CAMERAS IN THE CITY:
Video Surveillance in Public Places

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Abstract

Public space video surveillance cameras are prolific in Britain and much of Europe. The United States also has a great many cameras in public spaces. Canada has far fewer cameras on our streets, but this is changing. Three cities have active cameras on their streets, two others have removed cameras and three have large scale plans to install cameras. This thesis looks at these communities and sets the installation of video surveillance cameras into a wider social and political context. This thesis seeks to answer the questions of why cameras are installed and what effect they have on the democratic use of public spaces.

The answer to these questions seems to be that cameras are used as part of a mechanism of social control which attempts to monitor and control groups whose members do not conform to the 'consumer model' which is increasingly the norm in urban public spaces. This affects primarily the homeless, youth and people of minority race or ethnicity. Cameras are being used in an attempt to sanitize space of those who are not able to consume in order to recreate a shopping-mall-like atmosphere in urban cores. The effect of this is to create spaces of exclusion and a 'fortress-like' area dedicated to shopping and consumption.

In order to examine this issue as inclusively as possible I also focus on women's unique experiences in the city. As they are often viewed as the primary shoppers in the mall, the fortressing of the city streets often targets women's fear as a motivator for installing the cameras. I discuss the overall failures of the cameras to create safer streets and the total failure of the cameras to address women's concerns in the city.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis examines the issues of video surveillance, public places and social control; more specifically it looks at the intersection of the three. I take video surveillance cameras as my starting point to examine how they influence public spaces and to what extent they are both a symbol and a practice of increasing social control in public places. Video surveillance cameras and the patterns which exist in their installation and usage are examined from a theoretical prospective. This thesis also includes a preliminary survey and basic analysis of video surveillance cameras in Canada comparing to the existing systems in Britain and elsewhere (Appendix 1). I ask three questions: one, what are the implications of using cameras to capture images of bodies which are then transmitted across space and time; two, what are the implications for the use of public space when it is a space under constant monitoring; three, what are the ramifications of the increasing level of surveillance to a free and democratic society? This includes discussions of the gaze, bodies in space, state control over space, privatization and commercialization of public space, women's use of public space and fear of crime. The use of cameras to control particular populations in public spaces leads to the conclusion that the one of the main purposes of video surveillance cameras is to control what are considered 'deviant' populations, such as the homeless, the poor, visible minorities and youth, to create a sanitized space to be used for consumer purposes.

Definitions of Terms

It is important to define the key terms which appear throughout this thesis, these

are surveillance, video surveillance cameras and space/place. Firstly, surveillance is a concept which forms the foundation of this project. This is a complex term which has been defined in many ways in different literature. At its base surveillance implies watching. Surveillance as it is used here is watching for a purpose, to collect information about a person or group of people. David Lyon defines surveillance as, "any collection and processing of personal data...for the purpose of managing those whose data have been garnered" (2001: 2). This thesis deals with the collection and processing of personal images through video cameras for the purpose of social control in public urban spaces.

Surveillance is an important area of study at the start of the twenty-first century. Surveillance is not new. It has historically been used as a way to maintain social control (Bauman 1997). In pre-modern Europe surveillance was at the level of the community, it was all encompassing and shared (ibid.). Because of the close physical proximity of people to each other there was no need for an overarching body to keep track of peoples' movements. Crises arose in these societies when these communities began to break down and people began to move beyond the village borders. A larger, more centralized instrument of authority was needed to continue to maintain control. This was institutionalized within the modern state which was able to dominate the local rule and traditions that were the centre of pre-modern society. In this way, Bauman suggests the creation of the modern state was preceded by the crisis of social control (ibid). The state became the entity which would control people by creating institutional forms of control such as the military, education, medicine and the work force.

The state is a key agent of social control and often takes advantage of what are

perceived as effective technological developments. For example, in recent decades numerous surveillance capable technologies have emerged, such as video cameras, digital capabilities, biometrics software, the Internet, the mapping of the human genome—all of these have surveillance applications. David Lyon (2001) argues that with the advent of the computer the method of collecting data has been transformed. He writes, "surveillance has been dispersed, decentred, disorganized, and is a feature of all organization in every city" (56). As well as using physical means to keep track of people, it is now possible to use electronic means of surveillance to keep a better, faster and cheaper watch over people. This tracking information is turned into what Manuel Castells calls flows by surveillance systems which are transmitted over greater distances faster than at any time in history. Castells refers to this as an informational city: "while people still live in places, it is in the space of flows that function and power are organized" (Lyon 2001: 57). These flows include the images from video surveillance cameras which are transmitted, reconfigured, stored and retrieved. It can be argued that the existence of the camera also promotes a specific appearance of the city; a vision of the street as a secure and sanitized place where video taping is taken for granted and even welcomed. Urban citizens are so accustomed to seeing not only the camera, but their images on screen that the camera has for many ceased to be intrusive. In some daycare facilities, cameras have been installed so that at work parents can log-on to the website and watch their children on screen. Because many children spend more of their time in daycare it can be said that children are growing up literally on camera. Building on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Haggery and Ericson (2000) suggest that this be seen as rhizomatic growth of surveillance, which is the weed-like spread of cameras

and surveillance.

Video surveillance in public spaces presents several interesting contradictions. For instance, it is both ubiquitous and targeted at the same time. In the locations where it does occur it is everywhere, yet it is targeted in the monitoring of the images that are observed. It is important to remember that ubiquity does not mean an equality of gaze. Under a video surveillance camera scheme everyone in the area that is monitored is potentially a target of the camera's gaze, but the gaze does not fall on everyone equally. Katherine Williams and Craig Johnstone (2001) call this the selective gaze. Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong (1999) observed that the camera operators they studied selected people for intensive monitoring based on what appeared to be a pre-existing set of stereotypes which led, among other things, to Black[1] youth being surveilled more than any other group, disproportionate to their percentage of the population. This selective gaze is a major theme throughout this paper.

Secondly, the term "video surveillance camera" has to be explained. These cameras are often referred to by their technical term, closed circuit television cameras (CCTV). I refer to CCTV as video surveillance cameras or simply cameras in agreement with Hille Koskela (2000) who points out that CCTV is a term has been given to the technology by the industry and may not be understood by the general public. The term CCTV also does not give an accurate depiction of what the systems really do: watch people for the purpose of collecting information which is then used to manage them. CCTV implies a seemingly benign piece of technical circuitry without social or political meaning. I argue throughout this thesis that video surveillance cameras are embedded

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[1] I take the convention of capitalizing the word 'Black' from John Fiske to as he writes, "signal the reversal of the negative connotations of the word 'black'" (Fiske 1998: 87).

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within a larger political and social context which is working to create spaces of exclusion. However since many researchers commonly use the term CCTV, it will appear in direct quotations.

Public place surveillance cameras are a form of video cameras (the sophistication of technology varies) that are mounted on a solid object in such a way to facilitate as complete a view as possible of the public area around the camera. Cameras range in technical sophistication from being completely stationary to having rotate, zoom and night vision capability. Increasingly these cameras are digital, such as the sixteen cameras installed in London, Ontario in November 2001 (*London City Services*). The cameras are connected to television screens in a separate location and often to some type of recording device (such as a VCR). A camera scheme involves more than one camera connected with others to form of web of visible space. Each individual camera is connected to a television monitor and in the case of a camera scheme there is a bank of monitors each with its individual camera's image being shown. The people who watch the images captured by the cameras are called camera operators or monitors, they sit in a control room that contains a bank of television screens (depending on the number of cameras involved) and can manipulate individual cameras to swivel and zoom. They also chose which camera image to monitor at a given time. Because so many images may come into a control room at any given time the person monitoring the cameras must select what they believe to be the most important image to view. As stated above this decision is often based on pre-existing stereotypes (Norris and Armstrong 1999). For example if the camera operator had to choose between watching a young Black man, a middle aged man in a suit or a woman Norris and Armstrong indicate that most

operators would choose to monitor the young Black man (ibid). This is another illustration of targeted surveillance.

The camera operators are sometimes police officers, but most often are civilians. In Britain for example almost exclusively the operators are private citizens working for minimum wage (Norris and Armstrong 1999). In Canada the new projects such as those in London and Kelowna are run by police officers, but they plan to turn it over to non-police operators in the future. In Sudbury Ontario Works clients[2] mostly monitor the cameras, but there are some light duty police officers and some students who occasionally operate the cameras. (KPMG 2000: 13). It is the individuals in the control room who operate the cameras and thus the images and decide when it is appropriate to report activity on the street to the police. It is then up to the police whether or not to pursue the situation with a deployment of officers.

The new technologies have facilitated new ways of watching. The ability to send an image across time and space has helped to change the nature of public space. No longer is watching based on a co-presence. One does not have to be in the place to see an event, but can be in a control room across town or even in a living room across the country. Anthony Giddens refers to this as time-space distanciation. He writes, "the advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between "absent" others, vocationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction" (1990: 18). Video surveillance technology allows an event to be turned into a data stream and transmitted across space and reassembled in a different place and perhaps at a different time. Giddens refers to this phenomenon as disembedding (ibid:

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[2] Ontario Works is a government programme that replaced welfare in 1996 and requires people in need of social assistance to work for their assistance—often referred to as 'workfare'.

21). Castells (1996) discusses this when he writes about information flows. He theorizes that there is a difference between spaces of flows and spaces of places. In the past the latter had more social and political power, but with the ability to transmit information across time and space places of flows have come to assert dominance. Video surveillance cameras are a good example of this. There is more emphasis placed on the transmitted images which are received on a television monitor than the actual events occurring in a physical place. Those monitoring the cameras react based on what they see on their screen which has been transmitted from a separate location. As well, in terms of facial recognition, identity can come to be based on the computer matching of two images until and unless the individual under scrutiny can prove otherwise.

Thirdly the term space/place must be understood. I am using the terms place and space interchangeably although I am aware that there is often a difference ascribed to them. For the purpose of clarity and because it suits the purpose of this thesis space and place will be interchangeable.[3] "Public space" is also a crucial term. I believe that Carol Brooks Gardner's definition of public places is useful here. She writes that public places are, "those sites...that our society understands as open to all" (1995: 3). For the purposes of this paper examples of those sites include streets, sidewalks, parks, squares and all other spaces where there is no restriction of access or habitation. In other words, anyone can be in a public place at any time for any or no reason. It is often the purpose of cameras to limit and restrict this space to some people for some reasons and it is that relationship between the city and the cameras which this paper seeks to explore.

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[3] For example "Space" can refer to cities as points or locations that involves their growth and decline as well as the processes of urbanization. And "Place" can refer to the components of cities such as their

Cameras in Canada: an overview

Public space video surveillance cameras are slowly being installed in communities across Canada. The Appendix offers a description and analysis of the locations in Canada, but it is useful to review them here as they are referred to throughout. There are ten communities of interest: Sherbrooke, Quebec; Sudbury, Ontario; Kelowna, British Columbia; Yellowknife, North West Territories; London, Ontario; Hamilton, Ontario; Vancouver, British Columbia; Toronto, Ontario; Winnipeg, Manitoba; and Brookville, Ontario. I will briefly discuss each in turn.

Sherbrooke was the first community in Canada to install a public space camera in 1992. The cameras was operated by the Sherbrooke Police to curb delinquent behaviour. The camera was removed after the Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) ruled the camera violated Quebec's privacy legislation.

Sudbury is the first community to have installed cameras (starting in 1996) that are still in operation. Sudbury has five cameras installed mostly in the downtown area (with one is a rail yard). The Sudbury Regional Police Service (SRPS) operate the cameras which are mostly monitored by Ontario Works clients with addition assistance from college students and police officers on light duty[4]. The Lion's Club and local businesses funded the cameras and none of the initial cost of buying and installing the cameras was borne by citizens. The objectives given for the installation of the cameras were to decrease criminal and anti-social behaviour, to increase the police's ability to respond to any crisis and to aid in solving crime. The system was audited by the

populations, movements and built environments (Herbert and Thomas 1997: v).
[4]By operate I mean the organization who is in charge of the overall camera scheme and monitoring refers to those who are actually watching the television screen. Under this distinction it is important to note that those who are monitoring the cameras have little or no power over the operation of them.

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international consulting firm KPMG which showed a forty percent drop in crime, and this report has been used to justify plans in other cities including London and Hamilton.

Kelowna installed a single camera in downtown in 2001. This camera was preceded by another in 1999 which was destroyed when the pole it was mounted on was set on fire (this act can be seen as a form of resistance against the cameras). The camera is operated by the RCMP, monitored by trained civilians and paid for by the RCMP and various local businesses. The objective for the camera is to control drug activity and prostitution. The camera in Kelowna has been the object of controversy because the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (PCC), George Radwanski (a strong opponent of public space video surveillance) ruled that it violated the *Privacy Act*, and launched a *Charter* challenge when the RCMP refused to remove the camera. The decision of this challenge will be very important for the already operation cameras and the communities with plans to install cameras.

In 2001 Yellowknife had four cameras installed downtown by Centurion Security Services which funded and monitored the cameras. The company claimed to want to increase security of the city; however the cameras were also being used as a marketing tool to promote the company's future private investigation branch to the federal government to win forthcoming contracts. The cameras came under the scrutiny of the Privacy Commissioner of the NWT who filed a complaint with the PCC. The PCC ruled that the cameras violated *The Personal Information and Protection and the Electronic Documents Act* (*PIPEDA*) the new federal privacy legislation, but by the time the ruling was handed down the cameras had already been removed.

London, with sixteen cameras, has the largest scheme in Canada. The cameras,

which were activated at the end of 2001, are operated by the London Police and monitored by Commissioners at City Hall. The funding for the cameras came almost entirely from private sources including the local newspaper, the Bank of Nova Scotia and several other local businesses. Other sources of funding came from more public institutions (The London Police Services and The University of Western Ontario). The installation of the cameras was spearheaded by an organization which was formed after the stabbing death of a young man in the downtown area. The objectives for the cameras were named as deterring crime and anti-social behaviour, increase the quality of policing, increase the feelings of safety, increase the economic situation of the downtown area, and to identify suspects.

Hamilton installed five cameras downtown in 2002, but at the time of writing they have not been activated. The cameras were bought and will be operated by the Hamilton Police Service. The plan is to have trained volunteers monitor the cameras. The rationale for installing the cameras is to deal with the disproportionately high crime rates in downtown Hamilton. The objectives for the cameras are increasing the economic vitality of the downtown, to deter crime and anti-social behaviour, increase people's feelings of safety and contribute evidence to aid the police in solving crimes.

Vancouver is still in the planning stages of its twenty-five camera strategy. The plan that has been developed is for the Vancouver Police Department and the Forensic Video Unit to operate the cameras and 911 Communications Operators to monitor the them. The funding sources are unknown at this time. The stated purpose behind the desire to install cameras is to reclaim the streets for the criminals who occupy them thus making them inhospitable to others who may wish to use the space. The perceived

benefits of the cameras would be to reduce crime, public nuisances and drug activity and also to create a network of police, government, health, social and community service agencies.

Toronto is another community that is in the planning stage of a camera scheme. The Toronto Metro Police Service would operate the cameras, and potentially civilians, police officers or city staff would monitor the cameras. The funding for the cameras has not been secured yet. The cameras would likely be placed in neighbourhoods deemed to be 'at risk'. The rationale for wanting cameras is to create safer streets. The objectives are to prevent and deter crime, increase both police and public safety and identify suspects (Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board (Minutes) October 18, 2001).

Winnipeg has proposed cameras for their downtown core to deal with drug dealing, prostitution and panhandling, but are waiting for the *Charter* challenge over the Kelowna camera to be resolved before going ahead.

In 1999 in Brockville the mayor proposed installing between three to five cameras installed in the downtown area. The cameras were to deal with problems such as vandalism and rowdy behaviour which made people feel unsafe at night. The proposal was dropped after hundreds of people called into City Hall to register their opposition to the plan.

While there are many differences between the various communities there are some similarities that can addressed. The cameras are all (except in Yellowknife) operated by the local police service. The funding has come from various sources, both public and private. Most of the schemes have split the costs between the police services

operating the cameras and private funding mostly from local business organizations. In Sudbury and Yellowknife all of the funding came from private sources, in London the majority of the funding was provided by private sources with a small amount contributed by the London Police, in Kelowna the funding was split between the RCMP and the local business association and in Hamilton the cameras were bought entirely with money from the Hamilton Police Service.

The objectives behind the installation of the cameras are all very similar. Most of the communities include in their reasoning, preventing/deterring crime and anti-social or nuisance behaviour, increasing the public's sense of safety and increasing economic expansion. These similarities are important because the literature on other locations indicates that cameras are often used to attempt to manage and control certain 'nuisance' groups such as panhandlers, the homeless, and youths (see Norris and Armstrong 1999). Given the stated objectives it is not surprising that the vast majority of the cameras are located or will be located in what is labelled as the downtown core. The downtown is the area which is often seen as the most dangerous and the area which is need of being rejuvenated as much of the retail business which traditionally spent in downtown shops had moved to the suburban malls (Christopherson 1994). It is significant that much of the funding has come from local businesses which can be viewed as an attempt to create a safer space in which to attract consumers back to the urban downtown. Towards this end, one way in which cameras are being used is to create a mall-like atmosphere in the downtown (Williams and Johnstone 1998). Cameras therefore are being used to control certain groups of people that can be seen as an attempt to create a sanitized space for consumption. The above issues are discussed extensively in the upcoming chapters.

Another important issue that has developed from the installation of cameras is the *Charter* challenge that the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, George Radwanski, launched against the RCMP in Kelowna in 2002. The Commissioner believes that the camera violates s. 8 of *The Charter of Rights and Freedoms* that states everyone has the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. Radwanski contends that general public street video surveillance by the police can constitute an unreasonable search. The final decision of this challenge, which likely will not be reached for years, will have far reaching implications for other camera schemes and even without a resolution the shadow of a *Charter* challenge may deter some communities.

Women and Cameras

Much of the discussion around the purpose behind installing the cameras is to create both safer and more comfortable spaces for one to pursue consumer goals. The unspoken objective for these cameras is to help create a shopping mall-like atmosphere in an urban setting. This has an undeniable impact on women because they are the primary users of the mall (Woodward, Emmision and Smith 2000: 348). It is important to consider women's experiences in the city because they are often the group which is considered to shop most regularly and spend the most time doing it (ibid). It should come as no surprise that most men do not enjoy shopping and spend the least amount of time possible doing it, whereas the majority of women get at least moderate pleasure from the shopping experience (ibid). In order to attract women to the urban shopping districts there is an attempt to make the city feel like the mall in both comfort and safety.

This meant excluding the same groups who are regularly excluded from the mall, and cameras are one tool which are being employed in an attempt to homogenize the urban consumer spaces.

Despite this effort to appeal to women's experiences, there are unique aspects to urban space which makes women feel less secure than they do in a mall. For many women these feelings revolve around the experience that public spaces are dangerous and hostile. Gill Valentine writes that women are fearful of sexual harassment and attack in public spaces and that fear limits their activities in that space (1991: 288). However Valentine also suggests that women's fear is heightened in certain types of spaces such as multi-level parking garages, or waiting for public transportation, in open spaces such as parks and in pathways (ibid: 289). These are not the places where open space video surveillance is most often located. The type of fear that many women feel on the open streets where cameras are located is of sexual harassment which is a behaviour that the camera has no ability to control or even detect (Haleigh-West 1996; Gardner 1995). The fact is that men are much more likely to be the victims of violent crimes in public spaces (Duffy 1995: 162). Ann Duffy writes, "violent crime, both in terms of victims and perpetrators, has long tended to be a male preserve" (ibid). Based on this fact and the fact that men are typically the one's suggesting, operating and monitoring the cameras it can be suggested that video surveillance is a male solution to a male problem which does not take into account women's unique experiences of the city and public space (Brown 1998; Seabrook and Wattis 2001). The issues of women and public spaces are discussed in chapters three and four.

Whatever the true agenda for the cameras, much of the discourse surrounding

them involves making the streets feel safer for citizens. It is implied that having cameras looking down at you increases feelings of safety on the street. In this way cameras are also seen as a solution to women's insecurity on the street; however this assumption does not seem to be based on women's actual experience (Brown 1998). Women's fear of the street is much more likely to be caused by harassment, stares, verbal intimidation and comments than anything else, and there is little to nothing that cameras can do about these types of behaviours.

Chapter Overviews

Chapter Two is a brief literature review which summarizes the main authors and their key points in relation to video surveillance cameras and public space. This chapter is divided into the literature on surveillance, public places and gender. Chapter three discusses video surveillance. I have divided this topic into six themes which are: the desire of people to be under the gaze of the camera lens even when it decreases their 'freedom' in the city; the social control aspect and the criminalization of poverty; the agendas of neo-liberal governments and the shift towards a risk society; the parallels to the image of the panopticon; making the city visible through the gaze; and the gendered aspect of video surveillance. Chapter four examines the issues of public space. Again I have divided up the topic into themes. These are: general background and the postmodern city; the fear of the city and abandoning of the street; consumer space; women in the city; and the need for democratic public space. The conclusion summarizes the main points made and poses questions for further research. The last section is the Appendix, which is an empirical look at the Canadian situation in terms of where the cameras are located, the operators,

the rationales and objectives, and the organizations that attempt to regulate the cameras.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The topic of video surveillance cameras in public places is a complex issue that involves the examination of various different sections of literature in order to gain a complete understanding of the intersecting components. One of the tasks of this project is to make the connections between the different bodies of literature. In broad terms these groups of subjects include the specific literature on video surveillance, public spaces and gender as well as the more theoretical literature on surveillance/ technology theory, urban theory and feminist theory. As with most categories these are not mutually exclusive, but they can be useful in order to clarify and illustrate the key contributors to the existing debates. This chapter will briefly describe and situate the key points and theorists and draw the connections between them. I will begin with the literature on surveillance cameras.

Video surveillance and surveillance theory

Much work has been done in the past decade in the area of video surveillance, especially in Britain where an exceptionally large number of cameras are in operation. There have been several authors who have focused specifically on video surveillance cameras in Britain. Within this section there are six themes: the desire of people to be under the gaze of the camera lens even when it decreases their 'freedom' in the city; the social control aspect and the criminalization of poverty; the agendas of neo-liberal governments and the shift towards a risk society; the parallels to the image of the panopticon; making the city visible through the gaze; and the gendered aspect of video

surveillance. The authors on who I have relied heavily are Clive Norris, Nicholas Fyfe, Jon Bannister, Jason Ditton and Michael McCahill.

Norris and his collaborator Gary Armstrong published a book in 1999 titled *Maximum Security Society: The Rise of CCTV.* In this text Norris and Armstrong chronicle the history and the development of video surveillance cameras as well as presenting a theoretical analysis of who is subjected to the most intense watching and who is exempt from the gaze. These analyses are informed by detailed empirical observations of the camera operators at work in various control rooms. Norris and Armstrong argue that individuals are targeted for watching based on the preconceived stereotypes that the camera operators hold; Norris and Armstrong call this the "social construction of suspicion" (117). These 'working rules' usually mean that minority youth are targeted more intensely than other groups. People behaving in certain ways who have been predetermined as suspicious are also closely watched. Furthermore, people are categorized as belonging or not belonging in a certain place and those who fall into the latter category are more closely monitored. Norris and Armstrong conclude that the evidence indicates that the reasons for watching someone tended to be based on narrow and unfair criteria.

Norris' most recent article, "From personal to digital: CCTV, the panopticon and the technological mediation of suspicion and social control" (2003) deals with the digitalization of video surveillance and the continuing ramifications that the use of biometrics technology has on personal freedoms and privacy. Norris writes that with the digitalization of technology including video surveillance it becomes easier to link systems and create searchable databases. This would enable an operator to input a still

image of someone's face from a video surveillance camera and search for a match against a database of stored images, such as driver licence pictures. This is known as biometrics, which is seen as the present pinnacle of security systems. This however leads to problems of whose images are used to compare, the possibility of misidentification and the consequences of that for an 'innocent' person and the loss of anonymity in public places. It is one thing to be observed in public, but a step beyond that is to have one's image identified, tracked and stored to be reviewed at a later date. This feature of the newer digital camera technology is another factor that appeals to those planning camera schemes as it is another 'impressive' feature of technology that can be used as a further tool of social control.

Fyfe and Bannister have also made contributions to the video surveillance literature. They have published many articles in journals and edited and contributed to a collection on public space and identity. Two of their pieces are used extensively in this thesis. The first was a 1998 article in *Area* titled "City Watching: Closed Circuit Television Surveillance in Public Spaces." This piece examines the panopticon, a concept that was developed by Jeremy Bentham in 1787 of the ideal prison (Norris and McCahill 2002). There is much comparison between modern surveillance technologies and the panopticon in surveillance literatures. This article also focuses on resistance to video surveillance, this is a topic of much importance throughout this thesis as people's ability to actively oppose a method of social control is crucial to include in any examination of surveillance. The second article also published in 1998 was titled, "'The Eye Upon the Street': Closed-circuit Television surveillance and the City." This piece deals with the impact that video surveillance cameras have on public space. Fyfe and

Bannister maintain that the inclusion of video surveillance in public spaces has a destructive impact on democratic spaces (1998: 263). This is a position that is maintained throughout my work.

Jason Ditton has written on the fallibility of survey results reporting public support of video surveillance cameras. Much of the pro-camera literature shows that the general population supports the installation and maintenance of video surveillance cameras. In his article, "Public Support for town centre CCTV schemes: myth or reality?" (1998) Ditton questions the validity of the method in which public opinion surveys are administered to the public. Ditton shows conclusively how simple it is to achieve a favourable response to a questionnaire. This is relevant when applied to the international consulting firm KPMG report on the Sudbury cameras (this report is discussed in detail in the Appendix) that uses empirical evidence to back up the claim that people support the cameras. With many studies showing the benefit of cameras in public it is useful to have a critical view of the studies.

Michael McCahill has recently published a more inclusive work on video surveillance title *The Surveillance Web: The rise of visual surveillance in an English City* (2002). The book examines many aspects of the neo-liberal form of governance and the reasons behind installing cameras. I also use his piece titled "Beyond Foucault: towards a contemporary theory of surveillance" (1998). This article argues that while Foucault may be useful in certain respects we must be vigilant not to rely too heavily on his theories especially in relation to video cameras. Foucault's analysis of the panopticon is one of the most drawn upon theories in surveillance literature and it seems especially appealing in the case of video surveillance cameras. McCahill writes that while there are

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applications to video surveillance cameras there are many differences as well. He also discusses consumerism and the risk society as being important concepts to understanding the use of video surveillance. There is also a more general body of theory that underlies the more specific video surveillance literature. This is found in surveillance and technology studies which look more generally at the impact of surveillance technologies (among other issues) on societies. Those that I have used for my project include David Lyon, Stephen Graham, Zygmunt Bauman, Michel Foucault, Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty. I also draw on theorists Anthony Giddens and Jean Baudrillard who do not fall under the previous heading but whose work can be applied to the study of surveillance.

David Lyon examines surveillance in a great deal of his work. This paper draws primarily on two main books on the subject, *The Electronic Eye: The Rise of the Surveillance Society* (1994) and *Surveillance Society: Monitoring everyday life* (2001). Both of these works deal with general surveillance and technological theories that enable the examination of specific types of surveillance to be set in a wider context. In *Surveillance Society* Lyon identifies four key themes that apply to what he terms the 'monitoring of everyday life'. These themes are first, coordination that relates to the fact that social relations can be coordinated between people who are far apart geographically and in different time zones in a way that was impossible before the large-scale application of new technologies. This could refer to the use of the Internet for communications and commerce in a way that would not be possible in physical spaces. The second theme is risk, or the managing and controlling of it. Surveillance, Lyon writes, is a way in which knowledge is produced about individuals and groups in an attempt to control and minimize various risks. I return to the topic of surveillance and

risk in Chapter three. The third theme is privacy, which is often brought up in resistance

to surveillance practices. Lyon makes it clear that privacy is a concept which is not very

useful in relation to surveillance because of the fact that, "new surveillance regimes tend

radically to destabilize the public/private boundary" (7) thus rendering the concept of

privacy of little use to the analysis of video surveillance. This is a point that I have taken

up in this thesis and is why privacy is a concept that does not appear often here[5]. The last

of Lyon's themes is that of power which is almost always referred to as a 'top down'

phenomenon, but often operates in a more subtle coercive manner where people are

controlled not so much through an all powerful Big Brother, but as Lyon writes 'many

little brothers'.

People often go along with surveillance schemes because they believe that they

are benefiting from them. This theme relates to video surveillance as well as many of

those in favour of cameras who cite the 'caring' aspect of the schemes to create safer

streets and cities. This is also referred to in Lyon's work as he remarks that surveillance

'has two faces', it can be both caring and controlling (3) which is a point which I have

tried to keep in mind as I reflect on public space video surveillance cameras.

Steven Graham has written specifically on video surveillance in his 1999 article

"The Eyes Have It-- CCTV as the 'Fifth Utility'". In "The Eyes Have It" Graham writes

of how video surveillance is becoming a fifth utility in Britain. Many of the steps he

outlines in the case of Britain can be seen in Canada as well. This piece tells a clear story

of how a population becomes reliant on video surveillance for its sense of security and it

is a narrative that can be applied to Canada to trace the development of camera schemes.

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[5] Another point about the term privacy is it often leads to confusion as it does not often apply to people in
public places, I find it more useful to speak in terms of anonymity, people have the right to move about in

His work also falls under urban theory with his 2001 book co-authored with Simon

Marvin titled *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities*

and the Urban Condition. Graham and Marvin write about the restructuring of urban

space into areas which are primarily used as places of consumption and additionally, how

technology, including video surveillance cameras, are being used to create and maintain

these spaces by controlling the deviant population--those who cannot consume.

Zygmunt Bauman examines many subjects in his work, but what is of interest

here is his writing on surveillance and social control. Bauman theorizes that surveillance

has been applied throughout history in order to control populations; however the form of

the surveillance apparatus has changed. In pre-modern Europe the method of control was

at the level of the community. There was no need for an entity such as the modern state

because control was on a day-to-day, communal level that functioned so long as people

remained in their communities. A crisis arose in these societies when these communities

began to break down and a class known as "masterless men" appeared. These people had

no communities and thus were outside the mechanisms for community social control.

This taxed the resources of the local communities and in order to maintain social

cohesion a larger, more centralized instrument of authority was needed. This institution

became the modern state that was able to dominate the local rule and traditions that were

the centre of pre-modern society. In this way Bauman suggests that the creation of the

modern state was preceded by the crisis of social control. Video surveillance can be

viewed as one tool that the state uses to maintain social control.

I touch upon Michel Foucault's work as well, as is necessary in any examination

of surveillance. His application of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon is explained and

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public without being identified and monitored as they go about daily life.

analyzed as a possible framework for understanding video surveillance in a modern (or postmodern) context. As the panopticon is the basis for many analysis of surveillance an inclusion of Foucault in important in any study of surveillance. In this work I critique the overemphasis on the similarities between the panopticon and present surveillance technologies. I believe that the panopticon is a useful concept, but should not be relied on exclusively as a model for modern analysis of surveillance.

Ulrich Beck's (1992) concept of the risk society is also examined by Haggerty and Ericson in their book *Policing the Risk Society* (1997). In *Policing the Risk Society* Haggerty and Ericson take off from Beck's concept of the 'risk society' and examine it from a social control perspective. They examine the aspects of security in the 'risk society' and argue that as better technological means of managing risk become available our fear and uncertainty increase, promoting further development and implementation of technologies (85). Surveillance cameras are becoming more sophisticated and technologically advanced with the motion sensors, night vision and self defence mechanism as well as the use of facial recognition software, the ability to link systems together and the ability to create internal databases and access external databases. These developments are a response to the increased need for security and the belief that technology offers such security (ibid).

Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson write about surveillance more generally in their 2000 article entitled, "The Surveillant Assemblage." In this piece they examine the rhizomatic growth of surveillance (614). This refers to the weed-like expansion of surveillance from one initial function to multiple ones as well as the use of surveillance mechanisms in ways that were unintended at conception (ibid). This concept is important

in regards to video surveillance. Video surveillance cameras were initially installed in Britain to control soccer hooligans, but it was soon discovered that cameras were even more useful for controlling 'anti-social' behaviours such as urinating on the street, graffiti, and petty vandalism. The initial reason for installing cameras is often added to or even overshadowed by other purposes. Often these other purposes involve creating a managed consumer space sanitized of 'problem' populations such as the homeless or youths (Williams and Johnstone 2000).

Anthony Giddens' *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990) is also drawn upon to examine the nature of the image that is transmitted from the 'real time' occurrence to the television monitor in another area. Both of these works theoretically examine pulling images out of their spatial, temporal, and social context and reproducing them in another space that allows for an interpretation and reinterpretation of the situation. It is then possible to give the image an alternative meaning that changes the nature of the social interaction. This is particularly relevant to video surveillance as the nature of the technology is to transmit images across time/space and place a human operator in the position of interpreting the meanings. This can lead to misinterpretation and conflict especially if the person is operating with preconceived stereotypes of behaviours (Norris and Armstrong 1999).

Public Space and Urban Theory

The other major section in this paper looks at public spaces and urban theory. As with the previous section there is a specific and general body of literature that I have used. In this section there are five sections: general background and the postmodern city;

the fear of the city and abandoning of the street; consumer space; women in the city; and the need for democratic public space. The literature specifically on public space includes authors Mike Davis and Lyn Lofland. The more general urban theorists used are Ali Madanipour, Edward Soja, Michael Dear and Steven Flusty.

In *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (1992) Mike Davis takes a critical postmodern look at L.A. Part of his analysis examines the 'fortressing' and 'militarization' of the city; he looks at the way in which fear of crime reinforces itself and leads to the increase of security measures while simultaneously the increase in security increases the level of fear. This leads to the destruction of public space(s), an issue that concerns many urban theorists as well as many writers concentrating on surveillance, including Fyfe and Bannister. Davis also addresses panoptic malls, private security forces, and the police use of technology to monitor space. Davis is important to this thesis because he talks specifically about the destruction of public space through the increasing level of 'security measures' that are meant to increase the feelings of safety in public spaces, but in the end they increase the fears and also target and further marginalize the groups already on the fringe. Video surveillance cameras fit into this construction of the dialectic of fear and security. Cameras are used to create security, but also themselves reinforce fear of public spaces as images of crime caught on camera are fed back to the population via the news media.

Lyn Lofland is essential to this thesis as she writes about public places and the street in her book *The Public Realm" Exploring the City's Quintessential Social Territory* (1998). I draw heavily on her work in exploring both the theoretical and the practical aspect of the street. Lofland discusses the history of the antiurban sentiment that forms

the basis for much of the appeal of video surveillance cameras. Through Lofland's work

I am able to put video surveillance cameras into a historical context of antiurban

sentiment which implies the streets are dangerous and dirty places where people should

spend the least amount of time possible in order to avoid being victims of violence or

being contaminated in some way. This sentiment is an important thread in the present

day rhetoric of 'cleaning the streets' of the homeless, or making sure that loiterers are

'moved along.' Antiurbanism figures prominently in the promotion of video surveillance

cameras as cameras are used as a tool to control and contain the undesirable groups that

populate the street.

On a more general level I draw on Ali Madanipour (1996) to present an overview

of different perspectives on urban space. Madanipour clearly sets out the different

approaches to understanding public space and illustrates how those different approaches

have lead to different theories of the function and perception of public spaces. I use his

work to establish a general understanding of urban theory so that I can build on a general

understanding with the more specific theories of Lofland, Davis, Soja and Dear and

Flusty.

The work of Edward Soja, Michael Dear, and Steven Flusty serve as the

theoretical base for the examination of urban space. Soja examines the postmodern city

and looks at the trends and themes that can be seen in these cities. The postmodern city

is a new phenomenon that has developed within the postmodern era (2000). The

postmodern city has several types and one type is the 'carceral city' that uses surveillance

technologies and security features to create the place where the marginal can be kept

securely away from the rest of the population; monitored closely by surveillance cameras

and kept in line with a variation of architectural features, unofficial police policies, and official laws. These aspects of the carceral city are discussed in greater detail in chapter four. The postmodern city is an important theoretical concept because a feature of the postmodern city is the desire for security and cameras are one aspect of the quest for that security (Soja 2000; Davis 1992.). Video surveillance cameras do not exist in a vacuum; they are part of a larger social condition. The exploration and analysis of that condition, often referred as the postmodern epoch, is a central goal of this thesis as well as the examination of video surveillance within the larger context.

Dear and Flusty (1998) examine what they label as postmodern urbanism. They explore what is being referred to as the "new Los Angeles school of urban theory". And they look at the different characteristics of cities that typify this new urbanism, which includes the 'fortified city'. The fortified city is another way of referring to Soja's carceral city or Davis' fortress L.A.. It is a place that is created to keep groups of people separate from each other (59). The poor and homeless are kept away from the affluent and the visible minorities are kept away from white people. The fortified city creates fragmentation of space that helps to maintain its homogenous nature that creates the situation where the rich have their protected fortresses and the poor are confined in their fortified 'prisons'. (1998:59). The already marginalized are further marginalized and the chasm between the rich and poor grows ever wider (ibid.).

Gender and Feminist Theory

The third area I wish to address-- gender-- is not a separate section, but interweaves throughout the paper. It is important to me that this thesis not only contains

a reference to women's experiences, but also considers the uniqueness of those experiences. Much of the general surveillance and urban theory literature that exists does not consider how women's experiences differ from those of men. While this paper is a general overview of video surveillance in public places it also includes the fact that women experience public space differently from men and that difference is important. The sources that I have used in these sections include Rhonda Lenton, Michael D. Smith, John Fox and Norman Morra, Maggie Haleigh-West, Susan Griffin, Carol Brooks, Gardner Carolyn Whitzman and Tim Beneke.

Much of this literature deals with sexual assault and harassment, both the practical components of the actions and theoretical aspects of the larger underlying issues. The threat of sexual violence is a major contributing factor to women's fear of public spaces (Beneke 1997: 130). Women see the world and included in that, public space, differently from men. Public space is often viewed as threatening, hostile and dangerous and many women choose to avoid being alone especially at night (1997: 135.). Despite women's increased fear of public places crime statistics show that women are much more likely to be assaulted by someone they know in a private setting (Gardner 1990 and Whitzman 1995: 92). Nevertheless, the fact remains that women feel far more fear of the street than the 'reality' of the situations dictate. Despite the actual number of crimes against women that occur on in public places, the street is often still a hostile and threatening place for many women. Much of the fear of the street comes from the day-to-day sexual harassment that women face in public places (Lees: 1996; Haleigh-West: 1996; and Beneke: 1997). The fact that women face daily harassment on the street is a significant contributing factor to the fear that women feel. In accord Beneke writes, "it's not just

rape; it's harassment, battery, Peeping Toms, anonymous phone calls, exhibitionism, intrusive stares, fondlings-- all contributing to an atmosphere of intimidation of women's lives (1997: 135).

Gardner describes public harassment as, "that group of abused, harryings, and annoyances characteristic of public places and uniquely facilitated by communication in public" (1995: 4) is a constant in women's lives when they are on the street. These behaviours consist of actions such as yelling out of car windows, whistling, and staring. The topic of public harassment is important to this thesis because it helps in understanding the uniqueness of women's experiences on the street since women are the primary recipients. Lenton, Smith, Fox, and Morra (1999) articulate three theories for public space sexual harassment. The first of these is the social structural argument that places harassment into a larger framework of unequal power relations between men and women. The second is the sociocultural argument that brings in the social construction of gender and gender roles that, in turn, create an expectation of certain types of behaviour, for example sexual aggression for men and passivity and availability for women. The third argument is social control that is that harassment is a way in which to exert social control and for men to maintain supremacy over women. These theories form the framework for the exploration of harassment on public streets.

Gardner (1995), Whitzman (1995), and Lenton et al. (1999) also present empirical evidence about women's experiences in public places that I have applied against the popular argument for installing public surveillance systems as a way to create a less hostile public for women. The threat of sexual assault and the experience of harassment are major contributing factors to women's fear of the street and because of that fact,

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video surveillance cameras are not a solution that is sensitive to women's needs. The use of cameras and the entire militarization of public spaces are based on a male model of fear and security that has been forced on women as solutions to their anxiety in public spaces. However, we can see that solutions based on male experiences of fear and security can not possibly be real solutions for women since it is male aggression that is the source of their fear and therefore applying male solutions to women's problems serves to intensify women's fears or at the very least does nothing to alleviate them (Brown 1998).

Chapter 3: Panopticon, the Gaze and Social Control

Surveillance is not a new concept. People have been watched in public spaces since society began (Bauman 1997). However, in contemporary societies the ways of watching have changed due to the creation and increasing sophistication of technology. As new technology develops it is applied to the observation of people's movements. And as the technological capabilities increase we get better at watching and recording people's movements through public spaces. Cameras, then, can be seen on both a historical continuum and on a continuum of surveillance. Historically, cameras are a new mode of surveilling people; the ability to capture an image and transmit it across time and space is a new way of continuing an old practice. On the continuum of surveillance, cameras are an aspect of surveillance mechanisms. The continuum runs from individual officers of the state watching people, to cameras watching and recording people, to biometrics used to match real time images with stored images to digitalization of the network. All of these constitute a larger trend towards what Lyon (2001) calls the 'surveillance society' and Norris and Armstrong (1999) calls the 'maximum security society'. Cameras are not the only type of surveillance mechanisms in postmodern societies, but they are a lens through which to examine the larger issues at play, more specifically the larger surveillance society and the transformation and militarization of public spaces. As Norris and Armstrong write, "the growth of mass visual surveillance…has to be understood in a much wider context. Surveillance is, after all, a form of power, exercised for the purposes of control and CCTV is only one example of the application of new technologies to extend the surveillance gaze" (1999: 19). In order to use cameras as an

effective lens it is important to understand the multiple and intersecting issues connected with them.

Norris and Armstrong document that the employment of photography for crime control dates back to the mid-1800's when pictures of prison inmates were taken in order to identify 'habitual criminals' in Bristol (1999:13). However, it was not until the development of the videotape and VCR in the 1960's that a close circuit camera system was created, since it then became possible to constantly watch and record images and events (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 18). Britain implemented a closed circuit camera system to try to prevent shoplifting in 1967 (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 18). Video surveillance cameras appeared in other places around the same time including Australia and New York (Gunders 2000: 22; Belair and Bock 1973: 155). Norris and Armstrong write, "around 130 years after the birth of photography, its true panoptic potential was about to be realised" (1999: 18). It was now possible to monitor a space and record and process the images in a way that is simply not possible for a human agent. Norris and Armstrong write, "the camera does not blink, sleep or get bored and, unlike images captured on videotape, the results of human visual surveillance cannot be rewound or replayed in a court of law" (ibid). Cameras also have the benefit of being less expensive than paying law enforcement officers to patrol the same space at the same intensity. This is especially the true when the camera operators make the minimum wage, which is often the case in Britain (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 102) and some areas in Canada (KPMG 2000).

The technology of the cameras has changed considerably since its application to video surveillance forty years ago. The systems available now have the ability to pan,

tilt, zoom, rotate and see at night. Many cameras can read a cigarette package at 100

meters. The cameras can be motion activated, bullet proof and have self defence

mechanisms (Norris and Armstrong 1999). The present technology also allows for the

information caught on film to be stored, transmitted and analyzed in much different ways

than was the case in 1967. For example it is now possible to link biometrics to video

surveillance cameras.[6] And the increasing digitalization of this technology makes linking

databases together much easier as well as retrieving the recorded information from the

tapes of the camera footage. The improvement in technology has helped to makes its

widespread use more practical, but is not the reason for its increased popularity (Norris

and Armstrong 1999: 19).

While there are a limited number of cameras in Canada, it is interesting to look at

Britain who has been the leader in the installation of video surveillance cameras. In

Britain cameras have been in wide use in public places since 1992 (Norris and Armstrong

1999). The cameras were first installed in an attempt to control football hooligans and

prevent and control terrorist attacks. The Home Office and the police put to use cameras

to help "fight crime" in public places. There is no official number as to how many

cameras and schemes are in operation in Britain partly because there is are so many

systems being so rapidly installed that social researchers have found it impossible to

count the number of cameras; as well as the fact that there is no centralized organization

where the number and location of cameras are logged. McCahill and Norris

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[6] Various police forces, including some in Britain and the United States, use facial recognition software in
conjunction with video surveillance cameras to identify and track known individuals. This program pulls
up pictures stored in a database that appear to match faces on the street that have been captured by the
camera (much in the same way fingerprints are compared). The person working with this program makes a
judgment call about whether or not it is the same person in the two images. The police can track people in
a way that was not possible a decade ago. This system relies on the ability of the video camera to send an

'guesstimate' that there are at least half a million cameras in London alone which means that for every fourteen people in London there is one camera (2002: 21). In principle, then, a person traveling though downtown London would be caught on film approximately 300 times in a day (Norris 1999: 12). McCahill and Norris also suggest that it can be estimated that there are over four million cameras in the UK (McCahill and Norris 2002: 21). Norris writes that there between 1992 and 2002 there was approximately three billion pounds spent on installing and maintaining camera systems, this does not include monitoring them (2003: 256).

Throughout England some cities and towns have reported a decrease in certain or all crimes, some have reported stable crime levels and some have seen an increase in crime since the cameras have been in operation (KPMG 2000). And crime statistics are not always the most reliable way to get an understanding of the criminal activity in a specific place. For example, in Britain there are a reported six hundred and fifty five gun related injuries annually including ninety-seven deaths. This figure rose thirty-five percent over the past year (Travis 2003). It is evident that despite the vast number of cameras in Britain, there is still a problem with violent crime.

Another concern of critics of the cameras is that they displace crime to parts of towns or neighbouring towns that do not have cameras. Again there is evidence that both supports and disproves this claim. The evidence often indicates that the cameras merely relocated criminal activities to non-surveilled areas of town (Norris and Armstrong 1999:63). Emma Short and Jason Ditton (1998) interviewed 30 offenders about their perceptions of the surveillance camera system in their town. Most claimed that the

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image instantaneously to a control booth and the ability of the computer, with its databases of photographs to pull up ones with similar features (Norris 2002: 270).

cameras made them more careful, but did not necessarily stop them from participating in illegal activities. Many of them had even been in view of the camera when they had broken the law and had not been stopped or caught this led to the view among many that the camera could be circumvented. From their experiences it seemed obvious that there were ways around the system if one was determined enough (ibid). A critique of the claim that the cameras lower the incidence of crime is that, like many other programs to reduce crime, camera schemes do nothing to address the underlying issues that may lead to a high crime rate in a particular area. Chief Constable for Scotland's Strathclyde Police Department, Leslie Sharp articulates this thought when he says, "I don't believe that just because you've got cameras in the city centre that everyone says, 'oh well, we're going to give up crime and get a job'" (in Flaherty 1998).

There is a fairly substantial body of literature surrounding video surveillance, especially in reference to cameras in Britain. There is less written in regard to the rest of Europe and the United States and when it comes to Canada there is very little academic writing about cameras, likely because until recently there has been little to write about. In this section I will outline the main themes of the literature that I believe can be applied to the Canadian situation; because while the phenomenon may not develop exactly the same way in Canada, the theoretical and practical concerns already have parallels to the existing locations in other countries and are likely to continue to have more in common as time goes on. I have identified six broad themes that run through the work of the scholars who are engaged with the issue of public space video surveillance cameras. These are: attempting to understand the desire of people to be monitored by the camera lens even when it decrease their 'freedom' in the city; the social control aspect and the

criminalisation of poverty; the agendas of neo-liberal governments and the shift towards a risk society; the gendered aspect of video surveillance; the parallels to the image of the panopticon; and making the city visible through the gaze. These themes are not mutually exclusive, they blend and blur into each other, they support and underlie each other and they reinforce and sometimes contradict each other. I have chosen to separate them into distinct themes for clarity, but it will become obvious that these are artificial boundaries. I will discuss each of them in turn.

People desire surveillance

Rosa Ainley writes that, "CCTV is the current panacea for all public order ills" (1998: 90). Police statistics claim that the camera schemes are very effective in lowering crime rates. Given the positive portrayal of surveillance of city streets and parks, people seem to support or at least not oppose the 'care' aspect of the cameras and disregard or do not recognize the control aspect (Lyon 2001: 3). There is no consensus however, among critical researchers as to whether or not the cameras actually contribute to a decrease in street crime (Norris and Armstrong 1999), and the exact effect that the cameras have on crime in urban settings remains largely unknown. John E. Eck argues that the value of video surveillance cameras in public spaces is unknown due to lack of any tests. He also writes, "the level of uncertainty about CCTV effectiveness is too high to advocate its use except to test its effectiveness" (1996). However is it likely that any decrease in crime is likely to be attributed to cameras if there is a scheme in place. Many studies that show this drop in crime have been charged with methodological unsoundness by social scientists (Fyfe and Bannister 1998; Ditton 1998) and many researchers doubt the ability

of the cameras to live up to their claims of making the streets safer (Norris and

Armstrong 1999; Lyon 2001). And despite the uneven results of 'success' there is still a

push by many police agencies, governments and businesses to implement a local video

surveillance program. This is certainly the case in Canada. Sudbury implemented their

cameras after the chief of police observed cameras in Scotland and the other communities

pursuing the idea of installing video surveillance cameras use Sudbury and Britain as

proof of the effectiveness of the cameras. It is understandable why these agencies may be

keen to pursue cameras in public spaces, but that does not explain why most of the

population seems, if not completely supportive of cameras, at least not completely against

them. Lyon (2001) explains that, "surveillance always carries with it some plausible

justification that makes most of us content to comply…the advantages of surveillance for

its subjects are real, palpable, and undeniable" (3). We want to be safer in the streets and

those in authority tell us that cameras will help to make that possible. It is also logical

that cameras should deter criminals with the fear of being caught on film and thus caught

by the police or that if they are not deterred then whoever is watching the monitor will be

able to send someone to help us. Rosa Ainley (1998) comments on this lack of concern

by citizens regarding being surveilled by cameras and comments that the, "intrusion into

public space is generally accepted unquestioningly as an (architectural) feature—and by

some as an essential—of modern life" (91). If cameras will help make the streets safer,

as we are assured that they will, it is likely that many people will support the idea,

especially those who do anticipate any negative consequences from the camera's gaze

falling on them.

John Fiske (1998) also addresses the issue of why many citizens in democracies

do not oppose surveillance in public places. He firstly discusses Giddens' (1987) declaration that widespread surveillance is one of the totalitarian tendencies that have become pervasive in 'late capitalist' democracies. One of the reasons that surveillance is not widely condemned is because it exists not as official policy, but rather as a technique (69). A technique is something that is not as concrete as a policy and can always be considered as beneficial that is a fact that hides the true malevolence (ibid). And while cameras in public places potentially have many benefits that could enhance the life of citizens—indeed when cameras help to prevent, stop or solve a crime it is a positive thing—cameras have many negative implications as well. Despite the police discourses surrounding cameras, that everyone has an equal chance of being an object of surveillance and everyone gains equal security, the evidence indicates that not everyone benefits from cameras. The fact is that there is little equality about the gaze of the camera or the benefits that may be a result. What is important about this point is that because of the unequal gaze, the majority tends not to notice the camera because the gaze tends not to fall negatively on them and therefore the existence of cameras are of little or no consequence except in a positive aspect. Fiske writes of the camera, "understanding and possibly supporting its socially benign operations does not require us to recognize that it is always also constructing the eye of whiteness as the power to make the racial other visible, and thus hold him (or, more rarely, her) within the disciplinary mechanism" (Fiske 1998: 71). Those who have power, the 'normal' are able to remain invisible to the camera for the very reason that they are considered to be 'normal' and it is the abnormal who are targeted. Because those who are often cited as supporting cameras are in Fiske's words 'coded as normal' they often have no understanding and indeed often no wish to

understand, the consequences of increased surveillance to already marginalized groups, or the 'abnormal' (ibid). Fiske maintains that for the normal the norms are invisible and it is that invisibility that underlies this demand and support for increased surveillance.

We also are growing increasingly used to being captured on film. We have grown used to being videotaped at family gatherings, weddings, and vacations. We have also grown accustomed to being on security tape when we go to convenience stores, ATMs and the mall. Being video recorded is often no longer something that is unusual or obtrusive. People have started taking for granted living their lives on film (Crang 1996: 2101). This trend will only intensify as children begin to grow-up on camera as some daycares have installed web-cams so that parents can log on from work and watch their children play. It may be that cameras in the streets simply do not seem like a big deal, and perhaps as Ainley writes, simply an element of life, especially in the city.

Yet another reason why people may seem to support cameras, at least in Britain, is that there have been a number of high profile incidents that have been captured on film and have cemented in the public mind the need for surveillance cameras (Fyfe and Bannister 1996:43). In the U.K. the most notorious of these is the videotape of two young boys leading a younger boy, James Bulger, away from his mother in a shopping center. Bulger was then killed by the two boys. This footage was shown over and over again in Britain (and other countries) and is credited with helping to catch those responsible. This along with other incidents such as two men dropping a bomb in a trash bin and a women abducting a baby from a hospital have helped lead to the high approval rates of the schemes in Britain (Fyfe and Bannister 1996:43). In London, Ontario a similar pattern appeared following the death of Michael Goldie-Ryder. His death appears

to be a catalyst to move ahead with plans to install video cameras.

Steven Graham (1999) also argues that the desire for video surveillance is reinforced by a feedback loop. The cameras catch a crime being committed that is then broadcast by the news media, people then view the image and develop anxieties or increased anxieties about public spaces and in turn support expanding the number of cameras that subsequently capture more images and the cycle continues (1999: 312-3). Another part of this expansion is that cameras are increasingly becoming normalized; the discourse has shifted from 'are cameras a good thing?' to 'why can't we have more cameras?' Graham claims that it the news event will cease to be when cameras are installed and instead be about the places where there are no cameras. In several cases the media story has not the criminal activity, but the absence of cameras to capture the crime as though the lack of the cameras is to blame for the incident happening (1999: 313). This point is also reflected in the London, Ontario experience. The news discourse became centred around the absence of cameras over the actual crimes committed.

There is also an irony about cameras in cities that is pointed out in much of the literature. The public discourse surrounding cameras in public spaces is that the cameras will increase individual safety and security and act as extra police on the streets. If the cameras do not always increase the actual level of security then they are expected to increase the perception of security. However this is not always the case. Sometimes it is the very presence of the cameras that creates and reinforces anxiety. People may feel that there must be a crime problem in the surveilled areas if cameras needed to be installed or that areas not surveyed by the cameras are unsafe (Oc and Tiesdell 1997: 141). For those who live in the surveilled area a 'siege mentality' may develop, making them feel as

though they are under attack (ibid.). And, as we shall see, for women this insecurity may be even higher.

It is also important to note that while there is considerable data that purport to show that the British population is highly in favour of cameras (sources cite up to a ninety percent approval) independent researchers show a level of support around sixty to seventy percent, which is a fairly substantial discrepancy (Ditton 1998: 221). As Jason Ditton (1998) shows most of these studies are highly flawed and therefore almost completely unreliable. We can see this reflected in the KPMG report that claims that the majority of the residents of Sudbury agree with the presence of cameras; however to get this result the researchers interviewed only fifty-eight people out of 156 000 (2000: 41). It is obvious that these results cannot be taken as representative, yet they are presented as such. The flaws come from problems with the sample selection, the location where the interview/survey is conducted and most importantly the faulty way most of the questionnaires are designed, which leads to a skewing of the responses and creates a false sense of support. Ditton concludes that methodologically sophisticated studies would likely only show approval of slightly fewer than fifty percent (ibid. 227).

Not everyone is equally supportive of public video surveillance; there are many people who are completely opposed to cameras in the city. These opponents include some, but not all, academics, social activists, homeless and people who are members of already marginalized groups. The reason for this is likely because they are aware that those who are already marginalized tend to be the first and most intense recipients of surveillance, this is certainly the case with public video surveillance (Norris and Armstrong 1999). The second theme deals with the control of these marginalized groups.

This, to which I now turn, is the use of cameras for social control and the increased criminalisation and marginalisation of the poor and already marginalized.

Cameras as Social Control

Cameras are marketed to the public as a way of making the streets safer. Initial or increased use of cameras are often a response to a violent or sensational incident such as the Bulger case in Britain in 1992 or the stabbing of Michael Goldie-Ryder in London Ontario in 1999. But, the cameras are actually not useful for preventing this type of violent crime (Seabrook and Wattis 2001: 246). The cameras may possibly be useful in apprehending the perpetrators, but that is little help to the murder victim. Most of these incidences are over too quickly for anyone to intervene even if the event is witnessed. Cameras are far more effective for dealing with 'nuisance behaviour' or what is often referred to as 'anti-social behaviour'. In this way cameras are successful tools to assert control over 'problem populations'.

Many proponents of video surveillance cameras may claim that if you have not done anything wrong then the cameras should not concern you (Flaherty 1998). Researchers tell us, however, that the above assertion is not true, there is no guarantee that you will not be targeted for "no reason". As well the fact remains that even 'law abiding' citizens may not be too keen on having their images captured on film every time they are in public spaces. Norris and Armstrong (1999) and Coleman and Sim (1998; 2000) tell us that certain individuals are tracked even if they are not engaged in illegal activity. Just being in the space is enough to be targeted by surveillance, especially if you are a member of certain groups such as youths, the homeless or racial minorities.

The cameras are seen, by law enforcement agencies, the government and many members of the public, according to opinion polls in Britain, as the best and easiest ways of controlling all types of problem behaviour in public, even if that behaviour is not actually against the law[7]. Katherine Williams and Craig Johnstone (2000) define four basic categories of behaviour that the cameras focus on. The first type is what most would consider serious criminal activity such as fighting, racial and sexual harassment and drug offences; the second type of behaviour is the things that may turn into trouble such as being drunk and disorderly that could potentially lead to the first category behaviour; the third is more nuisance than criminal behaviour such as urinating, littering, most drunk and disorderly behaviour; and the last category is the non-criminal but that many people find unpleasant, loitering, being disorderly and loud, hanging out in large groups and panhandling (190). Video surveillance cameras target all of these types of behaviour but are most effective against the last two categories, the low level criminal behaviour and the non-criminal but, what many would consider disagreeable activity. Video surveillance cameras are being used to monitor and control certain groups of people including young men, visible minorities, the homeless, groups of youth and anyone who generally looks 'suspicious' or 'out of place' (Norris and Armstrong 1999).

This argument also fits with the 'social disorder' literature, including George Kelling and Catherine Coles (1996) and Wesley Skogan (1990), which discusses disorder and the response to it by different groups. Disorder can be classified as, "incivility, boorish and threatening behaviour that disturbs life, especially urban life" (Kelling and Coles 1996: 14). Examples of disorder would be prostitution, public drinking, sexual

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[7]Increasingly communities are criminalizing 'anti-social' or nuisance behaviours. An example of this is the Safe Streets Act in Ontario that criminalizes types of panhandling.

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harassment, aggressive panhandling, unlicensed vending, squeegeeing, obstruction of streets, vandalism and graffiti, public urination, and other such behaviour (ibid: 15; Skogan 1990). The argument is that these acts, while may not be a serious threat to a person's wellbeing, create a sense of fear and discomfort when, "it reaches critical mass, and in the potential for more serious crime, urban decline, and decay that may ultimately follow on the heels of unconstrained disorder" (ibid:16). The argument that follows is that unchecked disorder creates a feeling that the space is unsafe that leads to people staying off the streets, and when 'law abiding' people staying off the streets there is an escalation of disorder and a cycle would be created (ibid). To solve this problem people need to feel that the disorderly behaviour is being controlled (for example through police foot patrol) and then they would feel safe to return to the streets. George Kelling and Catherine Coles (1996) do not mention cameras as a potential solution, but it is easy to image how they would fit into this type of mentality.

Variations on this argument are common throughout the literature on video surveillance cameras. Cameras are often employed to deal with "anti-social" behaviour. However I contend that many of the disorders (panhandling, vending, squeegeeing and graffiti) on Kelling and Coles and Skogan's lists are not something that should be done away with (Sennett in Fyfe and Bannister 1998). The problem lies with the classification of these behaviours as disorderly or anti-social. Skogan (1990) also makes the argument that physical disorder, such as vacant lots, litter, vandalism and abandoned building, are a major problem in city life. I would agree that this is a major problem, as I will discuss in the next chapter the built environment is an important aspect of city life, but I think that it when physical and social disorder are lumped together as something to be 'dealt with'

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then the result is often sanitized spaces free of both physical and human problems. I maintain that the social disorder literature, while important to acknowledge because it is used by many supporters of video surveillance cameras, is contradicted by much of the literature that is used to disagree with the use of surveillance cameras (Fyfe and Bannister 1998a; Fyfe and Bannister 1998b; Lees 1998; Lofland 1998; and McCahill 2002).

One of the major social justice issues that the installation of cameras raise is that not everyone within the range of the camera has an equal chance of being monitored. The camera operators create what Williams and Johnstone (2001) call the selective gaze. Despite the fact that everyone in the surveilled space theoretically has an equal chance to be viewed by the camera, not everyone in every place is gazed upon equally, only selected streets in selective places are surveilled and within those place who is selected to be watched is based on narrow and often prejudiced criteria. This creates and enforces of spatial divisions within towns and among the users of the street. Norris and Armstrong (1999) articulate seven working rules that they claim are followed by cameras monitors (118-119).

The first of theses rules interests us here. Norris and Armstrong contend that because of the high number of images that someone monitoring a camera has to process they have developed criteria of who warrants surveillance and who does not, based on preconceived ideas of who are likely to commit crimes or cause some sort of trouble. It is through these stereotypes that the patterns of watching come about. Norris and Armstrong found that the most common reason for suspicion was based on personal characteristics such as how someone was dressed, their race, or their apparent membership in a subculture (1999: 112). All of the reasons for selecting a specific

person to watch are based on visual cues that form the basis for 'suspicion' that was all

that was needed to warrant targeted surveillance on an individual or group. This is what

Lyon (2002) refers to a 'social sorting' and also what Fiske calls, "criminalization by

visual category" (1998: 84). There are several groups whose members are targeted for

intense surveillance by video cameras; these include visible minorities, youth, the

homeless and protesters. And if you were to fall into more than one of these categories

there would be even more reason for suspicion. These groups are constantly targeted

because they disrupt the consumer image that local governments and businesses are

trying to cultivate in the urban downtown (Fyfe and Bannister 1998: 261).

Norris and Armstrong (1999) extensively study the social categorization of those

who are surveilled and found that there is evidence of ageist and racist tendencies of

video surveillance in public spaces. They found that Black people, particularly men, are

over-represented as targets of surveillance. People who are Black were found twice more

likely to be targeted for no apparent reason than were white people (ibid: 115). Not only

were people of colour more likely to be targeted, but the operators also expressed

themselves with racist expressions (ibid: 123). Norris and Armstrong observed that,

"stereotypically negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities and black youth in particular

were more widespread and ranged from more extreme views...about their inherent

criminality to a more general agreement as to their being work shy, 'too lazy' to get a job

and in general 'trouble'" (ibid).

Youth also constitute a large portion of those who are watched. Norris and

Armstrong (1999) found that despite the fact that teenagers make up only fifteen percent

of the population, they make up forty percent of individuals targeted for surveillance in

public spaces (109). For a person over thirty to be the target of surveillance they would have to be doing something that got them noticed, such as fighting, otherwise they are largely ignored by the camera (ibid). It is the groups of youth that are often seen as disrupting and annoying to those trying to use the street in 'more conventional ways' (Fyfe and Bannister 1998: 261). Rob White (1990) in his discussion of youth in Australia notes that there has always been a public concern and perhaps fear of youth crime and a view of all youth in public space as a negative element. There is a movement to increase the regulation over youth behaviour and attitudes that is driven by what White labels as this 'moral panic' over youth crime. However, it is increasingly the case that the streets are often the only place for youth to 'hang-out' especially with the cuts to social programs that include community sports teams, arts programs and youth centres (Seabrook and Wattis 2001). Youth are being forced to hang out in public spaces, including malls, as the only alternative space other than home and school. Young girls also may feel that a way to counteract the fear of the street that they experience is to be in groups that adds to the anxiety of adults (Seabrook and Wattis 2001). Cameras target groups of youths as suspicious and they are often 'moved out' of certain spaces to create a more comfortable environment for adults who may view all youth as potential hooligans or trouble-makers (White 1990).

Another group that is often targeted is protesters. Crang (1996) looks at the use of cameras in environmental protests. In order to combat the growing costs of dealing with policing the protests the British government introduced an 'aggravated trespassing' law that enabled the police to evict protesters from the land where they were protesting as well as prohibit them from returning to it. Cameras are used to capture the images of the

protesters that are then compiled into a database that may be used to target the key protesters in the future. This particular example is not about the urban public camera system, but can easily be applied to any video apparatus that enables the state to take, keep and review images of protests, dissidents or others who oppose the official version of public order.

A similar example occurred in Ottawa, Ontario. Ottawa does not have cameras specifically to monitor public space, but it does have many cameras whose purpose is to monitor traffic flow so that traffic controllers can change the traffic lights and spot any problems. However during the G20 meetings in November 2001 the Ottawa Police Service used the traffic cameras to track and record movements of the protesters (Brooks 2002: A1). This is a good example of what Norris and Armstrong call 'expandable mutability' (1999: 58). They identify two types of mutability, intra-organisational and extra-organisational. The above is an example of what they define as intra-organisational mutability that is when a system installed for one particular purpose is used for multiple and different purposes. They also define extra-organisational mutability as when footage taped for one organization is given to or sold to another organization. For example police footage that is sold to a television programme (ibid). Video surveillance is obviously susceptible to this mutability or what Langdon Winner termed 'function creep' which refers to the tendency of surveillance technologies to be used for purposes other than what they were intended for (in Lyon 2000: 111).

The homeless are also targeted by surveillance cameras in public spaces. As public spaces become increasingly consumer spaces the 'homeless problem' becomes a more pressing concern. The image of the city that officials wish to promote is a space of

leisure and consumption, an image that the homeless do not fit into (McCahill 1998: 50).

David Harvey (1990) argues that one aspect of the post-Fordist city is a rise in poverty

that creates an even larger underclass of 'low income or no income' communities (in

McCahill 1998). It is these communities that are increasingly visible on the city streets[8].

There is a desire by the local governments as well as the middle and upper class users of

the street to get these groups and individuals 'out of sight and out of mind' (McCahill

1998).

It is in these contexts that video surveillance cameras are used, not for the

prevention of crime, but to impose a certain moral and economic order on the streets,

which does not include the visibility of the poor, homeless, youth, protesters and often

visible minorities (McCahill 1998). Carol Brooks-Gardner (1995) makes an important

point when she claims that public places allow for the type of discrimination that is not

allowed, legally or socially, in other places. She argues that people feel freer because of

the level of anonymity that public places offer to express the feelings of contempt and

hostility that they are not able to express anywhere else and on the street they can get

away with it (1995: 227). However it must be noted that video surveillance does not,

"enable the enforcement of some singular disciplinary norms, but the situational norms

relevant to particular sectional interests" (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 7). Depending on

the spatial situation the definition of normal may change, as does who is considered

abnormal, and subjected to more targeted surveillance. These groups become a risk that

needs to be anticipated and controlled and one tool used to do this is the video camera.

David Morley argues that cameras are a way of taking "pre-emptive action to exclude"

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[8]The issue of homeless and the city will be discussed in further detail in the urban Chapter four.

those who do not appear to belong in a certain space (2000: 135). Fiske makes the argument that surveillance is a way of imposing norms and those, "who have been othered into the 'abnormal' have it focused more intensely upon them" (1998: 81). Much like Norris and Armstrong claim, Fiske argues that with the overload of images derived from ubiquitous surveillance there must be a trigger to activate intensive surveillance that can be then be used to control those being surveilled. This trigger is the abnormal. Once categorized as abnormal, a person is subjected to more intense surveillance. Coleman and Sim (2000) argue that video surveillance is part of a wider security network[9] that, "works at constructing a consensus through generating images and categories of dangerousness that target the economically marginalized, the homeless and petty thief" (636). The concept of anticipating and managing risk is part of a larger social, political and economic climate that is the topic of the next section.

Post-Fordism, the Neo-Liberal Government and the Risk Society

In order to examine the place cameras have in the wider social, political and economic context, public space video surveillance must also be seen in the larger context of post-Fordism, the neo-liberal government strategy, risk society, and globalization.[10] These trends reflect a shift in the form and function of the government, the economy and social interactions.

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[9]This security network will be discussed more fully in a subsequent section.

[10]Unfortunately I do not have the space in this project to delve very deeply into these issues and as a result I am simply giving a brief and admittedly incomplete explanation of the related points to ensure that the rise of video surveillance cameras is not simply examined as a isolated phenomenon. For a more complete discussion see Barry, Osbourne and Rose (1996) *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*, Ullrich Beck (1992) *The Risk Society* and Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson (1997) *Policing the Risk Society* and selections in *Post-Fordism: A Reader* edited by Ash Amin (1994).

Post-Fordism is a term that describes the political and economic changes that have occurred during and since the 1970s and 1980s. As with most theories there is much debate as to the causes of the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism (Elam 1994: 44). One theory is the neo-Marxist perspective that roots the change in both technological transformations and capitalist market fragmentation and a new 'mode of accumulation', and also in the new 'mode of regulation' (ibid). The city has also been affected by post-Fordism as Susan Christopherson notes. Christopherson writes that as a result of the changing economic situation and the ensuing government response of deregulation there was an 'explosion' of real estate development in both urban and suburban areas. Much of this development was geared to meet the needs of the financial and business communities. This urban development has in turn played a role in the development of the current western consumer culture—shopping is now often an urban experience (ibid). The city has become a space of consumption that is to be used for consumer activities, primarily the buying and selling of goods and services. Christopherson writes,

> what is implied in much of the new critical analysis of contemporary urban development, however, is that people's experience of the city and of the relation between city and suburb has been altered. Urbanity has been narrowed and redefined as a consumption experience; the suburban 'gated community' is perceived as a haven in a highly dangerous environment (1994: 413).

Another issue of post-Fordism is an increased polarization between the rich and the poor and thus an increase in poverty, crime and homelessness (ibid). The city is an ideal place to observe the manifestation of this issue. Furthermore, the idea of 'the public good' has been destroyed and replaced with consumer rights (Christopherson 1994). This is the idea that people have the right be safe in the city or to avoid the congestion and the

pollution of the street. But these 'rights' are only accessible to members of certain groups who can afford to be part of the consumer culture; these are the people who benefit from the cameras on the street or the sky-ways above the street.

One of the issues that Christopherson addresses is the partnerships between private and public organizations that arose in the post-Ford era (1994: 412). Christopherson states that urban development needs the involvement of the public sector in areas of regulation and taxation, but that these relationships serve to blur the lines between the public and private sectors. Coleman and Sim address the partnerships that form around video surveillance schemes that include private and public organizations. In many places the funding for the cameras comes from private business, community organizations and government incentives. For example in Canada almost all of the camera schemes have at least partial private funding (except for Hamilton). London and Sudbury were established almost entirely with private funds. But despite the source of the initial funding, police organizations in Canada are still the primary operators of these systems. According to Coleman and Sim, "partnerships have opened up political spaces for new 'primary definers' to articulate a strategy for urban, social and political regeneration while simultaneously identifying those who pose a danger to that regeneration" (2000: 632).

These types of partnerships allows those with a vested interest to further a consumer agenda in public space, to define what is in the 'public interest,' and continues to link crime control and prevention with 'good business.' This is most evident in Hamilton where the Hamilton Police have prepared a Strategic Communication/Market Plan in that they write:

> We see CCTV as an opportunity to meet the needs of downtown business and
> property owners by increasing the sense of security…it is also an opportunity to
> assist in the downtown revitalization efforts driven by the City of Hamilton
> Downtown Renewal Division and various care area committees (Shea 2002: 2).

The Glasgow organization that helps to run and operate the cameras has a slogan that

reflects this partnership: "CCTV doesn't just make sense, it makes business sense" (Fyfe

and Bannister 1998: 258). These partnerships work to define and construct the categories

of 'dangerousness' that includes those who are economically marginalized and continue

to increase economic polarization by pushing those on the margins even further aside and

subjecting them to increased video surveillance, as they are not considered to be behaving

in the proper and correct way in public space—in other words they are not consuming

(Coleman and Sim 2000: 636). McCahill also refers to an ideological group of 'moral

entrepreneurs' who are made up of the groups, networks or coalitions who are pushing

for the systems and when they get the systems installed they then can transform into

operational networks that can shape their uses and direction (1998: 47)

The second aspect of the broader societal trends is the neo-liberal government

strategy. Video surveillance is very useful in the neo-liberal agenda of what might be

called govern-at-a-distance strategies that public authorities are shifting towards

(Coleman and Sim 2000: 630). Video surveillance is a part of the neo-liberal agenda in

which the state is able, "to set up 'chains of enrolment', 'responsibilization' and

'empowerment' to sectors and agencies distant from the centre, yet tied to it through a

complex of alignments and translation" (Barry et al 1996 in Norris and McCahill 2002).

This system of network and alliances is alleged to increase the power of the centralized

state and create a more widespread ability to influence and act (Garland 1996 in Norris

and McCahill 2002). It also allows the state to escape being held responsible for any direct "forms of repression or intervention" (Coleman and Sim 2000: 630). This neo-liberalism ties into the concept of Ulrich Beck's (1992) risk society.

There are many aspects to the risk society, but what is of particular interest here is the focus on security and managing risk (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 85). As Beck writes, "risk society remains particularly negative and defensive. Basically, one in no longer concerned with obtaining something 'good', but rather with preventing the worst" (1992: 49). So we quest after better methods of knowing and managing risk and also create more insecurities as our knowledge of risk grows (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 85). In this mentality hope is derived through the pursuit of newer and 'better' technologies of risk management. These technologies also have the mandate of managing the fear and anxiety that are connected to the risk society (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 86). Surveillance technology has a major role in managing risk, as Ericson and Haggerty write:

> Risk society is fuelled by surveillance, by the routine production of knowledge of populations useful for their administration. Surveillance provided biopower, the power to make biographic profiles of human populations to determine what is probable and possible for them. Surveillance fabricates people around institutionally established norms--risk is always somewhere on the continuum of imprecise normality (1997: 450).

Ericson and Haggerty assert that in a risk society part of the job of the police is to conduct surveillance in order to compile more thorough knowledge of populations that can in turn be used to manage them (ibid.). It is this emphasis on risk that creates the environment that makes everyone a possible target of surveillance, until it can be determined otherwise (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 24). It is easy to see, even through

this brief sketch, how video surveillance can be considered as a technology of risk management that allows government agencies to create broader knowledge of populations to better deal with them. As well as being able to watch and manage the public space that is traditionally a place of great potential risk.

One aspect of this social climate is the shift that has occurred in dealing with crime. Fyfe and Bannister (1996) argue that video surveillance is part of the 'master shift' that has occurred in the discourse of social control. The concern of those in power has moved from the desire to understand what motivates an individual to commit an illegal act to being only concerned with behaviour that is observable. Fyfe and Bannister write that this is a shift from concern for the mind to concern for the body (1996: 42). The underlying social factors that may cause someone to commit a crime are no longer of interest, instead there is a concern for simply preventing crime. Norris (2003) argues that as demands on the criminal justice system increase, "there has been an increased emphasis upon preventive responses, to crime that focuses on 'opportunity reduction', and situational prevention and risk management'".

There has also been a shift in policies to manage crime based not on the individual offender but on the "criminogenic situation" such as car lots, poorly lit streets, bus stops and so on (Garland in Norris 2003). It has become less about the individual criminal behaviour and motivations and more about managing groups and predicting the probability that someone may be an offender and in this way managing risk and danger. Norris (2003) writes, "we are witnessing an increase in, and legal sanctions of, such actuarial practices as prevention detention, offender profiling and mass surveillance" (252). The widespread use of video surveillance is just one such method.

The Gendered Gaze

Women often feel insecure and vulnerable in the city, more so than men. Women feel that there is a generalized danger that is found in public places, fear of the unknown actions of an unknown male stranger. There is a fear of what may happen to them outside that is usually centered around sexual violence and is felt more strongly at night than in the day (Beneke 1998). This fear is well known by most in society and is often encouraged as a means to keep women 'safe'. Women are often instructed or advised to stay inside where they are safe, this is extremely limiting for women's life chances and choices. When there is an effort made to address women's fears it is often made from the male perspective that either does nothing to make women feel safer or in fact increases the anxiety. Cameras are an example of this. There are several reasons that cameras do not address women's issues with the city streets despite the insistence of camera advocates.

Women are targeted by the discourse that claims that video surveillance will create safer streets for women. Crime and fear of crime are constructed from a male viewpoint, which often leaves women out. Coleman and Sim argue that, "the interests behind CCTV operationalize particular conceptions of order and danger in the city and marginalize alternative definitions of danger and insecurity that do not fit easily within a traditional crime prevention framework" (2000: 633). The other definitions are often specific to women, such as sexual harassment. As well, Sheila Brown (1998) writes that women are often anxious about the modes of public transportation to and from the city center and public surveillance cameras do nothing to deal with these issues.

Brown (1998) articulates that the taken-for-granted-assumption by government and police agencies is that women welcome cameras because they would feel safer being in areas where cameras were installed. It is unclear how these assumptions were reached as there seems to be little or no research conducted prior to the installation that sought out how women actually felt towards the cameras. As well, Brown (1998) also found that men tended to use the city and were in the city center more than women in both night and day. One reason for this may be that women often feel unsafe in public places and have developed coping mechanisms for dealing with the fear that include avoidance. In study after study women report that they simply avoid going into the areas that make them feel unsafe, do not go out alone (especially after dark) and structure their activities around the often ever present unease in public areas (Gardner 1995: 11).

Brown has found that video cameras are unlikely to be seen by women as a solution to this feeling of insecurity in public, to the contrary she claims, "the continual sense of male policing in the broadest sense...heightens rather than reduces insecurity" (1998: 217). Brown also echoes much of the literature of women's fear in public space by articulating that the cameras do not relate to the type of insecurity that women feel. Women tend to more troubled by the harassment, stares, the verbal intimidation and comments than anything and the camera do nothing to elevate these behaviours and can do nothing about the general male ownership of public space. In fact cameras may only add to an existing problem:

> Their [women's] feelings of extreme visibility in public are created by masculine regulation of the public domain. Their exaggerated visibility creates insecurity. More men, sitting in front of camera screens, adds visibility...in one sense it is part of the male gaze, and therefore part of the problem rather than the solution (Brown 1998: 218).

Seabrook and Wattis (2001) add that the young teenage girls they interviewed wanted

the cameras and liked the idea of technological surveillance, but also claimed that they

did not know whether or not the cameras were effective and thus their presence did not

increase their usage of the street or their 'social and spatial mobility' (250-251). Other

girls interviewed by Seabrook and Wattis claim that they feel that the cameras are

intrusive and felt that they were often the unjustified objects of surveillance (ibid: 254).

This study shows that the young women interviewed had mixed feeling about the

cameras. The first set of girls interviewed seemed to view the street as more dangerous

and therefore were looking for something to make them feel safer, yet despite their

support of cameras they did not feel that video surveillance was effective and, therefore,

it did not increase their feelings of safety of the streets. This result is echoed in Brown's

(1998) work as well. The second group of girls interviewed did not feel as through the

streets were as dangerous as the first and therefore felt that the cameras were unnecessary

and intrusive.

The irony of this is that despite the ideological male gaze that is intensified by the

existence of the cameras, women are practically invisible to the camera monitors.

Seabrook and Wattis argue that, "CCTV operates as the prosthetic eye of the white male

operator: it is today's flaneur. It is operated in a very gender-blind manner, rendering the

image of women invisible in public space, that consequently reinforces masculine

ideologies of traditional female roles" (2001: 242). The empirical evidence that Norris

and Armstrong gathered found that women account for only twelve percent of all people

targeted and only seven percent of the primary persons targeted for surveillance (1999:

109). They also found that only two percent of the total persons targeted for surveillance

were watched for protectional reasons (1999: 112). Not being the target of street surveillance may not be a bad thing, but given this figure the claim of the camera's protective role is highly misleading. And perhaps more disturbing is that Norris and Armstrong found that the camera operators tended to be less willing to intervene in a situation that is deemed to be a type of domestic dispute between and man and a women, even when there is the threat of violence. In an incident that Norris and Armstrong observed monitors and several police officers watched a man and a women have a public and heated argument that drew cheers and boos from the 'spectators' in the control room. This is only one example and is not generalizable to other control rooms in Britain or in other countries; however given the empirical evidence compiled by Norris and Armstrong it does support the argument that cameras are not in accord with combating women's experience of fear in public space.

As well, when women are targeted for surveillance, ten percent of it is for voyeuristic purposes (as opposed to two percent for protectional purposes) (1999:129). Norris and Armstrong write, "CCTV also fosters a male gaze in the more conventional and voyeuristic sense, with its pan-tilt and zoom facilities the thighs and cleavages of the scantily clad are an easy target for those male operators so motivated" (1999: 129). This is what has come to be known as 'rape by camera' that refers to camera operators zooming in on women's breasts and genitals and often also refers to images captured without consent in change rooms and washrooms (Hiller 1996: 96)

Another and more ominous problem with maintaining that cameras will increase women's security in public is that it reinforces the notion that it is the public spaces that women have the most to fear. Seabrook and Wattis argue that, "CCTV is positioned

within an approach that constructs crime as a phenomenon of public space" (2001: 246).

This directs attention away from the far more dangerous place, the home. Rape, when it

is considered, is characterized as a stranger with sexual motivation grabbing a woman off

the street and sexually assaulting her (Allison and Wrightsman 1993: 3). Stranger rape

does happen, but it is not the norm; evidence shows that up to eighty-five percent of rape

survivors knew their rapist (ibid: 5). However, the cameras indirectly perpetuate the

stranger rape stereotype, not only for women, but to the rest of society as well.

Date/acquaintance rape or spousal rape is far more likely to occur in a private dwelling,

in an isolated location or in a car (Allison and Wrightsman 1993: 65), places far from the

eye of a camera. The street is portrayed as a dangerous place for women to be, especially

without a man. The media discussion about the cameras in London Ontario is a good

example of this. In almost all of the newspaper articles about the cameras there is the

mention that they are a response to the stabbing death of Michael Goldie-Ryder, and what

is also mentioned is that he was killed while trying to protect two women who were

'caught in the middle of a knife fight' (Osvald 2001). This seems to reinforces one, that

the streets are dangerous for women, two, women need the protection of men and three,

that cameras are needed to prevent this from happening again. The official reliance on

cameras to promote 'law and order' marginalizes, not only different definitions of danger,

but also different sites of danger (Coleman and Sim 2000).

The panopticon parallel

Ainley writes, "panoptic means 'all embracing, in a single view'" (1998: 88), and

the concept of the panopticon has come to dominate surveillance discourse (Lyon 1994)

especially in regard to video surveillance. The panopticon is a prison design that was designed by Jeremy Bentham in 1787 (Norris and Armstrong 2002). The plan was that the inmate's cells would form an outer ring with a central guard tower from where all of the cells could be monitored. The guard could see all, but no one could see him, thus the prisoners would have to always assume that they were under observation and act accordingly. The panoptic design created a situation of permanent visibility so that those under the potential gaze would internalize the gaze and discipline themselves to conform to the proper behaviour. Give this simplistic outline of the panopticon[11] it is easy to understand how the panoptic model has come to be used as a theoretical tool for examining the all seeing lens of the video cameras and the asymmetrical gaze of the operator. Many scholars have pointed out the parallels between video surveillance and the architectural design of the panopticon, but also articulated the divergences.

Hille Koskela (2000) outlines several "characteristics of the mechanism of the panopticon that are clearly inherent in the surveillance of contemporary cities". These are: visibility, unverifiability, anonymity, absence of force, internalisation of control, permanent documentation, normalisation and social contact is reduced to the visible (253-254). Visibility applies to the fact that the city and those in it are permanently visible and by placing cameras in the open people are constantly reminded of their visibility. Unverifiability refers to the fact that like a panoptic prison, people on the street cannot be certain when or if they are being observed, but the promise of the camera is that they may be under surveillance at any time. Anonymity is the fact that it is not known who is conducting the surveillance and the people doing the watching may not be the ones who

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[11]Michael Foucault has taken this notion further in his work *Discipline and Punish* (1978).

have the power over what is seen. For example, minimum wage students may be operating the cameras, but it is the police or state who has the power to act on the images viewed. The absence of force refers to the fact that the watching lens of the camera is often enough to deter a problem without having to use overt action. This leads to the internalization of control that suggests that people police themselves and their behaviour that is far more effective than an external force. Permanent documentation is important to the panoptic mechanism because it creates an accumulation of knowledge and information that in turn leads to a more effective ability to manage populations. Normalization applies to the notion that the cameras can help to exclude the abnormal and reinforce the normal in public space. The final parallel is that social contact is reduced to the visible, where what can be seen is considered more important or valid over other ways of knowing the social environment. This is a compilation of the parallels between the panopticon and city video surveillance; however many theorists have moved beyond the panoptic imagery citing that it is limiting as an analytical tool.

McCahill (2002) argues that video surveillance cameras in work-places, schools, apartment buildings comes closer to the panoptic model because these settings are enclosed and the same people are in the same space day after day allowing for the constant surveillance of known subjects. In public space it is not possible to know the subject in the space, therefore the observer cannot systematically categorize and classify people that is an essential element of the panopticon. In public space surveillance is based, not on the known characteristics of individuals, but on broad and prejudiced stereotypes. Williams and Johnstone (2000) argue that the 'all-encompassing Panopticon' should give way to the idea of the selective gaze that would then create a

more thorough and diverse understanding of the various issues that surround the study of surveillance. As well William and Johnstone claim that the street, unlike a prison, is not space that is bounded or contained so it is difficult to draw precise parallels between the city and the total institution of a prison or hospital.

Norris and Armstrong (1999) argue that the notion of the panopticon and Foucault's use of it to explore disciplinary mechanisms are important to the examination of video surveillance and should not be totally discounted. However they warn that they must also not be overly relied on either. They write, "we need to be cautious about merely equating the power to watch with the disciplinary power implied in Foucault's concept of panoptic surveillance" (1999: 6). It is important therefore to include other forms of disciplinary mechanisms that work in conjunction with the cameras.

The gaze, visibility in the city

In previous sections I have touched on the idea of the gaze and visibility, but it is important to go into more depth because these issues are central to video surveillance. Jean Hiller defines gaze as:

> a technique of power/knowledge that creates and exploits a new kind of visibility, of organizing and normalizing people so that they can be seen, known, surveilled and controlled. The gaze both gives power to the all-seeing so that they might cure the ills of the gazed upon and renders its subjects into self-policing docile bodies which behave in the 'approved manner' (1996: 95).

This type of gaze is an attempt, according to Hiller, to contain the 'disease' of disorder and violence that is found on the street; it is an attempt to create a purified space. Hiller claims that in public we gaze and are gazed upon, but the camera creates a type of gaze that is asymmetrical, we cannot gaze back at the camera operator as we can at a person on

the street.

Another type of visibility and gaze comes through the television lens. With the growth of video surveillance of all kinds (convenience stores, ATMs, street, police cars etc.) comes the increased number of televised images from these cameras. Some of these come in the form of news clips. The news media gets inexpensive and non-labour intensive video footage of crime, events and general city life. Often footage is broadcast in an attempt to help the police apprehend a suspect and solve a crime; in this way the viewer is encouraged to become part of the surveillance mechanism. Crimestoppers is a Canadian example of using the television media to enlist the viewers to help the police with an unsolved crime. Crimestoppers is a commercial length programme that often uses still photos from video footage to attempt to identify the perpetrator(s) of a crime. And as Graham has pointed out the more that this footage is broadcasted the more the general level of anxiety increases as does the support for cameras (1999).

Norris and Armstrong (1999) argue that video surveillance and television form a perfect partnership, especially because they deal with crime. The relationship that these three elements have, Norris and Armstrong write, "can blur the distinction between entertainment and news; between documentary and spectacle and between voyeurism and current affairs" (1999: 67). There are a plethora of television shows that are dedicated to presenting video footage of crimes, perhaps to solve a crime but often for just for the total spectacle of it. Many of these programmes are British in origin, but there are American examples as well. Examples of such shows are, 'Police, Camera, Action' that uses footage of outrageous driving incidents including police chases, foolish driving and spectacular accidents; 'City Surveillance' that is surveillance video footage of all possible

activity in a city from shoplifting to murders, often presented with the message that the video footage solved the crime; and 'Worlds Worst Drivers' and 'America's Dumbest Criminals' that are programmes highlighting the absurd and unbelievable actions of people driving or committing crimes. These are just a few examples of the programmes that exist because of the availability of video surveillance camera footage. These programmes also function to reinforce and promote video surveillance by showing the views that the cameras work to deter crime and the shows give visual evidence of that success (Norris and Armstrong 1999). But, as Norris and Armstrong point out the footage that is shown of television is deliberately selected for a specific agenda that is to promote the use of cameras. This footage, "show[s] only the morally unambiguous interventions in line with public and police conceptions of 'real police work'" (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 70). It does not show the hours and hours of inactivity. Nor does it show the work that is far more routine such as moving out youth, surveilling political dissenters and excluding children and 'undesirables' from malls (ibid.).

These six themes run through the literature and offer a far-reaching theoretical and practical examination of video surveillance cameras. There is however, another facet of this examination that is crucial to understanding the full picture of video surveillance in public spaces. In this next section I will present a concise review of the postmodern city of which video cameras have become an integral part. This includes a general overview of the theories of the city and the place of surveillance in the city.

Chapter 4: Public Spaces: the street, the mall and the postmodern city

Integral to the discussion of video surveillance is the issue of public space, both material and cultural. The material public spaces are the streets, sidewalks, squares and parks that are open to all: this is the physical geography of a place. The cultural aspect includes the ordinary people going about their daily tasks, plus the rallies and demonstrations, the panhandlers and the religious zealots: this is the interaction in a place. It is often the purpose of cameras to limit and restrict both of these spaces to some people for specific reasons. It is that relationship between the city and the cameras that I seek to explore here.

The presence of video surveillance cameras goes against the notion that public space should be open and accessible to all. They create an easier and more effective way of getting people to 'move along,' and may interfere with people interacting with others. This may have the effect of sanitizing public space. Norris and Armstrong assert that those being targeted belong to specific groups. They write, "the gaze of the cameras does not fall equally on all users of the street but on those who are stereotypical predefined as potentially deviant, or through appearance and demeanour, are singled out by operators as unrespectable" (1997). This was also discussed in Chapter three. This chapter continues my examination of video surveillance cameras in public space and involves looking at the issues around public spaces. In order to place video surveillance in its full political, social and economic context it is crucial to understand the trends, theories and changes to urban public space that create the perceived need and desire for the use of surveillance cameras. This section will examine these trends and theories with a focus on their

connection to video surveillance cameras in the city. As with the video surveillance literature the public space literature can be divided into distinct themes, and in the same way these boundaries are fairly arbitrary and forced, but they will help to identify the main themes that run through the literature. I have divided the literature into five sub-themes which are: general background and the postmodern city; the fear of the city and abandoning the street; consumer space; women in the city; and the need for democratic public space. I will examine each of these in turn.

General Background and the Postmodern City

I am using public space in a broad and imprecise way, yet I am referring to a specific phenomenon. Edward Soja argues that space is made up of three aspects, one the physical space of material objects; two, the mental space that is made up of personal interpretation and symbolic meanings; and three, the social space of interactions. The challenge of social theory is to understand and articulate the ways in which these three spaces are interconnected (in Madanipour 1996). The public space that I speak of is made up of these three aspects and their interconnectedness. I define public space as those areas in cities that are accessible to everyone at all times, and the activities that take place there (both legal and illegal). There are many definitions of public space. My definition includes both Carol Brooks Gardner's observation of, "those sites...that our society understands as open to all" (1995: 3) and the theory of Carr et al who assert, "public space is the stage upon which the drama of communal life unfolds" (1992: 3). Public space is a social construction and as Madanipour states, "space is created in a historical process that produces and conditions both ideal and real aspects of space"

(1996: 14).

Also crucial to this examination is the notion of the public sphere. The description I use to describe public spheres is, "places of public discourse". Public space and the public sphere are distinct entities. Public space can exist without a public sphere or can contain a public sphere and public spheres do not have to be in public spaces. There are many public spheres with many different agendas. What I am arguing here is that public space should contain a public sphere and for many, public spaces are the only space available for certain discourses to be heard.

The city is an important place to find both public spaces and public spheres and it is the primary site of discussion for this thesis. In 1938 Louis Wirth defined the city as 'large, dense and heterogeneous" (in Lofland 1998). Today however, the city is no longer a geographically bounded location due to urban sprawl — the growth of highly populated suburbs each with their own 'downtown' that are separated geographically from each other and from the 'city' (ibid.). However, for our purposes I think that Lofland's definition will be sufficient — she defines a city as a "permanently populous place or settlement" (1998: 7). I also use the term urban to contrast with the idea of the rural or the suburbs. The urban aspect of public space implies the potential presence of a relatively large number of people on a daily basis, social, economic and political activities, diverse architecture and heterogeneity of people, services and activities.

Many definitions of public include reference to the concept of the private. The public is that which is not private, that which is outside of the private. The private is a very important concept both to understanding the public and for exploration in its own right. However I do not use the private to define the public because it sets up a

dichotomous relationship which is often false and misleading. As well, this dichotomous relationship assumes that there are certain things which are only private and certain things which are only public which may lead to a certain issues being ignored or trivialize. An example of this is domestic abuse, an issue that used to be considered a private issue, but has become a matter of public concern. Maria Lohen writes that it may be better to, "theorize a continuum of intersecting public and private spaces" (200: 108). The meanings of space are multiple and often contradictory and the debates are many and long running (Madanipour 1996: 4). This thesis does not have the scope to examine all of the debates and theories of public space, thus is limited to a brief overview of the issues that are relevant to the examination of social control and video surveillance.

It is useful to get a sense of the theoretical history of urban sociology because it has undergone significant changes in the past several decades. The Chicago School of urban sociology has been an influential force in the study of the city, its problems and its future. Edward Soja (2000) writes that, "the Chicago School at its peak defined urban sociology in America, despite its weaknesses, it represented the most serious attempt to make the spatial specificity of urbanism both a focus for theory — building and a rich domain for empirical and practically applicable research in the social sciences" (89). Three of the main theories of the Chicago School are the zonal/concentric ring theory, sector theory and multiple nuclei theory; these three ideas shaped much of the research agenda in the twentieth century (Dear and Flusty 1998). The concentric ring theory was based on the idea that people filtered outwards from a Central Business District (CBD) and that the city was made up of different concentric zones made up of different socio-economic categories. The sector theory observed that different sectors often radiated

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from the center in wedge shaped pieces of land, thus cutting across the zones (Soja 2000:

87). The multi-nuclei theory claimed that there existed multiple nuclei within the city

that were created from different socio-economic and historical forces[12] (Dear and Flusty

1998: 51). However, during the last two decades many researchers have moved beyond

the Chicago School in order to look at what may be considered the new specificity of

urbanism. This new way of looking at the city has been labelled as postmodernist and the

Chicago School is coming to be challenged with what some have begun to call the Los

Angeles School (Soja 2000; Dear and Flusty 1998). During the 1980's social researchers

in and around Los Angeles began to take interest in what was happening in that area.

This 'school' included Mike Davis, Marco Cenzatti, Allen Scott and Edward Soja (Dear

and Flusty 1998).

The move beyond the Chicago School by some theorists is a response to the

changes in the nature of the city itself. Postmodernists believe that the changes the city

had undergone were so significant that modernists' ways of thinking were no longer

adequate and had to be reconstructed or entirely abandoned in order to sufficiently

understand the new movement going on in the city (Soja 2000: 96). The city was not the

only thing that was changing post World War Two. Society itself was being shaped and

changed by social economic and political forces. There are scholarly arguments about

whether or not those changes represent a new epoch or simply a shift in the old one. The

battle lines have been drawn over modernity versus postmodernity, but it is important to

understand the city is set within a larger context and I believe it is a tangible example of

the postmodern era. As Sharon Zukin writes:

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[12]This is an extremely brief overview. The original sources are: Concentric Ring Theory: E.W. Burgess
(1925), Sector Theory: Homer Hoyt (1933, 1939) and Multiple Nuclei Theory: C.D. Harris and E. Ullman

While no clear understanding separates modern from postmodern cities, we sense a difference in how we organize what we see: how the visual consumption of space and time is both speeded up and abstracted for the logic of industrial production, forcing a dissolution of traditional spatial identities and their reconstitution along new lines (1991: 221).

The postmodernism and its separation from the modern is a controversial subject that has been the focus of many debates. I talk in much detail about the postmodern city and the fact that video surveillance can be considered a feature of the postmodern city. I am not arguing that all cities are postmodern nor that all features of the city are postmodern. My argument, which draws on work by Soja (2000), Dear and Flusty (1998), Davis (1990) and Zukin (1992), is that there are elements of city that are identifiable as postmodern. As Soja writes, "postmodernity, postmodernization, and postmodernism now seem to be appropriate ways of describing this contemporary cultural, political, and theoretical restructuring; and of highlighting the reassertion of space that is complexly intertwined with it" (1989: 5). Ted Relph (1987) claims that postmodernism is not solely a style, 'but a frame of mind' (in Dear and Flusty 1998: 54). Relph argues that the trend such as gentrification, heritage conservation, architectural fashion, urban design and participatory planning came together and caused the end of the modernist version of the city (ibid). This is a period that started in the 1970s and is still continuing. The postmodern city can be distinguished from the old modernist city, argues Relph, by its material eclecticism. There are many characteristics of a postmodern city. Some of the relevant ones are the attempt at predicting and pre-empting activity, de-industrialization that lead to cities being centres of post-Fordist production and consumption (Hill 1995) and a fluidity of time and space. The hyper-real, sanitized, and

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(1945).

forcibly diverse city is also an element of the postmodern where city centres look increasingly similar to suburban malls. Another aspect that set the postmodern city apart is how individuals perceive and relate to the city (Rabin 1974 in Dear and Flusty 1998). It is evident that the postmodern city is a different entity from its modern predecessor. Cameras in public spaces fit well into this model of postmodern public space. I do not mean to imply that everything in the city is postmodern, the need to categorize, classify and label can be seen very much as a modern trait, one that cameras fit into as well.

It may be useful at this point to discuss some physical manifestations of the postmodern city to give the theoretical argument some practicality. One such form is the edge city that is often located on an intersection of an urban beltway and a hub-and-spoke lateral road and reflects the continued importance of the car to society. 'Privatopia' is a term used to describe private residential neighbourhoods that are developed based on common interests, but create a culture of non-participation and isolationism. Often these types of neighbourhoods are gated to keep those who are considered dangerous, suspicious or just 'wrong' out of the area and to keep those who belong safely enclaved behind their gates and walls. Another aspect of the postmodern city is the increasing level of racial, ethnic, economic and cultural heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is reflected in the architecture and the atmosphere of the city and while it can be seen as a positive development, it should be noted that there is still a high level of racism, homelessness, inequality and unrest all of which influence the growing number of cameras in the city that are used to observe, usually with suspicion, this heterogeneity.

Edward Soja (2000) also addresses the changes to the city and calls the "new urbanization processes that have been restructuring the modern metropolis over the past

thirty years" (147) the postmetropolis. The postmetropolis is postmodern, post-Fordist and post-Keynesian (ibid: 148). Soja writes that while urbanization is not entirely new, it is a continuation of the processes that have been ongoing since "the origins of urban-industrial capitalism" (ibid.), the postmetropolis is something new and can be examined as such. Soja (2000) discusses six discourses that represent the postmetropolis. The one of most interest to this project is the Carceral City that represents the fortressing of the city using surveillance and police technologies and techniques to maintain and create order. These discourses are part of the new Los Angeles School of urban theory and are specifically looking at L.A., however the purpose is not to only study one city, but to invite comparative analysis for other cities in the world (ibid.).

The 'Fortress city' is another important aspect of the postmodern city. This has several features in common with Soja's carceral city. Video surveillance cameras play a major role in the fortress city and this will be discussed in greater length in the following sections. This attempt at fortification creates what Dear and Flusty label "interdictory space" that is a variety of types of spaces that are designed in ways so as to exclude certain peoples. This creates unequal space and results in an intense fragmentation of spaces and places. Yet another aspect of the postmodern city if that of post-Fordism. Dear and Flusty state that the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism is one of the most significant factors in the current political economy. This shift has represented a change in the form of accumulation from the mass production that is characteristic of Fordism to what has been dubbed 'flexible production' which means producing smaller batches of goods that are often subcontracted out to various manufacturers. This has created changes in the regimes of social control and regulation most notably the collapsing of the

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welfare state. Dear and Flusty write that this is an urban process:

> driven by a global restructuring that is permeated and balkanized by a series of
> interdictory networks; whose populations are socially and culturally
> heterogeneous, but politically and economically polarized; whose residents are
> educated and persuaded to the consumption of dreamscapes even as the poorest
> are consigned to carceral cities; whose built environment, reflective of these
> processes, consists of edge cities, privatopias, and the like; and whose natural
> environment, also reflective of these processes, is being erased to the point of
> unlivability while, at the same time, providing a focus for political action. (1998:
> 59-60).

These factors represent the theoretical explanations for the types of characteristics of the new type of city, but there is also another aspect of the city that is significant in the study of the relationships between the city and video surveillance cameras and that is people interaction on and with the street.

Fear of the City and Abandoning the Street

The above section provided a brief overview of some of the issues related to the postmodern city and the next sections take several of those topics and deal with them in more depth, relating them back to the subject of video surveillance cameras. Firstly, the issue of fear of the city. The city has long been viewed with both hostility and wonder; it was seen as both a place of corruption and a place of freedom (Lofland 1998). The tension between these two positions is at the basis of much of the debate over video surveillance on public streets. The antiurban sentiment is nothing new, it has been around practically as long as modern cities have existed (ibid.). Lofland writes that it is the very nature of the city that has incited scorn and fear; it is the public spheres of the street that are historically and presently despised. Lofland identifies four historical reasons that still apply for the dislike of the city streets.

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The first reason she claims is the presence of the 'unholy and the unwashed'. The street is commonly home to the 'wrong type of people' which is a malleable term. Today this may apply to the 'flawed consumers'—those who can not or will not participate in the consumer culture (Bauman 1997). This includes the homeless, the poor and youths. The solution to this problem is to 'clean-up' the streets and create a sanitized consumer area which by extension segregates the 'offenders' to different areas of the city. Video surveillance cameras suit these purposes ideally.

The second problem with city streets is the 'mixing of the unmixable'. The city contains members of different and diverse social groups and is technically open and accessible to all groups of people. In the past this complaint was based on the presence and thus mixing of men and women, rich and poor, white and non-white and today it is also based on the presence of youth and children. Lofland claims that this complaint is less evident today, not because of an increased tolerance, but because we have decreased the probability of encountering anyone who is different by choosing to spend time in places frequented by those who are similar to us. For example upper class white people tend to chose to spend time in places where they are likely to encounter other upper class white people such as country clubs, expensive shopping districts and exclusive suburbs. However there are still areas where different people come into contact with each other, such as the urban core, and it is there that cameras are useful to watch those who are considered to be 'out of place'. Cameras are also used in areas where there should be no 'social mixing', such as gated communities, where it is easy to target those who are different and do not belong.

The third complaint is 'the sacrilegious frivolity of uncontrolled play'. This

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argument is based on the perception that the values which are valued, sobriety, responsibility, rationality are abandoned in the city. The streets thus become sites of uncontrolled sexual and alcoholic play that become moral concerns (Lofland 1998). Cameras are great instruments to observe both the sex and alcohol driven activities on the city streets.

The last problem with the city streets is 'political anarchy'. This applies to the fear by the authorities that the disenfranchised will command an audience that would otherwise be absent in a private place (Lofland 1998). Public space, especially places where a large number of people pass through is an excellent place for communication and for the exchange of ideas that are counter-hegemonic. For example public rallies and protests such as the anti-globalization demonstrations in Seattle (November 1999) and Quebec City (April 2001). Cameras have long been used to watch political dissent. It is also interesting that cameras are also being used by the protesters to film their movements along with those of the police. These videos can be used as both a deterrent to, or evidence of police brutality and as a way of telling the 'other side' of the story in contrast with the mainstream media.

The city has long been seen in some accounts as the site of immorality and depravity and Lofland argues that when the street is seen in such a light all activity on the street is by association 'evil' (1998: 128). The reaction to this is to retreat to the private: to the family, the home, the car, the suburbs. The street with its variety of ills is avoided and interaction with family and intimate friends is prized above all else. Norris and Armstrong (1999) articulate the notion that there has been a creating and growth in what can be termed the 'stranger society'. People's knowledge of others is no longer based on

personal interaction and therefore the case for surveillance grows stronger because

someone needs to manage of all the strangers in public places. The stranger may also be

the outcast and the criminal (Lofland 1998: 152). The outcast may be seen as infectious,

both morally and physically, and not to be touched or seen. Fear of the stranger as

criminal has been a long standing and continuous fear in public spaces and crime is one

of the overriding problems associated with public space. The specificity of the feared

stranger is not constant though time or space and consists often of groups that are

regarded with suspicion by the majority, presently in North America those of Arab

descent (based on the fear of terrorism) would be an ideal example (Lyon 2003: 146)[13].

Those who promote cameras in public spaces play on the fear of crime and the usefulness

of the cameras in combating it.

Fear of public spaces can also be based on the fear of the unpredictability of

people in an urban setting. There are crowds filled with strangers, whose behaviour can

not be controlled by an individual: the poor, whose behaviour one fears may turn violent

if their calls for money are not appeased; the 'crazies', whose behaviour is feared to be

completely irrational because of drugs or mental disease; and the aliens, who are so

unlike the norm that their behaviour is perceived as completely unforeseeable (Lofland

1998: 162-167). The perception of a threat does not have to correspond with an actual

threat, but both are equally important in terms of fortifying space. Both an actual threat

and the perception of a threat are acted upon and in some cases the fear of crime is given

more mobilizing power (when the fear emanates from the rich) (Davis 1992). Cameras

are an overt attempt at demonstrating that there is an effort by those with authority to

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[13]For a more complete discussion of this see David Lyon (2003) *Surveillance Since September 11th.*

control these unpredictable elements. The promise of the camera for this is twofold, one that because of the 'disciplinary gaze' of the camera, social control is internalized and thus behaviour is normalized (McCahill 2002: 5); and two, that if the gaze is not internalized then there will be external agents who will react to any 'threat' seen through the cameras.

The built environment can have an effect on the nature and the quality of social interaction. This assertion that physical, material space may be an important variable has long been avoided by urban sociologists and others out of fear of the charge of geographical determinism (Lofland 1998: 180); however recent scholars are rediscovering that the built environment is an important aspect of social interaction in public spaces; it can both encourage and discourage communication and interaction. This is not in any way to suggest that the design and creation of space is any less a social construct, but it must be emphasized that within this social construct there is a physical world of walls, streets and buildings which are also important to consider when examining social interaction in urban settings. Lofland asserts that while urban settings do not determine our interactions they can influence the type and quality of interactions. For example spaces can encourage or discourage people hanging around and thus influence the duration and type of contact individuals experience with others (Lofland 1998: 182). The built environment can also influence who one interacts with and the content of that interaction. Contact with people on the street is still the best way of getting ideas and information to others without the aid of any forms of mass media (for example passing out leaflets, holding rallies). Lofland refers to Susan Davis (1986) who argues that three elements of the streets helped get information out in the nineteenth

century: the equal sharing of the streets among different groups; the density of the people on the streets; and way the street was physically designed into grids all made the streets an effective communication medium (in Lofland 1998: 187). The campaign against the street is eliminating any of these features that still exist. The militarization of the street makes the mixing of different types of people and a high density of people of the street less and less likely to occur (ibid).

The fear of the street appears to be leading city planners to attempt to create a defensive fortress to counteract people's dislike and disgust of the city. The short-lived feelings of confidence and security that was achieved without fences and walls of the 1960's was replaced with 'a defensive architecture' of technological surveillance and strong military-like police force (Tanner and Oc 1997: 1). The desire to fortress is obvious in the rise of the gated communities of residential homes. In affluent areas of cities these communities emphasize security and defence for their residents in an attempt to combat the fear of crime that is keenly felt by the rich (Judd 1995: 160). These communities are often surrounded by fences that require everyone who enters to pass through gates that are patrolled by human security guards and/or video surveillance cameras. These initiatives serve to increase the fear of what lies outside the walls because by their very existence, the walls illustrate that the world beyond them is not safe (Judd 1995). As Judd writes:

> a segregation and isolation impelled by fear and anxiety are becoming fixed in urban culture. In cities, the problems of drugs, violent crime, and other problems associated with concentrated poverty are escalating. Rising numbers of the homeless roam the street. One way to deal with these outcasts...is to wall them out (1995: 164).

Architecture is used in the city as a method of social control to keep certain groups of

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people in certain areas and out of others. Video surveillance cameras have become part of the architecture that adds to the fortressing of the city; they are an all seeing eye that surveils the city landscape and those in it as a means of maintaining control over them.

Mike Davis (1992) talks of the obsession with security in downtown Los Angeles and writes that using architecture to create and maintain social boundaries was becoming the 'master narrative' of the built environment (224). Davis refers to what he sees as the militarization of city life that is most evident on the street (ibid.). This entails the increasing segregation of public spaces, the banning of youth activities in general, the presence of video surveillance cameras, the enactment of laws to control panhandling and the presence of the homeless, and other physical and policy initiatives to control public space with a firmer grip. One example of this is the concentrated and deliberate effort on the part of downtown Los Angeles to remove public washrooms. In fact, L.A. has the fewest public toilets of any North American city; and the absence of washrooms also means the absence of clean water for cleaning and drinking (Davis 1992: 233). This is just one example of the way in which city planning and design can be used to create a certain type of space that is hostile to certain groups, thereby making it more appealing to others.

Architecture and urban policy go together in this effort to secure the city. As well as using the physical environment such as design and cameras, local governments also create laws to control 'anti-social' behaviour (Fyfe and Bannister 1998). Some of these laws include anti-camping statutes to prevent people from sleeping on the street, restrictions about where people can panhandle (for example, outside banks) and the level of persistence that people can use in asking for money. The Ontario government's *Safe*

Street Act[14] is one example of this type of law. McCahill argues that while video surveillance cameras alone cannot exclude people from spaces, they gain power when coupled with these types of legal restrictions it become easier to exclude certain types of people as anti-social (2002: 16).

If it is not possible to rid the downtown of the "undesirables", then another solution is to abandon the streets to them and create alternative ways of transversing the city. One way of doing this is with underground tunnels or overhead sky walk-ways. Downtown malls were built often with tunnels or walkways connecting the mall to different buildings so that people would not have to walk through the street. There was little anyone could do about the weather and the pollution of a city, but they could take people out of it by building covered walkways, often above street level. The same principle also applies to the tunnels built under the city. Montreal and Vancouver are two examples of Canadian cities with underground mall infrastructures. Graham and Marvin use the example of Houston, Texas where there are 6.2 miles of tunnels that connect 26 million square feet of malls, hotels and offices together (ibid. 257). Both security guards and video surveillance cameras monitor the entrances to these tunnels in order to ensure that only those who are 'appropriate' have access (ibid.). This leaves the streets to Bauman's 'flawed consumers', further developing an image of being both unsafe and unpleasant.

Graham and Marvin (2001) write about the strategy of 'building cities in the sky' where the street is abandoned to the cars so people are removed completely from the

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[14] The Safe Streets Act of 1999 is provincial legislation which limits panhandling on public streets. A person is no longer allowed to ask for money from anyone around an ATM, telephone, washroom, waiting for or riding on a public transportation, in a parking lot or is in or getting out of a vehicle. A person may also not ask for money in a "threatening way" or follow or obstruct someone.

physical and cultural street (256). Tanner and Oc (1997) argue that the postwar changes to the city are a result of the increasing ownership of cars. The city previously did not need to be designed with roadways for the mass usage of cars and other motor vehicles that meant that cities needed to be redesigned to accommodate the increased volume of traffic. This meant the addition of freeways, highways, arterial roads, filling stations, parking lots and road signs. The end result of this was the 'demise of the street' (Relph 1987: 158). Relph argues that since 1945 planned developments have not included any streets, only roads. Streets are often viewed as simply a transitory space, a place to use to get from point 'a' to point 'b'. Places to transverse space, not to linger and experience the atmosphere. Streets are not considered by members of the public to be of any interest or use unto themselves (Gardner 1990). This abandoning of the street is an attempt to limit and avoid contact with the 'untouchables' of society and has been perpetrated with the attempt to kill both the street and the crowd which are essential to the democratic mixing of peoples and ideas (Davis 1992: 231). Michael Rustin (1986) asserts that under capitalism the street and public space becomes a 'nonspace', it is the space which people move through in pursuit of their individual goals and objectives (487). Part of the reason for this, Rustin argues, is a result of the capitalistic thinking that, like everything else, space is a commodity (ibid.) that can be used for private gains and purposes such as consumption. The uses of the street, shopping, strolling, meeting with friends have been displaced to the new malls and plazas (Relph 1987: 158).

Consumer Space and the Mall

The urban centre is becoming commodified as a place for consumer activity.

Alan Reeve writes that the purpose of the design and management of the British town is, "consumption and the creation of efficient, attractive and seductive consumer spaces" (1998: 69). This is happening in the United States and Canada as well. Public spaces are being transformed into consumer spaces, and those who do not fit in with the consumer image are the individuals and groups who are being monitored most intensely by the video surveillance cameras. The people—racial minorities, youth, political dissenters and the homeless—whom I addressed in the previous chapter as those who are subjected to the most intensive and often un-provoked surveillance are also those who are not consuming. Bauman (1997) refers to these groups as 'flawed consumers', those who are unable or unwilling to participate in consumer culture upon which our society has come to be based. Public space has also come to be based on the consumer model and the only legitimate use of that space is to be in the pursuit of consumption, or at least to appear to be.

There is a highly visible transformation of space that has accompanied this trend. As the retail market moved from the city centre to the suburban mall the urban core often fell into neglect (Morley 2000: 134). In an attempt by city governments to bring consumers back to the core, the public space was turned into a more consumer-friendly space, complete with video surveillance cameras. Many felt that one of the big drawing features of the suburban mall was the feeling of security that one felt there. In a mall the shoppers are protected by cameras and security guards, both of which work to maintain a watched-over shopping environment. For women especially this is a relevant issue, as they often find public space more threatening (Drucker and Gumpert 1997). Drucker and Gumpert write, "malls redefined shopping as an activity occurring in a non-threatening

environment, in a new environment modeled along the lines of the commercial center of the city, but in a milieu that is clean, safe, and controlled" (1997: 125). The city center is now trying to reproduce the mall with its clean, safe and controlled atmosphere where those who are not considered appropriate to the shopping experience or who are perceived as threatening are managed out. This means excluding those who may make patrons feel uncomfortable. The homeless, political dissents and youth top this list. One mall official is quoted as saying, "we simply don't want anything to interfere with the shopper's freedom to not be bothered and have fun" (in Crawford 1992: 23). Video surveillance cameras are one method that this is done in the mall and increasingly on public streets.

Those with no visible means to participate in the mall experience, the poor and the homeless, are asked to leave. Also managed out are social and political issues. Freedom of speech and expression are not protected in the malls. Malls are spaces used by the public, but they are not public spaces. The mall in no way constitutes the new public square where citizens can gather and meet together in any real or meaningful way. People with a clear political agenda are asked to leave the mall, sued and in extreme cases convicted of a crime as was the case in the United States of the 71 year old man who was given a year long jail sentence for distributing world peace leaflets (Judd 1995: 150). There is also anecdotal evidence of people being asked to leave because they are wearing buttons promoting a specific cause. Teenagers are also carefully managed in the malls. Some malls do not allow children and teens in without a parent and some do not allow them in at all (ibid.). As was seen is Chapter three, in Canadian cities groups of youth are considered threatening and in malls they are seen as a disruption to the

enjoyment of shoppers. In malls discrimination is not only allowed, but actively and

publicly encouraged. Malls are in every way private spaces.

Unlike the city, the mall does not have the negative aspects such as poor weather,

smog, cars and poor people. In order to lure consumers back to the city centre something

had to be done to counteract the negative aspects of the city. One strategy implemented

in the city to deal with the poor, homeless and others who were kept out or stayed away

from the suburban malls was a technique of the mall: video surveillance. A main reason

to install video surveillance cameras in the urban core is to attempt to reproduce the

security that is found in the mall. Appropriately Williams and Johnstone call this the

'malling' of public space. They write:

> The same social and cultural processes which reinforce selective exclusion in the
> mall are now beginning to be felt in the public spaces of town centre streets, and
> CCTV is also bringing with it a range of economical and political processes
> which are having significant consequences for the social experiences of Britain's
> city centre streets (2000: 192).

Dennis Judd (1995) makes the claim that this attempt to capture the mall in open public

space is an attempt to resurrect a romanticized version of the utopist city, the type found

in text books and imaginations (148). Judd writes that this is an, "attempt to make perfect

that which is flawed" (ibid.) and as I will argue in a later section, it is those flaws which

are necessary for a democratic city.

Another interesting aspect of this trend in the false diversity that is fostered and

exploited by urban planners. As noted above the postmodern city is a diverse one.

However, according to city governments and social control agencies that diversity must

be managed. Christopherson writes that cultural diversity has been elevated to, 'almost

religious significance in the USA' (1994: 414). As such, in a consumer culture diversity

is packaged and marketed for easy and painless consumption en mass. Christopherson also writes, "this commodified version of diversity is not about traditions and needs but about surfaces—colours, styles, tastes, all packaged in easily consumable forms" (ibid.). This trend is represented in international food courts in malls and 'ethnic' restaurants and boutiques in urban cores that cater to the trendy upper class. Christopherson notes that people of diverse ethnicities work in these restaurants, but they cannot afford to eat in them.

Lofland (1998) observes that these areas of privately owned public space are growing larger and taking over more and more publicly accessible space. She refers to this as the 'mechanism of privatization' that is the process of increasingly bringing public space under private control (210). Lofland also makes mention of a trend of public-private partnerships that for several reasons, usually economic, turns public space into private or semi-private and also turns private spaces into 'kind-of' public ones. Video surveillance is another way of turning public spaces into more private areas that are visible to whoever is in power.

Much city space is being constructed with business purposes in mind (Christopherson 1994: 418) and these places seem to exist apart from the areas that are for use by the general public. These highly managed spaces do not foster spontaneous public activity, but resemble the mall with its controlled and private spaces. There is an attempt in the United States to design and run public spaces that are privately controlled for the purposes of consumption (ibid.). These types of spaces are run by an association of business owners and are often referred to as business improvement districts (BID). These types of spaces exclude a great number of people and work to create the secure

atmosphere of the mall in order to attempt to bring shoppers back to the core. This is the type of situation where cameras are employed in an attempt to recreate the perceived security of the mall. Christopherson argues, "the need for control leads to a homogenized and administratively segregated urban environment" (1994: 419). Cameras are a highly visible way of appearing to have increased security of a space. People can see the cameras and the signs for the cameras and, as goes the popular thinking, feel safer. The issue of fear and safety in the city is an important one for women and both in theory and in practice video surveillance cameras do not take into consideration women's unique experiences in the city.

Women and the City

Women have a diverse and complex relationship with the city. Women find both freedom and constraint, courage and fear, joy and sorrow in the city and no two women's experiences are the same. Nor do women have the same experiences as men: women experience the city differently from men (Gardner 1990). However, urban planning has not seemed to be interested in women and their interaction with the built environment. Women are either ignored or assumed to have the same needs and desires in the city as do men. It is fair to say that almost exclusively urban planning has been done through a men's world view (Whitzman 1995: 90). And the city and spatiality are often analyzed only through, "the medium of a male body and heterosexual male experience'" (Massey in Koskela 2001: 254). This lens is not adequate because as Massey and Koskela assert space is gendered and therefore must be acknowledged as such (ibid.).

In public spaces, women's bodies are constructed by the male gaze. Men watch

women in public; any woman who has been the recipient/victim of a 'cat-call' or 'wolf-whistle' will attest to that fact. Women in the public sphere are seen as 'fair game' to the gaze, glance and gawk of any number of passing men. John Berger (1977) writes that men physically inspect women before they will meaningfully interact with them either personally or professionally, so a woman is very aware of the male gaze and the fact that she is judged based on what it sees. Many scholars have made reference to the fact that in order to fit the norm, women internalize the male gaze. They see themselves and their bodies through male eyes. Sandra Bartky writes, "[the] panoptical male connoisseur resides with the consciousness of most women: they stand perpetually before his gaze and under his judgment. A woman lives her body as seen by another, an anonymous patriarchal other" (1997: 101). A woman, writes Berger, has two parts to her identity, the surveyor and the surveyed; she has internalized the male surveyor into her identity. Therefore, since men look at women, "women watch themselves being looked at...the surveyor of women in herself is male: the surveyed female. Thus she turns herself into an object" (1977: 47). Berger sums up the experience of being a woman in the public sphere when he writes, "a woman is almost continually accompanied by her own image of herself" (46).

Gazing and commenting on women in public spaces contributes to an overall hostile environment for many women. A threatening atmosphere can come in many forms and does not begin and end with overtly violent or threatening actions. Haleigh-West demonstrates this in her documentary film *War Zone*. She goes out on a busy public street in a large city in the middle of the day with a video camera and watches men watch her and other women. When men are confronted with the question of why they

watch women on the street their responses reflect the feeling the women are 'fair game' since they are in public and it is their right as men to look. They stare and comment as they might if they saw a car they particularly liked. Men were, "voicing their opinion," it was "natural" to make comments to women, and it was women's fault for looking "provocative;" at no time did these men accept any type of accountability for making women feel unsafe. Many of them felt their attentions should make women feel good about themselves. Haleigh-West interviewed several women who responded that their feelings were the opposite of good; the male attention often made them feel uncomfortable or unsafe walking down the street.

Sexual harassment is one of the biggest contributors to fear of public space, but it is not illegal nor is it regarded with much interest by authorities. This behaviour includes, "pinching, slapping, hitting, shouted remarks, vulgarity, insults, sly innuendo, ogling and stalking" perpetrated by men against women (Gardner 1995: 4). The empirical numbers support the claim that women are the subjects of some form of harassment in public spaces. Lenton et al. (1999) in their study found that only nine percent of women interviewed had never received unwanted attention in public. Eighty-one percent claimed that they had been stared at in a way that made them uncomfortable (525). Women who reported experiencing harassment responded with fear foremost and also anger, shock, feelings of being violated and blame, only a small number felt nothing at all (ibid.: 531). Women who had experienced being harassed tended to be more fearful of being in public and suffered psychological repercussions from the routine abuse they suffer (ibid. 522). These repercussions include work-related issues (such as loss of job opportunities), fear, distrust, depression, lower self-esteem, stress and a number of

physical ailments (ibid.). It is clear that sexual harassment in public creates a 'normalized distaste' for being in public for many women (Lenton, Smith, Fox and Morra 1999: 520). Cameras are of absolutely no use for these types of problems. Despite the claims that cameras will increase security and safety for women they do nothing to address the true causes of women's fear.

Women are often on guard in the public sphere, conscious of being watched and afraid that the watching will go further to rape or another crime (Gardner 1990). Gardner reports that, "in public the fear of rape is a cardinal fear for women" (1990: 311). The fear women feel in public spaces alter the way the built environment feels and the way they interact with it (Beneke 1998). The male gaze is part of what produces this fear. Harassment, either verbal or visual, often evokes a fear of rape. This fear is one thing that unites all women. It may not be a conscious or consistent fear, but it can be evoked at any time and it is especially acute when in the public sphere. Margaret Gordon and Stephanie Riger claim that because of the fear of rape women "experience their whole environment as a dangerous place to be" (1989: 121). For some women it is an active and ever present fear that inhibits them from enjoying the same freedoms most men enjoy. Mary Ellen Mazey says that rape transcends race, age and location because all women are the potential victims of rape. Susan Griffin says that the fear of rape, "keeps women off the street at night. Keeps women at home. Keeps women modest for fear that they be thought provocative" (1979: 3). Cayolyn Whitzman (1995) reports that fifty per cent of women are do not feel safe walking alone in their neighbourhoods after dark. Only thirty per cent of women claim that fear is never a deterrent in their activities (Gordon and Riger 1989: 121). There are many women however who fully experience

the urban environment and do not allow the fear of harassment and rape inhibits them from doing and being what they like. However, these fears do affect many women, even if it is only at the level of annoyance at being stared at.

The fear and the risk do not always coincide, however the perception of danger is as real as the danger itself. Whitzman says that while women are less likely than men to be victims of crime in public places, they are more fearful. Despite the fact that approximately only fifteen per cent of all rapes are perpetrated by strangers (the rest are perpetrated by people the victim knows, most likely in the private sphere) women are still more fearful of the public than the private (Alison and Wrightsman 1993:51). Women are far more likely to base their actions on their perception of fear than on the actual crime rates. However, of rapes perpetrated by strangers, eighty-six per cent are in public places (Lees, 1997: 9). The ideology behind the idea that women are most likely to be raped by a stranger as rapist is still widely held throughout many groups in society (including the media)[15].

The fear of rape changes the way women interact with the public sphere and the built environment. Beneke asserts that rape, or the fear of it, inhibits the way women use space. This fear alters the way in which women live their lives, the opportunities they have and the people they meet and associate with. According to Beneke the fear of rape is, "an assault on the meaning of the world; it alters the feel of the human condition" (1998: 438). The fear of rape alters the way the public sphere feels and often keeps women from using it with the same freedom which men enjoy. This is a reality which

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[15]The media also have a role in contributing to the misconception that rape is only perpetrated by strangers. The news media report stranger rapes much more often than intimate rape. As well television and movies portray stranger rape much for frequently as well. For an in depth argument see, Lisa M. Cuklanz (2000). *Rape on Prime Time: Television, Masculinity and Sexual Violence.* Philadelphia: University of

has not changed with women's increasing participation in the public sphere. Many women are still fearful in public places and men still contribute to that fear by creating a hostile and threatening environment on public streets and in public places. Again cameras do nothing to help the problems as Brown shows cameras do not even reduce women's fear.

Gordon and Riger assert that "crime against women...has the cumulative effect of reinforcing social norms about appropriate behaviour for women" (1989: 122). Fear of rape has the effect of continuing to reinforce that norm into the twenty first century. Women are blamed for crime that is committed against them, especially rape. "She asked for it" is a popular refrain that is echoed in rape defences. Women who are seen as being dressed a certain way, or acting a certain way are seen to somehow have brought on rape. Women in public spaces are perceived as even more to blame for what happens to them. Questions are asked as to why she was in that particular area, or out at all, especially at night. Tim Beneke (1982) writes that women in public are seen as commodities. He asserts that women in public without the company of a male are considered to be asking for whatever they may get. In the same way, you would not leave a stereo on the public street if you did not want it stolen, much popular thinking implies that women should not be alone in public if they do not wish to be assaulted in some form (31).

The onus continues to be on women to avoid rape. Women are taught to fear the urban environment and avoid it (Allison and Wrightsman, 1993). The popular mentality is that in order to avoid rape one must avoid getting into a situation that would facilitate an assault to occur, which often takes the form of avoiding public spaces especially at night. Women are told not to go out alone particularly at night, to steer clear of certain

neighbourhoods and to not wear provocative clothes (ibid). Women are taught through the numerous articles and pamphlets on women's safety to travel with an escort when in public, especially at night. This popular notion reinforces the fear of public spaces that many women feel. When people are afraid for you it is easy to become afraid yourself. Parents, friends, partners fear for us and place the responsibility to stay safe on the individual woman. This also has the potential to severely limit women's life choices. All of this advice given to women is ironic as Mazey writes, "if one believes that a 'women's place is in the home,' one should also realize the rapist often follows the same philosophy" (1983: 40). What is clear after reading the victim surveys and the personal interviews is that women do not feel as though the public streets are a safe place for them to be (Brown 1998; Beneke 1986; Haleigh-West 1996).

It is necessary to explicitly include gender in any analysis because women experience the city differently from men. It is also important in this thesis to address the issues of gender because cameras are often presented as a solution to women's fear in public space. But, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, cameras do little to increase women's actual safety in public and it is questionable as to whether they do anything to increase women's perception of safety in public. There is no reason to believe that women's experiences of cameras in Canadian cities will be any different from women's experiences elsewhere. Cameras cannot address the subtly of sexual harassment and there is not even any mention of the problem of sexual harassment in the documents prepared by the various groups involved in installing and operating the cameras. There is also very little to no engagement with Canadian women's group to ascertain how women may feel about cameras in public spaces. As Brown (1998) has stated it is the trend to

assume women will be in favour of the cameras but to not actually consult any women. This is illustrated by the KPMG report in Sudbury. The researchers asked fewer women (35%) than men (65%) about their feelings and perceptions about video surveillance cameras (2000: 40). Despite the fact that women experience more fear and insecurity in general on the street than do men, the lived experiences of women do not seem to be considered when installing cameras in public spaces.

The last issue that I will discuss is a culmination of all of the previous points. It is the importance of public space as a place for everyone to have access to without being systematically watched. The fear and danger that is often found on the city streets is a real concern, however managing that must be balanced with the belief that public space is an essential element for every community which refers to itself as democratic.

The Need for Democratic Public Space

Davis writes, "the universal and ineluctable consequence of this crusade to secure the city is the destruction of accessible public space" (1995: 226). If truly public space is not considered vital to democracy then the destruction of it is not likely to be regarded as very important. However, I am asserting that the maintenance of truly public space is crucial to maintaining and pursuing democracy and equity. The city and the street are the main site of the public sphere in public space and consequently also the site of the heaviest assault. I do not intend to idealize the city and ignore its imperfections, because there are many problems in the city, problems that are both found exclusively in the city and also in other locations. These problems include violence, extreme poverty, the presence of garbage and other waste, stray animals, crime, pollution, noise, crowds—the

list could continue. However, these things are not inevitable in the city. The current

social order and social priorities of advanced capitalist societies play a role in these

problems and they can not solely be considered urban problems or problems which were

created by the city, but by many intersecting social, political and economic forces. These

problems may reside in the city but are not necessarily of the city[16]. As well in the

previous section I examined the experiences of women in the city which I argue are

different from men's and often negative. Again I will claim that fear and discomfort is

not a product of the city, but the overarching social condition of systemic patriarchal

violence against women. The city then can be seen more as a repository of social

problems, not as the creator of them. In this section I not only argue for the city as it is,

but also as it could be. Cameras in public spaces limit and constrain the possibilities of

the city and those in it.

In this chapter I have discussed public space as a site for the public sphere. The

public sphere is vitally important as a place for all citizens to collectively be heard on

issues that are important to them. Public space is the most accessible and most influential

setting for this public discourse. Ali Madanipour writes that public space is a 'constituent

part' of the public sphere and thus it is important to understand the theories of the public

sphere to gain a complete understanding of public space (1996: 149). Don Mitchell

distinguishes the public sphere often considered an 'abstract realm where democracy

occurs' from the immateriality of physical space. Public space on the other hand

Mitchell claims is material and, "it constitutes an actual site, a place, a ground within and

from which political activity flows" (1995: 117). In this construction it is the material

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[16]For further on this argument see Lyn H. Lofland's *The Public Realm: Exploring the City's Quintessential Social Territory.*

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space that is crucial to the functioning of democracy. The presence of the cameras threatens to limit access for some to public spaces and thus limit the ability of groups to be heard and continue to silence the voices of the marginalized.

Public space has often been seen as a place for the public sphere, a place for debating politics and social issues, a place where all could come and be heard and a place for different view points and where different groups of people could come together regardless of ethnic or class background. Mitchell (1995) writes that public space is an important ideological concept that has roots in the agora of ancient Greece. Habermas talks more contemporarily of the public as being a place for all to gather and discuss, with different points of view present and voiced. However when we examine the public realm we must be aware that these idealized versions of the public likely never existed, despite the claim of inclusion, there have always been those who have been excluded. Even these models are based on a certain type of inclusion, for Greece and Rome it was the citizen, and for Habermas it was bourgeois. Habermas' version of the public sphere has become a dominating version of the ideal public sphere. But, Nancy Fraser critiques Habermas' public sphere as "bourgeois, masculinist and white-supremacist" and a truly democratic and inclusive model of the public sphere must question the Habermasian assumptions (1997:76). These assumptions are that we do not need social equality for political democracy, that one overarching public is better than multiple publics, that private issues are not appropriate and that there must be a separation between civil society and the state (ibid.). Fraser takes issue with all these assumptions.

The idealized, romanticized version of the public resembles the rhetoric of 'the good old days' when politicians were honest and children respected their elders. There

are always better days when the streets were free and open to all and there was no

corporate presence or influence. History tells us that this was not the truth, there was

always private ownership and influence over public space and the activities that went on

there. Public spaces, as Fraser points out, are places of exclusions and Mitchell argues

that all groups who are now a part of the public sphere are there as a result of struggle

and conflict. However, Mitchell does write that it is an important and powerful

ideological construct as it provides a rallying point (1995: 117). Therefore a truly

inclusive model must be based on the recognition of inequality both among individuals

and publics and strive to eliminate them. It must also recognize that those issues labelled

as private need to be brought into the public discussion; and civil society, that part of

society which is non-government, in the form of 'counter-publics' grow stronger in their

ability to be a real and true part of the decision making process.

There are different versions of what public space should be. One vision is that of

the political, as Mitchell (1995) writes, "it is politicized at its very core; and it tolerates

the risks of disorder...as central to its functioning" (115). This is in contrast to the

orderly, sanitized and secure city of local governments and police agencies. Mitchell

writes that public space is a result of these contestations and the competing and often

incompatible ideas of freedom versus order and control.

As well as the streets being places for the marginalized to gain a voice they are

also a place to come into contact with different ideas and cultures which one would not

have opportunity to experience in the individualized life of home and work. The chaos of

the street, the encounters of people of different ethnicities, genders, abilities, religions,

economic statuses, cultures, ideas and ages is what makes it possible to move beyond the

our own lived experiences. Fyfe and Bannister cite Richard Sennett who is concerned that the purification of public space of what he calls 'disorder' is fundamentally damaging to the collective emotional and psychological well being of people in the city (1998: 264). Sennett argues that people need to encounter difference in order to be able to better deal with conflict and without encountering difference and disorder in the city, conflict, when it does occur, is more violent. Fyfe and Bannister use the contemporary example of 'road rage' to illustrate this point (ibid.). The purification of urban space through cameras and other measures, Boddy (1992) argues, imposes a, "middle-class tyranny on the last significant urban realm of refuge for other modes of life" (quoted in Fyfe and Bannister 1998: 263). As Sennett writes, "the great promise of city life is a new kind of confusion possible within its borders, an anarchy that will not destroy men [sic], but make them richer and more mature" (in Fyfe and Bannister 1998: 263).

The need to fight to create and preserve free access to public space, both as a place to simply be in socially and economically and as a place to use politically, is increasingly important and difficult. In Canada there is movement to create laws and policies to restrict activities which are most often associated with the homeless or those living in poverty, these include 'aggressive panhandling', sleeping on the street, squeegee work and others. One of the most obvious attempts to sanitize the streets through legislation is the Ontario Safe Streets Act of 1999. This Act seeks to punish the poor and homeless by making it illegal to ask for money near a bank machine, parking lot, or bus stop, asking for money more than once or approaching parked cars, or soliciting while under the influence of drugs or alcohol (Government of Ontario 1999). These types of initiative seek to create a sanitized space where people are not 'bothered' by panhandlers

or squeegee kids because the police now have greater authority to arrest and incarcerate the poor. These types of laws are part of the same surveillance mechanism as surveillance cameras and in fact video surveillance cameras could easily be used to monitor groups for these types of behaviours.

Chapter 6: The End?

It is easy to dismiss cameras in public spaces as relatively insignificant in light of other problems in the city such as violence and poverty. However as I have attempted to demonstrate in this thesis, cameras in the city are an important concern to democratic societies. Cameras are just one part in an attempt to sanitize the city streets and silence those who do not conform to the consumer culture. Cameras are one component in a larger web of increasing social control and police power that if left unchecked threaten to become normalized and even more powerful.

Post-September 11th

I can not end this work on video surveillance cameras in public places without making reference to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Many theorists have written on the consequences of the attacks on civil liberties, privacy and freedom. David Lyon (2003) in particular has devoted a book on surveillance after September 11th and I think that it is important to address the issues here. Cameras in public places are not new to the urban landscape. Video surveillance cameras have decade-long histories. However in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States cameras have taken on a new significance.

Surveillance technologies are not being met with much resistance in the post-September 11th social climate. Citizens have been mobilized into the fight against terrorism, as Lyon writes, 'now after 9/11 not only is everyone a potential suspect, everyone is a potential spy (2003: 53). While Lyon also points out that inequalities and

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the 'culture of suspicion' are not new to societies, but they are deepening (ibid: 40).

Lyon writes, "security was in, liberty was out" (ibid: 41). For example, immediately after

September 11th there was talk of installing one hundred surveillance cameras in Time

Square with biometric software (Barstow September 16th, 2001). However, despite

claims by the electronic companies to the contrary, it is unlikely that video surveillance

cameras even with facial recognition capabilities would have stopped the hijacking of the

planes on September 11th or would stop a similar act. The New York Surveillance

Camera Players (New York Surveillance Camera Players), a protest group that is vocal

and critical of public video surveillance cameras, documents the number and placement

of cameras in New York City and they claim that before the attacks there were too many

cameras in the World Trade Center area to count. It is obvious that those cameras were

unable to prevent the destruction of the twin towers. The NY SCP write, "surveillance

cameras did not and will never prevent a major crime or terrorist attack. The problems

— of crime, of terrorism — must be solved in other ways" (New York Surveillance

Camera Players). Despite the high visibility and the appearance that something is being

'done', cameras are really quite ineffective for dealing with major violent crimes or

terrorist attacks.

Resistance

> *Only someone completely distrustful of all government*
> *would be opposed to what we are doing with surveillance cameras.*
> NYC Police Commissioner Howard Safir, 27 July 1999.

> *the Surveillance Camera Players:*
> *completely distrustful of all government*
> (New York Surveillance Camera Players)

I do not want to end this thesis with the bleak picture of a completely surveilled society. There are many sites of resistance. In Canada, as I have mentioned previously, there is the presence of the Federal Privacy Commissioner who has taken a vital role in slowing the growth of video surveillance in Canada and if successful, his *Charter* challenge will make it very difficult for Canadian cities to implement public space video surveillance schemes. There are other forms of organized resistance as well. These include 'Shoot Back Day' which is an annual international event on December 24th when people are encouraged take pictures of the cameras. This allows people to look back at the watcher thereby reclaiming the gaze. December 24th was chosen because it is a day of mass consumerism and cameras are a tangible representation of the consumer lifestyle. The New York Surveillance Camera Players (NY SCP) is a group of political activists who through their website disseminate anti-camera position papers and opinions. As well they attempt to map the locations of cameras in New York and plot them on a map which is also posted on their website. In addition they actively resist by performing small skits in front of the camera thereby turning the camera lens into a theatre and distracting the operators from seeing anything but the players. Their skits include the last scene from George Orwell's *1984* and scenes from Samuel Beckett's *Waiting For Godot*. There are similar groups in Arizona, Louisiana, Sweden, Italy and Lithuania. (Surveillance Camera Players Website). The NY SCP have received minor attention recently with a positive write-up in the movie magazine *Famous* (Davidson 2002: 38).

Another form of resistance is not as organized as the NY SCP or Shoot Back Day is, but it also involves taking the power from the authorities by turning the gaze back at them. Such actions are using handheld camcorders to record the actions of members of

authority groups such as the police. Such 'caught in the act' video includes the Rodney King arrest and beating in 1991, the Ottawa police officer allegedly assaulting a woman by banging her head against the police cruiser in 2001 and even more recently the two video recordings that captured the police in the U.S. on two separate occasions violently arresting suspects. This creates a democratization of surveillance in which the power of the gaze is reversed and held by those who do not hold authority.

Individuals and groups also find more subtle ways of resisting. Graham and Marvin write, "many young people 'develop strategies for maintaining their presence' against the disciplinary practices deployed against them, whether it be through asserting their rights as consumers, directly dealing with conflicts from security staff, developing their own covert spaces or coordinating through the Internet" (2001: 395). People find ways to avoid the cameras or to make themselves even more visible.

The Future

While I cannot predict what will happen in Canada in regards to the cameras, I can make an informed analysis that there will be more cities that will see cameras as a legitimate option to increase the police's ability to exercise social control. The *Safe Streets Act* in Ontario criminalizes behaviours which cameras can help detect, such as actions and locations associated with panhandling. Municipal governments and police services do not seem concerned with the criticism of the Privacy Commissioner or any of the other civil liberties and anti-poverty groups (among others) who have been vocal in protesting the cameras. The KPMG report seen in the light of Ditton's argument (1998) makes it obvious that public opinion can be manipulated. As well, without a clear

understanding of what the cameras actually do, citizens may not be overly concerned with cameras in the city. The news coverage seems to support that view. People seem to view the cameras as the protector of the city and those who disagree with their usage obviously do not care about the good of the majority. Politicians and police agents report that if you 'have done nothing wrong' the cameras should not concern you, as though increased surveillance should only be the concern of criminals. Newspaper columns in Canada reflect this view. Journalists write that all of this concern about privacy is holding up movement towards a safer city and privacy concerns really are not that big of a deal (Osvald 2001). Fiske (1998) argues that the members of the normal majority are unlikely to be concerned or even notice a technology such as surveillance cameras as they have little or no impact on their daily lives. This lack of opposition however, does not mean that there should be a widespread assumption that there is a) no public concern about cameras and b) that cameras should be adopted on a wide scale.

My purpose behind writing this thesis was three fold, first was to link the public space literature with the literature on video surveillance, second, was to examine the holes in the literature when it came to examining women's experiences and third was to examine cameras in Canada. The situation in Canada is nowhere near the level of surveillance camera density in many other places including Britain and the United States, but trends are emerging which indicate that widespread use of cameras in Canada may be coming. However, the Canadian Privacy Commissioner is working to prevent that from happening. The outcome of the *Charter* challenge will dramatically affect the number of future cameras in Canada. There is also more academic discourse surrounding video surveillance in public places specifically and surveillance generally in Canada. Issues

which may have been regarded in the past with only passing interest are being examined with more intensity as the 'surveillance society' becomes more overt.

The connection between public space and cameras is quite clear. I attempted to show that cameras are not only part of a larger surveillance mechanism, but a part of changes to the city. The postmodern city embraces the technology of the cameras. The trend of securing the city supports the widespread use of cameras that often become part of the architectural features of the city. Cameras, I argue, are not a positive solution to the problems of the city. They control and regulate public spaces and curtail activity that happens there. Open and accessible public spaces are crucial to the functioning of a healthy democracy and cameras threaten the ability of people to move freely and unobserved through space.

Substantial work has been done in the area of women in public space, but relatively little done in the area of public harassment and its relation to women's fear. I build on Gardners' claim that it is the daily harassment that women face on the street that leads to the anxiety many women feel when in public. I suggest that cameras are useless in combating women's fear of and on the street and the use of cameras is based on a male model of fear that leaves out women's experiences. Cameras are not helpful in creating safer streets for women or even the feeling of safer streets and perhaps more problematic is the fact that they draw attention away from the truly dangerous places for women: their homes.

This thesis proposes that cameras in general (and Canada is no different) are part of a larger surveillance mechanism which aims to sort and control marginalized groups of people including the urban poor, the homeless, youth and people of racial and ethnic

minority. It has been discussed throughout this thesis that video surveillance cameras are employed based on stereotypical and discriminatory categories that in effect means that already marginalized groups are subjected to more intensive and invasive surveillance. David Lyon writes, "surveillance today sorts people into categories, assigning worth and risk, in ways that have real effects on their life-chances. Deep discrimination occurs, thus making surveillance not merely a matter of personal privacy but of social justice" (2002: 1).

The expense of installing, maintaining and monitoring the cameras and violation of civil liberties of all who are slightly or intensely monitored do not justify the use of video surveillance in public places for crime reduction. However, the use of cameras can be understood within the larger theoretical framework of the postmodern city and the attempts to fortify and sanitize the city for consumer purposes. The cameras are used to create spaces of exclusion to keep out the flawed consumer (Bauman 1997), the stranger (Lofland 1998) and the general Other. Cameras in Canada are being used to monitor and control 'anti-social' behaviours that are most often associated with 'the poor' and the homeless, those who use the street as a space to live and/or earn money. Cameras are used to exclude groups of youth, especially young men of racial and ethnic minorities, people who use the streets as a social space to gather and 'hang out'. And cameras are used to exclude political dissenters, those who use the streets to spread a political message and gather with others to create a louder united voice. Cameras are being used in Canada much in the same way they are being used in Britain and the United States, to create mall-like spaces of exclusion and inclusion dedicated to consumption. In this thesis I have presented a picture of cameras within a theoretical framework of

surveillance studies and urban sociology. There is little work on surveillance cameras in Canadian cities and it is my hope that this thesis has contributed to an understanding of how the implementation of cameras is progressing and the problems associated with cameras in public spaces.

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Appendix 1: Video Surveillance Cameras in Canada

This section reviews the Canadian communities that have cameras, plan for cameras, have had cameras that have been removed or have rejected camera proposals. These communities are Sherbrooke, Sudbury, Kelowna, Yellowknife, London, Hamilton, Vancouver, Toronto, Winnipeg and Brockville. The technical details (such as funding, placement, administration and day-to-day operations), the purpose and the rationale are discussed and a preliminary picture of cameras in Canada is described. The resulting description is then analyzed in terms of a number of factors in order to try to isolate the socially significant features of these developments.

Methodology

The method for this section consists of secondary source analysis of newspapers, websites and press releases. My data for this project came from a number of sources. These included Canadian news sources: *Toronto Star, The Ottawa Citizen, Globe and Mail, The London Free Press* and *The Victoria Times Colonist*; CBC Online News; and a variety of related websites which posted archived newspaper articles. I gathered data from Police service websites including the Sudbury Regional Police Service (SRPS), The Hamilton Police Service (HPS), The Vancouver Police Department (VPD), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). I also received information from the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner's Office and the Federal Privacy Commissioner's Office and Official Press Releases from the privacy commissioners. I decided against interviews with the various individuals involved because of time constraints and also I did not believe that for the scope of this project personal interviews were necessary.

Canadian Cities

Sherbrooke, Quebec

Sherbrooke, Quebec is a community of 77 000 people located in South Eastern

Quebec. It was the first city in Canada to install video surveillance cameras in 1992 on

the main street of the town (Stoddart 2002). The Sherbrooke police operated the camera

the purpose of which was to curb delinquent behaviour in the downtown (ibid). The

Commission d'acces a l'information du Quebec (CAI) ruled that the cameras violated

Quebec's privacy legislation and it was removed. There is not much information about

this location. There are however industry reports of cameras remaining operational in

Sherbrooke as well as in Hull and Drummondville ("CCTV International Newsletter"

2003). CAI is unaware of any other cameras located in Quebec (Stoddart 2002).

Sudbury, Ontario

Sudbury is a community of approximately 156 000 people and is the largest

centre in north eastern Ontario. The main economic stable of the community is nickel

and copper mining and it is the home to Laurentian University. Sudbury was the first

centre in Ontario to install video surveillance cameras in 1996 when, after a vacation to

Glasgow, Scotland, and a viewing of the schemes there, the Sudbury police chief initiated

his own video surveillance programme. Chief McCauley believed that video surveillance

cameras would be a useful tool for his police force (KPMG 2000: 9)[17]. Sudbury Regional Police Service (SRPS) began the video surveillance programme. During the next three years the number of cameras grew to five that is the number of cameras installed today. Three of the cameras are located in or near downtown in close proximity of each other, another is located near police headquarters and the other is further away from the other four, near the rail yard. They are all situated in what is considered 'downtown' in one policing zone (ibid: 13). All five of the cameras have the ability to pan, tilt and zoom and are thus able to move from side-to-side and up-and-down and have a wider range of vision than a stationary camera (ibid).

The initial costs and the continuing cost of operating the system have been raised independently of direct government funding or taxes. This money has come from a variety of sources including The Lions Club, Sudbury Metro Society (chamber of commerce group), Northern Voice and Video (who donated the first camera), Sudbury Hydro, CP Rail and Ontario Works and various local insurance companies and businesses (KPMG 2000: 9). The Lion's Club is the major contributor and the cameras are nicknamed the "Lion's Eye in the Sky". KPMG reports that from 1996 to 2000 the costs of operating the system have totalled $31 000--this figure does not include the initial purchase of the cameras. The first three cameras and other equipment cost $66 500. The rental of the fibre optic cable to transmit the images from the camera to the monitors is the most expensive part of the operation, but Sudbury Hydro subsides some of this cost

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[17] KPMG is an international consulting firm that was hired by the Sudbury Police Service to audit the camera system. The Report is relied on for factual information in this thesis despite the some questions about the reliability of the analysis. I have done this cautiously, but with the rationale that the factual information is the 'official account' that is endorsed by the SRPS. The Report is relied on for information about funding, dates and the official rationale and benefits. I apply my own analysis to the official facts and figures, but the KPMG Report provides sufficient information to begin an analysis from.

(ibid: 37).

Most of the camera operators are Ontario Works 'clients' and a few are placement students from Cambrian College and police officers who are on restricted duty (KPMG 2000: 37). Ontario Works is the social assistance program in Ontario that claims to provide training and job opportunities for people in need. Ontario Works helps to fund the system in return for training their 'clients'. The images that the cameras capture are monitored from a location next to the police service dispatch centre (ibid: 13). The cameras are not monitored continuously as a result of lack of staff, often these unwatched periods are at night and on weekends; at these times the cameras are on an automatic pattern (ibid). There are signs on the roads leading into the downtown indicating that there are cameras, but none in the actual downtown area (ibid). The images that the cameras capture are recorded and kept for two months and then taped over unless they are needed for a police investigation (Government Product News August 1, 1999).

The goals of the camera project were primarily to decrease criminal and anti-social behaviour and also to increase the ability of SRPS to act on crimes that actually occur, by both being able to spot a crime in progress and alert police and assist in solving a crime after the fact (KPMG 2000: 15). The type of crimes that the police were hopeful would decrease were those of violence against persons and theft and destruction of property (ibid: 16). The anti-social behaviour refers to mostly 'nuisance' behaviours such as intoxication, 'aggressive panhandling' and harassing conduct and anything else that would pose an annoyance to people with 'legitimate' reasons for being downtown (shopping or working) (ibid). Prostitution and drug related offences were also considered under the label of "anti-social".

According to the official account the cameras are doing their 'job'. Crime rates show that in the three years following the installation violent crime in the area monitored by the camera decreased thirty eight percent and property crime decreased by forty four percent (ibid: 17-18). The category of anti-social behaviour was more ambiguous. Some behaviours decreased while others increased. Acts involving disturbing the peace and intoxication fluctuated. It is speculated by the KPMG researchers that perhaps because as it became easier to monitor those behaviours more charges were laid and thus acted as a deterrent for others, this is a claim that is not backed with any evidence (ibid: 29). Prostitution decreased and then increased during the time period since the cameras were installed and drug offences increased sharply and then decreased over the same time period (ibid: 30). The speculation that the cameras are helping the police detect these types of behaviours and thus make arrests does not seem to be supported as the statistics fluctuate. Overall the police believe that the cameras have resulted in fewer crimes being committed and acted to both deter and catch people engaged in anti-social acts without displacing any of the crime to other areas of the city (ibid: 31).

The SRPS hired KPMG to audit the video monitoring system to evaluate the "economy, effectiveness and efficiency of the monitoring system" before the project was expanded into other areas of the region (KPMG: 3). In 2000 KMPG released their report that was positive about the overall picture in Sudbury post-cameras. It seemed to confirm that the cameras did lower the crime rate and that people did not have concerns about being monitored by cameras. However the methodology of the report should be questioned before the validity of these conclusions are accepted. For example fifty-eight people were asked how they felt about the cameras (out of a total population of 156 000)

and from that it was concluded that, "residents of Sudbury approve of CCTV monitoring for law enforcement purposes" (ibid: 41). This report is also significant because it has been used by other organizations to support plans of installing video surveillance systems.

Kelowna, British Columbia

Kelowna is a community of approximately 96 000 people and is the largest city in the Okanagan Valley in the interior of British Columbia. The economy of Kelowna is based on the fruit industry, forestry and manufacturing. The town is also the location for two campuses of the Okanagan University College. This is the only community outside of Ontario to have permanent public space video surveillance cameras. The camera was activated February 23, 2001 and is located above Queensway bus loop near City Hall that is an area where the RCMP claim has a lot a drug activity (Sorenson 2001). The cited purpose for installing the cameras is to control the drug and prostitution in that particular area of town ("Privacy watchdog pulls RCMP into court" 2002). The RCMP claim that since the camera has been activated calls for service in the monitored area have decreased substantially (Sorensen 2001).

The camera that is in operation now was preceded by a trial camera that was destroyed when the pole on which it was mounted was set on fire in the summer of 1999 (Clarke 2000). The new camera has a powerful zoom ability and can be operated both by a joystick control or be set to sweep automatically (ibid). The cost of running the project for the first year was $108 000, half of this funding comes from the RCMP ($54 000) and half from community donations including $5000 from the Downtown Kelowna

Association (Clarke 2000). An additional $22 000 came from the City of Kelowna (*Kelowna Daily Courier* 2001; Clarke 2000). The City had budgeted $100 000 for an additional five cameras (*Kelowna Daily Courier* 2001), but that plan was shelved in October 2002 when it was concluded that the one camera was sufficient (Seymour 2002).

There are four civilians who have been trained to monitor the camera and they view the images on one television screen that is located in the RCMP detachment (Clarke 2000). The images are recorded on two tapes one which is taped over every day and one that is kept for six months (*Kelowna Daily Courier* Feb. 24, 2001). RCMP policy states that signs to alert people that they are under surveillance must be visible and there are signs on all streets leading up to the camera (Clarke 2000).

The supporters of the cameras include the RCMP, the Downtown Kelowna Association, which is an organization to promote business and events in the downtown area, the City of Kelowna and Mayor Walter Gray (*Kelowna Daily Courier* February 24, 2001). There is also a claim that polls show that eighty per cent of citizens of Kelowna support the camera, but I have not been able to access that poll or the results ("Privacy watchdog pulls RCMP into court"2002). The RCMP is the only police organization that falls under the jurisdiction of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (PCC), George Radwanski, the other communities are governed by municipal and provincial legislation. And while the PCC has been vocally opposed to the other camera schemes in Canada, but does not have any authority over the municipal police forces who are under the jurisdiction of provincial privacy commissioners. Given that fact the PCC has ruled against the camera in Kelowna and caused the police to suspend twenty-four hour recording. On June 21st, 2002 the PCC launched a *Charter* Challenge with the Supreme

Court of British Columbia. (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2002c).

Yellowknife, Northwest Territories

Yellowknife is a community of over 18 000 whose industry relies on mining, transportation, communications and administrative centres (City of Yellowknife 2002). In May 2001 a company called Centurion Security Services installed four video cameras on the roof of a building in downtown Yellowknife to capture images of the main street. The camera images were monitored twenty-four hours a day by staff of Centurion. The operators watched the images from the cameras on two video display terminals but did not videotape the images (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2001b). The Centurion staff reported that they contacted the police on several occasions when they observed incidents on the street (ibid). Centurion reported that they believed that video surveillance would be, "of great benefit to the Yellowknife community on the whole" (ibid). The cameras were not requested by the town or the police and were paid for entirely by Centurion. The purpose behind the installation of the cameras was to demonstrate the usefulness of video surveillance in order to gain federal contracts for the private investigation company that it is trying to start (ibid).

This situation was observed by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut who filed a complaint with the PCC. This location fell under the jurisdiction of the Privacy Commissioner because of the fact that all business ventures in the Territories are considered federal business and thus subject to federal laws. The PCC ruled that the Centurion cameras violated the *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act* of 2000 (*PIPEDA*). This is a new

piece of legislation is designed to included all private institutions not currently covered by the *Privacy Act* and will be in full force by 2004. *PIPEDA* requires those collecting information to gain consent when collecting, disclosing or using personal information and make known what purpose the information is being collected for. *PIPEDA* also requires that the information only be used for the purposes stated at collection. Organizations can also only collect, use or disclose information which a 'reasonable person would consider appropriate under the circumstances' (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2001c). Unlike the *Privacy Act PIPEDA* does not specify that the photo image must be recorded in order to apply, so cameras that are not recording are in violation of *PIPEDA*.

The Commissioner ruled that the cameras violated *PIPEDA* in several ways. Firstly he determined that the cameras were collecting personal information in the form of identifiable physical features of individuals information could later be to identify the person in another situation. Secondly he ascertained that the information collected was done so for the purposes of commercial activity. The Commissioner made that decision based on the fact that Centurion claimed that the cameras were installed and operated as a marketing demonstration for potential clients. Lastly Radwanski concluded that the information was being collected without obtaining consent of the individuals being monitored. The cameras in Yellowknife were removed within a week of their activation (in early May 2001) and before the Commissioner released his decision; however the Commissioner did state that any other attempts to monitor public space would be unlawful. Radwanski is quoted as saying, "people have a right to go about their business without feeling that their actions are being systematically observed and monitored. That is the very essence of the fundamental human right to privacy, which is a crucial element

of our freedom" (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2001b). This has been the only

successful ruling against cameras to date.

London, Ontario

The 'success' in Sudbury has been the model for proposals in other Canadian

cities including London, Ontario. London is an urban centre located south west of

Toronto and is home to approximately 338 575 people. The city is the location of the

University of Western Ontario. London was the second Ontario community to install

cameras in their downtown core. The sixteen cameras were activated on November 9th,

2001 (Neighbourhood Watch London, Program Overview 2001). The motivation behind

the cameras was the stabbing deaths of two men in the same area. The first occurred in

1995 and the second in 1999. It was the latter, the death of twenty year old Michael

Goldie-Ryder who was stabbed trying to protect two women, which provided the catalyst

for the camera scheme. An article in the *London Free Press* states, "the brutal attack

galvanized members of the community to push for a safer downtown with measures such

as surveillance cameras" (Matyas 2001a). A committee named "Friends Against

Senseless Endings" (FASE) was formed and included as founding members Goldie-

Ryder's friends and family (ibid). The groups set out to raise the $235,000 needed to

fund the purchase and installation of sixteen wireless digital cameras. Two cameras were

to be installed at the intersections where the two men were killed as well as at fourteen

other locations. That money was raised and the cameras were installed (but not

activated) as of October 29th, 2001. The largest amount of funding has come from an

anonymous donor ($50 000), the London Downtown Business Association ($43 000), the

Bank of Nova Scotia ($24 000). Six other donors have given $12 000 (the cost of one camera) these are, the Hampton Group, The London Free Press Newspaper, Ceeps and Barney's (a pub in the area where the cameras are located), Aboutown Transportation Ltd. (a transportation company), the London Police Services Board and the University of Western Ontario Board of Governors (Matyas 2001a).

The City of London lists six objectives behind installing video surveillance cameras. The first, is to deter crime and anti-social behaviour; secondly, is to increase the quality of the police reaction to crime; thirdly, is to improve the feelings of safety and security for people in the downtown core; fourthly, to improve the economic activity in the downtown; fifthly, to control the displacement to surrounding areas; and sixthly, to use the images recorded by the system as to identify suspects (London, Canada 2001). Shelley Lawson writes that the purpose behind the cameras is to, "to improve community safety, crime prevention and the desirability of the city as a place for shopping, business and leisure" (2001).

Since the cameras' activation Commissioners at City Hall have been responsible for the monitoring of the system (London, Canada 2001). The information on the tapes is kept for seventy-two hours unless it 'has been requisitioned for use' (ibid). The areas that are monitored by the cameras are marked with signs at every major intersection beside the cameras (ibid). The London cameras are audited by the Neighbourhood Watch London to randomly review sections of the tapes to ensure that the videotaping has complied with the Code of Practice and the Human Rights Code (ibid). The London Downtown CCTV Steering Management Group is responsible for evaluating the costs, the effectiveness, and the administration of the system (ibid).

Hamilton, Ontario

Hamilton, Ontario is an urban centre located about an hour west of Toronto; the population is 686 900 (Statistics Canada 2003). The city is the location of McMaster University. Hamilton does not yet have cameras up in public spaces, but it appears likely that they will shortly. The Hamilton Police Service (HPS) has created a strategic communication/market plan which is available on their website. The HPS claim that there is 'disproportionately high' crime in the downtown core that the cameras are an attempt to deal with (Shea 2002: 1). The reasons why the HPS want to have cameras are threefold. One, to attempt to create a safe environment in the downtown; two, to be a component of downtown revitalization; and three, improve the police's ability to deal with the crime that is committed as well as 'anti-social' behaviour which in Hamilton is defined as 'drug use/trafficking, prostitution, public intoxication and panhandling' (ibid.).

There are five goals for the cameras: one, to 'increase of economic activity in the downtown'; two, to 'deter crime and anti-social behaviour'; three to increase people's feeling of safety in the downtown; four, to 'control crime displacement to surrounding areas not monitored by the cameras'; and five, to capture evidence to use to identify people committing crimes (Shea 2002: 1). As well the plan notes that video surveillance is seen as, 'an opportunity to meet the needs of downtown business and property owners by increasing the sense of security, thus reducing the fear of crime, in the core area' (ibid: 2). The HPS freely admit that they are planning to use video surveillance mainly as a deterrent for criminals, supposing the visible addition of cameras will discourage people from committing a criminal act (ibid: 3). The HPS argue that video surveillance is not

designed to deal with the problems that contribute to crime, but to provide a deterrent to crimes of opportunity.

The cameras are supported by the City of Hamilton Downtown Renewal Division, area business owners, the two core Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) the Municipal Government and various city committees (Shea 2002: 3). Four cameras (a fifth was donated by the vendor, Panasonic Canada) and eight monitors have already been purchased with funds from the HPS budget (ibid: 4). As to who will monitor the cameras, the plan is to have highly trained volunteers monitor the cameras in an area which would be close to HPS staff so that there could be sharing of information (ibid). The cameras would be recording activity on the street 24 hours a day on digital tape and the tapes would likely be kept for two months ("Smile, downtown Hamilton is getting video surveillance cameras, police say" 2002). The idea for video surveillance cameras is supported by the experience in Sudbury Ontario (Shea 2002: 6). The Privacy Commissioner of Canada is vocally opposed to cameras in Hamilton (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2002a).

Vancouver, British Columbia

Vancouver is another city that has plans for cameras. Vancouver is the second largest city (after Toronto), with 2 122 700 people to consider video surveillance cameras (Statistics Canada 2003). Vancouver is proposing to install twenty-five cameras in the Downtown Eastside, Strathcona, Chinatown and Gastown. A similar proposal failed in 1999 because of lack of public support, but the current proposal seems to have been met with more backing ("Street cameras support in Polls" 2002: A4). The goals for the

cameras include, creating safer streets by reducing crime and the 'public nuisances' associated with crime, reduce drug activities, and created a network of police, government enforcement agencies, health and social services and the community (Neighbourhood Safely Watch Discussion Document 2001: 15). The plan is to have trained, accredited, and well paid 911 Communication Operators to monitor the cameras (ibid). The cameras will be monitored from two locations. One will be the Vancouver Police Department and it will be the central site to receive the video signals. The second site is the E-COMM that will be the main monitoring site[18].

The Vancouver Police Department (VPD) initiated the project and the Forensic Video Unit (FVU) will run the programme and report to the Chief Constable who in turn reports to an ethics committee named Citizen's Advisory for Urban Safety Enhancement (C.A.U.S.E). C.A.U.S.E. is made up of private citizens, community representatives, professionals and police (Neighbourhood Safety Watch Discussion Document 2001: 15). The Neighbourhood Safety Watch Discussion Document asserts that the VPD should only support the cameras if the conformed to the *Privacy Act* and meets the requirements set out by the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia (ibid).

Toronto, Ontario

Toronto, Ontario is another Canadian city that is considering video surveillance cameras for their downtown streets. Toronto is the largest city in Canada with over five million people as of 2002 (Statistics Canada 2003). The areas that are under consideration for monitoring are the new Dundas Square, the Entertainment District and

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[18] The E-COMM Centre is the communications facility for the Vancouver Police Service that houses the 911 radio dispatch service and the post-disaster Emergency Operations Centre. It is also the proposed

other 'neighbourhoods-at-risk' (Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board (Minutes) October 18, 2001). The main objectives for the cameras usage are preventing and deterring crime and creating a safe environment so as to reduce 'the cost and impact of crime to the community', enhancing the safety of both the police and the public, identifying criminal activity and suspects and gather evidence, documenting the action of the police for both review of tactics and to safeguard the officer and citizen's rights (ibid).

The cost of the program are estimated to be between $873 780 and $1 269 960 depending on who is monitoring the cameras, civilians or Toronto Police Officers. There may also be addition costs for installation (Minutes). Toronto is considering having the cameras monitored by City Staff in conjunction with the Ministry of Transportation and using existing staff members and some additional personnel (ibid). The Downtown Yonge Street Business Improvement Area has shown support for this project. The Toronto Police Accountability Coalition (TPAC), a police watchdog group, has expressed concern over this project and recommends against any long-term or permanent public place surveillance (Toronto Police Accountability Coalition 2002).

In March 2002 Toronto Police have declared that the cost of the cameras was too high for their officers to be watching the cameras screens and they do not wish to be seen by the public as 'Big Brother' (Quinn 2002: B1). The police still support the project, but cannot afford to run it, so the project is on hold until an alternate source of funding can be located.

Winnipeg, Manitoba

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monitoring site for any video surveillance project.   134

Winnipeg, Manitoba has a population of 685 500 and is located in South Eastern

Manitoba (Statistics Canada 2003) and had been considering installing video surveillance

cameras in the downtown core to deal with drug-dealing, prostitution and panhandling

("Winnipeg rejects installing 13 surveillance cameras in downtown core" 2002). The

Chief of the Winnipeg police would like to pursue the idea of installing cameras, but

wants to wait until the PFC *Charter* Challenge has cleared the courts before spending the

approximate $1.24 million for the thirteen planned cameras (ibid).

Brockville, Ontario

Brockville, Ontario is a community of approximately 22 000 located in Southern

Ontario. The Mayor of Brockville, Ben TeKamp, raised the issue of installing video

surveillance in 1999 to deter vandalism and rowdy behaviour in the downtown core and

the waterfront which are considered unsafe at night ("Brockville bars Big Brother" 1999:

A12). The plan was to install three to five cameras which would have cost $75 000 to

purchase. The cameras would have monitored about eight blocks and been viewed by

dispatchers at police headquarters (ibid). The proposal failed because of outcry by the

citizens. After the Mayor announced the proposal at least five hundred complaints were

filed with the city and the proposal was dropped (ibid).

Analyzing the Survey

It is difficult to make a general statement about the cities in Canada with cameras

and the reasons for their installations. There are no common factors linking all of the

cities. Unlike the pattern in Britain, where camera schemes started in the major centres

and moved out from central locations to smaller centres (Graham 1999), the communities

with cameras in Canada are all are under half a million people (Toronto and Vancouver

are larger, but have not yet installed cameras). The cities that have cameras or plans for

cameras seem to be random. However, there are some similarities in the experiences that

are significant. Figure 1 shows in tabular form the key features of video surveillance in

Canadian cities.

Communities have found funding for cameras from both private and public

sources. The purchase and maintenance of the cameras in Sudbury is funded completely

without the use of public money. Some of the operating costs have come from the police

as there are occasions when the cameras are monitored by officers. The cameras in

London were funded almost entirely without public money, a small percentage coming

from the London Police Service. Daily operating costs in London are paid for by the city

because the people who monitor the cameras are commissioners at City Hall. The

cameras and operation is Yellowknife was funded entirely by Centurion Security Service

as a marketing demonstration. The camera in Kelowna is funded by the RCMP and the

City of Kelowna as well as the Downtown Kelowna Association. The Hamilton

equipment was paid for from the Hamilton Police Services budget. The funding for the

Toronto and Vancouver projects has yet to be determined.

The operators of all of the systems are police forces, except for Centurion

Security in Yellowknife. Who actually monitors the camera or cameras varies from city

to city. Kelowna and London use trained civilians; Sudbury uses lower paid Ontario

Works clients or co-op students; Toronto and Vancouver plan to use trained civilians or

police officers; and Hamilton plans to use volunteers. This is interesting because whether

or not the funding came from the police budget, city funds or private donation, the police forces are in control of the cameras. This means that an agency of the government is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the camera systems including storing the videotapes. This is one of the things that makes public video surveillance different from private cameras; the 'state' is responsible for gather and storing information on its citizens.

The objectives for installing the cameras are all very similar. They include improving the quality of service offered by the police, improving the sense of safety for the public, decreasing/deterring crime, using footage to catch/identify suspects in crimes and revitalizing the downtown area to increase economic vitality. Sudbury, London, Hamilton, Vancouver, and Toronto all list these as reasons for utilizing camera technology in public places. Kelowna claims that the cameras are being used to control drug activity and prostitution. Sherbrooke was using its camera to 'curb delinquent behaviours'. Drug activity, prostitution, and anti-social behaviour are all activities that are cited as reasons for installing cameras. The desire to control these types of activities creates a situation in which certain types of people are monitored more than others. There have been explicit statements that the communities within Canada plan to use cameras to control and manage anti-social and nuisance behaviours.

The locations of the cameras within the communities are also very similar. They all have located (or plan to locate) their cameras in the downtown core. The research illustrates that cameras are used in downtown consumer areas in an attempt to replicate a mall-like atmosphere (Williams and Johnstone 2000). It is also significant that while much of the funding for the cameras comes from private sources it is the police who are

responsible for managing the system and thus the public will be contributing to the cost of their continued operation . There are also indications that the police may be operating the cameras to appease the business community. For example, Hamilton has developed a 'Strategic Communication/Market Plan' in which they state, "we see CCTV as an opportunity to meet the needs of downtown business and property owners by increasing the sense of security, thus reducing the fear of crime, in the core area" (2002: 2). Cameras in malls are used to keep certain people out and cameras in cities are attempting to do the same thing. Those running the system in London claim that the cameras will be used to increase the 'desirability' of the downtown as a shopping area (Lawson 2001).

There are several communities that have resisted the placement of cameras on their streets. Sherbrooke and Yellowknife have both had cameras that have come down, not from citizen protest, but from intervention from privacy officials. In Sherbrooke the CAI ruled that the camera violated Quebec privacy laws and it was removed. The cameras in Yellowknife were also subject to a complaint by the Northwest Territories and Nunavut Information and Privacy Commissioner. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada ruled that the cameras violated *PIPEDA* and the cameras were deactivated by the time the ruling was rendered. Kelowna is also in conflict with the PCC over the camera located there. The PCC ruled that video recording people on the street violated the *Privacy Act* and was successful in stopping twenty-four hour video recording, but has not been able to get the camera removed. In response to that the PCC has initiated a charter challenge that claims that the camera violates the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2002c). The Privacy Commissioner has been outspoken about his dislike of video surveillance cameras in public spaces, but does not have any authority

over the cameras in the local jurisdiction in Ontario[19].

Radwanski has been working to get the camera in Kelowna removed since it was installed. Unlike the police services in London and Sudbury the RCMP falls under the jurisdiction of federal privacy laws because it is a federal organization. A complaint was registered with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (PCC) by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, David Loukidelis, against the camera in Kelowna (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2001d). The PCC investigated the claim and ruled on October 4, 2001 that the camera in Kelowna was in violation of the *Privacy Act* because it recorded personal information that was not related directly to the operation of the government agency (ibid). As well, the *Act* stresses that only the minimum amount of information should be collected. This does not include the, 'monitoring and recording the activities of vast numbers of law-abiding citizens as they go about their day-to-day lives' (ibid). The RCMP complied with Radwanski's decision to a point and stopped the continuous video recording on August 28, 2001, they now only record images when there is suspicious activity occurring, or 'likely to occur'.

This concession is not sufficient, according to Radwanski, and while it may comply with the letter of the law (the *Privacy Act* only refers to recorded data), Radwanski is not satisfied that it complies with the spirit of the *Act*. He bases this opinion on the fact that while people perhaps do not have the expectation of total privacy in public, they do have a right to some level of privacy. Radwanski believes that privacy is a basic human right and should not be violated for the vague promise of less public crime. He writes, "we recognize that there is more to safety and a high quality of life

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[19]The regional police services fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial privacy commissioner Ann Cavoukian who up until now has been reluctant to engage with the issue of video surveillance in public

than merely the absence of crime. This same perspective...needs to be brought to the issue of surveillance cameras in out streets and public places" (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2001d). People can avoid entering a store or building if they do not wish to be video recorded, however that option is not open when it comes to public streets. And while there are signs informing people that the area is monitored, Radwanski rightly points out that it is no less a violation when people are informed that their rights are being violated (ibid). Radwanski references a 1990 Supreme Court Decision, Regina vs. Wong where the Court warned that the state cannot have free reign to gather video data and that electronic surveillance mechanisms must be used in moderation lest they 'annihilate privacy'(ibid).

Given the fact that the Kelowna RCMP did not remove the cameras from the public area Radwanski enlisted former Supreme Court Justice Gerard La Forest to write an opinion of whether the cameras violated the *Privacy Act* and the *Charter*. La Forest found that in fact public video cameras violated both. La Forest asserts firstly that general video surveillance is not exclusively a legal issue; it has socio-political factors as well and has implications for the future of the interactions between the individual and the state. La Forest found that continuous recording of video cameras violated the *Privacy Act*. He also adds that there are questions as to whether or not video cameras without continuous recording are even effective in reducing crime and even if continuous recording has any effect in reducing crime. La Forest concludes, "continuous recording significantly diminishes privacy without adding appreciably to the RCMP's ability to carry out its legitimate activities". La Forest also examines whether video surveillance cameras in public places are a violation under the *Charter*. He concludes that under s. 8

places.

of the *Charter*, the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, video surveillance by the police can constitute an unreasonable search. The Supreme Court has supported that interpretation on many occasions. La Forest also writes that while we may not have a "reasonable expectation that the police will never observe our activities in public spaces...surely it is reasonable to expect that they will not always do so" (Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2002b).

There are cases of citizen protests against the use of cameras. The first was in Brockville where in the few days following the mayor's announcement that the city was pursuing a plan to install cameras hundreds of citizens filed complaints with the city. The camera plans were immediately discontinued and have not been raised again ("Brockville bars Big Brother" 1999: A12). In 1999 the City of Vancouver raised a proposal to place cameras in the Downtown Eastside. This proposal was also abandoned after citizen protest ("Street cameras supported in polls" 2002: A4). However Vancouver has recently renewed their efforts to install cameras in several Vancouver neighbourhoods and the news media reports that the proposal has the support of the public (ibid). The other documented instance of resistance occurred in Kelowna when in the summer of 1999 the city put up a trial camera as a prelude the permanent one. The wooden pole that the camera was attached to was set on fire by 'vandals' that summer (Clarke February 17, 2000). The city installed another camera in February 2001 and mounted it on a metal pole to prevent a repeat of the destruction of the first camera.

It appears that official intervention by the privacy commissioners, the PCC in particular, has been the most effective in making headway against the operation of cameras in Canada. Radwanski in particular has campaigned consistently against

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cameras in public places, but he has limited jurisdiction and can only speak out against municipal police forces using cameras. The citizen protest in Brockville was effective, but the protests in Vancouver and Kelowna merely delayed, but did not halt the camera plans. It can also be postulated based on media reports and lack of overt public criticism in Vancouver, Toronto and Hamilton that most of the public is more accepting of public video surveillance in public spaces than it was in the recent past. The post-September 11th climate may contribute to this attitude.

It is difficult to speculate as to the future of cameras in Canada, but it can be noted that cameras have become increasingly an option for police forces to deal with 'problem areas'. Sherbrooke installed cameras in 1992 and Sudbury in 1996 and up until 2001 there was very little real activity in installing and activating other camera schemes. But since then two systems have been installed and three cities have advanced plans for cameras. Canada still has a long way to go before the number of cameras reaches that of England or the United States, but there is definitely momentum towards installing cameras in more cities. That momentum may be slowed or stopped as the *Charter* Challenge is pursued because the outcome of that will have far reaching effects on other schemes even if they are not under the jurisdiction of the PCC. If the Supreme Court in British Columbia (and perhaps Canada) rule that cameras violate the *Canadian Charter* then there will likely be very little in any new camera schemes activated. If on the other hand the ruling declares that there is no violation then we could very well see far more cameras in the future. For now, however cities may hesitate before spending money on cameras and equipment under the spectre of a *Charter* judgement.

City	Date	Operators/ Monitors	Funding	Location and #	Rationale	Objectives	Notes
Sherbrooke	1992	Sherbrooke Police	Unknown	Downtown 1		Curb Delinquent Behaviour	CAI ruled that camera violated Quebec's privacy legislation and it was removed
Sudbury	Dec. 1996	Sudbury Regional Police Service/ Ontario Works Clients College Students Police Officers On light duty	Lion's Club Sudbury Metro Society (Chamber of Commerce) Northern Voice and Video Sudbury Hydro CP Rail Ontario Works Local Insurance Cos and Businesses	Downtown and Rail yard 5	Police Chief makes visit to Glasgow and sees Video Surveillance schemes there	Decrease criminal activity and anti-social behaviour Increase police ability to respond to crisis Solving crime	Police claim 40% drop in crime Employed KPMG to audit system—report used to justify plans in other cities
Kelowna	Feb 23, 2001	RCMP/ Trained Civilians	RCMP Downtown Kelowna Association City of Kelowna	Above Queensway Bus Loop Near City Hall 1	To control the drug activity and prostitution in one area of town		Police claim decrease calls for service PCC ruled cameras violated Privacy Act no longer records 24/7 PCC has launched Charter Challenge
Yellowknife	May 15, 2001	Centurion Security Staff	Centurion Security Services	The main street of town on the top of a building 4	Marketing purposes to show usefulness of cameras to gain federal security contracts	To increase security in the city	PCC ruled cameras violated PIPEDA and the cameras were removed May 2001
London	Nov. 9. 2001	London Police/	Anonymous donor	Downtown York and	Response to stabbing	Deter crime and anti-social behaviour	

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City	Date	Operator	Partners/Funders	Location	Reason	Objectives
London	Nov. 9. 2001	London Police/ Commissioners at City Hall	Anonymous donor London Downtown Business Association Bank of Nova Scotia Hampton Group London Free Press Ceeps and Barney's Aboutown Transportation Ltd. London Police Services University of Western Ontario	Downtown York and Richmond St Dundas and Richmond St 16	Response to stabbing death of 2 men	Deter crime and anti-social behaviour Increase quality of police Increase feeling of safety Increase economic control displacement Identify suspects
Hamilton	Installed 2002 not yet activated	HPS/ Trained volunteers	Hamilton Police Services (HPS)	Downtown 5	To deal with the disproportionately high crime rate	Economic benefits Deter crime and anti-social behaviour Increase people's feelings of safety Control crime displacement Evidence

City	Stage	Agency	Funding	Location / Number	Objectives	Goals	Status
Vancouver	Planning stage	Vancouver Police Department and the Forensic Video Unit/ 911 Communication Operators	Unknown	Downtown East Side Strathcona Chinatown Gastown / 25	'reclaim public areas previously abandoned to the criminal element'[1]	Reducing crime and public nuisances / Reducing drug activity / Create network of police/gov't agencies/health/social/community services	
Toronto	Planning stage	Toronto Metro Police Service/ Uncertain Civilians/police officers/City staff	Funding sources not secured	Dundas Square Entertainment district Neighbourhoods at risk	To create safer street environments	Preventing and deterring crime / Enhance safety for police/public / Identify suspects	
Winnipeg	Proposal	Winnipeg Police	Unknown	Downtown core	Deal with problems in downtown	decrease drug-dealing, prostitution and panhandling	Waiting until the Charter Challenge in Kelowna resolved
Brockville	1999	Dispatchers at police headquarters	Never determined	Downtown / 3-5	Deal with areas considered unsafe at night	Deter vandalism and rowdy behaviour	Plan defeated due to citizen protests

[1] Neighbourhood Safely Watch Discussion Document Sept. 2001