MOTIVATION, JUSTIFICATION AND INNOVATION: THE MARRIAGE OF NEO-LIBERAL RATIONALITIES AND COMMUNITY BASED POLICING

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Abstract

This dissertation examines how the collision of neo-liberalism and regionally specific social forces have created differing manifestations of community based policing in three Canadian police services (Edmonton, Toronto and the RCMP K-Division). The contradictions that exist between the rhetoric and practice of community involvement explicit in the tenets of neo-liberalism and community policing and the dissonance between the neo-liberal concepts of marketization and consumer empowerment with that of community members' empowerment and citizenship are the central concerns of this project. The Merger of neo-liberalism and community policing has taken place under common conditions of downsizing, fiscal downloading and organizational restructuring. These conditions have not, however, led to a consistency of application. Organizational and operational reform have varied from police service to police service. The political, economic and social variables differ across regions, as do the stimuli for reform and the manner in which community policing has been implemented. As a result, each region has uniquely articulated the neo-liberal tenet of community involvement in community based policing.

Chapter one explores the global and national shift from the Keynesian welfare hegemony to that of Neo-liberalism. Chapter Two is an analysis of Edmonton Police Service's wholesale implementation of community policing. Chapter Three explores the range of reform initiatives from the perspective of broad RCMP organizational shifts and then within the context of contract policing in the Province of Alberta (K-Division). Chapter Four examines how Toronto Police Service sought to control the restructuring process for its own internal ends

The final Chapter summarizes the contradictions in the restructuring efforts of each Police Service. The disjuncture between the rhetoric and practice of community empowerment and how they differ or are similar in each site are the focus of this discussion.

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Introduction

This dissertation examines how the collision of neo-liberalism and regionally specific social forces have created differing manifestations of community based policing in three Canadian police services (Edmonton, Toronto and the RCMP K-Division). The contradictions that exist between the rhetoric and practice of community involvement explicit in the tenets of neo-liberalism and community policing and the dissonance between the neo-liberal concepts of marketization and consumer empowerment with that of community members' empowerment and citizenship are the central concerns of this project. The Merger of neo-liberalism and community policing has taken place under common conditions of downsizing, fiscal downloading and organizational restructuring. These conditions have not, however, led to a consistency of application. Organizational and operational reform have varied from police service to police service. The political, economic and social variables differ across regions, as do the stimuli for reform and the manner in which community policing has been implemented. As a result, each region has uniquely articulated the neo-liberal tenet of community involvement in community based policing.

The last decade of Canadian police reform has unfolded in a period characterized by the ascendance of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberal rationalities[1] have realigned the definition of community, responsibility and governance, all of which impact

[1] Rationalities are "practical rather than theoretical or discursive entities. They are forged in the business of problem solving and attempting to make things work. Consequently they manifest a

upon the role of the police. Like many other public sector institutions, policing has undergone a process of institutional isomorphism (Mastrofski, 1997) that has had profound consequences for the ongoing efficacy of policing. In fact, I argue that community based policing is being implemented, not because it represents a new found commitment to citizen involvement and democratic participation in governance, but because of an ideological commitment to reducing the size of government and emulating the private sector.

Although policy makers espouse the benefits of community based policing, community participation and partnership, the central emphasis in the adoption of community policing has been the devolution of responsibility and fiscal downloading. Here, community policing is "at root a strategy that seeks to shift the responsibility for security to local institutions and resources" (Shearing,1997,70). While, in principal, the devolution of responsibility appears to hold the promise of community empowerment, in practice, responsibilization has meant fiscal downloading, limited input into police initiatives and a tacit support for police/community partnerships. Community based policing has served as a platform from which police services have achieved organizational and structural reform that is consistent with governance shifts at municipal, provincial and federal levels of government.

Organization

The premise of this dissertation is that the analysis of community policing must go beyond a "parochial perspective centered on attempts to clearly define what it is and means" (Potter, 1999,4). David Bayley argues: "community policing represents the most serious and sustained attempt to reformulate the purpose and practices of policing since

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logic of practice, rather than an analysis, and tend to bear the hallmarks of the institutional

the development of the professional model in the early twentieth century" (1994, 120). And yet little attention has been given to the analysis of how the reformulation of policing and the adoption of community policing reflects contemporary dynamics within politics, government, business and the organization of social life. To do so requires us to recognize that society consists of complex sets of relations. Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff articulate the concept of social relations in the following manner:

> each process in society is understood as the site of the interaction of the influences exerted by all others. In other words, the existence and particular features of any social process are constituted by all other processes comprising a society. Each social is the effect produced by the interaction of all others (1987,24).

If we are to move beyond a parochial analysis of community policing we must therefore pry, not only into the social, political and economic forces that shape the model of reform, but dissect those that guide its implementation. As Rainer Schulte argues

> Police responsibilities and the way they are performed should always be viewed in the political context, under societal and economic circumstances and developments. Any changes in these areas are very much likely to lead to subsequent changes in the general framework for the police service and police work (1996,1).

Therefore, the dissertation begins by considering the theoretical and political underpinnings of the adoption of community policing in Canada. In this regard I am particularly interested in the tenets of neo-liberalism and their expression in new approaches to public management. Chapter one explores the global and national shift from the Keynesian welfare hegemony to that of Neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism has imposed a template of reduced governance, a credo of responsible citizens and a marketization of the state. I argue that the implementation of community policing is not only a reform strategy internal to policing but a response to external political and

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settings out of which they emerged" (Garland, 1997,184).

economic pressures. In this chapter I examine how the concepts of community empowerment, organizational streamlining and fiscal downloading are woven into the rhetoric and set of practices that synthesize neo-liberalism with the implementation of community policing.

Chapter Two is an analysis of Edmonton Police Service's wholesale implementation of community policing. The Chapter begins by way of a contextual analysis of Edmonton's political and economic environment prior to and during its process of implementing community policing. From here the chapter follows the various stages of implementation in an attempt to place it in context to similar efforts occurring in the public sector. Edmonton is unique in the sense that it has implemented community policing in a manner that emulates corporate sector organizational and managerial strategies while at the same time achieving an active partnership with the community.

Chapter Three explores the range of reform initiatives from the perspective of broad RCMP organizational shifts and then within the context of contract policing in the Province of Alberta (K-Division). The imposition of Federal and Provincial neo-liberal governance agendas placed Alberta's RCMP in a compromising situation both fiscally and organizationally. This has resulted in an organization characterized by 3 year business plans, corporate organizational models and organizational and cultural reform based on the commodification of police service governance.

Chapter four examines how Toronto Police Service sought to control the restructuring process for its own internal ends. While, the overarching model was that of community policing, the outcome is more consistent with the wholesale emulation of private sector managerialism. The analysis begins by addressing the complexity of

police reform in the volatile political environment of the 1990's in which provincial governance shifted from both the New Democratic Party (NDP) to the Progressive Conservatives and the province experienced a severe economic recession. The analysis continues by examining two specific restructuring projects, the Robbery Reduction Initiative and Central Field Command's implementation of Crime Management. These projects reveal the Service's use of community policing as both a vehicle for and philosophy by which to underpin structural and operational reform.

The final Chapter summarizes the contradictions in the restructuring efforts of each Police Service. The disjuncture between the rhetoric and practice of community empowerment and how they differ or are similar in each site are the focus of this discussion. While I indicate that the practice of community empowerment has been unimpressive, I will also argue that communities are at a critical point in asserting their legitimacy in the partnership of crime prevention and order maintenance. At present the opportunity exists for communities to take an active role in the policing of their communities and to participate in the task of governance. The question that remains is whether or not communities can in fact take up the challenge that lies before them.

While I have not included a stand alone methods chapter this does not suggest a trivialization of the research process. Only that I felt it necessary to outline my analytical strategy within the introduction so as to articulate the challenges posed by a comparative analysis, particularly, in context to a diverse police environment.

Methods of Analysis

Differences in the political, economic and social variables in each region, the stimulus for reform and the manner in which community policing has been implemented pose a particular methodological challenge requiring a variety of techniques in order to

capture various levels of incongruity. As each police service differs in the extent of its implementation and stage at which this process has unfolded, it was necessary to utilize a degree of flexibility in the methods by which I could collect information. Furthermore, if a comparison was to be made between these three police services it was essential to have detailed structural, operational and ethnographic information. A simple myopic approach to research methodology would exclude the opportunity to compare and contrast policy statements with the operationalization of stated policy objectives. Additionally, the diverse nature of implementation existing between the three sample police services required a detailed understanding of the external political and economic environment. Hence, a variety of methods were needed to undertake this investigation.

The resolution to this methodological quandary was located in the practices of qualitative analysis. The decision to utilize a qualitative format was based on qualitative research characteristics of contextualizing the settings and history of the institutions, a descriptive approach to analysis and the fact that "qualitative research is concerned with process rather than simply with outcomes and products" (Bogdan and Bilken, 1992,30). Furthermore, a qualitative approach would support posing questions such as under what circumstances do official documents come into being, what historical circumstances and movements are they a part of, how do certain notions come to be taken as part of what is understood as the "common sense" (Ibid.). Finally, a qualitative approach supports the construction of a detailed, descriptive analysis of activities, participation, relationships and setting (Lofland,1991).

The structure of this project required three stages of analysis. The first was a contextualization of policing's institutional isomorphism. This required a theoretical analysis of global and national governance trends both external and internal to policing.

Flowing from this contextualization was the need to juxtapose these trends with the organizational reform taking shape in Toronto, Edmonton and the RCMP K-Division. More specifically, this level of analysis would correspond with what Bogden and Biklen (1992) refer to as historical organizational case studies. Here, the objective was to trace how community policing came to be implemented, what internal changes occurred over time, and what external political/economic variables influenced these changes. In order to achieve these objectives I relied on data sources such as interviews, participant observation, internal communications, internal and external policy documents and newspaper articles.

The data was also divided into two categories, the first concentrated on the external political/economic environment influencing the need and structure of organizational reform. This information was required in order to extend the contextualization from a generalized global perspective to that of a micro application wherein one can identify specific political variables influencing the localized implementation of community policing. Data collection for this level of analysis was achieved by way of archival research, literature review and examination of municipal, provincial and federal government documents.

The second layer of analysis required in depth onsite analysis of each of the three police services. In the case of Edmonton Police Service and the RCMP, K-Division I spent a full month working with each police service. With respect to Edmonton Police Service I was given a desk in the Evaluation and Research unit. Here, I had open access to the Services internal documentation. Moreover, all interviews and ride along sessions were coordinated through this unit. My site research with Edmonton Police Service began on February 8, and ended on March 6,1998.

On February 1st, 1999 I began a similar on site research program with the RCMP K-Division. My initial contact was with the Community and Aboriginal policing unit commander. Similar to my experience with Edmonton I was given access to internal documents as well as an open opportunity to interview numerous officers. These interviews were conducted with personnel from six detachments in the Central Alberta Region, as well as K-Division HQ personnel. The onsite component of my RCMP research was completed on March 9th, 1999. Subsequent interviews were undertaken in Ottawa at RCMP Headquarters in the ensuing months.

The format of on site research altered for the Toronto case study. This was due to the ongoing nature of Toronto Police Service's reorganization and secondly the various initiatives I wished to examine were evolving in a consecutive fashion. Therefore, I was restricted to the timelines set out by Toronto's command and the implementation schedule they had set. The Toronto experience also differed in the fact that I took on the role of participant observer during the development and implementation of Toronto's Robbery Reduction Initiative and Central Field Command's implementation of Crime Management. My research tenure with Toronto began in January 1997 and was completed in February 1999.

While these onsite opportunities enabled me to access a vast array of documents not readily available outside the Police Services, the onsite component was also essential for the analysis of activities, participation, relationships and setting. During this period of research I completed 89 interviews[2], sat in on six day long focus groups, as a participant observer and participated in a month long program development

[2] See appendix for interview questions. (open ended style of interviews allowed for wide range of response from participants)

(the Robbery Reduction Work Group Sessions)[3]. The sample of interviewees was inclusive of front-line constables, middle management staff and executive command officers.[4] A noted shortcoming of this interview schedule is the lack of community participants.

The combination of data sources and the various layers of analysis applied in this dissertation have enabled me to present a historical organizational case study for each of the identified police services. And while it is perhaps only a snapshot in their overall history it does capture the political, economic and social variables guiding each of their organizational isomorphism throughout the last decade. Moreover, this qualitative approach has been inclusive of the voices of those who must operationalize the organizational re-engineering. Furthermore, this methodological strategy highlights levels of incongruity between the practice and theory of community policing; an analytical quality integral to this dissertation.

[3] See references for dates and titles of sessions.
[4] See references for list of participants. In an effort to share my findings with participants I will forward a final draft to designated liaison with in each of the participating services.

CHAPTER ONE

The Courtship of Neo-liberal Rationalities and Community Based Policing: Theoretical and Political Underpinnings for the Adoption of Community Policing

A wide body of analysis confirms that, policing has been subject to the critique and realignment of neo-liberal reform. Pat O'Malley implies policing has begun to reflect "the ascendance of neo-liberal political rationalities and related social technology of new managerialism" (1996,10). Leishman, Cope and Starie draw attention to a "new policing order" framed by what they refer to as "new public management" (1996). Moreover, new public management "is now deeply ingrained within the management structures of the police service" (Savage and Charman,1996). Chris Murphy notes:

> The previously insular and organizational culture of public policing is being increasingly colonized by business concepts, values and terminology. New management training frequently uses business analogies and cases to illustrate proper police management principles. Police are encouraged to see themselves in the "business" of supplying policing services to clients, customers and consumers (1998,10).

Acknowledging a similar trend Peter Manning states:

> One indication of this trend is the popularity of business management jargon to describe policing. Police chiefs are seen as analogous to CEOs, managing business and taking risks in a market context (1995,375).

He further indicates:

> two of the most significant developments for policing and especially community policing are benchmarking[5] and the search for best practices and procedures (1996,3).

Peak and Glensor (1996) observe that police leaders increasingly address the problem of service performance and decreasing operational costs by appealing to private sector strategies of efficiency and fiscal restraint. Mastrofski argues that "the structural forms gathered under the community policing umbrella are precisely those au courant among progressive corporations and management consultants" (1998,168). He further acknowledges that the structural changes shaping the corporate sector seem to be "well on their way to institutionalization as the accepted way to organize police departments in North America" (ibid. 169). This concept of accepting private models is further supported by former Conservative MP Rene Marin's argument that:

> While it is clear that a modern police force organized on a national, provincial or municipal basis is not the same as IBM, McDonalds, ESSO or, for that matter, Canada Post, it is still possible to draw analogies and find similarities (1997,2).

Finally, Clifford Shearing argues that, at the discursive level, police services are emulating the new market language, as articulated in terms like 'the police industry, customers, products and market share' (1996,293). The common thread in these observations is the consensus that policing is emulating market models. Increasingly, the market buzz words of corporate strategy[6], effectiveness, efficiency and fiscal accountability are being applied to police practices and framing the structure of operational reform. [7]

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[5] Benchmarking is an approach to organizational assessment that seeks standards, often in the form of procedures and best practices, that are relevant to assessing the quality of performance in a given type of industry or industry sector.

[6] As early as 1988 one could locate the rhetoric of corporate strategies and managerial discourse within U.S. policing circles. In a paper written for the U.S. Department of Justice Moore and Trojanowicz outlined the importance of corporate strategies and the need for police services to adopt market models. (Manning, 19??) In a Canadian context, the emphasis on market management strategies is apparent within Peter Campbell and Susan Wright's 1993 document 'Leadership in Turbulent Times'.

[7] It should be noted the reforms influencing policing have also overtaken the governance of other criminal justice institutions. Davids and Hancock suggest 'the new rationality of the governance of

Yet, if we are to understand policing's isomorphism as being linked to broad neo-liberal objectives we must dispel the assumption that police agencies, like many other components of the criminal justice system, are independent apparatus "separate and rationally organized to achieve specific goals" (Ratner et al,1987,89). In other words we must acknowledge the inter-related nature that exists between the state and its various administrative apparatus, of which the police are considered a component. While it is important to understand the specific institutional processes that constitute the neo-liberal transformation of policing and police administration it is also essential to place these organizational reforms within a wider political context. Past analysis of police reform has under emphasized and neglected the role of the state, particularly in relation to the State's role as an organizer of hegemony (Ibid.). Therefore, reform should not be considered solely in terms of an individual Police Service's attempt to achieve efficiency and effectiveness. But more importantly, we must recognize that current reform initiatives undertaken by Canadian policing have broader implications and objectives than the singular reconstruction of a police service. Reform initiatives, particularly those occurring under the banner of neo-liberal ideology, must be considered in relation to broad state objectives and understood in relation to the inter-related nature that exists between the state and its various administrative apparatus.

The task, therefore, is to construct a theoretical framework through which to understand current reform initiatives in relation to the inter-related existence between the state and its administrative apparatus, more specifically the police. The theoretical underpinnings for such an analysis can be derived from Nico Poulantzas' concept,

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crime and of criminal justice, is characterized by managerialism, budget restraint and enterprise culture with evaluation and accountability through implementation of national and state

"relative autonomy of the state" (1973). Poulantzas sought to explain "the independence of the state from the immediate demands of private accumulation" and suggested that the state is

> neither completely autonomous in the sense that it is free from active control by the dominant economic class, nor is it simply manipulated by members of that class. Rather, it is relatively autonomous in the sense that it is free from the interests of particular factions of capital, thus allowing it to serve as the factor of cohesion in the determinate social formation and to regulate its overall equilibrium (Ratner et al,1988,86).

He further concluded that the regulation of equilibrium (balancing the legitimation and accumulation functions of the state) requires the state to take on the role of educator, the organizer of hegemony while at the same moment not "be the instrument of any one class or faction but rather possess a relative autonomy in relation to the immediate short term interests of the dominant class(es)" (Mahon,1977,169). Poulantzas noted

> the state may, for example, present itself as the political guarantor of the interests of various classes and fractions of the power bloc against the interests of the hegemonic class or fraction, and it sometimes may play off those classes and fractions against the latter. But it does this in its function of political organizer of the hegemonic class (1973,301).

Poulantzas argues that, as the hegemonic organizer the state does not negotiate between private interests but rather with its various organs or branches (Ibid). These branches of the state (government offices, the executive, local and regional authorities, judiciary, police, etc) represent various social forces, each of them representing "this or that fraction of the power bloc" (Mahon,1977,170). More importantly, it is essential to recognize that these state apparatus represent "differential forms of the articulation of

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government agendas (such as externally imposed performance indicators, public audit and community surveys)' (1998,44)

the economic and political" and as such are critical to the maintenance of hegemonic equilibrium. (Poulantzas, 1973,309). In the contemporary moment, the distance between the state apparatus and dominant capitalist fractions is shorter than Poulantzas' theory would suggest. The financial discipline imposed on the Canadian state due to the country's increasing participation in the international market has limited the breadth of debate that may be undertaken by state agents. Nonetheless, Poulantzas' insistence that the state is not a coherent and unified entity is an important insight for understanding the differing manifestations of community based policing under the broad hegemonic framework of neo-liberalism.

In the current context, the Canadian state has adopted a neo-liberal mode of governance. Neo-liberal ideology[8] has shaped the reconstruction of legal, institutional and cultural conditions in order to develop "an artificial competitive game of entrepreneurial conduct" so that new levels of efficiency and effectiveness might be achieved (Burchell,1993). In particular, the state and its functions have been reshaped

[8] Neo-liberal ideology is framed by principles of neo-classic economic rationalism drawn from libertarian concepts of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill (Levitas,1986) Neo-liberal principles include "the freedom of individuals from government regulation, except when individual rights of others are under threat; the benefits of unregulated voluntary market transactions to optimal wealth creation and distribution and the commitment to a limited role of government in creating the legal and institutional setting for efficient functioning of the laissez-faire economy" (Davids and Hancock, 1998,39). Neo-liberalism is, in fact, a "restatement of classical liberalism's view that the chief threat to liberty comes from those who wield political power" (McBride and Shields, 1997,29). Moreover, neo-liberalism is the "theoretical and practical rejection of the active state that had emerged in the Keynesian postwar era, and its replacement by laissez-faire free-market doctrines and practices' (Ibid,18). J.W Sheptycki argues neo-liberalism is a "radical programme of government, concerned with correcting the so-called pathologies of the welfare state" (1998,492). McBride and Shields suggest that: "Neo-liberalism represents an assault upon the underlying logic of the welfare state capitalism and on the mass-based democracy from which the welfare state emerged. It seeks to undo the norms surrounding mass based democracy and the Keynesian welfare state by challenging a politics guided by the values of equality and based on the ability of groups to influence economic and social policy. Instead, neo-liberals promote the value of free-market individualism. Consequently, public institutions should be structured in a way that enhances the values of individual freedom. The state must be constrained in its spending and its monopoly of power.... Governments must be circumscribed in their ability to interfere with the marketplace and thus maximize the ability of individuals to enjoy property" (1997,30).

along market principles and forced to compete in the market with respect to many of its activities (O'Malley,1996). Neo-liberal policies[9] and objectives have reconstituted the arena in which state and citizen interact by what Rose refers to as a realignment of the "contractual relations between agencies and service providers and between professionals and clients" (1996,327). Within the context of these objectives and policies, the public sector's role and practices of governance have faced a dramatic reordering. One particular shift can be outlined in the structure and standards of operation by which the public sector currently operates. Increasingly the market has become the significant standard against which to compare the structure and performance of government organizations (Peters,1993). This reordering is most prevalent in relation to the hierarchical and rule based tradition of management equated with public sector bureaucracies. Guy Peters argues that no longer does the neat Weberian[10] model "apply within public organizations to the extent that it once did, and in its place we encounter a variety of alternative sources of organizational power and authority" (1993,2).

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[9] Here I rely on Johnson, McBride and Smith's characterization of neo-liberal or neo-conservative policy prescriptions. They state these prescriptions "have sought to shrink the size of the state and to curb its scope, to restore the primacy of market forces and particularly, to dismantle the social welfare state, which is still alleged to be excessive, an obstacle to creation of wealth and a drain on the state's ability to compete economically in international markets"(1994,4). They also suggest proponents of these neo-liberal policies "continue to claim that market forces must be liberated, by downsizing the state and emasculating social welfare policies, so that the state can meet the challenges posed by global economic restructuring" (ibid).

[10] Weber considered bureaucracy the best administrative form for a rational pursuit of organizational goals. "Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy comprised various elements: a high degree of specialization and a clearly defined division of labour, with tasks distributed as official duties; a hierarchical structure of authority with clearly circumscribed areas of command and responsibility; the establishment of a formal body of rules to govern the operation of the organization; impersonal relationships between organizational members and with clients; recruitment of personnel on the basis of ability and technical knowledge; long term employment; promotion on the basis of seniority or merit, a fixed salary; the separation of private and official income" (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner,1984).

Within this context of neo-liberal political and economic hegemony the police are viewed as educators, as organizers of hegemony. As the state divests itself of a range of fiscal and social responsibility, the police educate communities to become more reliant upon their own resources, to become self-responsible. This process of education occurs by way of program and organizational reform, such as community based policing, wherein greater onus is placed upon communities to become more responsible for their particular order maintenance issues. Police reform, understood in this context, is meant to set in place a variety of strategies and practices that will reengineer the existing relationship of dependence to one based upon independence. Therefore, the police are, in fact, to educate the community through a particular articulation of the economic and political as it corresponds to the issue of governance and order maintenance. Given this understanding, current police reform, particularly community based policing, is a process of educating, of maintaining the state's hegemonic equilibrium. Yet, it is important to note that police reform is but one vehicle whereby the state has been able to support its organization of hegemony. The shifting organizational and structural geography of the state apparatus cumulatively educate the citizenry and articulate a particular understanding of the political and economic. The use of community policing by police agencies is but one pedagogical tool in the organization of hegemony.

While the above observations suggest policing, like other public sector institutions, are components in the state's effort to educate and organize a neo-liberal hegemony it is also important to understand the broader stimulus[11] for the adoption of

[11] Stimulus, as used in this context, refers to external forces influencing organizational reform. John Meyer and Brian Rowan (1992) argue that the development of structures and policies in organizations are not generally created from an internal think tank, but are the result of

market oriented management models. The answer to this question can be located within the evolution, thematics, and ideology of neo-liberalism.

The environment of change

> These appear to be times of bewildering transformation and change in the structure and organization of modern Western economy and society. It seems that capitalism is at a crossroads in its historical development signaling the emergence of forces - technological, market, social and institutional - that will be very different from those which dominated the economy after the Second World War (Amin,1994,1).

The current public sector reordering and comparison to market sector standards reflects what Janine Brodie terms performativity. She argues performativity is a process wherein "state practices are increasingly being formulated within terms of the market" (Brodie,1997,234). Brodie goes on to suggest: "performativity is a textbook case of institutional emulation - a process whereby one sector takes on the procedures and trappings of another" (ibid,235). This adoption of private sector models has become common practice in many western nations. As Donald Savoie observes:

> The political leadership virtually everywhere in the western world, even in countries with left-of-center parties in power, concluded that management practices in the private sector were superior to those in the public sector and whenever possible, the public sector should emulate the private sector (1993,12).

A public sector tack of performativity is further acknowledged by Jon Pierre, who suggests "the public sectors in most countries in Western Europe and North America appear to be gradually transforming from Weberian organizational structures into the private sector-modeled organizations" (1995,57). Lending further credence to this

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organizational adaptations to external institutionalizing forces or by mirroring other organizations within their interorganizational environment or domain that are recognized as legitimate.

observation and this evolution toward private sector models, Isabella Bakker and Riel Miller indicate:

> Like many private sector firms confronting new competitive conditions public organizations are facing pressure to adapt to the new circumstances. As a result, there are significant changes occurring in the state 'production process'. Slowly, and often without explicit directives from political or bureaucratic command centers, new forms of public administration are emerging (1996,334).

Reflecting the Australian experience, Davids and Hancock argue "public sector reforms in the 1980s were focused around the use of managerialist and corporate planning measures" (1998,40). And, as Wendy Larner points out, New Zealand's public sector reform was structured from a template borrowed from the rationalities of corporatism (Larner,1997). With respect to the United Kingdom Jenkins and Gray indicate that in a wide range of public services "the talk is now of delegated budgets, targets, performance, audit, contracts and purchaser/provider relationships as the new managerialism takes hold" (1993,74).

The above statements would, indeed, denote a market oriented wave of reform shaping the structure of public sector governance.

A Neo-Liberal Evolution

> Since 1979 there has been a worldwide growth in the belief that markets are the solution to economic difficulties... Everywhere there is a loss of faith in state intervention, regulation and ownership as instruments of economic improvement" (Hutton,1995,15).

The political credo of neo-liberalism has influenced a restructuring of the state and the techniques of governance. The past two decades have been ones of a "dramatic shift from Keynesian welfarism to neo-liberalism as the basis for state policies

and the transformation of a highly protected domestic economy into an open network economy" (Larner,1997,7). The hegemony of Reaganism and Thatcherism has transformed the welfare orientation of not only the United States and Britain but the overall structure of global governance.[12] Jenkins and Gray (1993) suggest this international fashion has realigned the governance structures and policies of the Anglo-American democracies of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Further, neo-liberal strategies and structures "can be observed in national contexts from Finland to Australia, advocated by political regimes from left to right and in relation to problem domains from crime control to health" (Rose,1996,53).

The neo-liberal hegemony has been ushered on to the stage during a "transition from one distinct phase of capitalist development to a new phase" (Amin,1994,1). Here neo-liberal rationalities were to become the unassailable alternative to the apparent economic crisis evolving from Keynesian policies and the foundationlessness of the postmodern era (Yeatman,1994). The setting in which neo-liberalism was thrust is articulated by a "pervasive process of transformation in the political economy of capitalism, with the growing problems of Fordism-Keynesianism and a process of transition to flexible accumulation under way in the capitalist mode of production" (Smart,1992,191). It is a setting that, as David Harvey (1989) argues, exhibits the conditions of postmodernity. Conditions that emerged with the demise of the post war

[12] Philip Resnick states: "It is no secret that during the 1980s what is commonly called the new right captured the political and economic agenda in Western countries, especially in the English-speaking world. The coming to power of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States symbolized this sea change in policy; so, in slightly more muted fashion, did the victory of Brian Mulroney in Canada in 1984 and neo-conservative ventures in provinces from British Columbia to Newfoundland" (1995, 25). Emphasizing the Canadian context of a neo-liberal shift Janine Brodie points out: "Canada, like other western liberal democracies, is currently experiencing a pronounced shift in state form and governing practices" (1997,223). She goes on to suggest for, " the past 15 years, Canadian politics has been preoccupied with the fashioning of the neo-liberal state" (1997,234).

boom, the diminished faith in Fordist-Keynesian policies - a period accented by rapid change, flux and uncertainty (Harvey,1989). As Hindess argues, the rise of neo-liberalism "is a product of the same conditions that have generated a widespread loss of support for, and an equally widespread loss of faith in, political programmes that seemed to rely on the effectiveness of a broad Keynesian programme of economic management" (1993,38).

This transition to, or ascendance of neo-liberal rationalities has come on the heels of "diminished economic expansion after thirty years of growth, slowed economic growth in OECD countries, significant budget deficits and double-digit rates of inflation" (Resnick, 1994,26). In tandem with these factors was a declining faith in Keynesian instruments of economic management and a belief that national governments could no longer effectively intervene in the management of national economies all of which created an environment primed for the evolution of neo-liberalism (Hutton,1995, Savoie,1993). The dynamics of this transition are aptly summarized in the following observation:

> While Keynesianism always had its critics, and certainly never was ensconced firmly and evenly throughout the social domain, it was clear by the late 1970s that a rising tide of resistance to its assumptions was taking hold in OECD nations. As part of this transformation, broader institutional discourses based on strategic rationalities of economic liberalism have also found their place and been brought together under the rubric of neo-liberalism, and especially in the cultural form thought of as Enterprise Culture (O'Malley and Palmer,1996,141).

From a neo-liberal perspective the emergent economic crisis was directly linked to the shortcomings of Keynesian policies. These shortcomings included state-guided welfare for citizens, collectively regulated economic policies which would maximize collective welfare, distribution of welfare benefits in a calculable, impersonal, formal and

bureaucratic manner, and an active state role as "guarantor of the general interest against the encroachment of individual interests" (Brodie,1997,232). Neo-liberals asserted that Keynesianism had a built-in tendency for deficit financing and led to welfare expenditures which destroyed the work ethic, state spending that tended to be out of control and government regulation that sapped the vitality out of the market system (Resnick,1994). The Keynesian state role of intervening "in order to smooth out demand fluctuations and to regulate the activities of individual capitalists, thereby ensuring the stability of the system as a whole" (Tickell and Peck,1995,368), ran counter to the neo-liberal assertion that the state must extract itself from the process of defining "the good" and adopt the "single minded focus of ensuring the health of the capitalist economy" (Harder,1998,2). In other words the visible hand of the state which once was to govern over the invisible hand of the market in order to guarantee the basic needs of citizens was to now relinquish its control on the market (Brodie,1997). The philosophical assumption of neo-liberalism is that "markets are inherently superior to any other way of organizing human societies. From this perspective, state intervention in markets through macro-economic policies, crown corporations, encouragement of collective bargaining and much social provision impedes rather than improves market operations" (Johnson, McBride and Smith,1994, 7). Neo-liberals claim that only by "a return to neoclassical principles, a shift in emphasis from state activities to private-sector production and entrepreneurial initiative, or so it was alleged, could the balance be set right" (Resnick,1994,26).

The Target: Public Sector Reform

The neo-liberal economic argument filtered down to the critique of governance structures and, in turn, resulted in a neo-liberal scrutiny[13] of the public sector. In the lens of this scrutiny public sector institutions were viewed as bloated, inefficient, costly and unresponsive to the needs of the market. The failure of many public sector institutions was perceived to have its roots in the self interested nature of bureaucracies (Peters,1993). In other words, public sector bureaucracies became equated with realms of power concerned only with enhancing their specific position of influence "at the expense of the producers of wealth in the private sector" (Resnick,1994,26). As Jon Pierre deftly argues:

> The predominant Zietgeist of the 1980s and 1990s has been derived so far from market strategies, behaviour and conceptualizations. In this ideology, the public sector has been portrayed as a rigid, expensive and self-sufficient set of structures, more or less indifferent to what citizens think about the services they are delivering. Instead of being responsive to the recipients of these services, public institutions are responsible and responsive only to the preferences and ideals espoused by policy makers and elected officials; this is the essence of the market-based criticism of the public sector (1995, 66).

The zietgiest which Pierre speaks of, created an antibureaucratic backlash and a "worldwide frustration among political leaders with their civil services" (Savoie,1993,9).[14]

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[13] An example of this scrutiny can be shown by examining the final report of Margaret Thatcher's Financial Management Initiative Unit on departmental efficiencies (Improving Management in Government:The Next Step,1988). The results of this study indicated 'the civil service was too large to manage as a single organization; ministerial overload diverted attention from management matters; the freedom of middle managers was being frustrated by hierarchical controls and there was little emphasis on the achievement of results. The findings of this report would later prove to be the catalyst for implementing change throughout the British civil service (Jenkins and Gray,1993).

[14] As Donald Savoie indicates, "Bureaucratic bashing was often the order of the day and the rhetoric did not die down once new political leaders took power... The overall image of the civil service that emerged was that of a bloated and misdirected behemoth staffed by incompetent zealots" (1993,10).

The antibureaucratic sentiment in western countries "had taken hold like an epidemic" (Kaufman,1981,3). Political agendas of many western nations consistently singled out civil services as the target for reform (Savoie,1993, Resnick,1994, Pierre,1995, Ingraham,1995). This prevalence of civil service reform is further indicated by Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) insistence that the reinvention of government was a global revolution. Acknowledging this global trend Savoie states:

> "Scandinavian countries are "renewing" their national administration, France is attempting to decentralize its civil service, the Reagan administration implemented its Reform 88 initiative and all British Commonwealth countries have introduced a host of reform measures in search of a new "Public Management" (1993,9).

The importance of governance reforms is underscored in a report by the Club of Rome[15] entitled "*The First Global Revolution: A Strategy for Surviving the World*". The authors of the report argue that; "the deficiencies of governance are at the root of many of the strands of the problematique and hence improved governance is an essential aspect of the solutions" (King and Schneider,1991,160).

In Australia the trend toward governance reform unfolded under the guise of the "Management Revolution" as it heralded a shift in focus "from inputs to results, performance measurement and evaluation, better resource allocation, substantial restructuring of job structures in the public service (notably in the senior executive service), improved accountability with the introduction of corporate planning, and

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[15] The Club of Rome is an international think tank comprised of industrialists, academics and politicians. The Club's mission "is to act as an international, non-official catalyst of change. This role is prompted by the slowness and inadequacy of governments and their institutions to respond to urgent problems, constrained as they are by structures and policies designed for earlier, simpler times and the relatively short electoral cycles. This, in view of the confrontational nature of much of public and international life, the stifling influence of expanding bureaucracies and the growing complexity of issues, suggests that the voice of independent and concerned people having access to the corridors of power around the world, should have a valuable contribution to

improved strategic planning within departments" (Davids and Hancock,1998,40). The "New Zealand Experiment" entailed civil service reform focusing on "the shift from a welfare to a competition state: the move in governmental policies away from the goal of the maximization of welfare within a national society, towards that of the promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors" (Larner,1997, 7). The United Kingdom (Next Steps Agencies), and to a similar extent Canada (Special Operating Agencies), initiated reforms through the fragmentation of large ministerial structures into smaller autonomous organizations (Peters and Savoie,1995).[16] More specifically to Canada, in December 1989, the Federal government implemented a public service renewal initiative known as "Public Service 2000".[17] The goal of this initiative was "to streamline internal administrative regimes and to bring about a change in organizational culture to better serve Canadians" (Auditor General Canada,1993).

While national governments undertook public service reforms in relation to circumstances specific to each national context, these reforms also evolved in response to economic and political variables shared with other Western countries. The 1993 Report of the Auditor General (Canada) outlined three common factors underlying reforms within the jurisdictions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Factors commonly highlighted were, "changing economic circumstances, increasing and shifting public expectations of government and the need to modernize

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make towards increasing understanding and, at times jolting the system into action" (Club of Rome Declaration,1998).

[16] On the hand , one also sees the creation of large super ministries like Prime Minister Kim Campbell's concoction of the Ministry of Public Security which included CSIS, the RCMP and Immigration.

[17] Paul Thomas suggests the Public Service 2000 initiative placed a great emphasis upon changing the existing bureaucratic culture of the federal public service. He indicates: 'The Public Service 2000 exercise within the federal government is said to involve ten percent legislative change, 20 percent systems change and 70 percent change to the culture(s) of bureaucracy' (1993,57).

public service management" (Auditor General Canada,1993). Further commenting on the similarity within these jurisdictions, the report goes on to suggest national reforms have in common an "increased focus on results and accountability" (ibid.). In a similar but more detailed presentation, the New Zealand Treasury outlines four factors leading to the process of reform and suggests these factors are in no way unique to the New Zealand context. These factors are as follows:

1. A deficit and debt situation that required concerted action: In addition to establishing measures to increase revenues, the government had to restrain, even reduce spending.
2. Policies that were patently counter productive: Public policies across a broad front had to be reshaped. This required rethinking both longstanding commitments to particular policy constituents and the efficacy of traditional approaches to the role of government.
3. Management of government activities through highly centralized command and control systems with a plethora of constraints on those who deliver public services: Increased productivity and, to a lesser extent, greater responsiveness to 'clients' demanded changes to these systems. This required new structures and management processes to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
4. An approach to accountability that had become increasingly blurred and confused: multiple and overlapping authorities and responsibilities had to be clarified. (Source:www.treasury.gov.nz/pubs/canada/report)

In tandem with these forces of reform is the market sector assumption that one of "the principal problems with the traditional structure of the public sector is a reliance on large, monopolistic departments that receive little direction from the environment" (Peters,1993,8). Additionally, neo-liberal reformers have insisted that in order for market forces to be liberated the state must be downsized and social welfare policies be emasculated so that the state can meet the challenges posed by global economic restructuring (Johnson, McBride and Smith,1994).

During the 1980s and 90s the thematic structure guiding proscribed reform of the public sector found its foundation within core elements of neo-liberal rationalities. The

thematics that are readily identifiable within the paradigm of neo-liberalism and are of particular interest to this project, are decentralization and marketization.

Neo-Liberal Rationalities: The template or thematics for reform

> Neo-liberalism re-codes the locus of the state in the discourse of politics. The state must be strong to defend the interests of the nation in the international sphere, and must ensure order by providing a legal framework for social and economic life. But within this framework autonomous actors - commercial concerns, families, individuals - are to go freely about their own decisions and controlling their own destinies (Rose and Miller,1992,199).

As previously indicated, neo-liberal rationalities stem from an understanding of governance which suggests that the state govern from a distance, as opposed to a Keynesian, interventionist approach. [18] Neo-liberal strategies seek to create a distance between the decisions of formal political institutions and other social actors. This is accomplished, in part by recognizing social actors as subjects of responsibility, autonomy and choice, and by acting upon them through shaping and utilizing their freedom (Rose,1996). This requires a new contractual relationship between the state and citizen, one which places an emphasis on self-responsibility and a citizen's obligation to his/her own well-being.

Of course this relationship has implications for both the community (citizenry) and the state institutions of governance. With respect to the community, neo-liberals argue "that liberal governance requires a commitment on the part of the people to accept responsibility for providing their own governmental services. People are free, they argue, to the extent to which they regulate themselves and do not rely on the state

[18] For a discussion of neo-liberal interventionism see pg. 22.

as their principal source of government services" (Shearing,1997,69). Rose indicates that this contractual relationship represents "a new relationship between strategies for the government of others and the techniques for the government of self, situated within new relations of mutual obligation: the community" (Rose,1996:331). Interestingly, similar arguments are made for the implementation of community based policing. Certainly one objective of community policing is to empower the community to take a greater role in the task of order maintenance. Community policing is to offer citizens a chance to participate in their own policing.

Achieving this contractual relationship becomes problematic in that this relationship of mutual obligation cannot simply be achieved by way of the state divesting its responsibility. To do so would involve,

> offering individuals and collectivities active involvement in action to resolve the kind of issues hitherto held to be the responsibility of authorized governmental agencies. However, the price of this involvement is that they must assume active responsibility for these activities, both for carrying them out and, of course, for their outcomes (Burchell,1993:29).

For state institutions and public services the implications of this divestment are that not only must they surrender power but must also share, if not completely relinquish, their rowing[19] of governance. (Osborne and Gaebeler,1993) This requires a de-bureaucratization based on the wholesale idea that governance should not be propelled or rowed by state-employed professionals (Osborne and Gaebeler,1993, Shearing,1997). Ingrained within this prescription is the recognition that

[19] Osborne and Gaebler derive their understanding of steering and rowing from the work of E.S. Savas who states: "The word government is from a Greek word, which means to steer. The job of government is to steer, not to row the boat. Delivering services is rowing, and government is not very good at rowing" (Cited in Osborne and Gaebler,1993, 25). This perspective is further supported by Peter Drucker's insistence that governments must "shift to systems that separate

> Top-down, command and control forms of government cannot work as effectively as local, indigenous forms of government because theoretical, professional knowledge can never fully comprehend the complexity of life. What is required instead is local knowledge especially knowledge that is expressed through the coordinating effects of market mechanism and that brings together and coalesces the judgments of masses of people each operating with local knowledge (Shearing,1997,70).

In the context of community policing, community empowerment offers citizens the opportunity to assume an active responsibility for a variety of order maintenance issues. Moreover, it facilitates a divestment of state responsibility through a process of decentralization or downloading of responsibility.

These arguments outline the thematic of decentralization wherein there is a shift "of governmental powers and responsibilities from a single centre to multiple smaller units" (Brodie,1997,236). Within the paradigm of neo-liberalism, decentralization facilitates not only the empowerment and development of self-responsible communities but also promotes accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency with respect to public service operations. Brad McKenzie suggests that in a neo-liberal framework, decentralization serves a twofold purpose of first extending power and authority down through the organizational hierarchy and the delegation of authority to local units; second the political dimension of "promoting participatory democracy and enabling consumers and community members to influence decisions that affect their lives" (McKenzie,1994,98).

Central to the element of decentralization is the rhetoric, symbolism and construction of a self-responsible community. As O'Malley and Palmer suggest, "indeed, recognition that the community has to be created, empowered, mobilized and

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policy decisions (steering) from service delivery (rowing)" (Ibid,35). Osborne and Gaebler go onto

made aware of its best interest is one of the hallmarks of neo-liberal politics" (1996:139). In a neo-liberal context, community symbolizes governance that is no longer distant but both immediate and empowering. The community becomes a means by which strategies of governance can be demarcated in order to effectively respond to the specific pathologies, concerns and culture of a community in question.[20] In other words, the community is a means by which specific identities of risk can be managed in a more efficient manner. From a neo-liberal perspective, community stands in opposition to "remote central government and insensitive local authorities" (Rose,1996:329). Within the framework of community, individuals form networks of concern, seeking solutions for the welfare of themselves, their families and their communities. They develop alliances with the state and its various apparatus (of which the police are to be considered as one) to insure achievement of these desired outcomes. What is interesting is that the community serves not only as a point of alliance, but also as a mechanism for fostering self-governance. As Rose indicates:

> Here, new modes of neighbourhood participation, local empowerment and engagement of residents in decisions over their own lives will, it is thought, reactivate self-motivation, self-responsibility and self-reliance in the form of active citizenship within a self-governing community. (Ibid:334)

This concept of community and decentralization of governance is further illustrated by Donzelot. As he states;

> decentralization operates as a pluralization of the centre, enabling the problems of the state to rebound back on to society, so that society is also implicated in the task of resolving them, where previously the state was expected to hand down an answer for society's needs. (Donzelot,1991:178)

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argue that "entrepreneurial governments must increasingly divest rowing from steering" (Ibid,35).

[20] A similar strategy unfolds with respect to community policing. The process of problem solving utilizes the community as a resource in the resolution of specific pathologies and community disorder. This is examined further in subsequent sections.

In the context of decentralization, community is no longer considered a realm to be governed but rather "a means of government" (Rose,1996:334). Community becomes a range of strategies and techniques to be utilized in addressing both the micro and macro issues of governance. Here, alliances are created at various levels, they are negotiated, directed and propelled (rowed) by the community so as to address their immediate concerns of governance and risk management.

The process of negotiation between community and state is further supported by the construction of an enterprise culture and marketization of the state. Here the discourse and practices of consumerism support a contractual relationship in which the consumer is placed as the sovereign. In this formulation of a consumer/service relationship the state is to be responsive to the demands of individuals/communities; the customer. The discourse of consumerism and entrepeneurialism, while realigning the relationship between state and citizen, also reinforces a sense of self-responsibility for an individual's (Community's) achievement of specific goals[21]. In a neo-liberal environment of consumerism, traditional functions or responsibilities of the state are to be reworked so as to be commodified and thus regulated through market orientations. This emphasis on market orientation places the individual (the consumer), in a position from which to influence and direct the nature of specific services. In this sense, individuals are no longer considered passive receptors of governance but "as active agents seeking to maximize their own advantage and are both the legitimate locus of decisions about their own affairs and the most effective in calculating actions and outcomes" (Rose and Miller,1992:198).

[21] Wendy Larner argues: "In most accounts of the emergence of the consumer, this identity is unequivocally associated with the enterprising and individualistic self of neo-liberalism" (1997,375)

This implies a radical re-orientation of the state's relationship to the citizenry and its governance responsibility, a re-orientation wherein, "the state ceases to be the directive core attracting to itself a monopoly of functions and, instead, begins to shed or share many activities and responsibilities" (O'Malley and Palmer1996:141).[22] This scenario frames an entrepreneurial style of government, in which the state adopts "systems that separate policy decisions (steering) from service delivery (rowing)" (Osborne and Gaebler,1993,35). Jon Pierre argues, "this current debate appears to be concerned mainly with other means of empowering citizens in their relationship to the state" (1995,59). Neo-liberal anthems of self-responsibility and self-motivation place a renewed onus, on the individual, to "maximize their quality of life through acts of choice" (Rose,1996:57). In other words an individual can no longer rely on a relationship of dependence to maximize their well-being. The neo-liberal, autonomous individual must fulfill themselves "not through their relations of dependency and obligation to one another, but through seeking to fulfill themselves within a variety of micro-moral domains or communities, families, workplaces, schools, leisure associations and neighbourhoods" (Ibid.). This implies that accountability for action and change should rest with the individual or community. Proliferation of this perspective is aptly highlighted in President Bill Clinton's 1996 State of the Union speech where he argued that in order "to improve the state of the union, we must all ask more of ourselves, we must expect more of each other and we must face challenges together. The era of big government is over" (Cited in Shearing,1997, 69).

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[22] As will be noted in subsequent chapters, one way the state has reoriented its governance responsibility is via a process of fiscal downloading. In the context of policing this reorientation has taken shape under the guise of community based policing. Communities are frequently asked to directly share policing costs as state budgets continue to shrink.

In a neo-liberal contractual relationship overweaning reliance on external expertise, (such as the police, doctors, or social workers), to solve and identify problems of individual or community well-being is no longer considered acceptable, efficient or effective. A neo-liberal shift from dependence to autonomy realigns the relationship between not only the state and the individual, but between the individual and state apparatus. The resulting relationship is one wherein the consumer (the citizen) first articulates a specific need and, in order to maximize a beneficial outcome, negotiates with those who can supply the desired service. (In terms of policing these services correspond with order maintenance, crime prevention and security.) The framework of this relationship is shaped by directives of the consumer not those of the service provider. Here, if a service agency cannot supply a required service it may face a crisis of legitimacy. The service provider must, in order to avoid such a crisis, be willing to negotiate with and adapt to the needs of the consumer. This implies a need for greater interaction and communication between community and service provider.

Therefore in a neo-liberal formula, accountability is inaugurated by first shifting responsibility to a community to identify a pathology and seek a resolution to an issue. Second, guided by the forces of consumerism, a community then negotiates with a service provider in an attempt to resolve (effectively and efficiently) the identified concerns. Finally, a service provider, in an attempt to avoid a crisis of legitimacy must be responsive to a community's identified needs, thereby imposing a level of accountability.

The problematique of neo-liberial rationalities: A critique

While the above arguments outline neo-liberalism and its influence upon the restructuring of public service organizations it does not suggest the evolution and

outcomes are without criticism. Neo-liberalism and its tenants are viewed by many as problematic. Tickell and Peck argue, neo-liberalism is "capitalism's law of the jungle...Neo-lberalism is now, and ever was, the politics of crisis" (1995,370). Eduardo Rosenzvaig indicates:

> *Neo-liberalism is an economic philosophy for early peripheral* post-modernism. Messianic, authoritarian, and exclusionary, it is a mathematical model designed in certain academic centers of the advanced world and later in the periphery for the economic conversion of the Third World to a strategy of late colonialism (1997,56).

The basis of this criticism is derived from the broad economic implications of neo-liberalism and how the pendulum of free market policies and orientations had swung too far (Emy in Davids and Hancock,1998). Neo-liberalism's presumed task of alleviating the crisis of Keynesianism came with a price. In the pursuit of efficiency and an increase in individual freedom, human dignity and collective social responsibility had been cast to the side. In a critique of the narrow economic view of neo-liberalism and its reification of the free market Emy (1993) argues:

> by stripping the market down to its bare essentials by abstracting it from society, economic rationalists endow it with misleading simplicity. By oversimplifying the social dynamics of market societies they run the risk of recommending policies which do not contribute to the long run viability of society as a whole (in Davids and Hancock,1998).

This collective social responsibility that Emy makes reference to has been fragmented by a re-coding of the members of society into the categories of the "affiliated" and the "marginalized" (Rose,1996). The "affiliated" actively make choices within the confines of a market structured state and, in doing, so access and benefit from the commodified services of the state. In contrast, the marginalized, by virtue of their perceived and real inability to manage themselves in a market environment are increasingly faced with less

choice and access to the benefits of neo-liberal individual freedom. In a neo-liberal setting "the distribution of social welfare becomes increasingly bifurcated between those who can afford to buy superior services from the private sector and those who remain tied to the eroding public system" (Brodie ,1997, 236). Shearing (1997) similarly observes that the marginalized are confronted by the "Janus faced character of the neo-liberal agenda".

> For those who are included in forms of self-regulation (primarily the well to do), governance becomes increasingly less coercive and less state based. For those excluded (the poor or marginalized), there is more than less state government and its governance becomes increasingly coercive. This duality is particularly visible in the justice and policing arenas (ibid,71). [23]

The inequality of a market structured state is further aggravated by the categorization of citizens as customers. This understanding of a citizen as a customer is very limiting and excludes the broad responsibilities of the public service. The notion of customer also creates a problematic image of the citizen as an individual who is mobile, discerning, able to make active choices, and free to pursue self-interested purchases. As Davids and Hancock point out, the concept of customer "may fail to capture and provide for the notion of social and collective responsibility" (1998, 61). The reality of the consumer/service relationship sets in place a structure wherein the public service/state has no further responsibility once the specific transaction has occurred.

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[23] An example of this duality can be located in Metropolitan Toronto Police Service's choice of partners in its implementation of community policing and related prevention strategies. The police service has undertaken a partnership with what they refer to as the "Big Five" (The police, government, business, the media and the community). Interestingly, in the context of the "Big Five" community refers to mainstream representation, not the marginalized. The partnership struck between the "Big Five" has little input from grassroots community organizations or those who are on the fringes of the community. In other words the marginalized or less organized are not offered a chance to participate in policing themselves but remain the recipients of initiatives developed by those designated as the "Big Five". This is further explored in the chapter on Metropolitan Toronto.

"Critics have argued that when public sector management is forced to mirror private sector management there is a tendency to pay more attention to direct customers and disregard public beneficiaries" (ibid. 60). The problem becomes one of whether the public service can differentiate between the goal of customer satisfaction and the broader task inherent in the concept of collective responsibility. Ingstrup summarizes this dilemma aptly when he argues:

> What is lost and what is gained when public servants begin to think of those they serve as customers rather than citizens? The distinction is subtle but significant. The concept of customer is atomistic: the customer is sovereign. A citizen is not sovereign: a citizen is a citizen by virtue of something he or she shares with others. The satisfaction of individual customers may not add up to some kind of overarching public good that serves the best interests of the citizenry at large (Cited in Ingraham,1995,248).

The notion of customer also brings to the foreground the question of accountability and identity of the consumer, the customer. In light of the public service it has many customers with varying needs and characteristics. Marketization of the state raises questions of who identifies the customer, how are they differentiated (the affiliated and the marginalized), are public services accessed at varying degrees and what are the implications for accountability and standards of service.[24] Jon Pierre argues:

> The emergence of the public market means that the system of accountability is shifted from that which involves elected officials, political parties, and political institutions to accountability measured primarily in terms of customer satisfaction. However, unlike the relationship between citizens and the state, which is based on equality and universal rights and duties, the market relationship is based on - or at least generates - inequalities

[24] This is a particular concern when one considers the narrow construction of partnership or community as in the case of Metropolitan Toronto Police Service's concept of the "Big Five". The vague parameters of community become a valuable tool in the process of citizen inclusion, a tool open to manipulation.

> determined by purchasing power, knowledge, information and so on. The point here is that the customerization of citizens introduces the notion of selective public services as utilities not distributed equally to all. This is clearly in conflict with the traditional meaning of citizenship (1995,72).

While criticism of neo-liberalism continues, the move to restructure the state has been unabated. Public service reengineering has continued. Marketization of the state and the importation of market language and practices inundate public management. The paradigm shift has taken place, the concern now is at what cost. Robin Murray aptly captures this shift and potential cost in the following passage:

> "The current changes have been formed by a theory of public administration which is quite new... It seemed no more than an ideological excursion of orthodox economics into a neighbouring academic field. Within 20 years it stands at the centre of our political stage, as Keynesian generations listen passively to the sound of its axes in the cherry orchard of the state" (1991,23).

The question we are left to ponder is what will germinate in this cleared land? What fruit are we to soon consume?

The Impact: restructuring, reinventing government

> We can no longer afford to pay more for - and get less from - our government. The answer for every problem cannot always be another program or more money. It is time to radically change the way the government operates - to shift from top-down bureaucracy to entrepreneurial government that empowers citizens and communities to change our country from the bottom up (Clinton and Gore, cited in Gore1993, xxiii).

The anthems of accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness serve not only as the desired outcomes of decentralization and marketization but as the building blocks of a neo-liberal restructuring of the public service (Levitas,1986, Pierre, 1995,

McKenzie,1994). Various techniques have been applied to the structure and culture of the public service in order to achieve these outcomes. As Christopher Pollitt (1995) argues there has been a heavy political emphasis upon techniques of decentralized budgeting, performance indicators, setting standards in order to raise public service quality, contractualization of relationships previously hierarchical and ongoing evaluation. More generic models of these techniques are suggested in the four principles of measuring results, putting the customer in the drivers seat, Introducing competition and a market orientation and decentralizing (Gore, 1993, Osborne and Gaebler, 1993, Pollitt,1995). [25]

What is common about these models is their reliance upon managerialist techniques of reform. Managerialist strategies have been stressed since the mid-1980's and continued to evolve under the buzz word of "new public management". Donald Savoie suggests:

> The new public management would concentrate as much on specific organizational units as it would on government-wide systems. It sought to transform public administrators into mangers who would think, act and perform like private sector managers and run their government operations like private concerns. The goal was to achieve greater efficiency, results, performance and value for money in individual government operations (1993,13).

The public management approach was to counter the past practices of narrow functioning public administrators who had not remained on top of the increasing growth and costs of current government. This new mangerialism sought "to break this pattern and to bring home the point that management in government involved a great deal more

[25] The practices of decentralized budgeting, business plans and customer relations are consistent with managerial practices currently utilized by police services. As subsequent chapters will

than controlling and supervising routine functions so that senior officials could be free to concentrate on policy issues" (Savoie,1993, 13). Peters and Savoie (1995) argue new public management facilitated two dimensions of administrative reform. First, that organizations would decentralize and therefore empower employees at the lower hierarchical rungs. Decentralization would also effect structural change in that now autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations would deliver services. Second, organizations were now required to better co-ordinate networks and partnerships outside departmental boundaries. This would address "issues of organizational complexity, including the problem of overlapping organizations dealing with overlapping issues and managing multi-organizational approaches to program delivery" (Savoie,1993,25).[26]

Within the realm of new public management is the common rhetoric of decentralization, quality and standards, organizational culture, citizens, customers, clients, users and mission statements (Pollitt,1995, Savoie,1993, Peters and Savoie,1995). This rhetoric forms the skeletal structure of efforts to improve the quality of service, improve service delivery and facilitate greater customer service (Ingraham,1995). The sinew and muscle of this form is applied through the "expanded employee participation in decision making and communication within the organization" (Ibid.240). While a variety of managerial strategies have been applied in an attempt to achieve these outcomes and enhance efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, the

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indicate these practices and concepts are integral to the implementation of community policing in the RCMP, Edmonton Police Service and Metropolitan Toronto Police Service.

[26] In a Canadian context a review of the Public Service 2000 initiative indicates similar dimensions of reform. Public Service 2000 places "an emphasis on service to clients, the push to empower front-line employees, the streamlining of government operations and the establishment of a new common service policy" (Peters and Savoie,1995,27).

model that has proven the most influential, particularly in North America,[27] is Total Quality Management (TQM) (Savoie,1993, Kernaghan,1993, Osborne and Gaebler,1993, Ingraham,1995, Manning,1996, Peak and Glensor,1996).

TQM is not an add-on approach to managerial reform, as it rejects "existing structures, procedures and relationships in public management systems" (Ingraham,1995,241). It cannot be simply tacked on to old public service structures for the goal of TQM is to "develop an organizational culture that supports quality and teamwork, feedback and assessment and that utilizes counting (statistical monitoring of the impact of practices on production process) and customer orientation" (Manning,1996, 3). The objectives of TQM run in contrast to the bureaucratic structures of traditional public services, which therefore implies the need for wholesale restructuring and not a simple jury rigging of the old system. Not only does TQM realign the internal structures of the public service it also advocates a dramatically different relationship between public service institutions and the public they serve. As Peak and Glensor argue, government services that have adopted TQM principles:

> promote competition between service providers, measure the performances of their agencies by outcomes rather than inputs, and are driven by their goals instead of their rules and regulations. They redefine their clients as customers and espouse participatory management. They use quantitative community condition indicators that provide information about current conditions. ... Objectives set the specific targets for each unit of government (1996,54)

[27] Patricia Ingraham argues that "TQM principles such as empowerment, flatter organizations, improved communication, and a focus on customer service are becoming common at both the federal and provincial levels of government. The federal government's Public Service 2000, for example, draws heavily on TQM principles. In Australia, the Continuous Improvement effort, one of three major initiatives of the National Public Service Commission, is essentially a quality activity" (1995,240).

TQM principles require a restructuring of the basic systems that drive traditional public service organizations. Key principles of decentralization, long term commitment, team work, internal communication, training, measurement, customer orientation, rewards and recognition define the character of a restructured or reinvented government. These principles are operationalized under the following broad objectives: move from a focus on procedure to focus on product[28], focus on the customer, on quality and customer satisfaction, topple the pyramid; empower employees and constantly track success and progress (Ingraham,1995).

TQM and its entrepreneurial orientation to governance fits comfortably in to the neo-liberal thematics of decentralization and marketization. Through the application of TQM the public service is transformed in a manner that reflects characteristics consistent with a neo-liberal contractual consumer/service relationship. Furthermore, TQM facilitates the creation of autonomous self-responsible individuals, and dictates the necessity of decentralization and empowerment. Moreover, it is a managerial strategy of wholesale restructuring.

The above sections argue that a neo-liberal ideology and corresponding rationalities have been manifested in a particular model of public service restructuring, as well as articulating a new set of rules by which the state and citizen interact. In the remainder of this chapter, the transcription of this neo-liberal hegemony onto the operational and structural reform initiatives guiding current police restructuring, tangentially addressed in the earlier sections, will undergo a more focused examination. To do so requires, first, an examination of whether or not the implementation of community based policing achieves similar operational and structural objectives as

[28] This signals a lack of concern for democracy and inclusiveness.

those occurring within the public service as a whole. Secondly, we must answer the question as to whether or not the implementation of community based policing supports the state project of organizing of neo-liberal hegemony. Supplementary considerations include a discussion of community and the manner in which it is defined, both of which become critical to the application of police/community partnerships, the process of responsibilization and the economic strategy of fiscal austerity through decentralization. Subsequently an analysis must unpack the structural, organizational and cultural change imposed by community policing, as this will allow for a comparison to similar shifts occurring in the public service. The following sections thus dissect the current police reform in light of these questions.

Policing Reform: The Need For A New Model

> The rationalization of public services like health, education and policing is often facilitated by the use of mystifying reform rhetoric which both legitimates and masks shifts and reductions in traditional service, while prompting them as progressive improvements. The ambiguous but powerful rhetoric of community policing has been particularly effective as a critique of the modern full service model of professional public policing as unresponsive and ineffective while providing a rational for a more limited model of public policing (Murphy,1998,9).

As suggested earlier, policing has not escaped the critique and realignment of neo-liberalism. This realignment has required a rapid adaptation from a service which "until relatively recently, still bore many of the structural characteristics of its organizational (and operational) origins in the nineteenth century" (Savage and Charman, 1996, 39). Reform has been stoked by a diminished confidence in the

adequacy of the professional model[29] to achieve the desired outcomes of a modern police service, and a growing demand for police services to adapt to the changing political economy of governance. The call for change has been "propelled by a powerful historical critique of the reform strategy; by an operational movement in police departments; and by political forces" [30] (Kennedy and Moore,1997,469).

For more than a decade police practitioners and researchers have confronted the necessity of a new model of policing (Bayley,1994, Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy,1990, Kennedy and Moore,1997, Pelfry,1998, Peak and Glensor,1996). Bayley and Shearing argue that police services are "no longer confident that they are either effective or efficient in controlling crime, they are anxiously examining every aspect of performance - objectives, strategies, organization, management, discipline

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[29] Professionalism is a model of policing adopted during a period of police reform beginning in the 1920's and 30's. It is a model that has influenced and shaped the mode of policing during the bulk of the twentieth century. Professionalism was to nurture an autonomous relationship between the political realm and the police organization. The philosophy was one of centralizing the control of both police mandate and operations. Policing was to become, 'a legal and technical matter left to the discretion of professional police executives under the guidance of law' (Kelling and Moore,1988,11). Turner and Wiatrowski summarize the professional model in the following manner: 'Its authorization is based in the criminal law and its primary function is crime control. As a result, the primary outcome on which it is evaluated is the ability to control the crime problem in the community. Organizationally it is designed to be bureaucratic and centrally controlled to reduce discretionary decision making. It is isolated from the political and social environment to reduce the opportunities for partisan politics. The primary tactics are controlled through the chain of command and include preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service' (199?,203). Reformers pursuing the professional model saw that it encompassed the compelling quality of internal control and the requirement of self regulation. Self regulation enabled 'the occupation to keep control, to make its own determinants as to what is its proper domain' (Price,1977,15). Deciding one's domain proved beneficial in developing and supporting a police hegemonic dominance. This facilitated a process wherein police legitimacy found its source within criminal law and its social function was one of crime control. On an organizational level the police mandate was associated with functions that directed them to criminal law and crime related activities (Manning,1977). The narrow focus of mandate and legitimacy propelled the police to enforce the law and not partake in activities that could be equated with social work (Kelling and Moore,1988).

[30] The external influence of political forces corresponds with an earlier reference made to the stimulus for change or adoption of alternate models. (See footnote 6) The stimulus for change can also be understood in terms of neo-institutionalist theories of organizational change which suggest organizational reform is not only an internal process but one wherein the organization is cognitive and responsive to the changes in the external environment (Turner and Wiatrowski, 1995).

and accountability" (1998,393). Core changes such as; "the restructuring and relocation of policing authority and responsibility, the reconceptualization and commodification of public policing and the economic and ideological rationalization of public and private policing", have orchestrated a shift from the professional model (Murphy,1998, ii). Certainly in a political environment influenced by a neo-liberal ideology the status quo of the professional model is regarded as theoretically incompatible and unable to address current dilemmas of crime control, governance restructuring and fiscal restraint.

Recently governments and politicians have begun to question the "institutional power, status and cost of public policing" (Murphy,1998, 7). From a neo-liberal perspective, policing operations modeled by professionalism are considered as inefficient and wasteful as other government institutions (Stenson,1993). Palmer argues:

> police are under pressure to satisfy governments that they are cost effective and achieving the required results. Limited resources have already substantially impacted upon policing as governments apply funding cuts. Police managers have been forced to achieve considerable savings through more stringent and controlled use of finance and other resources. Lean and mean has been the emphasis at the management levels in addressing this demand to provide policing services at considerably reduced cost (cited in O'Malley,1996,23)

The professional model of policing has become costly without being clearly effective. Neo-liberal trends of fiscal responsibility place police services "under enormous pressures to economize and rationalize local police services" (Murphy,1998,5).

The professional model's viability is further undermined by the accusation that it supports a culture of dependence and learned helplessness. Within this structure of policing, communities have become dependent on the police to solve the problem of order, a reliance that has proven unrealistic, ineffective and inefficient (Bayley,1994).

The current rhetoric of policing, particularly within a neo-liberal paradigm, "admonishes the community for its reliance on the police and declares the need for communities and individuals to accept their responsibilities and actively participate in policing their own communities in the fight against crime" (Murphy, 1998,9). A neo-liberal opposition to this level of dependence is easily identified in the rhetoric of the mobilized, responsible, and self-governing citizen. Neo-liberal commitments to decentralization and empowerment challenge policing structures that support a culture of dependence. From a neo-liberal perspective the professional model represents a strategy of inefficiency, ineffectiveness and a lack of accountability.

The failings of the professional model "underscore the need to look beyond that model, to adapt policing to new times and needs" (Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy,1990,44). These failings also highlight the necessity of reworking or re-conceptualizing the police function in ways that would redefine "the essential nature and scope of public police service" (Murphy 1998, 8). The critique of the professional model and its perceived inability to address the changing political economy of governance has left policing in a bind. This has forced policing to grapple with the need to re-examine its role, its structure and how it is to be judged. The current trend and blueprint for this re-conceptualization is derived from examples, structures and practices of the private sector.

In light of the current needs of policing and criticism of the professional model, community based policing has been hoisted onto the stage of reform in an attempt to fill the paradigmatic vacuum confronting policing. Researchers and practitioners alike have acclaimed community policing as the premier organizational strategy, representing "a programmatic set of internal, organizational and managerial reforms"

(Murphy,1988,178). As David Bayley argues: "community policing represents the most serious and sustained attempt to reformulate the purpose and practices of policing since the development of the professional model in the early twentieth century" (1994:120). The question to ask is whether or not the reformulation of community based policing reflects contemporary fashions within politics, government and business.

Community Policing and The Responsible Citizen

In the shift to community-based policing, policy makers have adopted community participation and the rhetoric of partnership in their engagement with the imperatives of post welfare crime prevention. These new imperatives suggest that the state respond to crime and disorder not in the traditional direct manner but indirectly through the resources and actions of individuals (Garland,1996). In the context of this arrangement the role of community policing is to "uncouple policing and police so that policing becomes everybody's business rather than exclusively or primarily the business of police" (Shearing,1997,71). Phrased in a somewhat different manner but echoing a similar sentiment, Sheptycki suggests that through community policing we restore

> a balance between citizen and police responsibilities that reflects a more accurate assessment of actual capacities and acknowledges that effective social control cannot possibly be achieved by hired hands alone (1998, 492).

Community policing "is at root a strategy that seeks to shift the responsibility for security to local institutions and resources" (Shearing,1997,70). Philosophically and operationally community policing encourages "communities to recognize that the brunt of the task of policing a free society does not lie with the police but with citizens themselves" (Eggers and O'Leary, in Shearing, 1997,70). In the devolution of crime prevention the discourse of partnership, the multi-agency approach, activating communities and creating active citizens punctuates the strategies of prevention

(Garland,1997). Evidence of this emphasis upon citizen participation is strongly suggested in the following 1985 Home Office policy circular that states:

> Every individual citizen and all those agencies whose policies and practices can influence the extent of crime should make their contribution. Preventing crime is a task for the whole community (cited in Gilling,1996,106).

Further support for the shift toward renewed community responsibility is offered in a summary of police originated commentaries examined by Palmer and O'Malley that states:

> It is destructive... to attempt to pass over to the police the obligation and duties associated with the prevention of crime and the preservation of public tranquillity. These are the obligations and duties of the public, aided by the police and not the police occasionally aided by some public spirited citizens (1996,143).

Certainly, the overarching message woven throughout this discourse is that crime control and prevention are not the sole responsibilities of the state. In fact the community must be made to "recognize that they too have a responsibility in this regard, and must be persuaded to change their practices in order to reduce criminal opportunities and increase informal controls" (Garland,1997,451). In other words, and as per the general neo-liberal prescriptions of community empowerment, crime management is now to be shared with the empowered community, the partners in prevention.

While the optics of this devolution of responsibility suggests a diminished role for both the state and the police, it, in fact, increases the influence and range of surveillance. Shearing (1997) argues that downloading responsibility and streamlining government have shifted the role of policing to proactive leadership guiding community partners in the task of crime control and order management, while supporting greater access to community surveillance, organization and intelligence gathering.

Furthermore, "responsibilization" sets in place a process wherein both the state and police "takes on a new set of co-ordinating and activating roles, which, in time, develop into new structures of support, funding, information exchange or co-operation" (Garland,1997, 452). Moreover, this process can be understood in terms of the state undertaking the task of educating or organizing hegemony. Here we see policing in its role of administrative apparatus being utilized in order to co-ordinate a new set of roles within the realm of order maintenance, a realm of economic and political articulation specific to the role and responsibility of policing.

It should be noted that the realignment of responsibility, while potentially an effective crime prevention tool, has an adverse effect of setting in a place a duality of service and control, a duality demarcated by those actively involved in self-regulation (primarily those with financial resources) and those perceived as irresponsible or incapable of organizing (the poor and marginalized). Examples of this duality are highlighted in the manner in which Metropolitan Toronto Police Service has identified the community they partner with in its various crime prevention initiatives. As noted earlier these partnerships are articulated under the rubric of the "Big Five" (Police, Government, Business, Media and the community) and while community is included in this partnership it refers to mainstream communities (middleclass, predominantly white) not the marginalized.

Community: The Essential Ingredient

> Little attention has been given to a definition of the community commensurate with the vast promise imbedded in the rhetoric of community policing (Buerger,1994:415).

Central to both the concept of community policing and the neo-liberal discussion of responsibilization is the "entity of community" (Patterson, 1994:3). And yet, a clear definition of community remains illusive. "At a minimum it refers to a collection of people in a geographic location" (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1984,44). For others, community has tended to imply society at large, or those living in an identifiable geographic region, with the assumption all are woven together by a set of common concerns (Buerger,1994, Goldstein,1986, Grinc,1994). From a policing perspective this presentation is problematic in that it assumes communities are homogenous and therefore the interests and goals "of the police and the community can be fully harmonized" (Goldstein,1986:10). A representation of this nature ignores the reality that "community is not a unitary phenomenon but is characterised by many varieties of local and extra-local organizational forms" (Leighton,1988:352).

Following on the lines of geographic identity Etzioni suggests "it is best to think about communities as nested, each within a more encompassing one. Thus, neighbourhoods are parts of more encompassing suburbs or cities or regional communities. These, in turn, often intersect or are part of larger ethnic, racial or professional communities and most communities are contextualized by the national society" (1998, XIV). Robert Nisbet argues "community includes but goes beyond local community to encompass, religion, work, family and culture and it refers to social bonds characterized by emotional cohesion, depth, continuity and fullness" (1991,20). A.P Cohen states social scientists have used the term community to describe a stable, bounded, organized social entity. When in fact community should be considered in terms of "how individuals identify with other individuals and institutions and define themselves in opposition to yet others" (Cited in Pearce 1989,28). In a similar vein

Robert Bellah (1998) argues that a good community is one in which there is argument, even conflict, about the meaning of shared values and goals and about how they will be actualized in every day life. "Community is not about silent consensus; it is a form of intelligent reflective life, in which there is indeed consensus, but where the consensus can be challenged - often gradually, sometimes radically - overtime" (Bellah cited in Etzioni, 1998,16).

Clearly there are a variety of ways in which one can conceptualize community, hence, the dilemma of definition remains. Stanley Cohen suggests that this conceptual blurring of community "is, if not always deliberate, certainly part of the appeal" (1985,116). Cohen goes on to argue that by blurring the definition of community "almost anything can appear under the heading and almost anything can be justified if this prefix is used" (Ibid.). Wendy Kaminer suggests a blurred concept of community allows those at differing points along the political spectrum to not only co-opt the rhetoric of community but legitimate specific policy initiatives. She states "community is a private and a public place, located somewhere between the individual and big government. It combines conservative belief in individual responsibility with liberal faith in collective, civic solutions to individual problems" (1994,120).

By using the phrase "neighbourhood care" Philip Abrams gives an example of how a generic phrase, such as community or neighbourhood, can be ascribed very different meanings depending on the political framework of analysis. Abrams observes that "neighbourhood care" can be interpreted as either service delivery or neighbourliness. The first means " the efficient delivery of bureaucratically administered welfare services, a more vigorous reaching out of the welfare state to those in need, the other means an alternative to the welfare state, the cultivation of effective informal

caring activities within neighbourhoods by local residents themselves" (cited in Cohen1985,123). Interestingly, this last conceptualization corresponds with a neo-liberal perspective of community. As Harder notes, neo-liberals have reconceptualized the community "not as a site of collective identity, but as a collection of self-reliant individuals who may seek the help of others in extreme circumstances but who have no entitlement to the help of others or that of the state" (1998,53).

The conceptual blurring of community supports not only varied interpretations of community structure, but more importantly, a diverse interpretation of community responsibility. Given this conceptual looseness of community and Cohen's (1985) observation that anything is possible under the title of community, it is not difficult to understand the currency of community policing. And as subsequent chapters will demonstrate the ambiguity of community has been strategically integral to the promotion of the state's devolution of power, responsibilization and fiscal downloading.

Policing's New Model: Community Based Policing

> Community policing is a very popular term but one that has a multitude of definitions. The popularity and ambiguity of this concept are both a blessing and a curse (Rosenbaum, 1998, 6).
>
> Community policing is a general term capturing a potpourri of social and political trends that have converged at about the same time. It has emerged in reaction to problems that became highly visible in the past three decades (Mastrofski ,1998,162).

There is little question that community policing has become "the official morality so to speak with respect to policing in Canada" (Clairmont,1991:469). Nor is there little doubt that it is "the only form of policing available for anyone who seeks to improve police operations, management, or relations with the public" (Rosenbaum and Lurigio,1994:299) or "the most appropriate response to the challenges and problems of the next decade"

(Leighton and Normandeau,1990:18). And yet, while there is a consensus of community policing's wealth and radical shift from the professional model of policing, there is "little consensus on a specific definition of the concept of community policing "(Hornick et al,1989:3). Rosenbaum and Lurigio acknowledge the problem of definition is due, in part, to the fact that "academics and practitioners alike continue to struggle with the definition of community based policing" (1994:302). Vagaries of definition have also been shown to haunt police practitioners; as illustrated in RCMP Commissioner Norm Inkster's comment, "the essence of community based policing still eludes some of us and many of our efforts do not yield results because we have not properly understood the concept we are trying to apply" (1992:28).

One way of ameliorating the problem of definition is to recognize that the concept of community policing did not evolve or solidify in a short span of time. In fact, "most commentators regard community policing as a development of the past twenty years, occurring in response to a number of social, political and economic factors" (Seagrave,1995,6). Furthermore, community policing is "an umbrella term used to describe certain approaches to policing that encourage police involvement with the community" (Murphy and Muir,1985:9) Perhaps a more appropriate understanding of community policing is as a dynamic, developing strategy of policing. Not merely a set of new police tactics, but an evolving organizational approach (Kelling and Moore,1986,1988). At the same time this does not "imply a specific programmatic approach to policing; only that there be community involvement in both the identification and resolution of policing problems" (Murphy and Muir,1985:19).

From a critical analysis community policing is perceived as only a rhetorical tool utilized by police services in order to redirect or appease public discontent. It serves as a

"public relations effort to convince the public, governments and members of the police force that something is being done" (Ross,1995,247). Ericson and Haggerty imply community policing is typically critiqued on the basis it is nothing more than a rhetorical and ideological model that "conceals what is really going on and thereby helps to legitimate practices that are unpalatable or offensive to the population concerned" (1997:67). Taking this a step further Buerger suggests community policing has "been grabbed onto by various police services at a time of scandal and crisis, wielding its promises like a shield to ward off earned criticism" (1994:414). Consistent with this orientation is the critique that community policing is, in fact, just "an attempt to put old wine in a new bottle" (Bayley,1997) or an attempt to capture "an imagined past" (Manning,1998). Manning also claims "community policing is yet another presentational strategy, a means of selectively highlighting some changes in urban policing while suppressing information about others" (1997:15). Others critique community policing on the basis it is nothing more than a covert technique of penetrating communities in order to acquire information and influence (Seagrave,1996, Shearing 1996, Klocars,1988). In a similar frame, Fielding suggests "community policing is easily seen as mere tinkering or as a disguised part of a repressive political apparatus" (1995:1). The ambiguity of definition in itself is considered problematic by critics, in that police chiefs and administrators see ambiguity "as an opportunity to define anything and everything as community policing for political gain" (Rosenbaum and Lurigio,1994)

It is apparent that community based policing elicits a wide range of interpretations of which the above critiques are but a sample. And yet, an understanding of community policing remains elusive. Research suggests a more comprehensive definition can be achieved by reviewing the operationalization of specific actions and goals associated with

existing community based policing initiatives (Zhao and Thurman,1997, Rosenbaum and Lurigio, 1994). Evaluations undertaken by, Goldstein(1987), Murphy(1988) Kelling and Moore(1989), Skogan(1990), Clairmont(1991), Bayley(1994), Seagrave(1996), Rosenbaum and Wilkinson(1997) and Skogan et al(1997) have resulted in a consensus of key elements and broad principles associated with community policing. A synthesis of these evaluations suggests the following typology of core components:

1. Consultation between police and local neighbourhoods about problems, policies and priorities.
2. Mobilization of all the resources of a community - police, civilian, government, private, human and material to solve, or at least palliate the enduring, high-visibility problems of crime, disorder and insecurity. Mobilization requires partnerships between the various players.
3. A commitment to a broader problem-oriented policing philosophy and a move away from a focus on crime fighting.
4. Decentralization, empowerment of front-line officers - two-way communication between police and citizens - An adaptation of strategies to fit the need of particular neighbourhoods..
5. Police help neighbourhoods help themselves by serving as catalysts. Police and community are co-producers of public order.

A condensed view of this typology suggests community policing consists of two complementary components; "community partnerships and problem solving thus capturing the precise essence of community based policing " (Community Policing Consortium, 1998:1).[31] And while the debate over definition continues, community policing is commonly understood to encompass the central tenets of problem-oriented policing and a common set of values emphasizing the shared responsibility of both police and community as Partners in the production of order (Goldstien,1990, Vietch,1993, Bailey,1997, Webster and Connors,1996). Intrinsic to each of these components is the pursuit of improved partnership between the police and community (Rosenbaum,1996).

Community Partnerships:

> Community policing represents a re-negotiation of the social contract between the police and society (Bayley,1994:120).

Underlying the re-negotiated social contract of community policing is the central *strategic principle of seeking a "full partnership between the community and their police"* (Leighton,1991:487). In the context of this social contract, full partnership assumes that the community is an active negotiator, not a passive receptor of police policy. Full partnership, understood in these terms, is meant to "empower the community to bring it onto a more equal footing with the police in terms of joint ownership of local crime and disorder problems and as co-producers of peace, order and security at the local level" (Normandeau and Leighton,1990:49).

The emphasis on partnership sets the parameters for a new contractual relationship between police and community. It does so by first constructing an alternate identity of community, countering the image of dependence and helplessness as perpetuated by the professional model. Secondly, partnership forces a realignment of responsibility and authority, which in turn creates a network of alliances between communities and police. Thirdly, it sets a new criteria of measurement and effectiveness based on the successful inclusion of community in the process of problem solving; not the measurement of arrests and clearance rates that reflect a narrow mandate of law enforcement.

Community policing displaces the community's reliance on police services to resolve all issues of crime control and, by doing so, it requires a shift in the roles of both

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[31] Kratcoski and Dukes(1995), Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux(1990) argue this narrow definition does not adequately address the distinction between the terms community based policing and problem solving.

the community and the police. This has meant a realignment of both the responsibility and role the police are to take in the production of order; a new role frequently characterized by signifiers such as "knowledge brokers, expert advisers and security managers" (Ericson,1994:164). This image dramatically distances itself from that of the crime fighter and law enforcer as suggested by the professional model. In terms of the community, its responsibility becomes one of apprising the police "of the services it requires in its specific locale", and "to advise its police on what are locally regarded as problems of order and security" as well as "stress a correlative adaptability and accountability of police to local communities" (O'Malley and Palmer,1996:142).

While community policing displaces the police as sole initiators of action, it does not necessarily undermine their locus of control. They continue to possess the attributes (resources and knowledge) required to resolve identified problems. (Shearing,1996) Though they remain a locus of control, there is a need to alter their role from that of the reactive agent responding to criminal events, to one that reflects, what O'Malley refers to as, "a proactive leadership role" (1996:18). O'Malley goes on to suggest that this leadership role is one of an "accountable professional practitioner... a community leader harnessing community resources to tackle the problems which give rise to crime and disorder" (Ibid). In this designation, policing becomes not only a crime prevention resource but also a catalyst for neighbourhoods and communities to take the initiative for problem solving. (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux,1990, Ericson,1994) In the role of proactive manager, the police must spend time not only engaged in resolving the determinants of crime, but more importantly they must engage the community to also address these issues. For as Bayley suggests: "Crime prevention is not a service people are given; it is an activity people must engage in. The public must become co-

producers of public safety" (Bayley,1994:102). Therefore, the task of the police, as proactive managers, is to facilitate the activity of crime prevention and help communities help themselves. This articulation of crime prevention and the role of the police supports the neo-liberal principle of empowering citizens, of ensuring that individuals take an active role in their own governance.

From an operational stance, citizen empowerment is to be achieved via a consultative process. Consultation sets in place a mechanism whereby the police can discuss priorities and formulate strategies with the community they serve (Bayley 1994, Leighton 1991, Normandeau and Leighton 1990). Consultation and collaboration "create a sense of shared accountability for community vitality and quality of life" (Campbell and Wright,1993,14). Consultation further serves as a platform from which the police may establish their proactive leadership in managing the required resources of crime prevention. Finally a consultative process "assists community representatives to set their agenda for safety and security in the area and to better understand the problems associated with public policing" (Normandeau and Leighton,1990:44). Consultation therefore encompasses a means by which the community is engaged and motivated, while the police interact simultaneously as service providers managing the commodity of crime prevention. More importantly, consultation structures a process of interaction that, by its nature, imposes a level of accountability and develops partnerships. Furthermore, it can be argued that consultation is a vehicle by which the police can define their role as co-educator in the state's organization of a neo-liberal hegemony. Through this process the police are able to impart the need for partnerships, sharing of resources and an overall need for community responsibility.

Community/police partnerships, on the surface, symbolize a relationship that is inclusive of the community at large. But under closer examination, one finds that community/police partnerships can be circumscribed by narrow and limiting parameters. The narrowness of these parameters becomes problematic when community partnerships are defined only in relation to interest groups that support police driven objectives (Leighton,1991, Stenson,1993, O'Malley and Palmer,1996). A community defined in narrow homogenous terms perpetuates what Buerger refers to as "the cyclical and serial failures of community organizing" (1994:422). Leighton further suggests failures of community partnerships are due, in part, to police assumptions that communities are "homogenous social units characterized by a consensus of values, norms and agreements on crime problems" (1991:504).

Community policing strategically and operationally, seeks to develop a co-operative, reciprocal relationship wherein both police and community action is decentralized. Furthermore, it supports a contractual relationship that structures police/community interaction within the framework of partnerships. Yet, if community partnerships and thus community policing initiatives are to avoid failures a police service's archetype of the communities they serve must include broad demographic and socio-economic attributes. In other words, the police must know and be inclusive of all sectors of the community they serve. Partnership does not mean working with only those who mirror police concerns and modes of response. Unfortunately, there remains the potential for a duality of service based on the definition of community and those who the police identify as its members.

Problem Solving: an operational tool for empowerment

Woven into the fabric of community policing is the operational strategy of problem oriented policing. While problem solving can be considered a stand alone tool, it builds on community policing principles of community/officer empowerment, resource sharing, and the long term resolution of disorder. The fundamental nature of problem-oriented policing can be outlined in the following manner:

> problem oriented policing goes a step further than what is commonly conveyed in community policing by asserting up front that the police job is not simply law enforcement, but dealing with a wide range of community problems - only some of which constitute violations of the law. It further asserts that enforcement of the law is not an end in itself, but only one of several means by which the police can deal with the problems they are expected to handle. Officers are encouraged to think in terms of problems rather than incidents (Goldstein,1986:16).

Problem solving policing requires a service to refocus its attention "from individual incidents to larger patterns of incidents that become community problems and from the simple question of whether an arrest is justified by a particular incident, to the more complex question of what might be causing the incidents and how they could be prevented in the future" (Kennedy and Moore,1997:471)

Problem solving primarily looks beyond the incident as the key unit of work and attempts to resolve the determinants or root causes of the problem (Eck and Spelman,1996, Goldstein,1990, Kennedy and Moore,1997, Veitch,1996). The process of problem solving calls for a systematic approach inclusive of a proactive stance, analysis of local conditions and a collaborative relationship between all stakeholders. Eck and Spelman (1996) indicate that a particular systematic model had been developed by the Newport News Police Department in the mid 1980s and has since been adopted by other services such as Edmonton, San Diego, Tulsa, Madison and New York City. The model

consists of four components and is recognized under the acronym of S.A.R.A. The four Components are:

Scanning: As part of the daily routine, officers are expected to look for problems.

Analysis: Officers then collect information about the problem. The goal is to understand the scope, nature, and causes of the problem.

Response: The knowledge gained in the analysis stage is then used to develop and implement solutions. Officers seek the assistance of other police units, public and private organizations, and anyone else who can help. (At this stage the community is rallied to share resources, to, in fact, take an active role in the process of problem resolution. One might suggest that this is an active stage of responsibilization wherein the community is empowered to respond to identified disorder. Here, responsibility for long term action is shifted onto the community through the collaborative process of problem solving. The response to crime and disorder is no longer the sole responsibility of the police but is now shared with the community)

Assessment: Finally, officers evaluate the effectiveness of their response. They may use the results to revise the response, collect more data, or even redefine the problem. (Eck and Spelman, 1997:460)[32]

Problem solving, while offering the benefit of effectiveness and efficiency, also has implications for both police management structures and the police role. An alternate representation of problem solving might suggest it is one example of institutional isomorphism, wherein policing has copied institutional forms that will allow it to prosper and adapt in a period of reform (Mastrofski,1998). Problem solving is one method by which policing can respond to the pressure for the adoption of private sector strategies in its attempt to ameliorate disorder. It has enabled policing to incorporate strategies of empowerment, decentralization and outcome measurements so that they may be utilized in an order maintenance environment. Implementing a problem solving approach

[32] The relevance of the SARA model is grounded in the fact that it has been adopted by the RCMP, Toronto and Edmonton as an operational model from which to address crime prevention and long term resolution of ongoing disorder. Moreover, the SARA model implicitly articulates the importance of including a variety of stakeholders in the process of problem resolution. If long term resolutions are to be achieved the community must be included in process.

requires a shift from a traditional centralized command structure. Middle management and command officers must support decentralized efforts and initiatives. Command staff must allow front-line officers the flexibility to identify, analyse and solve problems. With this flexibility comes a need for officers to exercise a wide range of decision making and discretionary power. "Patrol officers are given broader freedom to decide what should be done and how it should be done in their communities - they assume managerial responsibility for the delivery of police services to their assigned area" (Community Policing Consortium,1998:7). In this context middle management officers are to no longer be recognized as "taskmasters" but as team leaders (Eck and Spelman,1996). Interestingly, decentralized management structures, broad discretionary powers and the empowerment of the front-line are, in fact, central to the au courant models of TQM and NPM.

Strategically, problem solving infers that the role of a police service must shift. No longer can a police service perceive itself as the sole agent responsible for order maintenance and crime control. Instead, police services must act as partners in the task of analysis and response. The police must acknowledge they cannot solve these problems and, furthermore, must rely on "other public service agencies, the business community and the public" (Eck and Spelman,1996:466). Problem solving, while requiring a shift both structurally and philosophically, "provides a tested, practical approach for police agencies frustrated with putting band-aids on symptoms" (Ibid,1996:470). It further represents a fine tuning approach to the broad philosophical and organizational strategies of community based policing (Goldstein,1990, Webster and Connors,1996).

Problem Solving and Community Partnerships: New Levels of Intervention

> Community policing provides an emblematic example of the neo-liberal strategy of governance (Shearing,1997,71).

Theoretically, problem solving and community partnerships require both the police and community to be co-producers of public safety. This relationship places a responsibility upon police/community partners to engage in interventions "aimed at stabilizing neighbourhoods, increasing neighbourhood bonds and communication, increasing the capacity of the neighbourhood to mediate in conflict situations and ultimately strengthen neighbourhood cohesion" (Greene, 1998,152). The premise from which these interventions evolve stems from the theoretical belief that cohesive and stable communities are less criminogenic and if these interventions are consistent, reduced fear of crime, enhanced use of public space, reduced community disorder, and reduced crime and victimization will be residual outcomes (Greene, 1998, Bursik and Grasmick,1991, Sampson,1989, Bryne and Sampson,1986, Wilson and Kelling,1982). This theoretical framework further suggests that the solutions to crime and disorder are complex and require diverse points of intervention. Moreover, diverse points of intervention suggests the need for communities to take a more active role in identifying and resolving community pathologies. This, in turn, implies a process wherein citizens become more responsible for their own governance and the resolution of disorder. It also implies that everybody sees "the problem" as a problem.

Interestingly, this framework is similar to public health models of intervention and their corresponding understanding of disease etiology (Erickson,1990, Lavis and Sullivan, 1996). "The public health model adopts a multi-causal and ecological perspective that allows for reciprocal associations among variables. Its focus is groups of people, usually

communities, and its goal is health promotion and disease prevention" (Lavis and Sullivan,1996,9). As with public health strategies, community based policing suggests a community focus to both solutions and cause. Community policing intervention, like public health, places a premium on proactive responses[33] to the issue of crime and disorder (Erickson,1990). Where community policing differs from a public health model is in its continued inclusion of reactive interventions akin to the curative model of medicine. Regardless of this difference, community policing requires diverse and proactive strategies of intervention no longer reflecting myopic reactive choices of the professional model.

Under a community policing philosophical and operational umbrella, intervention should encompass both reactive and proactive characteristics and be considered in terms of primary, secondary and tertiary strategies. Within this framework, primary or preventative interventions would mediate between the variables that cause crime and disorder, for example community cohesiveness and neighbourhood deterioration. At the same time, secondary interventions would continue to rely on traditional responses of the police and community such as reactive patrol, follow-up criminal investigations, and most forms of crime prevention, including crime prevention through environmental design, that seek to deny opportunity rather than motivation. Finally, tertiary strategies would address disorder and crime from a rehabilitative stance in which the focus of intervention is upon the consequences of crime and how they can be ameliorated (Greene,1998).

From an organizational stance, these interventions have wide-ranging implications. Diverse interventions impose certain managerial responsibilities, which require "a change in the management ethos, as well as placing more demands on managers to take greater accountability for resource deployment and outcome" (Stockdale,1998,5). Here, the

[33] Here proactive responses refer to any targeted action that is not directed solely at criminals.

community becomes a resource from which funding and labour are mined as part of their enhanced responsibility. On another level the police agency must realign its measurement of inputs and outputs with respect to problem solving as opposed to the traditional model of referring solely to crime statistics, clearance rates and response time. The service must also reassess its division of labour, particularly, if it is to implement primary and tertiary strategies of intervention. Part of this reassessment now becomes a recalculation of the community as a resource base. If new programs are to be implemented, the community must be actively recruited, as they are now to share in the cost and responsibility.

Micro-management Models and Community Policing: Neo-liberal Building Blocks

Throughout this chapter it has been argued that policing is divesting itself of the old organizational model and embracing a model which will allow it to survive in an environment of change. And while there are numerous reform models, the vanguard of police restructuring is influenced most by the reform tools of New Public Management (NPM) and Total Quality Management (Leishman, Cope and Starie,1996, Manning, 1996, Ingraham, 1995, Savage and Charman,1996). "Police reform in the 1990s, though mediated by key actors in the policing policy network, is largely a manifestation of New Public Management (NPM)" (Leishman, Cope and Starie,1996,24). Further to this argument Goldstein states: "The adoption of Total Quality Management in policing has demonstrated very positive results and holds much promise. We can learn important lessons from TQM" (Goldstein, 1993, 5).

One need only examine the programmatic restructuring efforts implemented under the guise of community based policing and how they correspond with the

managerial and operational objectives of NPM and TQM to recognize the validity of these arguments. Take for example community policing's emphasis upon the tactic of decentralization. One of TQM's four operational principals suggests the need to topple the pyramid and empower employees. Furthermore it places an emphasis on problem solving, at not only the upper managerial levels, but, more importantly at the level of service delivery. In doing so, managers take on the trappings of facilitators wherein their direct influence is dramatically reduced or redefined. Moreover, employee empowerment stimulates the necessity to develop a culture of teamwork, an environment that has traditionally been lacking in bureaucratic organizations. Similarly NPM requires organizations to decentralize and empower employees at the lower hierarchical rungs. In this context decentralization imposes structural change in that newly autonomous and semi-autonomous units would deliver services. Within these units the responsibility of service delivery is delegated to managers who are given operational discretion "within the limits of the policy strategy set by the centre" (Leishman, Cope and Starie,1996,12).

Decentralization in a community policing context appears to assume similar traits and objectives. Furthermore, decentralization sets in place a service/community relationship that enhances the process of responsibilization, a downloading onto those directly involved with a particular order maintenance concern. Decentralization is an important component in the practice of problem solving. As suggested earlier implementing a problem solving orientation requires a shift from the traditional centralized command structure. Middle management and command officers must support decentralized efforts and initiatives. Command staff must allow front-line officers

the flexibility to identify, analyse and solve problems. In this context middle management officers are to be recognized not as taskmasters but as team leaders.

Another point of comparison centers on the overarching theme of a performance culture. In practice NPM sets out to develop a similar culture wherein public sector managers are "encouraged if not required to set out clear objectives for their organizations and departments, devise or apply indicators to measure inputs and outputs relative to those objectives, reassess performance, and so on" (Savage and Charman,1996,45). Correspondingly, TQM suggests that organizations constantly track success and progress, and that any evaluations be inclusive of external measurements of satisfaction. Furthermore, evaluations must examine the success of organizational objectives and functions. An organization must recognize mistakes in their early stages and be willing to rectify these in a timely manner. This requires the input of front-line service providers both in terms of recognizing problems and implementing change. "A corollary of this is that mistakes are tolerated and not punished; they are learning experiences and can serve to improve long term performance" (Ingraham,1995,242).

With respect to a performance culture, the objectives of crime prevention, crime reduction, reduction of disorder and reducing the fear of crime place an onus on police managers to measure the inputs and outputs relative to these objectives. These objectives are increasingly perceived as the criteria of service effectiveness by which the success of community policing initiatives are measured. The measurement of effectiveness requires the public, police and evaluators to be clear about what the police function is, so that concise boundaries of acceptable outcomes can be set. Assessment of effectiveness is guided by whether a police service is in fact achieving these objectives for which it was created (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994) From the perspective

of the general public this would mean 'the enhancement of public safety and good order' (Bayley, 1994,79). The identification of objectives can become problematic depending on whether communities are defined in broad or narrow terms, along the parameters of the mainstream or the marginalized, those who generally support or those who generally disapprove of police initiatives.

On a micro level, assessment and reassessment of objectives and practices occur in the operationalization of problem solving and an adherence to components of the S.A.R.A model. Problem solving requires officers to continuously evaluate the implementation of strategies and solutions to crime and disorder. Furthermore, problem solving requires front-line officers to maintain a consistent level of input both in terms of recognizing problems and implementing solutions.

Both TQM and NPM place an emphasis upon serving the needs of customers and clients - the public (Purchase and Hirshhorn,1994). The focus on customers implies the need to continuously improve the services offered. This imposes the necessity to constantly measure the service and clearly define the customer or community one is serving. As indicated earlier, community policing represents a re-negotiated social contract wherein the community is no longer perceived as the passive receptor of police policy, but as partner or customer. Operationally, partnership symbolizes a measure of effectiveness, as community policing is increasingly evaluated by the degree of involvement of the community served (Leighton, 1991). This measurement of involvement can also be translated into a measure of a community's input of resources, labour and responsibility for self governance. Community policing emphasizes "that policing is both more effective and legitimate when it responds to community-defined issues" (Murphy,1988:176). As a customer of police services the community's, responsibility

becomes one of apprising the police "of the services it requires in its specific locale", and "to advise its police on what are locally regarded as problems of order and security" as well as "stress a correlative adaptability and accountability of police to local communities" (O'Malley and Palmer,1996:142). Yet, responding to community defined issues can be prove problematic, when the community and its citizens are viewed as customers. Here, a Pandora's box of service duality begins to open, especially when community is defined along economic boundaries. Duality of service and control are quickly demarcated by those actively involved in self-regulation (those with resources) and those perceived as irresponsible or incapable of organizing (the poor and the marginalized).

Finally, neither NPM, TQM or community based policing can be considered in terms of a simple re-jigging of the old bureaucratic routine, but a long term systematic method of improving services and implementing operational reform. The promise of these models is one of improved communications both externally and internally, improved decision making, an enhanced problem solving ability, improved employee participation and commitment and productivity. Furthermore, consistent with each of these models is an emphasis upon "equalitarian approaches to production, process, problem solving, bottom-up sources of innovation, customer values or at least external measures of performance and decentralized service delivery" (Manning,1996,6).

The above section argues that clear parallels do exist between the core operational principles of TQM/NPM and those of community policing. And while TQM/NPM have evolved from corporate sector rationalities their legacy is one of "providing the context within which efforts to streamline management are taking place in policing" (Ibid.). Core principles of these managerial models have been recontextualized

so as to fit the operational and managerial context of policing. And yet this recontextualization is much more than a simple shifting of operational principles from one sector to another. It must be considered in terms of an extension of neo-liberal rationalities. Understood in this context the institutional isomorphism that policing is undergoing can be perceived as a process wherein neo-liberal principles are compressed into the operational framework of policing (see table 1.). For the purpose of this analysis the mobilization of community resources, restructuring objectives of decentralization and a service/customer relationship characterized by market outcomes will serve as a minimal measure of compressed neo-liberal principles within a police service's operational framework. While the following case studies present various examples of institutional isomorphism these will articulate a basic measure of neo-liberal rationality.

Police services, like other public service organizations have been restructured so as to emulate private sector institutions in order to set in place a new contractual relationship between the state and its citizens. Current police reform, particularly community policing is a strategy that will reengineer the existing relationship of dependence on state resources to one based on independence from those resources. Whether this independence actually translates into greater citizen autonomy or enhanced social control is an issue that well meaning proponents of these reforms must assess.

Table 1.

Neo-liberal Principles	TQM/NPM Principles	CB/Policing
Define a new contractual relationship between state and citizen, one which places an emphasis on self-responsibility and a citizen's obligation to his/her own well-being.	• Effect structural change so that autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations would deliver services. • Co-ordinate networks and	• At root a strategy that seeks to shift the responsibility for security to local institutions and resources • Uncouple policing and police

In a neo-liberal contractual relationship complete reliance on external expertise (such as the police, doctors, or social workers) to solve and identify problems of individual or community well-being is no longer considered acceptable, efficient or effective. A neo-liberal shift from dependence to autonomy realigns the relationship between not only the state and the individual but the individual and the state apparatus.	partnerships outside departmental boundaries. • Management of multi-organizational approaches to program delivery.	so that policing becomes everybody's business rather than exclusively or primarily the business of the police (Shearing,1997) • Crime management is to be Shared with the empowered community, the partners in prevention. Crime prevention is not the sole Responsibility of the state. • Mobilization of all the resources of a community, police, civilian, government and private sector to addres disorder and insecurity.
Support decentralization, wherein there is a shift of governmental powers and responsibilities from a single centre to multiple smaller units (Brodie, 1997). Key to the concept of decentralization is the rhetoric, symbolism and construction of the self-responsible community. From a neo-liberal perspective, community stands in opposition to remote central government and insensitive local authorities (Rose,1996).	• Organizations must decentralize and empower employees at the lower hierarchical rungs. • Expanded employee participation in decision making and communication within the organization. • Key principle of toppling the pyramid and empowering employees. • Counter the past practices of remote and narrow functioning public administrators.	• Decentralization - Empowerment of front-line Officers, the community. • Police help neighbourhoods help themselves, police and community are co-producers of public order. • Strategically and Operationally seeks to develop a co-operative, reciprocal relationship wherein both police and community action is decentralized. • Counter the unresponsive and ineffective professional model.
The process of negotiation between community and the state is supported by the construction of an enterprise culture and marketization of the state. Here the discourse and practices of consumerism support a contractual relationship in which the consumer (individual) is placed as sovereign. This emphasis on market orientation places the individual (consumer) in a position to influence and direct the nature of specific services.	• Use of Market Rhetoric: the customer, client, user, putting the customer in the driver's seat, etc. • To achieve greater efficiency, results, performance and value for money in individual government agencies. • The focus on customers implies the need to continuously improve the services offered. • A necessity to constantly measure the service and clearly define the customer or community one is serving. • Promote competition between service providers.	• Police recognize they work for the community as well as the law. • Community/constituent Organizational based objectives with measurable results. • Police seek wider Consultation and more Information from the community And community priorities are taken seriously and acted upon.

Conclusion

Policing' s ascendance toward neo-liberal rationalities is, in part, driven by the internal needs of individual police services and yet the stimulus is not merely an internal

phenomenon. For, as I have argued, the institutional isomorphism policing is undergoing must be understood in relation to the state and its role as the organizer of hegemony. As the police are an apparatus of the state they have a task associated to the organization of hegemony. The police are co-educators, but as they represent a different articulation of the economic and the political they have required a specific pedagogical tool. Community policing has shown itself to be that tool. Community policing has been implemented not because it represents a new found commitment to citizen involvement and democratic participation, but because of an ideological commitment to reducing the size of government and emulating the private sector. As the following chapters will indicate, this has meant different things to different police services. Moreover, this commitment to reform and the ideological framework from which it has evolved has a number of consequences, particularly with respect to the efficacy of policing and the duality of service. These too are drawn out in the subsequent sections.

CHAPTER TWO

Policing in a Neo-liberal Province: The Edmonton Experience

> In essence, we must see the community and not just the criminal justice system as our customer (Chief McNally, EPS, 1991).

Edmonton's pursuit of policing reform began with the farsighted concerns of Chief Robert Lunney. As early as 1983 Chief Lunney recognized that the professional model was bankrupt and could no longer serve the needs of the Service or the community. The only way the professional model could work was through the commitment of substantial resources. At a time when Alberta was verging on fiscal restraint due to the collapse of oil prices in 1981 and 1986, he knew these financial resources would not be available. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that increased resources could achieve desired policing outcomes. Governance reform was also evolving at the Federal government level, suggesting a shift for all public service agencies. The ethos of smaller government and responsible, empowered communities punctuated the debate around future governance structures and included an analysis of policing. Early research undertaken by the Federal Solicitor General and the subsequent tabling of the 1990 Police Challenge 2000 document lauded community policing as the future savior of policing.

During this time, Edmonton Police Service (EPS) S/Sgt. Chris Braiden served an internship with the Federal Solicitor General. His exposure to ongoing research and the conceptualization and empirical examples of community policing informed his perception of police reform. This was a perception that he would later operationalize as he took an active role in defining Edmonton's restructuring process. Further, Braiden experienced

the evolution of reform concepts in a period of Federal Public Service reform. This would heighten the currency to his internship given the fact that Edmonton would soon face similar factors of fiscal restraint and the political impetus for the adoption of neo-liberal rationalities. Ten years would transpire between Chief Lunney's early concerns and Service wide implementation of community policing.

In the years preceding the implementation of community policing, the Service embraced a number of changes, but the internal culture was not ready for the wholesale reform required to implement community policing. Chief Lunney would retire in 1987 and was not in a position to bring about the required change. His successor, Chief Chahley, was committed to community policing, putting in place neighbourhood foot patrols, but his energy was consumed with internal management issues. The service was facing a crisis of legitmacy as several constables had been arrested for a variety of serious crimes. Chahley was under pressure from the media, community and municipal government to address these concerns (Hawkins,1998). It was not until Chief McNally took over in 1990 that changes would begin in earnest.

In this chapter I argue that Edmonton Police Service's wholesale incorporation of community policing was a forward thinking response to the bankruptcy of the professional model, Service deficits, reduced provincial spending, provincial downloading of fiscal responsibility and an internal service delivery crisis. Edmonton's operational shift to community policing represented a deft realignment and re-conceptualization of policing during a period of political transition to neo-liberal governance. The community was actively involved in the restructuring process. Although there were limits to the content of community participation, resulting from fiscal constraints, the on-going cultural dynamics of policing and the Klein government's

ideological commitment to neoliberalism, Edmonton's success in implementing community-based policing can largely be attributed to the more genuine commitment to community inclusion in problem solving and policing generally. Edmonton thus offers an important counterpoint to the community based policing initiatives of both Toronto and the R.C.M.P.

The External Winds of Change

In 1985 the conservative government of Don Getty had the misfortune of inheriting an economic environment punctuated by a reduction in oil revenues of $6 billion (Cdn) in 1985 to a low of $2.5 billion (Cdn) in 1987 (Taft,1997). This resulting economic shortfall heralded the end of annual provincial surpluses and the beginning of deficit budgets. In1987 the provincial deficit had soared to $1,561 per capita and its debt load increased from zero in 1986 to $18.5 billion in 1994 (McMillan and Warrack, 1995). The Getty government chose to address reduced revenues and public accounts deficits through dramatic cuts in government services rather than increased taxation. In fact, as early as 1987, the Alberta media was proclaiming a state of cut back hysteria spurred by the government's freeze on education spending and doctors fees, an announced plan to cut 2000 government positions, a cut of 14% to provincial capital projects and a reduction in welfare rates from $420 per month to $326 per month (Taft,1997, 21). The overall impact of the Getty government initiatives was a 15% reduction in per capita government spending and the elimination of 4400 provincial full time positions in the span of six years (Ibid,22). In the period between 1986 and 1991 the provincial government had reduced program spending by $2.8 billion and had sought to hold program expenditures steady for the 1991-92 fiscal year (Ibid,23).

Fiscal restraint and reduction of service became the credo for the Getty government.[34] Having been implemented at the provincial level, the impact of this approach then filtered down to the municipalities. For example the 1987 Edmonton municipal budget confronted a $3.1 million provincial roll back in grants. Commenting on the province's downloading, Edmonton's mayor Laurence Decore stated: 'the budget is the government's way of decentralizing the pain it is suffering for not showing the restraint every municipality, hospital and education board has been trying to show in the last four years' (Edmonton Journal, March 23,1987). Regardless of the outcry, the provincial grant rollback continued and in 1987 the law enforcement grant suffered a 3% decrease from the preceding year, leaving the police service with a shortfall of $508,000 (City of Edmonton, 1987).

Budget cuts to the police service thus became an annual expectation. As Edmonton Alderman Brian Mason observed, the police service had been hit with eight years of tight budgets and an increased demand upon the service (Edmonton Journal, Nov 30,1990). The grimness continued when, in December of 1990, the Edmonton Police Service posted a $1.7 million deficit and revealed that the service was operating below the 1982 complement of officers while the city's population had increased by 100,000. In a report delivered to Edmonton City Council in May of 1990, Chief McNally stated that, in the previous decade, the city's population had increased by 20% and that crimes against persons and property had increased by 36% and yet the service's staff had increased by only 6% (Edmonton Journal, May 25,1991).

Unfortunately, Alberta's political horizon held little relief for the service's practice of doing more with less. Fiscal conservatism punctuated the political rhetoric leading up

[34] See Taft,1997

to the 1992 Conservative party leadership selection of Ralph Klein and subsequent 1993 provincial election victory (Mansell,1997). These factors would only guarantee Alberta's drive toward fiscal restraint and service downsizing.

The Klein Revolution

The tone of Klein's political tenure was set as early as October 1992. In a letter to the Canadian Manufacturers Association, he suggested a need to:

> reduce the number and size of government departments and decrease overlap and regulation; privatize some government services, cut government expenditures, and improve productivity of program delivery before considering new taxes (Mansell,1997,46).

After the 1993 election and with Ralph Klein's hand firmly grasping the reins of Alberta government policy, the government shifted to a thorough-going neo-liberal agenda. Whatever vestiges of welfare state interventionism that had been maintained by his predecessor in the spending controls of the late 1980s, were abandoned. The objectives of the new agenda were to promote the greatest possible market freedom to facilitate the increasing fluidity of transnational capital, the establishment of minimum government and the development of a less regulatory state (Trimble,1997,486). The Klein government embraced an outlook "exclusively concerned with the freedom of markets and individuals from government interference and with economic efficiency" (Denis,1995, 91). It became abundantly clear that economic freedom and efficiency were to be the guiding values of the Klein government (Ibid).

Cloaked in the rhetoric of "living within our means; balancing the budget to avoid hitting the wall; deregulation; competitive taxation; getting government out of the business of business and cutting out layers of fat", the Klein government sought to

develop a model of Alberta characterized by a business culture (Lisac,180,1995). Albertans were to be convinced, through the use of business metaphors, "that their province was, indeed, a business, and that every social concern comes down to either the profit motive or at least an overriding concern for cost-effectiveness" (Denis,1995,94). As Gordon Laxer notes, Klein's reconstituted Alberta was one wherein "people are no longer portrayed as citizens and wage-earners in a democratic community. They are now primarily consumers, investors and stakeholders, acting as individuals in the private marketplace"(1995,101). Corresponding with the development of a business culture was the message that Albertans must become more responsible both individually and collectively. The Klein government called upon Albertans to be more accepting of higher user fees or lower-quality government service and "to provide services to family members that used to be the purview of paid professionals" (Denis,1995,94). At the core of Klein's reconstituted Alberta is an image of the marketplace "as the purveyor of all that is good. It is efficient, competitive and teaches people tough love: how to be self reliant" (1995,101).

The bricks and mortar of Klein's Alberta began to be laid in February of 1993 when it was announced that six Deputy Minister positions would be eliminated in addition to 1000 civil service positions. These indicators were quickly followed by a freeze of all grants to hospitals, schools, post-secondary institutions and municipal governments (Mansell, 1997). Klein's reshaping of Alberta would continue in earnest with the 1993/94 budget which contained a 20% reduction in overall government spending (Ibid.). The budget would chop "$1 billion from spending in one year, with unprecedented cuts to the most sensitive social policy areas, an overall $252 million cut in education, $138 million in social services, $287 million in health. Other departments

lost even more. Some began with what would amount to a 30 percent cut over three years" (Lisac, 1995,185). What was becoming abundantly clear from these initiatives was that Alberta's process of trimming the fat would have dire implications for not only government employees but anyone who was indirectly funded by the provincial government. This meant "doctors, nurses, non-professional staff at hospitals, teachers, academic and non-academic staff at colleges and universities, all municipal employees, court workers and police" (Ibid, 80). In other words, "about one-eighth of the entire Alberta work force was now being identified as a roll of fat, as an unhealthy drag on the province" (Ibid).

In February of 1994 the government set out to recast the structure of government services. The blueprint for reform was articulated within the core elements of its three year business plan outlining the role of government and the objectives of all agencies under provincial jurisdiction. The proposed plan set out the criteria for core government tasks in the following manner:

> investing in people and ideas; building a strong, sustainable and prosperous province; providing essential services for health and well-being of Albertans; maintaining a quality system of roads and highways, telecommunications and utilities, and providing law, order and good government (Mansell,1997,49).

In tandem with the provincial government's business plan, departments and agencies were to develop mission statements in which objectives, spending targets, actions and methods of measuring outcomes would be outlined. These components would facilitate an analysis of program effectiveness and departmental alignment with core provincial business objectives. Correspondingly, if there was a variance from the province's core elements of business, departments were eliminated or privatized. Business plans were also to serve as a mechanism of accountability whereby

> it would be more difficult than in the past for departments or other units to make ad hoc spending decisions since any sharp deviations from the plans and targets would invite scrutiny. Secondly, these plans would form the basis of a system of performance measures to keep track of the progress relative to a set of bench marks or targets (Mansell,1997,50).

As Lisac(1995) notes, these plans "opened up vast areas of policy change" as well as an empowerment of departments and agencies to "make crucial decisions on how to implement budget cuts and policy reform" (Kneebone and McKenzie,1997,186).

While the tidal wave of Klein's restructuring swept over the realm of provincial governance it also dragged municipal governance along in its undertow. As Claude Denis(1995) indicates, the municipal sector was overwhelmed by "high-impact deep changes" guided by the provincial government's disciplinary drive. The first indication of this imposed discipline came with treasurer Jim Dinning's 1994 budget in which municipal grants, like all other government spending, was cut by 20 percent. In response to municipal outcry, Dinning argued that he was not transferring his fiscal problems onto the municipalities but they could work things out with less money, and if they could not, they would suffer "a form of self-imposed downloading" (Lisac,1995,187). The province's imposed "centralization of decision making on the size of budgets" forced municipalities to scramble to make regional decisions on how to cope with the budgetary shortfall (Denis,1995). This appeared to add insult to injury as municipalities had undertaken sharp fiscal restraint during the mid 1980s when the province had undergone only minor corrections in its fiscal housekeeping (Lisac,1995). This fact did not seem to influence the direction municipal funding was to take nor temper the unsympathetic nature of the provincial government's fiscal conservatism. The harshness of the provincial stance was articulated in the Municipal Affairs budget documents which

stated: "with deficit elimination being the major priority of the government, subsidizing solvent municipalities by borrowing is no longer feasible" (Lisac,1995, 1996).

Policing, like other municipal services, would be swept into the vortex of budget restraint and restructuring. Under the banner of the Klein revolution, municipal policing would suffer two direct hits. The first would come from the Ministry of Justice in its attempt to set in place its required three year business plan. In Alberta Justice's 1994-95 annual report Deputy Minister of Justice Neil McCrank set out eleven business functions all of which had a number of goals attached, "some of [which] are related to budget, while others are related to increased efficiency or improvement of service" (Alberta Justice Annual Report 1994/95, ii). Topping the list of business functions was that of "reducing crime through policing and prevention programs" and the first goal related to this function was "to provide high quality cost effective programs to prevent and control crime" (Ibid,2). One of the objectives of this goal was to "reduce the level of municipal policing grants over the three years of the business plan by 50% ($16 million)" (Ibid,3). The achievement of this restraint was well under way within the first year and by April 1,1994, Alberta Justice no longer awarded municipal policing grants, relinquishing this responsibility to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. It was at this point that municipal policing was to take its second hit.

Municipal Affairs' disbursement and administration of municipal policing grants would prove problematic in that they were included in the lump sum grants allocated to the municipalities. The situation became even more precarious when the 1994/95 budget set out a "$59 million cut in municipal grants, further to this the1995/96 budget would see this grant reduced by 10 percent to $169 million and outlined plans to cut this grant in half again by 1996-97" (Lisac,1995,196). Limited municipal grants nurtured a

competitive relationship between municipal agencies and services as they vied for shrinking pieces of the budgetary pie. As early as 1991 this scenario was apparent in Edmonton as can be noted in the Edmonton Journal headline: "Other services face cuts if police get more funds, officials say" (November,13,1991). Policing services were by no means exempt from the funding struggle and like all other services would need to justify their budgetary requirements. Further, the city did little to alleviate the competitive nature of budget negotiations. As Donna Artuso notes in her article "Council's chain-saw budget massacre",

> the first problem with city council's approach to these provincial government cuts is that the recipient departments are widely expected to bear the brunt of the cuts on their own. If all city departments took equal reductions, it would be fairer for everyone. But so far, that hasn't been the trend (Edmonton Journal, March 27,1994).

Unfortunately, budget negotiations tended to resemble the competitive nature of the market, pitting local units against each other in a competition for both clients and government funding (Kneebone and McKenzie,1997).

Alberta's political restructuring took its cue from "the global new right ideology that extols the freeing of markets and maligns government activism in all but a few disciplinary spheres of society" (Denis,1995,98). Hence, the overarching objective of the Klein government restructuring was to discipline Alberta for a "new age of capitalism" (Ibid). This ideological project was not, however, the motivation behind EPS reform. Still, if Edmontonians would have to take on increased responsibility for order maintenance as a function of the Service's fiscal constraints and adoption of community based policing, this increased citizen responsibility would also serve to discipline them for a new era of global capitalism.

Developing the Corporate Structure: CBP and Organizational Realignment

> As a commission we are committed to the goal of community based policing which is surely to become the cornerstone of tomorrow's policing (Edmonton Police Commission, January 8,1990).
>
> Because we are at the forefront of change in policing we have recognized before many others that we have taken the reactive style of policing to its effective limits and have recognized that we are not able in this way to meet community needs. Those of us who are charged with the responsibility for policing our city had to develop a new vision of the service to this community (McNally, From The Chief's Desk, April 8,1991).

In July of 1990, at the request of Chief McNally, Superintendent Chris Braiden presented the Executive Officers' team (EOT) with a position paper outlining a process of change. He took the stance that change should be wholesale and service wide. Braiden argued that implementing reform one Division at a time would only be postponing the inevitable. Sooner or later, broad reform initiatives would need to occur as components of the service proved contrary to the community policing philosophy (1990,1). Braiden also felt that Edmonton possessed the appropriate managerial environment and noted:

> The timing for such a major change of direction couldn't be better; there will never be as much enthusiasm and commitment on the EOT again, in our time. We should capitalize on this energy by directly involving as many as possible, at least all of those who want to be part of the process (Braiden,1990,1)

In a manner radically departing from the professional model's hierarchical process of command-dictated change, Braiden suggested that if reform was to occur it could not be driven by a small elite. The input and commitment of all members was essential and each member was to feel that they had something to gain from success. The necessities of a decentralized service and a toppled hierarchical pyramid could be clearly detected in Braiden's paper. These necessities correspond with the neo-liberal

objective of extending power and authority down through the organizational hierarchy, a decentralization that would eventually make its way to the community. Corporate notions of empowerment were frequently utilized to highlight the cultural realignment Edmonton was to take. Harvard Business School professor John Kotter's concept: "The leader's job is to set strategic direction, get people to buy into your perception of reality, give them resources and power, and then leave them alone", punctuated Braiden's vision (Cited in Braiden ,1990,9). Throughout his paper Braiden continuously illustrated the importance of empowerment and the inclusion of all service members in the process of reform. Braiden quoted Herman Goldstein's assertion that, "police leaders have readily available to them a huge resource: their rank and file people"(Ibid.). In a period of reform Service members were especially valuable, particularly since other resources were restricted.

Woven throughout Braiden's strategy was the argument that wholesale reform was not only operational in nature but cultural. More importantly, a cultural shift inclusive of empowerment and ownership would not only guide the service's immediate reconstitution but would form the foundation for continued reform. Braiden noted:

> it is important to recognize that what we are tackling here is literally a mindset transplant, fundamental change in our perception of what police business is all about, what its core value is and what our priorities must be (1990,3)

He further argued that 'community policing requires us to rethink and restate the core value that drives our organization' (Ibid.). The core value was to guide the objectives, actions and decisions of all members. Braiden argued:

> This core value must dictate everything we do; our leadership style; management systems; the structure of our organization; what our priorities are; who we recruit and how we train them; where we assign people; how we prioritize crime categories and

> so on. In short, this core value is a constant reminder to everyone why we exist (1990,4).

In addition to the core value, an integral component of Edmonton's cultural reorientation would be the development of a mission statement indicating how the requisite tasks were to be accomplished (Ibid.). The EOT suggested that this statement should acknowledge the diversity of the Edmonton community, its neighbourhoods and various dynamic cultures and articulate the importance of problem oriented policing.

At the heart of Braiden's understanding of cultural reform was a recognition of policing's prior deviation from serving the community at large. Under the professional model, policing had adopted the role of criminal justice functionary, feeding only the needs of the criminal justice system. Invoking a neo-liberal critique of bureaucracy, Braiden suggested that the monopoly held by policing and the criminal justice system had caused it to 'drift and eventually mold its product to its wants, not those of its constituents' (1990,4). Policing, and particularly the Edmonton Police Service, would need to reorient its service culture to address the "primary needs of the community". This reoriented culture would eventually take on the rhetoric of a consumer/service relationship, as noted in Chief McNally's comment that "Customer service is an integral cornerstone which is built into community based policing...The police like any other good business, must provide quality customer service" (From the Chief's Desk, Aug 6,1991). "Three words explain the concept, service, service, service" (EPS,1997,36). In September of 1990, in consultation with the Executive Officer's Team, Chief McNally identified the core value as "Committed to Community Needs".[35] "Committed to

[35] Before it was officially adopted Chief McNally sought the input of all service members. As Hornick, Duggan and LeClaire argue this gesture gave the message that the Chief 'was committed to collegial decision making and gave the members of Edmonton Police Service the confidence to move forward' (1993,25). Moreover, it reflected the corporate managerial strategy of

Community Needs" was to be the measurement by which the service would gauge its actions and continue organizational reform. Still, as the previous articulation of consumer rhetoric suggests, the Service understood its relationship to the community as a market oriented interaction.

At this early stage of Edmonton's reform, the service was actively divesting itself of the professional model and private sector concepts of empowerment and decentralization were being articulated. The shift from the bureaucratic structure of the professional model, to the anti-bureaucratic model guiding public sector restructuring is readily observable (Resnick 1994, Pierre,1995). Similar to other public sector initiatives, constituent needs and constituent based organizational objectives informed the Service's core value. The focus of this shift was a negotiation between the community and the Service wherein the community(consumer) was placed in a position of influence and thus directed the nature of specific services. The success of Edmonton's organizational reform, however, would require more than the hallmarks of new management models.

Setting Change in Motion

Braiden's blueprint for change was not simply a re-jigging of the old bureaucratic system but a wholesale, service-wide process of reform. He had proposed five steps the service would need to undertake in order to implement community policing. These included:

- an organizational review
- an in-depth analysis of workload

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empowerment through inclusion. Furthermore it was a strategy for ensuring buy-in from all layers

- a decentralization through the addition of neighbourhood foot patrols, satellite police offices
- a re-evaluation of specialization and
- a stratification of the service delivery system around a four-tiered level of delivery; *high priority units, complaint units, satellite police offices and neighbourhood foot* patrols. (Hawkins,1998, 243).

Of these, perhaps the most influential in forwarding the implementation of CBP was the organizational review. The resulting recommendations and agenda for implementation would set forth an institutionalization of empowerment and decentralization.

By the Fall of 1990 an organizational review had begun with the objective of examining each area of the service to ensure its effectiveness and compatibility with community policing. The review format included a workload analysis, a unit analysis (specialization) and an examination of community needs over the previous 10 years (Hornick, Duggan, LeClaire,1993). The workload analysis examined crime rates by neighbourhood and division in order to facilitate a realignment of divisional borders based on an efficient allocation of resources. The unit analysis, on the other hand, assessed each Service unit's efficiency under the following criteria;

- What was the unit intended to do
- What is it actually doing
- Should it be doing what it is doing
- What should it be doing
- How should it be doing what it should be doing (Ibid. 27).

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of the Service.

Additionally, the community examination provided the service with a concise picture of trends, which had previously been unarticulated or placed in a service wide context. This report yielded a variety of distressing indicators such as a reported crime rate increase of 44%, a 14% decrease in actual patrol constables, a 15% increase in call consumed time, and a 19% population increase (T. Harder,1991). The report thus served to underscore Edmonton Police Service's prior decade of cutback management (McNally,1991). The organizational review was completed in March of 1991 resulting in 132 recommendations. These were consolidated to 81 and submitted in a final report to the Executive Officers Committee. Commenting on the review outcome Chief McNally stated "we now have an agenda for change that brings us closer to the flexibility we need to create the community based policing approach in Edmonton" (From the Chief's Desk, April 8,1991). In fact, the results of this reallocation were that "68 officers moved to positions that would improve the response to community needs, 58 constables were reassigned from specialist to generalist duties, several specialized units disappeared or were decentralized and two-and-a-half million dollars of existing budget was reassigned to operational areas" (EPS,1997,27). Flexibility, however, meant much more than the simple reallocation of officers and funds. More accurately, it was a reference to the dismantling of procedures and operational barriers preventing the institutionalization of empowerment and decentralization. The centrepiece of this effort would be the construction of a decentralized Service structure wherein a wide range of responsibilities could be realigned. Moreover, it would ensure that the community could be made to share the responsibility for ongoing order maintenance.

Institutionalization of Empowerment and Decentralization

The first crack in the operational barriers of EPS occurred with the review recommendation to "examine and amend the Policy and Procedure Manual to ensure that decision making authority and procedures are established at the lowest organizational level" (EPS, 1990). This was supported by the rationale that subsidiarity would "allow members to complete meaningful work, and give them control over it" (Ibid.). Similarly, strategic component #4 of the agenda for change indicated the need for "a stratification policy designed to recognize that those in touch with community needs are the most important component of community-based policing" (Hornick, Duggan, LeClaire,1993,28). This implies that organizational policy should overtly identify the importance of front-line officers and in doing so undermine the premise of the hierarchical pyramid. (see appendix re: Edmonton's redesigned Organizational Chart) Further to this, it acknowledges the need to empower officers in maintaining links to the community. With respect to decentralization, strategic component #1 emphasized the decentralization of service delivery allowing "citizens to access police services closer to their community" (Ibid.). Following a comparable tack component #3 suggested the realignment of districts in order to facilitate the development of turf ownership. Here, ownership was understood as the "assignment of specific turf to officers empowered with the responsibility for finding problem solving solutions" (McNally,1992 Mar,31).

Decentralization and empowerment, then, were considered integral tools in providing Edmonton the flexibility to implement community policing. The flexibility of semi-autonomous divisions and officers was reliant upon a successful incorporation of these concepts. Furthermore, their inherent promise of autonomy would serve as an incentive to officers previously shackled by the hierarchical practices of the professional

model. As one Patrol Sergeant suggested, empowerment "has allowed members the flexibility and autonomy to get the job done. It cuts members loose, it facilitates an atmosphere that will bring about solutions" (interview, February 18,1998). Still, while the institutionalization of empowerment and decentralization were imperative to Edmonton's implementation strategy, dismantling procedural barriers would have only limited value in the absence of proper training for its agents.

Service wide training in the community based policing approach began in September of 1991. Community policing tenets "needed to be carefully developed, taught and nurtured if it was to become entrenched in daily operational activities" (EPS,1997,78). Two day sessions incorporated an overview of the community policing model, ownership, problem solving, leadership and community networking. Each session was facilitated by Chief McNally and command staff in an effort to indicate their commitment to the model of reform.

Decentralization also implied greater leadership and managerial pressure on middle management officers. In recognition of this, EPS implemented managerial training for operational supervisors. Supervisory training focused on "reinforcing and promoting the concepts of community policing, providing leadership reflective of the core value of the organization, mentoring, coaching and developing the problem solving abilities of operation members" (EPS,1997,79). The goal was to enhance mid-level management performance and thereby facilitate a stronger team approach to problem solving and community policing (Ibid.). To further enhance the supervisory skills of front line leaders the service also implemented a Front-line Leadership Course consisting of the following three hour sessions:

1. The basic principles for a collaborative workplace
2. Giving and receiving constructive feedback

3. Getting good information from others
4. Getting your ideas across
5. Handling emotions under pressure
6. Giving recognition
7. Establishing performance expectations
8. Developing job skills
9. Taking corrective action
10. Coaching: Bringing out the best in others
11. Clarifying team roles and expectations
12. Conducting information exchange meetings
13. Resolving team conflicts
14. Winning support from others
15. Managing change
16. Solving problems: the basic process (EPS,1997,80).

Recruit training would also need to instill the community policing philosophy as the model of 'policing as it should be' (Ibid.). Incoming officers would have to acquire appropriate skills in order to pursue service wide goals. To achieve this, recruit training would require a change in syllabus. Indeed, training at all levels would be examined in terms of its compatibility to the service's core value. The Training Section was charged with the development and delivery of training programs that would provide quality policing (EPS,1997).

To this point, Edmonton had achieved the inculcation of CBP tenets, the installation of an empowerment culture and procedural flexibility. The manner by which the executive instituted these objectives followed four implementation strategies:

1. The executive had communicated to all members the importance of community based policing and described the effectiveness of a problem oriented process as opposed to incident based response.
2. The executive provided incentives to all members through the process of empowerment.
3. It reduced the barriers to reform through the redevelopment of procedures and practices and it
4. Gave officers the skills to address problems affiliated with the new practices and to be innovative. Here training is of critical importance.

Interestingly, these practices correspond with corporate models of implementation and were consistent with the TQM notion of putting "the responsibility of implementation at

the door of everyone in the organization" (Peak and Glensor,1996,113). Service wide responsibility and empowerment would continue to guide Edmonton's efforts to implement a new service delivery model.

In Pursuit of Efficiency: The New Service Model

Addressing the bankruptcy of the professional model, limited resources and an increasing demand for more effective and efficient service remained at the foreground of Edmonton's restructuring objectives. This chorus was not unique as the same anthem was trumpeted as part of the strategy of neo-liberal restructuring throughout the public sector (Levitas,1986, Pierre,1995, McKenzie,1994). The Executive had not lost sight of the fact that incident based policing was ineffective, required excessive resources and undermined or compromised the service offered to the community (EPS,1997). Limited resources continuously threatened to erode the quality of service provided to Edmontonians (McNally,1993). And while Edmonton's organizational review resulted in the reallocation of officers and an internal administrative divestment of a traditional management structure; these efforts were limited in offsetting the erosion of effectiveness and efficiency. Edmonton could not escape the specter of budget cuts and a growing demand for service and there was little indication from the political arena that resource concerns were to be ameliorated. As Chief McNally argued:

> Compared to other city departments, the Edmonton Police Service has been very fortunate in the last couple years in terms of budget allocations from City Council. However, because of the continuing economic recession, the EPS, like all public service agencies, will face greater public scrutiny of expenditures in the future. The competition for limited public funds will continue to increase as taxpayers demand more value for their tax dollars (From the Chief's Desk, January 19,1993).

Financial restraint would prove to be the mother of invention, stimulating Edmonton's continued pursuit of effective service delivery (Chief Lindsay,1998). Building from the foundation stones of empowerment, procedural flexibility, decentralization and ownership, the EPS adapted to its new environment.

Service wide brainstorming resulted in the position that if the EPS was to implement a more efficient service model it would need to be responsive to community needs, increase public access, improve customer service, decrease the number of police responses to calls, and improve the effectiveness of overall call management (EPS,1997). This was, again, an innovation indebted to neo-liberal concepts of responsibilization and downloading since its primary objective was fiscal austerity rather than a more thorough-going commitment to democratic empowerment.

To facilitate these outcomes the EPS formulated a model consisting of four service components, each inclusive of a set of guiding principals and a strategy for implementation. These four service components were:

- Receiving: how the public accesses police services
- Responding: how the police make themselves available and attend to public needs
- Recording: how the police capture information
- Resolving: how the police work with the community to identify problems and develop solutions. (EPS,1997,37)



(source EPS,1997)

Each of these components was connected with a common objective of improved service delivery. And while there is an assumed interplay between each component, receiving was considered the stage at which service delivery is first negotiated. Given the importance of this initial contact, Edmonton proposed to "decentralize and increase the number of reporting outlets, increase face-to-face contact between the public and police, improve customer service and have the public come to the police at their convenience" (EPS,1997,38). Operationalizing this proposal required the development of full service community stations with operating hours flexible enough for public access and a city marketing blitz to inform Edmontonians of the change in service model.

The operational component of receiving necessitated effective management of calls for service. This would first require the diversion of calls to appropriate levels of service. Edmonton's initial response was the development of a call path chart (see appendix) with the underlying rationale of reducing calls. If the number of calls could be diminished, officers would have less committed time, enabling them to execute problem solving initiatives.

While the call path chart was an important initiative, diverting calls was only part of the solution. More extensive consideration of strategic and operational restructuring

would be essential. To begin, Service response would require criteria and an operational structure by which to guide the division of response. Secondly service response was bound by the following three principles:

- police are duty-bound to attend
- police must respond to calls that compromise public or police safety
- where response is required, they must respond as quickly as possible. (EPS,1997)

The synthesis of these factors resulted in the Service's development of a two tier response strategy: primary and ownership response. Primary response officers were to respond to all emergency and service level calls. Ownership officers responded to emergency calls, priority response calls close to their ownership turf and all service or deferred level calls in their community.[36] Calls not fitting these criteria were diverted to community stations or other non-emergency services.

While efficient call management was achieved through the application of response criteria and effective application of the call path chart, achieving efficient service was conferred by the diversity of the units dispatched. Central to Edmonton's strategy of diversity was its concept of ownership. EPS general order 92-64 set out the nature and task of ownership in the following manner:

> Ownership refers to the static assignment of selected members to areas where problem-solving would be a benefit to the community. Ownership cars have the primary responsibility for taking calls in their areas and are expected to take an aggressive approach to identifying and solving neighbourhood problems in their uncommitted time (EPS,1992).

In a less formal manner:

> ownership applies to the structure of the organization. Ownership is built into all areas and levels of the organization.

[36] Foot patrol officers utilize the same response criteria.

> Ownership and empowerment has de-emphasized the chain of command and encouraged decision making at the lowest possible level. Management has given members increased latitude, autonomy and trust. Members do not always follow the chain of command when making decisions for the good of the community (EPS, 1997,35).

Nonetheless, while the rhetoric is that of ownership and empowerment, the underlying objective remains one of structuring a decentralized Service.

From an operational stand point, the implementation of ownership was the responsibility of each Division and was customized to fit specific Divisional objectives. In order to facilitate this "each of the four Operational Division Superintendents were tasked with researching and developing a version of ownership suited to their unique divisional needs, based on manpower, demographics and current problems" (McNally, From the Chief's Desk. March,1992). Edmonton's model of response was now a synthesis of the attributes of ownership and the division of response and call management. It was also a model that would discipline Service members to adopt the necessary attributes for the new regime and would similarly assist in disciplining the community to take an active role in the process of call management and ownership of community disorder.

As noted earlier, effective problem resolution would now be possible due to less committed officer time. But the task of problem-solving was also to be undertaken by the community. Indeed, among EPS's objectives 'the involvement of the community in problem identification and the development of solutions, the empowerment of members to take ownership of problems and to create interagency and community partnerships' (EPS, 1997). It was clear that the Service recognized the premium of community involvement and responsibility. As noted by Superintendent Buerger in a presentation to the Executive Officers' Committee:

> If police ever want to make significant advancements in problem solving and truly wish to reduce crime we must get away from the notion that all crime is a police matter. If we accept the basic notion that the police cannot continue to accept responsibility or involvement in all public order or crime issues then citizen self-reliance must be encouraged and stimulated... This dependence, resulting in a total care society has become too expensive and needs to be changed (Supt. Buerger, EPS,1992).

There was little doubt that effective problem resolution would require the community. In broader terms the Service recognized that:

> The public must also take ownership of their communities. Effective community policing requires that the community become involved in problem identification, assessment and development of solutions. Solutions developed by the police and imposed on the community generally fail. Citizens must be encouraged to network within their communities and assume ownership of problem solving strategies (EPS,1997,35).

After all, if EPS was to decrease the number of calls and effectively respond to community needs, citizen responsibility would have an integral role. If Edmonton was to both enhance problem resolution and alleviate pressures confronting service delivery, community empowerment could not be ignored.

Edmonton's emphasis upon community empowerment and responsibility echoes neo-liberal arguments for a new contractual relationship between state and citizen which places an emphasis on self responsibility and a citizen's obligation to his/her own well-being. As with neo-liberal strategies, Edmonton's approach appears to be one wherein individuals and communities are offered "active involvement in action to resolve the kinds of issues hitherto held to be the responsibility of authorized governmental agencies" (Burchell, 1993,29). Moreover, it suggests an indirect response to crime and disorder wherein the resources and actions of the community are utilized. Furthermore, it suggests that disorder and problem solving are everybody's business rather than exclusively the business of the police (Shearing,1997).

The pursuit of improved customer service frequently punctuated the implementation objectives of the new service delivery model. Customer service consistently underscored Chief McNally's bimonthly editorials. For example:

> Community Based Policing is providing service which is both complete and of superior quality. The Edmonton Police Service and our community will benefit if we collectively care about the customer service that we each provide (From the Chief's Desk, September 3,1991).

One year later:

> Service is an integral cornerstone of community based policing. Policing is not just a job: it is a profession which requires a high degree of skill, dedication and loyalty. Customer service should be the focus of all EPS personnel; not just counter personnel, but all those who serve the public (From the Chief's Desk, September 29, 1992).

And in the final stages of implementing the new service model:

> Customer service is not confined to for-profit organizations. The Edmonton Police Service is in the business of providing quality customer service to the citizens of Edmonton. Quality of service is one of the key ingredients that differentiates excellent police work from mediocre (From the Chief's Desk, March 16,1993).

Throughout the restructuring process customer service served a dual purpose, first as a an operational objective and second as a means by which to measure service efficiency. For Edmonton, customer service was much more than just a rhetorical tool or a means of stimulating internal change. It was a correlate of efficiency. This is supported by the fact that in early 1992, EPS initiated annual citizen surveys for the purpose of measuring customer satisfaction, a measurement that emphasized an understanding of police/citizen relationships consistent with the customer/service interaction inherent to an enterprise culture.

By the end of 1994, Edmonton had accomplished its goal of institutionalizing community based policing. Empowerment, ownership, customer service and

decentralization were no longer foreign terms but intrinsic to the task of policing. Ownership had been decentralized to four Divisional zones with each implementing a strategy specific to their needs. Eighteen community stations were operating throughout the city, offering "customers" greater access. The new service delivery model proved its effectiveness. Calls for service had dropped from 485,309 in 1991 to 280,895 in 1994. Dispatched calls also showed a prominent reduction from 171,880 in 1991 to 109,282 in 1994 (EPS,1997). Furthermore, citizens continued to express their satisfaction with the level of service. Surveys indicated that between 1991 and 1994 there was a consistent growth in the numbers of citizens noting confidence in the EPS as opposed to those expressing dissatisfaction (See Appendix). The service also demonstrated a consistent reduction in the percent of consumed time per unit fielded[37]. That is, between 1992 and 1994, the time consumed by officers shifted from a reactive policing standard to community policing, thus allowing officers more time to initiate problem solving (See Appendix). All indicators lead to the conclusion that EPS had achieved its goal of implementing a shift from dependence to autonomy, decentralization and the marketization of services.

Edmonton's executive had avoided using superficial operational strategies and, in doing so, severed the service from the objectives and practices of the professional model . This was achieved by using community policing to frame the reform and drawing on the tenets of new public management to give coherency to the new

[37] "Consumed time includes travel and service time for dispatched calls. The more time officers spend on dispatched calls the less time they have to engage in proactive, community building and problem solving activities. Ultimately the patrol division becomes response driven and reactive as a result of prolonged periods of intense dispatching. Fifty percent consumed time per unit is the minimum service level that should be delivered to the citizens of Edmonton. It is however a very reactive level of service, not consistent with being committed to community needs. At 35% we

structure. Edmonton's efforts to improve the quality of service, improve service delivery and facilitate greater customer service were consistent with both public service restructuring and private sector managerial strategies. Edmonton sought to develop an organizational culture that emphasized quality, team work, feedback, assessment and customer orientation, all of which are consistent with the following private sector reform outcomes.

- Tracking success and progress: recognizing mistakes early and remedy quickly. A corollary of this is that mistakes are tolerated and not punished; they are a learning experience and can serve to improve long term performance.
- Improving employee participation and commitment : Within the organization, all employees are to be involved in problem identification and solutions.
- Improving communication inside the organization in particular, the patterns of communication and fundamental communication processes.
- A focus on the customer, on Quality and customer satisfaction: implies careful definition of customer and customers. All of which requires continuous efforts to refine quality and its measurement and should be an integral component of organizational activity.
- Improved Productivity: to be achieved through reduced duplication of services, innovation and improved resource utilization (Ingraham, 1995).

Interestingly, to this point Edmonton's restructuring was more reflective of broader national and international trends of public sector reform and private sector emulation with Alberta's political environment providing the impetus for reform simply through fiscal restraint. Certainly, the Getty government reinforced the bankruptcy of the professional model. However, in the early stages of reform Alberta's Provincial government did little to supply concrete examples or policy directives that would guide organizational reform. The focus had been predominantly one of fiscal downloading and budget cuts. Under Premier Ralph Klein's leadership, however, budget reductions would be combined with a transformation in the rules of provincial governance in an attempt to discipline Albertans for a new era of capitalism.

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have found officers are more inclined to seek out long term solutions to problems underlying the

Current and Future restructuring

Despite its accomplishments, 1994 proved to be a bittersweet year for the EPS as budgetary concerns continued to haunt the Service. With the Klein government's elimination of the municipal policing grant the service found itself in a state of crisis. In a statement delivered at an April 11th,1994 Police Commission meeting, Chief McNally outlined the situation in the following way:

> The Service is approximately eighty constables away from being entirely reactive, which could occur by year end if there is no recruitment by 1995. If the service lost these constables, community stations would be shut down, and officers would be taken off beats and out of ownership areas. The service would do nothing but respond to radio calls (McNally, Police Commission,1994).

In short, the service was in jeopardy of losing the benefits it had gained in restructuring. In an attempt to alleviate some of these fiscal concerns the service had already eliminated the rank of inspector and proposed revenue making programs such as a False Alarm by-law.[38] But the service continued to confront an increasingly bleak fiscal horizon. By 1996 the provincial policing grant would be reduced by 52% from its 1994 level and the municipal tax levy would also be reduced by $1.1 million dollars. The service was operating at its 1983 service compliment while the population of Edmonton had increased by a number equivalent to the population of the city of Red Deer (Lindsay, From the Chief, 1996). In 1997 further fiscal burdens would find their way onto the shoulders of the EPS. The municipality would find itself in a fiscal crisis due to a

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dispatches to which they respond, in other words to be proactive problem solvers" (EPS 1998).
[38] "In 1995, the Edmonton Police Service underwent further organizational restructuring. The Service eliminated a Deputy Chief position and several units were amalgamated following an organizational review. The objective of this restructuring was to enhance customer service and

new, provincially imposed, appraisal system for assessing property taxes. The loss to the city would amount to $40 million dollars in 1997 with a similar loss anticipated in subsequent years. To put this in context, Edmonton had faced a total loss in revenue of $37 million dollars between 1992 and 1996. The city would now be addressing a $40 million dollar revenue loss on an annual basis (Lindsay,1997). Unfortunately for the Edmonton Police Service, the reward for its organizational accomplishments was an unpredictable political and fiscal environment. Yet, the service had acquired some important resources. Its accomplishments of "enhanced community policing initiatives, a committed, creative and empowered workforce and quality customer service" would serve as a valuable foundation from which to implement a plan of attack (EPS,1996,3).

In 1995, after institutionalizing the tenets of community policing, Chief McNally retired, relinquishing the reins of the EPS to John Lindsay and his executive team. Quickly the executive team recognized the need for continued reform. As Chief Lindsay stated:

> In 1996, the Service acknowledged that fiscal restraint and rapidly changing external influences compel a shorter planning horizon than that charted by the original strategic plan. Recognizing that the environment was changing faster than planned for, the Executive Officers Team adjusted by creating the Edmonton Police Plan as the first step in establishing a vision which will guide the Service in the delivery of quality policing (EPS, The Police Plan, 1997,3).

The strategic premise of the Edmonton Police Plan was to refocus the Service's organizational skills in order to concentrate on a set of critical issues. Doing so would once more require wholesale change and a service wide effort. As the following statement notes, the tone of reform was to be inclusive of all sectors of the Service:

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eliminate administrative duplication, as well as to further flatten the organization" (Moore and

> Effective organizational change cannot be accomplished only at the borders. To be effective, it requires systematic and coordinated change that is orchestrated throughout the service. This orchestrated change requires careful planning, coordination, patience and learning from our experience (EPS, The Edmonton Police Plan: Strategic Vision, 1996,3).

And while reform would continue on a Service wide basis this did not mean the casting off of past reform outcomes of empowerment, diversity of response, decentralization and ownership. On the contrary, Chief Lindsay argued that given the fiscal environment confronting the EPS:

> All organizational divisions will be strongly encouraged to seek different, more efficient ways of organizing their personnel to enable greater productivity with existing resources. Giving responsibility to all members for ownership, community involvement and problem solving is only one example (From the Chief,1996,2).

In fact, empowerment, ownership and decentralization would form the basis of many of the Service's initiatives. They would prove to be essential tools in the continued task of developing an efficient Police Service in light of limited resources. The objective of decentralized service continued to hold currency. Moreover, it would continue to emphasize the role of the empowered community and the importance of sharing resources.

The synthesis of old and new : Edmonton's Police Plan

Edmonton's solution to increased fiscal restraint, demands for efficient service and threats to previous reform initiatives took shape in the guise of the 'Edmonton Police Plan'. The police plan was conceived as a guide by which Edmonton would set

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Veitch, 1997,8).

out clear Service goals, boundaries of accountability and methods of evaluation. As noted in the Police Plan's strategic vision:

> The creation of the Edmonton Police Plan is the first step in establishing a mutual and collective vision which guides the Service in the delivery of quality policing in this city for the next three years. The Edmonton Police Plan will evolve to include the principal components ordinarily associated with separate plans devoted to strategic issues, technology, communications, facilities, finances, and operations. It will not be shelf material (The Edmonton Police Plan,1996, 1).

Interestingly, a similar process of strategic planning, accountability and evaluation was taking shape in the provincial government with its implementation of three year business plans. As noted earlier provincial departments and agencies were to develop mission statements where objectives, spending targets, actions and methods of measuring outcomes would be outlined. Moreover, these business plans would serve as a mechanism of accountability, but more importantly empower departments and agencies to make decisions on how to implement reform objectives. Certainly similar traits can be noted in the operational process guiding Edmonton's Police Plan. Furthermore, the underlying premise of this process was the objective of implementing a decentralized service structure, whereby the responsibility for service could be downloaded to the Division and thus to the community.The operational premise of the Police Plan corresponds to Osborne and Gaebler's (1993) concept of steering and rowing in which the executive sets the objective or goal for the organization (steering) and empowers those who are most capable of delivering the service (rowing). Similarly Edmonton's Police Plan outlines a service delivery that requires a bottom-up are most capable of delivering the service (rowing). Similarly Edmonton's Police Plan outlines a service delivery that requires a bottom-up process wherein front-line officers, supervisors and mangers synthesize service wide plans into actions and standards. These Divisional actions and standards would be "negotiated with the Chief's Committee

for the purpose of planning, performance evaluation and accountability" (Lindsay, April 8,1997). The criteria by which these would be measured was based on whether or not they supported the goals of the EPS.

Critical Issue	Selected Criteria of of Evaluation	Strategies	Measurement Process
Making Edmonton a Safer City	Increased confidence in police	Multi-agency team building	Annual District/Division Survey
	Appropriate crime reports	A proactive focused media plan which includes our own publication	Divisional Commanders develop annual report on multi-agency building
	Decreased fear of crime	Targeting career criminals	Development of SHOCAP Plan
		Building citizen confidence	Media relations to develop annual plan for presentation to EOT
		Improving customer Service	
Shortage of Resources	Minimum Staffing plan	Patrol Divisions to set minimum staffing requirements	Divisional staffing report by June 1996
	Ideal Staffing plan	Patrol Divisions to set ideal staffing requirements	Annual Recruitment report by April 1996
		Remaining Divisions to set minimum staffing requirements	Develop Ownership Report by January 1997
		Remaining Divisions to set ideal staffing requirements	
		Recruit beyond established strength	
		Give ownership responsibility to all personnel	
Customer Service, Roles and Expectations	Excellence in Customer Service	Evaluate the use of technology as it relates to customer service	
		Recognition of Excellence in Customer Service	
		Determine expectations of customers and take steps to meet them	
Family Issues Violence and Prevention	Positively impact on dysfunctional families	Appoint family violence prevention coordinator	
	Create strategic alliances internally and externally	Coordinator to review and report on appropriate organizational structure	
Rewards, Recognition, Career planning, Organizational health	Employee recognition	Develop broad recognition strategy	

	Career Planning	Create healthy work environments
	Organizational health	
Evaluation Methodology and Perceptions	Standardize problem-solving process	Revise problem solving form
		Annual consultations with community stakeholders

Source EPS: The Edmonton Police Plan 1996-1998

Edmonton's Police Plan set out six critical issues that were to guide Service and Divisional initiatives, criteria for evaluation, strategies for achievement and measurements of success. In order to ensure that the Plan would achieve its objectives, a framework of Actions for Success was implemented.

Actions for Success were a means by which the Executive could evaluate how each unit, division and department was implementing a strategic process to achieve the desired outcomes associated to each critical issue. As outlined in the Police Plan:

> The actions will define who we are and what we do. It will identify unique characteristics of our Service and provide a mechanism to chart our growth and progress into the future (The Police Plan: Policing for Results 1997,16).

Evaluating "Actions for Success" consisted of measuring seven criteria. Each unit was to apply these criteria to initiatives corresponding with the six critical issues. The criteria of evaluation consisted of:

- Function Priority: what critical issue do these initiatives correspond with
- Goal: the intended result; the objective of the resources or strategy utilized by the Division or Unit
- Standard: what is the benchmark that the objective is to meet or exceed
- Strategies: plans and courses of action developed as means to achieve the intended goal

- Performance Indicators: how are these initiatives to be evaluated; a means for measuring the success or shortcomings of strategies
- Target dates: Projected completion dates for each strategy
- Accountability: who are the individuals/positions responsible for the attainment of these goals; how do the results relate to the critical issues. (The Police Plan: Policing for Results 1997, 16) [39]

Actions for Success would be evaluated at intervals of six months by a board review set up by the Chief's Committee. As noted by Chief Lindsay "the process was to be constructive and helpful and only rarely remedial" (From the Chief, April 8,1997).

At the most fundamental level of determining the Plan's success, however, was the support of EPS service members. As the Police Plan's directional statement indicates:

> Organizational accountability will therefore be measured by our ability to make the plan real. It is everyone's job to be aware of the Police Plan and contribute to it. Make it YOUR plan (EPS, The Police Plan,1997,6).

There was little doubt that internal empowerment and ownership where considered essential and required ongoing encouragement. Service members were encouraged as early as 1996 to take an active role in the Police Plan. Chief Lindsay stated:

> I want to strongly encourage every member and employee to take a personal interest and role in implementing the Plan. We have a great deal of work to accomplish and your continued support and contributions are vital (From the Chief, February 13,1996).

[39] See appendix for example of Actions for Success

This encouragement continued with Chief Lindsay's 1997 directional statement wherein he suggests; "every member must therefore find the opportunities to become fully involved in supporting these six critical issues" (The Police Plan: Policing for Results 1997, 6). The encouragement of empowerment and ownership was not limited to this one passage but was frequently articulated throughout the directional statement. For example :

> The best service for customers will, of course, be given when all members understand what is expected of them and how they can support the six critical issues. Each organizational unit of the EPS will be required to support this priority by developing "Actions for Success" that defines the roles and expectations of the unit, the standards of service they will apply and the performance indicators that will evidence their success (Ibid. 7).

And further:

> we want to encourage all employees to take on ownership of problems, problem solving and community building, as a personal obligation on behalf of the EPS. Together, we own policing in Edmonton. Each of us is an asset to the Service, ...and collectively we are a community asset (Ibid. 8).

Empowerment and ownership remained integral in operationalizing Edmonton's Police Plan. As the previous quotes make clear, the relationship between rank and file officer support and achievement of Service goals was not one that would be left to chance or good faith. Instead, the Police Plan explicitly evaluated compliance with its objectives at all organizational layers. Evaluation was differentiated in the following manner:

- all Edmonton Police Service personnel will support and promote the appropriate and relevant Critical Issues in their work. Supervisors should reflect Critical Issues initiatives on Performance Evaluations, in the promotion process, Divisional and other forms of recognition and

- Divisional Superintendents will be accountable to the Chief's Committee for the progress of their Division's work, consistent with agreed upon goals, standards and strategies (EPS, The Police Plan,1997,15).

Further, the Chief's Committee was to implement a Board interview process wherein *Divisional Commanders would report on the success of their initiatives related to service* delivery (Lindsay, From the Chief, 1997).

The onus for instilling the Plan's objectives within the work of the service did not, however, rest solely with front-line officers and their immediate superiors. Indeed, the framework for evaluation sought to involve all organizational layers in operationalizing the Plan. As Chief Lindsay notes in his introduction to the 'Edmonton Police Plan - Policing For Results 1997', evaluating outcomes of the strategic plan would also entail an assessment of the Plan itself. To that end, the following criteria were to be assessed. Does the plan:

- encourage innovation and creativity
- strive for success with a tolerance for failure
- promote personal and professional growth
- recognize and reward employee contributions
- foster freedom of expression and open communication
- advocate equality of treatment
- encourage teamwork and participation in decision making
- inspire trust in employees

(Lindsay,1997,5).

While the Police Plan sought to achieve specific outcomes and to integrate officers in its achievement, the key guidepost remained the Service's commitment to

community policing initiatives. This commitment was clearly acknowledged in Chief Lindsay's Statement: 'community policing is not just rhetoric to me or my management team. It is fundamental to our future vision of the service' (From the Chief, January 27,1998). Given this understanding Edmonton proceeded to synthesize a variety of "the best ideas embodied in contemporary policing" (Edmonton Police Plan,1996,1). Problem solving, community involvement and interagency partnership were highlighted as those which should be refined. As the Police Plan's strategic vision noted:

> We must create realistic public expectations, and involve the public in helping themselves. We must connect with other agencies, even for-profit corporations and encourage them to become stakeholders with us (Edmonton Police Plan,1996,3).

Suggesting the need for a further synthesis between community involvement and problem solving the Strategic Vision goes on to indicate:

> Individual communities have individual problems, and we have strived to create and apply a generic a problem solving approach to all communities. This is the institutional approach to problem solving...There is an untapped strength in bringing more of these community assets and resources together, more frequently and more informally, to solve local problems and therefore, to maintain an independent local ability to sustain a real long-term problem solving approach to neighbourhoods (Ibid.).

The continued commitment to community policing and particularly the refinement of specific components was due, in part, to the perceived benefit each component held for the success of Service initiatives. As the Plan noted:

- The unit of police work is a problem, not just an incident. Problem solving is therefore the ultimate manifestation of effective policing.
- The community, however community needs to be defined, is a full partner with the Service in community building. Together, the development of preventative strategies

in an environment of attention to social problems and community issues improves neighbourhoods.

- Other agencies and institutions have skills, authorities and resources which the Service must learn to access. (Edmonton Police Plan 1996,2).

The Executive sought to reinforce the relationship between the Service and the community so that the community could be continually called upon to assist in the task of order maintenance. The executive articulated a relationship whereby the community was to be utilized, empowered and mined as a resource.

So, where is Edmonton?

In retrospect , Edmonton's Police Plan clearly emulated practices and strategies occurring in the realm of public sector restructuring. The Service wide objectives of the Police Plan coupled with a reliance on decentralized initiatives and empowerment of front-line officers reflected the steering /rowing dynamics of Osborne and Gaebler's concept of public service management. The broad Service objectives of the Police Plan served as a directive for Units and Divisions; a directive that is very similar to that of the business plans outlined by Provincial Departments. As with Provincial Departments, the actions of each Unit or Division were evaluated in terms of their support for the broad objectives set by the executive. Similarly, decentralization shifted responsibility for the achievement of these broad objectives to the newly empowered units and departments.

Edmonton's Police Plan articulates a strategy inclusive of performance indicators and standards in order to raise public service quality and a process of ongoing evaluation. In more generic terms it is a model that supports the basic principles of measuring results, putting the customer in the driver's seat, introducing a market orientation and decentralization. Still, although the rhetoric of customer service guided

the actions of the Service, citizen responsibility and a reliance on community partnerships were also key components of the reform initiative, corresponding with public service initiatives of responsibilization. The linkage between the public sector reform mantra of accountability, efficiency and effectiveness and the Service's objectives of decentralization and citizen responsibility is readily apparent.

So how successful was the Service in operationalizing its various objectives? The commitment to community policing has remained an institutional imperative. As Deputy Chief Vann noted, "community based policing is just the way the service does business" (Interview February 26,1998). This institutionalized reality was echoed by front-line officers, divisional managers and the executive staff. Certainly there is a consistent understanding that community policing was a "broad, organized and systemic approach to policing" (Interview, EPS Sgt., February 27,1998). Differences arise, however, in the interpretation of what community policing represents and the purpose it serves. The frequently cited understanding of community policing by those officers interviewed was a means by which the community and police could work in partnership to address core problems within the community. This understanding supports a shift of responsibility onto the community. There was also a common acknowledgment that community policing enabled the Service to cope with fewer resources. One constable aptly articulated this understanding:

> Community policing is a shift to doing more with less. Originally community policing had to do with going out to the community but because of limited resources it has shifted to having the community come to the police. The community is now more involved and this relieves the pressure from the reactive process (February 26,1998).

Here, community policing is a mechanism by which both the Police Service and the community are disciplined. Furthermore, it supports a practice of fiscal austerity through downloading. The community is expected to take an active and responsible role in the task of order maintenance. Community policing was also viewed in terms of an ongoing process. It was felt by many that if the Service was to remain committed to Community policing, the Service members and Executive must continue to innovate and not become complacent.

Reflecting a need to avoid Service stasis Superintendent B. Yaremko indicated that while the Service had indeed "entrenched community based policing it now needed to go back to practices that were effective before the transition occurring over the last year" (Interview, February 25,1998). The need for an evolving understanding of community policing is further illustrated in a S/Sgt's comment, "community based policing requires a process of ongoing implementation. It requires a constant change in definition of what the Service is doing and a changing definition of the community" (Interview, February 18,1998).

The challenge facing the Service, then, was one of continued energy and innovation. In April 1997 a voluntary severance package was offered to senior officers. As a result 100 senior members retired, leaving behind a leadership vacuum. This loss of personnel contributed to a diminished level of energy within the leadership ranks and a mistaken belief among front-line officers that the Service lacked direction. At the same time, however, this generational shift also served a cleansing process for the service as it rid the service of older officers well ensconced in the paramilitary model of policing. Many of these officers were skeptical about the concepts of empowerment, problem solving and ownership. By January of 1998 the severance package had been

implemented and the promotional process had been completed. Officers of the new leadership cohort were trained in the process of problem solving and were dedicated adherents to community-based policing and the principles of new public management. As Superintendent Duggan suggested "things would now shift due to the fact that the *critical mass of the converted were now in positions of management*" (February 10,1998).

There is little doubt that the Service had institutionalized the concepts of ownership and empowerment. It was apparent from interviews with front line officers and platoon sergeants that these concepts were actively practiced. As one Sgt. stated, " the members under my command are given 100% freedom to do the job. There are certain expectations placed on the members but they are given full responsibility to work on a variety of problems" (Interview, February 17,1998). In support of this approach another Sgt. noted that:

> I allow my members the flexibility and autonomy to get the job done. I cut them loose and give them lots of slack. I allow my members to make mistakes. I facilitate an atmosphere that will bring about solutions (Interview, February 18,1998).

Nurturing an environment of ownership and empowerment was not limited to middle management or front line management. As suggested by Superintendent B. Yaremko, "the service has many skilled community policing practitioners. It is my role to support these members in their practices. I will allow individuals to make mistakes" (Interview, February 25,1998).

Although it is apparent that the Service embraced the practice of empowering its members there is also concern that the Executive has become less aware of the Service's internal needs. For as one S/Sgt. states:

> the Executive needs to recognize they are addressing two communities, an internal one (the Service) and the external (the broader community). The internal community needs to be looked after as well as the external (Interview, February 17,1998).

This is echoed by another S/Sgt. who further suggests that "the Executive level must understand the differences not only in terms of the broad community but also within the Service" (Interview, February 18,1998). The impetus for these concerns lay in the Executive's continued downloading of responsibility on to Service members without recognizing the pressure and demands already present. Empowerment and ownership were positive objectives but acknowledgement that Service members required greater support was also necessary. This meant treating service members as customers and also acknowledging their needs and concerns. The Service had developed a market oriented relationship not only with community, but also within its own organization. Internal Service relations had been renegotiated in a manner characteristic of an enterprise culture. The empowered rank and file viewed themselves as customers in a position to influence and direct the nature of specific services.

Service members readily voiced their needs with respect to the lack of consistent and ongoing training in problem solving, ownership or basic community policing strategies. The general tone of those officers interviewed was that training specific to community based policing was infrequently and largely confined to recruits. This lack of coherent community policing training left the impression that the Service was not fully committed to community policing. One explanation for the inconsistency in training was that, as of 1998, a large percentage of Service personnel were junior with approximately five years service. These officers would have been trained in a curriculum based on problem solving and community policing philosophies. The training of the remaining officers would have been limited to the initial training process undertaken in early 1992.

The training section, having recognized this differential, began, in the spring of 1998, to redevelop the curriculum in order to address these concerns. Training section commander S/Sgt. Rick Gagnon, indicated that the new curriculum would redirect its attention to the members' understanding of community policing. "It will look at how the current curriculum develops these concepts and what can be done to improve these. The future curriculum will be such that the process of problem solving and community policing will be woven into existing programs related to interagency and partnership development" (Interview, February 25,1998). But as noted by one constable "there is an immediate need to offer on-going training for senior officers, especially those who received the initial two day training during early implementation stages, as these officers are now in management positions" (Interview, February 25,1998).

An alternate explanation for the inconsistency in training is budgetary restraint. In an attempt to address changing needs and resources, the training section was shifting from a traditional five year strategic plan to one more consistent with an annual review process. Further, budgetary restraint suggested the need to utilize collaborative efforts in training and to acknowledge the importance of interagency efforts. The bottom line remained that the Service was facing a crisis of training while also confronting a dramatic reduction in required resources. The Service would need to revisit officer needs and address these needs at all levels.

In addition to training concerns surrounding the lack of communication, both in terms of inter-divisional and intra-divisional networks was also prevalent within the Service. Decentralizing to the divisional level had resulted in a reduced flow of information shared between Divisions. This was considered a critical issue particularly with respect to the application of problem solving initiatives. And yet one constable

indicated "the Divisions have achieved a level of decentralization, but this has recently proven to be a detriment to the sharing of best practices (problem solving) between Divisions" (Interview, February 16,1998). One Sgt. argued "problem solving is not being utilized to its fullest capacity because of this lack of communication. Officers are left to find out information on their own. In part, this perpetuates a problem of issues being shifted from neighbourhood to neighbourhood" (Interview, February 17,1998). Decentralization had created an environment where Divisions were perceived as separate police services and, consequently, had limited the sharing of information between Service members. Superintendent B. Yaremko suggested that "Divisional Commanders need to become more aware of where they are in relation to Service goals. These people need to find out where the Service is going and clarify their roles" (interview, February 25,1998).

Although these concerns were significant, the Service evinced an overweaning desire to address current problems and to move into the next stage of management. It was felt that the environment was once more ripe for innovative change. While fiscal restraint and a potential slide toward a reactive status due to the VSP's (Voluntary Severance Package) imposed reduction in Service members were certainly concerns, an atmosphere of optimism remained. The initiatives that the EPS were subsequently to develop would lead "toward community development, restorative justice, continued partnerships and smaller initiatives accenting the structure and practices already ingrained in the Service" (Chief Lindsay, March 3,1998). The Service was prepared to actively pursue a relationship with the community based on decentralized service and an expectation that the community would shoulder greater responsibility for order maintenance.

Conclusion

Among the most interesting aspects of Edmonton's restructuring is its wholesale nature. Operational and organizational change did not occur as a process of simply adding on programs but, rather of clearing the slate and beginning with a new concept. In order to facilitate this process the Executive utilized managerial techniques consistent with private sector models. By the end of 1994, Edmonton's organizational objectives and implementation process did, indeed reflect characteristics of corporate sector models and neo-liberal rationalities. Empowerment, ownership, customer service and citizen inclusion became foundation stones in Edmonton's restructuring process. Throughout the early stages of restructuring, efficiency and effectiveness served as not only the credo of change but the yardstick by which outcomes were measured. The pursuit of efficient service drove the wholesale restructuring of Edmonton's operational structure.

Edmonton's early restructuring outlined a framework of flexibility and adaptability that would serve future innovation. Certainly as the political environment of Alberta continued its transition toward neo-liberalism, this flexibility would be an asset. As Edmonton Police Service pursued its operational slalom through fiscal and political obstacles one could clearly note the strategies of empowerment, decentralization and business planning. Furthermore, while the Service sidestepped municipal and provincial downloading it instituted its own version by way of ownership and community partnerships. EPS also emulated the Provincial implementation of business plans

wherein objectives and outcomes could be monitored. Clearly Edmonton's Police Plan fits neatly with the decentralized business plans of the Klein government.

In closing, Edmonton's restructuring success is due in part to the service wide manner in which it was undertaken, an internal environment conducive to broad structural change and an Executive willing to utilize alternate managerial techniques. Moreover, Edmonton was successful in avoiding narrow definitions of community and, in doing so, was able to solicit wide ranging support for empowerment, fiscal downloading and responsibilization. The quick transition to a decentralized service structure, coupled with a negotiated relationship with Edmontonians supported a wholesale process of reform. Furthermore, it set in place a structural and operational foundation from which to cushion the Service during Ralph Klein's disciplining of Alberta. Edmonton's decentralized service structure, emulation of private sector managerialism and empowerment of the community would be consistent with Klein's efforts to prepare Alberta for a new era of governance.

CHAPTER THREE

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The RCMP in Alberta

> Modern institutions must keep pace with the changes surrounding them. The RCMP has embarked upon a journey of organizational renewal several years ago... The years ahead signal continued alignment of the organization's priorities with those of government (and ultimately, of taxpayers), supported by cultural and structural changes (RCMP Commissioner J. Murray, 1999).

The RCMP has a unique role in our national sensibility of policing. Images of the red serge, musical ride, rugged frontiersmen, protectors of law and order in Western Canada and international peace keeping are key elements of our national policing psyche. Unfortunately, the APEC inquiry, the Airbus investigation, the commercialization of the RCMP image (Disneyfication), financial concerns and apparent service wide poor morale have diverted our attention from the RCMP's broad history. Still, we are ignoring in our acceptance of these older images, that the Service has undergone a decade of transition, one that has been guided by a variety of assumptions, political reforms and managerial calculations. Existing research gives little attention to the fact that external variables have in fact contributed to a disjointed process of organizational reform. Analysis of the Service's early attempts to confront the political winds of change suggests the RCMP were strategically unprepared and, as a result, instinctually fell back upon old structural and cultural assumptions. Disappointingly, reform was hindered by the Service's broad mandate encompassing

Federal, Provincial and Municipal policing responsibilities[40] and an organizational belief that little was required in terms of structural change. It would not be until the mid 1990's that the Service would, after a period of internal reflection, recognize the need for organizational and managerial renewal. Eventually, as with other police services, the RCMP would root its reform in community policing and au courant models of corporate management. Unfortunately, community based policing would be implemented not because it represented a new found commitment to citizen involvement and democratic participation in governance, but because of an ideological commitment to reducing the size of government and emulating the private sector.

This chapter examines this range of reform initiatives first from the perspective of broad RCMP organizational shifts and then within the context of contract policing in the Province of Alberta (K-Division). The Alberta experience is unique for a number of reasons, but perhaps the most compelling is the political environment through which RCMP reform was guided; an environment articulated by the neo-liberal agendas of both the Federal and Provincial Governments. The imposition of Federal and Provincial governance agendas placed Alberta's RCMP in a compromising situation both fiscally and organizationally. While "K" Division can be understood in terms of a semi-autonomous organizational unit it was and remains situated within the potentially fractious dynamics of federalist politics in Canada. Diverse, and yet ideologically similar, centers of influence prodded and shaped both the organizational and managerial character of the RCMP within Alberta. This has resulted in an organization characterized by 3 year strategic business plans, corporate organizational models,

[40] " The RCMP enforces provincial statutes and municipal by-laws in all provinces and territories with the exception of Ontario and Quebec, which have their own provincial police, and those

organizational and cultural reform based on the commodification of police service governance. "K" Division' s navigation of these federal and provincial directives has garnered both distressing and innovative stages of reform.

And while this general direction of reform continues, it is important to indicate that current organizational structures and practices are, in fact, a synthesis of two realms of political influence. In order to articulate this synthesis I begin by outlining RCMP reform initiatives in the context of Federal directives and political trends beginning in 1984 and then superimpose reform initiatives onto the political geography of Alberta post 1993.

Looking Down the Barrel of Reform

Early rumblings of organizational reform did not originate in the offices of RCMP headquarters but were given life and guidance by the conservative government of Brian Mulroney. Responding to international economic pressures and following the political examples set by the leaders of Great Britain and the United States, Mulroney began a systematic shift toward neo-liberal policies. The prominent orientation of this shift was the dismantling of the welfare state and subsequent delegitimization of the public sector, a dismantling which included attacks upon "big government" and unwieldy bureaucracies. The rationale for this orientation was supported by laissez-faire doctrine, which suggests that the state's influence in the lives of individuals should be minimized. Underlying this orientation is the policy objective of limiting government intervention and restricting its task to that of enforcing general rules, "rules which broadly protect, life,

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portions of of Newfoundland and Labrador policed by the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary. The

liberty and estate" (Held, in McBride and Shields, 1997,29). Corresponding to this attack upon big government was an initiative to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the bureaucracy while undermining the centralized control of bureaucrats.

In 1984 the Conservative Government launched a Ministerial Task Force on Program Review with the objective of overhauling government programs "so that they would be simpler, more understandable and more accessible to their clientele and that decision making should be decentralized as far as possible to those in direct contact with client groups" (Aucoin,1995,128). The task force did little to reduce the number of programs but what it did stimulate was a renewed rhetorical commitment to reductions in operating costs and the size of the public service (Ibid.). Emerging from this invigorated rhetoric was the implementation of the Conservative government's program of Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability (IMAA). The goal of the IMAA was to enhance the managerial authority and capacity of deputy ministers in their allocation of resources. While the IMAA created a level of decentralized decision making at the ministerial level, the IMAA was limited and showed little political or strategic guidance in restructuring or reforming the public service (Aucoin,1995). The federal public service continued to flounder, due in part, to a continued assault by the political leadership without any true attempt by the government to formulate a clear strategy of reform.

By 1989, the ineffectiveness of the reform rhetoric was sufficiently acute that senior bureaucrats, under the guidance of the Clerk of the Privy Council, Paul Tellier, began a concerted effort to develop a strategic plan for public service renewal (Aucoin, 1995). This effort was bolstered by the initiatives of the Public Policy Forum, a joint private sector-public sector venture set up to champion the cause of good government.

RCMP also enfoces federal statutes in all provinces" (Solicitor General, 23,1991).

Given the source of these suggestions the Mulroney government supported the launch of reform initiatives that were articulated under the banner of Public Service 2000 (Ibid.). Initially, Public Service 2000 was to instill, within the ranks of senior managers, a culture of change that would eventually trickle down through the ranks of the public service. Interestingly, this approach to reforming the bureaucratic culture of the public service paralleled trends within the private sector. As Aucoin suggests:

> Program renewal, while not inspired by the central tenets of the "total quality movement" and other management movements then fashionable, was subsequently cast in a way that linked its proposals to these private sector schemes (1997,130).

While the government gave verbal support to Public Service 2000 the reform program was undermined by the continual political demands for fiscal restraint and the reduction of public service staff. Strategic guidance was not available from the government and as a result the public service appeared to lurch from one management model to the next. Reform initiatives were not "connected to any major plan for alternative organizational designs that might serve as a basis for altering behaviour" (Ibid. 131). This does not mean, however, that Public Service 2000 was ineffectual in forwarding organizational reform. In fact, it entrenched the rhetoric of empowering public servants and articulated a managerial framework that supported the decentralization of responsibility and accountability. This was particularly beneficial with respect to the Treasury Board's attempt to emulate Australia's "running costs" budgetary model wherein departments would be allocated lump budgets from which they were given the flexibility to allocate resources to their particular needs (Ibid.). Departmental management of budgets could only be successful if it was facilitated by an

organizational culture that embraced empowerment and the decentralization of responsibility.

Although, early Public Service 2000 initiatives were limited in their overall effect upon organizational change, they did provide philosophical and practical harbingers of a concrete framework for public service reform. This framework would prove critical to the eventual public service overhaul undertaken by Prime Minister Kim Campbell and eventually the Liberal government of Jean Chretien. Public Service 2000's inception heralded the need for the public service to improve citizen and user access to information, to make services more user-friendly through streamlined administrative processes, and to establish partnerships with users and other agencies (Ibid.). It also forecast the emulation of the philosophical and pragmatic reform models of corporate sector management.

The embrace of corporate management models is borne out by the evidence the leadership within the various departments and agencies championed "the adoption – formally and informally of total quality management principles" (Aucoin, 1995,199). Decentralization, client focus, empowerment, partnerships and ownership were now the building blocks of the federal public service. Moreover, once these principles had been embraced at the senior bureaucratic level there was little chance that these management concepts would be ignored. Managerial reform became infectious moving from department to department well into the mid 1990's.

As with other federal agencies, the RCMP would face demands for managerial and organizational reform. The measuring stick of effectiveness, fiscal accountability and client based service was also held up to the RCMP in order to assess its need for organizational reform. One symptom indicating the need for attention was a budget that

had doubled from $471 million in 1979-80 to $1,052.5 million in the fiscal year 1988-89. Budget concerns continued to raise flags as expenditures ballooned from $1,052.5 million to $1,641.4 million in the fiscal year 1991-92 (Bailey,1991, Solicitor General of Canada, 1992). The remedy for this perceived budgetary crisis would come through the imposition of the deep fiscal cuts associated with the 1992 Federal Government review.[41]

While fiscal conservatism underlined the impetus for reform, hints of organizational and managerial shifts within the RCMP could be noted as early as the fiscal year 1989-90. The Solicitor General's 1989-90 annual report articulated a shift to corporate management which was to permit "a corporate level approach to strategic and resource planning, financial management, audit, public affairs and other areas" (1990,21). In the Solicitor-General's 1990-91 annual report these managerial restructuring initiatives were furthered through the RCMP's inclusion within the Federal Government's Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS). This system of management required all government departments and agencies to set out an "Operational Plan Framework" by which the Treasury Board could survey agency operations and thus impose a stringent criteria of fiscal accountability.

Like many other Federal departments incorporating PEMS, the RCMP presented an operational plan endorsing corporate sector strategies of amalgamation, downsizing and decentralization[42]. A key component of the 1990-91 operational plan was the Service's commitment to implement a Service wide community policing strategy.

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[41] . As I will note later, budgetary cuts would trickle down to the Divisional and Detachment level. In the context of 'K' Division, this would translate into a $5.4 million budget cut with further budget reductions of 5% being levied in the fiscal years 1996-97 and 1997-98 (Bowlby,1999).

Community policing was the strategy by which to structure a streamlined, fiscally efficient service, a strategy that would enable the RCMP to emulate the private sector. Unfortunately however, this initiative would fall short of its objectives in the early stages of reform. While operationalization of the strategic plan was to be Service wide, implementation was inconsistent and operationally underdeveloped. As noted in the 1990-91 Solicitor General's annual report, Community policing, had not "been uniformly adopted across the RCMP, nor had all the necessary organizational changes been made to support a Service wide community policing approach" (Sol-Gen, 1991,25).

The RCMP's weak start out of the restructuring blocks was largely due to its inability to transfer generic Federal restructuring objectives to the existing organizational structure and function of the Service. And yet, the problem is also a deeper one to the extent that restructuring was not simply cosmetic but involved a profound reorientation of policing culture. It isn't all that surprising that the start was weak. At this point the RCMP did not realize that such a profound change was necessary. In fact they thought they already emulated these managment prescriptions because of the detachment model. It quickly became apparent that broad public service objectives could not be applied in a generic fashion, particularly to the existing organizational and operational dynamics of the RCMP. Some form of customization would be required.

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[42] One example of amalgamation is the compacting of the Community Based/Contract Policing Directorate, Crime Prevention/Victim Services Branch and the Aboriginal Policing Services Directorate into the compact Community and Aboriginal Policing Directorate.

Customizing the RCMP

In October 1990 Solicitor General Pierre Cadieux introduced the discussion paper "Police Challenge 2000: A Vision of the Future of Policing in Canada". As this was an initiative of the Federal Solicitor General it did not transcend the provincial jurisdiction and although it could not be enforced elsewhere, the RCMP would have to respond. This document had a profound impact upon the operational, philosophical and structural shift of the RCMP. Its directional tone was unmistakably reflective of corporate sector models of reform. Private sector jargon and strategies filled the text of this document. Paul Palango notes:

> The Discussion paper was larded with the kind of American technocratic ideas and Harvard Business School buzzwords and phrases that have been so seductive to the business elite over the years: total quality, core values, empowerment, partnerships, excellence, risk taking, conflict resolution, ownership and user pay systems (1998,125).

Although this customization of policing encompassed a tone reminiscent of private sector reorganization, the specificity of its policing context was also apparent. Here the rhetoric and philosophy of community policing framed the strategic model from which reform was to evolve. The transformation of police services would occur through the implementation of community policing. Old hierarchical organizational structures and bureaucratic empires consistent with the existing police management would fade once the implementation of community policing occurred. As noted in Police Challenge 2000:

> Police organizations will be transformed. They will become more open and accountable, less hierarchical, allow greater responsibility and autonomy for front line officers and be based increasingly on the mission of solving local problems in partnership with the community (1990, v).

Pierre Cadieux lauded community policing as the savior of Canadian policing, asserting that it offered an effective strategy for the future. With Police Challenge 2000 Cadieux encouraged Canada's Chiefs of Police to "get on with the business of systematically implementing community policing" (Cadieux, cited in Seagrave 1995,164). But moreover, the Chiefs of Police were also urged to embrace corporate sector models of management. In Police Challenge 2000, Cadieux prodded police managers to shape the restructuring of policing in a manner similar to those reforms taking shape within the Federal public sector. Policing was to shed the vestiges of past public service privilege and structures and view itself in terms consistent with those of the private sector. This argument is apparent in the introductory paragraphs of "Police Challenge 2000" wherein it states:

> Police organizations in the future will, much like private organizations, pursue excellence. They will no longer be stagnant and assume that funding will be stable or constantly increasing and that the public will remain supportive but passive. Total quality service is now being demanded. Further, quality service must be delivered within the context of a lean department because fiscal constraints are expected to be ever present in the future (1990,1).

This tone of operating police services as a business was echoed throughout the "Challenge" document. It can be argued that Cadieux set in motion an agenda that would continue to frame the structures, culture and strategy of policing within a private sector enterprise model.[43] And while community policing was wrapped in the rhetoric of

[43] The concept of treating police services as a business or at least seeking the assistance of business models to address operational ineffectiveness had been floating around Canadian police circles since the early 1980s. An example of this can be noted in a speech given by the Hon Rene Marin during a Canadian Police College Workshop in June of 1982. His presentation "Management Under Financial Restraint" frequently suggested that police managers look to the business world for solutions to their organizational shortcomings. He states: "Where does the police department turn when it is hit by economic reality? I suggest that the best place to start

better responsiveness, the objective was not really better governance through enhanced community participation, but rather, better governance as a product of private sector emulation and fiscal austerity. Combining community policing and business analogies became increasingly popular with administrators and politicians who were consistently facing diminished funds and heightened pressure for effective public service (Palango,1998). Not surprisingly, the RCMP was a primary target.

Under the direction of Commissioner Norm Inkster, the RCMP operationalized the concepts articulated by Police Challenge 2000 in the 1991 Strategic Action Plan for the Implementation of Community based Policing. As director of Interpol and Commissioner of the RCMP, Inkster was familiar with the workings and philosophy of community policing and clearly appreciated the correlation between business models and community policing. In a 1992 article written for the trade publication "The Police Chief", Inkster articulated the need to undertake a variety of private sector practices in order to successfully implement community policing. Suggestions such as the flattening of the bureaucracy, greater autonomy and authority to the front-line, increased ownership, problem-solving and a reliance on community partnership were central components of Inkster's argument. Predictably, these concepts not only punctuated the "Police Challenge 2000" document but were consistent with those percolating throughout private sector management reform models.

Yet despite the RCMP command's rhetorical commitment to and philosophical understanding of community policing, from an implementation stance there was little sense of the direction or manner in which the process of reorganization was to occur.

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looking for profitable lessons is the business world" (1997,2). Interestingly, many of the points he highlights, such as decentralization, empowerment and total quality service, are echoed in the document "Police Challenge 2000".

S/Sgt Jack Briscoe notes that early stages of implementation took on the moniker "if you decree it, it shall happen" (Interview, 1999). In other words, the command seemed to be operating under the belief that they only need voice the broad concepts and philosophy of their reform objectives for the troops to give them shape. With respect to the implementation of community policing this belief was predictable, due in part, to the administration's conviction, that empowerment, community partnerships and problem solving were what the RCMP had always done by the nature of policing in a detachment environment. As indicated in the Solicitor General's 1988-89 annual report:

> The detachment is the front line unit with which the force ultimately performs its policing responsibilities. It is therefore the foundation on which the force builds its resource requirements. Detachments are generally the first contact between citizens and the police, and they represent approximately 60 per cent of actual resources. They are the focus of attention in crime prevention programs and are the most visible uniformed police presence... The philosophy of detachment policing is based on the Community Based Policing model. This model asserts that the community involvement is an integral part of policing (1989,25).

Given this understanding of the RCMP operational structure and practice, the administration felt the Service was well on its way to achieving the specific goals set out by "Challenge 2000". Unfortunately, what was to actually happen was a massive downloading of responsibility onto the shoulders of the officers and administrators at the detachment level without a corresponding transfer of fiscal resources. Reform was foisted on the backs of the detachments and framed in the rhetoric of enhanced governance through decentralization, ownership and empowerment. The workings of this strategy however, had little to do with citizen empowerment and police responsiveness. Instead, decentralization represented a quick fix for the achievement of budgetary reductions. As one constable stated "decentralization is fine, but if you are

not going to give us any support then how can you expect us to do the work and implement the programs that need to be implemented" (Olansky, Interview,1999).

In the initial stages of structural reorganization, the implementation of community policing did little to shift the RCMP from its paramilitary, centrally controlled structure. Early implementation of community policing was more an attempt to structure a policing strategy that would in some fashion emulate operational and managerial realignment consistent with Federal public service organizational objectives. Reform initiatives were not perceived as a means for altering operations or behaviour. Rather, they were perceived as a means of coping with budget reductions (RCMP,1995,ii). In large part, this was achieved through a wholesale downloading of fiscal responsibility onto the detachment with very little true managerial or structural realignment of its centralized bureaucracy.

The RCMP quickly fell prey to the Government's agenda to develop a public service that would provide a simple, more understandable and accessible service. It was felt that by simply adopting the philosophical tenets of community policing Federal Government reform objectives could be met. It would not be until 1995 that the Service would recognize that it had missed a number of crucial pieces in the reform puzzle.

Downloading to the Community

While the Federal Government's reform agenda had immediate implications for the Service, the communities served by the RCMP would also be impacted by the Government's underlying reform objectives. The strategic maneuver of downloading to the detachment level would play into the Government's overarching goal of reducing expenditures as a means of addressing deficits. Decentralization, integral to community policing, had implications for the community and also offered the potential for

downloading responsibility. Here, the community[44] was expected to take on an active responsibility for policing itself and to become more proactive in the issues of crime control. This role is articulated in the Solicitor General's 1990-91annual report wherein it states:

> Community policing means the police and the community working together to identify and resolve crime and social order problems of communities. This style of policing recognizes that communities have an essential role to play in police decision-making. This role includes joint problem-solving, priority-setting and formulating requests for service that influence the attitudes of members and the delivery of policing services.(1991,25).

In this context, a community policing strategy would imply greater community interaction. What this definition of interaction does not overtly note however is, that emphasis was placed on the fiscal dimensions of governance rather than community empowerment through the self-identification of needs and strategies to address these needs. As was the case with other public service programs, communities were now forced by government belt tightening and fiscal reform to take on the responsibility of meeting the financial needs of specific crime control programs within their jurisdiction, a practice consistent with neo-liberal objectives of using fiscal constraints as a means of creating responsible citizens.[45] In this respect community policing was integral to the process of divesting the state of responsibilities related to the maintenance of social order.

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[44] The RCMP, unlike other police services examined in this thesis, articulated a diverse understanding of community. Community is defined as " a group of people who share certain elements: geographic location, cultural and racial background, socioeconomic status, common interests and goals or concern with the same crime and social issues" (RCMP,1995, 4). The RCMP also acknowledge the presence of numerous communities within the jurisdictional boundaries of a detachment. "It is possible for one detachment to have a number of communities within its jurisdiction, and it is incumbent on members to clearly identify these groups so that the unique needs of each can be addressed" (Ibid.).

[45] See Rose 1996

Furthermore, downloading of responsibility to the community effectively realized the Federal Government's objective of fiscal austerity through decentralization.

Budgetary cut backs and an emphasis on decentralized decision making forced communities to provide additional resources and to take on more responsibility for policing their own community. Supt. Bowlby (1999) argues that the "trend has been to get the community to do things that the police have traditionally been doing. If it is a priority to the community and goes beyond the core development of policing, as set out in Provincial and Municipal contracts, then the community must come up with the resources". One Commanding Officer aptly characterized the downloading of fiscal responsibility as the "jug of beer analogy", wherein your friends pool their resources to purchase more than any one individual could on his/her own (Interview,1999).

Among the policing functions most susceptible to budget reductions was crime prevention. The implementation of new crime prevention programs or the maintenance of existing ones was increasingly reliant on the sharing of community resources. As a result, officers found themselves in the peculiar position of serving as fund raisers.[46] As one Sergeant exclaimed "traditionally we were told not to take money from the community and yet now we are told go out with our cap in hand looking for resources (Interview,1999). This sentiment is echoed by many of the officers surveyed. Interaction with the community became one of asking what more could the community give both in terms of money and time. Community volunteerism became a valuable

[46] A good example of fund raising efforts to maintain existing programs is highlighted by the efforts of Sgt. Kevin Graham, Drug Awareness Coordinator for K Division. Between the fiscal years of 1997 and 1999 he had raised $1.2 million from private and community sources, while internal RCMP funding for drug awareness programming was set at $8,200 annually. An alternate example comes from the efforts of Sgt. D. Honeyman who raises $75,000 per year from community sponsors to support the crime prevention program Street Legal.

resource to be tapped by the local detachment. Community members were to be considered a source of both manpower and financial resources.

Throughout the Service there was a realization that decentralization meant policing could not be done in isolation but must be inclusive of the community. Interestingly, inclusion of the community quickly came to symbolize downloading fiscal responsibility to maintain services that were ancillary to traditional operational duties. Communities could no longer expect the RCMP to supply all the resources or take the lead in identifying the focus of crime prevention initiatives. This reality is succinctly noted in Commissioner Philip Murray's 1997 Commissioner's directive wherein he states "The RCMP cannot be all things to all people". In other words the apron strings were to be cut. The old welfare state assumptions were no longer applicable. Decentralization and empowerment meant communities were to be more responsible for a broad range of crime prevention services and to take an active role in the fiscal support of ancillary policing functions.

Prior to 1994, decentralization, downloading and empowerment characterized the early stages of the RCMP's reform process and yet much more was to be accomplished. The efforts to download responsibility to the community and detachment did little to resolve the continued fiscal crisis. Both internal and external pressures to reengineer the organizational structure of the Service continued to confront the Command. Simply downloading responsibility or proclaiming the implementation of community policing was not an acceptable resolution to the call for institutional reform. Moreover, the election of the Chretien Liberals did nothing to diminish the intensity of fiscal conservatism. The RCMP continued to feel the pressure for organizational reform as a function of the liberal's budgetary austerity. Addressing these concerns would fall

on to the shoulders of newly appointed Commissioner Philip Murray. Still, Murray's tenure as Commissioner would take on a distinctly different tone than his predecessor Norm Inkster. As Paul Palango notes:

> Ordered by the government to reduce spending in the federal area of policing, Murray set out to attack the vast bureaucracy built up under Inkster and Shoemaker... The essential difference between Inkster and Murray was that, while Inkster made an effort to be business-minded, Murray began to apply business thinking for real (1998,137).

With the seeds of decentralization and empowerment planted, the strategy now was to move beyond the rhetorical commitment to private sector models and their ham-fisted implementation through blanket budget reductions and downloading and instead, to mold the RCMP in the image of Corporate America. Mission Statements, business plans, client service, flattening the organization, partnerships and cost sharing became the building blocks of Murray's reengineering. And while Commissioner Murray's thrust differed from that of Commissioner Inkster's, the common thread of reform continued to be community based policing. Once more the banner of community policing was unfurled in the pursuit of reform.

RCMP Inc.

Under Commissioner Murray's leadership the pressures of fiscal conservatism and neo-liberal policy agendas were manifested in various ways. Between 1993 and 1997 the RCMP had lost 2,300 positions and had $173 million slashed from its operating budget (Hovey, cited in Palango, 1998). The Service was continuously confronted with the challenge of how to save money while striving to be more effective and efficient. Further aggravating this dilemma were concerns regarding the

encroachment of private policing, greater competition for resources between government agencies and an increased demand from communities to be more involved in policing. These were factors the Service could not ignore since the consequences of inaction were profound. Communities and Provinces could decide to use another service, create their own, spend less on policing, or they could put enough pressure on the RCMP that change was inevitable (RCMP,1998). The reality of this was made clear in Commissioner Murray's statement "change or be changed, or just be shown the door" (Ibid.).

Avoiding being shown the door required implementing a strategy by which the RCMP could counter forces undermining its "service of choice status". In other words, the RCMP needed to articulate a strategy whereby it remained competitive and maintained its market share of policing. Essential to this strategy were the provisions "of a quality service at an affordable price, responding to what the community wants and needs, thinking of clients first and negotiating for service priorities" (RCMP, 1998,6). What is perplexing about these strategic elements is their correspondence to market oriented strategies of competition. The relationship between the police and the citizens of a community were now to be negotiated in terms of market commodities, a bottom line, client relations and a competitive edge. This deviation from citizen to client based considerations was becoming more and more apparent within the rhetoric by which the RCMP articulated its strategic plans. Progressively the relationship between the RCMP and the community departed from the conception of a police service as being a public service whose task it was to "establish and regulate the common good " of citizens to one articulated by market concepts and activities (Butler,1996, 219). Especially

perplexing in this trend is the replacement of the citizen with the customer (consumer). This difference is aptly noted by Ralph Heintzman who states:

> The reality is that in the public sector we do not really serve customers. We serve citizens, which is not the same thing at all. One of the reasons why this is sometimes difficult to grasp is that there are at least three different dimensions to democratic citizenship: The citizen as user or recipient of public services and programs, the citizen as taxpayer; and the citizen as voter and more broadly as the participant in a civic community, with all the rights, duties, obligations, relationships and concerns that go along with membership in a democratic community. In any interaction with government or with an agent of government, all of these dimensions of citizenship are brought into play to some degree or other and all can be enhanced or diminished by the exchange. The concept of citizen is therefore very different from that of customer, where no such obligations or relationship exist. The concept of customer is an atomistic one, with no overtones of obligation or of community, where self-interest is, appropriately the dominant motive. If a customer is dissatisfied with a service transaction, he or she normally can and should abandon, walk away from the service relationship and seek another supplier. If a citizen is dissatisfied, by contrast, he or she normally cannot or should not walk away but rather must work with other members of the community to seek improvement (1999,13).

As the RCMP embraced the tenets and rhetoric of the market it began to lose sight of the conceptual differences between citizen and customer. Communities became grounds from which to wage a competitive market strategy against all others who would undermine their position of prominence. And while these rhetorical maneuvers may seem benign "there are significant issues of philosophy and concept which have the capacity fundamentally to change policing and its relationships to society" (Butler 1996,219). This changing relationship between police and citizen, while in itself problematic, was symptomatic of the broader political shift to a neo-liberal relationship between state and citizen. The RCMP, like many other Federal departments, could not resist the intense pressure to adopt market practices and corporate relations. And yet,

there is an apparent contradiction in using community policing to achieve these corporate/market ends. Community policing, in its best form, is a means to strengthen citizenry through strengthening the link between the individual and the well being of his/her social environment. Management reform fails to achieve this link in the fact that it attempts to create an enterprise culture wherein the link to community members is based on individual service.

Fine Tuning the Corporation

In order for the RCMP to adapt to its new role as service provider in a competitive market of policing, it needed to reflect on its own practices and identify internal impediments to reform. One example of this reflective process was the January 1995 tabling of an internal RCMP audit. The audit highlighted a number of concerns related to corporate structure and service delivery, but was especially critical regarding issues of management. As the following excerpt suggests, the RCMP needed to reconsider its existing management ethos.

> Community policing requires a fundamental change to the RCMP management paradigm. Attention must be focused away from complaint control systems that are designed to minimize the chance of mistakes, to a business plan where opportunities for success are maximized through innovative and creative interaction with the community and with members. (RCMP,1995,14).

Interestingly, this finding countered earlier beliefs that organizational reform was not necessary and that by simply implementing a process of decentralization the supposed benefits of reform would unfold. In fact, the audit was highly critical of this strategy

suggesting the Service had missed many of the essential components of organizational reform.

Implementation of community policing and reform initiatives prior to the 1995 audit had been narrowly focused thus limiting organizational reform. In its first steps, the implementation of community policing had been primarily dedicated to reuniting the RCMP with the communities it served. The Service-wide review indicated community policing was more a means by which to download responsibility to the detachment than it was a serious attempt at organizational and managerial reform. Little attention had been paid to the fact that community policing was to be a "blueprint for organizational and management reform" (RCMP,1995,22). In fact, organizational and managerial reform had virtually been ignored. As noted in the audit findings:

> The RCMP assumed that members could easily adapt to a new service delivery model without education and within the current organizational structure. It was also believed that all administrative and operational support personnel would readily and willingly modify their policies and practices. We know now this has not occurred. As a result, fundamental impediments have not been removed and the slow transition to a new service delivery model continues to be a source of concern (RCMP,1995,18).

The impediments indicated above were narrowed to four key areas, philosophy, structure, strategy and culture.

Audit findings indicated there was little internal understanding or support of the basic philosophical principles which characterize community policing. Therefore implementation at the service delivery level was not understood and thus frustrated further development. Structurally the RCMP provided, what seemed at times, to be an insurmountable barrier to reform, the existing paramilitary, centrally controlled bureaucracy only hindered organizational streamlining or empowerment of those at the

detachment level. With respect to the internal communication of Service strategies, clear and consistent dialogue had been lacking. Throughout the Service there had been little effort to share best practices regarding the new service delivery model. Yet perhaps the audit's most damning conclusion was that the RCMP had implemented its reform process in the wrong order. The audit asserted that reform would have been more effective if the RCMP had, in fact, addressed organizational and structural concerns before downloading to the detachment and assuming front-line officers would quickly adapt. As noted in the audit's executive summary:

> Community policing is not a program. Rather, it is an organizational philosophy that requires fundamental changes to the structure and culture of the organization in order for strategies to be successfully implemented. Communication, education and eliminating organizational barriers are absolutely essential to achieve a complete and sustained transition to community policing in the RCMP (1995,iii).

The audit presented RCMP command with the inescapable proof that recent attempts to implement community policing and, more specifically, broad Service reform, had been ineffective. And yet, while organizational reform lagged well behind the desired outcome all efforts at reform were not considered dismal failures. Clearly the goal of decentralization and down loading had been a huge success. There could be little doubt that the Service had effectively implemented a strategy of downloading or, in the corporate lexicon, empowered the community and detachment. But as Paul Palango suggests "this was simply a downsizing exercise wherein more and more responsibility was being thrown onto the backs of the street level officer" (1996,144). Moreover, it was a maneuver in keeping with the Federal government's attempts to download responsibility to the community .

RCMP decentralization played well into the objectives of the Service's political leaders. Interestingly, future organizational reform would capitalize on this process of decentralization and empowerment. While the Command sought to build on prior achievements they were in need of a model from which to proceed and move beyond identified impediments to reform. The task now was to manage the Service more like a business.

Shifting Into Corporate Mode

The findings of the internal audit coupled with continuing fiscal restraint and increasing public concerns of accountability heightened the anxiety of those tasked with reshaping RCMP management. In 1995 the command forwarded a transition plan that addressed issues of change related to structure, culture and strategy. This blueprint for transition outlined a definition of each of these components as well as articulating the changes necessary to achieve the desired organizational shift. For example, structure was defined as:

> the organizational management style of operations, reporting relationships, training, roles and rewards. (RCMP 1998,3).

Corresponding to this definition was a list of necessary organizational changes. The following are only four out of thirteen recommendations outlined in the RCMP transition blueprint:

- a move toward a decentralized structure
- an increase in individual responsibility and discretion
- performance based on quality
- move decision making to the lowest possible level

These recommendations clearly did not stray from the existing practices of downloading and decentralization.

While structure, strategy and culture were considered different aspects of organizational change their overdetermined relationship to each other was not overlooked. Managerial change could not occur without the coordination of all three components, they could not operate in isolation nor could the Service implement change piecemeal. Furthermore, the common rhetoric and objectives of corporate managerialism lashed these components together in a tangle so that one could no longer separate community policing objectives from those of managerial change. Client focused service, quality service, total quality management, and the pursuit of excellence were consistent phrases that punctuated the process of change associated with community policing and corresponding managerial reform. Although community policing remained the overarching philosophy guiding RCMP reform it was corporate concepts of management that appeared to mold the organizational structure. This marriage of a client based service model and community policing is aptly noted by S/Sgt. Jack Briscoe who states: "we are moving from crime control policing to a collaborative, responsive and client centred model of service, which we call community policing" (cited in Palango1998,143).

Shifting to a responsive and client centred model meant the RCMP would need to clarify its sense of purpose, the direction in which the Service was to go and how it was going to get there. Part of this exercise had, in fact, been accomplished through the transition blueprint but a more integral piece in the puzzle would be the RCMP's Mission, Vision and Values statement (See appendix). In an exercise similar to those

prescribed by corporate models of managerial reform[47] the RCMP, over a 10 month period between August of 1995 and June of 1996, sculpted a Mission, Vision and Values statement which was to "uphold the principles of community policing by defining the Service's commitment to employees, community and clients" (RCMP,1998, 4). Moreover, both the process by which the statement was developed and its ongoing influence upon RCMP operations was to "encourage leadership among all employees through empowerment, shared responsibility and accountability" (Ibid.). Here, as with other reform initiatives the importance of empowerment, decentralization and the responsibilization of individuals is inescapable. Once more the common managerial denominator of empowerment is placed at the strategic forefront of organizational reform. Moreover, it is a common denominator between the private sector model and community policing.

Concepts of decentralization and streamlining were not limited to front line operations as the April 1997 structural re-organization would suggest. The command structure was not immune to change and would undergo a reorganization process that would facilitate and imitate a strategy of decentralization. The division of labour and operational responsibility at the command level would be realigned by way of creating five new Deputy Commissioner positions designated by regional affiliation (Atlantic, Central, Northwest, Pacific and National Headquarters) as opposed to previous designations of Operations, Administration, Corporate management and Law enforcement and Protective services. Each Deputy was now tasked with the responsibility for broad operational duties within their designated region. Operational

[47] See Peak and Glensor, 1996.

duties were broken into five "business lines" [48] that contribute to the RCMP's day to day objectives and strategies. These business lines consist of Federal policing services, Contract policing services, National police services, Peace-keeping services and Internal business[49].

In this context of business lines contract policing offers an interesting porthole from which to view the Service's process of decentralization and the ease at which it could download responsibility. Contract policing consumes the largest percentage of RCMP resources. Furthermore, it is the lynch pin for its implementation of community based policing. This symbiotic relationship is noted in the 1997 RCMP performance report which states:

> As a renewed operational and organizational approach to the delivery of quality police services, community policing has changed the organizational culture of the RCMP by encouraging its members to think in proactive ways to solve and prevent crime. This style of policing is now conducted as a routine, widespread practice rather than as an add-on program....Everything we now do, particularly in the contract policing business line, focuses on client consultation, partnerships with the communities and local agencies, empowerment to the service delivery level and the mobilization of all available resources to supplement the role of the police. Learning from community policing pilot projects and good practices, the police role continues to change and improve the quality of service (1997,25).

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[48] The phrase business line seems somewhat out of place with the concepts of policing in a democratic society wherein the police are accountable to citizens and not clients. From 1995 on, one can readily identify a greater use of business, client centred rhetoric. This use of business analogies and strategic models derived from corporate models is perplexing especially when one asks the question if the police are a business how exactly does it measure profit margins and loss. Perhaps this language is more indicative of the manner in which the Federal government has blurred the lines between public interest and private interest in its headlong incorporation of neo-liberal strategies for public service reform.

[49] These latter two business lines tend not be the concern of the regional areas but are predominantly the responsibility of the Deputy responsible for National Headquarters.

Contract policing has supplied the RCMP with a diverse field from which to experiment with both community policing and reform techniques. Contracting to provincial, territorial and municipal governments has required the RCMP to adapt its service to the specific needs of each client. Policing services under contract agreements "are tailored to the needs and priorities of each community" (RCMP,1998, 24). Within the rubric of contract relations, both command and front line officers have had to engage the community, develop partnerships and mobilize community resources. The responsible citizen, the empowered front-line, and the decentralized management structure became prescribed mantras of those tasked with managing police services. Moreover, the concepts of empowerment and responsibilization became the active tools of those supplying police services. Contract policing, decentralization and tailoring had become synonymous. [50]

Contract policing furnished the RCMP with the opportunity to experiment with both private sector managerial techniques and the implementation of community policing. More importantly, it has supplied the terrain on which the RCMP has combined community based policing and private sector management techniques in a response to Federal fiscal belt tightening. Contract policing and its emphasis on decentralized management placed an onus on the Divisions and Detachments to set up formal structures to develop networks with the community and formally make the community part of the policing program. As one officer suggested, downloading has made the tailoring of services to the community much easier and it encouraged detachments to approach communities to set goals (interview, 1999). And yet, on the downside, downloading has forced detachments to scramble with limited resources forcing

[50] Certainly from a strategic position, framing decentralization in the language of tailoring police

decisions to be made on the basis of the bottom-line rather than on the basis of the needs of the community (Interview, 1999).

The RCMP's attempt to achieve fiscal austerity through decentralization has in fact handcuffed Divisions, particularly those who must operate within the confines of tight provincial and municipal budgets. An exemplar of this is found in the experiences of the RCMP in the province of Alberta (K-Division). Here, the imposition of Command directives and Federal belt tightening aggravated Divisional restructuring. Not only had K-Division needed to respond to the political winds blowing out of Ottawa but also the prairie storms whipped up by the conservative government of Ralph Kein. K-Division had the misfortune of being pressed between two political fronts each demanding fiscal austerity, public service reform and a downloading of services.

The Squeeze: K-Divisions Response

As with other RCMP Divisions, K-Division began the1990s decade encountering community based policing as a process of decentralization and downloading to the divisional level. And yet, not much would change structurally within the Division, for as noted earlier, in the initial stage of reform community policing was seen as synonymous with RCMP practice. Furthermore, funding formulas had remained the same and, in fact, budgets had increased throughout the previous decade, so there was no stimulus to address a process of wholesale restructuring. But all of this would change in 1992 beginning with the re-negotiation of provincial and municipal police contracts between Alberta and the Federal government. While these negotiated contracts dramatically changed prior funding formulas what is more interesting is the manner in which the new

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services to a community's unique needs makes the process of downloading more palatable.

formula reflected the Federal Government's emphasis upon decentralization and a downloading of responsibility onto the provinces.

On August 1, 1992 the Provincial Police Service Agreement along with the Municipal Police Agreement between the Province of Alberta and the Federal Government came into effect.[51] These agreements set out the contractual particulars whereby "Canada (RCMP) shall, subject to and in accordance with the terms and conditions of these agreements provide provincial and municipal[52] policing in the Province of Alberta"(Alberta,1992,4). Immediately apparent in these agreements is the inversion of the federal-provincial funding formula. Prior to 1992 the Federal Government had been responsible for 70% of the cost while the remaining 30% was the responsibility of the Province[53]. The outcome of the 1992 re-negotiated Policing agreements was a reversal of this formula. These agreements divested the Federal Government of its past fiscal responsibility, clearly a maneuver consistent with the Federal Government's neo-liberal commitment to achieving spending reductions through shifting greater responsibility onto those who require services, more specifically the provinces.

A further implication of these agreements was the creation of a fragmented realm of control with respect to issues of management, organizational restructuring and fiscal oversight. While, the internal management of actual police services remained the responsibility of the RCMP both the Provincial Justice Minister and municipal governments assumed fiscal responsibility for local police services because of their

[51] These agreements were assigned a 20 year term to be renewed in March 31, 2012.
[52] Noted exceptions to this agreement are municipal police services of Edmonton, Calgary and Lethbridge.

larger slice of the funding pie. This decentralized set of responsibilities and varied political agendas would compromise any form of consensus between the three levels of government regarding restructuring or operational reform. Furthermore the fragmented oversight structure created by the 1992 police service agreements would force K-Division into an untenable fiscal position wherein it was accountable to two levels of government each imposing severe financial constraints.

Prior to 1994 the pressure to change had been consistently driven by the Federal government. With the election of Ralph Klien's conservatives to public office in Alberta, pressure for reform would also come from the provincial level. Policing was not to be sheltered in the government's agenda for public service renewal. Clear signs of reform came in the guise of drastic cuts to municipal police service budgets and reduction of policing grants, a move that aggravated the already tight fiscal environment of the RCMP. K-Division was now squeezed under two political agendas espousing fiscal austerity, downsizing, decentralization and a neo-liberal tenet of responsibilization. The squeeze was intensified as each locus of political influence began articulating different platforms from which to pursue restructuring initiatives.

The Alberta context was quickly clarified by the deployment of fiscal policies that sought to trim budgets and download a variety of responsibilities onto the citizens of Alberta. As noted in the case of Edmonton, Minister of Justice Neil McCrank set out to trim municipal policing grants by 50% by the end of 1994. In fact by the fiscal year 1995/96 these grants would no longer exist as separate budget line items as they were incorporated into broad municipal service grants. This was made even more perplexing

[53] Municipalities with populations less than 15,000 faced a similar funding formula as the Province 70/30 split, but those municipalities with populations greater than 15,000 were shackled by a 10/90 funding formula.

by the fact that in the fiscal year 1995/96 these municipal grants were trimmed by $59 million and a further 10% in the following year. The outcome of these cuts placed a particular burden on municipalities especially in light of the fiscal formula articulated within the 1992 policing agreements. Reductions in funding had dire implications for municipalities, particularly when Federal financial support for the RCMP had already been reduced. Moreover, municipal policing was not the only victim of the Province's financial bludgeon. Provincial policing funds would be reduced by $2.9 million in 1994/95 and a further $1.2 million in 1995/96 (Alberta Govt,1999). These funding levels would not increase substantially until the fiscal year 1998/99.

Further complicating the fiscal reality of K-Division was the Federal Government's "Project Renewal". The outcome of this project was a federal government reduction in budget allocations to K-Division by $5.5 million spread over a 3 year period beginning in the fiscal year 1995/96. The break down would amount to a reduction of $2,333,000 in 1995/96, $1,370,000 in 1996/97 and a final amount of $1,800,000 in 1997/98 (RCMP,1997,2). The result of these reductions coupled with those levied by the Provincial government left K-Division in a somewhat precarious position. The immediate impact was a service deficit of $6,657,949 million. And, as noted in an internal memo drafted by A/Comm McDermid, "A deficit of this magnitude will have a severe impact on K-Division until such time as it is eliminated" (RCMP,1997,1). Articulating the broad implications of this fiscal shortcoming A/Comm McDermid concludes

> No one will be exempt from the impact of our present financial situation as all post budgets have been reduced which means we may not have the financial capacity to do what we did in previous years. This is not a situation that benefits anyone but it is the present reality and we must focus on rectifying the situation within as short of time as possible (Ibid, 9).

Solutions to this fiscal crisis were tackled by way of 13 strategic actions developed by the Divisional Executive Committee (DEC). While many of these solutions focused upon administrative streamlining, the four largest cost saving initiatives were linked to operational components. For example, detachment budgets were reduced by 5%, placing an onus on detachment commanders to closely scrutinize all expenditures and set strategic plans enabling them to stay within their budgets. A further incentive to achieve this fiscal austerity came by way of a directive indicating that any amount of over spending by detachment commanders would be extracted from the following year.

While decentralization and downloading increased the authority of detachment commanders, it also limited the range of opportunities and the varied policing strategies available to them, particularly, since basic operational duties constitute the largest share of budgetary costs. Moreover, the community is placed in a difficult position if it hopes to access services other than those provided by the performance of basic operational duties. The community must now negotiate for these additional services, find the funds to off set the cost or relieve staffing pressures through greater volunteerism. As one commanding officer noted "while this has forced members to be innovative and set realistic objectives it has none the less placed a great deal of pressure on the community and volunteers. More and more is being asked of the members and community volunteers" (Interview, 1999).

Augmenting these constraints was the action plan solution of reducing the Divisional membership by 15 officers. This solution of personnel reduction furthered a trend in membership reduction that had begun in 1994. Between 1994 and 1997 K-Division lost 100 sworn members. As operational duties remained a priority for all detachments, reduced membership resulted in fewer opportunities for alternate program

development or problem solving initiatives - key components of community policing. Once more the community became the pool from which resources were drawn both in terms of financial support and human resources via volunteerism. As one officer indicated, "the strategic alternatives forwarded by the DEC were a means by which the Command could off-load responsibility onto Service members. Unfortunately, there was little recognition that Service members were being asked to do more with less, front line officers and community members were being tasked to the limit" (Interview, 1999).

DEC micro management strategies had taken a play sheet directly from the strategic plan guiding Federal and Provincial attempts at public service renewal and deficit reduction. The overall tone of DEC solutions echoed the importance of downloading, sharing of responsibility and empowerment of those who are tasked with the operationalization of services. And while these strategies were an attempt to address K-Division's deficit, its emulation of Provincial and Federal government restructuring techniques did not end there. The DEC would continue to rely on Alberta's restructuring for a means by which to make the Service more efficient, including the development of 3 year business plans[54].

As noted in the previous chapter on Edmonton the Provincial Government of Alberta began a wholesale recasting of government services in 1993. The framework of recasting was shaped within the text of the province's three year business plan a document which outlined the government's objectives for line departments and all agencies under its jurisdiction. Provincial agencies were to formulate similar business

[54] Business plans were not specific to Divisional operations but would also be utilized at the the detachment and program level . An example of this is Drayton Valley detachment's business plan developed by the accounting firm KPMG after it had completed an internal audit. A further example is the 1999/2000 business plan developed by the Leduc Detachment's community policing unit.

plans that would articulate a mission statement, service objectives, spending targets and methods of measuring outcomes. An underlying purpose of these business plans was to set in place a yardstick by which agencies could analyze their effectiveness and alignment with the overall "business objectives" of the provincial government. And although internal RCMP management remained under the tutelage of the Federal government, the Provincial government's budgetary dominance and 20 year policing agreements gave it a jurisdictional trump card. Therefore, K-Division, as with other provincial agencies was accountable to the Provincial Government and thus required to develop and implement a 3 year business plan.

Perhaps one of the most interesting passages within K-Divisions business plan for 1996-1999 can be found under the heading of Mandate and responsibility. It states

> The RCMP engages in community policing to fulfill its responsibilities and to achieve its agenda of regionalization. Community policing is the application of modern management principles to policing. It involves decentralization, empowerment, decision making at the service delivery level, risk management, client consultation, problem solving and mobilization of community resources to supplement the role of the police. These techniques which have proven to promote effective police services at the front line, also ensure efficient management of the organization (RCMP,1997, 3).

From this statement one can infer that community policing was to remain an integral tool in achieving government objectives of decentralization, downloading of fiscal responsibility, managerial restructuring and citizen responsibilization. The link between community policing and fiscal management is further reinforced under the Strategic Vision subsection, which indicates:

> The vision of the RCMP is to create centres of excellence for policy, operations and service delivery and, before fiscal year 1997-1998, through the extension of community policing, review the organization and reduce the cost of doing business (Ibid.).

Throughout the business plan, issues of fiscal austerity and managerial change are interwoven with concepts of community policing, empowerment of service members and decentralized budgetary responsibility. The RCMP's business plan continuously emphasized the importance of decentralized budgets particularly at the detachment level. This sentiment is noted in the business plan's Financial Considerations section wherein it suggests

> In order to make the most efficient use of all available funding we will continue to focus on fiscal responsibility. Through the implementation of post budgeting in the past several years, the mechanisms are in place to permit budget management at the lowest possible level. We will continue to support and encourage "bottom" driven financial management (Ibid,18).

It goes on to indicate that

> K-Division has performed well in our efforts to cope with dwindling financial resources and the financial uncertainty caused by changing policing strategies and changing client and employee expectations. We will strive to ensure that detachment commanders, unit commanders and program managers have the tools and skills to mange their budgets (Ibid,19).

Community policing was a foundational girder of K-Division's three year business plan. Moreover, its value was not lost on Alberta's Justice Ministry. The Ministry's 1996/97 annual report extols the value of community policing in achieving its own objective of seeking more effective methods of police service. The Ministry had outlined, in its own three year business plan the objective of enhancing the partnership with the RCMP through the administration of the Provincial Policing Agreement it hoped to improve "accountability, cost effectiveness and citizen satisfaction" (Alberta,

1997,21).[55] The success of this objective had already been achieved in that the RCMP in cooperation with the Ministry, had established a 3 year business plan that set the implementation of community policing throughout Alberta as a business priority (Ibid). Ministerial interests in pursuing community policing can be further noted with respect to its fourth business strategy of "improving public awareness of the Justice system, increasing community involvement and develop partnerships with the community and justice stakeholders". This objective was to be achieved by way of "supporting and working with police services to further the concepts of community policing and developing measurements to identify its effectiveness" (Ibid,28). Moreover, the Ministry actively encouraged police services to embrace community policing as a service model and announced its intention to track the effectiveness of these initiatives.

The rhetoric of partnership is readily recognizable but so too is the underlying tone of citizen responsibilization and a relationship to Provincial government objectives of downloading a greater share of service delivery onto the community. There is little doubt the Ministry recognized the value of community policing as a vehicle by which it could achieve, not only its own business line objectives but also support many of the broad provincial objectives of neo-liberal governance. Through its capacity to set policy directions for subordinate agencies, the Ministry influenced the tone and nature of a variety of initiatives. Hence, with respect to its ability to influence the direction of police services it is not surprising that community policing would become paramount to the development of new service delivery models. This direction is affirmed in K-Division' s 1998/2001 business plan which states, "an objective jointly negotiated with Alberta

[55] While the RCMP appreciated, at some level, the conceptual distinction between community policing and private sector management principles, the Alberta Government saw them as synonymous.

Justice and corresponding to strategy 4, community policing forms the cornerstone of the services provided by the RCMP to Albertans" (RCMP,1998,13). In light of the RCMP's adoption of three year business plans and its close working relationship with the Ministry, there should be little surprise that Service objectives would reflect those of the Provincial government. For both the RCMP and the Ministry of Justice, community policing held the promise of achieving a variety of objectives the least of which was fiscal downloading, increased citizen responsibility for service delivery and organizational streamlining.

It is also important to note that public service reform continued to occupy an important place on the agenda of the Federal Government and RCMP Headquarters. As noted in K-Division's 1998/2001 business plan, "while the momentum for the process of change within the Federal Public Service has begun, much remains to be done. The RCMP is affected by the same environmental and demographic factors faced by the rest of the Public Service. We are also in the process of engineering new ways of doing business" (RCMP,1998, 5). Issues of government fiscal policy, resource constraints, efforts to implement service delivery mechanisms consistent with the Federal Quality Service Initiative program and demands for a cost effective service delivery continued to influence RCMP strategic planning.

In terms of the RCMP's contract policing, two initiatives influenced K- Division's strategic choices. The first relates to the March 31,1997 five year review of existing 20 year policing agreements. This review indicated that existing agreements should remain in effect with no significant changes to the cost sharing formula. Thus, there was to be no change in the existing fiscal contract nor was there to be any shift in the cost sharing responsibility between the Federal and Provincial governments. The second initiative is

a continuation of the Federal government's pursuit of decentralization and streamlining the layers of public service management.

Restructuring RCMP management was to be achieved by way of implementing an organizational model based upon regionalization[56]. The objective of this initiative was to remove one complete layer of management through the elimination of the sub-divisional level. With respect to K-Division, Regionalization would divide Alberta into two areas designated by the north and south districts. In a manner consistent with the philosophical premise framing decentralized decision making, RCMP HQ did not prescribe standardized procedures for regionalization but allowed the process to take shape within each Division. Each Divisional Executive Committee was to tailor the process to its own specific needs. And yet regardless of the flexibility of the process, the overriding objective was a further downloading of responsibility onto the detachment level of operations. As suggested by Superintendent Rick Bowlby the objective of "the two district restructuring was to make the detachments first more autonomous and secondly, improve accountability to the communities they police" (interview,1999). He further indicates, the objective of this restructuring was to "make the detachments more innovative both in terms of budget control and service delivery" (Ibid.).

As one detachment C.O claims the objectives of improved innovation and greater autonomy have been both achieved and welcomed. He goes on to suggest:

> The downloading of services has made this process easier. The manner in which HQ no longer sets the goals and objectives for detachments has made it easier for detachments to approach communities and have them set goals. HQ policy has been relaxed, there is greater freedom at the front line, there is greater discretion in terms of the community and detachment setting the objectives. HQ is less invasive, the North/ South

[56] While the initiative was first outlined by Ottawa in 1996 it was not fully implemented in Alberta until January 1, 1999.

> district division of Alberta has further facilitated this. Detachments no longer need to submit goals and objectives to the sub-unit. This shift now places the detachment in greater proximity to the community, it creates greater accountability and resource sharing (Interview, 1999).

And while a positive view of decentralization does exist, all Service members do not embrace it. As one officer points out:

> Decentralization has faced a difficult transition. There are a number of problems. For example most of the current unit commanders are poor managers. Decisions are being made based on bottom line perspectives. These bottom line issues start to cloud the decisions that affect service delivery. Fiscal responsibility and decentralization will become a problem which will eventually set the members and community up for disappointment (Interview, 1999).

This tone is frequently echoed as more and more members view downloading as merely a means by which to achieve fiscal objectives and broad political agendas.

Conclusion

By January 1,1999 K-Division had begun to implement its second three year business plan and claimed it was the model of a cost effective police service (RCMP,1999). Streamlined management structures, decentralized budgets, empowerment of detachments and the community are, without question, successes K-Division could claim. There is also little argument that what the RCMP does in Alberta is, in fact, community policing. Tenets of community policing are woven into the daily operational duties of RCMP members. Unfortunately those very same tenets have been utilized as tools to both cloak and forward neo-liberal politically guided reform in which the well-being of communities is secondary, at best, to the larger goal of reducing the size and spending of governments. The RCMP had become a casualty of neo-liberal

governance agendas leaving it vulnerable to ideological manipulation. RCMP reform has struggled to balance between political agendas that seek to cast policing as a generic public service agency and those that recognize a broader set of social responsibilities specific to policing. The question that frequently surfaces in this debate is whether objectives of cost efficiency, downsizing and downloading undermine the ability of a police service to remain both equitable and effective. We can see that the RCMP has become cost effective, it has streamlined its management structure and has certainly downloaded responsibility onto the shoulders of the community, but whether it has become more equitable; more responsive to the communities it serves, is an open question. Have these reform initiatives been merely an attempt to bring the service in line with broad public service reform, a downsizing of government? I would suggest that the question of equitable police service has not been lost in the foray of change. While recent reform initiatives reflect neo-liberal objectives of fiscal austerity and downsizing they have also laid the foundation for a more accountable and equitable police service. The task now is for communities to take advantage of this, to assert their role in the partnership that community policing affords. But more importantly take the reins from the hands of those who have set neo-liberal objectives by which police services are to operate. Empowered communities, coupled with innovative and accountable detachments may in fact provide exemplary models of equitable and democratic policing.

CHAPTER FOUR

Slow, Steady and Opportunistic: Toronto's Restructuring Process

> From 1992 to 1996 as a result of tough economic times coupled with the shift to community policing, the MTPS went through three phases: the first "Doing the same with less" , the second "Doing more with less" and the third "Changing the way we do business (Metropolitan Toronto Police, RRI 3, 1997).

The overt stimulus to implement community based policing originated, in part, with the 1990 Ontario Police Services Act, and yet, one cannot ignore the subsequent political and economic developments that have directed Toronto's strategic model.[57] The culmination of political directives coupled with economic trends of the early 1990s imposed a specific environment from which Toronto's police Executive would implement community policing. Ontario's political and economic environment forced the Service into a strategic mode requiring innovative policy responses. From 1992 to 1995 the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service moved from traditional policing to community policing (MTPS, RRI, 1997). Creativity had become the underlying characteristic of Toronto's attempt to restructure while ensuring control of the process. Service strategies could no longer maintain practices of rigid bureaucratic control but instead required innovative concepts of empowerment and managerialism. Furthermore, funding curtailments and reduced numbers of officers reinforced the importance of developing

[57] During the late 1980's Metropolitan Toronto Police Service had undertaken a number of community policing projects funded, in part, by the Federal Solicitor General. The purpose of these projects was to formally evaluate community policing practices. Divisions 14, 31 and 51 were designated as the test sites for this evaluation. And while the service undertook these projects there was little indication that the Command was committed to community policing or the corresponding organizational reform. The question of whether or not to implement community policing would eventually become moot as the possibility of change would eventually become an imperative.

partnerships outside the Service, particularly if a quality service was to be maintained. This implied the need to utilize community resources, both public and private.

As this chapter will indicate, Toronto capitalized on the imperative for reform in a manner that allowed the Service to consolidate its control of the restructuring process. While, the overarching model remained community policing, the outcome is more reflective of a wholesale emulation of private sector managerialism. The Beyond 2000 strategic plan and subsequent initiatives have orchestrated a corporate overhaul that encompassed renewed levels of efficiency, decentralization and fiscal downloading. Implementing community policing had less to do with citizen involvement than it did with emulating the private sector and consolidating the Service's internal operations.

This chapter begins by contextualizing the implementation of community policing in Toronto. It then examines Toronto's broad restructuring objectives as set out in the Beyond 2000 restructuring report. The analysis continues by examining two specific restructuring projects, the Robbery Reduction Initiative and Central Command's implementation of Crime Management. These projects reveal the Service's use of community policing as both a vehicle for and philosophy by which to underpin structural and operational reform. Moreover, they are clear examples of Toronto's narrow definition of community and the manner in which the concept of community policing was manipulated in order to achieve corporate objectives.

Stoking the need for reform:

In 1989 the Ontario Government's Race relations and Policing Task Force tabled its final report, making recommendations to effect a province wide transformation of policing (Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force, 1989). One of the

central arguments of the report is outlined in the recommendation that " the Solicitor General select community policing models appropriate for police forces throughout the province and that the Solicitor General encourage, facilitate and convince police governing authorities and police forces to commit resources to community policing by January 1991" (Ibid, Recommendation #38). The Task Force's stated premise for this recommendation was that "it viewed community policing as a framework for change" (Ontario Commission on Race Relations in Criminal Justice, 93,1992). Moreover, the Task Force sought to initiate a shift "from a traditional, reactive policing style to a contemporary, community based approach that would develop the necessary organizational structure and culture for policing a pluralistic, multiracial and multicultural Ontario" (Ibid).

Race Relations Task Force recommendations placed the imperative for reform squarely on the shoulders of the Provincial Solicitor General. Moreover, it reiterated that piecemeal attempts at policing reform would not achieve a wholesale transformation. Therefore, it was essential that reform be guided by legislative initiatives. Thus, in 1990 the Ontario Provincial Government introduced a revised Police Services Act (OPSA) which required Ontario Chiefs of Police to ensure their police forces provide community oriented policing and "discharge duties in a manner that reflects the needs of the community" (OPSA, Section 41(1)). Interestingly, in the same year the Federal Solicitor General Pierre Cadiuex tabled the discussion paper "Police Challenge 2000: A vision of the future of policing in Canada. The central argument of this document was that community policing was to become the preeminent model for Canadian policing. Furthermore, it encouraged Canada's Chiefs of Police to "get on with the business of

systematically implementing community policing" (Cadieux cited in Seagrave 1995,164).

And yet, the political demand to implement community based policing did not subside with the OPSA, nor the Federal Government's "Police Challenge 2000". In 1992 the Ontario Attorney General's Commission on Race Relations in Criminal Justice acknowledged its disappointment in the Solicitor General's efforts to implement community policing, a point clearly articulated in the following statement:

> We express disappointment with community policing initiatives taken by the ministry. We believe that although community policing is an obligation of the chief of police under the Police Services Act 1990, and is referred to as a philosophy in Ministry materials, it is still viewed by the Ministry as a program, as opposed to the overall premise upon which contemporary policing is based (Commission on Race Relations in Criminal Justice, 104,1992).

The report went on to state:

> It appears that community policing initiatives, whether pre-dating or post-dating the 1989 Task Force Report, were given a low level of priority within the Ministry. ... The Ministry must demonstrate its own commitment to, and command of the concept of community policing if it is to achieve the credibility required for the leadership mandated by the Police Services Act 1990 (Ibid.).

While the Commission Report critiqued the Ministry's lack lustre attempt at implementing community policing and half hearted effort to transform policing, it took the opportunity to reconfirm a definition of community policing. Within this definition it affirms the role of community, the importance of partnership and the need for organizational change. Moreover, it forwards the concepts of entrepenuerialism, decentralization, empowerment and citizen responsibilization. All of which are evident in the following Commission excerpt:

> Community policing is a voluntary and cooperative partnership between the police and the community, in their common effort to identify community needs and to develop mutually a comprehensive response to those needs. It gives all communities the opportunity to understand that each community and its cultural and racial representation is different and will require a different policing response to the problems it particularly experiences. ... Community policing will never occur until police management changes from a regulatory and autocratic environment, which is authority centered at headquarters, to a participatory style of management, with significant decision making authority decentralized to those in lower ranks who actually deliver policing services to the public. In order for community policing to succeed, an organizational environment must be created so that individual, entrepeneurial, visionary and sensitive initiatives can be developed and implemented (Ibid. 106).

In the context of this critique and preceding legislative initiatives Toronto's Executive Command quickly recognized that restructuring by way of a simple managerial re-jigging or a process of overlaying new projects over existing administrative practices would be ineffective. Playing a shell game with community policing projects would not be sufficient, nor acceptable in the current political environment. Furthermore, the Command appreciated that policing was in a state of flux. This reality is acknowledged in the Service's 1991 strategic plan which states, "the role of the police in society is changing; it is extremely important that our organization and our methods of interacting with the public reflect these changes" (Metro Toronto Police,1991,1).

And while the aforementioned political and legislative initiatives served as the initial stimulus for reform these would not be the sole variables guiding the transformation of policing. The Province's transition to neo-liberal governance would have a profound influence upon the structure and practices of Ontario's police services.

Fiscal austerity and a changing public service

> Not only are the economic constraints we face severe, but the complex urban problems of our times are placing extra pressures on policing and other public institutions (Chief W. McCormick, MTPS,1992, x).[58]

Fiscal restraint had become a concern as early as 1991 when the Provincial Government had indicated its unwillingness to increase its policing grants to the city of Toronto. In 1991 the Ontario Provincial Government was responsible for funding 8.5 % of Metropolitan Toronto Police Service's annual budget, a formula that was linked to Provincial household grants. This grant had not increased since 1987 while the Service's costs had increased by 9.6% annually (MTPS,1992). This funding shortfall further exacerbated the fiscal crisis that Toronto's municipal leaders were attempting to remedy, placing new pressure on the Municipality's choice of funding alternatives. Eventually, downloading and decentralization would emerge as the preferred means to achieve fiscal austerity.

In 1992 the Service received its last budget increase of 3.93%, raising the annual operating budget to $567.1 million. Subsequent years would see budget reductions with the largest cut of 6.76% or $37.4 million occurring in 1994 (MTPS,1995)[59]. This cut would come on the heels of the Provincial Government's July,8th 1993 passage of the Social Contract Act. [60] The NDP government of Bob Rae in

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[58] For the Municipality of Toronto the recession of the early 1990's resulted in high unemployment, reduced business fees and reduced fees from other funding sources. Furthermore, high unemployment increased the need for welfare. Between 1990 and 1991 the general assistance welfare budget had increased by 116% (MTPS,1992).

[59] Between 1992 and 1995 the MTPS budget shrank by $75 million reaching a low of $493 million in 1995 (MTPS,RRI,1997).

[60] "The Social Contract formed part of a package of measures designed to ensure that the government would be in a position to invest in Ontario's future, rather than borrowing from it. Without drastic action the government estimated that the deficit would rise to $17 billion rather than its target figure of $10 billion" (McBride, 1996, 79). The Social contract represented a

an attempt to address Ontario's rising deficit, passed the Social Contract Act (SCA) in order to "achieve significant savings in public sector expenditures in a fair and equitable manner", while encouraging efficiency and productivity in the public sector (SCA,1993,2). As Stephen McBride argues, this initiative marked "the adaptation of *Ontario's social democracy to neoconservatism's agenda*" (1996,79)[61].

The purpose of the SCA was, in part, to facilitate savings at the sectoral and local levels, as well as to preserve public sector jobs while maximizing productivity and efficiency and "provide for expenditure reduction for a three year period" (SCA,1993,3). Achievement of this goal was accomplished in large part through a process of unpaid leaves of absence that were both to protect and allow personal flexibility of public sector employees. In order for a sector to meet expenditure reduction targets established by the Ministry of Finance, Government and Public agency employers could require employees to take up to 12 leaves of absence within an annual period. These measures were to begin in the summer of 1993 and continue until March 31,1996. Although directed at the provincial public sector the Social Contract also included the Municipality of Toronto and the Police Service. As set out in the Social Contract Act, Sec 58.(1)b the Public Sector in Ontario consists of:

> The corporation of every municipality in Ontario, every local board as defined by the Municipal Affairs Act and every authority, board, commission, corporation, office or organization

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province wide attempt to download fiscal responsibility. More accurately it was an exercise in fiscal austerity through downloading.

[61] Interestingly, shortly after passage of the SCA the Rae government set in place its Community Economic Development Strategy (CED). One of the distinguishing components of the CED was its "proposal for economic democracy" (CED Review, 6,1994). The underlying focus of this strategy was one of community empowerment and decentralization. It was an effort to "shift from the conventional tools of macro management and central regulation, to the introduction of a developmental administration capable of animating and supporting communities in the field of economic production and institutional change" (Ibid,8). Moreover, it is a further example of what McBride has referred to as the " adaptation of Ontario's social democracy to neo-conservatism's agenda" (1996,79).

> of persons, some or all of whose members, directors or officers are appointed or chosen by or under the authority of the Council of the corporation of a municipality in Ontario.

The reduction in person hours mandated by the Social Contract Act further exacerbated the strains imposed by budget cuts and reduced resources. Compliance with the Act required negotiations between the Police Services board, the Toronto Police Association and the Senior Officer's Organization, culminating in an agreement that resulted in approximately 8.5 days of unpaid leave per Service member. While this number was much less than the maximum of 12 days set out in the SCA, forced leave of absence only compounded the concern for officer availability and the limits this placed upon the range of service. As noted in the Service's 1995 environmental scan

> the imposition of a hiring moratorium in 1992, early retirement incentives offered in 1993 and 1994 and mandatory unpaid days off. The effect of these strategies is a significant and on-going reduction in both the number of officers and the amount of time individual officers are available for the delivery of policing services (MTPS,1995,75).

Between 1991 and 1995, the Service lost 607 sworn members while also experiencing increased demand for service. Indeed, 1993 saw a peak in service calls of 2,507,579 (MTPS, Statistical report, 1995). These statistics were ample cause for the Executive to express concern that service delivery could be hindered, especially if the Service sought to maintain existing levels of response.

Financial concerns continued to frame the environment in which the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service developed its restructuring model through the remainder of the decade. In1995, the Federal Government undertook significant cuts to the transfer payments received by the provinces, with Ontario experiencing a proportionally greater share of those cuts. It had been estimated that by fiscal year 1997-98 cuts to transfer

payments to Ontario would amount to $2-2.5 billion per year (Taft,1997) . In order for the Provincial Government, now under the leadership of Mike Harris' Conservative administration, to make up the federally imposed shortfall it outlined two options. It could raise taxes, which it adamantly opposed, or it could make large cuts to social programs and decrease departmental and service expenditures. It was the latter option that drove the Conservative government's strategies and actions. [62]

Mike Harris' Conservative Government quickly implemented policies setting out an agenda of restructuring, improved efficiency and cost savings. The philosophical and structural emphasis of Harris' objectives are aptly characterized within the Omnibus Bill 26, the Savings and Restructuring Act. Certainly the long title " An Act to achieve Fiscal Savings and to promote Economic Prosperity through Public Sector Restructuring, Streamlining and Efficiency and to implement other aspects of the Government's Economic Agenda" makes clear the underlying direction of the Harris Government. Bill 26 was an agenda for applying neo-liberal rationalities. It imposed a schedule of downloading and organizational reform, insisting that Ontario's public sector had to shoulder the blame for the province's lack lustre economic performance and that private sector models would ensure a brighter future.

For the Municipality of Toronto amendments to the Municipal Act were tantamount to forced amalgamation and restructuring municipal governance. As set out in section 25.1 the purpose of the proposed amendments was

a) to provide for a process which allows municipal restructuring to proceed in a timely and efficient manner

[62] "Mike Harris won the 1995 Ontario election on a get tough platform involving a massive 30 percent cut in taxes and social services. Able-bodied welfare recipients would be forced onto

b) to facilitate municipal restructuring over large geographic areas involving counties or groups of counties, local municipalities in counties and in territorial districts and unorganized territory; and

c) to facilitate municipal restructuring of a significant nature which may include elimination of a level of municipal powers and responsibilities and changes to municipal representation systems (SRA,1996,145).

Early in the Province's restructuring process there was a recognition of problems related to the task of amalgamating and streamlining the numerous taxation and governance levels throughout the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). In April of 1995 the Provincial government formed the "Task Force on the Future of the Greater Toronto Area" with a mandate to examine and make recommendations related to the streamlining of GTA governance. Policing was included in this exercise. Recommendations evolving from the GTA Task Force called upon the Metropolitan Police Service to strengthen its focus on the achievement of innovative and efficient policing. In its analysis, the GTA task force identified four major issues related to policing; improving community policing, maintaining civilian control of police forces, enhancing budget accountability, and making policing more effective (GTA Task Force,1996). For the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service, the GTA recommendations had a wide range of implications. For example:

- there was now a greater pressure from the Province for all GTA police services to "co-operate, collaborate, and consolidate further in order to reduce costs and increase efficiencies".
- the need for budgeting to be "completely operational throughout the Service, so that the Service can give accurate accounting as to how scarce resources will be allocated to individual local municipalities, or within Service Districts"

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workfare. Those who could not make it in the tough job market of the 1990's, would be on their own, they were not to rely on the government" (Harrison and Laxer, 1995,1).

• the need for a new deployment formula in order to justify the Service's deployment of resources. This was particularly important with the downloading of funding responsibility and additional powers to the Municipalities, as now Service deployment of expensive and scarce resources will be scrutinized even further" (MTPS1996,32).[63]

GTA recommendations had a twofold effect, first they outlined a blueprint for improved service, secondly they were a tactical attempt at shifting the responsibility for reform onto the shoulders of police executives. GTA recommendations noted the inefficiency consistent with the existing organizational structure and practices, while at the same time suggesting an alternative framework. Moreover, the recommendations were used as a prod to reorient the Service in a direction consistent with the Provincial Government's neo-liberal governance agenda. The Service's response, however, did not involve whole hearted compliance. Instead, the Service attempted to marry its own internal objectives and desire for autonomy with the GTA's recommendations in order to ensure an outcome that would pacify provincial decision makers without compromising the Command's integrity.

[63] These recommendations would take on a particular relevance in 1997 with the passing of Bill 105 (An Act to renew the Partnership Between the Province, Municipalities and the Police and to Enhance Community Safety). In short Bill 105 was to amend the 1990 OPSA. This new bill would alter the level of responsibility municipalities would undertake for ensuring adequate and effective police services. Bill 105 would require adequate and effective police service to include "at a minimum, crime prevention, law enforcement, assistance to victims of crime, public order maintenance and emergency response" (Bill 105, I, 1997). Moreover, municipalities were to "provide all necessary infrastructure and administration (eg. Vehicles, buildings) associated with police services" (Ibid). Interestingly, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) endorsed Bill 105 suggesting, "municipalities have been advocating for improvements to the governance of policing in Ontario for decades. The move by the Province to abandon the outdated model of governance whereby municipalities had to pay the bills but had no control over the costs, will substantially improve accountability for police services in Ontario" (AMO,3,1997).

Beyond 2000: The Building Blocks of Corporate reform

In September of 1991 the Beyond 2000 Implementation Steering committee was struck in an attempt to formulate a strategic response to OPSA 1990 requirements and the political inertia of reform. The committee had representation from the Executive Officer, Staff Supervisors from all major sections of the Service, Chair of the Police Services Board and representatives from the Senior Officers Organization as well as the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association. By December 1992, this Committee, with the assistance of various sub-committees had tabled the document "Beyond 2000: the Implementation Process". This document furnished the Service with a model that would require fundamental changes in the manner in which the Service was to go about its business. The blueprint for "Beyond 2000" was derived from "the philosophy of neighbourhood policing, with its emphasis on public consultation and local, decentralized decision making" (MTPS, 1992, xii). This model had a variety of structural implications, including

•the need to redefine policing boundaries within the municipality, the downsizing of larger divisions,

• the updating of technological investments (especially relative to communications and information retrieval),

• changes in a broad range of human resources processes and the redefining (and often broadening) of member's roles within the organization,

• introduction of alternate means of providing service and responding to demands for service; and,

• changes in the training given to members and the systems by which they are evaluated (MTPS,1992,xii).

These implications were, of course, structural, having little to do with community input and everything to do with organizational reform.

The Committee indicated the need to co-ordinate structural reform in a manner that would ensure consistency with the Beyond 2000 document. This would assure internal control of the restructuring efforts and ensure compliance with the service's overall corporate objectives. The steering committee recognized that if structural changes or anything related to this process were not coordinated with or examined in terms of the long range strategy, waste and inefficiency were probable. This placed an onus on examining the linkage between financial planning and short term initiatives, particularly in an environment of unstable funding. The importance of financial coordination is illustrated in the following passage:

> A comprehensive capital plan must certainly be framed for the organization so that money is spent on initiatives or resources that fit the concept of neighbourhood policing. Just as importantly, though, consideration of Force goals, objectives, policies and procedures must conform to the Beyond 2000 vision (MTPS,1992,xii).

Short term goals and objectives were the annual guide posts by which the Service was to pursue long term objectives of the Beyond 2000 strategy. Setting these short term objectives "without consideration of the strategic plan of the Force would have been irresponsible" (Ibid.).

It was also essential that short term initiatives enhance the practice of neighbourhood policing.[64] Following a guideline of neighbourhood policing would ensure "that police resources and support systems were organized and allocated to

[64] Neighbourhood policing was considered an extension of community policing in the sense that it had evolved from pilot projects of the late 1980s.

strengthen the relationships between police and the people who live and work within specific geographic areas" (MTPS, 1992,xiv). Service wide initiatives were to reinforce the linkage between the community and the police as well as support a high degree of decentralized decision making and flexibility in service delivery. In practice this would require the Service to place a premium on the empowerment of front-line officers and reorient the Service structure in order to support this process. This implied that if the service hoped to implement neighbourhood policing, "management, support and specialized services of the police force" would need to restructure operationally and organizationally (Ibid.).

The overall orientation of this structural shift was one of getting the Service to break from the hierarchical structure of the professional model and to begin emulating the flatter management structures and dispersed responsibility characteristic of the best practices of post-fordist industry. Further, throughout the process of structural reengineering the rhetoric of community policing remained constant. Organizational reform continued to be cloaked in the concept of community policing.

Implementing "Beyond 2000"/ Corporate Managerialism

Implementation of the "Beyond 2000" strategic plan would take several years and require various stages due to alterations in the political and economic environment and was further complicated by the need to adjust Service goals and objectives. Moreover, it was abundantly clear that if the Service hoped to achieve its strategic goals it needed to address the issue of dwindling resources. Therefore, the implementation of the Beyond 2000 required substantial re-thinking of how resources were to be allocated (MTPS,1994).

The process of implementation began slowly in the spring of 1993 by way of a pilot project in the city of Etobicoke. The purpose of this project was to analyze three specific aspects of service delivery; decentralized investigative functions, the redrawing of patrol zones on the basis of neighbourhood boundaries and three new types of officer response: emergency, alternate and community. A central objective of the pilot project was the analysis of divisional autonomy and "the allocation of resources so that in addition to emergency and alternate response services, community response officers on platoons could focus on long term problem solving within neighbourhoods" (MTPS,1994,5). This analysis would inform future strategies of the efficacy of empowering community members. Moreover it would set the guidepost by which community members were expected to take responsibility for order maintenance and problem solving initiatives.

Analysis of the project suggested that decentralization of divisional functions was successful and that the redrawing of patrol zones along neighbourhood boundaries also proved effective. This early success of decentralized divisional operations would prove beneficial to future strategic planning and bolster its efficacy as an organizational framework. Interestingly, the outcome of this analysis did not focus on how the community might be empowered but how the Service and its members could enhance internal mechanisms.

While the Service's analysis suggested successful outcomes derived from the pilot project, it did not set a blueprint for continued implementation. In April of 1994 the Executive acknowledged that a wide range of structural changes would be required if the Service was to build on these successes and export these results Service wide. It was with this in mind that a Restructuring Task Force was created and given the

mandate to, "recommend changes to the organizational structure, deployment, management, human resources and other processes to facilitate the successful implementation of Beyond 2000 and other initiatives" (MTPS,1994,9). The Task force tabled a document entitled "Moving Ahead" wherein they set out nine goals and nine strategies to guide the implementation of the Beyond 2000 restructuring. The most interesting goals were the following: to promote service effectiveness and cost efficiency, ensure flexibility and continuous organizational adaptations to external and internal changes, minimize costs and risks associated with implementation and reflect application of leading edge organizational principles. Here, we witness a distinct focus on internal reengineering consistent with private sector concepts. The tone of these objectives echoes the discourse of the market and these objectives are easily interchangeable with those articulated within private sector managerialism. There is little mention of empowering the community or the role a community is to take within the confines of autonomous Divisions.

The discourse and objectives of private sector managerialism are reinforced within the Task Force's implementation strategies.

1. Consolidate and amalgamate redundant jobs and functions - eliminate duplication
2. Delegate authority and responsibility as low down the hierarchy as possible (Empowerment)
3. Expand constable functions to include a wider range of responsibility
4. Decentralize appropriate functions currently performed at the district and corporate levels to the divisional level, built around community focus

5. Move to semi-autonomous teams and shift the supervisors role to emphasize coaching/facilitation
6. Establish as few reporting levels as feasible (de-layer and flatten)
7. Increase the average span of control at each level (de-layer and flatten) (MTPS,1994,10)

This list of strategies suggests a marked departure from the old hierarchical model of management, a flattening of the organizational structure, a greater level of shared responsibility, the empowerment of front-line employees and the development of autonomous teams, all of which are consistent with the objectives of corporate managerialism.

To guarantee the operationalization of these service objectives, the Task Force submitted a list of 31 restructuring recommendations. Their purpose was to emphasize a service structure based on empowerment and decentralization. As recommendation #3 states: "empowerment should be advanced throughout the organization, in order to ensure that decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level" (MTPS,1994,26).[65] Empowerment was understood in terms of greater autonomy for front-line officers, as well as a mechanism by which all layers of the Service could be streamlined and strengthened. Empowerment would "allow unit commanders to allocate their resources as necessary to address their community's priorities, within corporate goals and guidelines" (MTPS,1994,27). In other words, community priorities were to fit within the

[65] Perhaps what is most interesting about this recommendation is the definition that the Task Force utilizes to express the meaning of empowerment. Empowerment in this context is understood as "trusting people and giving them all the information, training, encouragement, authority and power they need to make the right decisions for the customer" (MTPS,1994,26) This rhetoric of the customer suggests a market orientation of empowerment. It also suggests an articulation of organizational practices borrowed from corporate sector examples and sensibilities. Further emphasizing Toronto's emulation of corporate concepts and jargon, is the fact, that this

objectives set by the Service. Supervisors would "be able to coordinate the use of resources, including external liaisons, in assisting patrol officers without seeking unit commander approval" (Ibid.). Moreover, managerial empowerment would stimulate what the task force referred to as participatory management.[66] Yet, participatory management would not necessarily mean the inclusion of community feedback.

Decentralized decision making was essential, if resources were to be effectively allocated and, more importantly, if effective community partnerships were to be established. Here, decentralization was to be used in a manner that would draw the community into a shared responsibility for order maintenance. Decentralization was to be the gateway to creating a more active and responsible community. Recommendation #5 framed this gateway by acknowledging the importance of divisional responsibility in the development and implementation of working partnerships. The stated rationale for this recommendation was that "neighbourhood policing cannot work effectively without the establishment and maintenance of meaningful, local partnerships. Real empowerment must be given to the community; their involvement must not be, or appear to be, simply lip service" (MTPS,1994,41). This implies a distinct shift in the role of the community. For now, the community is expected to be involved in the process of problem solving. And yet problem solving was not understood in terms of communities

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definition of empowerment is taken from L.H. Secretan's 1992 book entitled "Managerial Moxie: The Eight Proven Steps to Empowering Employees and Supercharging Your Company".

[66] A further example of the Task Force's reliance on private sector models is found in their definition of managerial reform. Citing a 1994 U.S Bureau of Justice Assistance document, the Restructuring Task Force explained the evolution and role of participatory management in the following manner:

"Following the lead of corporate America, Police managers are beginning to adopt the principles associated with total quality or participatory management. There is a growing recognition in policing that employees should have input into decisions about their work. Management practices that restrict the flow of communication and stifle innovation are giving way to the belief that those actually working in the community can best understand its needs and develop ways to meet them" (Cited in MTPS,1994,29).

suggesting solutions to a particular problem but more along the lines of sharing fiscal resources to solve problems. The underlying push for community empowerment and active partnership was the need to address fiscal shortcomings. As the Task Force's rationale suggests:

> This initiative makes effective use of limited police resources in problem solving. It is becoming increasingly clear that the police cannot solve many crime and public order problems alone. It is vitally important that the Force establish partnerships with others who have resources of their own to offer, including time, money, expertise, ideas, energy, equipment and more (Ibid.).

Partnership, in this context, is based on resource sharing and fiscal downloading. Setting priorities for order maintenance was to remain the purview of the police. The community was a resource to be mined.

This concept of partnership is problematic and raises issues consistent with Shearing's argument of a duality of service based upon those who have and those who have not. If the community is defined by way of fiscal sharing then there are many that will not be considered full partners. The poor and marginalized will not be included as partners in the process of order maintenance by the fact they do not possess the financial resources that would assure partnership status.

Continued support for decentralized decision making was forwarded with recommendation #6 which required unit commanders to consult with community groups and liaisons in order to prioritize the allocation of resources "to areas of highest need or to specific community problems" (Ibid. 46). Once more the underlying premise of this recommendation was to simultaneously include and empower the community while addressing fiscal restraints. Budget restrictions and personnel constraints prevented the Service from handling every problem and every area with equal resources and energy

(Ibid.). Therefore the input and assistance of the community in prioritizing areas of concern would aid the Service in its attempt to implement effective problem solving. Furthermore it would facilitate a process whereby the community could actually take on some responsibility in the resolution of problems that the Service, due to restricted resources, could not address. This recommendation imposed a new level of accountability upon the unit commanders as they were now to be responsible for "and evaluated on, the effective resolution of problems" as well as the control of the resources devoted to these specific initiatives (Ibid. 48). Moreover, this recommendation, also implied an effort to make the community responsible for its own order maintenance albeit, in this context, financially.

On-going empowerment of officers and divisional autonomy remained a critical component of the task force's recommendations. Recommendation #15, for example, set out a divisional operational blueprint emphasizing the primacy of front-line officers as neighbourhood problem solvers. As the following statement suggests the divisional strength in achieving the goal of Neighbourhood Policing would be reliant upon the support these officers received.

> The divisional constable must be viewed as the Forces' key human resource in moving toward the successful delivery of Neighbourhood Policing. These officers provide front line policing service to the public. They must receive adequate training, supervision and evaluation for this role. Otherwise, strategic plans will have little impact on actual front line operations (MTPS,1994,111).

This recommendation reemphasized the important role that Primary, Alternate and Community Response officers were to play in achieving the desired outcomes of Neighbourhood Policing. It placed a renewed onus on a standard definition of these service components while emphasizing their importance in a decentralized divisional

structure. Recommendation #15 placed a responsibility upon unit commanders to utilize the three levels of service delivery in a manner that would efficiently address divisional needs and problems. Correspondingly, it also implied the need for unit commanders to solicit the support and resources of a community liaison committee in order to assist these various levels of service delivery. As subsequent examples will suggest, community input remained limited and consistent with corporate goals and priorities. The outcome is one of fiscal responsibilization of the community, not overall partnership.

While initial Task Force recommendations were guided by the need to restructure divisional operations in support of the decentralized nature of neighbourhood policing, recommendations articulated the importance of broad organizational restructuring. It was recognized that the existing organizational structure which embraced tenets of centralized management and decision making, broad standard management practices and centralized strategic operations would undermine the implementation of neighbourhood policing (decentralized service structure). Proposed changes suggested within the final ten recommendations were to "accomplish the restructuring goals and strategies by decentralizing corporate functions necessary to assist in local problem solving, improving the functional alignment of units for communication and coordination of resources, amalgamating and coordinating similar functions, and by reducing duplication for greater efficiency" (MTPS,1994,154). Organizational change was to support the implementation of neighbourhood policing and yet if one strips away the rhetoric of neighbourhood one is left with an effort to construct a decentralized organizational structure, a reengineering of a centralized bureaucratic organization.

Rank restructuring, civilianization, amalgamation of districts, amalgamation of various Service and operational support units are examples of the initiatives articulated in the Task force's latter recommendations. The trend of these initiatives was one of organizational streamlining, a point that can be readily noted by comparing the organizational chart prior to 1994 and the one proposed by the Restructuring Task Force. (See Appendix).[67] Proposed streamlining initiatives were to have a staffing and cost benefit to the Service. As indicated in the Restructuring Task Force's section entitled "Cost Impacts of Restructuring",

> The proposed structure provides for a total staffing complement of 7,030 positions at a total estimated cost of $436,871,500. This staffing level reflects a net increase of 55 positions, at net cost of approximately $60,000. Cost savings realized by the reduction of 61 Uniform positions, including 41 senior officer positions, is almost equal to the cost of an additional 116 civilian positions. As these additional civilian positions will release uniformed officers from support functions, the actual net benefit is equal to the 116 officers which may now be assigned to core policing functions (MTPS,1994,224).

Organizational streamlining was to trim the fiscal fat from the Service while setting in place an efficient operational structure that would support divisional decentralization. Without this restructuring strategy the Service could not hope to implement Neighbourhood policing nor achieve the long term benefits of its proposed service delivery model.

Perhaps the most critical recommendation was the final one, as it sought to tie together not only the initiatives of decentralization and streamlining, but create a Service wide process that was inclusive of all members. The final recommendation placed a

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[67] A further example of organizational streamlining and decentralization unfolded in 1996 when the Service "moved from five districts to three field command areas with each encompassing a number of Divisions. Each field command or division within the command owned the crimes

premium on the creation of a mission statement that would reflect the characteristics of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service, but, more importantly serve as a guidepost for ongoing restructuring. The proposed mission statement was to ensure that the Service members were fully aware of the *business focus* to which the organization was committed. Simply developing a mission statement would not guarantee that individual initiatives would evolve in isolation from the broad Service strategy. Management support, consistent management practices and a clear commitment from the organization were critical components essential to the desired objective of a mission statement. To assist in explaining its rationale the Task Force drew upon corporate management literature such as Michael Hammer and James Champy's book "Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution". These authors had suggested that

> Without supporting management systems, most corporate value statements are collections of empty platitudes that only increase organizational cynicism. To be worth the paper it is printed on, a value statement must be reinforced by the company's management systems. The statement articulates values; the management systems give those values life and reality within the company (Cited in MTPS,1994,228).

To avoid the pitfalls that these authors outlined the Task Force submitted an accompanying recommendation to its final one where they suggest:

> That every current and future action and initiative undertaken by the Force be consistent with its mission, its Beyond 2000 Strategic Plan and its restructuring initiatives (Rec. 31.1, MTPS,1994,228).

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committed within their area of responsibility and it was their responsibility to solve these crimes" (MTPS,RRI,1997).

This recommendation suggests that the strategic orientation set by the executive would guide the actions and initiatives of all Service members. In other words implementation would be achieved through the empowerment of Service members but it must remain within the operational objectives as set by the Executive. This recommendation echoes the Osborne and Gaebler refrain wherein the system of policy decisions (steering) are separate from and yet guide service delivery (rowing). The implications of this recommendation were not limited to the internal operations of the service but would influence the communities interaction with the Service. While the community was to be empowered and encouraged to partake in the task of order maintenance, this input would be influenced by the Service's corporate priorities and objectives.

Restructuring Task Force recommendations served not only as operational bricks and mortar but as a translation of broad Service objectives into tangible operational practices. These recommendations were the standard by which structural and operational change would unfold. Decentralization, empowerment, community/police partnerships, citizen responsibility, resource sharing and organizational streamlining punctuated the recommendation objectives. The goal of this process was to define an operational structure wherein the Service could achieve increased efficiency, cost savings and improved service. The task was now one of taking these recommendations beyond the conceptual stage. "On March 1,1995 David Boothby was appointed Chief of Police and on that day announced that community policing would be practiced, that restructuring would commence and that the Metropolitan Toronto Police would change their name from "force" to "service". (MTPS,RRI, 3,1997).

It is important to note that Toronto's restructuring unfolded in two distinct political environments. Between 1992 and 1995 the restructuring strategy took shape in context to an NDP (Social Democratic) government that was attempting to implement what Bakker and Miller (1996) refer to as a "Liberal Alternative State". The goal was to seek ways of "*decentralizing, customizing and improving the efficiency of state services. The* political goal was to preserve services through a combination of innovation and centralized supervision" (Ibid. 335). And yet, operationalization of Toronto's restructuring would unfold in a period guided by the conservative governement of Mike Harris. The governance objectives of this government, while supporting aspects of decentralization and customization of public services, were more characteristic of a "democratic alternative state" which "transforms what and how the public sector produces"(Ibid). The what and how of the "state produces moves away from the traditional practices and hierarchies, power shifts away from the state by virtue of an explicit abdication of responsibility" (Ibid). As a result collective action emerges unequally and unevenly, from a wide range of groups with different interests and capabilities. As we will see this has a number of implications for community inclusion, community definition and the equitable application of community policing. Moreover, this shift in governance strategies supplied Metro Toronto Police Service with both the stimulus and model to operationalize reform strategies.

The following sections outline two initiatives that exemplify Toronto's efforts to move recommendations beyond the conceptual stage. Moreover, they highlight Toronto's use of community policing rhetoric to perpetuate an image of community inclusion and partnership, when in fact, community rhetoric is merely that, rhetoric. In the context of the following examples, partnership is utilized in narrow terms and meant

to serve the Service's shift to corporate managerialism and remedy operational deficits. The objective remains one of assuring the implementation of a decentralized service structure while maintaining control of order maintenance priorities.

Unit Specific Restructuring: The Robbery Reduction Initiative

In the fall of 1996 the Robbery Reduction program was advanced by the Toronto Police Service with a goal of reducing robbery in Metropolitan Toronto by 20%. The premise for this program was to reflect the Service's move from the professional model ideology to that of community policing, as well as emphasize the Service's evolution to a crime prevention model inclusive of strategies guided by apprehension, suppression and deterrence. Furthermore the Robbery Reduction Initiative (RRI) was to serve as a companion to broader initiatives taking shape under the Service's rubric of restructuring. In particular it was a response to the Restructuring Task Force's recommendation that Detective Services be restructured and streamlined so as to better enhance its role as a support unit to the Divisions. The Robbery Reduction Initiative (RRI), in fact, represented one more stage in the Service's process of flattening the organization, increasing communication vertically and supporting greater autonomy for the unit commanders.

The Perfect Poster Child: The Hold- UP Squad

The symbolism of the Hold-up Squad embracing community policing would offer a cogent example of the Service's commitment to reform. The potency of this is reinforced by the fact the Hold-up commands the reputation as an elite unit within policing agencies. The Hold-up Squad is often regarded as the equal or a close second in ability, dedication and status to the Homicide Squad (Desroches,1995). However, "whereas Homicide is

perceived as crafty and sophisticated, Hold-up is seen as crafty and fierce" (Desroches,1995:222). This reputation of fierceness is supported by the nature of the offence; " robbery involves the threat or use of force and Hold-up Squads respond in kind" (Ibid). This unique reputation made the application of community based policing a challenging but innovative proposition. In the context of the Hold-up Squad the challenge and potential of this task were not lost in Deputy Chief Boyd's comment 'if community based policing can work here it will work anywhere" (RRI Focus Group,1997).

The Process

The Robbery Reduction Initiative unfolded in two stages. Phase One was a broad participatory management strategy, in that, feedback from a range of participants was to be solicited and analyzed. This was achieved by way of initiating four Service lead focus groups. These day long sessions were directed by Deputy Chief Boyd[68], who began each session by tasking participants to derive solutions to the question of "how robbery could be reduced by 20%". The first session was comprised of members from what was designated as the Big 5 (business community members, politicians, government and social agencies, media and the police). (See Appendix). While this created the appearance of community inclusion, community input was, in fact, limited by the nature of a narrowly defined community. "The Big Five" represented those who supported police initiatives. Moreover, the narrow definition of community, i.e. "The Big Five", raises concerns of exclusion. The consultative process could be criticised on the basis of an under-representation of grassroots community organizations or that "The Big Five" are simply interest groups supporting police driven objectives. Furthermore, the

narrow definition of community raises a concern about the assumption that communities are "homogenous social units characterized by a consensus of values, norms and agreements on crime problems" (Leighton,1991:504). The narrowness of community was made even more apparent as the RRI process continued to unfold.

The remaining three sessions were restricted to police Service members drawing from the ranks of constable, sergeant, detective and executive officer. (See Appendix). Further reflecting the narrowness of this consultative process are the Service oriented solutions these yielded. These included: the need for greater police presence, ownership of robbery at the divisional level, continuous improvement of the communication process within the Service, fostering of partnerships to identify and address problems and improving technology and data analysis.

Phase one was designed to reflect components of community policing such as partnership development through consultation and empowerment of both community and Service members. However, it was more characteristic of an internal management technique of open communication, in order to stimulate innovative problem solving and nurture employee empowerment. Throughout Phase One proceedings, the Command had consistently confirmed its commitment to both a community based policing strategy and innovative managerial techniques. However, this was less apparent at a middle management or front-line layer of the Service, as was apparent in the final three sessions. It is likely that this sense of commitment at the command level reflected the Executive's desire to articulate 'Beyond 2000' corporate goals of participatory decision making, proactive leadership, and organizational readiness. Throughout the final three focus

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[68] At this time Deputy Boyd was the executive officer for Detective Services he would later be transferred to the executive role of Central Field Command. It is important to note that Deputy Boyd was instrumental in forwarding innovative change in each of the these executive positions.

groups a consistent emphasis was placed upon the enhancement of management and leadership skills. Moreover, management and leadership were interwoven with the concept of accountability. Unit commanders, in fact all Service members, were challenged to take greater responsibility within their zone/region. This meant identifying high risk areas and then effectively directing resources to ameliorate the risk or root causes of disorder.

Phase Two:

While phase one was a consultative process capturing the perceptions of specific stakeholders, phase two gives a clear indication that the Service was in fact more interested in fine tuning internal operations than the true empowerment and inclusion of the broader community. Phase two represented a narrow exercise which sought to develop Service oriented recommendations. From the outset of phase two the emphasis was one of shifting the traditional structure and function of the Service. The objective was one of implementing structural and operational change. The responsibility for this task fell upon a seven member committee comprised of Service members representing a cross section of Divisions and special units. (See Appendix). The Robbery Reduction Work Group was mandated to forward a set of recommendations that would both articulate community policing tenets while having little impact on the existing police service budget. Recommendations evolved from two tracks of inquiry, first, community collaboration and second, operational realignment. While community involvement remained an undercurrent, particularly in relation to the objectives of community policing, concerns related to the Service's effectiveness and efficiency monopolized the working group's attention.

Phase two unfolded via three distinct stages. The initial stage involved analysis of materials, solutions and perceptions gathered during Phase One focus groups. Results of this analysis enabled the working group to articulate broad categories of solutions. Once this had been achieved the task of narrowing the focus of solutions to workable recommendations began. Coinciding with the compilation of focus group findings was an on going process of research comprised of interviews with unit specialists, external stakeholders (representatives of "the big five" for example banking officials, crown attorneys) and various service personnel. Findings from these activities guided both the rationale and Service specificity of potential recommendations. To ensure recommendations conformed with the mandate parameters and the Service's overall strategic goals an advisory group was formed from service members representing the various commands. The role of the advisory group was to serve as a "conduit to the different areas of command" (Robbery Reduction Working Group Final Report,1997:12). Moreover, the advisory group was to ensure phase two recommendations would support the Service's strategic plan "Beyond 2000".

The analysis concerning community broke into categories of community identity, community empowerment, partnership and community perceptions. Here, empowerment was equated with a flow of information funnelled to the community and the Service's utilization of volunteerism, not active participation in problem resolution. Take for example RRI recommendation #1

1. Increase Awareness levels so that individuals and the community better understand the effects of robbery

a) Supply community groups with up to date robbery statistics

b) All robberies to be listed on major news reports

c) Develop strategies, in conjunction with community groups and vulnerable groups for dealing with problem areas

d) Conduct robbery prevention awareness campaigns, with volunteers, to assist vulnerable premises in identified problem areas

e) Recommend that by-laws and codes be developed by the municipal and provincial governments that encourage robbery prevention practices are followed by retail/business establishments (RRI Final Report, 1997).

Out of the list of eight recommendations forwarded by the RRI working group this is the only one that acknowledges the community, let alone articulates a role for the community. And, as one can note this role is somewhat passive and remains guided by the Service. It also seeks to shift the responsibility for risk reduction on to the shoulders of business owners, via the imposition of by-laws.

Throughout phase two negotiations, the concept of partnership remained a contentious topic, in part, because partnerships within the Service were seen as problematic, let alone partnership relationships outside the Service. Moreover it reflected a cultural reality wherein the police are reluctant to share with those outside the police community. While the importance of these relationships was acknowledged they remained tenuous in the eyes of the working group members. And yet, it was clear that the Service could not simply impose initiatives upon the community. Community perceptions were critical to the legitimacy of the Service's initiatives and their overall success. It was felt that the community needed to be the focus, at least rhetorically, for if the police were seen as the sole initiators, actions would be perceived as self interested. Moreover, without the

buy-in from the community, it would be impossible to utilize the vast resources of volunteerism.

Yet, problems continued to arise when differentiating between communities identified as criminogenic as opposed to those experiencing problems with crime. Here, the spectre of service duality was made abundantly apparent, echoing Shearing's argument of the "janus faced character of the neo-liberal agenda, within the justice and policing arena" (1997,16). The ability to identify and target particular individuals and communities was considered a valuable tool in the reduction of robbery. In fact, the concept of identifying criminogenic communities became integral to the working groups strategy of apprehension, suppression and deterrence. Stepping from this platform the RRI working group charted the root causes of robbery wherein they articulated the strategic starting point with the category (community) "criminals and offenders". This chart was then broken into eight categories of offenders, for example "foreign criminals, repeat offenders, youth offenders, etc." These categories were then linked to corresponding police units that would be accountable for apprehension and suppression. (See appendix). Here, the concept of community is articulated not in terms of partnership, but in reference to a target of enforcement. Focusing on criminogenic communities culminated in three of the eight recommendations relating specifically to the targeting of particular identified groups. (See appendix).

The Consistent track of inquiry, and certainly the most influential in guiding phase two recommendations, corresponded with operational concerns. The intent of this inquiry was to find ways in which the Police Service could become more efficient and effective in its efforts to reduce robbery, but also, gradually adapt existing operational structures to

reflect private sector managerialism. Consistent with this enquiry were concerns relating to issues of leadership/management, the service's role as initiator, unit accountability/ownership, improved apprehension and enforcement practices, partnership within the service and the empowerment of front-line officers.

Leadership/management was considered on a broader level than the traditional understanding related to a command down structure. It was acknowledged that effective leadership required middle management officers to actively initiate and support problem solving programs. Leadership on this level meant a more decentralized approach as opposed to directives funnelling down from the command ranks. Effective management would reflect initiatives specific to the needs of the division and surrounding communities. In this context, leadership was a process of stimulating officer empowerment, ownership and mobilization.

The Service's role as "Quarterback" or initiator was considered important and was not to be relinquished. This meant the service must be on-line and focused. Internal alignment and co-ordination was considered critical if the service was to maintain its influence and ability to guide reform. This also meant that the service must understand the problems in order to effect possible solutions.[69] And while the reference was to that of crime and disorder, it also had currency in terms of broad reform associated with political and economic variables.

[69] The strategic plan of crime management plays a critical role in addressing these concerns. 'The strength of the crime management process will lie in its ability to improve communication and crime analysis within the service, identifying problems at an early stage and develop strategies for the co-ordinated and integrated use of resources.

Unit accountability or ownership was to encompass a number of solutions to operational realignment. Accountability meant a renewed emphasis on the capacity of each Division and a weaning of the past practice of a reliance upon specialist units. The Command would have to support a process wherein the Divisions were empowered to address problems specific to their zone. Accountability further suggested active problem solving initiatives. Problem solving at this level meant forging partnerships within the service and empowering front-line officers. The premise for this argument was based on the Service's need to implement a decentralized service structure. It also suggested a shift from dependence to independence and although in this context it refers to Divisional operations' a shift in community/Division relationships is also inferred.

In June of 1997, approximately two months after its formation, the Robbery Reduction Working Group tabled an executive report containing eight recommendations. While there were concerns about partner exclusion, the police centred character of the process and limited attention to solutions, it was felt that recommendations did indeed address the Service's need for operational reform. Interestingly, the recommendations reflected a broad approach to the focus of reform and articulated areas in which the Service was not "uniformly complying with its own policies and procedures" (RRI, Final Report, 1997,43). But more importantly, there was recognition that this initiative was only one stage in the solution to both the issue of robbery and the process of restructuring. Essentially, these recommendations were an attempt to rectify structural and operational points of concern so that effective strategies could continue to be implemented. One year later, implementation had proceeded to a satisfactory level as indicated in the implementation committee report tabled at the May 7th,1998 Robbery Reduction

meeting.[70] However, progress was less satisfactory in the development of links to the community and the involvement of a more diverse community at the divisional level. There was little surprise that the focus of implementation was to be directed at in-house recommendations, apprehension strategies and the process of getting the Service in order.

In summary, the Robbery Reduction Initiative, was an attempt to put the Service's own house in order. Recommendations generated from the various stages of development focused on the specific task of realigning the Service. While the Robbery Reduction Initiative may parallel what David Bayley argues is "determined crime prevention",[71] it also echoes organizational and managerial reforms observed in both the public and private sector.[72] The Robbery Reduction Initiative articulates managerial principals which seek to improve the quality of service, improve service delivery, effect greater customer satisfaction, expand employee participation in decision making and develop greater communication within the organization, all of which are characteristic of New Public

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[70] On the surface the initial goal of reducing robbery by twenty percent had been accomplished or at least in terms of retail and financial institutions. Statistics for 1997 and 1998 indicate a combined decrease of 24.53% for financial institutions and 32.86% for retail institutions (Hold-up Squad,1998). Yet, it would be difficult to draw a direct correlation between this reduction and implementation of recommendations evolving from the RRI. Such a summary would exclude an acknowledgement of the various social factors having an impact on rates of crime as well as sundry prevention strategies the service had previously put in place; particularly when implementation had taken over a year to take shape with a number of recommendations not yet fully operational. Moreover, these statistics do not take into consideration street level robberies which were to be investigated, not by the hold-up squad, but front-line officers at a Divisional level.

[71] The strategic orientation evolving from phase one and two parallels what David Bayley refers to as "Determined Crime Prevention". This can be understood in terms of a police service "taking demonstrably effective action to reduce crime" (Bayley 1994:124). A police service actively pursuing determined crime prevention would need to: **1.** Assess needs, **2.** Diagnose causes, **3.** Develop strategies, **4.** Advocate courses of action, **5.** Implement new approaches, **6.** Co-ordinate actions, and **7.** Evaluate results (Ibid.).

[72] As suggested in previous sections public sector governance reform articulated the need for empowerment, flatter organizations, improved communication and a focus on customer service (Kernaghan,1993, Ingraham,1995).

Management principles and the performance culture of the private sector (Savage and Charman,1996, Leishman, Cope, and Starie, 1996). (See table 2).

Table 2.

TQM principles of action	**Outcomes, recommendations associated to RRI**
Topple the pyramid: empower employees: frontline workers are to be empowered, problem solving is to occur throughout the organization, particularly at the point of service.	• Phase one facilitated sessions • Phase two Robbery reduction work group • Overall emphasis upon decentralized Service structure • Divisional strategies/ Divisional resource allocation
Improve employee participation and commitment: within the organization all employees are to be involved in problem identification and resolution.	• Phase one Facilitated sessions • Phase two Robbery reduction work group • Emphasis upon front-line problem solving • Divisional ownership of disorder issues

More importantly these managerial characteristics reflect the desired outcomes of the restructuring objectives articulated within the "Beyond 2000" Final Report. Considered in this light the RRI is merely one stage in the continuous implementation of broader organizational and operational reforms. Moreover, it is one of many experiments the Service undertook in its attempt to synthesize the principles of community policing and private sector managerialism.

Unfortunately, with respect to community empowerment this component of the experiment has been lack lustre. Here, community partnerships have been narrowly defined in an effort to assure the continuation of passive support of police initiatives.

Furthermore, community has been utilized as a definable category by which enforcement and suppression strategies can be targeted. In this experiment the collective action of crime control and order maintenance emerges unequally, in that, it is guided by the police Service and those they have articulated as its community partners, the "Big Five".

Crime Management and Central Field Command

Organizational restructuring was not limited to unit specific strategies or directed at the resolution of particular crime issues. Had this been the Service's mode of operation it would have perpetuated an ineffective, piecemeal reform. Furthermore this tack would have suggested the Service's lack of commitment to wholesale reform. Restructuring efforts could not be limited to micro projects or specific problem solving initiatives. Change was meant to be implemented Service wide and affect all operational aspects of the Service. It was now time to expand the experiment and place it in the context of a multi-Divisional environment. Central Field Command[73] was chosen to pilot the operational strategy of crime management.[74]

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[73] Metropolitan Toronto Police Service Field Command is divided into three areas, Central, East and North-west. Each command encompasses a number of Divisions totaling 21. Central Field Command is made up of eight Divisions which cover the central and downtown core of the municipality.

[74] Crime Management is understood in terms of a community policing approach to problem solving using crime analysis to 'develop coordinated strategies to prevent, solve and deter crime' (Metropolitan Toronto Police Service,1997,28). Crime management was considered one strategy by which Metropolitan Toronto Police Service addressed concerns expressed by the GTA Task Force with respect to insufficient information exchange among police services (GTA Task Force,1996), as well as satisfying Beyond 2000 recommendations that officers 'be able to access information that is relevant to their areas' (Beyond 2000, Final Report,1994:78) The rationale of this being ' if officers are not able to retrieve information on specific areas, local problem solving efforts and the measurement of the impact of the efforts are much more difficult'(Ibid:79). During February 1997, 41 Division was chosen to be the first Division to pilot the new crime management approach. Concurrent to this project was the existence of the crime management work group who were

While Central Field Command officially embarked upon the crime management pilot in May of 1998, the process had begun in earnest months prior with the appointment of Deputy Chief Boyd as Executive officer responsible for Central Field Command. Deputy Boyd had previously been the Executive officer for Detective Support Services and a driving force behind the Robbery Reduction Initiative. His deft manner of facilitating change and willingness to empower all levels of the Service became integral to the success of the projects with which he was associated. Deputy Boyd frequently expressed his commitment to corporate reform both rhetorically and in practice. Moreover, he was an ardent ambassador for aucourant styles of leadership and managerialism. In December of 1997 Deputy Boyd began his tenure by visiting the various Divisions in an attempt to capture the general tone of the operation and to develop a sense of the "big Picture". This effort corresponded with Deputy Boyd's acknowledgement that all levels of the Service must buy into the process of change and, in order to do so, all levels must be consulted. Early on in his exploratory visits Deputy Boyd found that many of the members lacked a clear understanding of where the service was going. Many members knew the service was adopting community policing but did not know where that was taking them, nor did they understand the overall restructuring objectives. Boyd's response was to encourage management to inform front-line officers of the Service's objectives.

The first step in this process was an information session facilitated by Deputy Boyd with representation from each of the Central Field Command Divisions and all levels of rank. The purpose of this session was to convey what the Command was doing and develop a clear sense of Service objectives and direction of reform. He

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developing strategies in order to support the field and the decentralized operations (41 Division Crime Management Report,1997).

confirmed his commitment to the process of change and the necessity to support change through the management levels. Moreover he reinforced the importance of decentralization and necessity of Divisional responsibility. He acknowledged that each Division was autonomous and would differ in the route they took to achieve central objectives. Furthermore, he echoed the need for each Division to initiate their own effective and efficient routes given the resources each had at their disposal. Deputy Boyd outlined a framework wherein the role of the Command was to set the objectives and then empower the Divisions to pursue a route that was appropriate to their divisional dynamics. In summary, Deputy Boyd outlined a decentralized service structure, wherein Divisions were to be responsible for order maintenance within their divisional boundaries. Moreover, it was a clarification of the steering/rowing dialectic that must occur.

As with all restructuring initiatives, crime management was to be located within the context of community policing. In order to both locate crime management and clarify a perceived Service wide misconception Deputy Boyd indicated that "Community policing was the vehicle to the goal. Community policing was not the goal" (Jan,28,1998). Instead, the goals were to be measurable outcomes related to the quality of life as experienced by the community. Measuring the quality of life was comprised of three components, the enhancement of public safety, a reduction of crime by 15% and a reduction in the level of disorder[75]. The task of each Division was to

[75] In this context disorder refers to aggressive panhandling, squeegee kids, graffiti and street prostitution. The tone of this definition was taken from examples of the quality of life infractions utilized by New York City in its attempt to address crime rates. It expressed a perception of disorder drawn from a narrowly defined community and Service members. Once more this raises the criticism of narrowly defined communities and the assumption that communities are

articulate and operationalize initiatives that enhanced each community's quality of life. The initial challenge facing Central Field Command was the task of implementing solutions that would affect the components linked to quality of life variables. These initiatives would require greater communication within the Division, better utilization of front line officers at all levels of the Service delivery continuum and a renewed reliance on the community. Here, renewed reliance on the community did not mean an active participation in decision making but a reliance upon fiscal support and legitimization of police driven initiatives. The main task was one of fine tuning the Divisional structure so that decentralized operations would succeed.

In order to jump start this process and achieve the desired level of coordination, the Executive noted the need for a level of standardization, a way of tracking success as well as a means by which these successes could be shared from Division to Division. Deputy Boyd argued that any model developed must be a strategic, coordinated, community policing approach. Furthermore, it must be based on crime analysis, officer input and partnerships with the community (Central Field Command,1998). In other words, the rudder by which the Divisions were to be steered must be clearly defined before divisional empowerment (rowing) could occur.

One stage in the development of this strategic community policing approach unfolded on February 3rd and 4th of 1998, when Deputy Boyd facilitated a brainstorming workshop comprised of middle and senior management officers from each of Central Field Command's Divisions. One purpose for this session was to change the dynamics

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"homogenous social units characterized by a consensus of values, norms and agreements on crime problems" (Leighton, 1991,504).

at the leadership level to one that was inclusive of middle management. Furthermore it was hoped that this session would develop plans by which communication could be improved and the flow from traditional policing practices to community policing made more efficient. Deputy Boyd quickly acknowledged the importance of middle management in the process of change and suggested that without the support of middle management there was little hope that the goals outlined by the Command would ever be achieved. It was hoped that this session would stimulate a process wherein problem solving initiatives could be explored, best practices shared and effective management teams nurtured. The desired byproduct would be innovative problem solving skills exported to the Divisional level. Moreover, the byproduct would be the exportation of the rhetoric and practices of private sector managerialism.

In tandem with these sessions Deputy Boyd articulated the need for a standardized structure whereby Divisions could operate and consistently measure outcomes. With this in mind he set in motion the formation of a working group with representation from each Division within the Central Field command. The mandate of this group was to develop a "standardized Crime Management Process to be implemented in every Division" (Central Field Command, 1998, 1). (Once more, there is a drive to articulate a mechanism by which the process is to be steered) It was quickly recognized that all Divisions were not equal with respect to resources or identified problems. Therefore, what was needed was a set of "minimum standards which would provide flexibility for the Divisions to do more but not less" (Ibid.). Once these standards were set and implemented the process would utilize the existing resources of each

Division and require minor organizational changes. The purpose of this process was to enhance the effectiveness of community policing within Divisions by coordinating:

1. crime analysis

2. problem identification

3. priority setting

4. strategy development

5. communication with resources

6. assigned tasks

7. measuring outcomes

8. accountability (Ibid.).

Of these eight components the most critical were communication, strategy development, measuring outcomes and accountability. The working group acknowledged that if the process was to be effective, every member of the Division must have some level of responsibility for these components. To ensure there was in fact this level of responsibility the working group outlined an operational format that would impose a level of accountability.

The format set by the working group reflected a detailed process of problem solving. Structurally the process was considered in terms of a hopper wherein information was funnelled from various sources and directed to a stage where strategic planning would occur. This planning would culminate in the development of strategic initiatives to address identified problems. The process or matrix of crime management, as referred to by Deputy Boyd, was outlined in the following manner:



While the above diagram indicates the broad framework of Central Command's problem solving process it required an operational format that would guarantee a flow of information, accountability and inclusion of all stakeholders. To ensure a process of inclusion, accountability and efficient communication, the Working Group developed an operational format consisting of three levels.

The first level of Divisional response was to take shape within the context of Crime Management Committee[76] meetings convened every six weeks. These Committee meetings were to promote Divisional communication, problem solving strategies and ongoing measurement of outcomes. Furthermore, they were a means by which all stakeholders[77] in the problem solving process could be made accountable for the process and kept abreast of outcomes. The importance of this process is noted in the following implementation rationale:

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[76] The Crime Management Committee is comprised of representatives from every sub-unit and from across all ranks. (See appendix for a break down of Committee positions).

[77] While the community is considered a stakeholder, representation at committee meetings was limited and in some cases non existent.

> Each and every member of the unit must have the opportunity to offer their opinion as to what the problems are and how to address them. The Crime management Committee is the forum to do this, supported by sub-unit managers who consult with their members for their input and then represent those members at meetings (Central Field Command,1998,11).

The Crime Management Committee meetings are an attempt to break down the barriers between the various information silos present within Divisional boundaries. The premise for the Crime Management Committee is to ensure that sub-units come together and share information, best practices and problem solving initiatives. In general terms the Committee is to formulate strategic blueprints in order to address identified community concerns. The general responsibilities of the Committee are

- problem solving/brain storming
- identifying and setting Divisional priorities/ projects/ targets/ initiatives
- developing strategies, including the assignments, measurements and timelines
- evaluating strategies and outcomes
- reviewing related issues and developing policies
- rewards and recognition for the efforts of personnel relating to the new process (Ibid.).

While this process is not inclusive of all stakeholders, its overt objective remains one of internal strategic planning and operational streamlining. Moreover, it is a mechanism to assure compliance with the course set by the Command.

The next layer in the crime management process facilitates more immediate attention to the daily operationalization of strategies and information sharing. This is achieved through the development of a Crime Management Team composed of the Unit

Commander, Primary Response (Sgt), Community response (S/Sgt), Investigative Response (D/Sgt) and the Crime Analyst. These members meet weekly with a mandate to monitor and evaluate the outcomes of strategies and the activities of Sub-units. The purpose of these meetings is to maintain a level of consistency and ongoing accountability. "Having a team of core members from the Crime Management Committee, who are also the sub-unit managers, ensures a measure of consistency between meetings and provides a link to all sub-units in the process" (Central Field Command,1998,17). Moreover this team structure placed a renewed responsibility on sub-unit managers to maintain a consistent and efficient channel of communication with front-line officers under their command. The importance of this level of communication to the crime management process is suggested in the following rationale:

> Officers must be consulted for their input on Divisional problems, priorities, strategies and measurements. Then, once the Crime Management Committee has designed and agreed to a strategy, the assignments must be communicated clearly to the members by their sub-unit supervisors (Ibid. 18).

Sub-unit managers were not only mandated to keep front-line officers informed but were accountable to the Divisional Committee for the progress on designated projects and problem solving initiatives. This created a two-way flow of information stimulating a constant process of problem solving. (See appendix, The Divisional Crime Management process). The key components to the success of this level of problem solving were responsibility, accountability and the ongoing development of team work. This structure sets a priority for decentralization by emphasizing the necessity of empowerment and accountability. In fact, it operationalizes the downloading of responsibility.

The need for accountability was not limited to the forum of internal Divisional management. It was also considered essential to the relationship between the Divisions and Central Command. A successful Crime Management process required ongoing communication and accountability with the Executive. This was to be accomplished via the *Central Field Command Crime Management Conference* that was to occur semi-annually[78]. Here, the Deputy Chief would meet with each Divisional Commander and Crime co-ordinators to discuss existing strategies, public safety, disorder problems and corresponding issues. This level of analysis was to address issues related to the evaluation of the crime management process, resources and deployment, operational decisions affecting Central Field Command and effective crime prevention initiatives (CFC,1998,24). The primary goal of these conferences was "to improve communication and collaboration between Divisional sub-units in relation to crime and non crime related problems. An extension of this goal was to apply the same principles to the relationship between the Division, the specialized support units and the Big Five community partners" (Crime Management Conference,1998,7). And while there is mention of community partners, this process remains internally driven, with little inclusion of the community or overt feedback from community representatives. The purpose remains one of coordinating strategic objectives of the Service.

In October of 1998 Deputy Boyd chaired the first Crime Management Conference at which time 14 Division was given the opportunity to share its initiatives and progress with respect to the Crime Management process. This session marked the first complete cycle of the Crime Management process and the initial stage of implementation. As

[78] Further to this conference the Deputy Chief was to visit each Divisional Crime Management Committee at least once per year to address similar issues.

expected, Divisions were operating at varying levels within the Crime Management process. What was most important at this and subsequent sessions was an acknowledgement that the process had begun. The framework had been successfully applied and the buy-in accomplished (Service buy-in). From a restructuring perspective, Central Field Command had implemented a decentralized Divisional structure that encompassed a process of accountability, inter and intra-communication, empowerment and on going problem solving. One need only recall the broad restructuring objectives of the Beyond 2000 final report to recognize the consistency of direction.

The overarching objective of Crime Management was to ensure a degree of accountability, Divisional communication and active problem solving. It was not to hinder Divisional diversity. One indication of continued diversity can be seen in the manner in which crime management is articulated from Division to Division. For example a 12 Division communiqué suggests:

> Crime Management is another tool in our arsenal. If used effectively, it allows us to focus the energy and resources of the entire Division at a common problem. Its success and strength depends upon each sub-unit applying their expertise and uniqueness in a collective force...It also allows all personnel to access the most recent status of any particular project. With this crime system, everyone has an equally important role to play. We all share in its success but must also accept responsibility when it fails (12 Division, 1998).

Yet 52 Division indicates Crime Management is

> a comprehensive system of information collection, analysis and dissemination, a method of tactical (short term) planning, implementation and evaluation, a method of strategic (long term) planning, implementation and evaluation, a plan for seamless integration of all sub-units of the Division and a system to allow all

> internal and external resources to be involved in the process (52 Division,1998).

And while these definitions suggest a Divisional uniqueness in interpretation, they also suggest a similarity. One can recognize common characteristics of empowerment, communication, teamwork and problem solving; characteristics not only consistent with crime management objectives but those of "Beyond 2000". Moreover they articulate a Service driven process that is to utilize the community as a resource base for problem solving strategies.

A noted shortcoming of the Crime Management implementation to date centres upon inconsistent community inclusion. While Crime Management took shape under the umbrella of community policing, community empowerment has varied from Division to Division. This may be due, in part, to the diverse communities and the existence, or lack, of prior partnerships and networks. Perhaps a more concise explanation corresponds with the fact that the process has been predominantly directed at internal restructuring and organizational needs. As one officer aptly notes, "in light of municipal fiscal restraint and existing political environment, the crime management process has proven to be a valuable tool for guiding the Service's needs" (Interview, Nov,24,1998). Crime management represents an effort to operationalize broad Service restructuring objectives of decentralization and resource sharing, while couching the process in the rhetoric and symbolism of community policing. Crime Management has been more an effort to institutionalize a process of problem solving in tandem with the Service's restructuring than it has been a process of community inclusion. The process has been one more akin to the emulation of private sector managerialism than the emulation of community policing principles and community empowerment.

Conclusion

Metropolitan Toronto Police Service's restructuring project has, and continues to be, a gradual, sector by sector enhancement of corporate efficiency. And while change has in fact occurred it continues to be police driven. The question of community empowerment remains unanswered. Community responsibility continues to correspond with its identity as a resource base from which the police can draw. Restructuring has focused more upon issues of diminished resources and ways in which the Service can do more with less. Minimally, this has meant the inclusion or responsibilization of the community. The more consistent thrust of reform has been directed at internal structures and practices. Toronto Police Service embraced the political demand for community policing, provincial and fiscal crisis and the zietgiest of public sector emulation of the private sector in an opportunistic manner. The Command recognized the need for reform and sought a proactive strategy in response to the external stimulus for reform. This meant actively defining both the internal reform model and the process of implementation. The result has been a steady re-engineering of Toronto's corporate and operational structure characterized by decentralization and private sector managerialism. And while the process has had little to do with a relationship suggesting greater community independence, it has set in place an operational structure that could support these initiatives. At present the sense of fiscal crisis or external forces driving the Service's need to divest itself of control have not been as acute as experienced by other

Services. Therefore, the Service has been able to side-step any true inclusion of Toronto's diverse community and has instead implemented operational and structural reform that assures its pre-eminence in the articulation of apprehension, suppression and deterrence.

FINAL REMARKS/ CONCLUSION

Within the various definitions of community policing one can readily perceive the compelling promises of community/police partnerships, the potential for community empowerment and a renewed commitment to citizen involvement in the task of order maintenance. And yet, when these promises are extracted from the scholarly literature and resituated in current operational practices, one finds community empowerment and enhanced participation in governance remains, in many instances, merely rhetorical. Moreover, one finds the implementation of community policing is consistently driven, by a desire to achieve renewed levels of efficiency and effectiveness rather than the development of empowered communities. In the police services of Toronto, Edmonton and the RCMP, the concept of empowered communities has become a mechanism for fiscal downloading and responsibilization, not the backbone of partnership building or the co-production of social order.

Political/economic forces have contributed to the articulation of a particular understanding of governance, an understanding that has influenced the restructuring and subsequent operation of police services across the country. Throughout the process of restructuring the tenets of community empowerment and community policing have been re-engineered so as to support an institutional isomorphism concerned more with structural efficiencies and measurable outcomes than with the democratic participation of citizens. Despite these environmental commonalities, however, the collision of neo-liberalism with community policing tenets has created different manifestations of community policing in different localities. These manifestations suggest a fluidity to community policing both in terms of its operationalization and

philosophy. Clearly, the starting point for Toronto, Edmonton and the RCMP was a commitment to the implementation of community policing, and yet, we have three very different outcomes. Moreover, we see three contrasting methods by which the community is defined, utilized and engaged.

Community policing has, as these examples suggest, come to mean very different things to different people. This looseness of definition coupled with an even more nebulous understanding of community has enabled the architects of police reform to individualize the institutional isomorphism of their specific Service. In a political environment characterized by governance practices of fiscal downloading, decentralization and downsizing the ability to orchestrate ones organizational restructuring is highly coveted commodity. Community policing, therefore, has proven to be an extremely useful mechanism through which to safeguard policing's newly precarious governing autonomy.

When comparing the efforts of Edmonton, Toronto and the RCMP with regard to community empowerment and active partnerships, it is apparent that there is, indeed, a discontinuity in the role of the community. Edmonton has embraced the importance of community inclusion and partnership far in excess of Toronto and the RCMP. From the outset of Edmonton's implementation process, the community was considered essential not only in supporting the wholesale restructuring but with respect to taking an active role in problem solving and long term order maintenance. The process of community responsibilization was understood not solely in fiscal terms but in relation to an active partnership. Moreover, the community was broadly defined so that neighbourhoods and diverse community groups would be identified and included in the task of problem identification and resolution.

While community inclusion was an essential to Edmonton's implementation of community policing it was also critical to the success of institutional restructuring and downloading of resources. This strategy of community empowerment and responsibilization dovetailed with the Klein government's neo-liberal agenda wherein people were no longer portrayed as citizens and wage-earners in a democratic community, but were primarily consumers, investors and stakeholders, acting as individuals in the private marketplace (Laxer,1995). Moreover, the practice of community empowerment corresponded with Klein's efforts to shift the responsibility for providing public services from public servants to individuals, families and communities.

As Edmonton's implementation of community policing progressed the service began to lose sight of the importance of community empowerment. Community members were increasingly viewed as a volunteer cadre, rather than as active partners in resolving order maintenance issues. The Service's vision of organizational change became more reflective of the political and corporate examples of restructuring pervading Alberta's provincial government. The rhetoric of business models and corporate efficiency overshadowed the practices of community partnership and empowerment and the Service neglected the imperative of on-going community partnership development. The challenge that the Service now confronts is one of nurturing community partnerships of the past.

The RCMP, who were perhaps best suited to implement community policing by the nature of the detachment system, were unable to capitalize on an existing decentralized structure and community focused operations. Instead, this organizational structure served as a ready-made vessel through which policy makers could off load fiscal and social responsibilites as per the neo-liberal agenda of both the federal and

provincial levels of government. Rather than substantively rethinking management practices within the Service or facilitating community involvement in problem solving, the primary innovation undertaken by the RCMP under the guise of community based policing was to task detachment commanders and front-line officers with the responsibility for fund raising. Fiscal austerity, not community empowerment would underline the RCMP's effort to implement community policing.

The outcome of this process was a discontinuity between restructuring directives and the daily operation of the service. The rapid downloading of responsibility, reduction of resources and a new institutional belief that the RCMP could no longer meet the breadth of citizen expectations left a sense of confusion throughout the service. Morale, community/detachment relations and internal communication became casualties of these initiatives, all of which ran counter to the objectives of community policing. Community policing had been co-opted as a strategy for fiscal downloading and deficit reduction, not the development of police/ community partnerships in the task of order maintenance.

In the context of Toronto, the strategic development of community policing has occurred for somewhat different reasons. Community policing has played a valuable role in underscoring Toronto's strategic restructuring plan. Moreover, it assisted the Service in deflecting criticism of its aloofness by playing on the presumption of inclusiveness that attenuates the operational framework of community policing. This disjuncture between rhetoric and reality is particularly apparent when we consider Toronto Police Service's definition of community (i.e. the Big Five, police, government, media, business and non-government organizations). Nonetheless, Toronto has adapted the concept of community policing to support not only restructuring initiatives

but as a means by which to focus and guide enforcement outcomes. As noted by Deputy Chief Boyd (1998) "community policing is not the objective it is the vehicle by which the Service moves forward".

The Service has articulated various initiatives within the rhetoric of community policing in an attempt to both generate support from the community and to utilize the community as a resource base. As a result, the Service has consolidated it's influence in defining enforcement initiatives and affirming its position as quarterback in issues of order maintenance. The adoption of community policing has facilitated the Service's decentralization of operations and reinforced the efforts to shift ownership for order maintenance onto the Divisions. Moreover, by adopting community policing as the vehicle for change, the service has been able to couch many of its efforts to emulate corporate restructuring in the rhetoric of community empowerment, front line ownership and partnership development. The outcome has been a process of restructuring that has supported a fine-tuning of the Service's level of efficiency and effectiveness while maintaining a strong hand on the steering wheel. The chief consequence of this approach to community based policing is that community empowerment and partnership is more of an illusion than a reality.

It is important to note that at the centre of each of the cases considered here, the stimulus for change is grounded in a political impetus of reform, a political impetus that sought to redefine governance structures and objectives. And while this political impetus can be considered a common thread within each of these case studies, the level of political influence would differ. For example, the RCMP would be responsive to three levels of governance, Federal, Provincial and Municipal. These contrasting and fractious levels of political governance would create a problematic environment from

which to articulate a consistent and clear consensus of reform. On the other hand, the municipal services of Toronto and Edmonton navigated a less fractious political environment. Therefore, reform could be directed in a more succinct and tailored fashion.

Throughout this dissertation I have indicated that both community policing and neo-liberalism articulate a promise of empowered communities, citizen responsibilization and the greater involvement in democratic governance. And yet, when these promises are juxtaposed with the examples of application within the policing environment we find a distinct incongruity. The rhetoric of community empowerment and partnership have, in many instances, been a cover for organizational restructuring and fiscal austerity. Community partnerships have been used in a range of different ways but, most consistently, as a target of fiscal downloading and responsibilization. And while this appears to be the mode of application, community policing continues to hold many possibilities. I believe that policing is still at the edge of a major shift and that the re-orientation occurring over the past decade has left policing at a point where it must embrace the community, not as a monetary resource, but as an active partner in addressing issues of social disorder. This also implies that communities must no longer be willing to be passive receptors of police driven initiatives but be proactive and reactive. This tone of partnership is frequently echoed in the language of police executives and the manner in which they have realigned their specific police services. It is now the task of the community to demand the opportunity, to take advantage of the situation and challenge police services. It is time for the community to co-opt the rhetoric and practices of empowerment and place its hand firmly on the rudder.

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Interviews:

Metropolitan Toronto Police Service (January 12th 1997 to January 15th, 1999)

Hold -Up Squad

Det. Belgrade
D/Cst. Pink
Det. Greenwood
Det. Farey
S/Insp. S. Harris
D/Sgt. J. Brown
D/Sgt. T. Warr
Brenda Tilley (Analyst)
Det. T. McNamara

Robbery Reduction Work Group

Det/Sgt B. Borg
Cst. B Luscomb
Bonnie Skok (Civilian Member) Corp/Planning
Sgt S. Ellis
Cst. I. Ross
Cst. E. Easterbrook
S/Sgt. M. Farrar

Other Service Members

Deputy/Chief M. Boyd
Supt. K Cowling, 14 Division
D/Sgt B. Kelman, 14 Division
Det. D. Vandemark, 14 Division
S/Sgt. K. Kinsman, 14 Division
Supt. Sam Fairclough, 12 Division
Insp. B. Smollet, 12 Division
S/Sgt. C. Ashley, 12 Division
D/Sgt. R. Totty, 12 Division
Det. L. Brien, Internal Audit and Review
S /Sgt. H. Kuck, 53 Division, Com/Response
Supt. A. Maher, 52 Division
Cst. B. Dziengo, Central Field Command
Sgt. T. Russell, Central Field Command
Carol Whynot, Senior Planner,

Participant Observation

Robbery Reduction Initiative Phase I
Focus Group : January 24,1997
: February 26,1997

Robbery Reduction Initiative Phase II
Working Group: March 24th to April 23rd,1997

Central Field Command, Crime Management Meeting, January 28, 1998
Central Field Command, Crime Management Workshop, February 3-4, 1998
Central Field Command, Crime Management Conference, October 30, 1998

Edmonton Police Service (Feburary 9th to March 5th, 1998)

Chief J. Lindsay
Deputy/Chief C. Vann
Supt. B. Yaremko
Supt. P.J. Duggan
Sgt. B. MacEachern
Sgt. J. Wilks
Cst. J. Elkow
Cst. S. Mah
Cst. J. Stephenson
Sgt. J. Findlay
Cst. E. McEvoy
Sgt. D. Grant
Sgt. T. Simoni
S/Sgt. R. Gagnon
S/Sgt. D. Veitch
Cst. D. Service
Sgt. G. Bonn
S/Sgt. G. Malina
S/Sgt. K. Whitton
Cst. A. Davis
Cst. D. Hickmore
Cst. D. Murray
Cst. J. Weiss
Cst. W. Denis
S/Sgt C. Kellet
Gerald Woodill (Civilian) Analyst /Executive Services Unit

Walk/Ride Along Sessions
Cst. Dan Service, Downtown Foot Patrol
Cst. James Elkow, Belvedere Foot Patrol
Cst. Elie McEvoy, Downtown Response

R.C.M.P K-Division (February 1st to March 3rd, 1999)

Asst/Commissioner D. McDermid
Supt. R.Bowlby OC Client Services/ Corporate Management Branch
Sgt. K Graham
Sgt. D. Honeyman
Cst. J. Lipscome
Cpl. J. Galloway
S/Sgt. J. Briscoe
Cpl. P. Clark
Cpl. N. Lemay
Cst. R. Olansky
Cst. D. Urano
Cst. G. MacDonald

Cst. R. Southern
Donna Huestis (Civilian) Community Policing Section, K-Division HQ
Sgt. J. Carrol
S/Sgt. J. Fell
Cst. K. Anderson
S/Sgt. Hobbes
Cst. J. Lefebvre
Sgt. M. MacKinnon
Cpl. H. Thompson
Cst. T. Ford
Insp. J. Guertin
Cpl. D. Hample
S/Sgt. A. Derouin

Supplementary Interview

Sue Olson, MLA, Alberta Legislature. Liberal Justice Critic

Appendices:

- *Edmonton Police Service Organizational Chart*
- Edmonton Police Service Call Path Chart
- Edmonton Police Service Citizen Survey
- Time Consumed Graph and Response Time Curve
- Edmonton Police Service Actions For Success
- RCMP Mission, Vision and Values Statement
- Metropolitan Toronto Police Service Organizational Charts
- MTPS, Hold -Up Squad Statistics for Financial and Retail Robberies 1996/98
- MTPS, Robbery Reduction Initiative Phase One Focus Group Participant Lists
- MTPS, Robbery Reduction Initiative Phase Two Working Group
- MTPS, Robbery Reduction Initiative Recommendations
- MTPS, Crime Management Process Overview
- MTPS, Crime Management Committee
- Interview Schedule

EDMONTON POLICE SERVICE



Organization Chart

APPENDIX A

Call Path Chart



Citizen Survey - Confidence in the E.P.S.

Changes in Public Confidence

1990 - 1996



The number of people expressing confidence in the E.P.S. exceeded those who indicated decreased confidence from 1993 to 1996.

CHANGES IN CIVIC POPULATION

1987 - 1996

Year	Sworn Members (as of Dec.31)	%Change	Population	%Change	Ratio
1987	1,080	-	571,506	-	1 : 529
1988	1,073	-0.65%	576,249	0.83%	1 : 537
1989	1,086	1.21%	580,800	0.79%	1 : 535
1990	1,078	-0.74%	605,538	4.26%	1 : 562
1991	1,072	-0.56%	614,655	1.51%	1 : 573
1992	1,088	1.49%	618,195	0.58%	1 : 568
1993	1,114	2.39%	626,999	1.42%	1 : 563
1994	1,078	-3.23%	628,310	0.21%	1 : 583
1995	1,107	2.69%	628,729	0.07%	1 : 568
1996	1,128	1.90%	616,306	-1.98%	1 : 546
Total Change	48	4.44%	44,800	7.84%	17

E.P.S. sworn strength has not kept pace with the growing population.


% Consumed Time per Unit
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
Reactive Policing Standard
Community Policing Standard
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
DOWNTOWN
NORTH
SOUTH
WEST


Response Time Curves
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Reactive Standard
Community Standard
15% 18% 20% 23% 25% 28% 30% 33% 35% 38% 40% 43% 45% 48% 50% 53% 55% 58% 60% 63% 65%
% Consumed Time per Unit
Theoretical
Actual

- WORKLOAD

	WEST	NORTH	SOUTH	DOWNTOWN
1997-1996 CHANGE	3.9%	-0.4%	3.8%	4.8%
1998 CHANGE	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

	1998 FORECAST REQUIREMENTS WEST	NORTH	SOUTH	DOWNTOWN	
ACTUAL CONSTABLES (98 FEB)	122	128	134	135	
CONSTABLES REQUIRED (1998)	138	156	158	174	COMMUNITY STANDARD (35%)
ADDITIONAL NEEDED	16	28	24	39	107
AVERAGE CONSUMED TIME PER UNIT	43%	49%	45%	54%	

EDMONTON POLICE SERVICE
Actions for Success

Critical Issues	
Making Edmonton A Safer City	**Shortage of Resources**
Customer Service, Roles & Expectations	**Rewards & Recognition, Career Planning & Organizational Health**
Family Issues - Violence & Prevention	**Evaluation Methodology & Perceptions (Policing for Results)**

Actions for Success will be developed by every Detail, Unit, Section, Division & Bureau head within the Edmonton Police Service. The Actions will define "who we are" and "what we do". It will identify unique characteristics of our Service and provide a mechanism to chart our growth and progress into the future. The Actions will be concise and address seven key criteria:

Area of Work: Detail, Unit, Section, Division or Bureau:

- **Function Priorities**

- the Critical Issues as developed by the Edmonton Police Service (pick Critical Issues applicable to your Detail, Unit, Section, Division or Bureau and develop "Actions for Success" on each one).

- **Goal**

- the objective toward which strategies and resources are directed as a means of addressing a function priority.
- the intended result.

- **Standard**

- an accepted measure of comparison conforming to an established norm.
- a benchmark that an established goal is intended to meet or exceed.

- **Strategies**

- plans and courses of action developed as means to achieve a goal.
-tactics, approach, steps to be taken in each action item.

- **Performance Indicators**

- the evaluation of strategies employed.
- a means or a yardstick for measuring the success and shortcomings of strategies and action items.
-progress reports.

- **Target Dates**

- projected completion dates for each strategy or action item.
- comparison of completion dates to target dates is a performance indicator.

- **Accountability**

- the individual(s) or position(s) ultimately responsible for the attainment of goals, or the functions of an organizational entity.
- how do the results relate to the Critical Issues?

	Prepared by:		
Name:	Rank:	Signature:	Date:
	Reviewed by:		
Next in Chain of Command:	Rank:	Signature:	Date:
Next in Chain of Command:	Rank:	Signature:	Date:
Next in Chain of Command:	Rank:	Signature:	Date:
Next in Chain of Command:	Rank:	Signature:	Date:

North Division - Patrol

- Actions for Success -

Priority

Making Edmonton A Safer City

Goal

To institutionalize Problem Solving within the Division.

Standard

Approach all calls in North Division with a view to eliminating or reducing the need for Police in the future.

Strategies

- Assign ownership of "turf" at the lowest level.
- Develop & establish a network of outside agencies that could provide for a multi-agency response to problem solving.
- Respond to the actual needs of the community & bring a sensitivity to their perception of the problem.
- Adopt the "Buck Stops Here" attitude.
- Ensure that every member of the Division works on at least one identified problem every rating period.
- Standardize the problem solving reporting process.
- Recognize & reward excellence in problem solving initiatives.

Performance Indicators

- Reduction in calls for Service.
- Positive feedback from our customers.
- Documented problem solving initiatives.

Target Date

December 31, 1997

Accountability

Divisional Superintendent
A, B, & C Platoon Commanders

***Our Mission**: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is Canada's national police service. Proud of our traditions and confident in meeting future challenges, we commit to preserve the peace, uphold the law, and provide quality service in partnership with our communities.*

***Core Values:** Recognizing the dedication of all employees, we will create and maintain an environment of individual safety, well-being and development. We are guided by: Integrity; Honesty; Professionalism; Compassion; Respect; and Accountability.*

***Our Vision** is to:*

- *Be a progressive, proactive and innovative organization.*
- *Provide the highest quality service through dynamic leadership, education, and technology in partnership with the diverse communities we serve.*
- *Be accountable and efficient through shared decision-making.*
- *Ensure a healthy work environment and encourage team building, open communication and mutual respect.*
- *Promote safe communities.*
- *Demonstrate leadership in the pursuit of excellence.*

(Royal Canadian Mounted Police *Mission, Vision and Values Statement)*


Exhibit 15
Metropolitan Toronto Police
Organizational Chart
Approved by The Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board
1992 07 09
Effective from 1992 08 05
(Updated 1994 09 23)
Board Staff
Legal Office
Chief's Staff
Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board
Chief of Police
Public Affairs
Support Command
Complaints Review
Internal Affairs
Support Operations
Court Services
Communications Services
Field Support Services
Professional Standards
Detective Command
Detective Operations
Detective Services
Field Command
Community Services
Field Operations
District Operations (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
Traffic Operations
Public Affairs
Community Planning
District Detective Office
Drug Squad
Street Crime
Division
Community Service Office
Uniform Platoons
Detective Office
Administrative Command
Administrative Operations
Training Education & Development
Records & Information Security
Computing & Telecommunications
Labour Relations
Personnel Services
Finance & Administration
Executive Operations
Corporate Planning
Staff Office
Duty Desk
Beyond 2000 Implementation Committee
Legal Services

Exhibit 16

Metropolitan Toronto Police Force
Proposed Organizational Chart



* *Beyond 2000 Restructuring Implementation Team is a temporary unit.*

** *Labour Relations reports to the Police Services Board for collective bargaining purposes.*

*** *It is important to note that the Employee Assistance Program (E.A.P.) will report, for administrative purposes only, to the Chief of Police through the Chief's Staff.*
The actual reporting relationship is at the discretion of the Chief of Police, and may be subject to further review.

Revised: 1994.12.16

HOLD UP SQUAD - FINANCIAL INSTITUTION UNIT
1996 to 1998
MONTHLY ROBBERY STATISTICS

(Note figures are given as of September 9th, 1998)

Year	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	Total
1996	46	40	47	33	43	17	41	32	27	23	32	17	Yr End 398 To 31 Aug 299
1997	44 -02	52 + 12	26 - 21	28 - 05	28 - 20	23 + 06	29 - 12	26 - 06	23 +5	23 0	19 +13	17 0	Yr End 338 To 31 Aug 256
1998	21 - 23	33 - 19	24 - 02	35 + 07	26 - 02	22 - 01	36 + 07	33 + 07					230 - 26



Analysis

In 1997 there was 43 *fewer* Financial Institution Robbery Occurrences than in 1996 or a 14.38 % decrease from January the 01st to August the 31st, 1997.

In 1998 there was 26 *fewer* Financial Institution Robbery Occurrences than in 1997 or a 10.15 % decrease from January the 01st to August the 31st, 1998.

In 1997 there was 60 *fewer* Financial Institution Robbery Occurrences than in 1996 or a 15.07 % decrease for the entire year.

98.09.11 @ 07:36

Monthly F.I. Robbery Occurrences 1996-1998 with Mean Average & Standard Deviations

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	To Aug 31st	Year Total
1996	46	40	47	33	43	17	41	32	27	23	32	17	299	398
1997	44	52	26	28	28	23	29	26	23	23	19	17	256	338
1998	21	33	24	35	26	22	36	33	*	*	*	*	230	230
Mean Average	37	42	32	32	32	21	35	30	*	*	*	*	262	322
Standard Deviation	14	10	13	4	9	3	6	4	*	*	*	*	35	85
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec		Year Total
Standard Deviation	23	32	20	28	23	17	29	27	*	*	*	*	227	237
Mean Average	37	42	32	32	32	21	35	30	*	*	*	*	262	322
Standard Deviation	51	51	45	36	42	24	41	34	*	*	*	*	297	407

In Statistical Analysis the **"Mean Average"** and the **"Statistical Deviation"** are two indicators that allow us to compare , "where we are", to "where we were" or current figures to past figures. to to get an accurate picture to determine of approximately how

The Mean Average simply gives us a **"middle of the road"** figure for each set or group of numbers we are looking at. In this case, the number of Financial Institution robberies is broken down month by month over the last three(3) years. In the above chart there wer 46 robberies in January 1996, 44 robberies in January 1997, and 21 robberies in January 1998. The mean average for January is 37 Financial Institution robberies. That number (37) is considered to be the typical number of robberies, or middle of the road figure per month for January.

1996 to 1998
MONTHLY ROBBERY STATISTICS

(As of September 9th, 1998)

Year	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	Total
1996	152	135	121	121	95	68	88	60	70	90	100	91	Yr End 1191 As of Aug.31st 840
1997	102 -50	89 -46	93 -28	59 -62	69 -26	81 +13	83 -5	89 +29	75 +5	81 -9	80 -20	105 +14	Yr End 1006 As of Aug.31st 665
1998	99 - 3	83 - 6	93 0	71 + 12	75 + 6	61 - 20	59 - 24	44 - 45					As of Aug.31st 585 - 80



Analysis

In 1997 there was 175 *fewer* Retail Business Robbery Occurrences than in 1996 or a 20.83 % decrease for the first 8 months.

In 1998 there was 80 *fewer* Retail Business Robbery Occurrences than in 1997 or a 12.03 % decrease for the first 8 months.

In 1997 there was 185 *fewer* Retail Business Robbery Occurrences than in 1996 or a 15.53 % decrease for the entire year.

98.09.11 @ 07:34

Monthly Robbery Occurrences 1996 to 1998 with Mean Average & Standard Deviations

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	To July	Year Total
1996	152	135	121	121	95	68	88	60	70	90	100	91	780	1191
1997	102	89	93	59	69	81	83	89	75	81	80	105	576	1006
1998	99	83	93	71	76	60	59	44	*	*	*	*	541	585
Mean Average	118	102	102	84	80	70	77	64	*	*	*	*	632	927
Standard Deviation	30	28	16	33	13	11	16	23	*	*	*	*	129	311

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year Total
Standard Deviation	88	74	86	51	67	59	61	42	*	*	*	*	503	617
Mean Average	118	102	102	84	80	70	77	64	*	*	*	*	632	927
Standard Deviation	147	131	118	117	93	80	92	87	*	*	*	*	761	1238



Appendix A:

Focus Group Participants

January 24, 1997

MCLOUD	Ron	C.I.B.C.	Director - Ontario Pub. Rel.
BROWN	Michael	Ministry of Justice	Sen. Pol. Advisor
GARDINER	Norm	Metro Council	Councillor
CLARKE	Paul	T.S.N.	VP.- Marketing
STROBEL	Mike	The Toronto Sun	Editor
SHEARS	Mary Deanne	The Toronto Star	Dep. Managing Editor
KENDALL	Ron	55 CPLC	member
SPYROPOLOUS	Barabara	12 CPLC	Chair
FERGUSON	Simone	National Parole Board	Director - Ontario
MANTZEL	Reinhard	Immigration - Canada	Director - Enforc.
ORR	Derek	Corrections Canada	Director- Ontario
COMMERFORD	Gary	Corrections Ontario	Director
REYNOLDS	Graham	Attorney General's Office	A.D.M.
CAMPBELL	Archie	Courts - Judiciary	Justice
MARSHALL	Lauren	Courts - Judiciary	Judge
CULVER	Paul	Courts - Prosecutors	Crown Attorney
MCMAHON	John	Courts - Prosecutor	Crown Attorney
MOTIUK	Larry	Corrections Canada	Director General
GRAHAM	Hugh	Royal Bank	Manager-Risk Mgt.
CHARLEBOIS	Marc Andre	Insurance Bureau of Canada	V.President
BALLARD	Mike	C.B.A.	V. President
JOHNSON	Carol	Crime Concern	Executive Director
WILSON	Keith	CITY TV	Director-News Operations
BOYD	Mike	Detective Supp. Command	D/Chief
REESOR	Steve	Operation Supp. Command	D/Chief
MOORE	Hugh	Adminstration Supp. Comm.	CAO - Policing
DICKS	Dave	41 Division	Supt.
ROBERTSON	Al	32 Divsion	Supt.
PARKIN	Jim	52 Division	Supt.
OLDHAM	Wayne	ETF	Supt.
WILEY	Jerry	Legal Services	Legal Advisor
HARRIS	Steve	Hold Up Squad	S/Inpsector
WARR	Tony	Hold Up Squad	Det. Sgt
MCCREADY	Brian	Hold Up Squad	Det. Sgt.
SHORT	Ron	Hold Up Squad	Det. Sgt.
TOWNLEY	Wilf	Hold Up Squad	Det. Sgt
MCNAMARA	Tom	Hold Up Squad	Det.
GRAY	Louise	Media Relations	Director
COTGREAVE	Wayne	Det. Supp. Command	Det. Sgt.

Facilitators were: Bill Goggin & Mike Farrar, Wendy Ward & Alison McEachern, Gary Pitcher & Aimee Fortier.

January 27, 1997

DICKS	Dave	41 Division	Supt.
ROBERTSON	Al	32 Division	Supt.
PARKIN	Jim	52 Division	Supt.
OLDHAM	Wayne	ETF	Supt.
WILEY	Jerry	Legal Services	Legal Advisor
MCCREADY	Brian	Hold Up Squad	Det. Sgt.
SHORT	Ron	Hold Up Squad	Det. Sgt.
TOWNLEY	Wilf	Hold Up Squad	Det. Sgt
MCNAMARA	Tom	Hold Up Squad	Det.
CROWLEY	James		33 D/Sgt
JONES	Donald	Reporting Centre	A/Insp.
BROWN	John	S.A.S	D/Sgt
BROWNELL	Dave	S.I.S.	D/Sgt.
TOTTY	Ron		12 D/Sgt
KINSMAN	Ken		14 S/Sgt
KELMAN	Robert		14 D/Sgt
HANLON	Gerry		21 D/Sgt
CSEFKO	Peter		22 S/Sgt
SMOLLET	Brody		23 D/Sgt
CORRIE	Tony		31 D/Sgt
PINFOLD	Mike		12 S/Sgt
COULIS	Rick	Communications	S/Sgt
DICKS	Jim		42 S/Sgt
CRAWFORD	Bruce		51 D/Sgt
SMALLBONE	Ron		52 D/Sgt
LEGEAR	Barry		55 s/ sgt
CAMPBELL	Donald	East Field Command	D/Sgt
TRAVATTO	Frank	North West Field Command	D/Sgt
WIGHTON	Stewart	Central Field Command	D/Sgt
GRAY	Louise	Media Relations	Director
MASSEY	Doug	Crime Stoppers	Sergeant
RAYBOULD	Brian	Oper. Support Command	Det. Sgt.
KINDY	Keith		42 Det. Sgt.
BRIAN	Larry	Int. Audit/Prog. Rev.	Det.

Facilitators were: Mike Farrar & Tom Russel, Wendy Ward & Darren Smith, Gary Pitcher & Gary Ellis.

NB: The list contains the names of those who were invited to attend this session, a few last-minute replacements may have been made for various reasons.

February 26, 1997

SHANAHAN, Michael	Det	11
FALLIS,Robert	PC	11
CESTRA,Mario	Sgt.	11
KOCHER, Jerry	Det	12
HOGG, Paul	Sgt	12
MONAGHAN, Pat	PC	12
TEETER, Robert	Det	13
HOLKER, James	Sgt	13
O'BRIEN, Tim	PC	13
WOLF, Ray	Det	14
WHEALY, Gord	Sgt	14
MADILL, Neil	PC	14
WOODLEY, David	Sgt	21
HART, Doug	PC	21
MANDS. Ted	D/C	21
IANNUCCILLI, Fred	Sgt.	22
NELSON, Bill	Det	22
TRETTER, Terry	PC	22
DITOMASSO, Mario	Det	23
LEGGETT, John	Sgt	23
CLARK, Gord	PC	23
PLATT, Steve	Det	31
GREENWOOD, Kim	Sgt	31
DIPASSA, Domenic	PC	31
BUTT, Dave	PC	32
SPROXTON, Jim	Det	32
STARK, Al	Sgt	32
BRATTON, Phil	Det	33
FENTON, Mark	Sgt	33
BARTON, Pat	PC	33
DOYLE, Ted	Sgt	41
COUNSELL, Mike	Det	41
PENGELLY, Ken	PC	41
GOTTSCHALK, Brian	Sgt.	42
HAMILTON, Bob	PC	42
VICKERS, Dave	DC	42
WILKINSON, Glen	Sgt	51
OOMS, Richard	PC	51
LEWIS, Cliff	Det	51
DOUDS, Keith	Sgt	52
TINKLER, John	Det	52
DALE, Don	PC	52
CHARUK, Mark	PC	53
McLEAN, Wm	Sgt.	53
WHEELER, William	PC	53
FLYNN, Barry	Det	54

Appendix B:

Routine Order re Robbery Reduction Working Group

97.04.07 - 0555

ROBBERY REDUCTION PHASE II

The Chief of Police and Command Officers have publicly committed the Service to reducing robberies in Metropolitan Toronto by twenty percent.

Phase I involved the collection of ideas and suggestions from four focus groups:

- Front line officers;
- Staff Sergeants and Detective Sergeants
- Robbery specialists and Financial Institution Investigators from the Greater Toronto Area;
- Representatives of the community(business and residential groups), politicians, social & government agencies and the media.

Phase II, a planning group comprised of members from each command, will be responsible for studying all suggestions and ideas collected and, to formulate an operational plan to reduce robberies which they will propose to the Command.

The success of this commitment rests with the continued involvement of, and suggestions and ideas from all members of the Service and our community partners. Contact the Robbery Reduction Planning Group at:

· E-MAIL: Robbery Reduction
· Voice Mail: Local 8-7779

To facilitate the completion of Phase II the following members will be temporarily transferred to Internal Audit/Program Review effective March 24, 1997:

Det/Sgt. Anthony WARR	(113)	Hold Up Squad - Project Manager
Sgt. Stanley ELLIS	(4317)	32 Division
PC Brian LUSCOMBE	(1161)	54 Division
PC Brian BORG	(2847)	Special Invest. Serv.
PC Ian ROSS	(4957)	53 Division
PC Ed EASTERBROOK	(7188)	Marine Unit
Civ. Bonnie SKOK	(88386)	R.I.S.

(Note: S/Sgt. Michael FARRAR (6111) of Internal Audit and Program Review will represent Executive Support Command on the Planning Group).

Per: Hold-Up Squad.

Appendix E:

Persons Interviewed by the Robbery Reduction Advisory Group

Colin Davies	Crime Analyst - Intelligence Services
Larry Brien	Internal Audit/Program Review re 41 Division Pilot Project.
Brenda Tilley	Crime Analyst - Hold-Up Squad
Louise Gray	Corporate Communication
Robert Montrose	Fugitive Squad - S.I.S.
Harvey Williams Steve Horwood Don Mccallum	Firearms Enforcement Unit - S.I.S.
Paul Culver	Crown Attorney - Toronto
Jerry Wiley	MTPS Legal Services
Paul Lobsinger	S.A.S. re the Internet
Erika Wybourn	C&T
Christine Long	IA/PR re Phone-In Reports
Terry Spencer	Victim Services
Gary Mcbride	Corporate Communications - Update
John Muise	Street Crime
Paul Facciol	Canadian Bankers Association
Lloyd Hodgins	Royal Bank Security
Norm Brosseau	Canada Trust Security
Doug Denniston	C.I.B.C. Security

Appendix D:

Members of the Robbery Reduction Advisory Group

D/Sgt. Brian Raybould - Op. Sup. Command

Erika Wybourn - C&T

S/Sgt. Brent Smerdon - Ad. Support Command

Peter Howes - R.I.S.

Det. Dave Harlock - N/W Field Command

S/Sgt. Gary Ellis - T.E.D.

Louise Gray - Corporate Communications

Hing-Bo Fung - Corporate Planning

D/Sgt. im Derry - Det. Sup. Command

D/Sgt. Don Campbell - East Field Command

Det. Frank Malone - Central Field Command

D/Sgt. Frank Trovato -N/W Field Command

S/Insp. Steve Harris - Hold Up

FIELD, Allistair	Sgt		54
MURRAY, William	PC		54
SAUNDERS, Dave	Sgt.		55
CASHMAN, Gerald	Det		55
MACOOMB, Rick	PC		55
LOWRY, James	Det.	Fraud	
CHAN, Philip	D/C	EFC	
GIEDROYC, Karl	DC	CFC	
MARTIN, Bob	D/C	SIS-Drugs	
BORG, Brian	D/Cst	SIS	
RADBOURN, Rob	Sgt.	Comm. Prg	
QUAN, Doug	D/C	Hold Up	
PINK, Ed	D/C	Hold Up	
MCDONALD, John	D/C	Hold Up	
MCCALLUM, Rob	D/C	Hold Up	
ROBINSON, Ken	DC	Rep. Centre	
BUCKLEY, Scott	PC	Police Dog	
DONAVON, Drew	PC	Traffic Serv	
KEALEY, Devin	PC	Corp. Comm.	

Facilitators were: Mike Farrar & Erika Wybourn, Tom Russel & Larry Brien, Wendy Ward & Darren Smith, Gary Ellis & Gary Pitcher.

NB: The list contains the names of those who were invited to attend this session, a few last-minute replacements may have been made for various reasons.

March 19, 1997

Financial Institutions	
HODGINS, Lloyd	Royal Bank
FACCIOL, Paul	C.B.A.
BROSSEAU, Norm	Canada Trust
ABRAHAM, Brian	Canada Trust
DENNISTON, Doug	CIBC
KEIGHLEY, Terry	Credit Union
RIDDELL, Bob	Hong Kong Bank
SMITH, Geoff	Scotiabank
STEAD, Al	Bank of Montreal
WADDELL, Bob	National Trust
JILEK, Brian	National Trust
DONNELLY, Mike	Toronto Dominion Bank
Police	
McCREADY, Brian	Metro Hold Up
TILLEY, Brenda	Metro Hold Up
PINKNEY, Stan	Durham
ROLAUER, Ron	Durham
MURRAY, Tom	Peel
CULF, Steve	Peel
SKERRAT, Steve	Halton- Burlington
PARRIN, Chris	Halton-Burlington
BROUGHTON, Dave	Halton
POWER, Marty	Halton
WILSON, Rod	Halton
BURNS, Larry	Halton
WILSON, Dan	Durham
HOLTORF, Pat	Durham
HORNE, Randy	York
WASSINK, Bob	York
YOUNG, Deb	York

Facilitators were Mike Farrar, Erika Wybourn, Gary Ellis and Tom McNamara.

NB: The list contains the names of those who were invited to attend this session, a few last-minute replacements may have been made for various reasons.

The Root Causes of Robbery

A Model for:
Apprehension
Suppression
Deterrence



"Broken Windows"

Percentage changes should be recorded within the robbery categories[25]

3. Target Youth Crime:

a) *Reinforce existing "Street Crime" Units as recommended by the Beyond 2000 Report.*

b) *Reinforce the working relationship between Community Response Units and Street Crime Units to develop coordinated approaches to youth crime both in and outside schools.*

c) *Support and reinforce existing education/prevention programs that offer youth an alternative to crime.*

The Working Group fully supports and adopts all of the recommendations made in the 1996 Environmental Scan[26] under the heading "Implications for Police Service" at page 148. It would be redundant to repeat them in this document.

In addition the recommendations in the "Beyond 2000 Final Report[27]" , in their Section (XVII) *Community Response Operations,* and principally their recommendation (17.3)[28] should be reinforced and used as the basis to comply with these recommendations. The structure already exists within the divisional model for proactive measures to be taken to target youth crime.

The Working Group supports all the efforts now being concentrated in the area of schools and students. These recommendations are made to stress the need for these programs to continue and to be reinforced wherever possible.

The police, school boards and community groups must continue to target students to educate them on the consequences of robbery. Statistics for 1995 show that the number of school age victims of robbery were 877 or about 14.7% of all robbery victims. Youths (12 - 17 years of age), charged with robbery account for 42.77% (580) of those arrested in 1995 for robbery. In 1996 the number of youths described as being responsible for robbery is about 43%[29].

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[25] Internal Audit & Program Review are currently working with R.I.S. with regard to this request and expect to do some computer runs within a few weeks to check the feasibility of this request.

[26] 1996 Environmental Scan and 1997/98 Goals and Objectives, August 1996, Corporate Planning Unit, Metropolitan Toronto Police Service.

[27] Metropolitan Toronto Police Restructuring Task Force, Beyond 2000, Final Report, December 1994.

[28] "(17.3) That the street crime function be performed by the constables in the Community Response Office, who will develop working relationships with school officials and students in their neighbourhoods. Using a community problem-solving approach, the officer[s] will exert a positive influence on local youth through a mix of communication, education and, when necessary, enforcement."

[29] Metropolitan Toronto Police Service 1995 Statistics. A Companion to the 1995 Annual Report at pages 10 & 11.

The Working Group offers the hypothesis that there is a graduation from minor offences such as schoolyard intimidation and bullying offences, to the more socially unacceptable and violent types of robberies,

> "...a former Chicago Police Executive, remarked shortly after "Broken Windows" appeared, "I knew it, when we stop kids from panhandling on the El (Chicago's subway system), we are preventing robberies. Kids start out asking for money; they then find out that people are scared in the subway and begin to try to intimidate them into giving them money. *It's a short step from intimidation to simply taking the money*"" [30].

There is a strong belief that armed retail/financial institution robbers graduate through the different types of street robberies. However, no empirical research has been located to support this belief. Once meaningful data is collected this kind of research can be conducted by Service analysts.

Development of programs by educators and street crime investigators that target these potential "graduates", and offer alternatives are strongly recommended.

Presently there are several programs geared toward educating youths on social values such as the VIP program and Tackle Violence 96. Feedback from the aforementioned programs has been very positive from both staff and students. A similar type of program directed at robbery should be developed. The Working Group has approached members of the former 5 District Street Crime Unit and the Video Services Unit and they are acceptable to developing such a program.

4. Institute a "zero tolerance" strategy with regard to all Repeat Offenders.

i) *In conjunction with the Crown Attorney's office develop a coordinated strategy for the prosecution of Repeat Offenders.*

ii) *Collect statistics concerning the number of repeat offenders arrested for robbery.*

iii) *Educate crime analysts so that they are able to deliver expert testimony at sentencing hearings of repeat offenders.*

Repeat Offender[31]: Any offender who commits a crime of a similar nature for a second or subsequent time, and in the context of

[30] Kelling, George et al, Fixing Broken Windows.

[31] Paul Culver, Crown Attorney for the City of Toronto and Mr. Jerry Wiley, Legal Services, support this definition.

robbery, one who is charged with a second or subsequent robbery.

This strategy is commonly referred to as "R.O.P. (e)" [Repeat Offender Program] and is based upon the principals outlined in the Beyond 2000 Report[32] and the recommendations of the Crime Management Working Group[33].

Statistical analysis has determined that repeat offenders commit a large percentage of robberies[34].

Usually, persons arrested for robbery have been convicted/arrested for other criminal offences prior to the arrest for robbery, thus supporting the hypothesis that robbery is not a "first-timer" crime. Robbery offenders will most likely come from one or more of these categories[35]:

Drug Offenders.
Firearms Offenders.
Parole Offenders.
Foreign Criminals.
Local Warrant Offenders.
Youth Offenders.
Organized Crime Offenders.
Judicial Release Offenders.

By targeting repeat offenders and adopting a "zero tolerance" approach in dealing with them from the time of arrest to conviction, robberies and other types of violent crimes will be significantly reduced.

The Service has no corporate strategy to deal with repeat offenders. Individual police officers have investigated, apprehended, processed and prepared cases for court in a manner that they have deemed to be appropriate. There are no guidelines to assist investigators other than through reviews of case preparation by supervisory Sergeants/Detectives and Staff Sergeants/Detective Sergeants.

Currently no offender profile information is collected, nor analyzed, to assist investigators to identify offenders who fit robbery offender profiles. The MTP 100, Record of Arrest report has some offender-profiling sections[36], however this valuable information is not captured during occurrence processing and therefore is not available to be extracted for the purpose of creating an offender profile. This data needs to be captured and available

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[32] Metropolitan Toronto Police Restructuring Task Force, Beyond 2000 Final Report, December 1994.
[33] Report on Crime Management from The Crime Management Working Group, 1997. Presented to Chief and Command March 1997.
[34] See Analysis of last 90 persons arrested for Robbery in Appendix "G".
[35] Ibid.
[36] Boxes that indicate: Previous convictions; On probation; On parole; On bail.

for analysis and it is recommended that the CIPS program be upgraded to allow this type of analysis.

At present specialized Service units exist to deal with drug, firearms and organized crime offenders and the Working Group assumes that the Service will continue to support and reinforce these programs. However, the Working Group recommends that programs be initiated or expanded to pursue the following categories of repeat offenders:

Parole Offenders
Foreign Criminals
Warrant Offenders
Judicial Release Offenders
Youth Offenders (addressed in Recommendation #3 above).

It is important to note that in the above offender categories, strategies can be implemented without significant deployment of personnel or additional financial resources. In addition emphasis should continue to be based on the concept of decentralization outlined in the Beyond 2000 Final Report.

More importantly, these strategies target repeat offenders already known to police **who are already subject to arrest.** When removed from society, they will not be able to commit violent crimes, including robbery. The Working Group accepts the well-known precept that most crime is committed by a very small segment of society and that the more frequently a person has been arrested the likelihood of recidivism is dramatically increased[37]. Therefore, it is logical to assume that this group of offenders are committing the majority of robberies.

Rationales for the recommendations regarding each type of repeat offender:

a) **Warrant Offenders:**

i) *Focus attention on the importance of executing outstanding warrants and conducting pro-active programs to facilitate this.*

ii) *Each Division/Unit conduct audits of outstanding criminal warrants held, and create a catalogue of wanted persons.*

iii) *Collect statistics of persons arrested for robbery for whom an arrest warrant already existed.*

iv) *Study the feasibility of a central "clearing-house" for criminal warrant investigations.*

[37] Philadelphia Cohort Study, Marvin Wolfgang et al.

Warrant Offender: Anyone, for whom a criminal warrant already exists, whether First Instance or Bench Warrant which originated from a charge laid by the Metropolitan Toronto Police.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Service has always dealt with local warrant offenders at the division, squad and unit level in one of two ways:

(a) through investigators assigned to the Unit, or
(b) through investigators assigned to the Detective Office, Warrant Office.

Front line officers have the majority of first contact with local warrant offenders as a result of other investigation or arrests. This usually occurs when the offender is arrested for committing new offences and investigation determines that a warrant already exists. Warrant Offenders are also arrested as a result of investigation after it is determined (usually via CPIC) that there may be a warrant(s) outstanding for their arrest. Investigators assigned to the Detective Office, general or warrant sections are usually responsible for processing these offenders for court. It is uncommon for a list or catalogue of persons wanted on warrants to be available.

Both the roles of front line police officers and officers assigned to the Criminal Investigation Bureau tend to be re-active roles toward warrant enforcement. A designated, divisional warrant officer spends a substantial amount of time processing persons who voluntarily surrender themselves on outstanding warrants ("walk-in's"). Due to a limited number of personnel dedicated to Warrant enforcement, very little in the way pro-active efforts are being made to arrest warrant offenders.

There are 17,030 outstanding criminal warrants Service wide[38].

> *An initial review of these warrants reveals that 1,587 persons have more than one warrant outstanding. Of those, 309 are a combination of Metro Police Criminal Warrants and Immigration Warrants. Of the remaining 1278 persons a significant number have warrants outstanding in more than one division.*

The Repeat Offender strategy will ensure that these offenders are apprehended on the warrants that already exist and removed from the streets, therefore eliminating their opportunity to commit crime, including robbery.

Divisions must develop programs to actively pursue offenders for whom warrants exist and all sub-units must be included in these programs. By taking a pro-active role in

[38] Determined by the Working Group by means of an off-line CPIC search by Dan Harrison of Security & Information on 97.04.25.

warrant enforcement the Service will deal with the problem of the outstanding warrants. Furthermore, by apprehending these offenders the likelihood of them committing robbery or other crimes will be reduced. By involving all sub-units within the division to locate and apprehend these offenders, warrant officers will have more available time to co-ordinate apprehension efforts, including warrant "stings" and other pro-active means of apprehension.

For the reasons that follow it may be more feasible to institute a Central Warrant Unit, and for the resources now dedicated locally[39] to be housed in one place or, to report centrally and operate locally:

- Volume of existing warrants.
- Offenders who reside outside of divisional boundaries.
- Offenders who reside outside of Metropolitan Toronto.
- Offenders who intentionally evade apprehension.
- Offenders who are high risk.
- Offenders with outstanding warrants in more than one division/unit.

It is suggested the R.I.S. develop a catalogue of outstanding warrants and cross-reference those which are held by different divisions/agencies for the same offender(s). This catalogue should then be made available to divisions and squads and once an offender is targeted by a division or unit that information should also be contained in the catalogue. This will avoid duplication of effort and enhance officer safety by making officers aware that other divisions/agencies are working on a particular offender. Another method would be to assign primary responsibility to one division/unit for offenders who are wanted on warrants by more than one division or agency.

NB: This concept requires further study, therefore, the current recommendation is that a study of the feasibility of a Central Warrant "clearing house" for the Service be conducted.

Nothing in this recommendation precludes the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service from actively pursuing persons wanted on warrants held or originating in other jurisdictions who may be resident in, or frequenting Toronto.

b) Foreign Criminals:

i) *In partnership with other law enforcement agencies and Immigration Canada Enforcement, deliver an education program to all members of the Service with regard to police officer's powers and duties under the Immigration Act.*

ii) *Ensure that MTP 250 forms are submitted on all relevant parties*

[39] See Appendix "H" for the number and deployment of officers assigned to warrant duties.

encountered by members of the Service.

(a) *Update CIPS to include an area for the collection of the offender's Citizenship status.*

(b) *Update CIPS so that when a citizenship status other than Canadian is entered, the system requires the information for the MTP 250 is entered before continuing with the process.*

iii) *Collect statistics with regard to foreign criminals who are deportable, to support applications to have the offender declared a "Danger to the Public" under the Immigration Act.*

iv) *Lobby the Federal Government to act on the legislation already in effect to deport Foreign Criminals.*

v) *In partnership with other law enforcement agencies and Immigration Canada Enforcement, deliver an education program to members of the Community regarding the effect that Foreign Criminals are having on society.*

vi) *Ensure those arrested for illegal re-entry (previously deported) under the Immigration Act are prosecuted and that maximum sentences are sought upon conviction.*

vii) *Have all Foreign Criminals entered on CPIC Level 2, returnable to the Fugitive Section of S.I.S.*

A Foreign Criminal is: 1. Any offender whose immigration status in Canada is other than a Canadian Citizen, and

(a) has committed an offence for which upon conviction a sentence of ten or more years in prison can be imposed, or

(b) has a previous criminal record that includes conviction(s) for which a sentence of ten years or more in prison could have been imposed, or

(c) is wanted in another country for offences that could result in deportation or extradition from Canada, or

(d) has previously been deported from Canada.

A significant number[40] of persons arrested for robbery are, by virtue of the seriousness of their criminal convictions, subject to deportation and to be declared a "Danger to the Public", under the Immigration Act. Once ordered deported and declared a Danger to the Public, the appeals are lessened and the offender is removed quicker, thus eliminating the possibility of committing further offences. If the offender returns to Canada they are subject to arrest on sight and should be charged with illegal re-entry and prosecuted.

Since members of the Service identify a significant number of these offenders as a result of investigations or arrests, it is imperative that officers become more aware of Immigration Act enforcement and their powers and duties under the Act.

Offenders who fit the above fall into these categories:

Illegal Immigrants.
Previous Deportees.
Foreign Criminals.
Over-stays (visitors).
Persons before the immigration adjudication process on a form of release.

The MTP 250 (Immigration Report) is not being submitted by members of the Service to any significant degree. There is a legal responsibility on the Service under the Immigration Act to notify Citizenship and Immigration Canada in the following circumstances:

Reports on Permanent Residents:

" An immigration or a peace officer shall forward a written report to the Deputy Minister setting out the details of any information in the possession of an immigration officer or peace officer indicating that a permanent resident is a person who:

(a) is a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(c.2),(d),(e),(f),(k) or (l): et al..."[41]

Reports on Visitors and Other Persons:

" An immigration officer or a peace officer shall, unless the person has been arrested pursuant to section 103(2). forward a written report to the Deputy Minister setting out the details of any information in the possession of the immigration officer or peace officer indicating that a person in Canada, other than a Canadian Citizen or permanent resident, is a person who:

(a) is a member of an admissible class, other than an inadmissible class described in 19(1)(h) or 19(2)(c): et al...."[42]

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[40] See Appendix "G".
[41] Section 27(1) of the Immigration Act.
[42] Section 27(2) of the Immigration Act.

The mechanism that the Service has in place to comply with these legal requirements is:

> i) the MTP 250 Immigration Report; or
> ii) for cases where a person has been arrested and is in the custody of the Service, to communicate verbally to Citizenship and Immigration Canada and request that they attend and conduct an independent immigration investigation.

The Service has not been complying with this requirement of the Immigration Act, in fact in 1996, only 607[43], MTP 250's were submitted by the Service to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The number of persons arrested, in 1996, who were born outside of Canada was 24,710[44].

The Working Group is aware that there is a general reluctance to submit these documents, as there is a general belief that once submitted to Immigration they will simply be ignored. The Fugitive Section of S.I.S. currently conducts extensive research on MTP 250's that are submitted, and has established a follow-up to the submissions. It is expected that as awareness and compliance increases and, if the recommendation for further lobbying of politicians is adopted, noticeable results will follow the submission of the MTP 250 notification forms.

By improving the CIPS system to collect citizenship data, in addition to place of birth, the system could require the MTP 250 to be generated once non-Canadian citizenship is entered. The system should then automatically produce the MTP 250 and solicit the required information. Once entered the process of filling out a record of arrest could continue. A similar tool should be developed when the direct data entry of MTP 208's is developed so that officers can fill out the notification at that time. Once generated the MTP 250 information should be automatically sent to S.I.S. Fugitive Section for research/analysis and to be forwarded to Immigration Enforcement.

Analysis of the MTP 250 Immigration Report, can achieve the following results:

1. True identities can be established of offenders who at the time of arrest did not disclose their actual identity. Further investigation and analysis may identify the offender as a subject for deportation.

2. These analyses can form a basis for investigations in conjunction[45]

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[43] Information from Detective Sergeant Robert Montrose, S.I.S., Fugitive Section on 97.04.28.

[44] Statistics from Hans Petersen of the Information Centre, 97.04.03. The Working Group recognizes that a large number of the persons who were born outside of Canada are Canadian Citizens and therefore not subject to any of the provisions of the Immigration Act. However, if only twenty-five percent of this number (6177) were non-citizens then MTP 250 forms were only submitted on ten percent of offenders covered by this provision.

[45] Currently a member of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Enforcement Section, is working in the

with Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police toward the issuance of arrest warrants under the Immigration Act.

Since criminal convictions are necessary to make application for an offender to be deported, it is essential that the investigation and prosecution of these offenders is thorough and complete. **Investigators and prosecutors must work together to ensure that the proper charges are laid and pursued vigorously through to conviction. No plea bargains to lesser charges can be accepted for repeat offenders.**

The Fugitive Section of S.I.S., as a result of the findings of the Working Group[46], has requested that the R.I.S., Information Centre supply them with the names and other particulars of all persons arrested for robbery, every two weeks. The Section will then investigate those arrested through their own and Immigration files to ascertain if any of the arrested parties are Immigration offenders. The Section will then pursue the matter with Immigration Canada.

To repeat the fact stated on page 25 above: 309 persons who have warrants outstanding for Criminal Offences are also wanted on Immigration warrants.

c) Parole Offenders:

i) *Change the mandate of the Reporting Centre to allow it to become a pro-active/operational unit with regard to Parole offenders.*

ii) *Deploy sufficient qualified personnel to the Reporting Centre to allow members to pursue and arrest offenders.*

iii) *In conjunction with Federal and Provincial Corrections personnel develop an educational program for members of the Service to make them aware of their powers and responsibilities under the respective Acts and the Criminal Code.*

iv) *Have all persons on Parole entered on CPIC level 2, returnable to the Reporting Centre.*

v) *Ensure those arrested while on Parole are prosecuted and maximum sentences sought upon conviction.*

vi) *Ensure all persons arrested for parole violations are debriefed for*

Fugitive Section of S.I.S., full time, as a secondment, and has the Field Operating Support System computer terminal there. This is the access to the database owned and operated by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

[46] See Appendix "G".

criminal intelligence.

Parole offender is: a Repeat Offender, and
(a) Is wanted on a warrant for Suspension of Mandatory Supervision (Parole), or
(b) Has served a portion of a sentence and has been released on Mandatory Supervision (Parole) with conditions of release, and is likely to re-commit a criminal offence, or
(c) Has served a full term sentence and has been released with no conditions and, is likely to re-commit a criminal offence.

Members of the Service often interact with parolees and parole offenders as a result of investigations and arrests.

In addition, the Service, has assigned the mandate surrounding the issue of released offenders, whether on bail or parole release, to the Bail and Parole Unit, now the Reporting Centre. This unit had, until recently, not been a pro-active enforcement unit, its' general duties were "in-house" and any arrests occurred on the premises itself.

The Reporting Centre is becoming more pro-active and is currently working in partnership with other government agencies, including Correctional Services Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada[47].

In November of 1993, the Fugitive Section of Special Investigation Services was mandated to become pro-active in the area of parole investigations. This mandate, in particular, was to assist in the apprehension of parolee's wanted on warrants for Suspension of Mandatory Supervision.

In addition to the apprehension of parolee's wanted on warrants, the Fugitive Surveillance team also assisted in other areas of investigation involving parolees including:

(a) Tracking and surveillance of high risk offenders being released from a correctional facility after full term release, and
(b) Tracking and surveillance of high risk offenders who had been released on parole with conditions

In 1996, as the Reporting Centre became more pro-active in the area of parolees and the Fugitive Section reduced its commitment to support this mandate and is now doing parole enforcement on a selective basis.

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[47] Currently there are Federal and Provincial Corrections Officers working at the Reporting Centre - each with direct access to their respective databases. Immigration officers attend regularly to administer immigration reportees who now report to the reporting Centre.

The Reporting Centre, without having a substantial commitment of operational personnel to pro-actively do parole enforcement has become extremely effective in the area of standard parole cases involving the apprehension of offenders wanted on warrants of arrest for Suspension of Mandatory Supervision.

It is recommended that a "zero tolerance" approach be taken against parole offenders. This approach must be broad-based and should continue from the time of the initial investigation through to arrest and prosecution. **A person on parole, who is arrested for another charge, should not benefit from plea bargaining, but be prosecuted fully for all offences committed.**

An "enforcement arm" of the Reporting Centre should be established to coordinate and investigate these types of offenders. Parole violators must be identified to Divisions and Units who must be encouraged to pursue these offenders and execute the parole warrants. Personnel dedicated to that purpose should actively pursue the more elusive, dangerous or cross-jurisdictional offenders[48]. Therefore, operational personnel should be deployed to the Reporting Centre to facilitate this[49].

Parole violators when arrested should be debriefed by investigators to establish intelligence information regarding criminal activity and especially robbery offences and offenders.

d) Judicial Release Offenders:

i) *Use the "zero-tolerance" approach for persons who violate the conditions of Judicial Releases.*

ii) *Develop an education program, in conjunction with the Crown Attorney's Office, to emphasize the importance of completing "show cause" documentation of sufficient quality to ensure a detention order is issued, or conditions imposed that inhibit the offender from committing further crimes.*

iii) *Study the feasibility of creating a central repository for Probation Reports submitted regarding those under Probation Orders in Toronto.*

iv) *Collect data, via MTP 208's, regarding persons contacted by police, who are under Probation Orders and supply this data to Probation Officers.*

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[48] However, all enforcement action should be conducted in conjunction with the Divisions and all arrests etc, should be processed at Divisions.

[49] A/Inspector Donald Jones reports that 70% of police personnel assigned to the Reporting Centre are non-operational due to some sort of physical or legal restriction.

v) *Collect statistics on persons arrested for Robbery while already on a Judicial Release or Probation and disseminate this information for use in show cause and sentencing hearings.*

A Judicial Release Offender is: a repeat offender, and

(a) is charged with a crime, and has been released on a Recognizance or a Surety Bail with court imposed conditions, or
(b) has been convicted of a crime and has been ordered to serve a period of probation with court imposed conditions, or
(c) who violates one of the conditions or commits another offence.

Front-line officers regularly encounter persons who are on Judicial Release for the offence of robbery or other serious crimes. Charges relating to the violation of conditions of release are more often the result of the offender being arrested for another crime and the violation then becoming apparent.

A more pro-active approach needs to be taken so that those offenders on Judicial Release are aware that they must comply with conditions imposed, or be brought back before the Courts. **Charges reflecting breaches of Judicial Release must not be grouped together with other charges withdrawn or stayed during plea-bargaining. Convictions and sentences must reflect the breach of a Judicial Order in addition to any sentence meted out for an unrelated charge.**

The Working Group has determined that a significant number of offenders who are released by the courts, either on a bail or probation orders, violate their conditions of release and commit robbery while on these releases[50].

By adopting a "zero tolerance" approach to these offenders the likelihood of further offences being committed will be reduced and the robbery rate will be reduced.

Probation Orders:

Contact by members of the Service with persons under probation orders should be centrally captured from MTP 208 submissions or arrest forms. The data should be collated and analyzed so that data on the effectiveness of probation conditions can be made available for presentation to the Courts or to probation officers. By alerting probation officers of the contacts of persons under probation orders, they will have more ammunition to take corrective action, when deemed necessary.

The information collected can also be used when a person on probation is arrested, during

[50] See Appendix "G".

the show cause or later sentencing hearing, to ensure proper, meaningful conditions are imposed.

5. Develop a "zero tolerance" strategy for all Firearms Offenders.

a) *In conjunction with the Crown Attorney's Office ensure that all firearms offenders are prosecuted and that substantial sentences are sought.*

   i) *Use analysts and other experts to testify at sentencing hearings to ensure the courts are aware of the full impact of illegal firearms upon our society.*

b) *Collect and coordinate information regarding all firearm offences including reports of the sounds of gunshots.*

   i) *Ensure the investigation of 'sounds of gunshots' are as complete as possible, including the collection of shell casings etc. found in the area of the incident.*

   ii) *Develop an incident code so that "Sounds of Gunshots" reports are searchable on COPS.*

c) *Officer in charge of the Major Crime Unit in each division to receive training and act as the division's liaison with the Firearms Enforcement Unit of S.I.S.*

The Service and the Crown Attorney's Office must develop joint strategies to ensure that all firearms offences are prosecuted, and are not used as bargaining tools for plea resolutions. Repeat offenders must be given no consideration and prosecuted fully.

The Service, until recently, did not have a central unit that was dedicated to pro-actively investigate firearms offences. Firearms enforcement was generally done by the division or unit who encountered a firearms offender. In the past, most firearms involved in other criminal offences were obtained either legally or illegally in Canada. The current trend reflects a change, now firearms are likely to originate from outside Canada. In fact, it is most likely that firearms used in crimes will have their origins traced to the United States. Research has found that many of these firearms have been purchased from licensed firearms dealers and subsequently smuggled into Canada for re-sale on the illegal market. They are smuggled into Canada individually or as part of large shipments.

These firearms are used to commit serious offences, including robbery.

In 1993, during the realignment of the Major Crimes Squad into the Special

Investigations Unit, the Firearms Enforcement section was created to pro-actively investigate trafficking in firearms. The principal mandate of the unit is, "*to reduce the proliferation of crime guns in our neighbourhoods.*[51]" The theory behind this type of centralized enforcement is to conduct investigations that are designed to trace the origins of firearms in order to identify and prosecute their suppliers.

The Unit has the capability of conducting complex firearms investigations in partnership with agencies in the United States and especially the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. In September, 1996, the Unit became part of the Provincial Weapons Enforcement Unit (P.W.E.U.). This joint forces unit consists of police officers from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Metropolitan Toronto Police and other agencies across the Province. P.W.E.U. receives funding from the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

Sounds of Gunshots are not acceptable in our neighbourhoods. They cannot be ignored, to do so reflects a tolerance of disorder that only leads to a deterioration of the "Quality of Life" for law abiding citizens. The Working Group reviewed the I/CAD Summary Reports and discovered that on average there were 2.8 calls for shots fired and 4 calls for "man with a gun" every day in 1996.

Statistics regarding the outcomes or investigations conducted regarding "sounds of gunshots" calls cannot be readily analyzed as there is no code for this type of report in the occurrence processing system presently in place. R.I.S. must develop a code so that these reports are captured and available for analysis. Officers must be encouraged to investigate these occurrences fully, including interviewing witnesses and collecting and submitting evidence (shell casings), for comparison to other crimes and incidents.

According to research compiled in the United States, a direct correlation has been found linking crime and disorderly behaviour, "Broken Windows," as the theory has become popularly known, uses the analogy of a broken window to describe the relationship between disorder and crime:

> "... if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken...[O]ne unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing."

This leads to a cascading effect of decay and fear in a community. Wilson and Kelling write,

> "...serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behaviour goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated

[51] Detective Sergeant Harvey Williams, S.I.S. Firearms Enforcement Unit, 97.04.29

> by prevailing conditions. If the Neighbourhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passers-by, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.[52]"

Divisional support, by the Firearms Enforcement Unit of S.I.S., could be greatly improved if the Service directed that an officer at each division/unit be designated as the firearms officer for that unit. It is recommended that the officer in charge of each Major Crime office be identified as the contact for this purpose.

As firearms related offences have a direct impact on violent crime it is imperative that the Service continues to support a centralized Firearms Enforcement Unit. To enhance the effectiveness of the Unit the Service needs to appoint a contact in each of the divisions/units to be the conduit for information to and from the Firearms Enforcement Unit. For issues such as officer safety and mutual assistance, cooperation and communication between the Firearms Enforcement Unit and the divisions needs to be constant and complete.

Divisions often conduct firearms investigations at a local level and should be encouraged to continue. However, there has to be a constant flow of information between the divisions and the Unit to ensure no duplication or overlap occurs, especially when undercover operations are being conducted. The dangers of two units working the same targets are obvious. If particular officers are designated to act as the conduits of information, the Firearms Enforcement Unit can educate these officers and advise of the areas in which they can assist with "buy" money, surveillance, undercover operators and search teams. They can also offer expertise for testimony at trials, and are the link to the resources of the Provincial Weapons Enforcement Unit, if the investigation requires additional resources.

6. Revise the mandate of the Hold-Up Squad to include these strategies and provide support for Field Units.

a) *Assign the responsibility for corporate analysis of all robbery types, and dissemination of robbery information to the analytical section of the Hold-Up Squad.*

i) *Add one more analyst to the Hold-Up Squad's analytical section with the responsibility of analysis of robbery types other than Financial and Business.*

ii) *Develop the responsibility within the Hold-Up Squad for the dissemination of information about robbery prevention and*

[52] Fixing Broken Windows - Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities, George L Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, Martin Kessler Books, The Free Press 1996

intelligence.

b) *Establish formal communications links with divisions to ensure timely release of robbery related information and in particular amend Directives 05 02 and 09 02 with relation to the handling of video tapes.*

c) *Encourage division-centred investigation of local robberies and ensure cross-divisional patterns are identified to local investigators.*

i) *Establish a cooperative investigation strategy with surrounding police agencies to investigate robbery patterns crossing jurisdictional boundaries.*

Currently analysis of robberies by the Hold-Up Squad is conducted by a police officer, for small business occurrences, and a civilian, for financial institution robberies. No analysis is conducted on the other types of robberies, commonly referred to as "street robberies". As the unit responsible for the coordination of, and in some cases, the investigation of robbery within Metropolitan Toronto, it is logical to expect that the complete robbery situation is available to Hold-Up Squad analysts. In fact there is nowhere in the Service that conducts analysis on all types of robbery centrally.

This type of analysis, when combined or compared to the analysis already being done by the Hold-Up Squad will allow more informed decisions to be made with regard to the deployment of personnel to combat robbery problems. Links will be identified with different types of robbery and similar offenders. More complete profiles of robbers and robberies will be available for dissemination.

The Working Group recommends that the Hold-Up Squad's analytical section be assigned Service–wide responsibility to conduct analysis and research on all types of robbery. The Squad will then be in a better position to disseminate these data to field personnel and to offer predictions and profile the robbery situation in various formats. Local analysts will still be able to conduct the research required locally, but by looking at the entire robbery picture central analysis will allow cross-boundary problems to be identified and challenged.

The analytical section of the Hold-Up Squad will also become a robbery information section offering robbery prevention and intelligence information to the community and the Service. The 'prevention' information will be that which is derived from *apprehension/suppression* techniques. The traditional 'Crime Prevention' information should continue to be coordinated by the Community Policing Support Unit and Divisional Crime prevention Officers. The data referred to is that which would be expected to come from research and interviews of robbers. However, as stated earlier in this report – *first we have to identify the problem.* Meaningful, in depth analysis needs to be done applying the robbery data to demographic and other data to identify patterns and

Figure #2

Crime Management Process Overview



3.8 Crime Management Committee

Mandate

The purpose of the Crime Management Committee, under the direction of the Unit Commander, is to develop, monitor and evaluate long term crime reduction and quality of life strategies for the division. These strategies will place emphasis on prevention, apprehension and deterrence to address problems identified and prioritized by the Crime Management Unit.

The Crime Management Committee may review divisional structure, organization and staffing and make recommendations for change, if required, to support strategies or improve the daily operations of the division.

Staffing

- The Crime Management Committee should be comprised of 7-10 people
- The Crime Management Committee should be comprised of a cross section of the division from all ranks and sections
- The Crime Management Committee should meet quarterly and more often if necessary

Positions

The following positions default to the person holding the position;

- 1 C.I.B. Detective Sergeant
- 1 C.R.U. Staff Sergeant
- 1 Planning Sergeant
- 1 Crime Management Unit Sergeant
- 1 Staff Sergeant - platoon / to be appointed by Unit Commander

The following positions will be elected by their peers;

- 1 Sergeant - platoon
- 1 Constable - platoon
- 1 Constable - investigative
- 1 Sergeant or Constable - traffic
- 1 Civilian

Interview Questions (RCMP and Edmonton Police Service)

1. What is your understanding of Community based policing.
2. Has the Service restructured in any substantial way to accommodate CBP.
3. How has this effected the implementation of CBP.
4. What was the stimulus for these changes in the Service.
5. How have cut backs/fiscal restraint effected the implementation of CBP.
6. Do you see a link between implementing CBP and fiscal restraint.
7. What is the importance of CBP in a time of fiscal restraint.
8. Do your immediate superiors understand CBP.
9. Do they support the concept of empowerment and ownership.
10. What is the role of the community in the current practice of CBP.
11. Do you have any concerns with the manner in which CBP is being implemented.

Questions Specific to Toronto (Crime management)

1. How often does the crime management committee meet.
2. At what points of the process are community members involved.
3. How is the information i.e. strategies communicated to the community
4. How are front-line officers included in the crime management process.
5. Are these initiatives understood in terms of CBP.
6. How is the crime management process different from the way the service used to operate.
7. Does the crime management process support greater Divisional autonomy.
8. How does crime management fit into the broad Service strategy.