

**Policing the Corporate Image:
A Case Study of In-House Security Governance and the Management of Risk in a
Mass Private Property in Canada**

**By
Steven D. Hutchinson**

**A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
Through the Department of Sociology
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor**

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2003

©Steven D. Hutchinson

National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

Acquisitons et
services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*

ISBN: 0-612-84587-7

Our file *Notre référence*

ISBN: 0-612-84587-7

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Canada

ABSTRACT

'Mass private properties' such as shopping malls, hotel complexes, and large educational, manufacturing and industrial sites increasingly operate as sites of public and social life. Since private interests reign over the policing of these spaces, public life that was once protected and controlled by the state is now policed by private institutions. These changes have resulted in a significant rise in the number of private security personnel employed in Canada, where there are now more than twice as many private security agents as there are public police officers. This development has expanded the ambit of authority held by the 'private police' and those institutions that employ them.

This paper is concerned with the nature, scope and extent of 'security governance' in mass private spaces, specifically through the use of in-house, or proprietary, systems of governance. Findings suggest that actuarialism, and the associated practices related to risk management, are enacted in order to reduce loss and to prevent, spread and minimize risk. Moreover, such strategies may be linked with other techniques that are designed in order to promote a particular image, or profile, of mass private spaces.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to gratefully acknowledge Dr. Daniel O'Connor, whose guidance, inspiration and flexibility throughout this process has been unparalleled. Also, many thanks to Dr. Randy Lippert for insightful comments, and for encouraging and fostering a youthful, but passionate, student. I am also very grateful to Dr. Larry Coutts for comments on the design and context of the study, Dr. Willem De Lint for comments on a related paper, and Dr. Bob Arnold for insight on method and analysis. I would also like to thank my family (David, Mary, Jennifer, Daniel and Kevin), without whom, none of this would have been possible. Never forgotten, Brian, Jeff, Grant, and Adam who have kept me grounded while providing unconditional support. Finally- but never lastly- Kimberly, without whom these pages would be blank.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. PRIVATE SECURITY	8
The Shifting Terrain of Governance	9
Contract v. In-House Security	12
The Growth of Private Security	15
3. GOVERNANCE	17
4. GOVERNING THROUGH RISK	20
Risk as a Governmental Rationality	21
Risk Identification, Risk Reduction and Risk Spreading	22
5. METHODOLOGY	29
6. OPERATIONALIZING PROPRIETARY SECURITY GOVERNANCE	31
Risk Technologies	32
Risk Managers	35
Discretionary Governance	38
Resisting Risk	40
Incomplete Governance	42
Disequilibria	44
Information Workers	47
Manufacturing the Corporate Image	50
Other Governance Rationalities	54

7. CONCLUSION	57
REFERENCES	61
APPENDIX A: Ethics Application	68
APPENDIX B: Ethics Clearance Form	75
APPENDIX C: Information Letters	76
APPENDIX D: Respondent Consent Form	81
APPENDIX E: Interview Guide	84
VITA AUCTORIS	86

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid- 20th century, the 'rebirth' of private policing¹ has become more evident in the overall expansion of the industry (Shearing and Stenning 1983; Johnston 1992; Jones and Newburn 1998). This phenomenon first received attention in the US (Kakalik and Wildhorn 1971-72; Spitzer and Scull 1977; Cunningham and Taylor 1985; Cunningham et al. 1990; Nalla and Newman 1991; Forst and Manning 1999; Sklansky 1999) and in Britain (McClintock and Wiles 1972; Draper 1978; South 1988; Johnston 1992; Loader 1997; Jones and Newburn 1998), but has since been studied in countries all over the world (e.g. Rees 1983; Shearing and Stenning 1987; Micucci 1995; Bayley and Shearing 1996; De Waard 1999; Kempa et al. 1999; Rigakos 1999). Most recently attention has focused on the transnational character of private policing (Shearer 1998; Johnston 1999).

Private security is the central mechanism through which social control is realized in the private sphere (Stenning 2000). Growing litigiousness in the US, and to a lesser degree in Canada (Priest 1990), has resulted in institutions taking steps to minimize liability by enforcing regulations in certain spaces. This enforcement necessitates surveillance and agents to point out and react to violations. By attempting to minimize liability then, institutions come to rely more heavily on private security agents and technologies (Rigakos and Greener 2000: 146). Resultantly, much contemporary research has focused on private security, the majority of it concerned with the contract sector (for example, see; Shearing and Stenning 1981; Jones and Newburn 1995; Kennedy 1995; Rigakos 1999; Rigakos and Greener 2000), which is in part due to the massive rise in national and international security providers over the last decade (Juristat 2002). While

these numbers have been contested (see; Lippert and O'Connor 2003; Nalla and Newman 1991), it has been argued that there are three times more private security agents than police officers in the United States, and twice as many in both Canada and Britain (Bayley and Shearing 1996).

A number of reasons for the growth of private security have been suggested. 'Fiscal Constraint' theories concentrate on trends in public expenditure and argue that limitations on spending for public policing have created a 'demand gap' which is consequently filled by the private sector (Shearing and Stenning 1981). Another popular explanation is found in the privatization of policing tasks by central governments, or the downloading of responsibilities for order (commonly associated with advanced liberalism²). Anthony Giddens (1990) has argued that the driving forces behind the growth and commodification of security are the 'subjective' anxieties, fears and 'ontological' insecurities which people experience in, and use to make sense of, their everyday lives. It has also been argued that the present growth in private security is a function of deeper trends in property relations (Shearing and Stenning 1981) and/or the

¹ 'Policing' is defined as a 'purposive strategy involving the initiation of techniques and strategies that are meant to offer guarantees of security to subjects' (Johnston 1999: 178). This definition does not exclude the private police, were they to be so engaged.

² Notwithstanding possible variations in definitions of 'advanced liberalism', Nikolas Rose (1993) argues that its importance lies in its capacity to associate itself with key elements of an alternative formulae for rule, a set of strategies for governing in an advanced liberal way. For him, advanced liberal government entails the adoption of a range of devices and strategies that aim to recreate the distance between the decisions of formal political institutions and other social actors, and to act upon those actors in new ways through shaping and utilizing their freedom. It further involves three principles: (1) a new relation between expertise and politics (such that the calculative knowledges of human conduct are replaced with calculative regimes of accounting and financial management); (2) a new pluralization of 'social' technologies (meaning a 'de-governmentalization' of the state and the adoption of a form of government through shaping the powers and wills of autonomous entities); and (3) a new specification of the subject of government (referring to the enhancement of the powers of the client as customer, and the privatization of risk management, or 'prudentialism' (O'Malley 1992), in which the citizen adds to his relations to risk and danger (as social work gives way to the private counselor, the self-help manual and the telephone help line). This is the formulation of advanced liberalism that we adopt here.

economy (Lippert and O'Connor 2003). Shearing and Stenning (1981) point to rise of what they call 'mass private property' over the past 30 years and suggest that it is the expansion of large, privately-owned shopping malls and office, recreational, educational, industrial and manufacturing complexes that has resulted in a shrinking of public police jurisdictions, and a simultaneous rise in those of the private police. As a result of this recent explosion of private police 'territory', paired with the difficulty in obtaining information from private corporations concerning their security functions, there is a gap in the private security literature regarding proprietary, or 'in-house', departmental security systems. This research project analyzes one such security programme in the hopes of illuminating how proprietary security officers govern space according to risk management rationales, and the relationship between those strategies and modern social governance mechanisms in advanced liberal societies.

Nikolas Rose (1993, 1999) has outlined what he views as a transition from classical liberal governance, to welfare governance, through to advanced liberal forms of government. It is his contention that the history of Western governmental rationalities has been powerfully influenced by liberalism (Rose 1993). Liberalism, as a 'rationality of rule', attempted to limit the scope of political authority and to "exercise vigilance over its exercise" (Rose 1993: 290). Moreover, government had an obligation to nurture markets, citizens and civil society and develop their self-organizing capacities (Rose 1993: 290). Later it was argued that the aims of 19th century liberalism had failed in response to social fragmentation and the 'individualization of society'³. Rose (1993: 292-93) argues that the welfare state was one solution to these problems as it organized a "recoding of

³ As was evidenced by soaring suicide rates and increasing levels of crime and social dissatisfaction (Rose 1993: 293).

the relations between the political field and the management of economic and social affairs” (Rose 1993: 293). Here, the state became the guarantor of both freedom and autonomy for individuals, the market and capital enterprise (Rose 1993: 293). The most recent shift to advanced liberalism grew from a number of suggested failures⁴ of the welfare state. Where welfare sought to govern *through society*, advanced liberalism tries to *govern without governing* society by regulating behaviour *through* the choices of supposedly autonomous agents (Rose 1993: 296). This rationality of government seeks to *recreate* the separation between the decisions of political actors and society, and to act upon individuals with new strategies of ‘shaping and utilizing their freedom’ (Rose 1993: 296). In advanced liberal forms of government, ‘the regimes of positive knowledges of human conduct are replaced with calculative regimes of accounting and financial management’ (Rose 1993: 293), and with ‘prudentialism’ (O’Malley 1992)- the privatization of risk management- whereby the individual citizen adopts calculative personal relations to risk and danger (O’Malley 1992 in Rose 1993: 296). The subject of risk thus takes the foreground in relation to modern formulations of governance.

Private security, as the central mechanism of social control in the private sphere, governs many social spaces and regulates the conduct of diverse populations. Over recent years political analysis has begun to focus on the *techniques and relations* through which power is exercised, rather than on *who holds power* (Rose 2000: 142). Within such debates, notions of risk have played an increasingly important role. It has been argued that the main concern of private security personnel is toward loss prevention and

⁴Criticisms leveled at the welfare state include, but are not exclusive to, its cost, the complexity of its bureaucracy, the paternalism of its organizational structure, implicit inequity, the smoldering of autonomy, and the granting of significant authority to unaccountable professionals and administrators (Rose 1993: 294).

protection rather than law enforcement (Micucci 1995; Johnston and Shearing 2003), and accordingly, notions of risk must necessarily enter contemporary debate surrounding the private police. Located within a private system of justice, the central impetus of security is the prevention of 'security breaches' that threaten the interests of their employers and their employers' customers (Micucci 1995: 21). Moreover, others have maintained that the concept of risk is fundamental to the understanding and analysis of contemporary policing (for example, Johnston 2000: 157; Ericson and Haggerty 1997).

This research is concerned with the extent to which mass private spaces are governed through security and the management of risk, and how this particular 'governmentalization' of space is actualized and enforced. Corporations are powerful actors who support private justice systems that are complete with investigative, adjudicatory and sentencing powers. Moreover, their legal departments and corporate headquarters powerfully shape the private corporate justice that is rendered in such spaces- in other words; they are self-sufficient and self-governing (Davis et al. 1991: 395). It has been remarked that these "emerging conceptions conjure up an image of the world in which corporate 'private governments' exist along side state governments" (Rigakos and Greener 2000: 149). This project focuses on these entrenched, enclosed and self-governing security systems that often find themselves in conflict with the moral practical imperatives of social community (Gray and Gray 1999).

This paper argues that rather than a total shift towards the 'out-sourcing' of security functions to contract companies, many large national and international businesses have maintained or adopted in-house departmental security systems, and that there may be a slow return to proprietary programmes of what has been termed 'security

governance.⁵ Heretofore, studies that have focused on the in-house security sector emphasize training, demographic characteristics, recruitment, and mobility (Micucci 1998). This research differs in its approach and analysis. It takes into consideration advanced liberal forms of government and their association to practices of *actuarialism*⁶ and its extent of penetration into the proprietary security sector. Populations today (be they workers or customers) on private property are subject to a constellation of actuarial control mechanisms designed to minimize risks (both personal and litigious) and maximize 'enjoyment' (Rigakos and Greener 2000: 148). Furthermore, the private sector enjoys a significant amount of discretion with which to govern its space, and as such represents an interesting dynamic whereby the classical distinctions between 'public' and 'private' become blurred. The management of populations on private property is in part facilitated by state doctrines such as Trespass laws and Innkeepers acts⁷, while state control and oversight mechanisms (such as the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*⁸) do not extend into private spaces, and do not apply to private security officers unless they are acting specifically as state agents.⁹

⁵ For Lippert and O'Connor (2003: 2) 'security governance' refers to efforts towards governance outside the formal state that aim to insure security. For them, security refers to a 'fervent hope' rather than a substantive reality, and can vary according to the programmes, or 'assemblages', that produce/consume it (Lippert and O'Connor 2003: 3). "Security presupposes controllability and is therefore motivated by risk, that is, risk reduction and risk spreading" (Lippert and O'Connor 2003: 3). For further elaboration, see Lippert and O'Connor (2003).

⁶ Here I define 'actuarialism' as 'the deployment of statistical probability in investigating, adjudicating, and sentencing subjects, objects and events, where the strength, length and nature of the investigation, adjudication and sentence is determined by the risk that the subject(s) pose to others, rather than the moral wrong they have committed.'

⁷ Provincial legislation referring to the law of Trespass and Innkeepers rights. For example, see Ontario's *Innkeepers Act* (R.S.O. 1990) and *Trespass to Property Act* (R.S.O. 1990).

⁸ See CCRF (1982).

⁹ In a recent supreme court case (*R. v. Buhay* 2003) the court ruled that security officers who searched a rented locker at a Winnipeg bus depot did not violate the subjects *Charter* rights because they were not acting as 'agents of the state.' While the accused had control and possession of the locker and thus had reasonable expectation of privacy, the search by security personnel did not trigger a *Charter* violation as the officers were private agents and not subject to the *Charter*. Decisions such as this support private doctrines of control and enforce compliance with private demands on private property even if such activity

This research was designed in order to examine potential relationships between the rise in the use of private forms of policing, the governance of security in advanced liberal societies and notions of risk and their relation to modern policing rationales. In shedding light on a neglected sector of the policing industry, the desire was to discover how departmental systems of security govern through risk. In particular, the research sought to discern the relative roles of individual proprietary security officers in the governance of mass private properties. It is my contention that such private spaces are ruled by the governmental rationality of actuarialism (Simon and Feeley 1992, 1994) as one among many potential strategies of regulation. The in-house security officers that dominate this space play a significant role in such formulations of governance and are centripetally engaged in the reduction of opportunity, the punishment of 'offenders', the responsabilization of employees and patrons, and the classification, categorization and management of risk. It is hypothesized that the proprietary officer plays a role as a risk manager that may be different than that normally performed by hired contract security personnel. This finding may suggest a possible future increase in the amount of in-house security systems in Canada. More generally, I hoped to gain a better understanding of the relationship between risk, security governance in the private sector, and contemporary, or advanced liberal, social relations.

on behalf of the public police would not be tolerated. Moreover, it is an interesting dichotomy (and problematic) whereby state doctrines, such as Trespass laws, can be utilized by private security officers in areas where state protections do not extend.

PRIVATE SECURITY

'Private' is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (2002) as "...belonging to or concerning an individual person, company or interest." Shearing and Von Hirsch (2000: 81) argue that the landlord's power to exclude is central to the conception of private property whereas public space generally signifies the widest liberty of movement (such that persons can freely come and go without having to justify his/her presence). In public spaces order is maintained by social representatives (the public police among others), whereas in private realms, security and order are produced through the mechanism of private policing. The distinction between public and private places is also based on whether or not they are privately owned or occupied. The categorization of space as private allots the owner, occupier and/or operator a significant amount of authority to define, maintain and enforce codes of conduct (Mopas and Stenning 2001: 70). It has been argued that within private spaces, the role of the private security officer is one of greater and more immediate impact on individuals' lives than any system of state law (Gill and Hart 1999). The pervasiveness of this growing form of security frequently leads to its intrusion into personal or private space and possible infringements on accepted civil liberties (Mopas and Stenning 2001). For example, individuals are often forced to submit to random searches of their belongings as a condition of admittance, or inclusion, into certain locations (for example sports stadiums, concerts, etc.) while the same activities performed by the public police, upon entrance to a public park for example, would not be

tolerated.¹⁰ Moreover, private security agents increasingly occupy, manage and govern diverse social spaces.

The Shifting Terrain of Governance

Difficulties in categorizing various spaces arise when we consider mass private properties, what Gray and Gray (1999) call 'quasi-public' spaces,¹¹ that are privately owned, yet have public functionality. For example, a large shopping complex that is owned by a private corporation but has significantly 'public' functions such as an attached library or fitness center (accessible to the public). These new forms of 'mass-private' space, to which Shearing and Stenning (1981) referred to in their landmark article on modern private security, not only blur the public/private distinctions associated with classical liberal thought, but create a dilemma which has definite consequences for powers of inclusion, exclusion and containment.¹² The distinction between public and private places has altered the scope of private security power and extended its reach into the realms of public life (Mopas and Stenning 2001: 70). Moreover, this increase in authority has resulted in a more important role played by private security in social control and the manufacture of contemporary conceptions of crime and criminality.¹³

¹⁰ See also, *R. v. Buhay*.

¹¹ For Susan and Francis Gray (1999) 'quasi-public' property is private property which has been made the subject of an open invitation to the public and which therefore becomes private property having an essential public character. For a more detailed discussion, see Gray and Gray (1999).

¹² These are common tactics used by private corporations to direct conduct to certain prescribed ends; for a detailed discussion of inclusion, exclusion and containment see, Young (1999) and Johnston and Shearing (2003).

¹³ As the economic and social structure of society moves away from small, separate free-holdings to mass privatization, more and more public life and socialization occurs on property that is privately owned (for example shopping malls, housing estates, large educational complexes, etc.) but which can no longer be considered to be purely private (Shearing and Stenning 1981). Since the private sphere retains control over the policing of these properties, public life that was once protected and controlled by the state is now policed by private institutions (see, Mopas and Stenning 2001; Shearing and Stenning 1983). As a result,

The authority of private security agents is recognized in both criminal and civil law, and ranges from forcing people to submit to random searches, to maintaining electronic surveillance systems (Shearing and Stenning 1983: 498, in Mopas and Stenning 2001: 70). It has also been noted that these powerful legal rights, derived from the concept of property ownership, can allow security personnel to deal with matters at their own 'unfettered discretion' (Shearing and Stenning 1983: 18, in Mopas and Stenning 2001: 70). They enjoy the same powers afforded to regular citizens in regards to search and seizure, arrest and self-defense (Mopas and Stenning 2001), but also reap further powers from statutes pertaining to law enforcement, the *Private Security Act* of the relevant province¹⁴, and from the 'panoply of legal rights of the private property owner (whose agent he is) to control the property and access to it' (Shearing and Stenning 1983: 21, in Mopas and Stenning 2001: 70). The relationship between property and security is central to understanding the political economy of policing, and this means that law must necessarily protect the interests of private landowners if the current mode of production is to be supported (Rigakos and Greener 2000: 150).

As has been argued by Mopas and Stenning (2001: 72), in addition to the symbolic authority that is derived from their role as agents and protectors of private property, private security personnel can also utilize various instrumental considerations to facilitate their social control. In other words they can induce compliance with intrusive demands by the threat of denial of access, or exclusion, to valued resources that they may be protecting. Moreover, the ability to set standards for conduct on private property is

social space has been taken over by spheres, or 'bubbles', of private governance of security (Rigakos and Greener 2000).

¹⁴ The only Canadian provinces to not yet have provincial Acts pertaining to private security are the North West Territories and Nunavut.

enshrined in Canadian provincial Acts that outlaw actions prohibited by the landowner (Rigakos and Greener 2000: 151). In essence this means that 'prohibited' activity consists of anything that security officers (or the security managers and directors) can justify as 'immoral, illegal or unethical' (Rigakos and Greener 2000: 157). They are granted additional discretion in Trespass legislation whereby they can ask a person to leave a property without having to provide a reason (Rigakos and Greener 2000: 157).

While regulating conduct on private property, security personnel are not acting as agents of the state, and are thus not subject to regulatory mechanisms such as the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (*R. v. Buhay* 2003). While still only a small amount of research has centered on the powers of private police, yet even less has been devoted to their accountability (Stenning 2000: 336)¹⁵, as while they utilize state doctrines such as Trespass legislation to enforce order within their respective spaces, they are not subject to state regulation (i.e. the *Charter*). It is now almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police that is not, somewhere and under some circumstance, assumed or performed by private police (Stenning 2000).

¹⁵ Stenning (2000) argues that abuses in the exercise of private police power are currently controlled by seven mechanisms: (1) state regulation (there is now at least some formal state regulation of private security in Canada based on Provincial Acts that refer to licensing and/or registration, uniforms, established qualifications, etc.), (2) industry self-regulation (as is the case in the UK where the industry seeks to achieve the same regulations and objectives as those of the formal state regulators), (3) criminal liability (whereby private policing organizations and their operatives are subject to criminal laws), (4) civil liability for Torts or Delicts (i.e. recourse is available through civil law), (5) labour/employment law (mechanisms for collective bargaining, grievance processing and arbitration in the workplace in regards to abuses in the exercise of private police power), (6) contractual liability (whereby liability for breach of contract is possible) and (7) perhaps most importantly for the proprietary industry, accountability through the market (where the marketplace itself provides substantial opportunities for private police to be held accountable in that clients can pursue security needs elsewhere).

Thus, while powers, accountability and intrusive capabilities are different for the public and private police¹⁶, the gap between their responsibilities is shrinking.

Contract v. In-House Security

It has become a common phenomenon for large corporations and businesses to out-source their non-core activities, and often this includes security (Button and George 1998; Lippert and O'Connor 2003). The business of security has now been taken over by large national and international security providers that specialize in securing space, objects and people (De Waard 1999). These 'contract' agencies represent the largest development in the private security sector and represent the target of most scholarly inquiry. Despite this tremendous growth and rapid development, comparatively little research exists on Canadian private security officers and their work. The data on the security sector in Canada are derived mainly from three investigations conducted in the 1970's (Farnell and Shearing 1977; Jeffries 1977; Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980). David Hyde (2003) has also produced an illuminating study on the government and regulation of private security in Canada including Provincial Acts and various statistics concerning enforcement and regulatory bodies. The main research that has abounded since those landmark studies concerns the legal context of security work, security policy, and the perceptions of police, the public and employers concerning security personnel and their activities (Micucci 1995).

While the contract sector is unarguably the largest part of the security industry

¹⁶ It has been argued elsewhere that private police are much more intrusive and coercive than the public police; have less accountability; more discretion; and are subject to less oversight and state regulation (for example see, Johnston and Shearing 2003, and Mopas and Stenning 2001).

and has seen the most dramatic increases (Juristat 2002), there are many other types of private security services. There are 'security professionals' hired for their expertise; alarm response services; armed car services; risk managers that have security roles; private investigators; and even bouncers and doormen (for discussion of the various types of security services see, Kennedy 1995; Nalla and Newman 1990; Gill and Hart 1999; Rigakos 2003). Heretofore, the definition of proprietary security included only security *guards*¹⁷ who are regular employees of an organization, and who are not contracted from an outside security agency (Kennedy 1995). Furthermore, the firm that hires them defines their duties and responsibilities, and they are responsible directly to that employer (Nalla and Newman 1990: 7). It may perhaps be more beneficial to further define the proprietary industry to account for the many types of security services that the above definition can include.

The differentiation that those in the security field make between the contract sector and in-house departments demands a further classification than that which has been established in the literature to date. As it stands, the definition of proprietary security is quite broad and includes *any* regular employee of an organization who is responsible to their employer for some security function, and has not been contracted from an outside agency (Kennedy 1995; Nalla and Newman 1990). This category of security personnel is not included in the most recent Juristat (2002) released on private security in Canada. They argue that there are two main types of security, 'security guards' and 'private investigators' (Juristat 2002) and I assume that proprietary security

¹⁷ A differentiation between security 'guards' and security 'officers' will also be made in this paper. It was my finding that there is a definite, if only perceptual, differentiation between the two within the security industry.

falls under the former heading. The proprietary department under study does not fit into either category. While Juristat does include bouncers, doormen, crossing guards, night watchman and airport security guards in its operationalization of 'security guard', the proprietary officers studied do not fit neatly into this conceptualization.

Proprietary departments are not licensed through the Province. There is no record of them working as security agents or possessing a 'security guard' license, nor are they investigators with the appropriate licenses. They differentiate themselves from the rest of the contract sector through the duties performed and the qualifications that they possess, as well as the significantly higher pay they receive (Interviews 1, 2, 4 and 8). They are not included in the definition of 'security guard' or among what has been termed the two main categories of security personnel (Juristat 2002: 1). They are not risk-managers, having no formal knowledge of these concepts and practices, though they do practice risk management and loss prevention to some extent. They are non-uniformed, non-identifiable and associate themselves with management level positions rather than 'employees' (Interviews 1 and 4). It is important then to distinguish such workers from the rest of the industry and afford them a place in the security sector that reflects their work, their position and their role.

Within the contract security sector there are various classifications of functions (for example, international military aid, VIP protection, surveillance technologies, etc.), which may also be the case in the proprietary sector. It is perhaps more helpful to refer to the entire proprietary sector as including *any* employee of an organization that has even the smallest security function (from the night teller at the 7/11, to the bouncer at the local night club). The officers studied, and others like them however, can be referred to as

'departmental security officers.' They are a powerful department (consisting of more than one person, and including a hierarchy of management within that department) that is located within the organizational structure of a corporation. Further, by assigning them the title 'officer', we can distinguish these agents from other guards in the industry as well as other personnel in the proprietary sector, and regard them as agents of the property with specific duties that go beyond the physical security of buildings and tangible goods.¹⁸ By referring to them as 'departmental security officers',¹⁹ we can separate them from the very large proprietary sector and afford them an appropriate place among modern security professionals.

The Growth of Private Security

Various arguments have been forwarded concerning reasons why some organizations prefer contract to in-house security personnel (see for example, Button and George 1998).

¹⁸ Alison Wakefield (2000) outlined the duties of contract security officers on private property as including six core functions: (1) housekeeping (ensuring the sites are properly maintained by reporting breakages and spillages, and making sure that the legal and insurance obligations of the property owners are satisfied), (2) customer care, (3) prevention of crime and nuisance behaviour, (4) rule enforcement and the use of sanctions, (5) response to emergencies and crimes in progress, and (6) the gathering and sharing of information. Departmental security officers were found to be engaged in all of these activities to a greater or lesser extent, however, their regulation activities went far beyond this. The list of extensive duties that departmental security officers are expected to perform include investigation of workers compensation claims, investigation of thefts, employee conflict resolution, management investigations, insurance claim investigations, auto thefts response and investigation, criminal investigations relating to employees or outside patrons, VIP escorts, First Aid/CPR response, Fire response, Emergency Response training, Bomb-Threat Management, liaison with outside police forces and security agencies, surveillance activities, extensive computer facility in relation to CCTV and Intellex systems, the gathering of risk information and the sharing of that information with outside properties, the manufacture of responsible workers and patrons, the protection of the 'image,' or reputation, of the organization and the property, the construction of images of 'criminals' and 'non-criminals', desirables and undesirables, and the reduction of opportunity for crime and risks.

¹⁹ More clearly, 'departmental security officer' here refers to employees that are in charge of security functions and operate within a department that is concerned primarily with security and has an inherent hierarchy of authority (management structure). The department is responsible directly to the organization for which they are employed. As not licensed through the state, they are separated from the contract sector, and through their title, from the rest of the proprietary, or 'in-house' sector.

This preference is associated with, for example, lower costs, increased specialization, greater flexibility (i.e. multiple agencies to choose from, and agencies that are flexible in response to consumer demand, see Lippert and O'Connor 2003), transfer of liabilities, and the prestige and image of the contractor. By contrast there has been minimal study of why some organizations have maintained or adopted in-house departments in the face of increased contractualization and the cheaper labour costs associated with it. As was relayed to us by a security representative in the private sector (Personal Communication August, 2003), flexibility in hiring (i.e. composing the security department according to specific characteristics) is one reason for proprietary department preference. Corporations that desire a specific composition of their security department may choose to adopt or maintain in-house departments, and as this study suggests, these departments may be more effective (perhaps posing less risk of unrest) in the composition of the subject populations on the property (through including some and excluding others). As departmental officers become more and more engaged in the prevention of loss and the management of risk, geared towards manufacturing a specific profile of the corporation and the property, specific types of security strategies and functions best accommodate those mentalities. It is with this impetus that I approach the present study, and examine the nature and extent of risk management within a particular departmental security system.

GOVERNANCE

In addition to the research on private security, a number of recent studies have examined governance in the private sphere. Over the past twenty years, research in many disciplines has investigated the emergence of numerous forms of non-state, or extra-state, governance (e.g. Samdyge 1999). This 'governmentality' literature focuses on making intelligible and exploring the programmes, strategies and techniques for the conduct of conduct (Rose 2000). Such orientations analyze the rationalities and technologies that underpin a variety of 'calculated interventions' that are enacted in order to govern the existence and experience of contemporary human beings, and to act on human conduct to direct it to certain ends (Rose 2000). When Michel Foucault coined the term 'governmentality' (a lecture in the 1980's, subsequently published in 1991 as an essay, see Foucault 1999), he was arguing that government is not a matter of imposing laws on subjects, but rather employing *tactics*. It was his belief that the dramatic changes in the techniques of government that developed in the western world from the eighteenth century onwards included the development of a range of multiform tactics for the government of populations outside the state, as well as the 'governmentalization' of the state itself (Smandyge 1999). Because of this standpoint's ability to focus on extra-state governance and the strategies and technologies therein, it is a beneficial perspective with which to analyze the governance of security in the private sector.

More recently, Hunt and Wickham (1994) have developed a more conceptually clear definition of 'governance.' They argue that governance is a more broad concept including any attempt to control or manage any known object (be it an event, a

relationship, an animate object, an inanimate object)- any object or phenomenon that human beings attempt to manage or control (Hunt and Wickham 1994: 78). As departmental security officers manage a specific space, they regulate and control spatial boundaries, subjects, populations, and objects. As agents of governance it is their role to utilize various strategies and techniques to regulate the conduct of those populations that flow through their sphere of authority- even composing, or manufacturing, the subject populations.

For Hunt and Wickham (1994) there are four main principles of governance.²⁰ The first is that all instances of governance contain elements of attempts and elements of incompleteness- attempts at governance are incomplete in that the governance programme is never perfect. Second, governance involves power, and as such, resistance and politics. Power is the 'always-incomplete' technical process by which governance drives the machine of society, or sociality- it is the productive *process* of keeping things going, rather than a 'thing' to be possessed. The third principle of governance is that it always involves knowledge. Knowledge is used to select objects for governance, as well as in actual instances of governance, and as Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argue, government in terms of risk and insecurity²¹ creates an insatiable demand for knowledge. Finally, governance is social and works to bind societies together. In other words, the objects of governance are 'always-already' known, and in every instance of governance, the object of governance and the techniques of governance are made available by society- they are always-already available. In this way, governance is always social. Departmental

²⁰ The rest of this section is drawn from Hunt and Wickham's (1994) book *Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance*.

security officers, as the 'fulcrums' on which corporate management programmes rest, are responsible for governing behaviour, managing subject populations, and constituting the image and profile of the property and corporation for which they work. This work effectively separates them from the contract sector of the security industry, as loyalty to the parent corporation is an increasingly important facet of effective security policy (Personal Communication August, 2003). Having long-term contracts with security personnel and decreasing departmental turnover more easily produce this loyalty.²² While the formal management programme of this particular organization cannot be discussed due to confidentiality agreements, its principle goals and boundaries can be alluded to given some of the responses of the interviewees. More specifically, the central concept upon which security governance programs such as this are based is the notion of risk and its management (Personal Communication August, 2003).

²¹ It is argued that within risk-based regimes security is centered, but paradoxically, *insecurity* becomes the preoccupation- the focus on risk minimization draws attention to the riskiness of everything and the certainty of nothing (O'Malley 1999: 139).

²² Personal communication, June 17th, 2003.

GOVERNING THROUGH RISK

In the last few decades, the organization of many fields of government (in particular the government of crime and social life) has been (re) shaped according to models and techniques of risk management (O'Malley 2000: 17). The emphasis has shifted in two ways: (a) from individual misdeeds to systematic problems; and (b) from governing the past through sanctions to governing the future- risk-managing the future (O'Malley et al. 1999: 30). The principle characteristics of risk are associated with the management of potential harms: risk identification, risk reduction, and risk spreading (O'Malley 2000: 17). More specifically, it has been argued that risk is fundamental to the understanding of contemporary policing (Johnston 2000; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Ericson and Haggerty 2002) and that risk management is a characteristic managerial technique in the business sector concerned with the security of capital and with the relationship between risk and profit rather than the maintenance of moral order (Shearing and Stenning 1985). In a corporate context where 'risk' is the primary mentality of policing, it may be defined as "the calculable probability of occurrences that deleteriously affect the economic effectiveness of the company, whether financial, material or intangible (i.e. to reputation or legal status)" (Bland 1999: 13). This definition is very useful in that *anything* can be a calculable hazard, be it financial, non-financial, material or non-material. It is then the job of corporate risk managers to anticipate, identify and assess the seriousness of risks, and deploy tactics to minimize them (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 76).

Risk as a Governmental Rationality

While Ulrich Beck's (1992) risk society thesis is perhaps the most well known and influential of the risk society literature, it is an unfit concept with which to approach the subject of policing.²³ While simultaneously being over-generalizing and totalizing, it also has the consequence of assuming that risk is a singular force with a homogenizing effect on society. By contrast, others have argued quite successfully that risk-based forms of policing are often combined with disciplinary tactics, providing new combinations of police philosophy and practice (for example see, Herbert 1996 and Johnston 2000).

For Beck (1992), risk society is a stage of development where social and technical innovation generates global risks which are beyond our effective control. The risk society is one of which you cannot be outside, and all members share the same fate and the same level of insecurity (not only are victims equal in their fate, but so are the offenders who instigate disasters). It has been argued that this equivalence between victim and offender, and a uniform level of insecurity for all, is combined with an entirely negative conception of security (Johnston 2000: 157). In other words, the risk society is obsessed with security in its most negative sense, such that individuals are unconcerned with the attainment of 'good' normative ends such as justice and equality. They are instead preoccupied with simply preventing the 'worst' (Johnston 2000: 157). The risk society thesis may be suited to the analysis of some global risks, but the sociological determinism

²³ Ericson and Haggerty (1997) attempted to combine two schools of thought on 'risk' when they utilized Beck's (1992) risk society thesis as an overarching framework to explain the rise, nature and scope of the 'risk society.' They then went on to use a governmentality perspective to analyze the techniques of policing, or governing, through risk. It has been argued that this combination is inherently problematic (O'Malley 2001, O'Malley 1999) such that there are explicit differences in the way that risk society theorists and governmentality theorists conceive of risk (for a detailed discussion of these differences, see O'Malley 1999). This work is not concerned with an overarching explanation of modern *society*, but rather focuses on the techniques and strategies of governing *through* risk, whereby risk is utilized as a mentality of governance, regulation and control.

in this argument makes it unsuited to the task of deconstructing policing and security practices.²⁴ While notions of risk are strong forces driving contemporary policing efforts, their effects are far from uniform. Rather, one of the most striking features of contemporary society is that individuals' and groups possess unequal and inequitable degrees of security (Hope 2000)- those who distribute security will do so inevitably in an increasingly uneven fashion (Johnston 2000: 158).

Risk Identification, Risk Reduction and Risk Spreading

It has been argued in some areas of risk literature that the private sphere has experienced a paradigm shift whereby reactive recourse, such as civil suit and restitution, have been replaced by the reduction of opportunities and by risk management²⁵ (Johnston and Shearing 2003).²⁶ As Les Johnston (1999: 192) argues, the growth of commercial security itself is a part of a wider shift towards risk-based thinking.²⁷ Risk-based thought is 'pragmatic' in that the objective is to anticipate and prevent risks rather than react to them after the fact (Johnston 1999: 189). This is accomplished by calculating potential losses, creating a balance between losses and the costs of prevention, minimizing and

²⁴ For more criticisms of the risk society thesis see, O'Malley (2000).

²⁵ But see Priest (1999) for a discussion of civil law as the incarnation of risk.

²⁶ This paradigm shift is similar to one which the entire criminal justice system has experienced. Simon and Feeley (1994) have labeled this 'actuarialism' and argue that a New Penology, which is actuarial, has replaced the Old Penology, rooted in reformation, reintegration and restitution. In other words, intervention and treatment have been replaced with "techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups assorted by level of dangerousness", or risk (Simon and Feeley 1994: 173).

²⁷ Johnston (1999) argues that commercial security and its increasing pervasiveness in democratic societies illuminates a shift towards risk-based thinking such that policing is now being supplemented by a wide range of civil, commercial and voluntary bodies. He warns that these developments raise two potentially disastrous issues. First, diverse policing, if left unchecked, may give rise to a fragmented system which combines the worst of all worlds: ineffectiveness (due to lack of coordination between elements) and injustice (due to inequity of the distribution of services). Secondly, preoccupation with risk- particularly the belief that every risk deserves a security response- if left unchecked, may result in the emergence of an invasive policing system located within a 'maximum security society.' While bearing in mind that Johnston is writing of the British experience with policing, his arguments are not lost.

controlling risks and at times transferring them to outside agencies or institutions such as private insurance companies (Johnston 1999: 189). Thus the securing of private space is not accomplished solely through the removal of problem-patrons, but is pre-emptive, proactive and preventive. In other words, private enterprises have developed ways to 'profile' various populations and risk-manage those 'categories' of people that flow through their spheres of authority. Risk-based thinking is now fundamental to corporate mentality (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and the efficacy of corporate capitalism is dependent on the deployment of rational calculation by managers and executives. Such calculation is concerned solely with maximizing corporate benefits while simultaneously minimizing any 'disbenefits' of risks.

Nalla and Newman (1990) provide a succinct account of the risk management process that could be found in any corporate management programme. First, it is necessary for corporate representatives to determine which company assets may be at risk. Having assessed assets and threats, the security manager is then required to undertake risk assessment. This involves assessing the probability of disbenefits and the calculable likelihood of their re-occurrence. The next stage in the process involves balancing anticipated loss with the probability of its occurrence. This is a crucial factor in the deployment of security resources. Prioritization of some risks over others is a necessary step as are various control strategies such as pre-employment screening for personnel, and situational crime prevention techniques. It is the final stages of this process with which I am centrally concerned here, as the departmental security officer, on behalf of management, will enact risk-control strategies such as exclusion, inclusion, containment, environmental crime prevention, and situational control mechanisms. As

has been argued elsewhere, the private sector has played an increasingly central role in defining and structuring definitions of risk and danger, and who and what should be targeted to avoid these risks and dangers (Coleman and Sim 2000: 627).

Further, Cunningham and Taylor (1985) have identified three components to proprietary programmes of risk minimization: physical security, informational security and personnel security. Physical security is enacted in order to control and monitor access; prevent unauthorized intrusion and surveillance, and safeguard information, merchandise and buildings (such security involves perimeter protection, sensors, alarms, barriers, fences, locks, CCTV, security lighting, access control systems, patrols, etc.). Similar means are utilized to control the threat from within by managing interior space. Corporations also need to protect sensitive information such as mailing lists, client files and pricing information. In this regard, specialists in computers may be brought in to 'securitize' computer files and programs. Lastly, prospective employees must be screened so that the quality and integrity of employees can be assured.

Johnston and Shearing (2003) have identified three broad categories to classify these general security functions. 'Opportunity management' refers to programme elements (screening of personnel, profiling, awareness programmes, etc.) directed towards the identification, construction, re-construction, mobilization, and reproduction of members who will comply with- and ideally be committed to- the aims of corporate security. 'Population management' refers to the use of techniques (security gates and doors, barriers, identity cards, CCTV, access control systems, etc.) directed towards the observation, containment, control and/or exclusion of persons operating inside or outside the organization. Finally, 'Information management' refers to techniques directed at

controlling the misuse, abuse or loss of corporate information. Such strategies can be seen in any proprietary security mandate, and provide useful insight into the mentalities behind diverse security programmes.

Tim Hope (2000) suggests that from the perspective of the private property owner, there are two broad kinds of security goods and practices. First, there are those that are geared towards responding to risk, commonly associated with physical security and/or target-hardening measures (Hope 2000: 95). Secondly, there are responses that aim to anticipate and avoid risks altogether (the ideal being a 'risk-free' property), in essence ensuring that persons and property are exposed to perceived sources of risks as infrequently as possible (Hope 2000: 95). Moreover, a purely rational and economic calculation of the benefits of private security action requires a degree of knowledge about risk which is unavailable to private citizens for the most part (Hope 2000: 95), but is available to the managers and programmers at this private property. Thus, the 'affluence' of the dwelling represents a powerful suppressant of property crime risk- the more 'exclusive' the property, the more it can exclude risks by maximizing avoidance of risk through spatial and cultural distancing from 'criminogenic' places and people (Hope 2000: 102). What this finding suggests is that 'exclusivity' as a goal may become more central to governance rationalities as corporate property owners attempt to reduce their contact with risky populations, situations and events by increasing the exclusivity of their property. The complex's capacity to exclude others through the use of private security personnel and the 'price mechanism'²⁸ (Hope 2000: 102) ensures it's positional and

²⁸ The property under study is one that is generally inaccessible to the public via its extremely expensive commodities and relative patron-class.

reputational advantage- it can remain a 'club realm' retaining 'club goods' (Hope 2000:

102) while insuring profitability in an advanced liberal marketplace:

Security becomes a positional good defined by income, access to private 'protective services' and membership in some hardened...enclave; security has less to do with personal safety than with the degree of personal insulation, in; consumption and travel environments, from 'unsavoury' groups and individuals, even crowds in general. (Davis 1990: 224, in Hope 2000: 83)

Ericson and Haggerty (1997, 2002) have written extensively on policing the risk society, however, they focused their analysis on the public police.²⁹ Regardless of their unsuccessful attempt to combine various conceptions of risk (the risk society thesis and a governmentality position) some of the insights they generated are valuable for examining private forms of policing. They posit that corporate institutions have their own private policing systems that are based on preventative security mandates and corporate and administrative compliance (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 28). Further, they argue, these systems of policing risk are much more elaborate and have greater technological and personnel resources than the public police (Ericson and Haggerty 2002: 255). It is noted that such corporate institutions do all the work of preventative security, public order policing, detection, apprehension, arrest, rights cautioning, production of evidence, and statement taking- the police only enter the situation when called upon to do so (Ericson and Haggerty 2002: 255).³⁰ As we look at how proprietary security officer's risk-manage

²⁹ The importance of Ericson and Haggerty's (1997) work was that it contemplated the public police as 'knowledge workers' dealing with more paperwork in fixed formats than real 'crime fighting.' It was argued that the police, as an institution, were constructed according to the needs of external risk institutions (be they insurance adjusters, auto insurance claimants, or private enterprises). The argument was that in the risk society (composed of institutions that organize on the basis of knowledge of risk), the public police are the fulcrum of risk communication among institutions and assume such roles as 'risk communicators', knowledge workers, knowledge producers, and information collectors and distributors.

³⁰ An interesting point is illuminated when we consider that private insurance companies, as key institutions of preventative security, discipline property holders into being self-policing agents (Ericson and Haggerty 2002: 255). In other words, through preventative policing of risk by managing opportunity, every

populations, it is important to note that their primary function is not 'crime fighting' or order maintenance. All forms of contemporary policing involve a significant amount of knowledge work and communication (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). In other words, managing a space based on risk necessitates information gathering and knowledge production rather than the physical task of ordering and responding to crime.

In producing information related to risk, and enacting governance strategies based on that knowledge, the moral and subjective subscriptions of the individual security officer may play heavily into the decisions made such that pre-defined risk categories and responses are flexibilized according to variable situational factors- moral judgments are still present in the risk management tools and those who use them (Hannah-Moffat 1999). Hannah-Moffat (1999) has argued that risk technologies are part of a wider programme of neo-liberal governance. Examining risk in the Canadian female penitentiary system, she employed various elements of culture in her analysis. Risk, she argued, is a normative concept able to mobilize culturally specific constructions of gender. More specifically, she found that women's corrections are not indicative of more efficient and objective actuarial technologies, but that *moral judgments are still prevalent in the risk assessment tools and in those who use them* countermending the assumption that risk governance acts uniformly across whole populations (Hannah-Moffat 1999: 72). She suggests that *there are qualitative differences in understandings of risk when applied in order to govern*. Moreover, as Alison Wakefield (2000) discovered, security agents' understandings of who is likely to offend, or behave in an 'anti-social' manner, could incorporate their

potential property crime victim is also a *suspect* such that they may be suspected of not doing enough to reduce the risk of loss. As we will see, this applies to the proprietary security programme under study, and the corporate risk management mandate that directs it.

personal prejudices against certain types of persons. Accordingly, the methodology for the present study was designed in order to elicit in-depth information from individual security officers concerning their relative roles in the risk management process, as well as the nature and extent of their discretion, autonomy and authority.

METHODOLOGY

The research plan was devised based on the nature of the proprietary security industry, and the challenges associated with gaining access to subjects working for private corporations in security roles. Personal contacts provided anonymous communications that generated the construction of various concepts, and one particular contact facilitated the acquisition of research subjects. Through use of his security department, subjects were obtained, and all security officers were sent a notice regarding the study. Those that replied comprised the sample.³¹

The interviews took place in a large Canadian city at a privately owned complex that boasts conference center facilities, a shopping promenade, banking facilities, several restaurants and bars, and a fitness club- in effect having public functionality while being privately owned and operated. This 'mass private property' (Shearing and Stenning 1981) employs an in-house, or proprietary, security department to govern its space. The officers are non-identifiable and non-uniformed, their attire consisting only of business suits and no identification nametags. The clientele of the complex consists of the upper-business class, mainly tourists, businesspersons, and dignitaries. The complex also hosts many large national and international conferences as well as various corporations that require extensive meeting space.

Eight security officers were interviewed using a semi-structured guide. This process allowed for the respondents to relay their own subjective understandings of the concepts under study in their own words and in their own time. The process was one of

reflexivity whereby transcription was completed after each interview and theoretical and conceptual construction was begun before completion of the project.

Data analysis involved compiling responses to the questions asked in the interviews as well as various personal communications that took place with anonymous security representatives throughout the study period. Each question was coded and the extracted answers were compiled from each interview transcription. This coding process can be understood in terms of 'decontextualization' and 'recontextualization' (Tesch 1990).³²

³¹ Martyn Denscombe (1998: 15) argues that a researcher can use non-probability sampling when they do not have sufficient information about the population to undertake random sampling, or do not know how many people or events make up the population.

³² This coding process can be understood in terms of 'decontextualization' and 'recontextualization' (Tesch 1990). Decontextualizing data involves removing extracts from their original context while retaining their meaning. Coded concepts are then merged with other interview data that has been similarly coded. The segmented and coded texts are then recontextualized, providing a new context for viewing and analyzing the data. This repositions the data in relation to theoretical concepts and themes that have developed.

OPERATIONALIZING PROPRIETARY SECURITY GOVERNANCE

The security personnel at this site are employed in order to reduce the risks defined by the corporation through means deemed acceptable, but are also subject to various normative constraints.³³ While the intricacies of the formal corporate policy of the property cannot be discussed due to confidentiality agreements, the specific risk strategies utilized by the private security personnel allude to various foci for governance efforts. In particular, these include the risk of liability, criminal liability on behalf of the security officers and/or the corporation, the risk of crime, the misconduct of employees, management and security personnel, and most centrally, risks to the image and reputation of the property (Interviews 1, 3, 4 and 6). These risks are managed by creating a corporate programme, a policy, in which are outlined the various risks and the pre-established responses to them. These strategies are geared towards the reduction of opportunity and risk minimization, and individuals, objects and events are grouped into various pre-defined categories. The guidelines are extrapolated from a continuous flow of information passed from the security officers to the programmers by means of incident reports, log books, tracking sheets, extensive files and a plethora of other information gathering mechanisms (Interviews 1, 3, 7 and 8). Paradoxically, the risk of security officer misconduct is also managed by use of the same mechanisms- they simultaneously serve as a monitoring device for the security personnel. By logging all incidents and events, security officers are also accounting for their presence and activities throughout their shifts.

³³ In seeking to understand the technologies and rationalities of rule, analysis of the normative discourses that underpin techniques and strategies for the maintenance of order (as articulated by those involved in initiating these strategies) must be undertaken (Coleman and Sim 2000).

Risk Technologies

Particular risk technologies used by the security department reveal how they gather information and disseminate it for use in the governmental programme. For example, some officers referred to 'taxi and limo tracking sheets' used to track and record incidents with various 'delinquent' taxis and limousines (Interviews 5 and 7). An *Excel* spreadsheet is modified to include various columns such as: taxi/limo license plate, Taxi/limo Company, incident, date and time. By keeping track of incidents and recording all events in this way, the security department is able to gather information in regards to which particular vehicles may pose a risk to the property and the patrons, and govern them accordingly (for example, banning them from picking up at the property for a certain amount of time). Moreover, taxi and limo profiles are thus established and desirables and undesirables are governed according to pre-established parameters.

Another officer (Interviewee #4) mentioned a 'vendor file' that is kept on each vendor immediately outside the property boundaries, for example hot dog vendors, candy vendors, ice cream trucks, etc. (Interviewee #4). These files consist of pictures, video recordings and written notes in regards to the activities of various vendors in the area. Such devices allow managers to peruse the files and enact strategies to govern vendors accordingly, for example, strategically placing pylons and automobiles in areas that are known to attract 'transient' vendors. Evidently, the vendor's presence poses a serious risk to the social stature, profitability and reputation of the property.

A way of ordering space in the complex is to make use of signs, or pieces of 'official graffiti' (Hermer and Hunt 1996). Upon entering the front entrance of the

property, one is confronted with a plethora of signs and arrows designating all things- where to get information, what information you are privileged to, and where certain events are taking place:

There's signs and stuff all over this place; it's a wonder people still ask for directions; like you can't look up and see where your supposed to go to. (Interviewee #2)

Members of the fitness club are given coded key cards that allow them access to the health facilities but no other area (Interviewee #2). They are directed to the spaces that they have access to by means of signs and arrows (Interviewee #2). There is also a shopping promenade³⁴ that is open to the public, and signs and arrows designate this area and how to get there (Interviewee #2). Physical security measures such as this regulate the flow of populations to their designated space and deflect them from areas they do not have access to. Moreover, the complex is abound with negative signs; 'do not enter', 'no smoking', 'no trespassing', 'Level 1 Members only', and these symbols and diagrams aid in the management of population flow and the regulation of space. This form that governance takes provides a prime instance of the construction of self-regulating subjects that is completely in line with the advanced liberal strategy of 'governing at a distance'.

There is a security notice-board outside the main security office where various posters and pamphlets are displayed (Interviews 5, 7 and 8). As employees enter through the employee entrance (the only way they can enter the building) they must inevitably pass by this board (Interviewee #5). The notice-board contains pictures of recent subjects

³⁴ Coleman and Sim (2000) have found that shopping areas in private spaces such as this are successful in that they provide leisure activities and the consumption of goods in what is seen as an inherently 'safe' arena. Specifically, they found that a majority of consumers preferred to pursue leisure activities and consume goods in enclosed private spaces containing CCTV cameras and private security (Coleman and Sim 2000: 627).

that have been arrested as well as their description and at times, pictures. Also on the board are descriptions of other 'undesirables' to watch out for that have been forwarded by other properties. One security officer (Interviewee #8) described a poster that was on the wall that had a picture of an individual on it beside of which were small notes advising viewers of what signs to look for when surveying potential 'undesirables.' Such mechanisms have the effect of making all employees of the property responsible for security in some way (either by looking out for 'risks', or making note of important information in relation to risks). They are examples of micro-powers (Hermer and Hunt 1996: 458) infiltrating the workplace, and are concrete examples of the construction of self-regulating subjects, such that all workers are responsabilized to take security measures and be in charge of their own safety to some extent.

Some officers referred to a 'points system' of classification (enabled by a computer database and software program) in which patrons and clients are ordered according to various characteristics such as number of visits, money spent, title, and relative stature (Interviews 1, 3, 6 and 8). Patrons are then categorized into levels of importance³⁵ (Interviewee #1). Detailed files are kept on all patrons and this information is used to define their respective status while on the property. The point's system aides in the creation and modification of existing profiles, and in feeding the corporate conception of what the overall profile of the property should be. The system allows for the employees to be aware of who is present on the property, and their importance to the organization. Upon being called to a security incident, officers are often informed as to the 'status' of the patrons involved. They mediate the situation accordingly:

At the main office there is a point system that determines the importance of the patron, not so much in security, but in other departments, and we use that as a guide for treatment sometimes. Sometimes we go to an incident and we don't know that they're a Level 1 patron, so you try to treat everyone equal until you know. [Interviewee #6]

The actions taken by security officers are based not only upon their assessment of the relative situation, but also upon the level of importance of each individual. All guests of the property are 'packages' composed of risk characteristics that dictate their relative levels of access, importance, and resulting categorization. In other words, the ability to contain incidents and respond to them with 'white glove treatment', or not, is dependent on knowledge of patrons and their assignment to various risk categories:

It can be the patron that tells me they're a Level 1 member, and it's happened before. "I'm a Level 1 member and you can't do this to me, and you can't treat me like this"; and you just have to be very patient. [Interviewee #8]

Situations such as this evidence actions and responses that are dependent on the stature of the patron and their relative importance. Decisions are made on this basis more often than not, and potentially dangerous and criminogenic situations can be contained in a manner that allows no permeation of information outside property boundaries (Interviewee #8).

Risk Managers

For the security department that governs this mass private property, risk management is not only a tool used to manage groups, but a way of thinking and acting- a mentality.

³⁵ These levels range from 1 to 6, where Level 1 is the top points earner and thus has the highest classification (Interviewee #6). The terminology and categories relating to the patron classification system have been changed in order to preserve confidentiality.

While the majority of the officers themselves were not aware of specific terminology related to risk management, they nonetheless possess in-depth knowledge as to their role in this process (Interviews 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8). When asked about general security responsibilities, one officer put it succinctly:

General security of the complex, making sure undesirable elements are kept out, dealing with injuries and patron illnesses, generally things of that nature. Making sure all rooms are secured and *loss and theft prevention*. [Interviewee #2, my emphasis]

The allusion to 'loss and theft protection' evidences at least some familiarity with practices of risk management and risk reduction, and how they play into everyday security functions.

When asked about dealing with problem-patrons, the officers reported that the hierarchy of patrons, as determined by the point system most centrally, allowed them to make decisions based on risk categories (Interviews 1 and 6). In other words, the handling of patrons in response to specific security concerns illuminates risk management mentalities that are actualized in the decisions of the security officers, removing some of their autonomy, and confining them to specific responses dictated by situational factors and the patron classification systems. As in the following quotation, differential treatment arises from an unspoken template used to organize and stratify all patrons of the property:

We look for signs of intoxication, level of voice, hand movements, what they're wearing; their eyes. At this property there is a certain dress code; our everyday patron; is more or less business attire, so when someone in ripped jeans and a faded t-shirt [appears], you get a little wary. [Interviewee #6]

By looking for intangible risks such as intoxication, tone of voice, body language and similarity with property image, officers classify patrons according to categories that

include the 'desirable', the 'undesirable', and many in-between groupings requiring specific strategic responses (Interviews 4 and 7). Tangible signs of risk such as mode of dress, style and physical attributes were also used in order to classify and sort the subject population into manageable groups each deserving of a particular pre-defined response (Interviewee #8). For example, when approaching a potentially problematic situation, officers would make mental assessments of mode of dress, intoxication, level of voice, height, weight, muscularity, etc. in order to enact the appropriate response (Interviews 1, 2, 6 and 8). These factors are used in order to slot each patron into a specific category for which there already exists a response based on the nature of that category. Responses range from immediate expulsion to no action at all, and could include constant surveillance, shadowing, logged descriptions, or the dissemination of subject description to other officers and/or other properties (Interviewee #2).

George Rigakos (2003) has found that often reasons for exclusion are based on formal guidelines that are geared towards the eviction of particular types of people. For example, property policy that states that no ripped jeans are permitted and shoes must be worn in fact may aim to exclude particular persons that do not fit the pre-established profile of the complex. While the official reason for exclusion is lack of proper footwear or inappropriate dress, the real motive may be to exclude homeless and transient populations. At this site, while exclusion was never a surety based on mode of dress, it nonetheless signalled potential targets for security surveillance. In an environment where everyone is uniformed to some degree (whether an employee uniform freshly pressed, or a manager's suit straight from the dry-cleaners) non-conformists threaten the integrity

and exclusivity of the corporate image. In so doing, they challenge not only the profile of the property, but the ideal which is represented in the corporate governance mandate.

Discretionary Governance

Most of the officers patrol on their own and are accustomed to making decisions and responding to security concerns by themselves, but within ready-made normative constraints (Interviews 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8). In regards to questions about conflict and conflict resolution it was suggested that subjective interpretation of individual situations coupled with discretion allows the security officers to act in a way that each officer sees fit at a particular time. Here, one officer relays how reporting all incidents is required, but how discretion is assumed:

I'd say we have about eighty-percent discretion. It's about eighty-percent our decision [what to do]; people [i.e. management] may want to question [you] the next day when they come in and hear about the situation, but they back us up. [Interviewee #4]

The decisions made and the action taken result from an individual perception of situational elements, the relative 'status'³⁶ of the patron and the interpretations and applications of pre-defined risk categories and characteristics (Interviews 1, 3 and 7). The way a security officer dealt with an unruly pair of patrons illustrates the interplay between pre-defined risk categories that called for exclusion and/or arrest, and the discretion evident in how the officer ended up dealing with the situation:

[H]e came back with his friend, and I told his friend that he was verbally trespassed and was not allowed back on the property, [or he could be] arrested. His friend was very apologetic, "I'm so sorry! Everything got mixed up tonight, it was all my fault." I let it slide. [Interviewee #8]

³⁶ According to a patron classification system discussed below.

The security officers are not machines acting in accordance with a seamless web of direction and design, but are permitted a certain amount of discretion as part of the governance process in order to assess risks and make decisions 'on the floor.' In this programme, efficiency and security are stressed through the advanced liberal strategy of 'flexible institutional arrangements' (Coleman and Sim 2000: 625) and fragmented service provision which addresses specific issues and problems rather than providing universally similar services and responses.

In the above case, the officer was able to make a decision based on an interpretive understanding of the situation rather than blindly following the formal property policy. The following quotation illustrates how discretion *within* the management programme allows security officers a particular amount of leeway when dealing with situations and events:

Some situations are tough because you want to react a certain way but then your partner jumps in and they react differently, so you're like damn! The way I would have handled it and the way someone else would, the outcomes are not necessarily the same; there are different ways of dealing with situations and those vary by officer.
[Interviewee #1]

Security officers are trained through formal and informal means to assess and manage various situations and are granted discretion with which to make decisions as part of an overall strategy of flexible corporate governance.

Corporate management of risk must be a strategy that allows for interpretive understandings of substantive situations and dangers. Governing according to risk necessarily involves the interpretation of risk characteristics, allowing the risk-managers

(the security officers) to make decisions that cannot be accounted for in the imagined construct of the governance programme. This programme is never perfect or complete in its operationalization of risk, and thus requires agents 'on the floor' to make decisions and act according to their interpretive understandings of what and who constitutes a danger:

I used to call my manager, but I was told that "I don't make decisions on my own" so I don't call for advice any more.
[Interviewee #2]

The ability to act with the appropriate discretion is an invaluable trait that is fostered within the security department so that officers that are loyal to the corporation will make decisions according to what they believe are in the best interests of their employer (Interviews 1, 2 and 7).

Resisting Risk

Governing this mass private space by utilizing risk strategies and permitting, even fostering, discretion in the security personnel, morality and personal subscriptions are infused into the risk management process. Individual characteristics and traits of both the risk manager and the subject play into the categorization process and the associated responses. One officer explains:

I'd say it all just comes with on-the-job training. It depends on how well you've gotten to know people, how you can gauge their actions, how you can read a person basically. *There's a lot of subjective decision-making, and everyone does it differently.*
[Interviewee #7, my emphasis]

In other words, while risk strategies are utilized in accordance with particular pre-established risk categories and responses, as outlined above security officers retain discretion with which to react to individual situations. This discretion at times allows them to utilize the risk programme according to their personal subscriptions (Interviewee #6).³⁷

Interviewee's demonstrated familiarity with various ways of dealing with conflicts and 'sorting' people and events into pre-coded schemas (Interviews 1, 2, 5 and 7). During the busiest hours on the property, for example, there was a maintained security presence in the public areas of the complex (Interviewee #2). Security was engaged in the surveillance of incoming patrons and the categorization of them into groups- desirable or undesirable; criminal or non-criminal.³⁸ Such categorization resulted in the immediate exclusion of some, the surveillance of others (through the use of extensive CCTV monitoring and shadowing), or no action at all (Interviewee #5). More specifically, the sorting of patrons in accordance with pre-established management ideals was never a perfect practice and officers at times would flexibilize the schema and shift patrons from one category to another depending on situational variables and personal decisions (Interviews 1, 3, 4 and 6). One officer relayed an incident where a group of loud youths entered the complex, and would normally have been confronted and queried as to their business, however, the officer recognized them as a popular music band from television:

Just the other night I had seen the same kids on TV. They were part of a band from the US that was visiting [a Canadian city] and so I let them go about their business; it was lucky because my

³⁷ As Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 123) argued, "[m]orality is embedded in risk technologies and in systems of risk management."

³⁸ The search for behaviour that breaches the standards of behavioural conduct laid down by the organization results in a target population of surveillance that far exceeds in breadth those who traditionally concern the public police (Shearing and Stenning 1981; Wakefield 2000).

partner didn't know who they were at all; but I like them.
[Interviewee #3]

The discretion that the security officers are necessarily given as part of the management programme allowed this officer to shift the youths from one category (immediate removal) to another (no action taken) based on his affinity for rock music. This countermands the assumption that risk governance acts uniformly across whole populations, but rather it may operate differently according to the nature and characteristics of the individual decision maker.

Incomplete Governance

Officer discretion in interpreting risk characteristics and applying risk strategies allows them to operate as somewhat autonomous risk managers, yet the normative constraints imposed by the formal governance programme limit that autonomy. Paradoxically, that same discretion and authority can facilitate resistance to formal policy. While the security department retains some discretion concerning how and when to enforce formal codes, so that exceptions can be made in cases that require sensitivity, they at times utilize that discretion to respond- or fail to respond- to situations they deem unworthy of their time, or unimportant (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7).

One officer (Interviewee #1) described a situation whereby a popular television star entered the property in a state of extreme intoxication. Formal management doctrine would require immediate expulsion in order to minimize the threat to the internal stability of the property and the image of the corporation. In this instance however, the officer felt that to expel the individual would create potential future problems for the property

including scathing criticism by the individual, a potential media response and/or a lawsuit. Here, the standardized response was ignored and the security officers shifted the patron from one category to another, responding with 'white glove treatment':

In that type of situation, it's better for us and the complex to diffuse the situation as quickly and quietly as we can without causing a scene and without pissing him off. It's in our interest to do that, they can respond the next day with complaints and it doesn't look good for us, so we make exceptions in some kinds of cases; It depends on your decision and what you think is the best thing to do at the time.
[Interviewee #1]

Here the governance programme failed in its attempt to secure regularity, but flexibilized itself in order to account for a situation that could not be provided for in the conceptual configuration of the original management programme. The security officer was allowed the appropriate discretion needed to apply other categories of response in order to manage the risk at hand.

At the same time, permissible discretion and flexibility can result in a 'resistance effect' that incorporates failure into the governance programme. While the security officers are responsible to the organization that employs them- the same organization that has defined the risk categories and the appropriate responses- they nonetheless deviate from that programme in some situations:

[T]here's a guy we know who likes to come in and raid the ashtrays for cigarette butts. He used to come in a lot until we trespassed him and then arrested him, so we don't see him much. He actually came in the other night; it was late and I just let him take the butts and go, he's no real trouble. (Interviewee #5)

Here the programme is incomplete. It attempts to secure regularity by enacting specific strategies that are based on risk information and assessment. In so doing, some situations, for example the incident with the television personality described above, require agents

on the floor to respond appropriately in the interests of the governing corporation. Thus infused into the programme is a certain amount of discretion for the security officers to use in order to shift patrons from one risk category to another. Paradoxically, that same discretion allows them to act, or fail to act, in other situations. One officer reported, “ignoring an undesirable” that came on property late at night to use the washroom out of feelings of sympathy (Interviewee #5). Another relayed that at times before the end of shifts he would “pretend not to see [things]” that he should have taken notice of (Interviewee #2). These activities incorporate resistance into the governance programme. It is thus never perfect, but always striving for perfection- the security officers do not govern in a perfect way as contemplated by the programmers, but use their ‘discretion’ to sometimes act in ways not endorsed by management or property policy.

Disequilibria

Many of the officers felt that they were akin to ‘managers’ of the property (Interviews 1, 2, 5 and 6):

We're not uniformed, we don't wear nametags, just business suits and ties; I think that we're really more on par with management than anyone else. [Interviewee #6]

The officers blend into the surrounding profile, limiting the visibility of 'security', and bolstering an image of safety and business continuity. Moreover, duties involve the disciplining of employees, formal report taking, and ensuring compliance with property policy (Interviewee #3). As a result, the officers exist in a state of disequilibria whereby the management and executive branches regard them as employees, and the employees perceive them as management:

But the problem is that we fit into that weird category where the workers hate us because they see us as managers, and the managers don't respect us because they see us as workers. [Interviewee #5]

The tasks of policing the patrons while policing the employees forces the security officers to work in an environment that has multiple perceptions of their relative position and authority. In such departmental systems, the officers police not only the physical property boundaries and those that cross those boundaries, but also the workers who keep the property operating smoothly. At times, discipline is handed out to management, and no organizational employee or manager is immune to investigation and/or surveillance (Interviewee #1). Unsure as to their structural position within the organization, the security team operates in a state of disequilibria.

When queried as to contract security involvement at the property, it was relayed that while an outside contractor is used to fill spaces in the schedule, when working, contract guards have little if any authority:

They don't do much. They sort of respond to what we ask them to do, they do patrols of the property; assist us if we need assistance; they do very basic stuff. [Interviewee #6]

These role placements stem from a distrust of the contract sector in regards to standards, qualifications and training (Interviews 2, 3, 6 and 7). Contract officers are perceived as being risks to the safety and security of the property, and are governed accordingly. Moreover, as is further discussed below, the functions of 'security' and 'safety' are of equal importance to the maintenance and manufacture of a particular profile. Contract personnel are seen to be of lesser value in fostering this particular ideal (Personal communication August, 2003), perhaps even becoming a risk to this image. The contract

security staff is managed by being relegated simple duties and being kept from sensitive incidents and events (Interviews 6 and 7).

An important finding was that almost all of the security officers differentiated themselves from the contract sector (Interviews 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8). They referred to themselves as 'officers' and even went so far as to have the title 'Security *Officer*' infused into their employment contracts (Interviewee #6). Most importantly, they feel that the duties they perform are different than those performed by contract security guards. For example, when asked about job responsibilities, one officer stated that:

You have to have a good head, basically you have to have the right mindset; It's not a job just anyone can walk in and do. And if you're sitting around all night just watching a room or a specific space that's a different type of job, but this job isn't that.
[Interviewee #1]

Another, in referring to the contract sector, reported that many of their duties amount to simply ensuring the safety of tangible goods within specified boundaries:

[T]hey mostly just watch the contents of the room; and they maintain some kind of order for the parties and that. [Interviewee #2]

Implicit in this quotation is a definitional divergence between contract sector security guards and departmental security officers. When probed as to this differentiation, another officer reported that:

I definitely differentiate. Calling us a guard is an insult. A guard specifically stands around and *guards* something. We are out there dealing with a variety of situations. Could be anything, we don't know. And we're a lot more than your average security guard. And we have significantly greater power and authority on this property.
[Interviewee #7]

Comments such as these allude to an implicit hierarchy within the security industry that necessitates recognition. The definition of departmental security officers outlined earlier is an initial step in this process.

Information Workers

Much of the work that departmental security officers do is preventative, including fire patrols (checking extinguishers, hoses, panels and detectors), regular perimeter patrols and maintaining a visual presence (Interviewee #5).³⁹ One officer estimated that eighty percent of their work is information gathering, while twenty percent is crime related (Interviewee #6). Whether locking up for the night or patrolling in a random pattern, security personnel are constantly collecting information to be catalogued in notebooks, logbooks and in incident reports. As one officer reported:

Thirty percent of my work is crime fighting and excluding people from the property, where the rest is gathering information or generating reports; Everything is written down, documented, pictures are taken, and then we pass it along to management and they take care of it. [Interviewee #4]

The security department at this site is engaged in a significant amount of 'information work.' According to them, physical security and order maintenance do not take up the largest portion of their time. Instead, they gather and elicit information at all times, disseminating it to management and other security personnel through the use of logbooks, notepads, incident reports, etc.:

³⁹ As previously stated, the security officers are non-uniformed, but in many interviews it was relayed to us that they could be easily picked out of a crowd (Interviews 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8). This suggests a particular demeanor, stature and presence of authority which is a preventative mechanism in itself (Mopas and Stenning 2001).

Even when we're strolling around, we're not just strolling for the sake of strolling. We're looking at this, looking at that, seeing what people are up doing, writing everything down; when people see us writing they seem to perk up as if we may be writing about them; they're almost afraid of the notepads. [Interviewee #1]

This 'information work' is a technology used to order, classify and predict future problems or risks.

Having security officers record all incidents, allows corporate managers, through their own knowledge work, to peruse the documents and develop new and innovative risk management strategies geared towards particular trends that have been extrapolated from the various collections of information. The security officer effectively acts as the 'fulcrum' of risk communication within the organizational structure. Risk management strategies require human agents 'on the ground' to point out, record and regulate risks, and by producing knowledge of risk, the corporation is better able to manage its space. Moreover, security intervention is reactive to organizational demands for knowledge of risk. Normative directions (such as 'hot topics' - recent focuses of security attention relayed at monthly meetings; Interviewee #5) are conditional on management's assessment of the latest risks to the physical property and its profile, whether from an internal (employees, etc.) or external source (for example a new bar opening down the street). In such cases security officers may increase internal and/or external patrols managing the latest risks that the corporation has identified (Interviewee #5). They act as risk communicators⁴⁰ gathering information and disseminating it to managers for use in future risk management strategies. It is extremely rare for a security officer to confront a crime in progress (Interviews 1 and 3). While on patrol, officers are proactive but mainly

in order to obtain information about possible suspects and 'undesirables' who appear out of place and time, and to relay that information to colleagues (Interviews 1, 3, 5 and 8). What they normally find at the scenes to which they are called are a number of troubles that require a combination of information gathering, mediation, assistance, expertise, coercion, and referral (Interviews 5 and 6).

While engaging in information work, the security officers at this site expressed some discontent towards the institution of privacy which limits their involvement in certain events, and minimizes their ability to record pertinent information (Interviews 1 and 8). Moreover, at times, the security officers simply had no capacity to do much about crime or victimization. This incapacity is related to the normative constraint of privacy as observed in the complex and enacted in the governance programme, whereby patrons expect and are afforded a certain amount of privacy for their belongings and their person. The institution of privacy is enforced by the corporation in response to consumer demand, and effectively limits the security department and its activities (for example, CCTV cameras are not permitted in certain parts of the complex that are labelled as 'private', and thus no information gathering or knowledge production ensues; Interviewee #8). This normative constraint on authority stops the security officers from action in cases where privacy of a patron is at issue:

[In cases of] domestic disputes; we try to separate the people first of all and then it depends on how far it went before we got there. If there's violence, I think we're not even able to lay charges at that time- we have to ask one of the parties if they want the police involved. If they don't want the police involved you automatically back down. [Interviewee #8]

⁴⁰ A term used by Ericson and Haggerty (1997) in reference to the work of public police, but equally applicable to these private security officers.

Furthermore, the action taken in such disputes was contingent on the status of the patron and their relative position in relation to the patron classification system (Interviewee #1). Individuals of lower status would perhaps be expelled from the complex, whereas those with higher status (read as importance to the property owners) may simply be moved to another area and/or separated for a time (Interviewee #1).

A significant amount of communication also occurs between the security officers and outside security teams from other properties (Interviews 2 and 3). This risk-communication identifies undesirables (potential thieves, problem-patrons, etc.) and is a concrete example of the security departments at several different locations collecting information and disseminating it outside their boundaries (Ericson and Haggerty 1997).

Regarding 'known subjects', one officer stated that:

[W]e can blacklist them so if they show up here or at another property, [the computer] will show that they have been blacklisted and they'll call security. Today actually, the [Shopping Complex] informed us of a patron that was a problem. She was unstable and refused to have black people serve her food; she yelled at everyone and started screaming randomly, just an unstable woman. So we refused her entry. [Interviewee #3]

This type of information gathering and dissemination amounts to the profiling of 'deviant' populations and outlining the sorts of risks that they may pose to the property and its patrons. A security network results where profiles are created and communicated so as to provide the appropriate tools for governing through risk.

Manufacturing the Corporate Image

In a competitive marketplace, reputation, or image, is a central risk to be managed. It is the responsibility of the security department to enforce property policy and govern

subject populations according to guidelines that are geared towards creating and maintaining a specific image that the corporation has imagined is good for business (Interviewee #6). To this end, profiles of 'good' and 'bad' patrons, employees, taxis, security officers, etc., are created using risk information not only to manage space, but to compose the subject population of individuals that are good for business- or at the least, do not detract from it (Interviewee #1). It falls on the security officers to help construct (through gathering and disseminating risk information) and maintain (through inclusion, exclusion and containment) the image of the complex and the corporation while simultaneously ensuring economic, reputational, and physical security (Interviews 1, 3, and 7).

The security department, through exclusionary practices based on property policy and the use of state doctrines⁴¹, is able to police the boundaries of the corporate image and deflect unwanted, or undesirable, subjects, objects and events (Interviewee #4). The complex's policy is the law in this site and supercedes the criminal, civil and public laws:

[Y]our enforcing rules, well laws really, on the property, but once you go outside its totally different. We're the bosses here. We have all the say. [Interviewee #6]

They construct the society inside, and manage and shape its behaviour through various tactics and risk technologies. By including desirable elements and excluding undesirable ones, they are effectively *creating* a subject population within their walls that fits a certain profile. That profile is not only part of the image of the corporate owners, but has been constructed as part of a risk management programme enabled in order to maximize profitability and minimize the risks of crime and liability. They *construct* and *constitute*

the profile of the property, maintaining and contain a particular atmosphere, governing behaviour and moulding the accepted definitions of criminality and risk by screening 'criminals' and 'non-criminals': desirables and undesirables:

It's like a small city in here. I mean it's like being a police officer in just the complex. We have all the authority, all the say; we really decide who gets in and who doesn't. [Interviewee #6]

Security is often engaged in the containment of sensitive, violent and embarrassing events and the profile that they have helped establish for the property (Interviews 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7). In one interview, an incident was described whereby a Level 1 patron, also a well-known TV personality, was in a heated argument with a prostitute about the payment of fees (Interviewee #5). When security was called because of the noise, they immediately recognized the patron and proceeded 'with caution' (Interviewee #5). Rather than expelling the "intoxicated, loud and disturbing" (Interviewee #5) patron from the complex as was required by formal policy, the prostitute was removed immediately, and the patron was coaxed back into his room. No logs were entered, and no incident report was filed. The actions of the security officers successfully contained the event so as not to allow information to leak outside the complex, insuring the privacy of the patron. These efforts are central to the image and reputation of the complex, whereby patrons and potential patrons are aware of the safety of their privacy when inside the building (Interviewee #5). By conducting business in this way, the corporation is able to serve high-end clientele that demand privacy and 'personable' security (Interviewee #5).

⁴¹ For example *Ontario's Trespass to Property Act*, (R.S.O. 1990) which allows property agents to evict persons that are in the process of contravening property policy as designated by the owner or occupier.

Officers are very strict with the media, and allow no cameras in 'public' areas without express permission from management, even going so far as to survey personal camera use (Interviewee #5). All employees sign extensive confidentiality agreements prior to employment, and it is frowned upon to discuss property events outside of the complex, even outside of the security department itself (Interviewee #7). Discipline is handled internally as are all matters pertaining to patrons and problem-patrons (Interviewee #1). All incident reports, tables, logbooks and other information gathering devices are internal and thus confidential- only the public police and the courts have legal access to them (Interviewee #6). All other information is mediated and relayed through a security representative (Interviewee #6). Through measures such as these, coupled with the rarity of public police involvement in property affairs (or any outside institution for that matter; Interviewee #1) containment of information, and thus image, is successfully achieved. Further, the feeling of ease that is associated with business suits outweighs the deterrent strategies of police-like uniforms, and reinforces the image of business-as-usual (Personal Communication, July 2003). These strategies of managing risks to the profile of the property allow the complex to present an image that is safe, conducive to business and ultimately 'risk-free'.

The high-end, busy, business-like profile and atmosphere of the property is the image that is (re)produced and maintained through the use of property policy and its enforcement by departmental security officers. Patrons form a key part of this image, and security officers are enlisted in order to regulate behaviour and secure the corporate image by sorting patrons and enacting various risk management strategies and technologies. This protects the image and its 'private palatial grandeur' from being

overturned and made 'common' (see, O'Connor 2002). Anything from the inside or outside that threatens the corporate image is 'contained.' When confronted with security incidents posed by 'problem-patrons':

[Y]ou pull them aside [and] move to a quiet area. If you arrest somebody you get the quickest way out of the public area and get them out of the area so people don't see kicking and punches flying ... [or] pull them aside, don't yell at them, talk calmly, rationally, listen to what they have to say, again be aware of who they [are]; [you use] you're body language, the implicit threat of violence, the tone of your voice; it depends on the person. [Interviewee #3]

Such strategies reduce the number as well as the intensity of disturbances to the picturesque image of business-as-usual and security (or the absence of risk).

Other Governance Rationalities

The risk management strategies discussed above are consistent with advanced liberal forms of governance and utilize visible signs, varying notions of risk, risk management and surveillance to 'govern-at-a-distance' individuals that flow through the private sphere of authority. An advanced liberal rationality is one whereby responsibility is distanced from the formal state apparatus, and organized around various responsabilized agencies and institutions (Lippert and O'Connor 2003). While the strategy for governance at this mass private property is geared around notions of risk, they do not wholly dominate the regulation policy. The programme instead combines a number of other strategies in order to successfully police its space.

The use of 'fake' cameras (Interviewee #7), visible cameras, and the posters, notices and signs described above, may be based on notions of who and what poses a

risk, but may also be attempts to discipline⁴² workers and patrons into acting in ways consistent with corporate aims and the property policy. These discipline strategies are enacted in order to create responsabilized workers and patrons that govern themselves accordingly so that the programmers can regulate behaviour and environment from a distance. Such a governmental system is not totally and wholly dominated by risk, but in fact uses notions of risk to aid in the policing of its space. Moreover, this system fluctuates and changes in accordance with a continuous influx of information from the private security officers- in other words the governmental programme (and the notions of risk through which it operates) are moulded and shaped by various ongoing events, objects and subjects⁴³.

There was also some sign of coercive governance whereby physical force and/or eviction was utilized in extreme cases or incidents (Interviews 1 and 8). These displays of coercive power may or may not be public, but they necessarily make use of the authority and power of the property owner to ensure compliance with policy demands. In one instance:

[From the street] He kept trying to come back on the property [so] I took him by the arm [and] he took a wild swing; so we restrained him physically [and another officer] sat on his back and held him in place, anchored him down; the police came and eventually he just moved on; he wasn't intoxicated, he was dressed quite

⁴² 'Discipline' features the continuous exercise of power through surveillance, individualization and normalization (Pratt 2001: 125). "As a strategy of normalization, the aim of [discipline is to] constitute an organized body where all partial, confined, and limited subjective perceptions would be linked in perpetual communication with another, privileged, objective perception that encompassed them" (O'Connor 2002: 56). It creates disciplined subjects that act in accordance with pre-established guidelines, and are regulated and trained through the act of surveillance and knowledge production so that they act in appropriate ways regardless as to the presence of 'authority.'

⁴³ This is somewhat *contra*-Beck (1992) who asserted that it was risk that shaped all of contemporary society and social relations. His argument was that risk permeates and shapes all social life, but in this case, risk may be augmented by disciplinary strategies and coercive governance, and the programme itself is shaped according to information that the security officers continuously gather.

normally, but it was the way he was talking; He seemed a little delusional. (Interviewee #8)

Here the security officers, working together, evicted an undesirable and were forced to physically keep him 'outside' of the property boundary. To this end they made use of their authority as agents of the property, and the power of the complex's policy regarding 'loitering', but also the physical reality of coercive governance.

At times, the security officers play the role of border guards, patrolling, surveying and punishing (through exclusion and/or arrest) 'non-citizens' in accordance with the 'laws' of the property. During the summertime, for example, the security team spends a significant amount of time on the outside perimeter of the property keeping out 'non-citizens' while allowing desirables to permeate their established border (Interviewee #4). These activities are public in that the forceful exclusion of some (homeless persons and/or youths; Interviewee #4) is done on the boundaries of the territory in response to the mandate of the governing policy.

The purpose here is not to convolute the analysis of an already complex governance programme, but to outline some findings that suggest that notions of risk do not totally and wholly dominate the corporate security policy. It may be the case that other governance rationalities are at work including the use of disciplinary techniques and coercive strategies based on negative punishments for non-conformists. Rather than risk shaping the system of regulation, it may be one, albeit a significant one, among many mentalities of rule that dominate this mass private property. This suggests that more study is needed into private sector security governance in regards to the depth of penetration that risk and other governmental rationalities have made into its programmes.

CONCLUSION

With the privatization of urban space, many areas that are privately owned and controlled serve as sites for public life. The setting for this study is one such example where public life takes place under the watchful gaze of departmental security officers engaged in the regulation and management of population flows, as well as the construction of social life and the formations that it takes. The officers maintain extensive territorial controls, their presence and function having ties to the community police officer, or the 'bobby on the beat.' It is evident that the rights of property facilitate rule-enforcement within private spaces that is more extensive than that usually applicable to public spaces (Wakefield 2000: 136). For privately owned and operated sites to act as forums for public life there is a need to enact controls that serve local communities and create truly communal spaces. What exists at present are areas of public life from which are excluded 'risky' populations and events, such that a particular profile is constructed and maintained- one that is supposedly free of risk.

In law now, if someone wants to hold private organizations accountable through the instrument of public law, they need to define them as fulfilling a function of, or for, government, since only then do they become subject to public laws (including the *Charter*⁴⁴; O'Malley et al. 1999: 30). Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw a line between public and private property, actions and functions (O'Malley et al. 1999: 31), a trend that makes it necessary to re-conceptualize the traditional rules for deciding who is and who is not subject to the *Charter* and state accountability mechanisms. Research and insight is needed into potential regulatory strategies to control and manage private interests that are performing more and more 'governmental'

functions, and who at present operate with a significant amount of authority and autonomy.

Proprietary security departments have been adopted or maintained in some organizations in order to facilitate regulation and control that has ties to advanced liberal forms of government, including actuarialism and the associated practices related to risk management. They are employed in the governance of people, objects and events in order to create a spectacular profile. No longer are strength, size and intelligence the hallmark of a good security officer. Instead, it is the ability to counsel, mediate, manage, and discern between the 'wanted' and the 'unwanted', between desirables and undesirables. In a market where security services are readily at hand, it may be the case that proprietary security officers are preferred by some due to their training, the flexibility in hiring, etc., but it may also be the case that they have a better understanding of, and are more accountable to, the organizations that employ them.⁴⁵

This study has illuminated many of the risk strategies used by departmental security officers in governing a particular private image. Moreover, it has enabled us to see how particular governmental rationalities related to risk operate in order to secure, contain, manufacture and governmentalize particular spaces. The findings also suggest that among the proprietary industry there is an implicit hierarchy, or classification, that needs to be recognized. Further conceptual differentiation is needed to account for all of the various types of security services and the ways in which private security officers (both proprietary and contractual) govern using advanced liberal rationalities. Analyzing

⁴⁴ See *R. v. Buhay* for details.

⁴⁵ I suggest that proprietary security officers are better controlled through the use of sanctions, suspensions and ultimately the control of wages and pay. Contract officers on the other hand have set pay scales and can be moved from property to property in the event of conflict of interest or misconduct.

risk as a technique of governance has allowed the successful deconstruction of this particular departmental security system, while simultaneously allowing for notions of risk to shape, mould and foster particular normative constraints and the governmental programme itself. Risk here is not an overarching strategy that shapes all social life, but one tool among many used to regulate spaces and the populations that flow through them.

This project has individualized and localized risk from the overall programmatic conception, down to the level of the individual security officer him/herself. The actuarial language of risk gives the impression of being objective, calculable and scientific; however, on the level of the individual security officer, there does not appear to be a sophisticated calculation used to determine the level of risk in any given situation. Rather, various mental assessments are undertaken and decisions are made according to pre-established normative constraints imposed by the formal governance programme. On the other hand there seems to be a significant amount of resistance to corporate policy that paradoxically stems from the same discretion that security officers are permitted as part of the governance programme. This suggests that moral and subjective judgements have not been removed from the application of risk assessment tools. The practical uses of risk technologies are not, in Simon and Feeley's (1992) words, "depersonalized or concerned primarily about independent, abstract statistical categories and populations." Instead, moral judgment remains central in the assessment of risk and the resulting composition of the corporate image.

Many officers expressed the feeling that a large number of organizations are returning to, or adopting, proprietary departmental systems, and that this trend will continue in the near future. Several of them reported that seven large businesses in the

same city have adopted or returned to in-house departmental security systems in recent months. These modern proprietary systems are a mixture of approximately seventy-percent in-house workers and thirty-percent contract guards.⁴⁶ This type of system effectively balances the cost associated with in-house staff and the risks associated with employing only contract security personnel. Moreover, too frequently a distinction between the types of security services (for example, contract and in-house) is either absent or made only in passing in contemporary works on private security. Hopefully this study will suggest that the distinction is more important in that it may reflect the mentalities of governance operating in mass private properties.

As security becomes a more important function of national and international business, security departments are playing a more central role in the overall governance and management of space. It may be the case that 'security' is slowly making its way into the core-functions of business enterprises. This would explain the continuing use of proprietary security departments whose central goal is the enactment of risk management and other governmental rationalities. This work attempts to lift the analysis of private police function, scope and nature out of the traditional field of crime control and place it into the field of government, however more research is needed in order to map the growth, function, domains and territory of private policing in Canada. This will provide a better empirical foundation for appropriate policy regarding regulation, standards, and accountability that may require extension into the private sphere. Accountability mechanisms outside the state, or combining state and non-state agencies and institutions, will need to be developed to deal with hybrid forms of governance, and the new proliferation of private security.

⁴⁶ Personal communication, June 8th, 2003.

REFERENCES

- Bayley, D. and C. Shearing (1996). "The Future of Policing." *Law and Society Review*, 30(3), pp. 585-606.
- Beck, Ulrich (1992). *Risk Society*. New York: Sage Publications.
- Black, Thomas (1993). *Evaluating Social Science Research*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bland, D.E. (1999). "Risk Management in Insurance." *Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance*, 7(1), pp. 13-16.
- Button, Mark and Bruce George (1998). "Why Some Organizations Prefer Contract to In-House Security Staff." In: Martin Gill (Ed.) *Crime at Work: Increasing the Risk for Offenders*. Britain: Perpetuity Press. Pp. 201-213.
- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, Schedule B of the *Constitution Act*, 1982 (79). (<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/>)
- Coleman, Roy and Sim, Joe (2000). "You'll Never Walk Alone: CCTV Surveillance, Order and Neo-Liberal Rule in Liverpool City Centre." *British Journal of Sociology*, 51 (4), pp. 623-639.
- Cunningham, W., J. Strauchs and C. Van Meter (1990). *The Hallcrest Report II: Private Security Trends, 1970-2000*. Stoneham, Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Cunningham, W. and T. Taylor (1985). *The Hallcrest Report: Private Security and Police in America*. Portland, OR: Chancellor Press.
- Davis, Melissa, Richard Lundman and Ramiro Martinez (1991). "Private Corporate Justice: Store Police, Shoplifters, and Civil Recovery." *Social Problems*, 38(3), pp. 395-411.
- Denscombe, Martyn (1998). *The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Research Projects*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- De Waard, J. (1999). "The Private Security Industry in International Perspective." *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 7(2), pp. 143-174.
- Draper, H. (1978). *Private Police*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Ericson, Richard and Kevin Haggerty (1997). *Policing the Risk Society*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- Ericson, Richard and Kevin Haggerty (2002). 'The Policing of Risk.' In: Tom Baker and J. Simon (Eds.) *Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 238-272.
- Farnell, Margaret and Clifford Shearing (1977). *Private Security: An Examination of Canadian Statistics, 1961-1971*. Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.
- Forst, B., and P. Manning (1999). *The Privatization of Policing: Two Views*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1991). "Governmentality." In: G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (Eds.) *The Foucault Effect: Essays on Governmentality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Giddens, Anthony (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gill, Martin and Gerry Hart (1999). "Enforcing Corporate Security Policy Using Private Investigators." *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 7, pp. 245-261.
- Gray, Kevin and Susan Francis Gray (1999). Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs, and Quasi-Public Space." *European Human Rights Law Review*, 1, pp. 46-102.
- Hannah-Moffat, Kelly (1999). "Moral Agent or Actuarial Subject: Risk and Canadian Women's Imprisonment." *Theoretical Criminology*, 3(1), pp. 71-94.
- Herbert, Steve (1996). "The Geopolitics of the Police: Foucault, Disciplinary Power and the Tactics of the Los Angeles Police Department." *Political Geography*, 15(1), pp. 47-57.
- Hermer, Joe and Alan Hunt (1996). "Official Graffiti of the Everyday." *Law and Society Review*, 30(3), pp. 455-480.
- Hope, Tim (2000). "Inequality and the Clubbing of Private Security." In: Tim Hope and Richard Sparks (Eds.) *Crime, Risk and Insecurity*. New York: Routledge. Pp. 83-106.
- Hunt, Alan and Gary Wickham (1994). *Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance*. London: Pluto Press.
- Hyde, David (2003). 'The Role of "Government" in Regulating, Auditing and Facilitating Private Policing in Late Modernity: The Canadian Experience.' Paper Presented at: *In Search of Security: An International Conference on Policing and Security*. Montreal, Canada.

Innkeepers Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter I.7.

(<http://www.canlii.org/on/sta/cson/20030205/r.s.o.1990c.i.7/whole.html>)

Jeffries, Fern (1977). *Private Policing; An Examination of In-House Operations*. Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.

Johnston, Les (1992). *The Rebirth of Private Policing*. London: Routledge.

Johnston, Les (1999). "Private Policing in Context." *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 7, pp. 175-196.

Johnston, Les (1999). 'Transnational Private Policing: The Impact of Global Commercial Security.' *Unpublished Paper*.

Johnston, Les (2000). *Policing Britain: Risk, Security and Governance*. New York: Longman Press.

Johnston, L. and C. Shearing (2003). *Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice*. New York: Routledge.

Jones, T. and T. Newburn (1995). "How Big is the Private Security Sector?" *Policing and Society*, 5, pp. 221-232.

Jones, T. and T. Newburn (1998). *Private Security and Public Policing*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Juristat (2002). "Private Security and Public Policing in Canada." Statistics Canada #85-002-XIE, Vol. 18(13).

Kakalik, W. and S. Wildhorn (1971-72). *Private Police in the United States* (The Rand Report), 5 vols. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

Kempa, M., R. Carrier, J. Wood and C. Shearing (1999). "Reflections on the Evolving Concept of 'Private Policing.'" *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 7(2), pp. 197-223.

Kennedy, D. (1995). "A Synopsis of Private Security in the United States." *Security Journal*, 6(1), pp. 101-105.

Lippert, R. and D. O'Connor (2003). "Making Sense of Airport Security in an era of Advanced Liberal Governance, Flexibilized Work, and Mass Private Properties." Paper Presented at: *In Search of Security: An International Conference on Policing and Security*, Montreal, Canada.

- Loader, I. (1997). "Private Security and the Demand for Protection in Contemporary Britain." *Policing and Society*, 7(3), pp. 143-162
- McClintock, F. and P. Wiles (Eds.) (1972). *The Security Industry in the UK: papers Presented at the Cropwood Round-Table Conference, July 1971*. Cambridge: Institute of Criminology, Cambridge University Press.
- Micucci, A. (1995). "The Changing of the Guard: The Transformation of Private Security." *Journal of Security Administration*, 18(1), pp. 21-45.
- Micucci, Anthony (1998). "A Typology of Private Policing Operational Styles." *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 26(1), pp. 41-51.
- Mopas, Michael and Philip Stenning (2001). "Tools of the Trade: The Symbolic Power of Private Security- An Exploratory Study." *Policing and Society*, 11, pp. 67-97.
- Nalla, M. and G. Newman (1990). *A Primer in Private Security*. New York: Harrow and Heston Press.
- Nalla, M. and G. Newman (1991). "Public Versus Private Control: A Reassessment." *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 19(6), pp. 537-547.
- O'Connor, Dan (2002). *Mediated Associations: Cinematic Dimensions of Social Theory*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- O'Malley, Pat (1992). "Risk, Power and Crime Prevention." *Economy and Society*, 21(3), pp. 252-275.
- O'Malley, Pat (1999). "Governmentality and the Risk Society." *Economy and Society*, 28(1), pp. 138-148.
- O'Malley, Pat (2000). 'Risk Societies and the Government of Crime.' In: M. Brown and J. Pratt (Eds.) *Dangerous Offenders*. New York: Routledge. Pp. 17-33.
- O'Malley, Pat (2001). "Discontinuity, Government and Risk: A Response to Rigakos and Hadden." *Theoretical Criminology*, 5(1), pp. 85-92.
- O'Malley, Pat, Mary Condon, Ron Levi, Clifford Shearing and Mariana Valverde (1999). "Democracy in Governance: A Socio-Legal Framework." A Report Prepared for the Law Commission of Canada on Law and Governance Relationships, May 10th.
- Oxford English Dictionary* (2002). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Personal Communication, June 8th, 2003.
- Personal Communication, June 17th, 2003.

- Personal Communication, July 25th, 2003.
- Personal Communication, August 4th, 2003.
- Pratt, Anna (2001). "Sovereign Power, Carceral Conditions and Penal Practices: Detention and Deportation in Canada." *Studies in Law, Politics and Society*, 23, pp. 45-78.
- Priest, G. (1990). "The New Legal Structure of Risk Control." *Daedulus*, 119, pp. 207-227.
- R. v. Buhay*, [2003], SCC30, 28667. (<http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/rec/html/2003scc030.wpd.html>)
- Rees, A. (Ed.) (1983). *Policing and Private Security*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.
- Rigakos, G. (1999). "Hyperpanoptics as Commodity: The Case of the Parapolice." *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 24(3), pp. 381-409.
- Rigakos, G. and D. Greener (2000). "Bubbles of Governance: Private Policing and the Law in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Law and Society*, 15(1), pp. 145-185.
- Rigakos, George (2003). "Ordering the Chaos: Bouncers and the Night-time Economy." A Paper Presented at the *Canadian Law and Society Meetings*. Halifax, Nova Scotia: June 1-4.
- Rose, Nikolas (1993). "Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism." *Economy and Society*, 22(3), pp. 283-299.
- Rose, Nikolas (1999). *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, Nikolas (2000). "Government and Control." *British Journal of Criminology*, 40, pp. 321-339.
- Rose, Nikolas and Peter Miller (1992). "Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government." *British Journal of Sociology*, 43, pp. 173-205.
- Shearer, D. (1998). *Private Armies and Military Intervention*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shearing, Clifford, Margaret Farnell and Philip Stenning (1980). *Contract Security in Ontario*. Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.

- Shearing, Clifford, and Philip Stenning (1981). "Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications." In: M. Tonry and N. Morris (Eds.) *Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 193-246.
- Shearing, Clifford, and Philip Stenning (1983). "Private Security: Implications for Social Control." *Social Problems*, 30(6), pp. 493-506.
- Shearing, Clifford, and Philip Stenning (1985). "From Panopticon to Disneyland: The Development of Discipline." In: Anthony Doob and E. Greenspan (Eds.) *Perspectives in Criminal Law*. Toronto: Canada Law Book Co.
- Shearing, Clifford, and Philip Stenning (1987). *Private Policing*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.
- Shearing, Clifford and Andrew Von Hirsch (2000). "Exclusion From Public Space." In: Garland et al. (Eds.) *Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention*. Portland, OR: Oxford Press. Pp. 77-96.
- Simon, J. and M. Feeley (1992). "The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implications." *Criminology*, 30(4), pp. 449-474.
- Simon, J. and M. Feeley (1994). "Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law." In: D. Nelken (Ed.) *The Futures of Criminology*. London: Sage Publications.
- Sklansky, D. (1999). "The Private Police." *UCLA Law Review*, 46(4), pp. 1165-1287.
- Smandyge, Russell (1999). "The Place of Governance Studies in Law and Criminology." In: Russell Smandyge *Governable Places: Readings on Governmentality and Crime Control*. England: Dartmouth Publishing. Pp. 1-13.
- South, N. (1988). *Policing for Profit: The Private Security Sector*. London: Sage Publications.
- Spitzer, S. and A. Scull (1977). "Privatization and Capitalist Development: The Case of the Private Police." *Social Problems*, 25, pp. 18-29.
- Stenning, P. (2000). "Powers and Accountability of Private Police." *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 8, pp. 325-352.
- Tesch, R. (1990). *Qualitative Research: Analysis Types and Software Tools*. London: Falmer.
- Trespass to Property Act*, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter T.21.
(<http://www.canlii.org/on/sta/cson/20030327/r.s.o.1990c.t.21/whole.html>)

Wakefield, Alison (2000). "Situational Crime Prevention in Mass Private Property." In: Garland, D. and Alison Wakefield (Eds.) *Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention*. Portland: Oxford Press. Pp. 125-145.

Young, Jock (1999). *The Exclusive Society*. London: Sage Publications.

Appendix A
(Research Ethics Application)

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR
APPLICATION TO INVOLVE HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH
Student Researchers

(Please complete, print and submit seven (7) copies of the Form to the
Ethics Co-ordinator, Office of Research Services Chrysler Hall Tower, Room 309)

Title of Research Project: Private Security and the Management of Risk: Governance Examined

Date: 02/15/2003 Application Status: New Addendum Renewal REB #

	NAME	DEPT & ADDRESS	PHONE/ EXT	E - MAIL
Primary Student Investigator ¹	Steven Hutchinson	Sociology & Anthropology	x. 2201	hutchi4@hotr
Co-investigator(s)				
Faculty Supervisor(s) ²	Dr. Daniel O'Connor	Sociology & Anthropology	x. 3705	doconnor@uw

Researchers from another institution who are a part of a research team, irrespective of their role, must seek clarification from their institutional REB as to the requirement for review and clearance. For each researcher, please indicate if REB clearance is required or briefly provide the rationale for why it is not required:

¹ Student Investigator Assurance

I certify that the information provided in this application is complete and correct.

I understand that as Student Investigator, I have responsibility for the conduct of the study, the ethics performance of the project and the protection of the rights and welfare of human participants.

I agree to comply with the Tri-Council Policy Statement and all University of Windsor policies and procedures, governing the protection of human subjects in research.

Signature of Student Investigator: _____ Date: 02/15/2003

² Faculty Supervisor Assurance

I certify that the information provided in this application is complete and correct.

I understand that as principal Faculty Investigator, I have ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the study, the ethics performance of the project and the protection of the rights and welfare of human participants.

I agree to comply with the Tri-Council Policy Statement and all University of Windsor policies and procedures, governing the protection of human subjects in research, including, but not limited to, the following:

- performing the project by qualified and appropriately trained personnel in accordance with REB protocol,

- implementing no changes to the REB approved protocol or consent form/statement without notification to the REB of the proposed changes and their subsequent approval of the REB
- promptly reporting significant adverse effects to the REB within five (5) working days of occurrence and
- submitting, at minimum, a progress report annually or in accordance with the terms of certification.

Signature of Faculty Supervisor: _____ Date: 02/15/2003

1. Level of Project

- Faculty Research Undergraduate Masters
 Ph.D. Post Doctoral
 Administration Other (specify) _____

2. Funding Status

- Is this project currently funded? Yes No
 If NO, is funding to be sought? Yes No

Period of funding: FROM: (m) _____ (d) _____ (y) _____ TO: (m) _____ (d) _____ (y) _____

3. Details of Funding (Funded or Applied for) Agency

- NSERC
 SSHRC
 Other (specify) _____

Has this application been submitted to another institutional REB? Yes No
 If yes, provide the name of the board, date and decision. Attach a copy of the approval.

B. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED RESEARCH

1. Describe the purpose and background rationale for the proposed project, as well as the hypothesis(es)/research questions to be examined.

My research examines the relations between private in-house security personnel and programmes of governance. Specifically, I am interested in the management of risk. The overarching research question is: how do private security officers manage risk under specific programmes of governance? This case study will examine the diverse methods and influences which contribute to the management of risk and governance of populations in specified settings by private security officers. The research will entail largely open-ended in-depth interviews (see attached interview guide) of all security officers as a single location. I expect the outputs of this project to stimulate debate on the future of private security, its organisational form, working practices, and priorities for the Canadian security industry in general and the in-house sector in particular.

2. Methodology/Procedures

(YES / NO)

Do any of the procedures involve invasion of the body (e.g. touching, contact, attachment to instruments, withdrawal of specimens)?

Does the study involve the administration of prescribed or proscribed drugs?

Describe, sequentially and in detail, all procedures in which the research subjects will be involved (e.g. paper and pencil tasks, interviews, surveys, questionnaires, physical assessments, physiological tests, doses and methods of administration of drugs, time requirements, etc). Attach a copy of any questionnaires or test instruments.

Subjects will be asked to talk about the nature of their work in a series of open-ended questions (see attached interview guide). The interviews will be tape-recorded with the consent of research subjects. Depending on the nature of their responses to the open-ended questions, subjects may be asked one or more follow-up questions related to the theme. The interview process should last approximately one hour.

3. Cite your experience with this kind of research.

I have had extensive training in research methodology and interviewing techniques as a Master's student at the University of Windsor. I have done extensive background research on the private security industry. I have also worked in the private security industry for many years and am generally aware of the central issues confronting private security officers in their work.

4. Subjects Involved in the Study

Describe in detail the sample to be recruited including the number of subjects, gender, age range, any special characteristic and institutional affiliation or where located.

Approximately twelve (12) research subjects will be interviewed. The subjects in this study are in-house private security officers who are full-time or part-time associates at a branch of a large private corporation located in a Canadian city. All the in-house private security officers at this research site will be asked to participate in the study. The final sample will include all those who agree to participate. No further selection criteria will be employed. A random sampling of this population is not possible due to corporate concerns of privacy. The type of methodology to be employed is beneficial in that it will garner an in depth and detailed understanding of the specific tools and strategies used to manage risk in a specific location. While generalizability will be limited, the depth of the data will be considerable. The research site is a branch office of a large private corporation in a Canadian city with an average sized compliment of in-house security officers. The particulars of the research site will remain anonymous, or will be indicated by a pseudonym to reduce the possibility of research subjects being identified. This method is also necessary to protect the privacy of the corporation and its security system.

5. Recruitment Process

Describe how and from what sources the subjects will be recruited. Indicate where the study will take place. Describe any possible relationship between investigator(s) and subjects(s) (e.g. instructor - student; manager - associate). Attach a copy of any poster(s), advertisement(s) or letter(s) to be used for recruitment.

I am currently a part-time associate of this corporation. I plan to make my initial contact with the Director of Security at this location. The director will be informed of the nature of the study and will be asked to provide a list of email addresses of all security officers employed at this site. I will contact all the security officers by email. They will be informed about the nature of the study by means of the email information letter (see attached email information letter) and asked to participate. I will arrange to meet with those who indicate a willingness to participate at a non-work location and at a time (during non-work hours) that is convenient to the research subjects. At the time of the interview meeting, research subjects will again be informed about the nature of the study (see attached information letter) and they will be presented with a consent form (see attached consent form) and asked to sign. This method of sampling has both strengths and limitations. For example, I recognize that the non-random character of this sampling strategy is subject to a convenience bias. The strengths and limitations will be noted in the methodology section of my thesis.

6. Compensation of Subjects

(YES / NO)

Will subjects receive compensation for participation?

Financial

In-Kind

Other (Specify) _____

If yes, please provide details. If subjects (s) choose to withdraw, how will you deal with compensation?

7. Feedback to Subjects

Whenever possible, upon completion of the study, subjects should be informed of the results. Describe below the arrangements for provision of this feedback.

Subjects will be notified by email when the summary report of the findings becomes available and copies of the report will be made available to them.

C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM THE STUDY

Discuss any potential direct benefits to subjects from their involvement in the project. Comment on the (potential) benefits to (the scientific community)/society that would justify involvement of

subjects in this study.

Subjects who engage in security work for a private firm will gain a better awareness of the nature of security work, and how this particular kind of work is organized, regulated and governed. I expect the outputs of this project to provide an understanding of the in-house security industry such that reasons for the maintenance of in-house departments in the face of increasing contractualization become more clear.

D. POTENTIAL RISKS OF THE STUDY

(YES / NO)

- a) Do you deceive them in any way?
- b) Are there any physical risks /harm?
- c) Are there any psychological risks/ harm?
- d) Are there any social risks/harm?

1. Describe the known and anticipated risks of the proposed research, specifying the particular risk(s)/harm associated with each procedure or task. Consider, physical, psychological, emotional and social risks/ harm.

There is, at worst, minimal risk to the research subject. It is possible, but highly unlikely, that the research subject would possibly lose some privacy if the responses in the interviews were to somehow become associated with the subject. Managerial sanctions are a possibility if the specifics of interviews were to become available. Similarly, there is a possibility that the organizations for whom they work could lose some privacy if the responses in interviews were to become associated with the subject or the subject's organization. There is also minimal risk to the researcher. My status as an associate of the organization could possibly be harmed if particulars of the interviews or the study were to become associated with me, the subjects or the organization.

2. Describe how the potential risks to the subjects will be minimized.

To reduce the possibility of subjects' responses becoming associated with them or with the corporation that employs them, the tapes will be kept in a locked and a secure place (a lock box) accessible only to the student investigator of this project. The transcriptions from these tapes will then be made anonymous by coding the names of the subject, the names of the subject's employer, and other individuals named by the subject. The code book will be kept in a secure place separate from the transcribed interviews and will only be accessible to the student investigator. Upon completion of the transcriptions, the tapes will be destroyed. Upon completion of the study, the non-anonymous transcription and the code-book will be shredded. The anonymous, digitized transcriptions will be kept on file for possible future research by the student investigator. To minimize the risks to the researcher, the information of the study will be held in confidence and not discussed with management or any of the associates.

E. INFORMATION AND CONSENT PROCESS

1. Attach a copy of a Letter of Information describing the procedures and a separate Consent Form. If written consent will not/cannot be obtained or is considered inadvisable, justify this and

outline the process to be used to otherwise fully inform participants.

See attached Information Letter and Consent Form

2. Are subjects competent to consent? If not, describe the process to be used to obtain permission of parent or guardian. Attach a copy of an information-permission letter to be used. (YES / NO)

3. **Withdrawal from Study** (YES / NO)

Do subjects have the right to withdraw at any time during and after the research project?

Are subjects to be informed of this right?

Describe the process to be used to inform subjects of their withdrawal right.

The consent form (attached) and information letter (attached) will be presented to the subject and the terms of the project and the consent form will be read to the subject. The subject will be informed of their right not to participate in this study and that they have the right to withdraw their participation at any time.

F. **CONFIDENTIALITY** (YES / NO)

Will the data be treated as confidential?

1. Describe the procedures to be used to ensure anonymity of subjects and confidentiality of data both during the conduct of the research and in the release of its findings. Explain how written records, video/audio tapes and questionnaires will be secured, and provide details of their final disposal.

Names, addresses or other identifying information will not be associated with transcribed interviews. To reduce the possibility of subjects' responses becoming associated with them, the tapes will be kept in a locked in a secure place (a lock box) in a locked office accessible only to the research investigator. The transcriptions from these tapes will then be made anonymous by coding the names of the subject, the names of the subject's employer, and any department, official, or other individual named by the subject. The code book will be kept in a secure place separate from the transcribed interviews. Upon completion of the transcriptions, the tapes will be destroyed. Upon completion of the study, the non-anonymous transcriptions and the code-book will be shredded. The anonymous, digitized transcriptions will be kept on file for twenty years for future research. The data will be treated as confidential and not discussed with management of the organization or any of the associates.

G. DECEPTION

(YES / NO)

Will deception be used in this study?

If yes, please describe and justify the need for deception. Explain the debriefing procedures to be used, and attach a copy of the written debriefing.

REB REVIEW OF ONGOING RESEARCH (Minimum Requirement: Annual Report)

Please propose a continuing review process (beyond the annual report) you deem to be appropriate for this research project/program.

Continued review by faculty supervisor

Use the remainder of this page and an additional page if more space is required to complete any sections of the form, using appropriate headings.

Will the results of this research be used in a way to create financial gain for the researcher? How will conflict of interests be dealt with?

The results of this research will not be used to create financial gain for the researcher.

H. SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA

Will the data obtained from the subjects of this research project be used in subsequent research studies. If so, please indicate on the Consent Form that the data may be used in other research studies. Subjects may be given the option regarding the use of their data:

The (anonymous) data from this study may be used in subsequent research. The participants are advised of this in the consent form. They are also informed of the right to refuse that their data be used in future research.



July 10, 2003

Mr. Steven Hutchinson
Department of Sociology
University of Windsor
Windsor, ON N9B 3P4

Dear Mr. Hutchinson

Subject: Private Policing and the Management of Risk: Governance Examined

This letter is in response to your application for ethics review at the University of Windsor. The University of Windsor Research Ethics Board (REB) has reviewed the above noted study. I am pleased to inform you that the proposal has been cleared by the Board for a period of one year.

You are reminded to:

- Submit an annual report
- To notify the REB when the project is complete
- For modifications to project, submit a Request to Revise
- For adverse events or unexpected events, please contact the Office of Research Services without delay

Forms for submission/notification to the REB are available at the Office of Research Services' Web Site.

We wish you every success in your research.

Maureen Muldoon

Maureen H. Muldoon, Ph.D.
Chair
University Research Ethics Board

cc: M. Mekis, Ethics Coordinator
Dr. D. O'Connor, Sociology

Appendix C
(Information Letters)

INFORMATION LETTER (email):

Dear Sir/Madam:

I would appreciate your assistance with my research project concerning in-house private security work. By participating in this study you will gain awareness of security service in the twenty-first century and learn how this service relates to Canadian society as a consequence of accessing the results of the research. I expect the outputs of this project to stimulate debate on future organisational forms of in-house security departments and the operation of such departments.

If you participate, responses will be confidential; your name and organization will not appear anywhere in the results of the study. The data obtained will be kept in the utmost confidence and not discussed with management or any associates.

If you wish to participate in this study, please respond to me by means of telephone at (519) 253-1866, by email at hutchi4@hotmail.com, or in person so that I can arrange to meet with you at your convenience.

You will be informed of the results of this study by means of e-mail. If you do not have Internet access at home you can easily arrange to have Internet access at your nearest public library, usually at no charge.

If you have any questions regarding the research project, feel free to contact Steven Hutchinson at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology - University of Windsor - either by telephone at (519) 253-3000 ext. 2201 or by email at hutchi4@hotmail.com, or by mail at 401 Sunset Ave., Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P4.

Sincerely,

Steven D. Hutchinson
Department of Sociology and
Anthropology
University of Windsor

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact:

Research Ethics Co-ordinator
University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P4

Phone: (519) 253-3000 ext. 3916
E-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca

Please retain this information letter for your records.

INFORMATION LETTER (hard copy)

Dear Sir/Madam:

You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Steven Hutchinson, from the Department of Sociology at the University of Windsor. The results of this study will contribute to a Master's level thesis project.

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please contact:

Steven Hutchinson

Department of Sociology and Anthropology,

University of Windsor, 401 Sunset Ave., Windsor Ontario N9A 3P4

Phone: (519)253-3000 ext. 2201

E-Mail: hutchi4@hotmail.com

- PURPOSE OF THE STUDY -

The purpose of the study is to shed light on the nature and challenges of security work in the private sector. I expect the outputs of this project to stimulate debate on the organization of private security, in-house departmental systems, and the security sector as a whole.

- PROCEDURES -

If you volunteer to participate in this study, I would ask you to read this information letter and respond to me via telephone at (519) 253-1866, email at hutchi4@hotmail.com, or in person.

I will conduct a one (1) hour interview which will be taped (with your permission) and later transcribed. The interview is the only process which you will undergo, and once transcription is complete, all associations between yourself and the data will be destroyed. The data will be maintained in strict confidentiality and not discussed with management or any other associates.

The data from this study will be used towards Master's thesis work, and may be used at a later date for subsequent research. You may at any time make the researcher aware that you do not wish data to be available presently, or in future.

The researcher will inform you when a report on the findings of the study becomes available. This will be done via e-mail if you are willing to provide your address.

- PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION -

There is no payment for participation in this research project.

- POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS -

There is, at worst, minimal risk to you as a research subject. It is possible, but highly unlikely, that you would lose some privacy if the responses in the interviews were to somehow become associated with you. Managerial sanctions are a possibility if the specifics of interviews were to become available. Similarly, there is a possibility that the organization for whom you work could lose some privacy if the responses in interviews were to become associated with you or your organization.

- CONFIDENTIALITY -

Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission.

To reduce the possibility of responses becoming associated with you or with the corporation that employs you, the tapes will be kept in a locked and a secure place (a lock box) accessible only to the student investigator of this project. The transcriptions from these tapes will then be made anonymous by coding the names of the subject, the names of the subject's employer, and other individuals named by the subject. The code book will be kept in a secure place separate from the transcribed interviews and will only be accessible to the student investigator. Upon completion of the transcriptions, the tapes will be destroyed. Upon completion of the study, the non-anonymous transcription and the code-book will be shredded. The anonymous, digitized transcriptions will be kept on file for possible future research by the student investigator.

You can at any time ask to review the interview tapes or the transcriptions thereof.

- POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR SOCIETY -

Subjects who engage in security work for a private firm will gain a better awareness of the nature of security work, and how this particular kind of work is organized, regulated and governed. I expect the outputs of this project to provide an understanding of the in-house security industry such that reasons for the maintenance of in-house departments in the face of increasing contractualization become more clear.

- PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL -

You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You may exercise the option of removing your data from the study. You may also refuse to answer any questions you don't want to answer and still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so.

- RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS -

You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a

research subject, contact:

Research Ethics Co-ordinator

University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P4

Phone: (519) 253-3000 ext. 3916

E-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca

Please retain this information letter for your records.

Appendix D
(Respondent Consent Form)

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

“Private Policing and the Management of Risk: Governance Examined”

You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Steven Hutchinson, from the Department of Sociology at the University of Windsor. The results of this study will contribute to a Master's level thesis project.

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please contact:

Steven Hutchinson
Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
University of Windsor, 401 Sunset Ave., Windsor Ontario N9A 3P4
Phone: (519)253-3000 ext. 2201
E-Mail: hutchi4@hotmail.com

- PURPOSE OF THE STUDY -

The purpose of the study is to shed light on the nature and challenges of security work in the private sector. I expect the outputs of this project to stimulate debate on the organization of private security, in-house departmental systems, and the security sector as a whole.

- PROCEDURES -

If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to read this consent form and the information letter and sign and date them.

I will conduct a one (1) hour interview which will be taped (with your permission) and later transcribed. The interview is the only process which you will undergo, and once transcription is complete, all associations between yourself and the data will be destroyed. The data will be maintained in strict confidentiality and not discussed with management or any other associates.

The data from this study will be used towards Master's thesis work, and may be used at a later date for subsequent research. You may at any time make the researcher aware that you do not wish data to be available presently, or in future.

The researcher will inform you when a report on the findings of the study becomes available. This will be done via e-mail if you are willing to provide your address.

- PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION -

There is no payment for participation in this research project.

- POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS -

There is, at worst, minimal risk to you as a research subject. It is possible, but highly unlikely, that you would lose some privacy if the responses in the interviews were to somehow become associated with you. Managerial sanctions are a possibility if the specifics of interviews were to become available. Similarly, there is a possibility that the organization for whom you work could lose some privacy if the responses in interviews were to become associated with you or your organization.

- CONFIDENTIALITY -

Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission.

To reduce the possibility of responses becoming associated with you or with the corporation that employs you, the tapes will be kept in a locked and a secure place (a lock box) accessible only to the student investigator of this project. The transcriptions from these tapes will then be made anonymous by coding the names of the subject, the names of the subject's employer, and other individuals named by the subject. The code book will be kept in a secure place separate from the transcribed interviews and will only be accessible to the student investigator. Upon completion of the transcriptions, the tapes will be destroyed. Upon completion of the study, the non-anonymous transcription and the code-book will be shredded. The anonymous, digitized transcriptions will be kept on file for possible future research by the student investigator.

You can at any time ask to review the interview tapes or the transcriptions thereof.

- POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR SOCIETY -

Subjects who engage in security work for a private firm will gain a better awareness of the nature of security work, and how this particular kind of work is organized, regulated and governed. I expect the outputs of this project to provide an understanding of the in-house security industry such that reasons for the maintenance of in-house departments in the face of increasing contractualization become more clear.

- PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL -

You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You may exercise the option of removing your data from the study. You may also refuse to answer any questions you don't want to answer and still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so.

- RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS -

You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the University of Windsor Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact:

Research Ethics Co-ordinator
University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P4

Phone: (519) 253-3000 ext. 3916
E-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca

- SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE -

I understand the information provided for the study "Private Policing and the Management of Risk: Governance Examined" as described herein. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

Name of Subject

Signature of Subject

Date

- SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR -

In my judgement, the subject is voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent to participate in this research study.

Signature of Investigator

Date

Appendix E
(Interview Guide)

1. What is your current job title?
2. What are your current job responsibilities?
3. How did you come to work in your current position?
 - a. By what process were you recruited?
 - b. What qualifications did you have at that time?
 - c. Do new members of the security team complete a period of probation?
 - i. Can you describe what was involved in this probation period?
 - d. How much training is involved?
 - i. Was formal classroom training involved?
 - ii. Was there any on-the-job training?
4. Do you patrol on your own or with a partner?
 - a. If alone, in what circumstances would you call your partner for assistance?
 - b. What are the biggest obstacles to working with partners?
 - c. Is turnover in the department a problem?
5. How familiar are you with legislation and acts that govern private security officers?
 - a. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
 - b. The Innkeepers Act?
 - c. The Criminal Code?
 - i. How did you become familiar with these acts?
 - d. Were they part of your formal training?
6. Does your department use the services of a contract company(ies)?
 - a. For what type of services?
 - b. What role do they play when on site?
 - c. What kind of authority do they have?
 - d. How would you describe your relations with contract security personnel?
7. Have you ever had to arrest someone?
 - a. What is the procedure?
 - i. How did you become aware of this procedure?

- b. How do you determine when someone needs to be arrested?
 - i. Are there guidelines to follow?
 - ii. How much discretion do you have?
 - iii. How do you determine the level of risk that someone poses?
- 8. What makes a security officer effective and what are the challenges?
 - a. How important are trust, loyalty, or reputation among co-workers?
 - b. How important is following formal procedure?
- 9. What kinds of conflicts have you encountered as a security officer and how are they typically handled?
 - a. What role do managers play in conflict and conflict resolution?
 - i. Do you resolve all situations yourself, or sometimes call a manager?
 - ii. In what type of situation does this occur?
 - b. Who takes command when multiple officers approach a situation?
 - c. What information are you provided with before arriving at a scene?
 - d. How does this information dictate your response to that situation?
- 10. What are the common risks involved in confronting situations?
 - a. What risk are posed to you?
 - b. What risks are posed to others?
 - c. How are these risks minimized?
 - d. How do you minimize these risks?
 - i. What formal or informal means do you have at your disposal?
- 11. Do you ever encounter situations where liability (corporate or personal) is an issue?
 - a. How do you determine who poses a risk in these situations?
- 12. How much of what you do could be written in a manual and performed by someone else simply by following that manual?
 - a. How important is fitting in to the department in terms of career options (mobility)?
 - b. How important is following formal rules in terms of career options (mobility)?