categorical variable (Father's level of education-2) with 4 categories.

a) primary school degree or less =1
b) high school years = 2
c) college years = 3
d) university years = 4

Variable 64: "All things being equal, in your estimation, the concentration of individuals belonging to your ethnic group who live in your neighbourhood is..."

a) high=1
b) normal=2
c) low=3
d) insignificant=4

Variable 65: "Were you born in Canada?"

a) yes
b) no. In which country were you born?_____

Variable 66: "How old were you when you arrived in Canada?" _____

Variable 67: "Do you eat Halal meat?"

a) almost all the time=1
b) ideally but not compulsorily=2
c) only for religious holidays=3
d) I don't eat halal meat=4

Variable 68: "Do you drink alcohol?"

a) yes=1
b) no=2

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE

General Information

1) Sex: _____

2) Age:_____

3) In which programme are you enrolled?_____

4) How far are you in your programme?_____

5) Level of education of your father?_____

6) Level of education of your mother?_____

7) What is your father occupation?_____

8) What is your mother occupation?_____

9) All things being equal, in your estimation, the concentration of individuals belonging to your ethnic group who live in your neighbourhood is.......

    a) high
    b) average
    c) low
    d) insignificant

10) What is your father's country of origin?_____

11) What is your mother's country of origin?_____

12) Religion of your father?_____

13) Religion of your mother?_____

14) Were you born in Canada?

    a) Yes
    b) No. In which country were you born?_____

        How old were you when you arrived in Canada?_____

15) In which country have you lived for the longest period of time between 0 and 15 years old?_____

<u>Questionnaire</u>

1) How would you qualify your knowledge of spoken Arabic?

    a) good
    b) average
    c) poor
    d) I don't speak it

2) Which language do you **mostly** use when speaking to your parents? (only one answer)

    a) Arabic
    b) French
    c) English
    d) Other _____

3) Which language do you **mostly** use when speaking to your brother(s) or sister(s) (only one answer)?

    a) Arabic
    b) French
    c) English
    d) Other_____

4) Which language do you **mostly** use when speaking to your friends originating from an Arab speaking country (skip the question if you have no Arab friends)?

    a) Arabic
    b) French
    c) English
    d) Other _____

5) Do you eat any food that is associated with your ethnic group?

    a) rarely (e.g.: only on special holidays)
    b) occasionally (e.g.: once a month or so)
    c) often (e.g.: once a week or more)

6) Do you listen to your ethnic group's radiobroadcasts, or watch ethnic group's television programs?

    a) never
    b) rarely (5 times a year or so)
    c) occasionally (once a month or so)
    d) often (once a week or more)

7) Do you read any of your ethnic group's newspapers, magazines, or other periodicals

    a) never
    b) rarely (5 times a year or so)
    c) occasionally (once a month or so)
    d) often (once a week or more)

8) Do you listen to music associated with your ethnic group?

    a) never
    b) rarely (5 times a year or so)
    c) occasionally (once a month or so)
    d) often (once a week or more)

9) How do you usually think of yourself **first and foremost**? (only one answer)

    a) as an Arab
    b) as a member of a national Arab group (eg.: Egyptian, Moroccan)
       If so, which one:_____
    c) as an Arab-Canadian (or Quebecois)
    d) as a (national group)-Canadian (or Quebecois)
    e) as either a Canadian or a Quebecois
    f) other _____

10) If you had to assign a percentage to the two following parts of your identity, what would it look like? (it must add up to 100%):

    a) The ethnic group(s) you belong to: _____
    b) Canadian or Quebecois: _____

11) How important is your ethnic or cultural background to you?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) somewhat important
    d) not important

12) How close are the ties that you maintain, **on a personal level,** with member of other ethnic groups in Canada?

    a) very close
    b) close
    c) rather loose
    d) no ties at all

13) How often do you attend your ethnic group' s dances, parties, or social affairs (formal or informal) ?

    a) often
    b) occasionally
    c) never

14) Do you or did you use to spend your summer in vacation resorts or summer camps located in Canada but attended mainly by your ethnic group?

    a) almost every summer
    b) I have been there once
    c) I have been there more than once
    d) never

15) I would like you to think about your three closest friends who are not relatives. Of these friends, how many belong to your ethnic group (or to any another Arab group)?

    a) one
    b) two
    c) three
    d) none

16) Is it important for you to have a job that will benefit your ethnic group as well as yourself?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) ideally but not necessarily
    d) not important at all

17) Is it important for you to marry within your own ethnic group?

    a) important
    b) ideally but not necessarily
    c) not important at all
    d) I do not want to marry within my own ethnic group

18) Which language do your parents speak **most often** to you (only 1 answer)?

    a) Arabic
    b) French
    c) English
    d) other_____

19) How important is it for your parents that you know Arabic?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) ideally but not necessarily
    d) not important at all

20) Have you ever attended Arabic classes here in Canada

    a) yes
    b) no

21) If so, whose idea was it?

    a) your own
    b) your parents'

22) How important is it for your parents that you attend activities and events offered by your national ethnic group or by the broader Arab community.?

    a) important
    b) ideally but not necessarily
    c) not important

23) How important is it for your parents that you retain your ethnic culture and traditions (at least those traditions they deem relevant)?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) ideally but not necessarily
    d) not important

24) How important is it for your mother that you marry someone within your own ethnic group?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) ideally but not necessarily
    d) not important

25) How important is it for your father that you marry someone within your own ethnic group?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) ideally but not necessarily
    d) not important

26) How important is religion in your life?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) not very important
    d) not important

27) Here in Canada, how close are the ties which you maintain, **in your personal life,** with persons whose religious background is different than yours.

    a) very close
    b) close
    c) rather loose
    d) no ties

28) How important is it for you to have a job that will benefit your religious group as well as yourself?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) ideally but not necessarily
    d) not important

29) Is it important for you to marry within your own religious group?

    a) important
    b) ideally but not necessarily
    c) not important
    d) I don't want to marry someone within my own religious group

30) Do you personally feel that you should support the special causes and needs of members of your religious group in Canada and abroad?

    a)   very much so
    b)   ideally but not necessarily
    c)   not at all

31) On average, in a year, how often do you go to either the Mosque or the Church (or any other temple)?

    a)   at least once a week
    b)   once a month
    c)   only for religious holidays
    d)   never or rarely

32) How often do you pray on average?

    a)   at least once a day
    b)   once a week
    c)   once a month
    d)   never or rarely

(The following question should only be answered by Muslim respondents)
33) Do you eat Halal?

    a)   almost all the times
    b)   ideally but not necessarily
    c)   only during religious holidays
    d)   I do not observe this prescription

34) In general, do you try to fast during religious holidays during which fasting is prescribed?

    a)   yes
    b)   no

(The following question should only be answered by Muslim respondents)
35) In everyday life, do you try not to drink alcohol as prescribed in the Koran

    a) yes
    b) no

36) How often do you attend religious events, activities, or social affairs (formal or informal)?

    a)   often
    b)   occasionally
    c)   never

37) Are you member of a religious movement or organization?

    a)   yes
    b)   no

38) I would like you to think about your three closest friends who are not relatives. Of these friends, how many share your religious background?

    a) one
    b) two
    c) three
    d) none

39) Does religion play an important role in your father's life?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) *not very important*
    d) not important

40) Does religion play an important role in your mother's life?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) not very important
    d) not important

41) In your estimation, is your father......

    a) a very practising person
    b) a fairly practising person
    c) a not very practising person
    d) a non-practising person
    e) atheist or agnostic

42) In your estimation, is your mother......

    a) a very practising person
    b) a fairly practising person
    c) a not very practising person
    d) a non-practising person
    e) an atheist or agnostic

43) How important is it for your father that you retain your religious heritage?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) not very important
    d) not important

44) How important is it for your mother that you retain your religious heritage?

    a) very important
    b) important
    c) not very important
    d) not important

45) Have you ever attended a religious school in Canada?

    a)   yes. If so, for how long:_____

    b)   yes, but in addition to regular school (week-ends or evenings)

    c)   no

Instructions for questions # 46 to 56:

Under each of the following statements, you will find two columns. In the left one, please indicate your level of agreement with the statement. In the right one, indicate what in your opinion would be your parent's level of agreement with the same statement (except for statement #56)

(N.B.: Statement #46 concerns only Muslim respondents)
46) Women should **NOT** be obliged to wear the hijab (the veil) outside the home

a) I agree completely	a) They would completely agree
b) I somewhat agree	b) They would somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree	c) They would somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely	d) They would completely disagree

47) Women should essentially be housewives

a) I agree completely	a) They would completely agree
b) I somewhat agree	b) They would somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree	c) They would somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely	d) They would completely disagree

48) In general, a woman should obey her husband

a) I agree completely	a) They would completely agree
b) I somewhat agree	b) They would somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree	c) They would somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely	d) They would completely disagree

49) Girls should compulsorily remain virgin before marriage

a) I agree completely	a) They would completely agree
b) I somewhat agree	b) They would somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree	c) They would somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely	d) They would completely disagree

50) Boys should compulsorily remain virgin before marriage

a) I agree completely	a) They would completely agree
b) I somewhat agree	b) They would somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree	c) They would somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely	d) They would completely disagree

51) A girl's virginity should be "protected" until marriage by her male kin in order for the family's reputation and honour to be preserved.

a) I agree completely	a) They would completely agree
b) I somewhat agree	b) They would somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree	c) They would somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely	d) They would completely disagree

52) Male teenagers should be allowed to have a girlfriend before marriage if they want to.

a) I agree completely
b) I somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely

a) They would completely agree
b) They would somewhat agree
c) They would somewhat disagree
d) They would completely disagree

53) Female teenagers should be allowed to have a boyfriend before marriage if they want to.

a) I agree completely
b) I somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely

a) They would completely agree
b) They would somewhat agree
c) They would somewhat disagree
d) They would completely disagree

54) Pre-marital sexual relationships are acceptable for boys

a) I agree completely
b) I somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely

a) They would completely agree
b) They would somewhat agree
c) They would somewhat disagree
d) They would completely disagree

55) Pre-marital sexual relationships are acceptable for girls.

a) I agree completely
b) I somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely

a) They would completely agree
b) They would somewhat agree
c) They would somewhat disagree
d) They would completely disagree

56) In my home, parental control is (or was) excessive

a) I agree completely
b) I somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely

Instructions for questions # 57 to 61:

Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements:

57) I feel accepted as an Arab by Canadians in my personal life.

a) I agree completely
b) I somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely

58) There are negative stereotypes against Arabs prevailing among Canadians.

a) I agree completely
b) I somewhat agree
c) I somewhat disagree
d) I disagree completely

59) There are negative stereotypes against my religious group prevailing among Canadians.

    a) I agree completely
    b) I somewhat agree
    c) I somewhat disagree
    d) I disagree completely

60) The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of my religious group.

    a) I agree completely
    b) I somewhat agree
    c) I somewhat disagree
    d) I disagree completely

61) The media contribute to propagate a biased picture of Arabs ?

    a) I agree completely
    b) I somewhat agree
    c) I somewhat disagree
    d) I disagree completely

_____End of the questionnaire_____

Would you be interested in eventually participating in a 30 minute interview during which you would be asked to elaborate on some of the responses you wrote down in this questionnaire.

a) Yes
b) No

If you answered yes, please write down below your name and phone number, so I can contact you subsequently:

Name:_____

Tel.:_____

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTION SHEET

1) Do you identify first and foremost as an Arab, a "National origin", an Arab-Canadian, a "National origin"-Canadian, or a Canadian? Could you explain your answer?

2) Do you identify at all as an Arab? Why?

3) Do you think there are many differences between your ethnic group and Canadians in general? In which respects is your ethnic group different?

4) Is it important for you to conserve your ethnic culture? Which aspects of this culture do you want to retain the most and why?

5) Is it important for you to conserve your religious culture. Which aspects of this culture do you want to retain the most and why?

6) Is it important for your parents that you retain your ethnic culture? Which aspects of it do they want you to retain in particular, and how do they let you know about it ?

7) Is it important for your parents that you retain your religious culture? Which aspects of it do they want you to retain in particular, and how do they let you know about it ?

8) Do you find sometimes that the Canadian component of your identity can lead to arguments or even conflicts between you and your parents. If so, could you give examples?

9) Is ethnicity important in your choice of friends? Why?

10) Is religion important in your choice of friends? Why?

11) Will ethnicity be important in your choice of a future life partner?

12) Will religion be important in your choice of a future life partner?

13) Do you agree with the statement "A woman should obey her husband"? Why?

14) Do you agree with the statement "A girl's virginity should be preserved until marriage" Could you please justify your answer?

15) Do you agree with the statement "A boy's virginity should be preserved until marriage" Could you please justify your answer?

16) In your personal life, do you feel well accepted as an Arab by Canadians?

17) In general, do you think that there are negative stereotypes of Arabs prevailing among Canadians? Could you give examples?

18) In general do you think that there are negative stereotypes of your religious group prevailing among Canadians? Could you give examples?

19) Do you think that the media contribute to propagate a biased, or an accurate picture of the Arabs? Why?

20) Do you think that the media contribute to propagate a biased, or an accurate picture of your religious group? Why?