# A SHOTGUN MARRIAGE:
## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT,
## A CASE STUDY OF POLICE REFORM IN HAITI

by

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**Abstract**

The thesis explores the relationship between security and development, through the case study of Canadian security sector reform in Haiti. Over the last 15 years, the traditional security paradigm has undergone a significant revision allowing the inclusion of non-military ideas such as human security within a wider conception of security. As the concept of security evolves, linkages between security and development are increasingly addressed and identified by the development community. One manifestation of the merger of development and security may be seen in security sector reform. The Canadian police reform project undertaken by the RCMP and CIDA in Haiti is used as a case study to examine the practical combination of development and security concerns in a developing country. The project is evaluated through the use of seven security sector reform principles that contribute to wider sustainable development in a community. The CIDA/RCMP project is found to have had little positive impact on either the general security situation in Haiti or on promoting sustainable development within the security sector or in wider Haitian society. Lessons learned are presented in the conclusion for future security sector reform initiatives. Security and development should be addressed simultaneously to promote a safe environment, capable of supporting high levels of human security and human development.

## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| BRJ | Bureau de Renseigment Judiciare |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| CIVPOL | United Nations Civilian Police |
| DFAIT | Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade |
| HNP | Haitian National Police |
| ICITAP | International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program |
| IPSF | Interim Public Security Force |
| MICAH | United Nations Civilian Mission in Haiti |
| MINUHA | Mission of the United Nations in Haiti |
| MIPONUH | United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti |
| MNF | Multinational Force |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| OAS | Organization of American States |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| RCMP | Royal Canadian Mounted Police |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNICEF | United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund |
| UNMIH | United Nations Mission in Haiti |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSMIH | United Nations Support Mission in Haiti |

UNTMIH    United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti

# Introduction

The concept of security has undergone significant redefinition since the early 1990s. With the ideological constraints of the Cold War removed, attention to internal security issues and the manner in which they influence development and individual and community well-being have assumed a place within development discourse. Security has expanded from a limited military definition to encompass wide-ranging concerns and issues, as illustrated in the concept of human security. As the connections between security issues and development goals are acknowledged, emphasis has begun to focus on security sector reform as a component of development objectives. Security sector reform is a relatively new focus area within development literature and practices. The re-examination of what constitutes security, and the growing use of the concept of human security has provided a framework to include issues of security sector reform within a wider development dialogue. The thesis will explore the new marriage of security and development, and examine the manner in which security sector reform is related to but sometimes not incorporated into wider development goals, through a case study of a troubled Canadian police reform and development project in Haiti.

Research for the thesis was conducted in two parts. The first encompasses a significant literature review on the topics of human security, security sector reform, Haitian political, economic, and social background, and the experience of international and Canadian donors in Haiti. This research came from a variety of sources. Academic journals and books were used extensively with additional sources from electronic media, think tanks, conference proceedings, unpublished masters thesis, human rights

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organizations, and public policy documents from the United States, United Nations, and Canada. The second component of the research focused on internal, unpublished documents related to the CIDA/RCMP police reform project in Haiti. These documents include a selection of annual reports and quarterly reports prepared by the RCMP project managers that outline the progress of the project from 1997 until December 1999. An evaluation report of the project, commissioned by CIDA, was also consulted. Additional documents related to the project included bi-monthly reports prepared by the RCMP Technical Advisors as well as two unpublished Haiti programming strategies, one prepared in 1997 and the more recent 2002 version. These documents were secured through the Access to Information Act.

The first chapter explores the development of linkages between security and economic, political, and social development. Following the end of the Cold War security has been re-conceptualized and redefined in a manner that brings security from the state level to the level of the individual through the creation of linkages to human development. Traditional state centric notions of security are increasingly being challenged with a more encompassing approach to viewing security and the ways it impacts an individuals' and communities' health, well-being, and sustainable human development. Within the new constructs of security, the concept of human security has gained an increasingly prominent role. Human security is increasingly incorporated into and guides development policy and practice. One manifestation of human security's inclusion in development agendas may be seen in projects targeting security sector reform.

The second chapter is a detailed case study of the police reform process in Haiti. It explores the integration of security and development within the context of a developing country. Following the American intervention in 1994, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) established an ambitious development agenda to reform Haitian society and its institutions.[1] CIDA, in partnership with the RCMP, placed a particular emphasis on the creation and institutional strengthening of the Haitian National Police, committing $21.4 million in international aid from 1996-2001 on this one project.[2] Reform of Haiti's security sector was identified as a means to ensure a stable environment conducive to democracy and sustainable development. International and Canadian reform initiatives sought to address the need to provide security and peace to Haitians through the creation of a civilian national police force. Despite the considerable financial and human resources committed to the reform process in Haiti, policing continues to be characterized by corruption and politicization.[3]

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[1] Canada is the second largest development donor to Haiti after the United States. Julie Emond, Canadian Cooperation Program in Haiti. (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 2002), p.3.

[2] Véronique Lamontagne, CIDA's Programming in Legal and Judicial Reform: Indicative List of CIDA Projects Related to Legal and Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and Central and Eastern Europe 1990-1997 (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 1999), p. 9.

[3] Please see Rachel M. Neild, "Can Haiti's Police Reforms be Sustained?" Haiti Insight Online. January 22, 2002. <http://www.nchr.org/hrp/archive/pol981.htm> (May 3, 2002); Charles Arthur, "Former police chiefs implicated in National Palace attack." Haiti Support Group. <http://www.oneworld.net> (May 1, 2002). United Nations. "The Haitian National Police and Human Rights." International Civilian Mission In Haiti, OAS/UN. July 1996. <http://www.un.org/rights/micivih/rapports /engpol.htm> (April 28, 2002); Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire, and J. O'Neil G. Pouliot. "Haiti Military-Police Partnership for Public Security." In Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.) Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security. (Virginia: National Defense University Press, 1997.)

The third chapter provides an analysis of the Canadian attempt at incorporating security and development through the police reform project in Haiti. Six security sector principles are used to evaluate the project's conceptualization and implementation in relation to its contribution to sustainable development.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of general lessons learned from the Haitian case study. Recommendations are offered for future security sector reform efforts that promote the effective integration of security and development, with the desired result of sustainable reform and overall social, economic, and political development.

In the post-Cold War era, development organizations are increasingly adopting security considerations into their programs.[4] Development assistance is moving away from helping people on a material level, through the provision of such needed things as shelter, food, and clean water, to attempting to ultimately change society and its institutions.[5] This thesis explores the theoretical union of security and development, and the manner in which they have been implemented in developing countries through an examination of the Haitian case study.

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[4] For example please see Canadian International Development Agency. <u>Government of Canada policy for CIDA on human rights, democratization and good governance</u>. (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 1996).

[5] For further discussion please see Mark Duffield, <u>Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security</u>. (London: Zed Books, 2001).

## Chapter One:
## The Conceptual Merger of Development And Security

The integration of security issues into development discourse, policy, and practice is a reasonably new phenomenon. This merging of security and development has been facilitated and encouraged by several theoretical, conceptual, and real world developments, in particular the concept of human security. Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent re-examination of the Western security paradigm, human security has gained increasing momentum both within the security field and in the field of development. Human security is increasingly conceived as invaluable to social, economic, and political development by organizations such as the United Nations as well as by donor and recipient governments. To further human security while recognizing the need for a stable and safe environments, development agencies have increasing sought ways to better incorporate security into development agendas. One popular way that this has been targeted is through programs promoting security sector reform. This chapter will examine the theoretical emergence of human security, and the manner in which it promotes the merger of security and development. Security sector reform will then be discussed as an important vehicle for advancing human security and sustainable development. The chapter will conclude with a brief critique of the incorporation of security into development agendas.

## Security

The gradual inclusion of security concerns in development agendas can be traced

to changes in the international political environment over the last fifteen years.

Throughout much of the Cold War "security" often referred exclusively to military

concerns and was rarely conceptually connected to development issues.[1] The traditional

security paradigm defined threats in terms of external dangers to a state, and viewed the

protection and promotion of security in almost exclusively military terms.[2] An increase

in the intensity and number of intrastate conflicts, increasing globalization, and finally, a

greater willingness on the part of the UN to promote democracy are trends that challenge

this traditional conception of security.[3] These trends have led to greater diversity in the

way the international community views security, such as the lifting of the dominant

ideological constraint of viewing international security that stressed a division between

East and West.[4] There is now a greater willingness to examine security threats from a

more comprehensive perspective, and to reexamine what constitutes both national and

international security.[5]

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[1] Dylan Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform. (London: King's College, The Conflict, Security & Development Group, 1999), p. 15.
[2] J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security." In Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds. International Relations Theory Today. (University Park, Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 176.
[3] Robin Jeffrey Hay. "Present at the Creation? Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century." Canada Among Nations 14 (1999): pp. 226-227.
[4] Jose Ayalo-Lasso, "Human Security and Sustainable Development." Our Planet and Human Security. October 1996. <www.unu.edu/unupress/planet.html> (October 9, 2000).
[5] Please see: Simon Dalby, "Contesting an Essential Concept: reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse." In Keith Krause and Michael Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997): 2-33; Tickner; and Richard H. Ullmann, "Redefining Security." In Sean Lyn-Jones and Steven Miller, eds.

The lifting of ideological constraints has directly supported the acceptance of alternative, non-military security visions. According to Dalby, security issues should be reexamined to acknowledge the violent results of formulating security policy in exclusively military terms. There is also recognition that military force does little to address "human" security issues such as structural inequality.[6] Militarily defined security concepts may also diminish the effectiveness of human development by draining scarce resources away from civilian problems such as poverty reduction or strengthening social infrastructure.[7] Also, focusing solely on military threats to security may cause states to ignore other non-military dangers, thereby reducing overall security.[8]

Viewing security in non-military terms has thus led to the re-conceptualization of security, and the increasing currency of the concept of human security in development literature and among policy makers. Security literature is increasingly promoting the view that the focus of security studies should move from the state to the individual, and should include a greater range of threats.[9] Krause and Williams, in a review of human security, maintain that by focusing the level of security analysis on the individual "three

Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995): 15-39.
[6] Dalby, p. 4.
[7] Tickner, p. 185.
[8] Ullmann, p. 15.
[9] Gary King and Christopher Murray. "Rethinking Human Security." May 4 2000. <www.cbrss.harvard.edu/hs/measuring> (November 18, 2000).

overlapping arguments emerge that treat individuals as rights-bearing persons, as citizens

or members of society, or as members of a transcendent global community."[10]


## Human Security

With the decline of the military and/or state conception of security, human

security has gained increasing currency as a means of conceptualizing security concerns.

This has brought security issues within the realm of development theory and practice.

Human security has conceptual roots in the post-Second World War era, the basic needs

development model, and in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994

Human Development Report.


The end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations have

been identified as spawning the emergence of the concept of human security.[11] With the

evidence of the atrocities committed against civilians fresh in the collective minds of the

founders of the United Nations, human rights and the protection of civilians would prove

to play a significant role in the function and interests of the UN and its various agencies.

The conclusion of the Second World War brought with it an increasing awareness of the

importance of the protection of individuals. Human rights and international law

increasingly focused on holding states accountable for crimes against their own citizens.

The rights of the individual have become integral to the UN system. The UN Charter and

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[10] Keith Krause and Michael Williams. "From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies." In Keith Krause and Michael Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), pp. 43-44.
[11] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World." April 1999. <www.sumit-americas.org/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.html> (October 9, 2000).

the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms are clear examples of the incorporation of the protection of citizens into the existing international order.[12] Many of the UN Conventions and UN Agencies have been established to address the concerns integral to human security. Examples include the World Food Program, which was designed to address a basic human right, the right to food, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees which was established to address the unique needs of refugee populations, and more recently, is concerned with the rights of internally displaced populations as well. Although these organizations were created within the constraints of sovereignty, they represent a much wider attempt to address the issues and situations affecting the well-being of the world's people, irrespective of their national citizenship.

In addition to the stimulus presented by the creation of the United Nations, one can also examine the influence of development theory to find the conceptual roots of human security. In examining the tenets of human security and the more familiar aims of human development, a connection may be seen in the emphasis on the physical and psychological well-being of individuals, and the importance of the use of indicators other than income to define the well-being of populations. Human security may be seen as a natural evolution of the ideas embodied in human development doctrines, particularly as an outgrowth of the basic needs movement of the 1970s. This movement adopted a

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[12] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security." 2000. <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca> (September 25, 2000).

broader understanding of development that was not solely based on economic growth, and which promoted a global minimum standard of living as a primary goal.[13]

A further linkage between human security and human development may be seen in an additional "birthplace" of human security. Often credited with introducing the term human security is the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report. The Report criticized traditional definitions of security that focused on nation states and territory rather then on people and their quest for security.[14] The Report defined human security, and threats to it, in seven categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Four characteristics of this definition can be identified. They are: the universal nature of human security, the interdependence that exists in the current international system, the idea of prevention of human insecurity, and lastly, the people-centered nature of human security.[15] Although the Report's definition has not been wholly adopted by the international community it is nevertheless cited as one of the primary documents that encouraged the growing popularity of human security in foreign and development policy and theory in the 1990s. The 1994 Report clearly linked development and security. Of particular importance were the securitization of traditional development areas, such as economic development and the health sector. The terminology of the Report encourages that each of the seven areas identified should be

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[13] Hay, p. 217.
[14] Hay, p. 217.
[15] King and Murray

specifically viewed in terms of security. This connection in language and discourse

legitimizes the integration of security into traditional development sectors and concerns.


Although human security has become a central component of the post-Cold War

debate on security and development, no single definition of human security has yet been

accepted by the international community.[16] Human security may be broadly defined as

the protection of individuals from all threats to their physical, emotional, social,

environmental, economic and political well-being. Commonly perceived threats to

human security include: natural disaster, financial poverty, systemic oppression of human

rights, lack of social infrastructure, weak government, environmental degradation, and

epidemic disease.[17] Any situation which contains the potential to significantly alter

people's well being and their daily lives may be viewed as a threat to a population's, or

an individual's security. Many of the threats may also lead to further destructive

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[16] To see the wide range of human security's definitions pleas see: DFAIT "Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World," People's Summit Conference. "Human Security and Development for All: Building a Better World." *Communiqué from the People's Summit Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 14, 1995.* June 15, 1995. <www.igc.org/habitat/p-7/hum-sec> (October 9, 2000); R. Bedeski, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons." *University of Victoria, Political Science Department.* <www.globalcentres.org/docs/bedeski.html> (October 9, 2000); United Nations "Keynote Paper by Anwarul Karim Chowdhury", United Nations. "Keynote Paper by Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations on 'Human Security: A Broader Dimension' presented at the Fourth UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Kyoto, Japan, 27 July1999." <www.un.int/bangaldesh/speeches/others/humansecurity> (October 9, 2000); King and Murray.
[17] Canadian International Development Agency. "CIDA Sustainable Development and the Human Security Agenda." *Notes from an address by the Honourable Diane Marleau at the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development's 1999 National Forum on Canada's International Relations: Canada and the United Nations, January 29, 1999. Vancouver, British Columbia.* October 29, 1999. <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca> (September 28, 2000).

situations were security is increasingly diminished and has the potential to spread into additional populations. Jessica Tuchman Matthews discusses the spread of insecurity when she describes how environmental degradation, such as deforestation, may lead to increased levels of violence and even potential civil war. Thus a situation of insecurity based on ecological factors may contribute to a violent situation, further lowering overall human security. [18]

There are two central elements to human security present in the majority of available definitions of the concept. The first element is that of the importance of the individual. Human security has shifted the examination of security from a state or system level, to a level of analysis that examines the security and safety of people.[19] This transition towards a focus on the individual is significant because security concerns have traditionally been defined in a state centric manner. Governments have sought to protect their own state from another by placing particular emphasis on the protection of a specific bordered territory. From a human security perspective it is no longer sufficient to simply protect a state's citizens from international threats.[20] People require protection from other states, their own government, and additional security threats such as disease and environmental degradation. One implication of human security is that territorial sovereignty increasingly comes under attack when the safety and well being of that state's citizenry is threatened.

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[18] Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security." Foreign Affairs. 68:2 (Spring 1989): pp. 166-168.
[19] UN, "Keynote Paper by Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdhury."
[20] UN, "Keynote Paper by Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdhury;" Hay, p. 215; Canada. Canada in the World: Government Statement. (Canada: Public Works and Government Services, 1995), p.ii.

The sanctity of sovereignty has long been at the core of the international system and international law. Traditionally a state's domestic concerns were their own, and do not warrant international intervention. With the emphasis placed on the individual, however, a state's sovereignty may be compromised if it is deemed that the need to protect individual rights supersedes a state's right to maintain exclusive control over its citizens and territory. This contradiction between traditional security and human security issues has resulted in great debate in the international arena, particularly in international organizations such as the United Nations.[21]

A second quality present in many definitions of human security is the assumption of the interconnectedness of the world's populations and states.[22] With the increased interdependence encouraged by globalization, events in one country are thought to affect the rest of the world. If human security is low in one country or region, the global level of human security will also be diminished. This interconnectedness can be expressed in a number of ways. An example may be found in Kosovo, where an internal situation, the systemic oppression of human rights, led to increased levels of poverty and violence in Kosovo, and resulted in the outflow of a large number of refugees who crossed international borders, thereby creating an unstable situation in neighboring countries. If

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[21] Please see United Nations. *Our Planet and Human Security.* October 1996. <www.unu.edu/unupress/planet.html> (October 9, 2000).
[22] DFAIT, "Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World;" People's Summit Conference, "Human Security and Development for All;" R. Bedeski, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons;" UN, "Keynote Paper by Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdhury;" King and Murray; Hay, p. 216; David Kilgour, "The UN and the Challenge of Human Security." *McGill International Review I (Winter 2000).* May 25, 2000. <www.david-kilgour.com/ssla/mcmun> (December 29, 2000); Canada, Canada in the World.

one country in a region is unstable due to a threat on its citizens, this instability can spread throughout the region, which could in turn continue to spread through interactions between that region and the rest of the world. Human suffering and turmoil can influence the way the immediately affected region will be able to conduct its affairs with the rest of the world.[23] Global interconnectedness implies that if a population's human security is threatened anywhere, it is threatened everywhere. Human security, therefore, not only challenges a state's unquestioning sovereignty, it also lowers the unit level from a system of states to one global community made up of billions of individuals whose well-being rests on the well-being of others.

## An Integrated Approach to Security and Development

Before the early 1990s security project areas were absent from the development debate. Over the last decade, however, security has increasingly been identified as a legitimate area for development assistance. The need for a greater recognition of human security concerns within development initiatives stems from the mutually reinforcing relationship between insecurity and decreases in people's well-being. War and conflict, and insecurity often lead to further deterioration in socio-economic development gains. Without internal security, development and poverty reduction are increasingly difficult to support and maintain.[24] This lack of human security may lead to situations of conflict

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[23] Ullmann, p. 28.

[24] Michael Berkow, "Practical Issues in Providing Police Assistance Abroad." In <u>Civilian Police and Multinational Peacekeeping – A Workshop Series: A Role for Democratic Policing</u>. (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, 1999): p. 13.

with the common result of increased poverty and suffering.[25] For example, at a recent

conference on security and development in Africa, it was recognized that "Africa's

serious and unrelenting security problems threaten to undermine plans and opportunities

for progress."[26] This concern could be equally applied to other conflict-prone countries

with high levels of insecurity.


Human development is not achievable without an adequate level of peace and

personal security.[27] Until recently conventional development projects, however, were

rarely assessed regarding their potential impact on a country's human security level.[28] As

a result security continues to be a neglected area for donor development, despite its

potentially significant contributions to stable, safe, and developmentally receptive

communities and states.[29] Without sound institutional frameworks to enforce the rule of

law in an equitable and unbiased manner, "societies lack the capacity to resolve conflicts

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[25] Michael Brzoska, "The Concept of Security Sector Reform." In Connie Wall (ed.) Brief 15: Security Sector Reform. (Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2000): p. 7.

[26] Sandra J. MacLean, Report: Advancing Human Security and Development in Africa CFPS-ISROP Halifax Workshop, 9-10 May 2002. (Halifax: The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002), p. 2; H. John Harker, "Discussion Paper: Advancing Human Development and Security in Africa." In Report: Advancing Human Security and Development in Africa CFPS-ISROP Halifax Workshop, 9-10 May 2002. (Halifax: The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002): p. 12.

[27] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 86; "Nairobi Declaration: on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lake Region and the Horn of Africa." Global Policy. March 15, 2000. <www.globalpolicy.og/security/smallarms/regional/nairobi.htm> (November 23, 2002).

[28] Kenneth D. Bush, "Beyond Bungee Cord Humanitarianism: Towards a Development Agenda for Peacebuilding." Canadian Journal of Development Studies Special Issue 1996: p. 88.

[29] Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform, p. 16.

peacefully, ensure human security and create the necessary enabling environments for

sustainable development."[30] Coupled with this acknowledgment of the importance of

security to development, is the recognition that security problems are often symptomatic

of greater social, cultural, political, and economic issues and concerns.[31] Poverty

reduction cannot be addressed without also examining the security consideration in a

given country. Similarly, the causes of conflict and insecurity cannot be identified if

issues of "poverty, social injustice, oppression, alienation, and violation of human rights"

are also not adequately addressed.[32]


For example, in examining one particular security aspect, that of the widespread

availability of small arms in many post-war countries, Muggah and Batchelor identify

seven impacts on a society's ability to obtain its development goals when security issues

are not effectively addressed. These impacts are: an increase in criminal violence, the

collapse of health and education services, the displacement of large numbers of people as

a result of a decline in their human security, declining economic activities, reduced

government expenditures, damage to social structures, and the withdrawal of

development assistance as the costs of assistance rise.[33] Thus, insecurity may seep into

all aspects of a community's ability to obtain its development goals, thereby negatively

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[30] United Nations Development Programme, "Crisis Prevention & Recovery," *United Nations Development Programme* <www.undp.org/erd/ruleoflaw/index> (August 12, 2002).
[31] Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform, p. 9.
[32] Lena Hjelm-Wallen, "Lena Hjelm-Wallen on the UN's Work for Peace and Security." *Global Policy.* September 24, 1997. < www.globalpolicy.org/security/docs/swereflg.htm > (November 23, 2002).
[33] Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor, "Development Held Hostage": Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development. (NewYork: United Nations Development Programme, 2002): pp. 6-7.

impacting upon people's ability to exercise the full range of life choices inherent to

human development.

Ignoring security issues may also bring significant cost to both donors and

recipient communities. In a discussion of the cost of development in conflict-ridden

regions of Africa, Rose identifies two major associated costs incurred by the development

community. Firstly, the loss of millions of dollars of aid dispersed over several decades

as a result of conflicts throughout Africa, which have eliminated or significantly reduced

development gains.[34] Secondly, the high costs of peacekeeping and peacebuilding

missions to restore and maintain order, which subsequently divert development funding.[35]

Conflict has eliminated development gains; military spending has been promoted over

social spending; and responding to major humanitarian emergencies resulting from

conflict often takes precedence over development spending.[36]

In summary, there is a recognized need for increased integration of security

concerns into development strategies for developing communities. Without security's

integration, sustainable human development is increasingly difficult to establish and

maintain, and human security cannot be assured. The manner in which governments and

donor agencies have responded to this challenge of integration has been varied. There

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[34] Tore Rose, "The Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development in West Africa (PCASED)" *Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer*. <www.nisat.org> (October 30, 2002).
[35] Ibid.
[36] Luc Duchesne, "CIDA and Security Sector Reform: Challenges and Directions" Roundtable on Security Sector Reform. (Cornwallis: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2000) p. 66.

has been a considerable focus on high-level diplomatic initiatives targeting security and development, and to a lesser degree, a concentration on security sector reform at the country level.

Development initiatives that focus on security issues have reached new levels of prominence in the international arena.[37] These issues largely affect the overall human security environment of a specific community or state, while simultaneously addressing the current international security environment. The international community has placed a particular focus on several key issues such as landmine removal, child soldiers, disarming combatants, curtailing the flow of small arms, and training security services in human rights and international law.[38] These issues may transcend institutional concerns and focus on community wide programs to increase human security levels. Although these initiatives have been successful in bridging development and security on the international agenda, donor countries have been more hesitant to engage directly in the security situations of developing countries.[39] Despite this criticism, the initiatives listed above have been successful in changing the perception of the relationship between development and security. The chapter will now examine one particular area in which development theory and security unite, that of security sector reform.

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[37] MacLean, Report: Advancing Human Security and Development in Africa CFPS-ISROP Halifax Workshop, 9-10 May 2002. p. 3.
[38] Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform, p.10.
[39] This is largely a result of the continued persistence of viewing security issues within the sovereign domain of the nation-state. See Rose.

## Security Sector Reform

To advance the human security agenda donor governments have initiated several

new areas of development programming. One area in which the concept of a revised

definition of human security has played a prominent role is the area of security sector

reform. In security sector reform initiatives, development assistance agencies support

and operate programs designed to recreate, or create, a new security apparatus. Reform is

not provided through the provisions of equipment or weapons, but rather is focused on

institutional issues surrounding the creation and enforcement of law and order. Strongly

infused in security sector reform programs is the notion of a new form of security that

places an emphasis on the protection of a country's citizens rather then on its sovereign

right to maintain security in a way they deem appropriate. Security sector reform

commonly includes strong components of the rights of the individual, democratic values,

and human and civil rights. All of these elements serve to reinforce the conceptual

construction of human security. In addition, by providing a stronger sense of peace,

order, and safety in a once "troubled" nation, they are attempting to ensure that insecurity

will not bleed into the surrounding region.


The security sector is composed of civilian and governmental organizations

responsible for protecting a state, its citizens, and its communities.[40] Reform may focus

on several institutions and practices that may jeopardize or strengthen security.

Institutions included within the security sector include the military, the police, the penal

system, and the judiciary. Reform initiatives in post-conflict situations are often aimed at

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[40] Berkow, p. 8.

creating, or rebuilding these institutions to ensure that they function within the constraints of law and order.[41] Other values commonly found in security sector reform include democracy, equity, human rights, efficiency, accountability, and civilian control.[42] An overarching goal of security sector reform is to create institutions that promote democratic and liberal ideals and contribute to a stable environment for social and economic development and poverty reduction.[43] The core challenge is to infuse security institutions with democratic values. This has often been attempted through programs aimed at training security institutions and their members in human rights practices, promoting an increasing profesionalization of security services, and separating internal and external security institutions and concerns.[44]

Due to the novelty of security initiatives in development there has been problems in the formulation and implementation of projects within the security sector. Security sector reform is a state-centric initiative that places an emphasis on reforming state institutions. This state-centrism is in conflict with the centrality of the individual in human security theory and programs. Security sector reform is understandably a politically sensitive program. In post-conflict communities the domestic security forces may have been the primary instruments of oppression and violence. The need for reforming such institutions is clear. Thus security sector reform has proved to be a

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[41] Brzoska, p. 7.
[42] Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform p. 10.
[43] UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, p. 86.
[44] Brzoska, p.9.

complex issue.[45] The challenges inherent to security sector reform are large, the principle

actors are inexperienced, and there are few tools available to assist them.[46]

Prior to the 1990s, major development organizations had little or no experience

with the security sector or with the institutions and bodies within it. What has evolved is

a situation where the development and security communities have begun to work as a

unifying force in a new field, which cannot exist principally from either a security or

development viewpoint. Donor agencies have gradually broadened their approaches to

include a security dimension to their programming.[47] In a discussion of the various

Canadian government partner organizations in security sector reform, Luc Duchesne

describes the various roles played by several government departments and agencies.

According to Duschesne, CIDA provides funding, country knowledge, and connections

to other development initiatives. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International

Trade (DFAIT) supplies foreign policy leadership and identifies the countries in need of

security sector reform assistance. The Solicitor General and the RCMP select, train, and

deploy Canadian police personnel to the region.[48] Security sector reform initiatives

require the participation and support of a variety of actors, working together towards a

common goal.

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[45] UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, p. 94; Herbert Wulf, Security-Sector
Reform in Developing Countries: An Analysis of the International Debate and Potentials
for Implementing Reforms with Recommendations for Technical Cooperation.
(Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ),
2000), p. 19.
[46] Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform, p. 36.
[47] Hendrickson., p. 35.
[48] Duchesne, p. 67.

Middlemiss describes the central element of civil-military relations as "the need to be protected by the military, and to be protected from the military."[49] In countries in which people have experienced violent and brutal internal conflicts, often at the hands of the military and police representing the state elite, this statement may be equally applied in regards to the relationship between all security sector institutions and the public. In a variety of countries and situations, such as Kosovo, Bosnia, South Africa, Guatemala and Namibia, the security sector has been targeted as a primary concern in rebuilding post-conflict societies. The security sector is conceptualized as playing a vital role in the day to day lives of communities and as influencing the probability of a return to violent confrontation. To ensure both the continued safety of individuals, and the ongoing success of other development initiatives undertaken in the affected communities, security sector reform often becomes an integral component of the peacebuilding process.

Security sector reform has often been part of peacebuilding initiatives and has continued on in many countries beyond the initial intervention of the international community following the cessation of hostilities. Peacebuilding may be broadly defined as the "strengthening of prospects for peaceful coexistence and the decreased likelihood for violent conflict."[50] This definition allows for the potentially important role that security sector institutions may play in creating a situation of sustainable peace.

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[49] Danford Middlemiss, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy." In Ann L. Griffiths (ed.) Building Peace and Democracy in Post-Conflict Societies. (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy studies, Dalhousie University, 1998), p. 72.
[50] Sandra J. MacLean, "Contributions from Civil Society to Building Peace and Democracy," In Ann L. Griffiths (ed.) Building Peace and Democracy in Post-Conflict Societies, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy studies, Dalhousie University, 1998): p.33.

Security sector reform is now a significant element of the peacebuilding agenda as it may influence the society's confidence in the "quality of peace and the commitment of government to it."[51] Creating a new, accountable, and legitimate security sector will work towards the obtainment of the goals of preventing conflict and rebuilding civil society. It also strongly incorporates the concept of human security into development programming. To advance the obtainment of a high level of human security, security sector reform often attempts to fundamentally change important institutions and cultural values present in a society. The goal of security sector reform is to create institutions reflective of the democratic and liberal values promoted by Western donors.

**Critique of Security and Development Initiatives**

While security sector reform has been adopted as a component of many national development agencies, as well as international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank it has generated criticism. Through the increasing adoption of security sector reform as a legitimate area of development assistance, the integration of security issues into development practice, policy, and theory is becoming further entrenched with what some argue are critical problems.

In his book Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Security and Development, Mark Duffield explores the increasing number of interventions in state

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[51] Rami Mani, "Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule of Law, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding." International Peacekeeping. 6(4) (Winter 1999): p. 10.

institutions by the development community in post-conflict situations.[52] Within this new

nexus of development and security, underdevelopment has become dangerous to liberal

nations and people.[53] This threat has been addressed through the building of institutions

reflecting liberal values as a means to combat insecurity caused by underdevelopment.

Following the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the conceptualization of

security, there has been an increasing willingness on the part of the development

community to engage in widespread institutional building in post-conflict situations, and

to use development funding to do so. The donor community may enter a country or

community following the cessation of hostilities and begin a process of rebuilding the

political institutions of that state. A new legitimization for intervention has been crafted

that the old sovereignty model did not allow. As discussed above, the recreation or

rebuilding of the security sector has figured prominently in post-conflict reconstruction.

Security is recognized as playing a vital role in the health of a community or state. This

sector is thus often targeted within a wider program of reconstruction. Such initiatives

can be seen in a variety of contemporary cases such as Haiti, which will be discussed in

detail in the second chapter, as well as Kosovo, Guatemala, and East Timor.

Reconstruction efforts of social, political, and economic institutions have also been

extensively undertaken in the former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe.

Addressing these efforts, Duffield describes the manner in which the reconceptualization

of security has allowed for a program of liberal global governance to be instituted on an

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[52] Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. (London: Zed Books, 2001).

[53] Ibid., p. 17.

almost worldwide basis. This new development emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction "embodies (…) a commitment to transform societies as a whole."[54]

The institution-building encouraged and funded in the developing world and in countries in transition attempt to mirror liberal values of democracy, economic liberalization, human rights, and good governance. However, these institutions are rarely built upon local traditions but rather reflect the donor's priorities. Duffield argues that development agencies involvement in this form of institution building "represents a marked radicalization of the politics of development."[55] Institution building is a reasonably new component of development. In previous decades development agencies were concerned primarily with meeting the basic needs of populations in the developing South. Development agencies have moved from a focus on basic quality of life to attempting to foster radical wide spread societal change. By creating a role for themselves in institution building, development agencies have created a new niche for themselves.[56] Within this new framework of security and liberal peace, development resources may now be used to "shift the balance of power between groups and to change attitudes and beliefs."[57] Social transformation has become a goal of development policy.[58]

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[54] Ibid., p. 82.
[55] Ibid., p. 15.
[56] Ibid., pp. 118, 121.
[57] Ibid., p. 15.
[58] Ibid., p. 39.

Duffield concludes that development has transgressed into areas such as security sector reform as a means to fundamentally change the nature of developing countries to further integrate them into the global economy created and dominated by the developed world. Security sector reform and wider institutional reform may have the motive of creating institutions more closely reflected of the comfortable and familiar values of liberal governance. Development agencies through their work in institution building, and by identifying underdevelopment as a security risk, are eliminating alternative modes of governance that do not reflect liberal values.[59] Security sector reform, therefore, may be seen as a political process attempting to intrinsically alter the development path of developing countries as a means to incorporate them into a wider liberal governance structure, while simultaneously eliminating alternate visions of development.

**Conclusion**

The linkage made between a secure, safe environment and sustainable human development has opened a number of doors in development theory and practice. A new vision of security and its impact on individuals and communities has promoted a rethinking in the division between security and development issues. Security sector reform targets security institutions as a means to promote values and processes such as democracy, accountability, and a respect for human rights to wider society. Programs in the area of security sector reform are meant to complement wider development efforts within a community or state. The second chapter will examine one case study in security sector reform as a means to further explore the integration of development and security.

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[59] Ibid., p. 28.

## Chapter Two:
## Case Study: Police Reform in Haiti

The goal of security sector reform is to create or reinforce an environment supportive of democratic values, human security, and human development. Within security sector reform, police reform has been attempted in numerous contexts with a variety of outcomes. As a means to explore the merging of security and development this chapter examines the case study of the police reform initiative conducted by Canada and other partners in Haiti from 1994 to 2001.

Haiti was selected for the case study on security sector reform for several reasons. Firstly, it represents a case where the international community clearly identified and articulated the need for a new civilian police force as a necessary component of development. The creation of the Haitian National Police (HNP) was included at the very earliest stages of planning for international involvement in Haiti. Secondly, the goal of the international community's involvement in Haiti was specifically and clearly to return democracy to Haiti. Democratic reform was the primary and underlying goal of the actions, programs, and development initiatives undertaken in Haiti. The creation of the HNP was designated as a primary vehicle to advance democracy and good governance in Haiti. International donors were present to bring democracy back. Such an overt liberal policy of development has rarely been so evident in other development endeavors. Finally, it was the first major police reform project undertaken by the Canadian government, under the auspices of CIDA.

## Historical and Political Context

Following the 1991 overthrow of the first democratically elected government in Haiti's long post colonial history, the international community became involved at an unprecedented level to restore the democratically elected government to power and to end human rights violations. This poor and historically neglected country found itself at the center of a new international democratic agenda. To gain a sound understanding of Canada's and the international community's involvement in policing in Haiti it is necessary to first examine, if only briefly, Haiti's unique historical and social context.

If one were to summarize Haitian experience in several words, it could be described as a country historically plagued by poverty, corruption and bad government. Located on the island of Hispaniola, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.[1] Haiti's population of just over 8 million suffers from extreme poverty, environmental degradation, illiteracy, malnutrition, an AIDS epidemic, rising crime rates and human rights abuses, and massive unemployment.[2] Like many poor countries Haiti also suffers from an extreme lack of social and economic infrastructure. Electricity,

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[1] Canadian International Development Agency. "Canadian Cooperation in the Caribbean 2000 Edition: Haiti" *Canadian International Development Agency*. October 5, 2000. <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca> (June 12, 2002.)

[2] Roughly 85% of Haiti's population lives in absolute poverty. Only a third of the population is employed in the formal economy. Haiti has a literacy rate of 45% for the total population. The average life expectancy is 49.38 years. The adult prevalence rate of AIDS is 5.17%. CIA. "Haiti." *CIA – The World Factbook.* <http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/geos/ha.html> (April 28, 2002).

sewage, transportation, and access to health and education services are inadequate in Port-au-Prince, and are virtually absent from the rural areas.[3]

But Haiti's current socio-economic problems are rooted in its tragic history. French St. Dominique, as Haiti was formally known, was one of the most profitable international holdings of the French Empire. Based on the labour of almost one million African slaves, French St. Dominique produced large quantities of sugar, molasses, rum, coffee, indigo, and cotton for export.[4] Following the success of the Haitian revolution against the French colonial power, independence was achieved in1804. But the economic system of plantation labour swiftly collapsed and the combined absence of foreign investment, and the unwillingness of Haiti's own domestic economic elites to invest in Haiti, resulted in the dramatic underdevelopment of Haiti's economic and social infrastructure. Since independence Haiti has had a turbulent political history marked primarily by unstable dictatorial governments. Since 1804 Haiti has had "21 constitutions, 41 heads of state, 29 of whom were assassinated or overthrown."[5]

The Duvalier family dominated Haitian politics and government from 1957 to 1986. Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier became president in 1957. Upon his death, Duvalier's son

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[3] Canadian International Development Agency. "Canadian Cooperation in the Caribbean 2000 Edition: Haiti"

[4] Sidney W. Mintz, "Can Haiti Change?" Foreign Affairs. 74(1) (January-February 1995): p. 75.

[5] Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire, and J. O'Neil G. Pouliot. "Haiti Military-Police Partnership for Public Security." In Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.) Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security. (Virginia: National Defense University Press, 1997).

Jean-Claude, or "Baby Doc" assumed power. Jean-Claude Duvalier was overthrown in 1986 following popular uprisings against his regime. The Duvalier regime was followed by a series of military juntas from 1986 to 1994, with a brief attempt at democracy for eight months in 1991 when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President, with 67% of the popular vote.[6] Aristide's presidency was short-lived, as he was overthrown in September of 1991 by a military coup led by Raoul Cedras.

**Diplomacy and Sanctions: 1991-1994**

Following Aristide's 1991 overthrow the international community, headed by the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations (UN), and the United States government began a series of campaigns to monitor human rights violations, to impose sanctions on the de facto government, and with the American intervention, to foster democracy and peace through institutional capacity building. Elizabeth Gibbons discusses the significance of the international community's reaction to the removal of Aristide from power: "the community of nations was prepared to see the overthrow of a democratic government as a threat to international peace and security and to protect a population's democratic entitlement."[7]

Sanctions imposed upon the de facto government were almost instantaneous. Significantly, Haiti was the first case in which the UN instituted economic sanctions to

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[6] John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti," Foreign Policy.102 (Spring 1996): p.143.
[7] Elizabeth D. Gibbons, Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy under Assault. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999); p. 7.

restore a democratically elected government.[8] The UN and OAS sanctions initially garnered support from the international community, Aristide and his supporters, and the Haitian people.[9]

The UN bolstered the original OAS sanctions with the imposition of a fuel and arms embargo in June of 1993. The additional sanctions had the desired effect of pushing the Haitian non-democratic government into negotiations with Aristide. These negotiations led to the signing of the Governor Islands Agreement, and the premature cessation of sanctions in July 1993.[10] The arms and fuel embargo, however, was reinstated in October 1993 and enforced through a naval blockade when the conditions of the Governor Island Agreement were ignored by the de facto Haitian government.[11]

In May of 1994 financial sanctions were imposed by the United States on the Haitian de facto government and its supporters in the elite class and the military. The financial sanctions halted all commercial international travel to and from Haiti, froze the assets and financial transactions of Haitian businesses and families, and finally imposed comprehensive trade sanctions.[12] In addition to the sanctions regime, the OAS also created the Human Rights Field Mission to monitor the human rights situation under the

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[8] Karin von Hippel, "Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building." The Washington Quarterly.23(1) (Winter 2000): p. 96.

[9] David Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 98.

[10] David Cortright and Georege A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000): p. 87.

[11] Ibid., p. 94.

[12] Ibid., p. 87.

de facto government in 1992.[13] This mission was expanded in 1993 through a cooperative venture between the OAS and the UN which saw the formation of the Mission of the United Nations in Haiti (MINUHA) in 1993, whose initial mandate focused on human rights protections and monitoring and support for democracy.[14] The mandate was expanded following American intervention to include a democratic institution-building component.

During the years following the removal of Aristide from power, the de facto government instituted the practice of politically motivated killings and beatings of Aristide supporters and pro-democratic factions within the country. Weiss estimates that 300 to 500 Aristide supporters were killed immediately following the coup.[15] A total of 5,000 political murders took place between 1991 and the American intervention in 1994.[16] The combined impact of the violence of the coup and the influence of the economic sanctions resulted in 300,000 internally displaced persons and 64,000 Haitian "boat people."[17]

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[13] Organization of American States. "First Interim Report on the Implementation of the Permanent Council Resolution CP/RES. 806 (1303/02) On the Situation in Haiti." *Organization of American States.* April 3, 2002. <http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press2002/en/Press98/Press2000/june2000/Haiti_inf_eng. htm> (May 3, 2002).

[14] United Nations. "Haiti – MINUHA: Profile." *Mission of the United Nations in Haiti.* August 31, 1997. <http://www.un.org/french/peace/f_unmiha> (April 28, 2002).

[15] Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), p.196.

[16] Gibbons, p. 92.

[17] Ibid., p. 96.

The effects of the sanctions proved to have a far greater effect on the well-being

and health of the Haitian population than it did on restoring a democratic government.

Haiti suffered at an unprecedented level as the effects of the economic sanctions took

root. The impact on Haiti's economy was devastating. In a country with rampant

unemployment, over 300,000 jobs were lost in the formal employment sector between

1991 and 1994.[18] Unemployment in the formal sector rose from 50% in 1990 to 75% in

1994.[19] During the crisis Haiti's agricultural output declined 20%, while the price for

foodstuffs increased more then 100%.[20] The already low annual per capita income

dropped by 30% over the course of the sanctions to US$ 250.[21] The United Nations

Secretary General reported an increase in child mortality for children aged one to five

increasing from 56 deaths per 1000 in 1987, to 61 per 1000 in 1994.[22] Child malnutrition

rose from 27% in 1990 to 50% in 1994.[23] Maternal mortality also increased by 29%.[24]

The international community responded significantly to the humanitarian crisis it

was helping in part to sustain. Karin von Hippel describes the situation in the following

manner: "the Haitian embargo, which endured for several years without accomplishing its

stated purpose of removing the Cedras regime, adversely affected long-term recovery and

increased the need for foreign assistance because essential medical and food supplies

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[18] Cortright and Lopez, p. 96.
[19] Gibbons, p. 96.
[20] Ibid., p. 95
[21] Ibid., p. 95.
[22] Cortright and Lopez, p. 97.
[23] Ibid., p. 96.
[24] Gibbons, p. 95.

were drastically reduced, while most jobs in the basic industries were lost."[25] The

UNICEF budget for Haiti reached US$12 Million in 1994[26], and the USAID budget was

US$ 74 Million that same year, up from $68.5 million in 1993.[27] UN relief organizations

fed 940,000 Haitians each day in the summer of 1994. USAID NGOs provided food for

an additional million Haitians, and CARE fed 620,000 people a day during the same

period.[28] In short, Haiti was in deep social, political, and humanitarian crisis and its

sovereignty was no longer protected.


**American Invasion**

After three years of diplomacy and sanctions that proved ineffective at restoring

democracy to Haiti, 22,000 American troops and 2,000 non-American troops landed in

Port-au-Prince on September 19, 1994. The US-led Multinational Force (MNF) arrived

in Haiti with the goal of restoring democracy and returning Aristide to power, and with

the permission and backing of the United Nations Security Council. Aristide, long a

supporter of tightening economic sanctions, had indicated in January of 1994 his support

for a "surgical intervention to overthrow the de factos."[29] In the summer of 1994 the

American government sought permission from the UN Security Council to intervene with

force to end the Haitian crisis. This permission was given in UNSC Resolution 940.[30]

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[25]von Hippel, "Democracy by Force," p. 98.

[26] Cortright and Lopez, p. 97.

[27] Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, p. 99.

[28] Cortright and Lopez, p. 97.

[29] Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, p. 101.

[30] The politics behind establishing support for this resolution among the five permanent members of the Council has been discussed at length in the literature, and is worthwhile examining for a greater sense of the support for the US led mission. See Malone,

The resolution was unprecedented on several counts. Firstly, it was the first resolution passed authorizing the use of force to restore democracy. Secondly, it was the first time the US government had sought permission from the United Nations before intervening militarily in its "sphere of influence."[31] On September 17, 1994 an American diplomatic mission comprised of former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn arrived in Haiti to broker a last minute deal with the de facto government. The military government under the leadership of Raoul Cedras agreed to withdraw from the country and to accept the deployment of American forces in Haiti and the return of Aristide to power. On September 19, 1994 the American led forces arrived. Aristide was restored to power on October 15, 1994 and the UN and OAS sanctions were lifted.

Upon arrival, the MNF began its work to create a secure environment that would allow a United Nations peacekeeping mission to be deployed. A condition for the Security Council approval of the use of force in Haiti had been that the Secretary General of the United Nations would ultimately determine when the MNF had achieved it security objectives, and would then recommend the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).[32] Work began almost immediately to address institutional capacity building, particularly the creation of a new civilian police force, and improvements on infrastructure soon followed. On January 15, 1995 the MNF commander optimistically

Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, and David Malone, "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study." Survival. 39(2) (Summer 1997): 126-46.
[31] Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, p. 110.
[32] Ibid, p. 108.

declared the establishment of a "secure and stable environment."[33] The transition from

MNF to UNMIH occurred on March 31 1995. At that time the majority of US troops

began withdrawal to be replaced by peacekeepers and civilian police officers working

under the UNMIH mandate.

## Foreign Intervention: Police Reform and Development, The UN and American Role

Central to the democratization process outlined by the international community

following the American intervention was the creation of a civilian national police force,

which would operate under internationally acceptable democratic standards.[34] The

Haitian military was officially abolished by Aristide in 1995. For the first time in Haitian

history internal security was separated from the military apparatus. Rachel Nield

describes the former policing apparatus as "an arm of Haiti's oppressive, violent

military, (...) engaged in widespread, systematic human rights abuses."[35] Through a

process of recruitment, training, mentoring, and monitoring the Haitian National Police

(HNP) was created in 1995.

### United Nations Involvement in Police Reform

The United Nations was the lead international organization involved in

peacebuilding and policing reform efforts in Haiti after Aristide's 1994 return. Following

the MNF, the UN has operated five missions in Haiti, all of which placed a premium on

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[33] Ibid., p. 122.
[34] United Nations. "The Haitian National Police and Human Rights." *International Civilian Mission In Haiti, OAS/UN.* July 1996.
<http://www.un.org/rights/micivih/rapports /engpol.htm> (April 28, 2002).
[35] Rachel M. Neild, "Can Haiti's Police Reforms be Sustained?" *Haiti Insight Online.* January 22, 2002. <http://www.nchr.org/hrp/archive/pol981.htm> (May 3, 2002).

police and judicial reform.[36] The conclusion of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) in 1997 marked the end of the participation of military personnel in UN peacebuilding. From that time missions were non-military, and were staffed primarily by police officers.

The nature of the UN missions also evolved over time. The MNF and the initial UN mission were charged with providing a secure environment in the absence of a functioning indigenous security sector. Later missions were concerned with first the training of the HNP and then institutional building to strengthen the HNP. Each of the UN missions placed an emphasis on judicial and police reform in addition to human and civil rights. The connection placed by the United Nations between security sector reform and wider political, economic and social development and stability was used to justify the UN's continued presence in Haiti and its continual work on institutional development of the HNP.[37]

UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) assumed the responsibility of maintaining law and order prior to the creation of the Interim Police Security Force (IPSF) and the Haitian National Police (HNP). CIVPOL had been authorized by the Governors Island Agreement "to carry weapons (a first for a UN police contingent), to enforce Haitian laws

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[36]United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), March 1995 – June 1996; United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), July 1996 – June 1997; United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti UNTMIH, August 1997 – November 1997; United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), December 1997 – November 1998, extended to March 2000; United Nations Civilian Assistance Mission (MICAH), February 2000 – March 2001.
[37] Beer, D. C. "The Partnership of Peacebuilding: A case study of justice development in Haiti." (M.A. Thesis. University of Windsor, 2001): p.3.

when no local security forces were present, to use the minimum force necessary under carefully prescribed conditions, and to intervene to prevent lose of life or the disruption of a 'safe and secure' environment."[38]

The overarching mandate of CIVPOL was to monitor the performance of a Haitian police force and to serve as mentors.[39] An important area of CIVPOL contribution was the field-training program that featured close collaboration between CIVPOL and the HNP Academy. CIVPOL officers tutored and monitored new recruits through field training, as a means to reinforce their experience and learning in basic training. Following the March 1996 CIVPOL change in command from Canadian to French leadership the field-training program was cancelled. CIVPOL's contribution to training was then largely confined to in-station training, lectures, and readings from manuals.[40] The collaboration between CIVPOL, bilateral police programs, and the HNP Academy's training program ended with French command of CIVPOL.[41]

In addition to the CIVPOL operations, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) operated a bilateral program in the area of police reform. The UNDP justice reform program in Haiti provided:

- Strengthening of police command structures

- Institutional and organization development of key HNP directorates

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[38] Bailey, Maguire, and Pouliot.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Pouliot, J.O.G. (Neil). "Post Conflict Judicial System Reconstruction: The case of Haiti." Policing the Peace Proceedings of International Peace Academy Seminar, November 2-3, 2000. (New York: International Peace Academy, 2000), p.8.
[41] Beer, p. 41.

- On-the-job training for upper and middle management

- Drafting of internal rules, regulations, and procedures for the HNP

- Equipment and rehabilitation of existing facilities for more than 15 police stations

- Provision of transportation and communication equipment[42]

The United Nations no longer operates a peacebuilding mission in Haiti. The decision to end UN involvement resulted from the Haitian government's refusal to recount the results of the May 2000 elections, and the increasing violence towards foreigners.[43]

**American Bilateral Police Program**

In advance of the launching of Operation Restore Democracy, the American government and the international community had already identified the need for extensive security sector reform. Responding to this perceived need, the US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) drafted a two-phase, 5-year police development plan in advance of the intervention.[44] This plan would be the dominant model used to create and train the new HNP, and would significantly impact upon Canadian and other programs.

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[42] United Nations Development Programme. "An Analysis and Lessons Learned of Rule and Law Technical Assistance in Haiti." *Transitions from Crisis to Recovery.* June/July 2001 <www.undp.org/erd/pubinfo/transitions/2001_06/rol_haiti> (August 12, 2002).
[43] Owen Bowcott, "UN should leave Haiti, says Annan," *The Guardian.* November 29, 2000. <http://www.guardian.co.uk> (May 1, 2002).
[44] Beer, p. 24.

The model was developed without consultation with the Aristide government or with any Haitian stakeholders. The program was modeled largely on existing police reform plans that were used in El Salvador and Guatemala.[45] Although not specific to the Haitian experience or needs, the ICITAP plan dominated the development of the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) and the HNP. The first phase of the plan was implemented immediately upon arrival with the assistance of a wide range of actors including the American Special Forces, military police, International Police Monitors, and CIVPOL.[46] The widespread implementation of this plan assisted the Americans to assume a dominant role in all police reform initiatives undertaken from 1994 until the end of bilateral US programs in 2000.[47]

The first phase of the ICITAP plan was designed to immediately assess the public security needs of Haiti, and to meet them in the short term. As a fundamental part of the first phase of security sector reform, policing was to be removed from the military and paramilitary organizations in Haiti. The role of the police also needed to be redefined. In order to separate policing from the military and define the role of the police, the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) was created. The IPSF was designed to meet the immediate public security needs of the Haitian public while the new HNP was in development.

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[45] Ibid., p. 43.

[46] In addition to the police reform plan, the American military also performed policing duties during the MNF phase of peacebuilding. Within the first week of US intervention, American and global television reports broadcast the beatings and death of Haitians at the hands of uniformed Haitian security personnel, while American soldiers watched from the sidelines. Following the release of this footage, and the subsequent outcry by the American public, the mandate of the MNF forces was changed, and US forces were granted police powers to arrest, detain, and shoot people caught committing serious crimes. Please see Bailey, Maguire, Pouliot, p. 6.

[47] Beer, pp. 29, 78.

Former military and paramilitary members were encouraged to join the IPSF, except those with records of extreme human rights abuse.[48]

In his book, the Immaculate Invasion, Bob Shacochis describes the process of recruiting and training for the IPSF as chaotic, disorganized, and lacking community support or involvement. US Special Forces were charged with creating an IPSF unit in the town of Limbé. Despite this mandate, the Special Forces could not arm or pay the new recruits.[49] Schacochis reports that after three months of work, the IPSF recruits in Limbé had not received any pay, uniforms, arms, or even one meal.[50] IPMs spent only one day with the IPSF unit in Limbé.[51]

The second phase of the ICITAP plan, which began in the spring of 1996, was to create a permanent civilian police force, the Haitian National Police. This required significant investment in the development of training modules and materials, a Haitian National Police Training Academy, and specialized training in a variety of branches to promote a professional police force.

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48 Individuals that had committed atrocious human rights abuses were often unknowingly accepted into the IPSF. In one community, after the Special Forces had left the area the town stormed the police station and beat the IPSF officers, and tortured and killed the police commander who was a former member of a paramilitary organization. Please see Bob Shacochis, The Immaculate Invasion. (New York: Viking, 1999), pp. 297-301.

49 Ibid., p. 171.

50 Ibid., p. 267.

51 Ibid., p. 261.

The training component of this phase was a large undertaking that began with the provision of basic training to almost 6,000 new recruits to the HNP.  The Haitian National Police Academy was established by the American government and ICITAP, in the capital city of Port-au-Prince, to provide basic training to the new recruits.  Over one hundred American trainers worked at the Academy. Twenty RCMP officers and three French police officers also assisted in the basic recruitment and training.[52]

ICITAP continued to offer training at the Academy following the completion of the MNF.  Training was offered on a continuous basis for up to three hundred HNP officers at a time in the following fields:

- Instructor development

- Criminal investigation

- Narcotics enforcement

- Crowd control

- SWAT

- Coast guard operations

- Dignitary protocol

- Border patrol

- Airport security[53]

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[52] Bailey, Maguire, Pouliot, p. 10.
[53] Ibid., p. 13.

## Canadian Police Reform and Development

### The Canadian Political and Development Policy Context

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was created in 1968 as the government agency responsible for the administration and disbursement of Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA). Since its beginnings CIDA has focused on poverty alleviation as its primary objective, while simultaneously adjusting its programming and priorities to reflect and address the current global environment, as well as changes in Canadian foreign policy. The number of countries which receive Canadian ODA include many of the Commonwealth countries and countries of la francophonie. In 1995 the former Soviet republics in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia were also included under CIDA's mandate, although outside of the ODA structure. CIDA currently operates programs in over 150 countries, including over 100 of the world's poorest states.

CIDA's current mandate and policy direction is based upon the document Canada in the World, which outlines Canada's foreign policy objectives. It was in this document that Canada's human security agenda was first introduced and outlined.[54] In Canada in the World three priority policy areas are identified: "the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security within a stable global framework; and the

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[54] The Canadian government defines human security as: "safety for people from violent threats, such as violations of human rights, terrorism, and violent crimes." The government further acknowledges that there are non-violent threats to human security including environmental degradation, illicit drug trade, disease, and natural disasters. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Human Security: New thinking and new actions for a new millennium." *Canada World View*. August 1999. <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foregnp/canada-magaxine/wv_sel/selt7-2.html> (September 25, 2000).

projection of Canadian values and culture."[55] CIDA policy is designed to complement

the initiatives undertaken by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

(DFAIT) and reinforce Canadian foreign policy priorities including the human security

agenda.

To advance the mandate identified within Canada in the World, CIDA

programming concentrates on six priority areas. These areas are:

1. Basic human needs. This priority accounts for 25% of CIDA's budget. Focus

   areas within this priority are primary education, basic health, HIV/AIDS, and

   child protection.

2. Gender Equity. The integration of gender equity takes place within each of

   CIDA's projects, as well as project's created specifically to target gender issues.

3. Infrastructure services.

4. Human rights, democratization, and good governance.

5. Private sector development

6. Environment[56]

Human security is addressed by CIDA in a number of ways throughout its

programming priority areas. Security sector reform figures prominently in the human

rights, democratization, and good governance priority area. Within this priority security

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[55] Canada, Canada in the World: Government Statement, (Canada: Public Works and Government Services, 1995), p. i.

[56] Canadian International Development Agency. "Program Priorities." *Canadian International Development Agency*. January 17, 2001. <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca> (March 25, 2003).

sector reform has been addressed at both the policy and programming levels. As discussed in the first chapter, security sector reform is directly linked to human security initiatives in that it attempts to create a secure and safe environment that promotes and enhances social, economic, and political development.

Following the release of Canada in the World, the Government of Canada drafted a policy paper for CIDA's programming in the area of human rights, democratization, and good governance.[57] This policy was designed to further complement Canada's foreign policy by upholding the following values and promoting them throughout the developing world: "the Government regards respect for human rights not only as a fundamental value, but also as a crucial element in the development of stable, democratic and prosperous societies at peace with each other."[58] Programming in this priority area has covered a wide array of projects targeting both government institutions and civil society as a means to promote and strengthen the process of democratization and good governance, and to protect human rights. The overarching policy direction for this area is: "to enhance the will and capacity of developing country societies to respect the rights of children, women and men, and to govern effectively and in a democratic manner."[59]

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[57] Canadian International Development Agency. Government of Canada policy for CIDA on human rights, democratization and good governance. (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 1996).

[58] Canada, Canada in the World, p. 34.

[59] Canadian International Development Agency. Government of Canada policy for CIDA on human rights, democratization and good governance. (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 1996), p. 3.

To further the success of this area of programming, CIDA has identified five objectives to be carried out under the banner of human rights, democratization, and good governance. The objectives are to strengthen:

1. The role and capacity of civil society organizations to encourage greater popular participation in decision-making;

2. The functioning of democratic institutions;

3. The competence of the public sector "to promote the effective, honest, and accountable exercise of power;"

4. The capacity of organizations that are concerned with human rights issues to increase each society's ability to address human rights concerns and promote individual security;

5. The political will of a country's leaders to uphold and enact the principles of human rights, democratic rule, and good governance.[60]

These objectives are met through a variety of programming and intervention ranging from funding institutional development, supporting truth commissions in post-conflict communities, widening public access to legal institutions, land mine removal, conflict resolution and dialogue, and building the capacity for women and marginalized groups to participate more fully in civil society.[61] Security sector reform has played a prominent role in this priority area as well, particularly in the area of institutional support.

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[60] Ibid., p. 4.
[61] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

Security sector reform was present in CIDA programming prior to the introduction of

the Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and

Good Governance. The Canadian Partnership Branch within CIDA, along with several

geographical branches began implementing projects in the area of judicial and legal

reform in the early 1990s. These projects were largely concerned with the institutional

strengthening of security sector institutions, as well as examining the manner in which

civil society interacted with these institutions. The steady increase of programming in

judicial and legal reform throughout the 1990s illustrates the growing acknowledgement

within CIDA of the impact that the security sector has on social and economic

development.[62] Projects in this area were included under the priority area of human

rights, democratization, and good governance following its official adoption.


In a review of programming in legal and judicial reform undertaken between 1990

and 1997, Lamontagne identifies four major themes of programming. These themes are:

1.  "Articulation, formulation and drafting of rules;

2.  Application and interpretation of rules;

3.  Provision of legal representation and advice;

4.  Promotion of public access and understanding"[63]

The majority of projects were aimed at strengthening institutions responsible for the

application and interpretations of rules, such as the police and judiciary, and the provision

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[62] Véronique, Lamontagne. CIDA's Programming in Legal and Judicial Reform: Indicative List of CIDA Projects Related to Legal and Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and Central and Eastern Europe 1990-1997 (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 1999), p.1.
[63] Ibid., p. 5.

of legal assistance and advice.[64] Lamontagne describes the legal and judicial reform projects as ranging from ad hoc, short-term projects to much longer-term projects that were integrated within country strategies. Funding in this area totaled $71 million from 1990-1997. It is important to highlight that of this total, $21.4 million went exclusively to support the Haitian National Police force, the single largest security sector reform in CIDA's history.[65]

Police reform was the most significant component of CIDA financing during the time frame from 1990-1997.[66] Police reform projects took place in over 10 countries in the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Africa. Of these projects, support to the Haitian National Police was the most ambitious and resource intensive project undertaken both within police reform and within security sector reform more generally. This chapter will now turn to an examination of police reform initiatives undertaken in Haiti.

**Security Sector Reform: Reforming Haitian Policing**

Canadian police officers were present in Haiti immediately following the US intervention. Initially, the Canadian contribution was largely defined through cooperation with the American-led initiatives and through CIVPOL. Beginning in 1996 however, the Canadian contribution to police reform in Haiti expanded significantly through the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) bilateral program. The goal of the bilateral program was to improve the institutional capacity of the HNP to

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[64] Ibid., p. 8.
[65] Ibid., p. 9.
[66] Ibid., p. 12.

ensure security and the observance of law and order.[67] The police reform project was a joint effort between CIDA and the RCMP. CIDA was responsible for the policy formation, the funding, and had the ultimate responsibility for the project. The RCMP were the executing agency of the project. It was the RCMP who ran the day-to-day aspects of the project. This relationship was a new one for both agencies. CIDA had little previous experience in security sector reform; the RCMP had very little experience working in developing countries.[68]

Due to the dominance of the American reform initiative, much of the RCMP-CIDA program was determined in relation to the American plan. This was manifested in several initiatives including training and recruitment of the Haitian National Police (HNP). At the request of the Americans, Canadian RCMP officers participated in the initial basic training of the IPSF recruits. To accommodate the large numbers of recruits, training was also offered by the RCMP at its Saskatchewan Academy. One hundred Haitian nationals and Canadians and Americans of Haitian descent were trained at the RCMP facilities to serve in the IPSF. This initiative later fell into disrepute, as evidence surfaced that these one hundred recruits had been selected by Aristide to become an elite policing unit to be used by the national palace.[69] Canadian officers also worked with ICITAP in recruitment and in developing curriculum and lesson plans for the HNP.[70] The manual used in the field-training program for the HNP was influenced by Canadian

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[67] Ivan Ménard, Jean Ostiquy, Lysiane Boisvert. Project D'Appui Institutionnel À La Police Nationale D'Haïti CR/Project: 444/20032: Évaluation mi-parcours. (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 2000), p. 1.
[68] Ibid., p. 11.
[69] Beer, p. 91.
[70] Bailey, Maguire, Pouliot, p. 9.

efforts, and was based on American and Canadian models. International police monitors used these field-training manuals following the deployment of the new HNP recruits. In addition, Canadians were among the initial trainers at the Haitian National Police Academy.

Canadian RCMP also contributed extensively to the CIVPOL mission. A Canadian, J. O'Neil G. Pouliot, led the first CIVPOL mission in Haiti. Following the transfer of command to the French, Canada continued to contribute approximately one third of the total CIVPOL contingent.[71] Canadian CIVPOL provided training, monitoring, and mentoring to the HNP. Throughout the MNF mission, national CIVPOL units were not separated or mixed with other national contingents. This practice ended with the UNMIH. National police units were then mixed, and each unit featured a core group of French and Canadian officers. This was largely a result of the inability of many of the international officers to communicate with the Haitian public and with the IPSF and HNP recruits.

CIDA assumed responsibility for the police reform program in Haiti in 1996. The RCMP served as the executing agency for the program, and conducted the project on CIDA's behalf. The program was created in accordance with Canadian foreign policy priorities and operated on a cost recovery basis between the RCMP, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), CIDA, and the Solicitor General.

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[71] Beer, p. 80.

CIDA's bilateral police program encompassed a wide range of initiatives targeted largely at providing additional training to the HNP beyond what they had received in basic training, and providing technical assistance. Through the placement of Technical Advisor throughout the HNP, CIDA's bilateral program also emphasized institution building to assist the HNP to make the transition to an independent public security institution.

Police reform initiatives undertaken through the Canadian bilateral program included:

- Mid-management training program created specifically for Haiti.

- The provision of technical advisors to HNP upper management.

- The creation and training of the Bureau de Renseigment Judiciare (BRJ). This branch of the HNP is responsible for criminal investigation. Previously, the Haitian judiciary had undertaken all criminal investigation.

- The proposal and initiation of a "business development process." The goal of the process was to provide the HNP with the tools to plan and execute its own institutional development. The HNP was to identify activities, resources, and coordinate the programs of international partners through the use of the business development process. To advance the process, twenty-four experts collaborated with Haitian department heads and their international mentors to draft a five year plan, which took into consideration training needs, policy, procedure, facilities, equipment, and financial and human resources. This process was not advanced

significantly as it met with resistance from other international partners and the Haitian government.[72]

- The forensic evidence-training program was a joint initiative undertaken by the Canadian and American bilateral programs. Canada's contribution focused on police identification technology and providing mentoring and administrative support to the director of forensic evidence. The Americans assumed responsibility for lab development. This program was not effective as a result of deficiencies in other branches of the HNP and sexism targeted at the female head of the department.[73]

- Academic Resource Centre at the Haitian National Police Academy. Through the bilateral program Canada renovated a facility at the Academy, provided materials to the Centre, and trained HNP staff to operate the Centre. The program was completely unsuccessful because the Haitian government refused to pay the salary of the Centre's HNP employees.[74]

- Police Transportation Centre and Maintenance Facility. Similar to the Academic Resource Centre, this initiative failed as a result of the unwillingness of the Haitian government to assume responsibility for the operation of the center after it was completed.[75]

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[72] Ibid., pp. 35-36.
[73] Ibid., p. 47.
[74] Ibid., p. 55.
[75] Ibid.

Although the last international contributor to the HNP's development,[76] the Canadian

program was cancelled by CIDA in March 2001 following the cessation of government to

government development assistance to Haiti.[77]


**The Haitian National Police Today**

CIDA commissioned an evaluation of the police reform project in 2000. The

evaluation describes an organization with a weak *esprit du corps*, a centralized

management whose executive is out of touch with the base of the police force, and no

communication system. The HNP's business plan was described not as a strategic plan,

but rather as a list of demands used to play donors off each other.[78] In addition to all of

these problems, the HNP was presented in the evaluation as a reactive organization under

the influence of political power.[79] Since the conclusion of the CIDA project the situation

has substantially deteriorated.


The weakness of the HNP has been prominent in the mainstream media through

its accounts of the inability of the HNP to respond to public crisis in an appropriate

manner. As demonstrations and strikes continue to occur on a regular basis, the HNP is

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[76] Ibid., p. 85.

[77] The Canadian decision to cut bilateral development funding was based on the view that the Haitian government could not be depended on to advance political, social, or economic development strategies. Programs from 2001-2002 were carried out on a project per project basis in partnership with non-governmental groups and organizations. For more please see Americas Branch. Programme Haiti: Document d'orientation, Presentation a BMF (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 2002).

[78] Ménard, p.12.

[79] Ibid., p.8.

often completely absent or ineffective in responding to violence.[80] Worse still is the high

rate of reporting of HNP officers participating in the pro-government rallies, and acting in

a violent and oppressive manner in response to opponents of the government.[81] The

traditional role of a politicized, corrupt, and inept security force, common to Haiti

throughout its history continues today in the HNP, regardless of the numerous initiatives

and programs described above.


Despite the anti-narcotic program implemented by the American government in

the late 1990s, top ranking Haitian police officers continue to be implicated in major drug

trafficking through Haiti. Corruption at the highest level in the HNP has been identified

with regards to the lucrative trade in drugs that flows from South America en route to

American destinations. In February 2003, Haiti's highest-ranking anti-narcotics officer

was arrested for facilitating drug trafficking.[82]

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[80] Please see BBC News. "Aristide loyalists riot in Haiti capital." *BBC News.* November 22, 2002. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/d/hi/americas/2503981.stm> (November 23, 2002); Michael Norton, "Haiti police deemed helpless as jailbreak shows latest violence, chaos." *The Seattle Times.* August 5, 2002. <http://seattletimes.nwsource.com> (August 15, 2002).

[81] Please see Charles Arthur, "Former police chiefs implicated in National Palace attack." *Haiti Support Group.* <http://www.oneworld.net> (May 1, 2002); James Canute, "Police battle rioters in Haitian city." *Financial Times.* August 7, 2002. <http://news.ft.com> (August 15, 2002); CNN, "Haitian students protest shootings." *CNN.* November 22, 2002. <www.cnn.com> (November 23, 2002); Tim Collie, "Murder in Haiti: 'Zero Tolerance' vigilante justice targets ordinary folks." *The State.* December 26, 2002. <http://www.thestate.com> (December 27, 2002).

[82] Jane Regan. "Haiti arrests top narcotics officer, suspends judge during crackdown." *The Miami Herald.* February 18, 2003. <www.miami.com> (March 8, 2003); Marika Lynch "Top Haitian police officials worked with drug traffickers, U.S. says." *The State.* January 31, 2003. <www.thestate.com> (February 11, 2003).

The HNP suffers from several serious problems including a lack of professionally trained leadership, an increasing incidence of politicization within the police force, continued human rights abuses, and the use of excessive force by police officers when arresting and detaining suspects.[83] The training, monitoring, and regulations have been undermined by poverty and lack of economic growth, the continued presence of former military and paramilitary members in high-ranking positions in the HNP, lack of reform to the judicial and penal systems, and a police culture that continues to support impunity for police actions.[84]

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[83] For a discussion of the current problems facing the HNP please see Neild;  Arthur; United Nations. "The Haitian National Police and Human Rights;" Bailey, Macguire, and Pouliot.

[84] Bailey, Macguire, and Pouliot, pp. 19-21; Human Rights Watch. "World Report 2002: Americas: Haiti." *Human Rights Watch*. 2002. <http://www.hrw.org/re2k2/americas/html> (May 1, 2002); Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic. "Sustaining Success in Haiti..." *Strategic Forum*. June 1996. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ forum77.html> (May 1, 2002).

**Chapter Three:**
**Analysis of the Canadian Police Reform Project in Haiti**

The Haitian security sector reform project was CIDA's first attempt at security

sector reform on a large scale. The task of building a civilian police force reflective of

democratic values was a large undertaking, particularly for an agency with little previous

experience in security sector reform, working with a partner unfamiliar with developing

countries or with wider development issues. Although this project was shared among

many international donors, CIDA and the RCMP played a significant role in the training,

management, and administrative development of the Haitian National Police.

In order to critically examine the CIDA police reform project and try and explain

its lack of success, six security sector reform principles have been applied. These six

development principles come from several development frameworks designed to address

security sector reform in a manner that is both sustainable and responsive to wider

development issues.[1] Using these core development principles allows us to critically

examine the Haitian security sector project as a model of police reform.

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[1] Johanna Mendelson Forman, Promoting Civil Society in Good Governance: Lessons for the Security Sector Working Paper Series No. 29. (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2002); Malcolm Chalmers, Security sector reform in developing countries: an EU perspective. (London: Saferworld and the Conflict Prevention Network, 2000); Clingendael, International Alert, Saferworld. Towards a better practice framework in security sector reform: Broadening the debate Occasional SSR Paper No.1. (The Hague, London: Clingendael, International Alert, Saferworld, 2002); Nicole Ball, "Towards a Conceptual Framework for Security Sector Reform." Roundtable on Security Sector Reform. (Cornwallis: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2000); Dylan Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform. (London: King's College: The Conflict, Security & Development Group, 1999).

## Good Governance/Democracy

This principle recognizes that security sector reform should be undertaken within a wider program focus on good governance and democracy.[2] It has been suggested by some writers that effective security sector reform that ensures the creation of a system based on the primacy of rule of law and human rights, is dependent on a democratic social and political environment.[3] Western-style democratization has often been at the forefront of the motivations for security sector reform. Western-style democracy, however, is dependent on promoting widespread political and cultural change. While many advocates describe reform initiatives, particularly policing, as providing a catalyst for a more democratic environment, experience has shown that "democratic" institutions will not survive in an otherwise undemocratic environment.

A common goal of security sector reform initiatives is to create a security sector reflective of democratic values, and one able to protect and promote these values within the wider society. Good governance often refers to the principles of rule of law, transparency, efficiency and ethical behavior. All of these principles are evident in the rationale and policy behind the Haitian police reform project.

The CIDA police reform project was conceptualized and operated under the human rights, democratization, and good governance policy identified by the Canadian

[2] Mendelson Forman, pp. 8, 15; Ball, p. 14.
[3] United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 86-88, 93.

government.[4] This policy clearly links the need to address these three overarching issues within all development areas, and highlights security sector reform, and police reform more specifically as a programming area that seeks to address these large goals. The Haitian police project was undertaken under this CIDA priority, in conjunction with several other CIDA projects targeted at human rights, democratization, and good governance. This area was identified by CIDA as a priority area as a result of "the serious governance problems that still persist in Haiti, and which have a direct impact on economic development and the well-being of communities."[5] CIDA clearly acknowledged the importance of addressing human rights, democratization, and good governance issues to foster human security and human development. Projects in this priority area operating at the same time as the HNP project included human rights support, legal assistance to victims of human rights abuses, justice sector reform, and correctional services support.[6]

Linkages to this priority area may be seen in the operation of the police reform project. There was a general recognition of the important role that the HNP may play in the democratic election process. The quarterly reports available for this project

[4] Canadian International Development Agency. Government of Canada policy for CIDA on human rights, democratization and good governance. (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 1996).
[5] Canadian International Development Agency. "Canadian Cooperation in the Caribbean2000 Edition: Haiti" *Canadian International Development Agency.* October 5, 2000. <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca> (June 12, 2002).
[6] CIDA "Canadian Cooperation in the Caribbean2000 Edition: Haiti;" Véronique Lamontagne, CIDA's Programming in Legal and Judicial Reform: Indicative List of CIDA Projects Related to Legal and Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and Central and Eastern Europe 1990-1997 (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 1999): pp. 61-64.

consistently address the need for the HNP to focus on upcoming elections: to ensure both

the accessibility of the poling stations, and to prevent any violence or conflict that is a

common feature of Haitian elections.[7] The HNP were clearly linked to the

democratization process through the emphasis on the need for their appropriate

participation in the electoral process to ensure an environment in which citizens felt safe

and free to vote. The importance placed upon elections support may be seen in the

following statement taken from a quarterly report: "the electoral process subordinates all

other issues of the business of governing. In turn, HNP attentions are focused on public

order maintenance in the face of the volatile political situation and in anticipation of the

now delayed Spring 2000 elections."[8]


Although the principle of good governance and democracy factored in the

conceptualization of the program, there were several reasons why this principle does not

appear to have taken root within the HNP. As discussed earlier, the HNP is an

organization characterized by corruption, brutality, politicization, and general ineptitude.

Despite the identification of the need to incorporate the values of good governance,

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[7] Royal Canadian Mounted Police. CIDA/RCMP Development and Training Project Haitian National Police, Project #444/20032: Quarterly Report, 4th, 1998-1999 January - March, 1999. (Canada: Government of Canada, 1999), Executive Summary; Royal Canadian Mounted Police. CIDA/RCMP Development and Training Project Haitian National Police, Project #444/20032: Quarterly Report, 1st, 1999-2000 April - June, 1999. (Canada: Government of Canada, 1999) Executive Summary; Royal Canadian Mounted Police. CIDA/RCMP Development and Training Project Haitian National Police, Project #444/20032: Quarterly Report, 2nd, 1999-2000 July – September, 1999. (Canada: Government of Canada, 1999) Executive Summary; Royal Canadian Mounted Police. GRC/ACDI Projet de Formation et Dévelopement Police Nationale Haïtienne Project #444/20032 Rapport trimestriel, 3 ième, 1999-2000, September – Décembre, 1999. (Canada: Government of Canada, 1999) Sommaire.
[8] RCMP, Quarterly Report, 2nd, 1999-2000 July – September, 1999, p. 1.

democratization, and human rights into the project, these values were not adequately transferred to the HNP. Firstly, the language and meaning of these values are largely framed within a North American context. The values were not translated and applied to Haitian society in a way that encouraged the HNP to incorporate these values into its organizational structure or activities. Secondly, the values of good governance, democratization, and human rights cannot be transferred solely through training programs. Value adoption and internalization is a socio-psychological process affecting both the institutional culture of the security sector as well as wider society. This kind of change could not be implemented in a couple of years, but rather require a long-term commitment on the part of the donors, the HNP, and the Government of Haiti.

By failing to identify the motivations behind problems such as corruption, sustainable change in the Haitian police force was exceedingly difficult given that good governance and democracy were not addressed on a large scale throughout Haitian society and its institutions. Regardless of how strongly the training, management guides, and administrative rules support the principles of good governance and democracy, a police force cannot operate democratically in a political environment that does not support these principles.

For example, an evaluation commissioned by CIDA in 2000 found that the HNP was created in an environment extremely hostile to its success, particularly in the areas of

good governance and democracy.[9] The lack of rule of law, respect for human rights, and

extremely low human development coupled with active campaigns against the success of

the HNP by groups such as narco-traffickers, created an extremely hostile environment

for the sustained success of the HNP.[10] These broader issues of good governance and

democracy were not explicitly addressed in the CIDA police reform project's objectives

or program goals. The project operated in isolation from other CIDA projects designed

to address good governance under the same policy initiative.[11]

## Local Ownership

The principle of local ownership is particularly important regarding the prospects

of the long-term sustainability of an initiative.[12] Without the willingness of a community

or state to continue with the gains made in a project after the donor agency and executing

agency have departed, the sustainability of any project is in jeopardy. Ensuring local

ownership of the police reform process in Haiti was made extremely difficult by the

particular political and social environment following the American intervention and the

return of "democracy." Without sustained support both from the country's elite and from

the individuals directly affected by poor security sector institutions, there is little chance

that reform initiatives will take root after the withdrawal of international support.

Countries in transition from internal conflict often experience turmoil in their social,

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[9] Ivan Ménard, Jean Ostiquy, Lysiane Boisvert. Project D'Appui Institutionnel À La Police Nationale D'Haïti CR/Project: 444/20032: Évaluation mi-parcours. (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 2000) pp. 32-36.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Throughout all of the CIDA/RCMP project reports examined for this research, there is no reference to CIDA projects in other areas outside of the security sector.
[12] Mendelson Forman, p. 15; Ball, pp. 9-10; Clingendael, pp. 8-9.

political, and economic environment. Elites may change, thereby jeopardizing previous reform initiatives, and priorities among the elite may also change. Democratic police, military, or judiciary may no longer be in their best interest.

Engaging local populations is also a difficult task in post-conflict situations. In some cases the damage inflicted upon them by former security institutions may severely limit their ability to place faith or confidence in the new reformed institutions. People may be wary of any interaction with local security forces. The HNP was the first civilian police force in Haitian history. Until 1995, all domestic security issues had been addressed by the military and paramilitary groups, often know for their brutality. The Haitian people, therefore, had no pre-existing understanding of what a civilian, non-political police force was. Prior experience of the Haitian people with any security institution was often characterized by violence and corruption. Based on the previous experience and knowledge, it was exceedingly difficult to bring the Haitian people into an effective reform process.

In addition to this lack of popular understanding of a civilian police force, the Haitian government was new, and also inexperienced with the management of a democratic security sector. Although the HNP executive received extensive management and police training, this was not extended to higher levels of the Haitian government. The police force originally had the support of the Haitian government to become an independent, non-political, and democratic institution. This initial support, however, was not consistent throughout the HNP's existence or throughout the project's life span.

Following millions of dollars of aid and investment in the HNP a common perception of

the HNP is that they continue to operate as agents of the state, in the long tradition of

Haitian security institutions.[13]


Canadian based police reform did attempt to foster a strong sense of local

ownership built on the needs and goals identified by the HNP. Training methods and

approaches were altered as the project progressed to best meet the learning and

operational needs of the HNP police officers.[14] Despite these efforts, local ownership of

the reform process did not take root, nor did the desire to continue with development

efforts at the conclusion of Canada's involvement. Examples of this may be seen in the

Canadian contributions of a HNP Academy resource center and a garage. Both of these

projects had been identified as desirable and useful by the HNP to further advance its

institutional capacity. At the completion of these projects, however, the Government of

Haiti failed to continue investing in their operation. This lack of host country investment

in police reform suggests that either the Haitian government was indifferent or possibly

hostile to the police reform.

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[13] Please see Charles Arthur, "Former police chiefs implicated in National Palace attack." *Haiti Support Group.* <http://www.oneworld.net> (May 1, 2002); James Canute, "Police battle rioters in Haitian city." *Financial Times.* August 7, 2002. <http://news.ft.com> (August 15, 2002); CNN, "Haitian students protest shootings." *CNN.* November 22, 2002. <www.cnn.com> (November 23, 2002); Tim Collie, "Murder in Haiti: 'Zero Tolerance' vigilante justice targets ordinary folks." *The State.* December 26, 2002. <http://www.thestate.com> (December 27, 2002).
[14] RCMP, Quarterly Report, 4th, 1998-1999 January - March, 1999, p. 9.

The HNP executive and the Government of Haiti are described in the CIDA evaluation as being opportunistic in their approach to police reform.[15] The business plan drafted by the RCMP on behalf of the HNP was used as a means to play donors off each other to garner the largest contribution from donors.[16] In addition to this attempt to gain the most financial resources possible, sometimes at a strategic cost to the HNP's development, the HNP executive and the government of Haiti responded primarily to the most influential partner in the reform process, the Americans, which resulted in lack of coordination with other partners.[17] This response may have negatively affected the Canadian-led projects. One may conclude that the Haitian government and the HNP executive placed short-term financial contributions and influence over the sustainable democratic reform of the HNP.

## Coordination and Coherence

Coordination and coherence are a third priority in security sector reform.[18] This principle emphasizes the need for communication and coherence between donor countries and institutions. Within reform initiatives several partners may work with a variety of institutions. Conceptions of what a reformed institution will look like may differ. The weakness of one branch of the security sector may directly impact the ability of another to flourish. It is, therefore, essential that a common goal is identified and sought in order to endure a greater level of success throughout the initiative. This coordination and

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[15] Ménard, Ostiquy, Boisvert, p. 12.
[16] Ibid.
[17] D. C. Beer "The Partnership of Peacebuilding: A case study of justice development in Haiti." (M.A. Thesis. University of Windsor, 2001), p. 30.
[18] Mendelson Forman, p. 11; Chalmers, pp. 22, 24; Ball, pp. 10, 14; Clingendael, p. 10.

coherence may be difficult to achieve for a variety of reasons including language barriers and differing interpretations of the reform process.

The principle of coordination and coherence was a particularly sensitive issue for the HNP project. As we saw earlier, there were several major partners involved in the development of the HNP. The police reform projects of all the donors often intersected, impacted upon each other, or determined the direction or approach of another donor's project. In many cases, the various donors seem to have worked in isolation and in conflict from each other in the development of different branches within the HNP. In other cases, donors worked together very closely to build on the synergy of their projects. Overall, however, coordination and coherence among international donors was severely lacking.[19]

As indicated in several CIDA/RCMP field reports[20] the Canadian project managers were aware of the need for greater coordination and coherence in the police

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[19] For a discussion of partnership please see D. C. Beer "The Partnership of Peacebuilding: A case study of justice development in Haiti." (M.A. Thesis. University of Windsor, 2001).

[20] Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 1997 Annual Report RCMP/CIDA Training and Development Project for the Haitian National Police Force. (Canada: Government of Canada, 1997); Royal Canadian Mounted Police. CIDA/RCMP Development and Training Project Haitian National Police, Project #444/20032: Quarterly Report, October – December 1998 (Canada: Government of Canada, 1998); RCMP CIDA/RCMP Development and Training Project Haitian National Police, Project #444/20032: Quarterly Report, 4th, 1998-1999January - March, 1999; RCMP, CIDA/RCMP Development and Training Project Haitian National Police, Project #444/20032: Quarterly Report, 1st, 1999-2000 April - June, 1999; RCMP, CIDA/RCMP Development and Training Project Haitian National Police, Project #444/20032: Quarterly Report, 2nd, 1999-2000 July – September, 1999; RCMP, GRC/ACDI Projet de Formation et Dévelopement Police Nationale Haïtienne Project #444/20032 Rapport trimestriel, 3

reform process, particularly with regards to the international partners. The RCMP project

mangers recognized that Canadian-led initiatives were often negatively impacted by the

failure of reform or development in other branches of the HNP.[21] This was addressed

within the project by actively seeking out a means to facilitate greater coordination in

ongoing and future initiatives, through the establishment of regular meetings and

committees.[22]


Despite the efforts of the RCMP to coordinate the international partners on the

ground, problems of coordination and coherence continued throughout the life of the

project. Donors were often unsure of their continued funding levels, thereby inhibiting

their ability to plan their activities with other donors. The uncertainty of future UN

involvement also hampered coordination or decision-making among partners. This

uncertainty was further complicated by different styles of police reform and visions of

what kind of institution the HNP should become. The Canadian and American goals and

visions of the HNP were fairly consistent which enabled their cooperation and partnering

on several initiatives. There was a considerable difference, however, between the style of

the North American partners and the French program. This difference in style and vision

resulted in a blurred vision of the HNP. Whereas, the Canadian and American visions of

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ième, 1999-2000, September – Décembre, 1999; Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Project Haiti – GRC/ACDI Appui institutionnel a la Police nationale d'Haiti Sommaire
Troisieme Rapport Trimestriel, Julliet 1998 a Septembre 1998. (Canada: Government of
Canada, 1998); Fred Schultz, Bi-Monthly Report March 16, 1998 RCMP/CIDA – Haitian
National Police Assistance Program. (Canada: Government of Canada, 1998).
[21] RCMP, Quarterly Report, 4th, 1998-1999 January - March, 1999, p. 2; RCMP,
Quarterly Report, 1st, 1999-2000 April - June, 1999, p.2.
[22] RCMP, Quarterly Report, 4th, 1998-1999 January - March, 1999, Executive Summary;
RCMP, Rapport trimestriel, 3 ième, 1999-2000, September – Décembre, 1999,
Sommaire.

a civilian, democratic HNP were of a pro-active force with deep connections to the community, the French planned for a more quasi-military reactive police force. Meetings and committees were organized in an attempt to bridge the gap between donors and to eliminate waste and duplication. These efforts do not appear to have resolved the problem of lack of coordination and coherence among the international players. International coordination efforts were described in one project document as "dismal" and requiring significant work.[23]

In addition to problems of coordination and coherence among international donors, problems also existed between CIDA and the RCMP. As a case study of the integration of security issues into development policy and programming, the CIDA project in Haiti also demonstrates the problems that may occur when a security institution works with a development agency. CIDA had ultimate responsibility for the programming direction, the policy, and the financing of the project. The RCMP, however, operated the project on a daily basis, as well as suppling the policing knowledge, expertise, and personnel for the project. The style in which these two institutions operate resulted in a blurry partnership.

Many of the CIDA priorities common to virtually all CIDA projects are missing in the RCMP reform project. For instance, each CIDA project must contain an element of gender and equity programming. This component was neglected in the Haiti police

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[23] RCMP, Quarterly Report, 4th, 1998-1999 January - March, 1999, Executive Summary.

reform project and was eventually cancelled.[24] In addition, CIDA's reporting requirements appear to have been largely ignored, particularly in the early phases of the project.[25] This resulted in a loss of CIDA's control over the project's direction. These problems were addressed through the eventual inclusion of a results based management system and financial accountings structure that addressed CIDA's needs. These problems, however, may have significantly impacted the wider development and human security aspects of the project. The RCMP, from a tradition of police autonomy from direct political control in Canada, operated the program in isolation from other CIDA projects, and discarded the development frameworks and policies identified by CIDA as being integral to the project's success. This relationship clearly shows problems that may exist when an institution and personnel not familiar with wider development theory, policy, and practice attempt to implement a development project.

## Historical, Cultural, and Political Analysis: The Importance of Context

A thorough understanding of the context of reform, and the manner that security sector reform may impact upon the level of human security, societal tensions, civil wars, or transborder conflicts is essential to a successful and well-informed reform initiative.[26] There is a danger in the same model of reform being undertaken in different environments. The previous security institutions, the nation's history with them, and the manner in which a people define justice, order, and crime are crucial to determine the direction reform should take. Security sector reform should only be undertaken after a

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[24] Ménard, pp. 20-21.
[25] Ibid., p. 27.
[26] Clingendael, p. 5.

sound analysis of the country's human security and human development needs has been conducted. This need for a sound understanding of the historical, cultural, and political environment was not strongly recognized within the police reform project, either by the RCMP or by its most influential partner, ICITAP.

As discussed earlier, the two-phase reform model sponsored by ICITAP was based on a generic model used in several countries and varying contexts and environments. In addition to this generic plan, much of the training material did not reflect the reality of Haitian culture. One example of this lack of context in the training material was the hypothetical situation of someone calling the police because they felt lonely.[27] Phone service is not common throughout many Haitian communities; and Haitians are far more likely to avoid contact with police then they are to seek it out. This training exercise demonstrates the lack of adapting training materials to reflect situations and conditions that the HNP officers may actually encounter.

CIDA had been involved in development initiatives in Haiti since 1968.[28] The Haiti program is the largest CIDA program in Central and South America and the Caribbean. It is also one of the most heavily funded programs within all of CIDA.[29] There is a wealth of country knowledge housed within CIDA that could have been

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[27] Ménard, p. 16.

[28] Since 1968 CIDA has contributed over $567 million in development assistance. Julie Emond, Canadian Cooperation Program in Haiti. Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 2002.

[29] Canadian International Development Agency. "Program Priorities." *Canadian International Development Agency*. January 17, 2001. <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca> (March 25, 2003).

utilized by the project staff in Haiti prior to and during the reform project. This knowledge does not appear to have been widely utilized in the operation of the project. The principle of good historical, cultural, and political analysis and the manner it impacts security sector reform and overall development success appears to have been significantly neglected in the planning and implementation of this project.

## Resources and Sustainability

The fifth principle of successful development is a required commitment level demanded of both the donor community and local stakeholders, in terms of human and financial resources.[30] Gathering an accurate picture of the needed level of resources to ensure a project's sustainability is an important and difficult principle in security sector reform. For many government donor agencies budgets are not guaranteed beyond one or two years. Security sector reform, however, requires a generational commitment, both in terms of finances and other resources. Donors must be ready to commit sufficient human and financial resources over a long period of time. It is not possible to assume that one or two years of work will result in effective change. True reform and change will only result if there is a genuine commitment by donor agencies to spend ten, fifteen, or even twenty years working with an institution to entrench the reform process. In the case of the HNP, donors were not willing to provide development assistance indefinitely with little or no visible improvements to the institution or its operations.

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[30] Mendelson Forman, p. 11; Ball, p. 10; Clingendael, p. 12.

Throughout the project reports prepared by the RCMP project manager is a concern regarding funding levels. In July 1999, CIDA dramatically decreased the funding of the police reform project.[31] The result was the cancellation of many projects mid-stream, and the down sizing of many others. All projects in the HNP were intrinsically connected, with the failure of one negatively impacting on the development of others. These cut backs directly impacted many Canadian projects, and significantly disadvantaged others. Within the project documents cutbacks are attributed to CIDA's involvement in other global crises, namely Kosovo and East Timor, as well as a sense that Haiti had squandered the substantial development assistance it had already received.[32] CIDA and the RCMP had neither the financial commitment nor the long-term commitment to carry on the HNP reform program.

By withdrawing virtually all support to the reform process in 2000/2001, Canada and other international partners have not demonstrated significant levels of commitment to this project over the long term, despite the huge amount of money already invested in the HNP and Haiti more generally. Like its international partners, the Government of Haiti also lacked the resources and commitment, and also the expertise, to ensure the sustainability of the reform process. Upon completion of various components of HNP projects, the Haitian government declined to accept responsibility for the continued maintenance of these new programs. The current situation is one in which the idea of a civilian and democratic HNP has largely been abandoned by international donors and by

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[31] Funding for Fiscal Year 1999-2000 was reduced from $5.5 million to $3.4 million in the second quarter of that fiscal year. RCMP, Quarterly Report, 1st, 1999-2000 April - June, 1999, p.10.

[32] RCMP, Quarterly Report, 1st, 1999-2000 April - June, 1999, p.12.

the critics of the current Haitian government.[33] Commenting on the recent appointment of a new police chief, opposition politician Evans Paul commented that: "it is not a question of who is at the head of the police, but of what kind of system is in place."[34]

## Incorporation of Security Sector Reform into Wider Development Goals

This principle is perhaps the most important for fostering the success and sustainability of security sector reform initiatives.[35] It is touched upon in several other principles such as good governance and democracy, coordination and coherence, and resources and sustainability. Security sector reform should "create an environment conducive to poverty reduction and environmentally sustainable development strategies," while recognizing the importance that issues such as disease, resources, citizenship, and transborder crime have on national security issues.[36] The link between security and development is made in the acknowledgment that those involved in security sector reform must be aware of the work being undertaken in other development spheres, and assess the manner in which the various programs may impact upon each other. As Hendrickson

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[33] Following the resignation of four of the HNP's top officers in March 2003 following American claims of their involvement in drug trafficking, President Aristide appointed a new police chief, Jean-Claude Jean-Baptiste. There was significant international criticism, following the new appointment as Jean-Baptiste has never been a police officer and is linked to the murder of a presidential candidate who ran against Aristide in the 1990 election. For further information please see Marika Lynch, "Police leadership in Haiti worries foreign observers." *The Miami Herald.* April 1, 2003. <www.miami.com > (April 1, 2003); Marika Lynch, "Top Haitian police officials worked with drug traffickers, U.S. says." *The State.* January 31, 2003. <www.thestate.com> (February 11, 2003); Michael Norton. "Haiti Replaces Police Chief on Pressure." *Newsday.com.* March 25, 2003. <www.newsday.com> (March 26, 2003).
[34] Michael Norton, "Haiti Replaces Police Chief on Pressure." *Newsday.com.* March 25, 2003. <www.newsday.com> (March 26, 2003).
[35] Mendelson Forman, pp. 11, 14; Chalmers, p. 23; Ball, p. 3.
[36] Ball, p. 3.

states: "the need to link the security aspect of reform with the sustainable development dimension is the greatest challenge facing the development community."[37]

As discussed earlier, CIDA recognizes the need to approach security sector reform within a wider program targeted at human rights, democratization, and good governance. The rationale behind such an approach is that these target issues will significantly impact upon other areas of social, economic, and political development. CIDA's policy framework described at the beginning of this chapter places projects like the HNP reform project within a much wider context. Security sector reform, and particularly police reform was adopted as a legitimate priority by CIDA based on the recognition of the impact that a legitimate and accountable security force can have on the positive development of other areas of a given society. Police reform was not identified as a legitimate development initiative on its own terms, but rather as a process that could significantly impact upon the human security and human development levels of the wider country and region. CIDA's policy on the need to incorporate the issues of human rights, democratization, and good governance into wider development agendas is a sound policy that recognizes the manner in which all sectors and facets of a community impact upon each other. Despite this solid conceptual background for the police reform project, the RCMP operated the HNP project in isolation from these development goals.

In practice the police reform project was artificially separated from projects in other sectors. There is no sense in the project documents of how the police reform

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[37] Hendrickson, <u>A Review of Security Sector Reform</u>, p. 41.

project will impact upon Haitian society, nor how Haitian society will impact upon it. Issues of corruption, politicization, and disregard for human rights are portrayed as resolvable through the right training and administrative skills. There is no discussion in the project documents of the wider societal, economic, political, or historical factors that spawn these behaviors. Unemployment, poverty, and violence within Haitian society are not mentioned in the CIDA/RCMP field reports. The Haitian police officers trained for the HNP were largely new to the security sector. Despite the newness of the recruits, old negative behavior from the previous security forces was introduced to the HNP. The motivating factors behind these behaviors were, therefore, not adequately addressed.

Within the project documents there does not appear to be any recognition of either the need to address influential factors impacting on the police reform process, or that there were Canadian and international projects targeting those factors. The police project is presented as a largely isolated activity without any meaningful context. When other factors are discussed they are referred to as "external." Factors identified as being "external" to the operation of the project included political realities, the HNP and Haitian government's lack of commitment to sustaining and promoting future development, and the manner in which lack of international coordination was impacting the project.[38] These issues all proved to be vital to the success of the Canadian police reform project. The failure to include these factors as intrinsic to the project success, and regarding them rather as external factors, may have accounted for the lack of sustainability and long-term

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[38] RCMP, Quarterly Report, 2nd, 1999-2000 July – September, 1999, p. 4; RCMP, Rapport trimestriel, 3 ième, 1999-2000, September – Décembre, 1999, p.3.

impact that the Canadian project had on the HNP or on wider issues of governance and justice.

When examining something as all encompassing as security sector reform, no factors are external. The political environment, poverty, human insecurity, environmental degradation, and a lack of social infrastructure are all factors which should have been considered when planning and implementing the project, and should be targeted simultaneously with the assistance of a much broader development agenda promoted by CIDA and the donor community involved in Haiti.

Failure to address issues of local ownership, international coordination and coherence, and the political context resulted in part for the failure of the project. Had the approach adopted by the RCMP project managers been more aware of the need to examine their project through a wider development lens, the project may have had greater success. If the project had more fully attempted to embrace the wider development goals identified by CIDA as a priority in the Haitian program, local needs, resources, and the impact of development of other spheres would have been recognized and the project would have had a greater chance at adapting to local conditions.

The only reference to outside development within the project documents is made in reference to the wider security sector. The conclusion was made that without adequate reform to the courts, the judiciary, and the penal system, that police reform initiatives

would inevitable crumble.[39] This connection is insightful; unfortunately, it does not appear that the RCMP led project contributed to any discussion or the furthering of dialogue throughout the security sector. There is no reference to projects being undertaken within the wider sector. Nor is the question asked regarding why the police reform initiative had begun if other areas intrinsic to the success of creating a democratic and accountable police force were severely lacking. The HNP reform project operated in an extremely isolated manner from both the Haitian context and wider development initiatives.

### Summary

Despite the significant financial and human resources invested in the reform initiative, the HNP is plagued by corruption, human rights abuses, disregard for law and order, and an increasing politicization. The CIDA/RCMP police reform project began from a conceptually sound policy position. As part of CIDA's policy on human rights, democratization, and good governance the project was established under a policy framework cognizant of the importance security issues play within a wider development agenda. Despite this conceptual grounding, the Canadian police reform project was operated in isolation from CIDA's development agenda and failed on a number of fronts. It ignored, in whole or in part, each of the six key principles of sound development described in this chapter. These failures substantially detracted from the potential for a sustainable reform process within the HNP.

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[39] RCMP, Quarterly Report, 4th, 1998-1999 January - March, 1999, p. 2; RCMP, Quarterly Report, 1st, 1999-2000 April - June, 1999, p.2.

# Chapter Four:
## Conclusion

The previous three chapters explored the relationship between security in development, first in a theoretical manner, and then through the Haitian police reform case. Security and development have increasingly been targeted through the same programs advocated by donor and international organizations. The police reform project in Haiti represented just one case of a security project attempting to effectively impact wider development issues, such as human rights, good governance, democracy, and human security. The conclusion to the thesis will examine the linkages made between development and security in the CIDA project described and analyzed in the previous two chapters. This will be followed by general lessons taken from the Haiti case that may be used in future security sector initiatives.

## Haiti Police Reform: Integration of Security and Development?

In examining the CIDA/RCMP police reform project through the six principles identified as important components of a security program with the wider aim of fostering sustainable development, several problems with the project's design and implementation were clearly identified. The project was implemented in a manner that disregarded local capabilities and realities and the wider societal, political, and economic influences on the success of the project. International coordination was virtually non-existent, and a sustained commitment level in terms of both time and resources was missing from all partners. An additional problem for the Canadian project was its general isolation from wider development initiatives.

The Canadian project was conceptualized in a manner that recognized the need to incorporate security issues into development practice. The project sought not only to strengthen the institutional capability of the HNP, but also to strengthen the democratic movement in Haiti, and the chances for sustainable development and heightened human security. The policy and research were available to the project managers to implement the project in a way that took into account the wider ramifications of security sector reform. The implementation of the project, however, effectively isolated it both from the policy that spawned it and other development initiatives in Haiti. The failure to take into account the wider human security and development environment hampered the success of the project.

The RCMP operated the project in a manner that solely focused on the technical aspects of the project. Although the RCMP may be qualified to provide training on police practices, they had virtually no previous experience working in developing countries. There was no strategic approach to incorporate the progress of the police program into the wider security sector or CIDA's country program.

The primary purpose of this thesis was to explore the relationship of security and development. These two concepts were integrated at the policy level in the Haitian case but not at the operational level. CIDA's policy on good governance, democratization, and human rights creates a framework for security sector reform projects to operate within CIDA's wider development programs. In policy and theory, therefore, security and development were integrated. The police reform project was conceptualized and

supported by CIDA policy that directly addressed the need to integrate security and development. Problems arose, however, in the execution of the project. In the Haitian case, policy did not translate to the operation level of the project. The project was conceptualized in a way that was cognizant of the need to address security issues and wider social, political, and economic development in an integrated manner. The operation of the project, on the other hand, was in isolation from wider development programs, and essentially divorced the practical from the theoretical. This may be a failure on the part of the RCMP to incorporate policy into the project's implementation, as well as CIDA's inability to bridge the gap between theory and practice.

## Lessons Learned

The international community set ambitious goals for police reform in Haiti. The overriding goal of all of the initiatives was to create a new civilian and democratic police force for a society that was unfamiliar with a security sector designed to promote its interests and safety. As discussed in the second chapter, the history of internal security and policing in Haiti was one of corruption, brutality and politicization. To create a police force that would support and uphold democracy the international community adopted approaches meant to foster respect for human rights, transparency, accountability, and other values fundamental to a democratic system. The achievement of these goals can be exceedingly difficult in communities experiencing widespread poverty, and general social, economic, and political instability. Police officers do not work in isolation from their communities or the political, social, and economic influences present in their societies.

For successful reform to truly foster democratic policing several prerequisites are required on the part of institutions and actors at the local, national and international levels. Firstly, effective reform will only be possible when it is supported and championed by local organizations and actors. The driving force behind the initiative should be internal.[1] Without this desire for change in the current policing structure, international efforts at institutional reform will be futile. If there is little or no support for the reform program, all efforts at training, regulation, and monitoring will fail. The level of support for the initiative should be assessed before reform measures are implemented.

Haiti demonstrates the cost of failing to secure local ownership over the reform process. The majority of the Haitian police reform projects were donor driven as opposed to locally created and directed initiatives. Projects were conceived with little or no input from local organizations.[2] Although the national government has assisted in developing the governing principles of the HNP, the concerns of the local communities were often overlooked.[3] Lack of government support for the policing program can be clearly seen in many of the failed initiatives undertaken by the Canadian government. The business planning process, the Academic Resource Centre, and the Police Transportation Centre and Maintenance Facility all failed because of lack of government

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[1] Dylan Hendrickson  A Review of Security-Sector Reform. (London: King's College: The Conflict, Security & Development Group, 1999), p. 9.

[2] United Nations Development Programme. "An Analysis and Lessons Learned of Rule and Law Technical Assistance in Haiti." *Transitions from Crisis to Recovery*. June/July 2001 <www.undp.org/erd/pubinfo/transitions/2001_06/rol_haiti> (August 12, 2002).

[3] Bob Shacochis, The Immaculate Invasion. (New York: Viking, 1999), p. 188.

support to implement or sustain these projects.[4] Had the situation been more adequately

assessed prior to the commencement of these projects, significant human and financial

resources could have been channeled to areas or projects that had the support of the

Haitian government, and thus had a greater likelihood of becoming locally sustainable.

Support for donor initiatives needs to be gauged through extensive dialogue with

all stakeholders including civil society organizations and individuals. One suggestion to

strengthen the police reform initiative is to implement a process of civic education on the

role of police. This would also provide an opportunity for civil society and individuals to

participate in police democratization.[5] William Lewis and Edward Marks suggest that it

is essential for the police to recognize and respond to the public, as they are the primary

stakeholders in police reform.[6]

Democratization efforts already in place will also assist in assessing the

compatibility of democratic police with the wider community. Donors should work

closely with existing democratic movements within civil society, and include them in the

reform process. This approach was not adequately used in Haiti. A substantial Haitian

civil society network was created following the overthrow of Baby Doc, which supported

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[4] D.C. Beer, "The Partnership of Peacebuilding: A case study of justice development in Haiti." (M.A. Thesis. University of Windsor, 2001), pp. 35-36, 55.
[5] United Nations. "The Haitian National Police and Human Rights." *International Civilian Mission In Haiti, OAS/UN.* July 1996.
<http://www.un.org/rights/micivih/rapports /engpol.htm> (April 28, 2002).
[6] William Lewis and Edward Marks. "Overview." In        Civilian Police and Multinational Peacekeeping – A Workshop Series: A Role for Democratic Policing. (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, 1999) p. 1.

democratic change, at a time when it was dangerous to do so.[7] The resources and efforts of this network could have been used to promote the police agenda, instead of relying almost exclusively on the national government and international donors for direction and resources.

Secondly, in addition to the necessity for local levels of support, the international community must be prepared to offer long-term economic and institutional support.[8] Police reform initiatives are not conducted in a short time period, but need long-term planning, financial resources, and incorporation into the overall development strategy for the country.[9] Police reform does not operate in a vacuum. If reform initiatives are to be effective they must be implemented within wider security sector reform, particularly targeting law and order, the military, the penal system, and the judiciary.[10]

Long-term commitment to police reform is essential if real and sustainable change is sought in reforming policing institutions. Hendrickson discusses the lack of commitment to security sector reform by donor agencies, which often favor short-term funding projects: "the risk is that short-term political commitments to crisis situations and

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[7] UNDP, "An Analysis and Lessons Learned of Rule and Law Technical Assistance in Haiti."

[8] Michael Berkow, "Practical Issues in Providing Police Assistance Abroad." In Civilian Police and Multinational Peacekeeping – A Workshop Series: A Role for Democratic Policing. (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice: 1999) p. 16.

[9] Dylan Hendrickson, "Security Sector Reform: A Work in Progress." *The Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Practice Network*. November 7 2000. <www.odihpn.org> (August 12, 2002).

[10] UNDP, "An Analysis and Lessons Learned of Rule and Law Technical Assistance in Haiti;" Rachel Neild, "Can Haiti's Police Reforms be Sustained?" *Haiti Insight Online*. January 22, 2002. <http://www.nchr.org/hrp/archive/pol981.htm> (May 3, 2002).

narrow donor institutional priorities will lead to an emphasis on stabilizing situations at

the expense of efforts to understand or to address underlying causes."[11] Once a

commitment has been made to support security sector reform it is critical that the funding

of these projects continues uninterrupted. In cases where failure seems evident, it may

not always be a wise decision to cut off funding.[12] If aid is cut before the reform process

has taken root, the advances and achievements of the program will often be in jeopardy of

completely dissolving.[13]


The police reform process began in Haiti immediately following the American

intervention. Reform continued to be provided by the UN and by bilateral donors until

2000. In 2001, Canada was operating the only bilateral program with an emphasis on

police reform. Since the Canadian program ended in March 2001 there has been no

renewal of the reform process for the HNP, despite the mounting evidence of the real

problems that currently exist in the security sector. Development assistance has largely

been withdrawn from the Haitian government as a result of the current political crisis in

Haiti.[14] The majority of development funding entering Haiti is currently channeled

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[11] Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform, p. 18.
[12] Robert Oakley, and Michael Dziedzic. "Sustaining Success in Haiti…" *Strategic Forum*. June 1996. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum77.html> (May 1, 2002).
[13] Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire, and J. O'Neil G. Pouliot. "Haiti Military-Police Partnership for Public Security." In Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, Eliot  M. Goldberg (eds.) Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security. (Virginia: National Defense University Press, 1997), p. 21.
[14] The May 2000 legislative elections have been hotly disputed by the international community and by Aristide's opposition, and resulted in the withdrawal of opposition participation in the November 2000 presidential elections. This political crisis led to the withdrawal of bilateral development assistance by major donor agencies. The crisis continues today in the form of protests and strikes directed against Aristide's government.

through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This lack of funds and commitment to long-term sustainability has severely hampered the ability of the HNP to sustain or promote a process of reform.

Thirdly, to be effective reform initiatives must be specific to the local context. Donor organizations must be aware that different countries will adopt different elements of security sector reform in different ways.[15] There is a risk that international donors will assume that the models of security sector institutions that they promote are the only legitimate forms that such institutions may take.[16] This could be avoided through a heightened sensitivity to the local cultural and political conditions and the implementation of principles of sustainable security sector reform, as opposed to complete systems or structures. What is required is the identification of the democratic elements of foreign security institutions so that they may be brought into the reform process in a manner compatible with local conditions.[17]

Finally, although security sector reform assists in bringing stability to a region, it should not be initiated in a context plagued by resistance to change, and constant political instability. Volatile situations are not ideal to introduce experimental and unfamiliar systems and values. Security sector reform cannot bring about democracy, but it may

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[15] David H. Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to do and how to do it, (Washington D.C.: US Department of Justice, June 2001): p. 36.
[16] Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform: p. 11.
[17] David H. Bayley, " The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View." In Civilian Police and Multinational Peacekeeping – A Workshop Series: A Role for Democratic Policing. (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, 1999), pp. 5-6.

reinforce existing democratic institutions.[18]  Police reform was conceptualized by the

international community as a primary vehicle for democratic change in Haiti.  Haiti has

not been politically stable since the American intervention.  It continues to be plagued by

extreme poverty, severe unemployment, political unrest, and social inequality.  Without

addressing the many issues of Haitian society, successful and sustainable reform in any

sector will be a difficult undertaking.


## Conclusion

Security and development were approached separately throughout much of the

twentieth century.  The implementation of concepts like human security has dictated a

need to merge these two previously divorced fields.[19]  This integration involves bringing

together academics, policy makers, and organizations that have little experience with one

another, and who may have often operated in the past at cross purposes.  The Canadian

security sector reform efforts in Haiti demonstrate several of the major obstacles faced in

the new marriage of security and development.  Although the policy developed to

incorporate security aspects into CIDA programming was conceptually sound and took

into account a variety of important factors such as political context, the impact of

structural inequality on human security, and the need to examine all aspects of the threats

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[18] Ibid., p. 6.

[19] Mark Duffield's criticisms regarding institutional reform should also be considered when examining the recent merger of security and development.  Duffield's argument states that security and institutional reform are often undertaken by development agencies, not to increase levels of human security and human development, but rather as a means to enforce liberal values and structures in the developing world in a new form of liberal imperialism.  For more please see Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security.  (London: Zed Books, 2001).

against human security and development, real problems existed in the implementation of the project. On paper security and development were integrated. In practice, the separation of the two fields continued at the cost of effective sustainable development in the security sector and in wider Haitian society. The integration of security and development must go beyond the theoretical, and be implemented in a manner consistent with the rationale behind their union. The six principles of security sector reform should be used both in the planning and execution of projects. Dialogue between partners is essential in this process particularly between those working at the policy level and those at the implementation level. The challenges of the integration of security and development are large and perhaps intimidating. Despite the obstacles present security and development must be addressed in an integrated manner to ensure that individuals and communities are able to exercise the full realm of choices integral to human development.

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